The first task of theology is to establish and unfold the doctrine of God. The existence of God is a fundamental concept in religion, and therefore a determinative factor in theological thought. The nature ascribed to God gives color to the entire system. To fail here is to fail in the whole compass of truth. Theology, however, can hardly be expected to furnish a demonstrative proof of God's existence, for belief does not rise altogether from logical arguments. The existence of God is a first truth, and must logically precede and condition all observation and reasoning. Men reach a conviction on this subject apart from scientific discussion. To the great mass of men the theistic arguments are unknown, and to many others they do not carry the conviction of certainty. These arguments will therefore be presented as confirmatory proofs of the existence of God, and will be useful in showing the approach of the human mind in its attempt to grasp and explain its belief in the Divine Existence. It must also be borne in mind, that the best apologetic is a clear statement of the doctrines we would establish. Once the Christian position is clearly understood, many of the objections urged against it become irrelevant. We must, then, seek for other causes which have made belief in God a general and persistent idea among men.
Definition of God. Since, the mind must define by limiting the object of its thought, it is evident that the human mind can never form an adequate conception of God or properly define His being. Only the infinite can comprehend the Infinite. This philosophical conclusion finds its support in the New Testament, which reveals God as dwelling in the light that no man can approach unto; whom no man hath seen, nor can see (I Tim. 6:16). The nearest approach to a definition is the I AM THAT I AM of the Old Testament (Exod. 3:14) which asserts His existence with no attempt at proof, and further implies that His essence can be known only to Himself. God, therefore, can be known to us only through a revelation of Himself, and while these manifestations are imperfect, due to our limited capacity, they are, in so far as comprehended by us, actual knowledge, which the mind attributes to God as possessed in an infinite degree. Since our conception of the attributes is likewise in a degree indefinite, they may not in this sense be regarded as a definition; but on the other hand, insofar as they furnish a comprehensive statement of the attributes as revealed in Scripture, they may very properly be considered a definition of God.
God is a Spirit, holy in nature and attributes, absolute in personality, and thereby the ultimate ground, and adequate cause and sufficient reason for all finite existence. In the words of our own creed, "We believe in one eternally existent, infinite God, Sovereign of the universe. That He only is God, creative and administrative, holy in nature, attributes, and purpose. That He, as God, is Triune in essential being, revealed as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit" (Manual, p. 25, Art. I). The Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England define God as follows: "There is but one living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts or passions; of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness; the Maker and Preserver of all things both visible and invisible. And in the unity of this Godhead there be three Persons, of one substance, power and eternity; the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost" (Article I). John Wesley revised the Anglican Confession for the Methodist Episcopal Church of America, reducing the Thirty-nine Articles to what is commonly known as the Twenty-five Articles. However, he made no change in Article I except to change the word "be" to "are" in the second part. But in 1786 the Bishops of the Conference omitted the word "passions," so that the Methodist statement reads, "without body or parts." The Anglican statement is one of the original articles of 1553 and its language is very similar to that of the Augsburg Confession. The Westminster Catechism defines God as "A Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in His being, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth."
The definitions of God given by the theologians of the Christian Church differ widely. Dr. Charles Hodge approves the Westminster statement, but Dr. John Miley holds that "personality is the deepest truth in the conception of God and with this should be combined the perfection of his personal attributes.'' Hence he defines God as "an eternal personal Being, of absolute knowledge, power and goodness." Dr. A. H. Strong's definition is the infinite and perfect Spirit in whom all things have their source, support and end." Calovius defines God as essentia spiritualis infinita; Ebrard as "the eternal source of all that is temporal," Kahnis as "the infinite Spirit"; while Andrew Fuller thinks of God as "the first cause and last end of all things." Martensen says, "God is a Person, that is, He is the self-centralized absolute, the eternal fundamental Being, which knows itself as center - as the I AM in the midst of its infinite glory, which is conscious of being the Lord of this glory." Calderwood defines God as "an infinite Being, who is subject to no restrictive conditions." Henry B. Smith says, "God is a Spirit, absolute, personal, holy, infinite and eternal in His being and attributes, the ground and cause of the universe." Hase defines God as "the absolute personality who out of free love is the cause of the universe"; while Van Oosterzee says, "We speak of Him, not simply as the totality of all being, but as the self-existent One, who unconditionally is and would be, though all beyond Himself should be altogether non-existent."
Philosophical Conception of God. The term God has a different meaning in philosophy from that which attaches to it in religion. In religion, the term God as Absolute Personality is interpreted to mean that He possesses in infinite perfection all that constitutes personality in finite beings. In philosophy, the term is a synonym for the Absolute in the sense of ultimate reality, whether conceived as personal or impersonal. The term Absolute is not scriptural and not necessarily religious. It has come into current use in modern times only, and is used to express abstract thought concerning the ultimate nature of reality. Aristotle defines God as "the first ground of all being, the Divine Spirit, which unmoved, moves all." The conception of God here is static, an "Unmoved Mover." Perhaps the highest definition in pagan antiquity is that of Plato who says, "God is the eternal mind, the cause of good in nature." Kant defines God as "a Being who by His understanding and will is the cause of nature; a Being who has all rights and no duties; the supreme perfection in substance, the all-obligating Being, author of a universe under moral law; the moral author of the world; an intelligence infinite in every respect." Hegel, whose absolute idealism was the outgrowth of the Kantian philosophy, defines God as "the Absolute Spirit, the pure, essential Being that makes Himself Object to himself; absolute holiness; absolute power, wisdom, goodness, justice." To Spinoza, God is "the absolute universal Substance: the real Cause of all and every existence; the alone, actual, and unconditioned Being not only Cause of all being, but itself all being, of which every special existence is only a modification." This is a pantheistic definition. When Calvin defined God as "an infinite and spiritual essence," and Luther held to a similar definition, it must be borne in mind, that in the sixteenth century during which they wrote, the pantheistic discussion had not sprung up. Now it is necessary to qualify such abstract statements by including the term personality, which is essential to the Christian conception of God.
In proportion as man's thought approaches maturity, the religious and philosophical conceptions of God tend to become more and more identified. The Spirit of Holiness and the Spirit of Truth are identical, and tend to lead to a rational statement of religious experience. This tendency toward the identification of thought and experience is not an arbitrary matter, but the consequence of a unity of life which combines both philosophic and religious interests in one person. It may be studied in religions and philosophies other than Christianity. With the broader and deeper insights of maturity, man comes to realize that God must be Master of the world, if He is to satisfy the religious needs of men; while the philosopher finds that the universe can have no explanation without accounting for the facts of ethical and religious life. Scripture makes this clear in the statement that Christ is not only the Head of the Church, but the Head of all things to the Church (Eph. 1:22).
In any comprehensive discussion of the doctrine of God, it is obvious that the subject must be considered in its two main branches, First, the more general idea of the existence of God as an object of human thought and knowledge; and Second, the more specific revelation of His nature and attributes. The first is the idea of God in its philosophical aspects, and is commonly known as Theism; the second is the idea of God as found in religion, and commonly treated as Theology, in the narrower sense of the term. These two conceptions cannot be kept entirely apart, but they may be distinguished in a broad way, as God's revelation in man as to his constitution and nature; and His revelation to man as a free and responsible person. The first is metaphysical, the second is ethical.
The Christian Conception of God. Before taking up the discussion of these two aspects of the Supreme Being, it may be well to notice a third phase of the subject in a preliminary way-the unity of the philosophical and religious aspects of God as revealed in the historical Christ. The Christian conception of God is a conviction that the ultimate Personality of religion and the Absolute of philosophy find their highest expression in Jesus Christ; and that in His Person and work we have the deepest possible insight into the nature and purpose of God. He that hath seen me hath seen the Father, is Jesus enunciation of this great truth (John 14:9). Stated theocentrically, Christ does not only reveal God, God reveals Himself through Jesus Christ. When theology starts with any conception of God lower than that which is revealed in and through Jesus Christ, says Dickie, it is always difficult to lift that conception to a standard which is fully and consistently Christian. Christian theology must therefore in a large measure be Christocentric, molding its conceptions in the fullness of Him who is the effulgence of the Father's glory and the express image of his person (Heb. 1:3). It is this conception which has expressed itself theologically in the great doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity, and which marks the fundamental distinction between the Christian view of God, and that found in other forms of theistic belief.
The Christian idea of God unites in itself historically three fundamental elements which may be traced to a greater or lesser extent in their processes of development. The first is the concept of personality, which forms the basis of the religion of Israel, and was revealed directly to the covenant people by the Spirit himself. The second is the concept of the absolute, indirectly revealed through the search of the human mind after truth. It reaches its noblest expression in the philosophy of the Greeks. Since the Greek language was ordained of the Spirit to be the medium through which the New Testament should be given to the world, its expression was determined largely by the philosophical concepts which characterized that language. This philosophical expression is given the sanction of Divine Revelation in the Logos doctrine as set forth in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel. In these few verses (John 1:1-18) the inspired writer has lifted out of the mazes of Greek thought, the true concept of Christ as the Logos, and in one of the most remarkable philosophical statements ever uttered, has given us divine insight into the relation existing between the revelation of God in nature and His revelation through the Spirit. The third constituent element is to be found in the interpretation of both personality and absoluteness in terms of the revelation of God in Christ. Christianity contends that in Christ is to be found at once, the explanation of the true nature of ultimate reality as sought by philosophy, and the supreme revelation of the personal God in His character and attributes, as demanded by religion.
Among the older theologians, the philosophical aspects of the doctrine of God were commonly treated under the head of Theism. By this is meant a belief in a personal God, Creator and Preserver of all things, who is at once immanent in creation, and transcendent, or above and separate from it. Opposed to this view may be mentioned Deism which maintains the personality of God, but denies His immanence in creation and His providential sovereignty of the universe. It is an overemphasis upon the separateness of God from His created works, and historically has denied the Scriptures as a divine revelation. Pantheism on the other hand is an overemphasis upon the relation of God to the universe, and stresses His immanence to the disparagement of His transcendence. In breaking down the distinction between God and creation, pantheism in contradistinction to Theism, denies the personality of God.
Philosophical Theism, with its various theories concerning the nature and proofs of God's existence, has in some sense been the most barren department of theological thought. And yet the Scriptures give us some ground for this philosophical approach by their emphasis upon the revelation of God in nature and the constitution of man. St. Paul asserts that the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by' the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse (Rom. 1:20).
The existence of God as we have shown, is a fundamental presupposition, not only of the Christian religion, but of all religion in its higher forms. It is not a conviction to be reached by discursive reason, and does not therefore depend upon demonstration. This conviction is real and potent, is innate in man and tends to become more and more explicit. The existence of God must therefore be regarded both as an innate idea in the limited sense of this term, and as a truth demonstrating itself to reason. According to the former, it is a necessary element in man's consciousness. It is like the atmosphere. We cannot see it, and yet we cannot see without it. According to latter, it becomes necessary to arrange the elements of consciousness into a system of confirmatory arguments, such as shall justify the claims of reason. We shall therefore treat this subject of the Existence of God, first, as to the Origin of the Idea of God in Intuition; and second, as a Confirmatory Revelation of God.
God alone can reveal Himself to man. This He has done in a primary revelation found in the nature and constitution of man, and secondarily, by the direct revelation of Himself through the Spirit to the consciousness of men. The first finds its culmination in the Incarnation, or the Word made flesh; while the second has its source in the Glorified Christ, as the foundation for the revelation of God through the Spirit.
The term "innate" is therefore applied to our primary knowledge of God. Since this term has been the source of much speculation and debate in philosophy, it may be well to use instead, the term rational intuition. By intuition we mean that power which the mind has of immediate insight into truth. Intuitive truths are self-evident and are usually regarded as above logical proof. There are some truths, however, which are intuitional in a portion of their content, and yet acquired in an experimental or logical manner. Such is that of the existence of God, which is intuitive as an immediate datum of the moral and religious consciousness, and yet a truth to be demonstrated to reason. When, therefore, we speak of the idea of God as being intuitive, we do not mean that it is a first truth written upon the soul prior to consciousness; this would be to make the soul a material substance; nor is it actual knowledge which the soul finds itself in possession of at
By intuition we mean that ability of the soul to receive knowledge independently of the five senses though not contrary to them.-PAUL HILL. |
birth; nor is it an idea imprinted upon the mind which may be developed apart from the law of observation and experience . It does mean that in the constitution and nature of man there is a capacity for the knowledge of God which responds in an intuitive manner to revealed truth, comparable to that in which the mind of man responds to the outer world. The Word by whom all things were created, is not only the principle of intelligence and order in the universe, but the mediatory ground, also, of man's intuitive knowledge of God. Thus we bring together three important factors in the knowledge of God, first, intuitive reason as the power of immediate insight into truth, which as a consequence of creation through the Divine Word, endows men with a capacity for the knowledge of God; second
There are some faculties of mind which determine the modes of our ideas. Some we obtain through sense-perception. Sense-experience underlies all such perception. We cannot in this mode reach the idea of God. Many of our ideas are obtained through the logical reason. They are warranted inferences from verified facts or deductions from self-evident principles. Through the same faculty we receive many ideas, with a conviction of their truth, on the ground of human testimony. There are also intuitive truths, immediate cognitions of the primary reason. The conviction of truth in these ideas comes with their intuitive cognition. Through what mode may the idea of God be obtained? Not through sense-perception, as previously stated. Beyond this it is not necessarily limited to any one mental mode: not to the intuitive faculty, because it may be a product of the logical reason or a communication of revelation to the logical reason; nor to this mode, because it may be an immediate truth of the primary reason. . . . . The idea of God as a sense or conviction of this existence is a product of the intuitive faculty. There is an intuitive faculty of the mind, the faculty of immediate insight Into truth. Thorough analysis as surely finds such a faculty as it finds the other well-known faculties, such as the presentative, the representative and the logical. To surrender these distinctions of faculty is to abandon psychology. To hold others on the ground of such distinctions is to admit an intuitive faculty.-MILEY, Systematic Theology, I, pp. 60, 62. A. A. Hodge in speaking of the innateness of the idea of God says, "It is not innate in the sense either that man is born with a correct idea of God perfectly developed, or that, independently of instruction, any man can, in the development of his natural powers alone, arrive at a correct knowledge of God. . . . . . On the other band, independently of all instruction, a sense of dependence and of moral accountability is natural to man. These logically involve the being of God, and when the intellectual and moral character of an individual or race is in any degree developed, these invariably suggest the idea and induce the belief of a God. Thus man is as universally a religious as he is a rational being. And whenever the existence and character of God as providential and moral ruler is offered as fact, then every human soul responds to it as true, seen in its own self-evidencing light, in the absence of all formal demonstration."-A. A. HODGE, Outlines of Theology, pp. 12, 13. |
or the Spirit's universal presentation of truth to intuitive reason, through the revealing activity of the Divine Word. This is the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world (John 1:9); and Third, as a consequence of the union of the two previous factors, the universal and necessary idea of God. Human nature, therefore, is such that it necessarily develops the idea of God, through the revelation of the truth by the Spirit, in much the same manner as it develops a knowledge of the world through the data of the senses. This consciousness may be perverted by moral unlikeness to God, even as that of the outward world may be perverted by a false philosophy. The fact that the idea of God assumes so many forms, is proof at once of its intuitive nature on the one hand, and of its perversion on the other-this perversion being due to the withdrawal of the Spirit of holiness occasioned by sin. In support of the intuitive nature of the idea of God as thus set forth, we offer first, the testimony of Scripture; and second, the universal experience of men.
The existence of God, God alone can reveal. He has wrought this supreme truth into the constitution of human nature as its Creator. Scripture, which never proves the being of the Supreme, appeals to this consciousness; it also gives the reason for its disturbance, and thus by anticipation obviates the force of every argument against it. . . . . All processes of this argument rest finally on the analysis of that original consciousness of God which is the birthright of man as a creature: hence they are derived, First, from an appeal to the nature of the human spirit itself; Second, from a consideration of the relation of the human mind to the phenomena of the universe; and Third, from the universal Theism of the race as the result of both. . . . . The simplest form of the argument is to be sought in the moral constitution of man, which in reason or conscience proclaims the existence of a Supreme Lawgiver, and in its desires and aspirations the existence of a Supreme Object for communion with whom it was made. These are elements of our nature and not the result of education; they are primary, intuitive, and universal; refusing at the outset all argument upon their origin. If conscience is the moral consciousness-its only sound definition-it as much implies a spiritual world into which man is born as consciousness generally implies the natural world. If it is the reason or heart or central personality of man it gives testimony, supreme in the soul, to a Power who rules In righteousness and hates iniquity. The rational law of our nature is its moral law. It points to a Holy Governor, whom it suggests or to whom it appeals, above the visible world nothing in which is capable of exciting its emotions. And the universal feeling of dependence on a Being or a Person higher than ourselves reinforces this argument: the same heart in man which trembles before an Authority above him yearns to be able to trust in Him. This may be called the moral demonstration.-Pope, Compend. Christian Theology, I, pp. 234, 235, 236. |
The Testimony of Scripture. The Scriptures everywhere assume that there is in man's nature the consciousness of a Supreme Being, upon whom he depends and to whom he is responsible. It makes an appeal to the law written in their hearts, and also to the sense of dependence upon God as the source
and satisfaction of all their desires, if haply they might feel after him, and find him (Acts 17:27). It is in God that we live, and move, and have our being. . . . . For we are also his offspring (Acts 17:28). The prologue to the Fourth Gospel is explicit in its teachings upon this subject, where the eternal Logos is declared to be the true light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world (John 1:1-18).
The only atheism which is recognized in the Scriptures is a practical atheism which grows out of a reprobate mind. Sin has obscured the truth in human nature and the Scriptures charge men with not desiring to retain the knowledge of God. It is the fool who has said in his heart, There is no God-that is, there is no God for me (Cf. Rom. 1:28, Psalm 14:1, Eph. 2:12). Of great significance also is the fact that the written revelation begins with the words, In the beginning God, and assumes without attempt to prove the
existence of God. The Christian scholar may, therefore, confidently rest in the fact that God has so laid this fundamental evidence in the nature and constitution of man, that He has nowhere left Himself without a witness. Even the Greek philosopher Plato could say that God holds the soul by its roots-he does not need to demonstrate to the soul the fact of His existence. He must therefore declare explicitly as does the
Scripture, that the invisible
The Scripture "certainly declares this at least, that the very life of the dependent creature is bound up with the idea of its Independent Source, the very thought of God in man's mind-to anticipate a future argument-assumes that God is. It goes higher still, if possible. It declares that the eternal Logos or Word is the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world. And this precedes, in order of time and thought, that higher revelation which follows: No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him (John 1:18). He is Himself the manifestation of the invisible God, but only as revealing Himself to a preparatory consciousness in mankind. EkeinoV exhgsato: He hath expounded in a final exegesis the original text implanted in the universal human nature."-Pope, Compend. Christian Theology, I, p. 235. |
things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they' are without excuse (Rom. 1:20).
The Universal Experience of Men. An intuitive or first truth must be characterized by universality and necessity. If then the idea of God is intuitive, it should be corroborated by an appeal to the universal experience of mankind, and this is the testimony of those whose investigations have enriched the fields of anthropology and comparative religions. In addition to the instances already cited in our discussion of the science of religion, we may mention also Max Mueller who after painstaking and discriminating research concerning the origin and growth of religion states, that "as soon as man becomes conscious of himself as distinct from all other things and persons, he at the same time becomes conscious of a higher self; a power without which he feels that neither he nor anything else would have any life or reality." This is the first sense of the Godhead, the sensus numinus as it has been called; for it is a sensus, an immediate perception, not the result of reasoning or generalizing, but an intuition as irreversible as the impression of our senses. In receiving it we are passive, at least as passive as receiving from above the image of the sun or any other sensible impression. This sensus numinus is the source of all religion. It is that without which no religion true or false is possible (MAX MUELLER, Science of Language, p. 145). In his reference to the worship of the lower forms of religion he says, "Not the visible sun, moon and stars are invoked, but something else that cannot be seen." While there have been races which at first appeared to be without any form of religion, closer observation and a better understanding of the varying forms of religious practices, have shown that no tribe is without an object of worship. "The statement that there are nations or tribes which possess no religion," says Tiele, "rests either upon inaccurate observations or on a confusion of ideas. No tribe or nation has yet been met with destitute of belief in any higher beings, an travelers who asserted their existence have been afterwards refuted by facts. It is legitimate, therefore, to call religion, in its most general sense, a universal phenomenon of humanity" (TIELE, Outlines of the History of Religion, p. 6). This agreement among individuals, tribes and nations, widely separated in time and place would appear to be sufficient evidence as to the universality of the idea of God. It may assume a thousand forms, but these diverse and imperfectly developed ideas can be accounted for only as perversion of an intuitive conviction common to all men. Washington Gladden once said, "A man may escape from his shadow by going into the dark; but if he comes under the light of the sun, the shadow is there." A man may be so mentally undisciplined that he does not recognize these ideas; but let him learn the use of his reason, let him reflect on his own mental processes and he will know that they are necessary ideas.
The universality of the idea of God leads immediately to its acceptance as a necessary idea. By a necessary idea we mean any intuition which springs directly and immediately from the constitution of the human mind, and which under proper conditions must of necessity so spring. This only can account for the persistence of the idea of God, without which it could never have been perpetuated. "Neither a primitive revelation, nor the logical reason, nor both together could account for the persistence and universality of the idea of God without a moral and religious nature in man to which the idea is native" (MILEY, Systematic Theology, I, p. 70). We may carry the argument one step farther, and insist that our intuitions give us objective truth. By a process of negative reason, we may argue that to deny this is to deny the validity of all mental processes. To distrust its intuitions is to lead immediately to a distrust in the interpretation of sense-perceptions through which our knowledge of the external world is mediated. To hold otherwise is to land in agnosticism. But man's mental faculties are trustworthy. His rational intuitions are absolute truth, and the intuition of God, universal and necessary in the experience of the race, finds its only sufficient explanation in the truth of His existence.
Since the time when English empiricism was led into thorough-going skepticism by Hume, and the famous Critique of Immanuel Kant played such an important part in the discussion, the historic arguments for the existence of God have been persistently attacked by both the opponents and the defenders of the theistic position. There are some theists who hold that the existence of God being a first truth, is the logical prius of all other knowledge, and must therefore be impossible of demonstration. God must be intuited, it is said, from the necessity of His relations; such as, the Infinite-as the correlative of the finite; Absolute Being in contradistinction to dependence; Overmaster or Lord in the nature of law; and Creative Reason as furnishing the guaranty
"The word intuition is a convenient term for stating the fact that the mind on certain occasions from its own inherent energy gives rise to certain thoughts." By an accommodation of language such thoughts are themselves called intuitions; the power the mind has of giving rise to such thoughts is called the intuitive faculty. The same idea is sometimes expressed by the terms, the nature, or the constitution of the mind, that is to say, the mind is conceived of as a somewhat whose nature is to give rise to thoughts when the proper occasion occurs. The same thing is intended when it is said of a class of ideas that they are innate, not that the ideas are in the minds of infants at birth, but that ideas are born in the mind when the conditions of their birth occur. Now, it must be manifest that an inquiry after the genesis of thought must in all cases in the last resort be referred to the nature of the mind itself; for example, in any instance of perception, if we inquire, How came the mind to be in possession of the idea, suppose of color, as white or black? The usual answer is, By the sense of sight; but this answer is not complete, for it may still be inquired, How does sight give such ideas? and the answer must be, It is of the nature of the mind to be so impressed when the organs of sight are brought into exercise. . . . . The affirmation that the idea of God is intuitive, is an affirmation that the idea arises in the mind precisely in the same way as do ideas of time, space, substance, and all others of that class of thoughts. Again, man comes into being in a condition of absolute dependence, and some apprehensions of this dependence must, from the nature of the case, be among the earliest ideas in consciousness. Arising out of this sense of dependence inseparably connected with it, is a sense of obligation. Obligation is an apprehension not only of somewhat as due, but also of somewhat as due to Someone, and that One him upon whom we are dependent. In a word, it would seem evident from the obvious facts of the case, that the sense of dependence and obligation, of which all men are apprehensive from the earliest moments of conscious thought, are by them intuitively referred to an infinite intelligent first cause."-RAYMOND, Systematic Theology, I, pp. 248-252. |
and basis of human reason. It is necessary, therefore, at the outset, to state in what sense the word proof is used in reference to the divine existence. Ulrici maintains that "the proofs for the
existence of God coincide with the grounds for belief in God; they are simply the real grounds for belief, established and expounded in a scientific manner. If there be no such proofs, there are also no such grounds-if possible at all, can be no proper belief, but an arbitrary, self-made, subjective opinion. It must sink to the level of mere illusion." If this be true; then it follows that the proofs of God's existence must be simply confirmatory revelations, the manifestations by which He makes Himself known in consciousness and the external world.
As confirmatory revelations, it is evident that the great theistic arguments must be something less than the full Christian view. There is a limit to their power
"Belief in God is by no means the necessary product of demonstration. As old as humanity itself, it was not at first produced by reasoning, but rather in its most primitive form preceded all reasoning. No one has ever begun to feel convinced of this truth merely because it had been demonstrated to him in a strictly logical manner. Men would hardly, indeed, have given themselves the trouble to seek for proofs for this conviction, had it not with irresistible power forced itself, as it were, on their innermost consciousness. Everywhere do we discover this belief, even where no proof has ever been yet heard of; and it will last even where the weak sides of all - known proofs are by no -means ignored. Belief in God is consequently no result, but, on the contrary, a starting-point for human thinking on invisible things-a postulate of our whole rational and moral nature, but no result of a universally recognized syllogism.-van Oosterzee, Chr. Dogm., p. 239. But Christian dogmatics ought not from its standpoint to overlook the importance of other so-called proofs for the existence of God; much less to make common cause with those who speak with a certain contempt thereof, as a fruit of defective reasoning and foolish imagination. On the contrary, it must and will deplore the levity with which the assertion, in itself true, that God's existence cannot be proved (demonstrated), is frequently repeated, understood, and applied in a way which as much as possible plays into the hands of unbelief and skepticism. "Modern theology, which so readily gives up the proofs for the existence of God, abandons thereby not only its own position as a science; but also, in principle, annihilates faith, and the religion of which it is the theology."-ULRICI. It is true, there is not a single proof against which objections more or less serious might not be, and have been, adduced. All bear the unequivocal traces of the limitation of human thought. . . . . But yet they remain highly commendable, as more or less successful endeavors, not only to bring into satisfactory clearness the utterances of the innermost consciousness, but also to justify them to oneself and others as highly reasonable"-Cf. POPE, Compend. Christian Theology, pp. 233, 234, 236. |
of demonstration, and indeed they are more properly regarded in this light, as probable rather than demonstrative arguments. But in either case they require the enforcement of the Holy Spirit's influence as divine credentials, and must in every case derive their strength from the further revelation of God as to His own essence and perfections.
While the earliest objections to the arguments were urged on the basis of being formally invalid from the syllogistic point of view, involving the logical fallacy of assuming that which they profess to prove, later criticism points out that even when carried out to a logical conclusion, they yield a result that is not fully Christian. It should be kept in mind that the period of the Middle Ages in which the schoolmen developed the theistic arguments, was characterized by an emphasis upon the antithesis between reason and revelation. Reason or Natural Theology must be supplemented by Revelation. Originally the theistic arguments were designed to prove that the Christian idea of God was impossible to Natural Theology or Reason, and must be supplied by the Scripture or Revelation. Their function was to show that reason revealed some things about God, but not sufficient for the knowledge of salvation. The rational method was supplemented by authority. But with the changed attitude toward reason and revelation, and the tendency to regard life as a unity, experience becomes the dominant factor in the knowledge of God and must supply the distinctly Christian content.
The sharp distinction between reason and revelation made by the schoolmen, gave rise further, to the two great methods of approach which have played such an important part in this department of theological thought. The first is the method of philosophy, which seeks to establish the existence of God solely from the standpoint of human reason, and thus apart from divine revelation. The second is the method of authority and makes its appeal to the Scriptures, more especially to miracle and prophecy. Both have been historically important, and together they make up the traditional arguments for theism. The method of the older theology, therefore, both Catholic and Protestant, began with the formal and abstract arguments of reason, and filled if in from revelation the distinctly Christian content. Dr. Dickie says, that in the first instance this scheme was superimposed upon Christian theology from Greek philosophy, and that it dominated all formal theology for at least seventeen hundred years.
The tendency, therefore, in theology has been to substitute a rationalistic conception of God for the personal revelation of God through the Spirit. The impression has been made that by examination of the evidences for the existence of God, as found in human consciousness and in the external world, man may attain to a spiritual and saving knowledge of God. In the Church of Rome this is held de fido, that is, it is heresy not to hold it. But rightly understood there is both a spiritual and a historical value attaching to these arguments. While in some sense they may be regarded as invalid syllogistically, they are of profound significance otherwise. First,
As we come to the positive theistic argument, it will not be amiss to guard against certain errors respecting its functions. It will be rating the practical worth of the argument much too high to suppose that it affords the whole ground or incentive to theistic belief. Constitutional impulse is prior to syllogisms. The needs of the emotional, the aesthetic, and the moral nature stimulate to thought and unite with intellectual needs to beget and to keep alive the idea of a supernatural and overruling power. The history of the race pays too large tribute to the force, persistency, and universality of this idea to allow the supposition of its adventitious origin. . . . . The function of formal argumentation, therefore, can be only supplementary. The basis of theistic faith is always at hand before philosophy or theology begins to set its proofs in order. SHELDON, Sys. Chr. Doct., pp. 53, 54. It would be an overvaluation of theistic argumentation to suppose that it is competent, in the strict sense of the term, to demonstrate the existence of a Divine Person. Demonstration proper belongs to the sphere of ideal quantities and relations, where the data are thus and so by hypothesis, and no account needs to be taken of any uncertainties and imperfections of observation or experience. It cannot, therefore, apply to the sphere of objective reality. In this domain, an overwhelming preponderance of grounds in favor of a particular conclusion is the most that can be attained. This suffices for practical needs, and speculation becomes intemperate when it asks for more, whether in physical science or in theology.-SHELDON, Syst. Chr. Doct., p. 54. |
be found, rest ultimately, on the analysis of the original consciousness of God which is the birthright of every creature. We mention this in anticipation of a later discussion concerning the knowledge of God, i.e., that there is a vast difference between knowing God and knowing about God. Secondary knowledge, such as is given in the arguments, can never lead to a direct knowledge of God; but once God is known through a spiritual revelation, "this secondary knowledge which comes to us indirectly fills out our mental picture, while our personal knowledge, however slight, gives life and actuality to the whole."
The second value of the arguments, is found in the fact that they mark the various stages of knowledge, the lines along which in all ages man's thoughts have risen to God. They are, according to John Caird, "the unconscious or implicit logic of religion."
"The manifold witnesses for God," says Bishop Martensen, "which man finds in and around himself are here reduced to general principles, and the various and intricate ways by which the human mind is brought to God are indicated by the summary results of thought." Both Bishop Martensen and Dr. Pope maintain that man's thought rises to God in two ways, by the contemplation of himself, and by the contemplation of the world. The arguments are classified accordingly-the cosmological and teleological growing out of the nature of the external world, and the ontological and moral from the constitution of the human mind. The arguments which have so greatly influenced the thought of the past, cannot therefore be passed over lightly, even though regarded as confirmative rather than demonstrative proofs. Later it is our purpose to &nb
Though these several arguments do not necessarily conduct the unenlightened to the knowledge of God, yet, given even a hint of the divine existence, reason and nature afford abundant corroboration. It is one thing to make a synthesis of all the teachings of nature and reason and declare, God before unknown, to be the necessary result, and quite another thing, the existence of God being given as a proposition for proof, to gather together the evidences of it. There is no proof that the first feat has ever been accomplished by nation or individual. The discoverer of God, though a greater genius than Euclid or Newton, has not recorded his name in history.-SUMMERS, Syst. Th., p. 69. |
gather them up and present them in their modern and scientific form.
In the more elaborate treatises on Theism, it is the usual practice to divide the arguments into two classes-the a priori and the a posteriori. This is a convenient arrangement but not accurate. It is difficult to draw a line and assign the arguments wholly to one class or the other. By a priori is meant the proof of fact or effect from the knowledge of existing causes; by a posteriori is meant the reasoning from effects to antecedent causes. For our purpose the simpler classification previously mentioned is more appropriate. We shall therefore treat the cosmological and teleological arguments as growing out of the nature of the external world, and the ontological and moral as related to the nature and constitution of the human mind. Dr. William Adams Brown defines these arguments and indicates their purpose in the following manner. First, the Cosmological Argument (from change to cause) is the
Revelation of God as Power. Second, the Teleological Argument (from adaptation to purpose) is the Revelation of God as Design. Third, the Ontological Argument (from necessary thought to being) is the Revelation of God as Reality; and Fourth, the Moral Argument (from ideal to power adequate to realize it) is the Revelation of God as Right. (Cf. BROWN, Christian Theology in Outline, p. 124.)
The Cosmological Argument. The term "cosmological" has been conventionally adopted for this argument because it attempts to account for, or endeavors to explain the cosmos or universe. It is more strictly the "etiological" or causal argument by which the mind reasons from the contingency of phenomena to a First Cause. The argument usually takes two forms - the physical which relies upon facts of the material universe, and the metaphysical which makes its appeal to causation or efficient force. The first or
physical argument makes use of two indisputable facts of nature-matter and motion. It is certain that something has existed from eternity, but this cannot have been matter for matter is mutable. But since matter because it is mutable cannot be eternal, so the Creator because He is eternal cannot be either mutable or material. From the point of view of physics, we are therefore shut up to belief in a self-existent, spiritual Creator. The second or metaphysical form of the argument is stated by Johnson as follows: "Every change must have a cause; but the only real cause is a first cause; therefore the ever-changing universe must have had a First Cause. Furthermore, the idea of causation arises in the mind upon the exercise of will. We have a conception
of cause only by virtue of the fact that in forming volitions, we ourselves are consciously causes. The First Cause must therefore be conceived by us as Will, that is, a Person."
The Teleological Argument. The presence of design or purpose in the universe has been more or less clearly recognized by men from the beginning. The earliest statement is found in Genesis, i.e., the stars are for light, fruit is for food, and like expressions. The Psalms are replete with arguments for design. The one hundred and fourth Psalm has been called the teleological or design Psalm. This argument has always held an important place among theists. Kant treated it with great respect, and Mill looked upon it as the only argument which had any strength. Christian apologetics has made much of it, often carrying it beyond the limits of sound reasoning. The evolutionists claimed for a time that the famous Watch Argument of Paley was invalid and had completely lost its point. But in LeConte, Drummond and others, the argument reappears in a new form-no longer particular design, but universal design. Kant made objection that "the design argument at best proves an architect only, not a Creator," but this objection loses its force when it is seen that origination and design go together.
The Ontological Argument. The germ of this argument is found in St. Augustine's discussion of the Trinity (Trinity VII, iv) where he says, "God is more truly thought than He is described, and exists more truly than He is thought." Dr. Shedd in commenting upon this says, "This is one of those pregnant propositions so characteristic of the Latin Fathers, which compresses a theory into a nutshell. . . . . God's existence is more real than even our conception of Him is for our own mind; and our conception confessedly is a reality in our own consciousness. . . . . The subjective idea of God instead of being more real than God is less real. The 'thing' in this instance has more of existence than the 'thought' of it has."
It remained, however, for Anselm to first give construction to the ontological argument in syllogistic. form, and with all the modifications to which it has been subjected, perhaps the original statement is still the clearest and strongest. "The idea of perfection includes existence, for that which does not exist will be less than perfect; therefore, since we have the idea of a perfect being, that being must exist for the idea includes his being or he would be less than perfect."
The acute and powerful intellect of Anselm possessed that metaphysical intuition which saw both the heart of the atonement and the heart of divine existence. Gaunilon, a contemporary of Anselm, wrote a tract entitled "Liber pro Insipiento," or "Plea for the Fool," in which he raised an objection to the argument which has been repeated over and over again. He maintained that we have the idea of a tree, but it does not follow from this that there is an actual tree; or we have the idea of a winged lion, but this does not assure us that such a creature exists. But the reply to this argument, and all those of a similar nature is, that the vital point of the argument-that of necessary existence has been entirely overlooked. One idea is of a perfect and necessary
Knapp gives the Anselmic argument in this form: "The most perfect being is possible, and therefore, actually exists; for existence is a reality or perfection, and necessary existence is the highest perfection. Consequently necessary existence must be predicted of the most perfect being.-KNAPP, Christian Theology, p. 86. Miley, quoting from the Proslogium gives the following statement of the argument. "We have the idea of the most perfect Being, a Being than whom a greater or more perfect cannot be conceived. This idea includes and must include actual existence, because actual existence is the necessary content of the idea of the most perfect. An ideal being, however perfect in conception, cannot answer to the idea of the most perfect Being. This most perfect Being is God. Therefore God must exist."-MILEY, Systematic Theology, II, p. 74. |
being-the other of an imperfect and contingent being. The idea of a tree is contingent, it may or may not be, and therefore from the idea of the tree it is impossible to prove its objective reality. But with the idea of God there is the element of necessity instead of contingency. If the idea is contingent and implies that a thing may or may not exist, then it does not necessarily follow that the object does exist; but if the idea of the things implies necessity, or that it must exist, then it does follow that the thing exists.
Descartes apparently came to the same conclusion independently. Beginning by doubting all things possible, he came to the truth, "I think, therefore I am," the cogito ergo sum which he could not doubt. From this foundation he passed to a second statement, "I found that the existence of a perfect being was comprised in the idea in the same way in which the equality of the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles is comprised in the idea of a triangle, and that consequently it is at least as certain that God the perfect Being exists as any demonstration in geometry can be." (Cf. DESCARTES, Method, p. 240.) The English theologians made much use of this argument in their conflict with the atheism of Hobbes and others. Especially was this true of those theologians who were deeply versed in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, such as Cudworth, Bates, Stillingfleet and Henry More.
Kant objected to the ontological argument on the basis which we have before mentioned-that to think a perfect being by no means involves perfect existence. The modern objections, however, are at the opposite poles to the reasoning of Anselm. He held that objective reality is greater than the inward concept, while exactly the opposite is found in Kant and his followers, i.e., that the object is not so real as the idea of it, and therefore must not be inferred from it. However, the argument may rest on another basis, that of absolute existence as necessary and implied in all existence. God is the substratum of all reality. We do not necessarily give up the argument by rejecting the Anselmic or Cartesian form of it. "The principle of absolute being," says Dr. Harris, "exists as a necessary law of thought, a constituent element of reasoning, and a necessary postulate in all things about Being" (HARRIS, Self-revelation of God, p. 164). Relative existence implies absolute existence; and a relative knowledge, absolute knowledge. God must be the end as well as the beginning of all things.
The Moral Argument. The highest revelation of God is the revelation of right. The tendency of speculative thought is to turn from nature to man. It is not that nature has no disclosures to make, but the deeper revelation is through man. Man is in the Divine image; nature is secondary. The argument, however, is but another application of the causal principle-one applied to-the moral instead of the natural world. This world is as orderly and full of purpose, as the physical, and can be explained only by a cause of the same nature as itself. The central fact of the moral realm is conscience; but conscience does not make moral law. The moral law is independent of man and unvarying from age to age. Its laws are inexorable, and its existence not only demands an Author, but the moral realm reveals His character as the friend of righteousness and the enemy of -unrighteousness.
It was, therefore, the distinctive service of Immanuel Kant, to present this argument in its full extent and with great emphasis. He regarded it as the only sufficient argument for God. "Two things there are," said Kant, "which produce unceasing wonder the starry heavens above and the moral law within." Kant had three postulates, Freedom, Immortality, God. In the practical problem of pure reason and the necessary pursuance of the highest good,
a connection is postulated between happiness and morality, proportionate to happiness. Man is to seek the highest good, and therefore the highest good must be possible. We must postulate then, the cause of nature as distinct from nature, and it is this cause which is able to connect morality with happiness. The highest good
cannot exist except God exists-there must therefore be a highest good because our moral reason demands it. Some highest good exists, Therefore God exists. Duty is a great word with Kant. It implies that there is in the highest good a Being who is the supreme cause of nature, and who is the cause or Author of nature through His intelligence or will-that is, God. As the possibility of the highest good is inseparably connected with it, and it is morally necessary to hold the existence of God, one cannot help wondering why Kant did not find the existence of God in the moral law rather than as deduced from it. Duty is not something of itself apart from persons, but connected with them and recognized by them. It is because there is a Supreme Person that we recognize a supreme good, a supreme duty, a moral law.