THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

Christian Theology as the science of the Christian religion, brings us at once to a consideration of its first underlying postulate, the fundamental nature of religion. The word religion is simply the Latin word religio brought over into the English language, and is derived from religere which means literally to go over again, or to carefully ponder. In the free translation of MacPherson it means "a careful reconsideration, a brooding over, a giving of the mind and all the faculties to a study of what seems to call for respectful and reverential inquiry." Lactantius held that the word is derived from religare, to bind back and therefore was significant of the personal relationship existing between man and his Creator. While most etymologists follow Cicero in rejecting this definition, Dr. Pope makes use of the two explanations together in describing the nature of religion. Following Lactantius, religion signifies "the eternal bond which binds man to God" and is therefore the relation of the human creature to the Supreme Creator, as acknowledged and borne witness to in all forms of theological teaching and worship; while with Cicero, the exercise of the human mind in pondering and considering divine things is signified by religion, which is, as it were, an instinctive and inwrought aspiration of human nature corrected and purified and directed to its highest issues in the true faith. Thus it is that both the objective and subjective relations of man meet in Religion, which is one of the largest and deepest terms with which we have to do (POPE, Compend Chr. Th., I, p. 1). 

There are two other words used in the New Testament to express the idea of religion. The first is eusebeia (eusebeia) which is used in the sense of a reverential fear of God. At first it signified only the careful handling of anything in a general way, but finally came to mean the careful, reverential treatment of divine things (Cf. Luke 2:25, Acts 2:5; 8:2). The second word is threskeia (qrhskeia) (Cf. James 1:26, 27) and is used in a more outward sense to distinguish one form of worship from other forms (Cf. Acts 26:5, Col. 2:18, James 1:26, 27). A community, therefore, may be threskos (qrhskoV James 1:26) because of its adherence to prescribed forms of worship; but it can be eusebeia (eusebeia Cf. Acts 3:12; 1 Tim. 2:2) only in the sense of being made up of pious individuals. This is further evidenced by the fact that the adjective of eusebeia, eusebhV (Cf. Acts 2:5) is translated in our English version by the words "devout" and "godly" while the substantive is translated "godliness." 

Definitions of Religion. In its essential idea, religion is a life in God. Stewart defines it as "fellowship with God"; Sterrett as "the reciprocal relation or communion with God and man, involving First, revelation; and Second, faith"; while William Newton Clarke, followed by William Adams Brown, defines it as "the life of man in his superhuman relations." Herbert Spencer maintained that "religion is an a priori theory of the universe," to which Romanes added the qualifying statement, "which assumes intelligent personality as the originating cause of the universe, science as dealing with the 'how,' the phenomenal process, and religion dealing with the 'who,' the intelligent personality who works through the process." Holland makes the following distinction between natural life, which is "the life in God which has not yet arrived at this recognition that God is in all things, and is not yet as such religious. Religion is the discovery by the son of a Father who is in all His works, yet is distinct from them all." MacPherson says that "religion consists in the fact of a real relationship subsisting between God and man." 

Objectively considered, religion is man's relation to the infinite, and subjectively, it is the determination of human life by that relation. HASE, Dogmatik.

   ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION    

The question of the origin of religion has given occasion to many and widely divergent theories. Three branches of modern investigation have centered their attention upon this subject and through observation and research have made valuable contributions. These are First, the History of Re1igion, sometimes known as Comparative Religion; Second, the Psychology of Religion; and Third, the Philosophy of Religion. 

The History of Religion. Great advances have been made in the study of religion since the publication of E. B. Tylor's famous work on Primitive Culture in 1871. Other works which have greatly aided this study are Menzies, History of Religion; M. Jastrow, The Study of Religion; C. P. Tiele, Elements of the Science of Religion; A. Lang, Myth, Ritual and Religion; Frazer, The Golden Bough; Brinton, Religions of Primitive Peoples, and De la Saussaye, Handbook of Religions. The fascination of this study in a field never before opened, led to many hasty deductions and ill-founded theories as to the origin and nature of religion. One of the distinct gains, however, was the collation of material drawn from wide fields of investigation, and its arrangement in scientific form. 

 

The objects of worship in primitive culture were found to fall into four more or less distinct groups, (1) Nature worship; (2) Ancestor worship; (3) Fetish worship; and (4) the worship of a Supreme Being. As to which of these groups represented the most primitive form of religion was early a matter of controversy. Fetishism was for a time regarded as the earliest form of worship and the root from which all others sprang. The savage, according to this theory, took for his god some causal object of worship, and from this he was led to higher objects such as trees and mountains, sun and stars, until at last heaven became his supreme fetish. Then when he learned of spirits, he made spirit his fetish and came finally to the worship of the Supreme Being. Herbert Spencer and E. B. Tylor maintained that the worship of spirits was the earliest form of religion, but Tylor's system of animism seemed more comprehensive. The term "animatism" has been frequently applied to Spencer's system which regarded all nature as alive or animated. Tylor, however, regarded nature as "ensouled" in man. "As the human body was held to live and act by virtue of its own inhabiting spirit-soul, so the operations of the world seem to be carried on by other spirits." It was therefore an easy step to the belief in spirits separable from the body, and moving about freely like the genii, demons and fairies which crowded the minds of antiquity. M. Reville advanced the theory that the minor nature worship was the earliest form of religion, while Max Muller and Ed. von Hartmann contended with like zeal for the primacy of the greater nature worship. 

 

While hasty and ill-formed conclusions were soon superseded, it is now generally admitted that the most primitive form of religion known to science is a belief in mana as a nonpersonal, but supernatural force. It is in Melanesia that this idea finds its fullest development. Bishop Codrington says, "The Melanesian mind is entirely possessed by the belief in a supernatural power or influence, called almost universally mana. This is what works to effect everything which is beyond the ordinary power of men outside the common processes of nature; it is present in the atmosphere of life, attaches itself to persons and things, and is manifested by results which can only be ascribed to its operations (Cf. WRIGHT, Philos. Religion, p. 25). Similar conceptions are found among the pygmies of Africa where the word used is oudah. Among the American Indians there was a similar conception of a supernatural force, which the Algonquins called manitou, the Sioux wakonda, and the Iroquois arenda. Wright asserts that the mana idea may contain a further truth-that of a spiritual Being separate from the human minds whose support is available to men through worship. To him, therefore, mana may be the crude conception by which these lower strata of civilization become aware of the existence of God and the manner in which this assistance is to be obtained. 

The material which enriched the study of historical religion was, according to the dominant philosophy of the time in which it was gathered, arranged on the evolutionary hypothesis. The natural religions were regarded as the basis from which, according to the process of evolution, man rose from animism and totemism to the higher religions of the spirit. These culminated in Christianity as the true ethical and spiritual religion. Hegel in his philosophy of religion classifies the lower primitive religions as the infancy of the race, the Greek religion as its childhood, the Roman religion as its early maturity, and the Christian religion as the full expression of man's religious nature. We cannot so regard it. John Caird has pointed out that one can never get at the true idea or essence of religion merely by trying to find out something that is common to all religions; and it is not the lower religions that explain the higher, but conversely the higher religion explains all the lower religions" (CAIRD, Fund. Ideas of Christianity, I, p. 25). The origin of religion must be traced back to man's original constitution. Man was made for personal fellowship with God, and as originally endowed, he had personal integrity and a sufficient knowledge of God to preserve him in the state in which he was created. But with the fall and the introduction of sin, fellowship with God was broken, and man's mind became darkened through the loss of that spiritual light which forms the true principle of illumination in the things of God. We must, therefore, with Stump, regard the natural religion as "an attenuated and diluted remainder of man's original constitution and endowment." It is true that these religions possess some elements of truth, but they have lost much of what was originally revealed, and are destitute of the saving knowledge of God. 

 

The Scriptures regard the degeneracy of religion as a direct consequence of man's sin, in which he willfully turned away from the purer knowledge and service of God. St. Paul outlines the steps in this decline in the following manner:(I) A rejection of the true God. Because that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things (Rom. 1:21-23). Here is indicated (a) A direct refusal to worship God. The rejection is ethical. The psalmist in the expression The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God meant not so much a denial of the existence of God as an ethical and spiritual rejection, "No God for me." (b) Rejecting God and setting himself up in his own right, man conceived of himself in a false independence which destroyed the ground of thankfulness. (c) Man, having lost the object of his worship, did not thereby lose his craving after God, and was compelled through vain imaginations to posit objects of worship for himself. (d) These objects of worship took the character of his own corrupt heart. (e) Through a profession of worldly wisdom, systems of religion were devised which included in their scope, man, birds, fourfooted beasts and creeping things. (f) Evidently St. Paul intends to indicate a gradual decline in the value of the objects of worship, through a blind impulse of a foolish and darkened heart. Man naturally would be the first object of worship, since in the rejection of God he set himself up in his own right. Dr. Dorner remarks       

 

Indeed, when we examine the history of the ancient pagan world, we are struck by the accuracy of the description which is given of it by St Paul in the first chapter of his Epistle to the Romans. He asserts that they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like unto corruptible man and to birds and four-footed beasts and creeping things. "They paid divine worship to oxen, to crocodiles, to birds and to reptiles. They metamorphosed beasts into gods and conversely transformed their gods into beasts, ascribing to them drunkenness, unnatural lusts, and the most loathsome vices. They worshipped drunkenness, under the name of Bacchus; and lasciviousness, under that of Venus. Momus was to them the god of calumny, and Mercury the god of thieves. Even Jupiter, the greatest of their gods, they considered to be an adulterer. At length the worship of avowedly evil beings became prevalent among them; and hence many of their rites were cruel and shockingly obscene. The floralia among the Romans, their festival in honor of Flora, the goddess of flowers was celebrated for four days together by the most shameful actions, and with the most unbounded licentiousness."-WAKEFIELD, Christian Theology, pp. 33, 34.

 

that the oriental religions set out from the divine, and attempt to bring God down to the human, issuing often in Pantheism; but the western religions set out from the finite and attempt to lift man up to God, issuing in the deification of heroes (DORNER, Doct. Person of Christ, I, p. 697). The second stage would include the aesthetical and useful, hence the totemistic birds and animals; while the third would extend the deification to all life as sacred, as in some of the forms of religion found in India. (II) The second downward step is a judicial abandonment to a perverse will. Through the lusts of their hearts they desired to serve creatures and creaturely things more than the Creator who is blessed forever. Amen. Unregulated by truth and moved by a false impulse worship became dishonorable even to man 5 physical nature. Wherefore God also gave them up to uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonor their own bodies between themselves: who changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed forever. Amen (Rom. 1:24, 25). (III) The third stage downward is a judicial abandonment to evil affections. Glorifying the unclean and actuated by inordinate and unregulated affection, man degenerated into the abnormal and obscene, the results of which St. Paul presents in the shocking picture found in the next two paragraphs- Rom. 1:26, 27. Analogous appearances of degeneration are facts which must be taken into account in any theory of religion found in organic life. (IV) The fourth and last step in the decline is a judicial abandonment to a reprobate mind. This St. Paul sums up by saying that Even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate      

 

Thus, to select a few instances out of many, the rites of the goddess Cybele were no less infamous for lewdness than for cruelty; and the practice of these rites spread far and wide, and formed a part of the public worship at Rome. The aphrodista, or festivals in honor of Venus, were observed with lascivious ceremonies in many parts of Greece; and Strabo tells us that there was a temple at Corinth so rich that it maintained more than a thousand prostitute women sacred to her service. WAKEFIELD, Chr. Th., pp. 33, 34. (Cf. STORR: Chr. Relig. SEISS: Apoc. Churches. Other references on Prim. Relig.)

 

mind, to do those things which are not convenient, being filled with all unrighteousness (Rom. 1:28, 29). The three judicial sentences cover the entire range of personality in its volitions, its affections and its intellect. Desiring perverse things, they were abandoned to their own lusts; following their own lusts they were abandoned to evil affections; and in their degeneracy, they were given over to a reprobate mind. Or viewed from St. Paul's summary, there was first the substitution of a lie for the truth; then the love of that lie instead of the truth; and lastly, the belief of that lie for the truth. The last stage, therefore, in degeneracy, is to be filled with all unrighteousness, which the apostle proceeds to analyze into its constituent elements (Cf. Rom. 1:29-31). The culmination of degeneracy, he finds in those who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them (Rom. 1:32). According to St. Paul, then, the depth of wickedness consists in a direct and conscious violation of the will of God, in the clear knowledge of its consequences, and conjoined with pleasure in others who are alike sinfully minded: Thus there is built up what Martensen calls, a "sinful society." The arrangement of the facts in the science of religion does not concern us primarily, only in so far as they are woven into a philosophy which is contradictory to the plain teachings of the Scriptures. The facts themselves, however, are of great value to theology in establishing the universality of religion, and the certainty of its being grounded in the nature and constitution of man. For a time this was denied. Sir John Lubbock insisted that some atheistic tribes had been found among savage peoples, but later writers, with a much better understanding of primitive religion, have refuted this position. Quaterfages says, "Little by little the light has appeared and the result has been that Australians, Kaffirs, Bechuanas and other savage tribes have been withdrawn from the lists of atheistic people and are recognized as religious." Tiele affirms that "No tribe or nation has yet been met with, destitute of belief in any higher beings, and travelers who asserted their existence have been afterward refuted by the facts (TIELE, Outlines Hist. Relig., p. 6). Thus the History of Religion becomes a valuable propaedeutic to the study of Christian Theology, and serves to clarify and establish the view that religion belongs to the constitution and nature of man. 

 

The Psychology of Religion. Another field of investigation has made a valuable contribution to this fundamental postulate - the Psychology of Religion. Like its companion study, the History of Religion, this new science entered with some hesitancy into its investigations, on account of the sacredness of the subject. Once, however, that it was under way, the very novelty of the field commanded the attention of scholars. Perhaps the greatest contribution that has been made to the study of religion is in establishing the fact of the variety and validity of religious experience. But in its attempts to explain the origin of religion it has made many and grotesque errors. These are not attributable to the science as such, but to the antagonistic attitude which has characterized many of its investigators. Many of the errors originate in a supposed projection of the idea of God from some inner human experience. God, therefore, on this basis has no reality. He is merely the objectification of certain inner psychological concepts. Wobbermin applies the term "illusionistic" to these theories of religion, and Knudsen classifies them in three main divisions: Psychological, Sociological, and Intellectualistic. 

 

The Psychological Theory of Illusionism, with which we are now concerned, attributes the origin of religion to a projection of psychic phenomena. This theory was held by Lucretius of Rome (B.C. 99-55), who maintained that religion had its origin in fear - especially the fear of death. Religion would not therefore exist, were it not for ignorance and timidity. But the theory that men make gods in their own likeness dates back into the dawn of Greek history. It is found in the writings of Xenophanes, the philosopher (c. 570 B.C.), whose attack was not against the existence of God, but against the anthropomorphic conception of God which men held. "If cattle could paint," he said, "horses would describe gods as horses, and oxen would describe them as oxen." For this reason "the Ethiopians represent their deities as having flat noses and black faces, while the Thracians picture theirs with red hair and blue eyes." Yet despite this attack, Xenophanes had a profound sense of the existence of God. "This Deity," he said, "is not begotten, for how can He be born of His equal; how of His unequal. If not born He cannot perish, since He is independent and by Himself." 

 

It is in Feuerbach that this psychological type of illusionism finds its most significant expression in modern times. Here the origin of religion is attributed, not to fear, but to the quest after life and happiness. According to this theory, religion is "man's instinct for happiness which is satisfied in the imagination." The idea of God is "the realized salvation, the bliss of man." Wobbermin points out, that while Feuerbach in the beginning sought only to advance a speculative theory, he at last succumbed to the error he sought to avoid, and gave to the world a completely rationalized theory of religions-a system as completely rationalized as that of Hegel, whose philosophy he opposed. "The necessary turning point of the whole matter is this frank confession and admission that the consciousness of God is nothing but the consciousness of the species." Here one cannot fail to see the influence of Fichte's philosophy of subjectivism, which for a time was popular in philosophy as subjective theism, but which Professor Howison frankly termed "objective atheism." It must be evident to all that the philosophy of Feuerbach furnished the germ of that which later issued in Humanism. Since this theory is closely related to Positivism, it will be given further treatment as one of the Anti-Theistic Theories. But the error of Feuerbach not only issued in  

       

Concerning his illusionistic theory of religion, Feuerbach says, "Man - this is the mystery of religion - projects his being into objectivity, and then again makes himself an object of this projected image of himself thus converted into a subject . . . . As God is nothing else than the nature of the man purified from that which to the human individual appears, whether in feeling or thought, a limitation of evil.

   Humanism, it laid the foundation for the modern development of two other theories antagonistic to the Christian faith - Freudianism, and Marxism. The latter of these, however, must be classified as Sociological Illusionism.   

Freudianism has greatly colored psychological and sociological studies in recent years. Through its theory of psychoanalysis, it has been closely related to medical science, and has sometimes been known as "medical materialism." Sigmund Freud (1856-1928) was a Viennese neuropathologist. Psychoanalysis, as he advanced it, was purely a medical method of technique. It consisted in an attempt to gain control over the subconscious life, and so of the unconscious forces in the substructure of the psychic world. Psychoanalysts have assumed that there are elementary wishes or instincts that have been repressed in the course of conscious development, but are still latent and may be uncovered. Freud and his followers, however, claim to have found these repressed instincts, almost if not exclusively, in the sphere of sexual pathology. They begin with totemism, which they attempt to explain by what they judge to have happened in the primitive horde of men. This gives rise to what is termed the Oedipus Complex in the emotional life of youth. These formulations claim to be decisive answers to the question as to what is the origin and nature of religion. Through totemism belated love and reverence were bestowed upon an animal as a substitute for the father; and this feeling for the animal as a totem and representative of the father, was in time heightened and thus arose the idea of God. It would seem that nothing could more exactly meet the description of St. Paul when he spoke of those who professing themselves to be wise they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds and four-footed beasts, and creeping things. The theory has been exceptionally devastating to the minds of college youth. 

 

The Philosophy of Religion. Having pointed out the contributions made by the History and Psychology of Religion, we must now examine briefly the manner in which the philosophy of religion has built upon these fundamental presuppositions its various explanations of religion. These are necessary, First, in order to a proper understanding of the true nature of religion; and Second, as a basis for the discrimination between a true and false emphasis of religion in the conduct of the Christian life. 

 

The philosophy of religion has a different function from the science of religion. The former deals with the mental processes of inward development, while the latter is concerned with material processes of outward development. Comparative religion relies upon the similarities found in a community of experience, while the philosophy of religion is concerned with the eternal principle of religion which is manifested within itself. Neither of these can tell what religion is, but only the form in which it manifests itself. Nor can these afford assurance in personal religious experience. At best they can serve only as confirmatory evidences and furnish means of expression. Personal religion can be known only by the religious themselves, and carries with it the assurance of the truth of their convictions. He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself (I John 5:10). But religion is never belief alone. The just shall live by faith (Gal. 3:11). Life is equally fundamental with faith, and the adjustments of life are an essential element in religion. The broad fact, to which all religion bears witness, is a belief in a higher order, proper relation to which is essential to the right adjustments of life. Here is a sufficient basis for the philosophy of religion, but we are concerned primarily with religion itself and the possibilities contained in it for the development of a theistic and Christian conception of God. Thus we lay the foundations upon which we shall later build our theistic arguments, and gather the material which we shall use in our criticism of the antitheistic theories. 

 

Waterhouse in his Modern Theories of Religion reviews nine developments in the philosophy of religion. These are (I) Religion as Feeling: Schleiermacher; (II) Personal Monism: Lotze; (III) Religious Conceptions as Value Judgments: Ritschl; (IV) The Transcendental Philosophy of Religion: the Neo-Hegelians; (V) Mysticism as a Religious Philosophy: Dean Inge; (VI) The Ethical Philosophy of Religion: Martineau; (VII) The Religious Philosophy of Activism: Eucken; (VIII) Pragmatism as a Religious Philosophy: William James; (IX) Personal Idealism: Rashdall. It would take us too far afield to study these various developments, and, furthermore, it is aside from our purpose. 

 

Schleiermacher (1768-1834) paved the way for the modern developments in the philosophy of religion. "Wherever a philosophy of religion is found," says Waterhouse, "which arises from the psychology of religious experience, there is a line which runs direct, through many junctions of converging tracts to the fervent speculation of Schleiermacher." He was the first to analyze and evaluate religion for its own sake. Previous to his time, little was known of the true inwardness of religion except among the mystics; since his time, no philosophy or theology can reckon without it. Schleiermacher was brought up among the Moravians at Halle and was early the recipient of a profound religious experience. His entire system of theology and his philosophy as well, were dominated by his desire to give expression to the work of divine grace in his own. soul. But anchored to this intense religious experience, he allowed himself to wander in the fields of philosophical speculation, so that he has been aptly characterized as "the union of a pious soul with a philosophical mind." The Moravian influence, therefore, did more than create through Wesley, his contemporary, a revival of religion; it created through Schleiermacher, a revival of religious philosophy. The evangelical revival and the new epoch in philosophy, heralded by Schleiermacher, may be justly regarded as two sides of one and the same fact.  

       

Like Wesley, Schleiermacher found it necessary to break with the Moravian brethren, but the breach was caused by his intellectual independence rather than by any revolt from their spirit or from their methods. The letters which passed between him and his father at the time he had decided to break with the Brethren and was pleading to be allowed to enter the wider sphere of the University, show clearly enough the agony that he suffered-Cf. SELBIE, Schleiermacher, pp. 18, 17.

 

Religion is, according to Schleiermacher, a "feeling of dependence." It neither seeks like metaphysics to determine and explain the universe, nor like morals to advance and perfect the universe through the power of freedom. The feeling of dependence leads immediately to the thought of God upon which the soul must depend. Religious knowledge, therefore, is "the immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite things in and through the Infinite, and of all temporal things in and through the Eternal." It is to have life and to know life in immediate feeling. When this is found, religion is satisfied, when it hides itself, there is unrest and anguish, extremity and death (Cf. Reden p. 36). Out of this conscious knowledge of a sense of dependence and a personal relationship with the divine is built up a philosophy of religion. 

Hegel (1770-1831) regarded religion as absolute knowledge. It is the relation of spirit to Absolute Spirit, and it is the Spirit only which knows and is known. Religion, therefore, becomes the standpoint for the consciousness of the True, and God is this Absolute Truth. God is conceived by Hegel, not as a Supreme Being who is back of all experience, God is rather in all experience. It may be said that the sum total of all finite experience is the Mind of God. There is according to this theory but one experience - that of the Absolute. The finite is merely an essential moment in the experience of the Infinite. Religion is not so much our knowledge of God, as God coming to a knowledge of himself through  

       

Waterhouse maintains that Schleiermacher finds the birth chamber of religion in the mysterious moment immediately prior to the breaking forth of consciousness, an instant so momentary that it can scarcely be described as an instant-a term which implies at least a fraction of time, in which sense and object are one and indistinguishable, when there arises the first contact of the universal life with an individual and in Schleiermacher's own words "you lie directly on the bosom of the infinite world." It should be constantly borne in mind that for him, feeling stands primarily for the unity of consciousness, in which the opposition of knowledge passing through feeling to will, and will through feeling to knowledge, the common relation to feeling forming the bond of connection between them. The sphere of religion is found in this unifying element of feeling. He therefore regards sin as the conflict and salvation as the reconciliation between the God-consciousness and the world consciousness, and this is accomplished by Christ who possessed the God-consciousness in absolute measure, thereby establishing His perfection and His divinity.

   

finite experience. It is a function of the human spirit through which it comes to know the universe, or what is equally true, the Absolute coming to full consciousness of itself. The universe therefore is to be conceived as a single huge process in which the Absolute is constantly coming to consciousness, or in Hegel's words, "the Divine Spirit's knowledge of itself through the mediation of a finite spirit." Thus is built up on the fundamental concept of religion, a system of monism closely related to ancient gnosticism. Nor does it differ greatly from the Stoicism of the ancient Greeks. In modern philosophy, Spinoza and Hegel are closely related in their theories of a single Substance. 

 

Ritschl (1822-1889) followed Schleiermacher and Hegel, but discounted philosophy as being detrimental to religion. His system has been characterized as "antidogmatic, antimystical and antimetaphysical." While Schleiermacher regards religion as feeling, and Hegel as knowledge, Ritschl regards it more from the volitional standpoint as power. Starting from the fundamental concept of religion, he draws a sharp distinction between the nature of things in themselves on the one hand, and what they mean for us, on the other. Science and philosophy attempt to explain the nature of things, and therefore deal with what he calls "existential judgments." This, however, is not the only way in which an object may be judged. Instead of inquiring as to its nature, we may ask, "What does it mean for us?" From this standpoint it takes on meaning as it affects the subject. This is a "value-judgment." Science and philosophy are concerned with the former, but religion is expressed in value-judgments. Thus he swings over from the idea of feeling or knowledge to that of volition, and 

       

William Adams Brown points out that the sudden downfall of Hegelianism is one of the most striking facts in the history of philosophy. There were two tendencies, one which tended to identify religion and philosophy and developed into a critical movement. The other tended to approach the positions of traditional theology. Men like Daub and Marheinecke attempted to make Christianity the final synthesis, but the elements of conservatism were eventually overpowered by those more radical. Dr. Brown indicates that the clearest expression of this destructive tendency is found in Feuerbach's Essence of Christianity.

   

religion becomes a practical affair. "In every religion," he says, "what is sought with the help of the supernatural spiritual power reverenced by man, is a solution of the contradiction in which man finds himself, as both a part of the world of nature and a spiritual personality claiming to dominate nature. For in the former role he is a part of nature, dependent upon her, subject to her, and confined by other things; but as spirit he is moved by the impulse to maintain his independence against them. In this juncture, religion springs up as faith in superhuman spiritual powers, by whose help the power which man possesses of himself is in some way supplemented, and elevated into a unity of its own kind which is a match for the pressure of the natural world (Cf. RITSCHL, Justification and Reconciliation, p. 199). 

 

Edward Caird (1835-1908) and John Caird (1820-1898) are commonly known, together with Thomas Hill Green, as Neo-Hegelians. Following the customary Hegelian procedure, Dr. Edward Caird finds in conscious life, a thesis, the self; an antithesis, a not-self or the objective world; and a synthesis which is God. He differs from Hegel, however, in that he does not make this triad in consciousness, but is more closely related to Lotze, who identifies God with the principle of unity. He sets out from the basic principle of religion to demonstrate the necessity of God, and he does this by interpreting religion as a rational consciousness. The principle, then, out of which the consciousness of God arises, is as much a primary element of knowledge as our consciousness of the self or of the objective world. The idea of God is accordingly described as "the ultimate presupposition of our consciousness." 

Martineau (1805-1900) develops an ethical philosophy of religion. Here one would suppose the Kantian idea of religion as morality would be given a modern turn, but Martineau gives more attention to the argument from causality than he does from conscience, though the latter is not neglected. His idea of causality is that of Will, and that Will regarded as free. He admits of no second causes other than that of created minds.  

 

Religion resolves itself, therefore, into "a conscious relation on our part, to a higher than we; and on the part of a rational universe as large, to a higher than all" (MARTINEAU, Study of Religion, II, p. 1). It consists of an inward source, personally revealed, though Martineau regards this as intuition rather than as feeling. "Just as in perception we are immediately introduced to another than ourselves that gives us what we feel, so in the acts of consciousness we are immediately introduced to a Higher than ourselves which gives us what we feel." "I care not," he says, "whether this be called an immediate vision of God in the experience of conscience, or whether it is to be taken as an inference drawn from the data they supply. It is the truth contained in them" (MARTINEAU, Study of Religion, pp. 27, 28). 

 

 

 

FALSE CONCEPTIONS OF RELIGION

 

The philosophies which have been advanced in support of religion have, in most instances, served an admirable purpose. But philosophy has a tendency to usurp the place of religion and as such its influence is always baneful. The false conceptions of religion to which we call attention are such by virtue of an improper synthesis of the factors of personality. True religion must call out the whole personality and in its forms of expression represent a balanced emphasis upon the primary element of feeling, intellect and will. 

Religion is not mere feeling. We tread on delicate ground here, for the term feeling is used in widely different senses. As Schleiermacher most commonly uses it, feeling is the unity of consciousness in which knowledge and volition meet. It is not, therefore, what is commonly  

       

In order to complete his construction, Martineau produces three reasons for the identification of the Will he has discovered behind phenomena, with the Law-giver revealed by conscience:(1) We unite m our persons subjection to both moral and physical law, inseparably intertwined. (2) Our springs of action are aroused by the external world; the data of conscience are found in life and humanity, and its problems set by the condition these impose. (3) The discipline required by moral law is enforced by physical law. . . . . These two aspects, however, the physical and the moral, are separate only in human apprehension. not in the divine existence.-MARTINEAU, Study of Religion, pp. 26ff.

 

 termed emotion, but the deep underlying source out of which both intuition and emotion arise. Religion is neither doctrine nor ceremony, but experience. It is deeper down than either thought or conscience. It is to know life in immediate feeling. Those who agree with Schleiermacher interpret his idea of feeling in the scriptural sense of the heart or the spirit. To this there can be no exception, but it is not always clear that Schleiermacher uses the term feeling wholly in this sense. Apparently he sometimes means merely organic sensation. He argues that since "religion is feeling," then "feeling is religion." 'Consequently he maintains that there is in the breast of every man, that which needs only recognition to be religion. Such a confusion of the spiritual affections of the heart with mere organic sensation destroys the very place which religion should occupy, and reduces it from the supernatural to a mere naturalistic plane. This position finds a modern exponent in Horace Bushnell, who conceived of grace as communicated through the natural relations of life, and therefore stated as a thesis, that the child should grow up so as to never know himself other than as a Christian. This theory forms the basis of much of the present day teaching on religious education. Religion is not a matter of unregulated emotion, nor is it "morality tinged with emotion." The religion of the heart must develop into a living consciousness through rational thinking, and must test its validity through action-the processes of which are induced and perfected by the conscience. In the Pauline statement, it is Love out of a pure heart, and a good conscience and a faith unfeigned (I Tim. 1:5) that is, the stream of perfect love, flowing out of a pure heart, regulated by a good conscience, and kept full and fresh and flowing by an unfeigned faith. 

 

Religion is not mere knowledge. Hegelianism has been a determining factor in the rationalization of religion. But it has also emptied it of its emotional content and left it barren and unfruitful. Hegel did not entirely ignore feeling. Like Schleiermacher, he made it the primal element in consciousness, but he makes it too elemental to be of any worth. Feeling as such, he says, is full of contradictions, the most debased as well as the highest and noblest. The value of religion lies in its rational content. Emotion in religion therefore came under the ban and the feelings were repressed until their sources were dried up. 

 

The Hegelian triad furnished an unworthy concept of sin. All progress is by means of a thesis, an antithesis and a synthesis. Evil is such on any plane merely through contrast with its corresponding thesis. It may, however, be conjoined with this thesis in a higher synthesis, thus removing the distinctions and forming a new and higher thesis. Sin, therefore, is merely a relative matter. It is only partial good. It is regarded as evil, solely because we fail to see it in its higher meanings. It therefore becomes impossible to hold to the exceeding sinfulness of sin as the Scriptures teach us, and thus the whole redemptive idea is weakened. It is for this reason that Dr. Olin A. Curtis abhors any touch of the psychological climate of naturalism. The emphasis upon development has weakened also the belief in the crises of religion, at least in its practical outworkings. The deterministic position of Hegelianism has given rise to a new interpretation of freedom which regards man as self-determined in the sense that his actions are the expression or realization of himself. This puts the ultimate source of moral accountability in character, which is regarded, not as the result of free and responsible choices, but proceeds from man's will as the expression of his whole self. Outward authority is therefore minified and man's will becomes his rule of life. 

 

Religion is not simply action. We have pointed out some of the dangers of a disproportionate emphasis upon feeling and knowledge as factors in religion, and it remains to be shown that volition can no more lay claim to the prime place than those just considered. Attempts to identify religion with morality usually date back to the philosophy of Kant with its categorical imperative. While the two coincide, and there can be no true religion without morality, nor no true morality without religion, the two must be clearly distinguished in thought. Morality presupposes a capacity which has been developed by practice, while religion is a power bestowed from above. Morality knows no sin as such, only failure or deficiency. Sin and repentance are distinctively religious terms. The moral life calls for no worship and is essentially action; religion, while manifesting itself in activity toward men, manifests itself also in worship toward God. Morality is primarily obedience to law; religion is submission to a Person. Christianity forever sweeps away all hope of justification through law, for by the law is the knowledge of sin; but as a redemptive religion declares that men may be justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus (Rom. 3:24). Neither ethical philosophies, metaphysical cults, formal worship nor any other form of religion relying upon self-righteous works can bring man to a sense of deliverance from sin. "You are doubtless acquainted with the histories of human follies," cried Schleiermacher, "and have reviewed the various structures of religious doctrine, from the senseless fables of wanton peoples to the most refined deism, from the rude superstition of human sacrifice to the ill-put-together fragments of metaphysics and ethics, now called purified Christianity, and you have found them all without rhyme or reason. I am far from wishing to contradict you. 

 

 

 

THE NATURE OF RELIGION

 

Having examined the results of both the science of religion and the philosophical developments based upon the history and psychology of religion, we are now able to determine more fully the true nature of religion regarded in its most general sense. Four fundamental characteristics appear, and these may be found, whether in the lowest and most primitive forms of religion, or in the supreme and final Christian religion. No form or degree of religion is without them. First, there is the thought of a supernatural power-God-in the religion of revelation, or gods in the naturalistic religions. 

 

Second, there is a sense of need which seeks satisfaction from this supernatural power. Third, there is the idea of reverence, and the feeling that it is incumbent to do homage in worship, and to render willing obedience to the supernatural. Fourth, there is some sort of assurance of the manifestation of God. It is evident that the first three are dependent upon the interchange of relations between God and man; while the fourth or Revelation is recognized as a special favor from God. 

A careful consideration of these characteristics reveal the fact of their necessity in religion. The Supernatural, for instance, may be regarded as the gods in polytheism, or even lower powers in animism, totemism, and Shamanism. In Christianity, there is a clear idea of the personal God as Father. The sense of need likewise may reach to the lowest forms of physical necessity in which divine aid is sought through superstitious practices and for lower ends. The third likewise varies, giving rise to heathen sacrifices on the one hand, and on the other to the loftiest moments of prayer and adoration in Christian worship. The fourth approaches the distinctness of the Christian religion, for only in the Old and New Testaments, given to Judaism and to Christianity as parts of one revelation, do we find a true manifestation of God, and this is in turn dependent upon Christ as the Eternal Word made flesh, thereby bringing to man the glorious and express image of the Father. 

 

From the time of Barnabas the early apologist, to that of Kant in modern times, it was the custom of the Church to draw a sharp line of demarcation between the Christian religion and ethnic religions, declaring that the former was true and the others totally false. The fact that these other religions contained much of truth was wholly overlooked. With the development of the modern science of religion there has come a changed attitude, and with it the recognition of the true Pauline view so long submerged-that the Gentile religions were "wild olive branches" as over against the cultured branches of Judaism. But neither has St. Paul any place for the modern syncretistic position that Christianity is but one among many other religions, which are equally beneficial expressions of the profound religious nature of man. While admitting the truth in any and all ethnic religions, he makes a sharp distinction between these and Christianity on a twofold basis, First the difference in ethical quality; and Second, the difference in the character of the Founder. The first is found in his condemnation of the heathen religions, a fact attested by all who are familiar with the low moral tone, not only of primitive religion, but also of the so-called universal religions. The latter will form the basis of our next proposition. 

 

From the historical viewpoint, we base our argument for the supremacy of the Christian religion over the ethnic religions on the fact of its all inclusiveness. Christianity is distinctive and therefore exclusive, because it is absolutely inclusive. "It is not an amalgamation of other religions," says Matheson, "but it has in it all that is best and truest in other religions. It is the white light that contains all the colored rays. God may have made disclosures of truth outside of Judaism, and did so in Balaam and Melchizedek. But while other religions have a relative excellence, Christianity is the absolute religion that contains all excellencies." By this method, therefore, we take firmer ground for the distinctness and finality of the Christian religion, than is possible by regarding it either as one religion among many, or one over against many, and we preserve what is true in both positions. 

Christianity is the distinctive and final religion. Having examined the false religions, it is evident that there is and can be but one religion in the sense of embracing all truth within itself. "Man is a religious being, indeed, as having the capacity for the divine life. He is actually religious, however, only when he enters into this living relation to God. False religions are the caricatures which men give to sin, or the imaginations which men, groping after light, form of this life of the soul in God" (Cf. STRONG, Systematic Theology, I, p. 23). We sum up our arguments for Christianity as the distinctive and final religion in the following propositions:  

 

1. Christianity Is a Historic Religion. Christianity is something more than a philosophy of religion or a cult of worship. It is not a theory of the intellect but a redemptive power worked out on the plane of human history in the person of Jesus Christ, who, tested in all points as are other men, was yet triumphant over sin and death. It must therefore occupy a place in the history of religion, and be classified with the so-called universal religions which take their character from the personality of their founders. The difference between Christianity and the ethnic religions lies in the character of the founders-the infinite stretch between the human and the divine. 

 

2. The Founder of Christianity Is Jesus Christ the Divine Son of God. Christianity takes both its exclusiveness from the personality of its Founder. The argument of the author to the Hebrews is essentially this: God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds (Heb. 1:1, 2). Here the argument is, that in the olden time the revelation of God was partial and imperfect in that it was mediated through human means; now it can be perfect because mediated through divine means. This is the essential difference between Judaism and Christianity. The prophets furnishing only a human mediation, the revelation must therefore be external; being external it must necessarily be ceremonial; and being ceremonial must be preparatory. Christianity mediated through the divine Son is internal rather than external; is spiritual rather than ceremonial, and perfect instead of preparatory. Thus Judaism with its prophetic offices could be only preparatory to the fuller revelation of Christianity. This is brought out clearly by St. Paul, who, being asked what advantage the Jews have over the Gentiles, says, Much every way; chiefly because unto them were the oracles of God-that is, they were the intermediaries between God and the religions of the world. They were thus, not an end but a means-elected for a purpose. Their condemnation lay in this, that they ceased to regard themselves as a people with a ministry, and made themselves an end in the revelation 6f God, and consequently despised others. But the Apostle John, in the Fourth Gospel, links the work of Christ directly to that of the Father apart from all earthly relationships. Choosing for his words, not the Jewish but the Greek concepts and terminology, he declares that In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God. 

 

Paul's argument has been condensed into what amounts to a creedal statement - Our Lord Jesus Christ-the Lord (or kurios) signifying his divinity as the highest term applied to deity; Jesus the human and historical relationship, and Christ, or the anointed one, as the office or mission of Christ. 

 

3. Christianity Is a Redemptive Religion. Throughout the entire New Testament, Christ is regarded in his redemptive aspects. Perhaps the most familiar text illustrative of the purpose of God in the incarnation is that of John 3:16, God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life. Paul makes the soteriological aspect of Christ's coming the thesis of perhaps his most outstanding and systematic treatise on theology-the Epistle to the Romans. This thesis is, I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ, for it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth. For therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith: as it is written, the just shall live by faith. St. Peter likewise expresses the same profound truth. Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, which according to his abundant mercy hath begotten us again unto a lively hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, to an inheritance incorruptible, and undefiled, and that fadeth not away, reserved in heaven for you, who are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation ready to be revealed in the last time (I Peter 1:3-5). To Paul and Peter and John, Christianity was not simply a doctrine but a power. To the Jews it might appear a stumblingblock, and to the Greeks foolishness, but to the saved, Christ was the power of God and the wisdom of God. Christ they regarded not solely as a prophet, or a teacher, or a great man, but as a redeemer. Much that passes for the gospel therefore is no more than a system of ethics, or a profound philosophy of life. Anything which stops short of the power of God in salvation, stops short of the place where the message of Christ becomes a gospel.