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H. Orton Wiley: Christian Theology - Chapter 14



We have previously pointed out in our analysis of terms, that there are two groups of definitions applied to the attributes-the one more general and popular, the other more technical and philosophical. The former may well be represented by the definition of Henry B. Smith who holds that "an attribute is any conception which is necessary to the explicit idea of God, any dis­tinctive conception which cannot be resolved into any other." In this sense, the attributes may be regarded as the qualities which belong to and constitute the divine nature. Dr. Pope calls them "the full assemblage of those perfections which God ascribes to himself in His Word; partly as the fuller expansion of His names, and partly as designed to regulate our conception of His character. They are to be distinguished from the prop­erties of the Triune Essence on the one hand; and on the other from the acts by which His relation to His crea­tures are made known. Hence Dogmatic Theology re­gards them, first in their unity as perfections manifesting the divine nature; and secondly in their variety as attributes capable of systematic arrangement" (POPE, Compend. Chr. Th., I, p. 287). Quenstedt, the Lutheran theologian (1617-1686), says the attributes were so-called because they are attributed to God by our intelli­gence; and perfections because they make up the divine essence. Theology therefore adopts the word perfections for these qualities as they are applied to God by Himself; attributes, as they are assigned to Him by His creatures.

At the other extreme is the more technical and philosophical definition of Dr. Shedd, who regards the attributes "as modes either of the relation or the opera­tion of the divine essence." They are therefore merely an analytical and closer description of the essence. In support of his position, which is so evidently Platonic, he cites the position of Nitzsch, who says that "every divine attribute is a conception of the idea of God." Here the term "concept" and "idea" are used in the sense of Schelling's philosophy. As the general and unde­fined idea is reduced to the form of the particular and definite conception, so the general divine essence is con­templated in the particular attribute. The attributes are not parts of the essence, of which this latter is composed. The whole essence is in each attribute, and the attribute in the essence. We must not conceive of the essence as existing by itself, and prior to the attributes, and of the attributes as an addition to it. God is not essence and attributes, but in attributes. The attributes are essential qualities of God" (SHEDD, Dogm. Th., I, p. 334). Here it is well to point out also, the distinction between hy­postasis and attribute. The Hypostasis or "Person" as the term is used in reference to the Divine Trinity, is a mode of the existence of the essence; while an attri­bute is a mode either of the relation or external opera­tion of the essence. Over against this external opera­tion is the internal operation of the essence which refers necessarily to the persons or hypostases and not to the attributes.

There are two questions which must be answered concerning the attributes, and in answering them, the Church has had to guard against two prevalent errors. First, are the attributes realities in the divine nature, or are they merely human modes of apprehending God with nothing in the divine essence corresponding to these human conceptions? Second, how do we come to know the attributes? As a corollary of this question, do we know God through His attributes; or knowing God, are the attributes merely an analytical and closer description of the essence as suggested above?

The first problem concerns the relation of the attri­butes to the nature of God-are they realities in the divine essence, or merely human modes of conception? To which we must reply, they are objective and real. They are not merely subjective human conceptions, with nothing objective corresponding to them in the nature of God. However, this question has been discussed at great length by theologians of a philosophical cast such as Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, William of Occam, and in modern times by Nitzsch and Dorner. Augustine taught that "God is truly called in manifold ways, great, good, wise, blessed, true, and whatsoever other things seem to be said of Him not unworthily; but His greatness is the same as His wisdom; for He is not great by bulk, but by power; and His goodness is the same as His wisdom and His greatness, and His truth the same as all those things; and in Him it is not one thing to be blessed, and another to be great, or wise, or true, or good, or, in a word, to be Himself.-De Trinitate, VII, p. 7. The Nominalist Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, William of Occam (c. 1270-1347) and Gabriel Biel (d. 1495) maintained that God had and could have but one quality or attribute, a position which grew out of an attempt to justify the be­ing of God as ens simplicissimum, and therefore without distinction of qualities and powers. Thomas Aquinas (1227-1274) on the other hand, marks carefully the distinction between what God is in Himself, and what He is in relation to finite being, defining the attributes as relations corresponding to nothing in God viewed in Himself, but to something not merely thought but ob­jectively real in His relation to the world. This position preserves the unity of God sufficiently against the dan­ger which arises from ascribing to Him a variety of at­tributes, in that these represent only the undivided es­sence in its relation to the world. Schleiermacher (1768-1834) follows Augustine (354-430), and states his position in a similar manner. "All attributes which we ascribe to God, are to be taken as denoting not some­thing special in God, but only something special in the manner in which the feeling of dependence is to be re­lated to Him. . . . the divine thinking is the same as the divine will, and omnipotence and omniscience are one and the same" (Der Christliche Glaube, Eng. Trans., p. 474). This overemphasis upon the Absolute has been the bane of both philosophy and theology, and if carried logically to its length, would lead directly into agnosticism. Martensen states the position truly when he declares that the attributes are "not human modes of apprehending God, but God's mode of revealing Him­self." Dr. Olin A. Curtis takes practically the same po­sition when he defines an attribute as "any characteristic which we must ascribe to God to express what He really is."

The second problem is concerned with the manner in which we come to know the attributes of God. Like the former question, much error has been associated with attempted solutions of the problem. Closely connected with this is the problem of the knowledge of God. Do we know God by means of His attributes? Or, knowing God, do we know the attributes as closer and more ex­plicit analyses of this primary personal knowledge? The two positions are at opposite extremes, the one making more prominent the mystical element in knowledge, the other the rational. Here again, many of the older theo­logians took the position that we know God through knowing His attributes. The rationalist in philosophy and theology seeks to come to a knowledge of God through the theistic proofs. This he does in a piecemeal manner by organizing them into a unity. The rational­istic spirit is seen also in certain types of biblical study, especially that which would merely collate the Scripture teachings concerning the attributes of God and blend them into a totality. In both of these instances the seeker after God can attain nothing more than a "knowledge about God," never a "knowledge of God." We must maintain that we come to a personal knowledge of God in the same manner as we come to a knowledge of finite human personality. However much we may learn about a person, we can never be said to have personal knowl­edge until there is spiritual contact. But having once made this spiritual contact, everything that we learn or discover through personal association may be regarded as personal qualities or human attributes.

So also is our knowledge of God. We gain our idea of the attributes only by analyzing the personal knowl­edge of God which has been revealed to us in Christ through the Spirit. Having this personal knowledge we may analyze it into more definite and specific forms. Consequently we must maintain that we know God per­sonally in the unity of His Being, however imperfect this may be; and the attributes are the analyses of this total knowledge of God by which He manifests Himself in nature and in grace. In other words, it is our per­sonal knowledge of God that makes possible a true knowledge of His attributes, and not a mere rational­istic summing up of the attributes that gives us our knowledge of God.

It follows, then, that a proper arrangement of these attributes is of great importance, in bringing the dis­tinctive features of the divine nature to clearest expres­sion. As in each finite person, some trait of character seems dominant and central, so it is in our finite concep­tions of God, though we shall show later, that there can be no disunity or lack of harmony in the attributes of God. Philosophy has generally made omniscience or wisdom the central attribute, although the divine will has sometimes been advanced as of prime importance. Augustinianism regarded grace, or condescending love as central. Calvinism makes justice the central attri­bute. But none of these fully reproduce Christ's concep­tion of God as Father. If God is Father, holy love must be supreme and central. Indeed, love is so central, that the other attributes of personality may be regarded as love energizing in certain directions. Justice is love in relation to moral law, omniscience is love exemplifying wisdom, and omnipresence is love in its universal pres­ence. Holy love must occupy the central place in our knowledge of God. But we are anticipating our discus­sion of the moral attributes.

It may be admitted that the doctrine of the attributes is not quite germane to the simplicity of the Christian idea of God, and we have previously referred to the attempt, on the part of theologians to preserve this sim­plicity from logical disunity. On the other hand, there is the constant danger of looking upon God as a bundle of attributes. The present day trends in psychology are toward the simpler forms of classification. Psychology is not nearly so sure as it was, as to the advisability of marking off the human mind into clearly defined and separate departments. It is the mind as a whole that acts in the unity of personality, and hence the intel­lectual, the volitional and the emotional aspects must be considered in relation to the mind as a whole. It is bet­ter, therefore, to guard against a multiplication of the at­tributes, and to center the interest in a few fundamental characteristics. This is the position of Dr. Carl Knudson who begins his study with an inquiry concerning the existence of God, and arranges the material following in three chapters dealing with, first, the absoluteness; second, the personality, and third, the goodness of God.

Perhaps the chief value of the study of the attributes lies in the fact that it tends to preserve the idea of God from indefiniteness and corruption. But it must be constantly kept in mind that the attributes can have no existence apart from the nature of God, nor can the being of God have reality apart from its attributes. The attributes are simply the qualities revealed to us, and as such belong to, and are inseparable from personality.


One of the simplest forms of classification is the two­fold division into absolute and relative attributes, or the attributa absoluta and attributa relativa of the older theologians. This twofold division is sometimes ex­pressed in other terms, as communicable and incom­municable, transitive and immanent, positive and nega­tive, moral and natural, ethical and metaphysical. What­ever the term used, the principle of classification is the same. Martensen adopts the twofold classification, but rejects the terms absolute and relative as attended with difficulties, since there are no attributes that are not rela­tive or transitive, that is, do not express a relation to the world; nor are there any which are not reflexive, that is, which do not go back to God himself. "We gain a more determinate principle of division," he says, "when we consider the twofold relation which God holds to the world. The relation of God to the world, namely, on the one hand a relation of unity, on the other hand, a rela­tion of diversity or antithesis. Indeed, our religious life, with all its morals and states, moves between these two poles-that of unity and that of diversity, that of free­dom and that of dependence, that of reconciliation and that of separation" (MARTENSEN, Christian Dogmatics, p. 93). In his consideration of the attributes, therefore, he finds it necessary to give consideration to the momenta of both unity and diversity. On the other hand, Dr. Pope objects to the terms incommunicable and com­municable, on the ground that those termed com­municable may be similar to the attributes of God, but considered strictly as attributes, they are not commun­icable. Similarity there may be, but the one belongs to God, and the other to finite human personality.

Another method of classification follows the analogy of human personality. This according to Dr. Miley is the true classification, since the method of science always gives attention to the most determinate factor, which in this instance is personality. "Personality is the most determinate conception of God," he says, and therefore, "the truest, deepest sense in which he can be viewed as the subject of His own attributes." Since man is con­scious of the substantiality of his being, and knows that he has a self which is unaffected in its identity by all changes, so also he conceives of the subsistence of God as apart from all phenomena. But man is a person with intellect, feeling and will, and in his consciousness is aware of these three modes of the manifestation of the self. Under this classification God as Absolute Person­ality is first, Absolute Reason or Omniscience; second, Absolute Feeling or Goodness, which Dr. Miley inter­prets as holiness, justice, love, mercy and truth; and third, Absolute Will or Omnipotence.

But man is also conscious of his own substantial ex­istence through all the changes of time and space, and this gives rise to the thought of Absolute Existence, and the consequent attributes of aseity or self-subsist­ence, and immutability or unchangeableness; hence there is omnipresence in relation to space, and eternity in relation to time. These latter give expression to that which is primary and fundamental in the Christian con­cept of God, and to these the previous classification does not appear to do full justice. Both William Newton Clarke and William Adams Brown take this into consid­eration, and therefore arrange the attributes as follows: (a) Attributes of personality: spirituality, life and unity; (b) attributes of character: wisdom, love and holiness; (c) attributes of absolutism: omnipresence, omnipotence, omniscience and immutability. The first is primary, the others secondary. With the same em­phasis upon personality as a determining factor, an­other class of theologians think that the truth may be reached in a more direct and simple manner, by follow­ing a twofold outline or classification; (a) attributes of absolute personality, including what is usually pre­sented under the term absolute and relative attributes; and (b) attributes of holy love, or the moral attributes. In this class we may mention Luthardt, 1823-1902) Haering and Dickie.

Differing from these and yet with the determining principle of personality as the basis of classification, is another class of theologians who, following Schleier­macher, have stressed more especially the religious de­mands upon man's nature. Here we have (a) the sense of dependence giving rise to the necessity of the abso­lute attributes; (b) man's sense of sin, the moral at­tributes; and (c) the whole consummated by the revela­tion of love through Jesus Christ. McPherson thinks that the classification under being, understanding, feel­ing and will is not sufficiently exact, and admits of a very confusing cross division. The correct principle of clas­sification he thinks is that which follows the leading moments in the historical development of the Christian revelation. God's attributes then are His ways of mani­festing Himself in the world and to men. They are to be classified therefore according to God's relation, (a) to the natural world; (b) to the moral world apart from redemption; and (c) to the world of grace, or the moral world inclusive of redemption. Here may be classified Alexander Schweizer (1808-1888), Herman Schultz (1836-1903), and F. A. B. Nitzsch (1832-1898).

Having reviewed the various principles of classifica­tion, we turn to the threefold method as being the simplest and most practical method for our discussion of the various attributes of God. If the twofold method of absolute and relative attributes be adopted, we are under the necessity of classifying such attributes as omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence, which imply God's creative relation to the world, with the moral attributes, such as wisdom, justice, love and good­ness, by which He administers His government of moral and responsible beings. If on the other hand we accept such a twofold classification as natural and moral, or in­communicable and communicable, we are compelled to classify together, the so-called absolute and relative at­tributes. This is confusing, in that we must thereby overlook the distinction between God's mode of exist­ence, and His mode of operation. We therefore adopt the threefold method of classification, as being logically the most simple method of arrangement, and at the same time the clearest form of presentation from the peda­gogical standpoint. Our outline is as follows:

I. The Absolute Attributes, or those qualities which belong to God apart from His creative work.

II. The Relative Attributes, or those arising out of the relation existing between the Creator and the cre­ated, and which of necessity require the creature for their manifestation.

III. The Moral Attributes, or those which belong to the relation between God and the moral beings under His government, more especially as they concern man­kind.

The favorite method has been to make a division into two counter­part classes. Hence they are distributed as natural and moral by a dis­tinction which the meaning of neither of these words will allow; both are inappropriate to Deity, and the harshness is not removed if metaphysical and ethical are substituted. The instinctive objection we feel to these terms is not felt to the correlatives of absolute and relative, immanent and transitive, internal and external: these distinctions furnish the right clue and are sound as far as they go; but they do not suggest those special manifestations of God which give their peculiar glory to Chris­tian theology. It is dangerous to speak of positive and negative attri­butes; for while there is no positive excellence in Deity which does not imply negation or its opposite, the negative ideas of infinity and so forth are really and truly positive. Lastly, when they are classed as com­municable and incommunicable, it must be remembered that, as attri­butes, all are alike incommunicable to the creatures-POPE, Compend.Chr. Th., I, p. 290.

Drury (Outlines of Doctrinal Theology, p. 143) thinks the best warranted classification is that given by Dr. Samuel Harris, although previously developed and used in part by others. This classification is as follows:

                                                                                Self- existence


                                                Absolute...       Eternity


Divine Attributes...

                                                                                Omnipresence                       Love

                                                Personal...        Divine Sensibility...           Holiness


The subdivisions of love and holiness are not directly given by Dr. Harris but are used by Dr. Drury in his adaptation of the scheme.


By the Absolute or Immanent Attributes we mean those qualities which have relation to God's mode of existence, in contradistinction to those which refer to His mode of operation or activity. They must be con­ceived as far as is possible, apart from any relation to the creature. They are absolute in that they are unlimited by time or space, are independent of all other existence, and perfect in themselves. They have their basis in the fact that God is, in Himself, Absolute Being. They are immanent in that they belong to spirit, and are essential to any right conception of the Divine Nature. They are the attributes of a Personal Being, and may be summed up as spirituality, infinity, eternity, immensity, immuta­bility and perfection.

1. Spirituality. This has frequently been regarded as belonging to the essence of God, rather than as an at­tribute of that essence. This would be true were we using the term in the sense of pure spirit. But even this must be known by its effects, as is implied in the term pneuma, which means a breathing forth. Consequently we use the term which most closely approaches pure spirit; and as previously analyzed, this gives aseity or self-subsist­ence, which is sometimes enlarged to include unity, simplicity and ideality. Viewing spirituality from the standpoint of self-subsistence, there can be no objection to regarding it as an attribute.

By "aseity" (aseitas) we mean self-subsistence, or the possession of life in Himself which is independent of all other existence. Man has life in himself but only in com­munion with the Son (John 6: 53 ); the Son has life in Himself, but even this is given to Him of the Father (John 5:26 ); but the Father alone has it from no one. He has it in Himself precisely because He is the Abso­lute Person. Aseity, therefore, denotes that the ground of being is in Himself. God that made the world and all things therein, seeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands; neither is worshipped with men's hands, as though he needed any thing, seeing he giveth to all life and breath, and all things (Acts 17: 24, 25).

It is evident that this truth concerning the independ­ence and self-subsistence of God was not known to the heathen, but was understood by <st1:country-region> Israel </st1:country-region> , and declared with clearness and power by the early Church. For this reason Van Oosterzee regards it to a certain extent, as the test of the purity of our conception of God- whether or not it acknowledges this independence with­out limitation. That philosophy which holds creation to be necessary to the personality of God as a subject, and the world as His object, must necessarily issue in pantheism. Yet from the standpoint of theism it must be recognized, that while the world is not necessary to existence of God as Absolute Personality, as the Highest Love He will have creatures of His own. This is not the self-sufficiency of Stoicism, but Love's inexhaustible fullness of life which can give without the need of re­ceiving.

The term "simplicity" as applied to pure uncom­pounded spirit, is sometimes referred to as an attribute. Dr. Boyce for instance, treats the first attribute under this head, which he affirms "means more than the spirit­uality of God, for that includes only that He must be spiritual." However, created spirits may have a com­posite spiritual nature which includes a spiritual body as well as a spiritual soul, and in this there is no contradic­tion. But in God spiritual nature must be uncom­pounded, and His attributes and His nature are in such a manner one, that they are inseparable from each other. Simplicity, therefore, is the unity of the spiritual nature as opposed to form and limitation. The difficulty of this concept to the finite mind, which is under the necessity of thinking in terms of time and space, frequently gives rise to anthropomorphism, although the church has always rejected it. Melito (A.D. 162) is said to have been the first Christian writer to ascribe a body to God. Tertullian also ascribed a body or corpus to God, and regarded the soul as material, but this materiality was not that of the human body. It was as he viewed it, a tertium quid or a different substance from that which we call matter, and was considered the necessary form of all existence. Origen opposed this as did the entire Alexandrian School. Their tendency toward idealization, as has been pointed out, resulted in a concept of the Deity as mere negation. Irenmus held that God is not to be compared to frail men, and yet His love justifies us in using human phraseology when speaking of Him. In modern times the Church has expressed clearly its belief in the spirit­uality and simplicity of God. This statement is found in Article I of the Thirty-Nine Articles as revised by John Wesley for the American churches and generally known as the Twenty-Five Articles of Methodism. That por­tion of the Article which refers to the spirituality of God is as follows: "There is but one living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts or passions."  The term "passions" in the foregoing statement, early became a matter of disagreement in the Church and the bishops of the Conference of 1787 removed it. Orig­inally the word passion referred to passivity, and hence God, not being a creature of environment and acted upon from without, the creed denied a passive nature to Him. But in time the word came to mean an emotion or a manifestation of feeling. To deny the term passion, then, seemed to convey the idea that God was devoid of an affectional nature. Those who held to the former view, maintained that the references to God as possessed of emotions were purely metaphorical. Richard Watson, the theologian of early Methodism, opposed this view. "It is assumed," he says, "that the nature of God is es­sentially different from the spiritual nature of man. This is not the doctrine of Scripture   The nature of God and the nature of man, are not the same; but they are similar, because they bear many attributes in common, though on the part of the divine nature, in a degree of perfection infinitely exceeding" (WATSON, Institutes, I, p. 389). We must therefore conceive of knowledge and love as being the same in God as in man, only in God they are free from all imperfections.

2. Infinity. By infinity, we mean that there are no bounds or limits to the Divine Nature. The term ap­plies to God only, and is peculiarly applicable to the per­sonal attributes of wisdom, power and goodness. It is for this reason that the creedal statements, found in the Thirty-nine Articles of the Anglican Church and the Twenty-five Articles of Methodism, include the words "of infinite power, wisdom and goodness." Modern theologians of the Arminian type, have tended to absorb the doctrine of infinity in the other attributes. Neither Watson, Wakefield , Raymond, Ralston nor Summers mentions it among the attributes. Field mentions it briefly, and Banks treats it as infinite wisdom. Pope alone gives it any extended treatment. On the other hand, the Westminster Catechism defines God as "A Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in His being, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth." Conse­quently we find the Reformed theologians tending to the opposite extreme of absorbing the other attributes in in­finity. Strong makes infinity basic to self-existence, immutability and unity, while Foster considers it the ground of eternity and immensity or omnipresence. Dr. Charles Hodge states that the infinitude of God relative to space is immensity or omnipresence; relative to time, it is eternity. He further regards immensity as that aspect of infinity by which God fills all with His pres­ence, while omnipresence is His infinity viewed in re­lation to His creatures (Cf. HODGE, Systematic Theol­ogy, I, pp. 383ff).

The term, "infinity," being negative in form, has sometimes been interpreted to be negative in content.

This leads directly to agnosticism as we have shown in our treatment of that subject. We must, therefore, con­sider the term infinite as a positive concept in negative form, and as such it applies only to Personal Spirit. It has no meaning when applied extensively to time and space, and its application in this sense leads directly to pan­theism. For this reason we must not regard transcend­ence as mere externality but as a boundless supply from within. In the words of Augustine, "He knows how to be everywhere in His whole Being and to be limited by no place. He knows how to come without departing from the place where He was; He knows how to go away without leaving the place whither He has come (Ep. cxxxvii, 4); and again, "He is everywhere in His whole Being, contained by no place, bound by no bond, divis­ible into no parts, mutable in no respect, filling heaven and earth with the presence of His power (De Civ. Dei, vii, 30). Theologians have generally recognized three modes of presence in space. Bodies are in space circumscriptively, that is they are bounded by it. Spirits are in space definitively as having an ubi, i.e., they are not everywhere but only somewhere. God is in space repletively, as filling all space. This, however, cannot be considered from the standpoint of extension, for this property applies only to matter. God is above the limita­tions of space, in that these are not applicable to Him. He is not absent from any portion of space any more than He is present in one portion more than another. Man and nature are everywhere present to Him, for all things are naked and opened unto the eyes of him with whom we have to do (Heb. 4: 13). Yet the Chris­tian concept of a Personal God prevents any trend toward pantheism, and clearly distinguishes God from all things in both fact and thought, If it be insisted that infinite Being must include all things, we can only refer again to our treatment of the Absolute. Infinite Spirit, to which only the term can apply, must if it is infinite in any true sense of the term, be able to create finite existences and endow them with free will.

3. Eternity. By eternity as an attribute of God, we can mean only that He stands superior to time, free from the temporal distinctions of past and future, and in whose life there can be no succession. This is the sense of those scriptures which speak of the eternity of God, none of which more explicitly set it forth than the reve­lation of the name I AM THAT I AM. From its first declaration made to Moses (Exod. 3: 14) to the final revelation made to St. John in the Apocalypse as that which is, and which was, and which is to come, the Al­mighty (Rev. 1: 8), this name not only declares the Aseity or Self-sufficiency but the Eternity of God. Earlier than the revelation to Moses, we are told that Abraham called there on the name of Jehovah, the everlasting God, or as it may be translated, the God of eternity (Gen. 21:33). In Deuteronomy we read that The eternal God is thy dwelling place, and underneath are the everlasting arms (Deut. 33: 27, R.V.). The psalmist declares that Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from ever­lasting to everlasting, thou art God (Psalm 90: 2); and again, Thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end (Psalm 102: 27), The Prophet Isaiah is specific in his reference to this attribute. I am the first and I am the last; and beside me there is no God (Isa. 44: 6); and again, thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy (Isa. 57: 15, Cf. 40: 28).  In the New Testament the same idea is expressed, but still in a more or less negative form. St. Paul speaks of his eternal power and Godhead (Rom. 1: 20 ). And closely related to this thought mentions the glory of the uncorruptible God (Rom. 1: 23 ). In the First Epistle to Timothy, the attribute of eternity is expressed by an ascription of praise, Now unto the King eternal, im­mortal, invisible, the only wise God, be honour and glory for ever and ever, Amen (I Tim. 1: 17). Apart from the august name I AM, it is evident that the references just cited carry with them the thought of duration in­definitely extended, but this is due to the fact that finite beings have no other mode of conception. Eternity must therefore be expressed in finite terms although the no­tion of a timeless being is not wanting. Furthermore, the pure idea of eternity was too abstract to find ex­pression in the earlier ages of the world, and Knapp points out that there was no word to express it in any of the ancient languages. The Hebrews like other nations were compelled to have recourse to circumlocution. To express eternity a parte ante, they used the expression, before the world was; and for eternity a parte post, they said, when the world shall be no more.

There are three different senses in which theologians have understood eternity in its relation to time. First, as endless duration, according to which time is a sort of existence which is external to God and conditions His existence. This would destroy His unity and like­wise prove contradictory to His attribute of unchange­ableness or immutability. Second, there is the idea of timelessness. As a philosophical theory this dates back to Plato and his timeless flow of ideas. But whether in philosophy or theology, the deepest thinkers of all the ages have seen the impossibility of attributing to God the ideas of time and succession as the conditions under which finite beings must think and act. To do so would indicate that the life of God was in successive parts, which must either be finite or infinite; if infinite, then each part would be equal to the whole, and each would be equal to the other. On the other hand, if the successive parts were finite, then the infinite would be the sum of finite things, and in either case the conclusion would be a reductio ad absurdum, Third, there is the position that both time and eternity are combined in the divine consciousness. One of two positions has generally been held concerning this relation in the Divine Mind, either that time has no meaning for God and therefore He bears no relation to the temporal order; or, that God's superiority over time is in some way connected with His intervention in time. As the finite self is above the stream of consciousness, without which there could be no knowledge of the temporal flow, so God as the Eternal is above all limitations of time; and it is exactly because of this that time exists or has any meaning. The two ideas of time and eternity are not exclusive. They are, on the other hand, objectively connected. The temporal, of necessity presupposes the eternal; and the eternal is at once the positive ground and the perpetual possibility of the temporal. The move­ment of the world in time, by which the past becomes the present and the present the future, would immediately cease were it not for the eternal. "The temporal and eternal do not in any way exclude each other," says Rothe. "The opposite of the temporal is the timeless, and therefore originless; the opposite of the eternal is the nonexistent" (ROTHE, Still Hours, p. 99). Instead of being opposed to each other, we must regard the eternal as the guaranty of continuity. From the negative point of view, eternity is merely the negation of time, but in the positive sense it is a mode of being which God sus­tains to time. The truth of eternity in the positive sense, is in some mysterious manner connected with the in­tuitive idea of God, while the temporal belongs to the intuitive idea of man. We must then hold fast the truth that as in self-consciousness, the self transcends the flow of time and yet recognizes this flow, so God also as the Eternal transcends time, but as the God of His creatures He works out His purposes for them under the law of time which He has Himself created. There is succession in the order of things as they exist; there can be no succession in God's knowledge of them. In dealing with His creatures, therefore, God recognizes them as past, present and future in this succession of existence; or as one theologian has so aptly stated it, God knows the past as past, the present as present and the future as future.

4. Immensity. As eternity expresses the contrast with the temporal world in God's mode of existence, so immensity expresses the same contrast with reference to the space world. It is sometimes identified with in­finity in opposition to the limitations of space, and is re­lated to omnipresence as transcendence is to immanence. As time is born out of eternity, so space is born out of immensity. Space is objective in that it is an existence mode of man, and subjective in that it is a thought mode of human reason. So also the immensity of infinitude is objective as the mode of the divine existence; and subjective as the order of divine reason. Immensity can­not be conceived as extension of space, as eternity can­not be conceived as the extension of duration. God as Spirit is above all spatial limitations, and it is because of this that such relations have validity.

This attribute is mentioned directly but once in the Bible, in two parallel passages found in I Kings 8: 27 and II Chronicles 6: 18, Behold, heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee; how much less this house which I have built. There are other passages, however, which indirectly teach the same truth. Thus saith the Lord, the heaven is my throne, and the earth is my foot­stool (Isa. 66: 1). Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him? saith the Lord. Do not I fill heav­en and earth? saith the Lord (Jer. 23: 24 ). The Lord looked down from heaven upon the children of men, to see if there were any that did understand, and seek God (Ps. 14: 2). As with the other attributes, the appeal of the Scriptures is primarily religious and devotional; and in this instance is designed especially to guard against the danger of unduly localizing our thought of God.

5. Immutability. By the immutability of God is meant His changelessness in essence or attribute, pur­pose or consciousness. Dr. Dickie thinks that this attribute should be included under eternity, and Dr. MacPherson points out, also, that eternity is generally as­sociated with unchangeableness. The two are related in much the same manner as omnipresence is related to im­mensity. When viewed ad intra immutability excludes all development, the process of becoming, any change or possibility of change; when viewed ad extra, God is the same after creation as before, the fullness of life and light and love, undiminished by the free outflow in cre­ation. It is opposed, therefore, to pantheism, or to any other form of emanation. "God is immutable," says Rothe, "because His being, in all its changes and modi­fications, remains constantly true to its own concep­tion   Seeing that God, at all times and in all His re­lations with the world, perfectly corresponds to His own idea. He is at all times like Himself, and consequently immutable" (ROTHE, Still Hours, p. 102). But there are some limitations. The divine unchangeableness must not be so interpreted as to preclude any movement in the divine life. Immutability is not a rigid sameness of being, but a characteristic of free intelligence. It refers to the essence or attributes of God, and not to His opera­tions in creation and providence, only in so far as these are always in harmony with the immutability of the divine nature. He loves righteousness and hates in­iquity. Consequently His moral government is always in harmony with His nature as holy love. He regards a person now with displeasure and now with complacency, according as that person is disobedient or righteous. The Divine immutability is therefore vital to both morality and religion.

The scriptural references to the immutability of God are peculiarly rich and satisfying. The psalmist declares, Thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end (Psalm 102: 27) and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews restates it in the words, But thou art the same, and thy years shall not fail (Heb. 1: 12). In the last book of the Old Testament the Prophet Malachi voices this attribute in the words, For I the Lord change not (Mal. 3: 6). Every good gift, says St. James, and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of Lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning" (James 1: 17 ). In Hebrews it is again stated that, Wherein God, willing more abun­dantly to shew unto the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath; that by two immutable things, in which it was impossible for God to lie, we might have a strong consolation, who have fled for refuge to lay hold upon the hope set before us (Heb. 6: 17, 18). "This is the perfection," says Dr. Blair, "which perhaps more than any other distinguishes the divine nature from the human, gives complete energy to all its attributes, and entitles it to the highest adora­tion. From hence are derived the regular order of na­ture and the steadfastness of the universe." The Eternal God who revealed Himself as the I AM to Moses, is the I AM of today, "infinite, eternal, unchangeable, in his be­ing, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth."

6. Perfection. By the term perfection is meant that attribute which consummates and harmonizes all the other perfections. It is by virtue of this that God is self-sufficient. Nothing, therefore, is wanting to His being which is needed for His blessedness. His knowledge, His will and His love are not dependent upon the existence of the creature, but find their relations and the infinite scope of their activity in the Persons of the Triune God.

We must regard this perfection also as a unity, unique and absolute. It is not the combination of the individual perfections, it is not the culmination of a process, it is the ground and source of all other perfection, and it ex­cludes all possibility of defect. God's perfection is simple and unique, excluding all plurality, and is peculiar to Himself. When, therefore, our Lord enjoined upon His disciples, Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect (Matt. 5: 48), He is pre­senting the Father as the Summum Bonum of all spirit­ual good and the chief end of man's enjoyment and de­votion; because as the Perfect One, He comprehends in His own being all that is needed for our own eternal blessedness.

Watson classifies the attributes as follows: (1) Unity; (2) Spiritual­ity; (3) Eternity; (4) Omnipotence; (5) Omnipresence; (6) Om­niscience; (7) Immutability; (8) wisdom; (9) Goodness; (10) Holiness.

Wakefield: (1) Unity; (2) Spirituality; (3) Eternity; (4) Omnipo­tence; (5) Omnipresence; (6) Omniscience; (7) Immutability; (8) Wis­dom; (9) Truth; (10) Justice; (11) Holiness; (12) Goodness.

Raymond: (1) Unity; (2) Spirituality; (3) Eternity; (4) Immuta­bility; (5) Omnipotence; (6) Omnipresence; (7) Omniscience; (8) Wis­dom; (9) Goodness.

Ralston: (1) Unity; (2) Spirituality; (3) Eternity; (4) Omniscience; (5) Wisdom; (6) Omnipotence; (7) Omnipresence; (8) Immutability; (9) Holiness; (10) Truth; (11) Justice; (12) Goodness.

Miley: (1) Omniscience; (2) Divine Sensibility; (3) Omnipotence. Dr. Miley treats Eternity, Unity, Omnipresence and Immutability as predicables but not distinctively attributes.

The idea we have of what the Divine Spirit is, is derived from our idea of what the human spirit is; this involves the actual existence of a real entity, a substance, an individual, simple substance, endowed with power to know, to feel and to will, a person conscious of self and not self, capable of moral actions and susceptible of moral character. These elements of being, conceived of as without limitation or defect, with all other known or unknown possible perfections, infinite in degree, make up our idea of God, and this, in the light of our conscious intuitions, confirmed, illustrated and enlarged by revelation, we are confident is, so far as it goes, a true idea; our knowledge of God is at best extremely limited and imperfect, but it is still positive knowledge; of spirituality and con­sequent self-conscious personality we cannot reasonably doubt.-RAY­MOND, Syst. Th., I, p. 314.

Three of the more essential attributes of God-namely, His self-existence, His eternal existence, and His literal independence-are all involved in the very idea of Him as the first originating cause. Thus, if He is the first cause of all things, then He is in Himself without cause. And if there is no cause of His existence outside of Himself, then He must have the grounds, the elements of existence within Himself; which is but saying that He is self-existent.-POND, Chr. Tb.., p. 49.

It follows also that God is a simple Being, not only as not composed of different elements, but also as not admitting of the distinction between substance and accidents. Nothing can either be added to, or taken from God. In this view the simplicity, as well as the other attributes of God, are of a higher order than the corresponding attributes of our spiritual nature. The soul of man is a simple substance, but it is subject to change. It can gain and lose knowledge, holiness and power. These are in this view accidents in our substance. But in God they are attributes, essential and immutable.-Hodge, Syst. Th., I, p. 379.

When it is said that God is eternal, the primary idea is, that His existence had no beginning, and will have no end; but evidently the Scrip­ture representations and the philosophic thought involve something more than the mere idea of duration: eternity is regarded as an attribute of God; that is, He is eternal in the sense that it is His nature to exist.- RAYMOND, Syst. Tb.., I, p. 315.

When considered as without a beginning, the schoolmen spoke of eternity as a pafle ante; when considered as having no end, it was called a parte post. This latter was frequently called immortality, which unlike that of finite creatures was considered necessary.

Nothing of a material or bodily nature can appertain to spirit. Matter possesses no power of thought or will, and is governed by laws entirely different from those which prevail in the sphere of spirit. The former is governed by the law of necessity, the latter by that of freedom. If this is so, and spirit is wholly unlike matter, it cannot be compounded, and is therefore simple (Cf. John 4:24 ). Here belong those texts which teach that God cannot be represented (Isa. 40:25, Exod. 20:4) .-KNAPP Chr. Tb.., p. 98.

­In the Scripture doctrine of God we, however, not only find it asserted that God has no beginning, but that He shall have no end.  No creature can, without contradiction, be supposed to have been from eternity; but even a creature may be supposed to continue to exist for­ever. Its existence, however, being originally dependent and derived, must continue so. It is not, so to speak, in its nature to live, or it never would have been nonexistent; and what it has not from itself, it has received, and must through every moment of its actual existence receive from its Maker.-WATSON, Theolog. Institutes.

The question of God's eternity has been a fruitful field for debate among theologians. It resolves itself into this, Is there succession in the divine consciousness? Some affirm, others deny. Those who affirm make eternity to consist in duration or continuance of being; those who deny maintain a nunc starts or eternal "Now." Of the former class, Watson says, "Duration as applied to God, is no more than an extension of the idea as applied to ourselves, and to exhort us to conceive of it as some­thing essentially different is to require us to conceive what is inconceiv­able. Charles Hodge says, "If, therefore, God be a Person, or a thinking Being, He cannot be timeless; there must be succession; one thought or state must follow another. To deny this, it is said, is to deny the per­sonality of God. The dictum, therefore, of the schoolmen, and of the theologians, that eternity precludes succession-that it is a persistent unmoving Now-is according to this repudiated (HEDGE, Syst. Tb.., I, p. 388ff). Dr. Summers criticizes this position advocated by Dr. Dwight as open to serious objection.

The explanation seems to lie in a truer conception of the nature of personality. There is a self which must be supra-temporal to the tem­poral flow of consciousness, or there could be no conception of this flow. Without an observer outside or above the temporal flow, how could suc­cession be known. So also in man as finite personality, there is an abid­ing element which constitutes itself one and the same, regardless of the multiplicity of changes in its own consciousness, Now may it not be possible, that those theologians above mentioned which are so insistent upon succession, and who regard eternity as mere duration, are referring rather to the content of consciousness with its multiplicity and change, while those who refer to the nunc starts or eternal Now, regard eternity as that which is back of and conditions the idea of succession. Dr. Sum­mers seems to admit this when he says that perhaps the objection to suc­cession in duration arises from confounding it with change in substance. We change by the flow of time; but we can conceive of an essence or substance which does not change, though there is a flow or succession in its duration. Simple duration has nothing to do with mutability or im­mutability; it is compatible with the former as predicated to us, and with the latter as predicated of God (Cf. Summers, Syst. Tb.., I, p. 78).

Dr. Raymond takes a clear and strong position. Referring to such Scripture citations as Isaiah 44:5 and 57:15, he says, "It is sometimes said that these affirmations so evidently true are equivalent to the af­firmation that with God there is no past or future, but from eternity to eternity one eternal now. If this be a denial that God sees things and events in succession, it is obj ectional; for evidently events occur in suc­cession, and God sees things as they are; not that He is older today than yesterday; nor yet that He is a stagnant ocean, eternally, immutably the subject of one and the same sole consciousness. He apprehends all His intelligent creatures as having a present, a past, and a future, as doing this now and that then. To Himself his own thought, purposes, and plans may be as eternal as Himself; and in this regard perhaps the con­ception of an eternal now may be valid; but as to all that is not God, it must be conceived that God regards them as existent yesterday, today and tomorrow. Of the truthfulness of the primary thought in respect to eternity of God, namely, that His existence had no beginning and will have no end, and also of the conception of necessary and therefore eternal existence, there can be no reasonable doubt; beyond this, prob­ably silence is wiser than speculation.-RAYMOND, Syst. Tb.., I, p. 316ff.

Dr. Pope takes a definite position in favor of the nunc stans. He says, "The perfect idea of eternity, as it is in the human mind, cannot tolerate duration or succession of thoughts as necessary to the divine consciousness. And this is the deep perplexity of our human intellect, which, however, must accept the profound meaning of the I AM as teaching an eternal now enfolding and surrounding the successive exist­ence of time. The Personal Jehovah once and once only declared His pure eternity. His name is the only word which human language affords in its poverty to express that thought; such terms as eternal and ever­lasting have temporal notions clinging to them; and all our phrases go no farther than that the Supreme fills all space and all time, and that He was before them, the very word carrying duration with it. But I AM - before time or space was I AM has in it all the strength of eternity. It is literally the assertion of pure existence, without distinction of past, present or future as measured in time and regulated by motion in space. We must therefore accept this doctrine of God in all its incomprehensible-ness, as the only one that satisfies the mind. The Eternal in Himself knows no succession in time any more than He knows circumscription of space; and when He created all things, His being remains as independent of duration as it is independent of locality. (Pors, Compend. Cb.r. Tb.., I, p. 295ff). Dr. Pope finds the explanation of his relations between time and eternity in Christ the eternal Logos. "We may dare to say that the Eternal inhabits eternity; and yet in the Son, the Firstborn of every creature, He inhabits time also. As in the incarnation God is manifest in the flesh, so in creation God is manifest in time. And as God will for­ever be manifest in His incarnate Son, so will He have forever in and through His Son, the Viceregent of created things, a manifestation in time; that is to say in plain words, eternity and time will forever co­exist. Something pertaining to time will cease; its change and probation and opportunity. In this sense time will cease to be, but in no other sense than this.-POPE, Compend. Cb.r. Tb.., I, p. 298ff.

Lotze says, "According to the ordinary view space exists, and things exist in it; according to our view, only things exist, and between them nothing exists, but space exists in them" (Outline Metaphysics, p. 87).

Most closely connected with this eternity of the Divine Being is the Unchangeableness, in virtue of which every idea of modification in His form of existence is utterly excluded (Mal. 3: 6, James 1:17), since He dwells in eternity; so that His perfection just as little admits of increase or diminution. In so far then, it is less accurate to speak of God's nature, since this word, by virtue of its derivation (nature from "nasci") necessarily suggests the idea of a growing or becoming. It is better to speak of the Being of God, as indicating that which in itself from eternity to eternity IS. (Exod. 3:14). What strong consolation flows from a believing acknowledgment thereof, can here only be indicated. Com­pare the 90th Psalm.-Van Oosterzee, Chr. Dogm., pp. 257, 258.

The divine intelligence is immutable, in the sense that it is an eternal, perfect knowledge of all things; but evidently a perfect knowledge of all things is a knowledge of them as they are: possible, as possible; actual, as actual; past, as past; present, as present; and future, as future; neces­sary events as necessary, and contingent events, as contingent. The phenomena of the divine moral and aesthetic nature are immutably the same, in the sense that they eternally correspond with the inherent nature of their object. God loves invariably that which is excellent, and ever feels aversion to that which is unlovely. He loves righteousness and hates iniquity and punishes the wicked. He is immutable in the prin­ciples of His government and is as variable in the application of those principles as are the ever varying objects to which they apply.-RAY­MOND, Syst. Tb.., I, p. 318.

The importance of this attribute is found in its use as a reverent de­fense of the adorable nature from all that would dishonor it in our thoughts or theological systems. If we sacrifice any one attribute to any other we derogate from the perfection of God who is the Being in whom every attribute has its supreme existence and manifestation. As it belongs essentially to God in Himself, so it impresses its stamp on all the divine works, and must give the law to all our theological views of His character.-POPE, Compend. Cb.r. Tb.., I, p. 304.

Strong relates perfection to the moral attributes, making it not quan­titative completeness but qualitative excellence. Right action among men presupposes a perfect moral organization, a normal state of intellect, affection and will. So God's activity presupposes a principle of intelli­gence, of affection, of volition, in His inmost being, and the existence of a worthy object for each of these powers of his nature. But in eternity past there is nothing existing outside or apart from God. He must find, as He does find, the sufficient object of intellect, affection and will, in himself. There is a self-knowing, a self-loving, a self-willing which constitute His absolute perfection. The consideration of the immanent attributes is, therefore, properly concluded with an account of that truth, love, and holiness, which render God entirely sufficient to himself.- STRONG, Syst. Tb.., I, p. 260.


In passing from a consideration of the Absolute to the Relative or Causal Attributes, it should be kept in mind that we are not presenting a new class of attri­butes, but the same perfections in another form and application. We have already sensed the difficulty of attempting to express the Absolute attributes apart from the relative, as for instance, when we speak of immensity or immutability, we are in reality applying to spiritual qualities the language of material things. It is this pov­erty of language that creates much of the difficulty in both philosophy and theology. If, as Dr. Pope suggests, we change our terms and speak of God as a Personal Spirit, infinite and eternal, ever the same in His nature and mode of being, and not thinking or acting of neces­sity under the limitations of time and space, we rid our­selves of this anomaly. But in doing so, we create an­other, this time the relation of personality and infinity. In dwelling upon the Absolute Attributes as we now at­tempt to bring them within the range of finite operation concerning the creature, we must hold firmly in our thinking to the fact that they form the background of every representation. This will obviate any difficulties which may arise from the use of anthropomorphic lan­guage and secure to us the truth, that without God speaking to man in terms which he can comprehend, there can be no science of theology and no religion. In changing from a consideration of the attributes as Absolute to the same attributes as Relative or Casual, we change our point of view from Absoluteness to Efficiency, from Be­ing to Power. Thus the Divine Aseity or Self-sufficiency finds expression in omnipotence or the all-powerfulness of God; while the Divine Immensity considered in rela­tion to space, and eternity in relation to time, with its closely related quality of Immutability, find expression in the omnipresence of God. Omniscience, however, does not appear to be so closely related to the Absolute Attri­butes as we have considered them, except in what we have summed up as Perfection. It belongs more especial­ly to personality as we understand it in the finite sense, and therefore becomes the logical transition point be­tween the metaphysical attributes considered as a whole, and the ethical attributes which belong to God in His relations with human personality. We shall then pre­sent the Relative or Causal Attributes in this order: first, Omnipresence, second, Omnipotence, third, Omniscience, and fourth, sum these up in the moral quality of good­ness as related to perfection on the one hand, and the ethical attributes on the other.

1.  Omnipresence. The Divine Immensity as pre­viously considered is the presupposition of the Divine Omnipresence. In the former, God was considered in a transcendental aspect as being superior to all spatial relations, here God is considered in an immanent aspect, as being present in all space as well as above it. By omni­presence we mean that God is not excluded from any­thing on the one hand, or included in anything on the other. But this immanence must be regarded as free and not necessitated. The error of pantheism lies in this, that it fails to recognize the truth that God's presence is not restricted to the limits of space; and further, that His im­manence in space can be understood only on the pre­supposition of His transcendence over space. "When, therefore, in harmony with Scripture, we speak of God as commensurable and everywhere present," says Van Oosterzee, "we have to understand this last expression, not in the extensive, but in the dynamical sense, and to be careful to keep ourselves from pantheistical leaven. Not a substantial, but an operative presence of God in every point of His creation must be ascribed to Him. In creating, He has not limited, but most gloriously re­vealed Himself. With His life-awakening power He is active in all things; but nevertheless is by no means im­prisoned in His own work. He embraces, rules, pene­trates it, not in the pantheistic, but in the theistic sense of the term" (VAN OOSTERZEE, Chr. Dogm., p. 258). Dr. Miley takes a similar position. He holds that the truth does not lie in the sense of a ubiquitous divine essence, which considered in itself would be without personal at­tributes, and therefore could not exercise the agency which must ever be a reality of the divine presence (MILEY, Systematic Theology, I, pp. 218, 219). So also, Thomas Aquinas taught (Summa Theologica, p. 8) that "God is in all things, not indeed as a part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon which it works."

There are three ways in which God may be regarded as omnipresent in the universe. First, the actual pres­ence of the Deity in every portion of the created uni­verse. Do not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord (Jer. 23: 24 ). By this it cannot be meant that the essence of God is extended or diffused in a pantheistic sense, for Spirit is not extended substance. It means rather in the dynamical or spiritual sense as we have just indicated. Nor can He in this sense be absent from any portion of the universe, or from any act of the beings which He has created and still be regarded as omnipresent. Dr. Dickie thinks that this means simply that God is not limited by spatial relations as we are. Dr. Rudolph Otto holds that God's relation to space is not the metaphysical abstrac­tion of omnipresence, but that God is where He wills to be, and that He is not where He does not will to be. Dr. Pope holds that this position with all its inevitable con­sequences is His absolute, or natural omnipresence. Second, by omnipresence is meant the presence of every creature to God, as would seem to be indicated in the statement, In him we live, and move, and have our being (Acts 17: 28). Viewed from the practical stand­point, this scripture is intended to impress upon men, that in His presence, every creature lives and moves, every thought is conceived and every deed done, so that nothing is hidden from the eyes of Him with whom we have to do. But it may be viewed in a metaphysical sense also. Creation as a potentiality is to be found in the very depths of the Eternal Being, but it becomes an actuality, only when there is an existence different and separate from that of God in which it lives and moves. True it is that everything is filled with God, but not in the pantheistic sense as we have already indicated. In this sense the divine omnipresence means simply that every creature is directly present to God and runs His course before Him. Third, by omnipresence is meant the exertion of God's power, which relates it even more closely to the divine activity. Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence? (Ps. 139: 7). This scripture when taken with its context indicates that God is present wherever there is a mani­festation of His power. In the light of our previous dis­cussion of the unity of God's person, the manifestation of His power is to be understood in connection with His omnipresence - that He is present at every point with His entire being.

One matter further, needs to be considered in our discussion of omnipresence. While God is omnipresent, He must be regarded as standing in different relations to His creatures. "God is present in one way in na­ture," says Bishop Martensen, "in another way in his­tory; in one way in the Church, in another way in the world; He is not in the same sense, present alike in the hearts of His saints, and in those of the ungodly; in heaven and in hell" (James 4: 8) (MARTENSEN, Chr. Dogm., p. 94). Dr. Gerhart takes a similar position, maintaining that the presence of God with the world is determined by the form of receptivity with which each order of creation is endowed by His own free creative word (GERHART, Institutes, I, p. 487). With these dis­tinctions before us, we must conclude that the omni­presence of God with finite things must ever be different from His presence with Himself in His glory. When the prophet called upon God to look down from heaven, and behold from the habitation of thy holiness and of thy glory (Isa. 63: 15) he could but mean that God who is omnipresent everywhere, manifests His glory more peculiarly and brightly in the region which we call heaven than in any other sphere, just as the sun which shines everywhere displays its full splendor only in the firmament. Nothing, therefore, prevents us from thinking of heaven as a place higher than the earthly and material sphere of things, and that it is to this habita­tion of His presence that Jesus intended to point us, when He taught us to pray, "Our Father which art in heaven" (Matt. 6:9).

While the question of omnipresence has given rise to many metaphysical problems, the Scriptures are rich and varied in their teaching on this subject. Further­more, it is a truth also, which is admitted by common in­telligence. The devout always worship Him as a very present help in time of need. Am I a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar off? Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him? saith the Lord. Do not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord (Jer. 23: 23 , 24). For thus saith the high and lofty One that in­habiteth eternity, whose name is Holy; I dwell in the high and holy place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones (Isa. 57: 15). Thus saith the Lord, The heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool (Isa. 66: 1). For he looketh to the ends of the earth, and seeth under the whole heaven (Job 28: 24). The Lord looketh from heaven; he beholdeth all the sons of men. From the place of his habitation he looketh upon all the inhabitants of the earth (Psalm 33: 13, 14). It is such scriptures as these that lead us to a conception of the value of the divine omnipresence in religious worship. How it is possible that the Infinite Person should be everywhere is to the finite mind beyond all comprehension, and yet whenever God's people draw near to Him in prayer, they apprehend Him as then and there present in the fullness of His infinite perfections.

2. Omnipotence. The omnipotence of God is the ground of all that we call efficiency or causality. It is related to the absolute attribute of Aseity as personality expressed in will, and to the omnipresence of God, as Aseity related to the creature. Being an expression of the divine will, it is also directly and vitally connected with the moral attributes of God. Omnipotence is rightly defined as that perfection of God by virtue of which He is able to do all that He pleases to do. This is the scriptural definition. There is nothing too hard for thee (Jer. 32: 17). But our God is in the heavens: he hath done whatsoever he hath pleased (Psalm 115:3). Both the prophets and the psalmist are discriminating in their thought, limiting God's power to that which is in conformity with His good pleasure. He can do all, not perhaps in the abstract as appertaining to that which is contrary to His nature and will, but all that He wills to do. Whatever is impossible to Him, is not such because of a limitation of His power but solely because His nature makes it so, in the same sense that His holiness is incom­patible with sin. Tertullian says, "For God to will is to be able, and not to will is not to be able." With the ex­ception, therefore of that which is contrary to His nature, nothing exists for Him of which the realization surpasses the power.

The Scriptures throughout abound in expressions which declare the infinite power of God. From the earli­est time God revealed Himself to Abraham saying, 1 am the Almighty God; walk before me and be thou per­fect (Gen. 17: 1); and this is followed by the declara­tion, I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, as God Almighty (Exod. 6:3, R.V.). The Psalms with their devotional richness, make much of the all-powerfulness of God. God hath spoken once; twice have I heard this; that power belongeth unto God (Psalm 62: 11). Let all the earth fear the Lord: let all the inhabitants of the world stand in awe of him. For he spake, and it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast (Psalm 33: 8, 9). The Prophet Jeremiah declares that He hath made the earth by his power, he hath estab­lished the world by his wisdom. .. . when he uttereth his voice, there is a tumult of waters in the heavens, and he causeth the vapors to ascend from the ends of the earth, he maketh lightnings for the fain, and bringeth forth the wind out of his treasuries (Jer. 10: 12 , 13, R.V.).

The New Testament is equally explicit in its teach­ing concerning the omnipotence of God, but here the re­ligious significance is even more marked than in the Old Testament. It is well understood that in the Greek creeds the word pantokrator (pantocratwr), translated into the Latin as omnipotens, means the all-governing; and it is in this sense that it is largely used by the New Testament writers. In its application to the work of salvation, Jesus declared that with men this is impos­sible; but with God all things are possible (Matt. 19: 26 ). Referring to God's preserving and protective power as exerted toward His people, Jesus said to the Jews in Solomon's porch, My Father, which gave them me, is greater than all; and no man is able to pluck them out of my Father's hand (John 10: 29). The Apostle Paul in a reference to Abraham, speaks of God who quickeneth the dead, and calleth those things which be not as though they were (Rom. 4: 17 ). Later in an ascription of praise he says, Now unto him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us, unto him be glory in the church by Christ Jesus throughout all ages, world with­out end. Amen (Eph. 3: 20 , 21). The last book of the New Testament gives us a vision of God as the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending. which is, and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty (Rev. 1: 8). And again, Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honour and power: for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created (Rev. 4: 11). Thus the attribute of omnipotence is made the basis on the one hand, for deep and abiding religious adoration; and on the other, is the ground and firm sup­port for quiet trust and assurance.

It is evident that even omnipotence must be con­ditioned by God's wisdom and goodness. William New­ton Clarke points out that it is easy to fall into the error of regarding omnipotence as the ability to do everything that can be thought, but divine power must always oper­ate in harmony with the divine nature. He cannot do anything contrary to His divine will, this would be ir­rational, and contradictory to Himself. It was this that occasioned in Van Oosterzee the contention that Sover­eignty must be regarded as an attribute of God, and this in an unlimited sense (VAN OOSTERZEE, Chr. Dogm., p. 263ff). William Adams Brown defines omnipotence as God's ability to do all things which His character and pur­pose may suggest (BROWN, Th. in Outline, p. 116). This, says Dr. Charles Hodge, is all we need to know on this subject, were it not for the vain attempts of theo­logians to reconcile these simple and sublime truths of the Bible with their philosophical speculations.

There are several deductions of importance that should be mentioned here. (1) Theologians have gener­ally made a distinction between the mediate and im­mediate, an ordaining and an ordained manner in which the power of God is manifested. To this difference in the manifestation of power, the term potestas absoluta is applied to the absolute power which creates all things at first; and potestas ordinata to the government through secondary laws. The immediate exertion of power in this sense would be the potestas absoluta, while the mediate exercise of that power would be the potestas ordinata. The first would be ordaining or absolute; the second ordained or relative. This distinction makes clear the difference between the supreme creative power of God, and the economical exercise of that power for the benefit of His creatures. (2) Modern empirical phi­losophy which denies cause as that to which an effect is due, and makes it consist solely in that which uniform­ly precedes it, destroys thereby the idea of power, and finds no place for the omnipotence of God. This was the doctrine of causation advanced by Hume, Kant, Brown, Mill and in some sense by Hamilton ; and it is this idea which lies at the foundation of Comte's Positive Phi­losophy. (3) Dr. Miley calls attention to an important distinction between the elective and the executive agency of the divine will. The choice of an end, he points out, is not necessarily its producing cause, otherwise the ef­fect must be instant upon the choice. This would deny to God the possibility of a plan or purpose and destroy all future effectuation by the causal energy of His per­sonal will (Cf. MILEY, Syst. Th., I, p. 213). God as a personal Being is free to determine His own plans by the elective agency of His will, and to perfect them by the executive agency of that same will. This is the mean­ing of the apostolic declaration that He worketh all things after the counsel of his own will. (Eph. 1: 11.)

As previously indicated, there is no doctrine more important in religious value than that of the divine om­nipotence. It led our Lord courageously to the cross, in the confidence that through the omnipotence of God, His cause would triumph even over death, the last enemy.  It has given courage to the saints of all ages, and in spite of discouragement and apparent defeat, has caused them to be more than conquerors.

3. Omniscience. By omniscience is meant the per­fect knowledge which God has of Himself and of all things. It is the infinite perfection of that which in us we call knowledge. Consequently we read that His understanding is infinite (Psalm 147: 5). God under­stands and knows the hearts of men. Nothing is hid­den from Him. He sees things as they are, in both their causes and ends. The teaching of the Scriptures concerning this attribute is, as in the case of those which we have previously discussed, made the basis of religious values. The Prophet Isaiah expressly assigns an insight into all futurity, as marking the distinction between Je­hovah and false gods. Shew the things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that ye are gods; (Isa. 41: 23) and again, Behold, the former things are come to pass, and new things do I declare; before they spring forth I tell you of them (Isa. 42: 9). Ezekiel takes a like position. Thus have ye said, O house of <st1:country-region> Israel </st1:country-region> : for I know the things that come into your mind, every one of them (Ezek. 11: 5). In I Chronicles 28: 9 David en­joins obedience upon Solomon, declaring that the Lord searcheth all hearts, and understandeth all the imagina­tions of the thoughts. Again he seems overwhelmed with the thought that He knowest my downsitting and mine uprising, thou understandest my thought afar off     For there is not a word in my tongue, but, lo, O Lord, thou knowest it altogether.  Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high, I cannot attain unto it (Psalm 139: 2-6 and entire Psalm). The New Testament presents this attribute with even greater clearness. The Apostle James in speaking to the Council at Jeru­salem uses the expression, Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world (Acts 15: 18 ). St. Paul uses foreknowledge in conjunction with pre­destination, For whom he did foreknow, he also did pre­destinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren (Rom. 8: 29 . Cf. also Eph. 1: 4, 5). Conformable to this are the words of St. Peter, Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ (I Peter 1: 2).

The attribute of omniscience occupies a critical and important place in theology. There is something about it peculiarly perplexing, even more so than the attribute of omnipotence. As omnipotence cannot be considered apart from the attributes of wisdom and knowledge, so omniscience seems to bear even a closer relation if pos­sible to the unique and Divine Personality. It does, in fact, furnish the transitional point between the relative and moral attributes, although we must sum up the former in a consideration of goodness, which as an attri­bute of God, may in some sense be included in either clas­sification. In the New Testament citations of the preced­ing paragraph, it has been shown that the attribute of omniscience has, for the most part been considered in relation to the moral government of God. This gives rise to two problems; (I) the question of the divine knowledge of contingent events, commonly known as foreknowl­edge. This subject is frequently discussed under the head of nescience and prescience, the former being a denial of foreknowledge in God, the latter its affirma­tion. (II) The question concerning the relation which exists between foreknowledge and predestination.

(I) The question of the divine foreknowledge has been the occasion of much speculation. Its importance lies in the fact that it is closely connected with predes­tination, which as the ground for a type of redemptive theory, forms the subject of our next paragraph. The question of the reality of the divine knowledge has been held in the following forms. (1) Pantheism denies the divine knowledge in the sense of omniscience, for the Divine Being in the pantheistic sense is a coming to con­sciousness only through finite creatures, and therefore can never be infinite. (2) Divine foreknowledge has been denied by some Christian theologians on the ground of a nunc stans or eternal now in the consciousness of God. Thus Augustine says, "What is prescience but the knowledge of future things? What can be future to God, who transcends all time? But of the knowledge He has of things themselves, they are not to Him future, but present, and consequently it cannot be called pre­science but knowledge." (3) Both the Arminian and Calvinistic theologians hold to the scientia necessaria, or the knowledge that God has of Himself, and scientia libera, or the free knowledge which God has of persons and things outside of Himself. However, they differ as to the ground of this foreknowledge, the Arminians gen­erally maintaining that God has a knowledge of pure contingency, while the Calvinistic theologians connect, it with the decrees which God has purposed in Himself. (4) There is a mediating position commonly known as scientia media or a knowledge of the hypothetical. This theory was advanced by the Jesuits, Molina, Fonseca, Suarez and other distinguished theologians of this order, who were opposed to the predestinarianism of the Jan­senists. It was accepted by the Arminian theologians, Limborch and Curcellaeus, and by a number of the Lutheran divines. Pope states that it has been generally accepted by all antipredestinarian theologians. The Cal­vinists were generally opposed to it. Van Oosterzee de­fines the three positions as follows: "The divine knowl­edge," he says, "is divided into a natural knowledge, which He has of Himself; and a so-called free knowledge, which He has of all that exists beyond Himself. And then again, from these two is further distinguished the conditional knowledge (Scientia media or hypothetica), by virtue of which He is exactly acquainted, not only with all which will happen, but also with all which would or would not happen under certain nonexistent condi­tions-the so-called futuribile. That this last also is known to God, will certainly not be denied: it is simply an insignificant part of that great whole which lies naked and open before Him." His conclusion is that whether knowledge be free or conditional, "absolutely nothing is excluded from the divine knowledge."

(II) Our second question is concerned with the re­lation which exists between foreknowledge and predes­tination. Three positions are taken in theology: (1) The Arminian position holds that the power of contrary choice is a constituent element of human freedom, and that foreknowledge must refer to free acts and therefore to pure contingency. Both Limborch and Curcellaeus maintain that God's ability to know is not to be judged by human standards, but that He foresees the necessary as coming to pass in a necessary way, and the contingent as occurring contingently (CURCELLAEUS, II, 6; LIM­BORCH, II, 8). "It is not the divine foreknowledge that conditions what takes place," says Dr. Pope, "but what takes place conditions the divine foreknowledge. We have seen again and again that the God of eternity has condescended to be the God of time, with its past, present and future. Instead of saying with the schoolmen that to God there is only an eternal now, it were better to say that to God as absolute essence there is the eternal now, and also to God as related to the creature there is the process of succession. Predestination must have its rights; all that God wills to do is foredetermined. But what human freedom accomplishes, God can only fore­know; otherwise freedom is no longer freedom" (POPE, Compend. Chr. Th., I, p. 318ff). Dr. Sheldon says that this theory should rather be called the Catholic than the Arminian, since it was the current theory in the pre­-Reformation Church from the apostolic age onward. It has in general been held by both the Lutheran and Anglican divines, and is still the dominant theory in the Greek and Roman Catholic churches (Cf. SHELDON, Syst. Chr. Doct., p. 173).  (2) The Calvinistic position identi­fies foreknowledge and foreordination, maintaining that the divine decrees are the ground for the occurrence of all events, including the voluntary actions of men. On this theory, foreknowlege depends upon the certainty of the decrees, and is not strictly a knowledge of contingent events. "He foresees future events," says Calvin, "only in consequence of His decree that they should happen" (CALVIN, Institutes, Bk. III, Chapt. 23). Turretin takes the same position. "The reason is," he says, "that the foreknowledge of God follows His decree, and as the de­cree cannot be changed, so neither can His knowledge be subject to mistake" (TURRETIN, Inst. Locus III, Quoest. 12). Cocceius, after identifying foreknowledge with the divine agency, makes a place for second causes. "God foresees from eternity what is to take place," he says, "because nothing is to take place without the agency of God." Then follows the statement, that "What He sees as hereafter to come to pass, He sees in the decree, by which either He summons events to take place, or by which He has decided to supply to the sinning creature the concursus of the first cause, without which the second is not able to act" (COCCEIUS, Summa Theol., Chapt. X). Dr. Charles Hodge thinks that the difficulty vanishes when a distinction is made between the cer­tainty of an act and the mode of its occurrence. (3) The Socinian position denies that God has any foreknowl­edge of contingent events. Both Faustus Socinus and Johannes Crell maintained that the contingent is in its very nature unknowable, and that therefore it is no more derogatory to exclude prescience from the om­niscience of God than it is to exclude from omnipotence the power to do those things which are contradictory to the divine nature. This theory was advanced in an at­tempt to harmonize foreknowledge and freedom. At a later time Dr. Adam Clarke advanced the peculiar view that God can know all future events but does not choose to do so. This view was never accepted by the Methodist theologians. Rothe and Martensen have in a measure reasserted the Socinian theory, the latter maintaining a conditional foreknowledge. "The actual alone," he says, "which is in and for itself rational and necessary, can be the subject of an unconditional foreknowledge, the actual which is not this, cannot be so; it can only be foreknown as possible, as eventual." Again, he says, that events "in so far as these are conditioned by the freedom of the creature, can only be the subject of a conditional foreknowledge; i.e., they can only be fore­known as possibilities, as Futurabilia, but not as reali­ties, because other possibilities may actually take place" (Cf. MARTENSEN, Chr. Dogm., pp. 218, 219). It is evi­dent that here the original Socinian position is consider­ably modified. In other statements in this section (Sec. 116) the reformed tendencies are in evidence, and ap­pear in contrast to the strict Lutheranism of the greater portion of his valuable work.

The Arminian position, as has been pointed out, is in reality the Catholic view of the Church, and is the only one which can be consistently maintained in har­mony with the great doctrines of salvation. Both the earlier Arminians and the later Wesleyans have sub­stantiated their positions with lengthy and logical argu­ments. Perhaps the best known of these arguments in favor of divine prescience is that of Richard Watson in his Theological Institutes (I, p. 365ff). Wakefield as­serts, that the position which holds that certain pre­science destroys contingency, is a mere sophism. Dr. Raymond with no little zeal declares that "with the ex­ception of atheists, pantheists, positivists, and that class of thinkers who have discussed the absolute and the in­finite in a way to philosophize themselves into a pro­fession of total ignorance, and into a conviction that the knowledge of God is impossible, all men regarded the in­finite First Cause as not only absolute and infinite, but also a Person possessing intelligence and free will, and especially regard His intelligence as without limitation. In the common apprehension, God has a perfect knowl­edge of all that is or can be; all existence and all events, the actual and the possible, the present, the past and the future" (RAYMOND, Syst. Th., I, p. 330).

4.  Wisdom. As a divine attribute wisdom is closely related to and dependent upon omniscience, but is usu­ally given separate treatment by Arminian theologians.  Dr. Summers, however, treats omniscience as compre­hended under the attribute of Wisdom. Wakefield de­fines the wisdom of God as "that attribute of His nature by which He knows and orders all things for the promo­tion of His glory and the good of His creatures" (Cf. WAKEFIELD, Chr. Th., p. 159). While wisdom and knowl­edge are closely related, the distinction is clear. Knowl­edge is the apprehension of things as they are, and wis­dom is the adaptation of this knowledge to certain ends. As knowledge is necessary to wisdom, so omniscience in God is necessary to His infinite wisdom. The Scriptures are peculiarly rich in their references to the religious value of the divine wisdom and to this we shall give our attention.

Job declares that With him is wisdom and strength; he hath counsel and understanding (Job 12: 13 ), and again, He is mighty in strength and wisdom (Job 36: 5). The psalmist exclaims, O Lord, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all: the earth is full of thy riches (Psalm 104: 24). The Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth; by understanding hath he estab­lished the heavens (Prov. 3: 19 ). Daniel answered and said, Blessed be the name of God for ever and ever: for wisdom and might are his (Dan. 2: 20 ). The New Testa­ment is equally rich in its praise of this divine attribute. O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowl­edge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out (Rom. 11: 33 ). The Apostle Paul in his refutation of the Gnostic tendencies, declares that Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God (I Cor. 1: 24 ); again, that He is made unto us wisdom,and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption (I Cor. 1: 30 ). This is a reference to the Logos or the Divine Word, which in the Old Testament was personi­fied as Wisdom. The Lord possessed me in the be gin­ning of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was     Then I was by him, as one brought up with him: and I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him (Prov. 8: 22 , 23, 30). This wisdom became the in­carnate Word, which was in the beginning with God and was God (Cf. John 1: 1). Now unto the King eternal, im­mortal, invisible, the only wise God, be honour and glory for ever and ever. Amen (I Tim. 1: 17 ).

5. Goodness. The goodness of God is that attribute by reason of which God wills the happiness of His crea­tures. Perfection as we have shown, is the absolute ex­cellence which God has in Himself; goodness is that ex­cellence which moves God to impart being and life to finite things apart from His divine essence, and to com­municate to them such gifts as they have capacity to re­ceive. Goodness is generally expressed by the Hebrew word chesedh, and by the Greek words  agaqosunh or crhstoth" and such like terms. The goodness of God ad intra belongs to the Holy Trinity, in which the Blessed Three eternally communicate to each other their infinite richness. In this sense, goodness is eternal and neces­sary. The goodness of God ad extra is voluntary, and refers primarily to His benevolence which may be de­fined as that disposition which seeks to promote the happiness of His creatures. Schouppe defines it as "the constant will of God to communicate felicity to His crea­tures, according to their conditions and His own wisdom."It is related to love, but love is limited to respon­sive persons or to those capable of reciprocation, while goodness applies to the whole creation. Not a sparrow is forgotten before God (Luke 12: 6). The word is applied to the whole creation in the dawn of its existence. And God saw every thing that he had made, and, behold, it was very good (Gen. 1: 31). The positive declarations of Scripture concerning the goodness of God are numerous and convincing. God said to Moses, I will make all my goodness pass before thee (Exod. 33: 19); and again, The Lord God, merciful and gracious, longsuffering, and abundant in goodness and truth (Exod. 34:6). The psalmist seems to take delight in meditating upon the goodness of God. Surely goodness and mercy shall fol­low me all the days of my life: and I will dwell in the house of the Lord for ever (Psalm 23: 6). I had fainted, unless I had believed to see the goodness of the Lord in the land of the living (Psalm 27: 13). O how great is thy goodness, which thou hast laid up for them that fear thee (Psalm 31: 19). The goodness of God endureth con­tinually (Psalm 52: 1). They shall abundantly utter the memory of thy great goodness, and shall sing of thy right­eousness (Psalm 145: 7). Isaiah mentions the great goodness toward the house of <st1:country-region> Israel </st1:country-region> (Isa. 63: 7) and Zechariah voices the exclamation, For how great is his goodness, and how great is his beauty! (Zech. 9: 17). In the New Testament the Apostle Paul speaks of the goodness of God as leading to repentance ( <st1:country-region> Rom. </st1:country-region> 2: 4); and in the same epistle mentions the goodness and severity of God as apparently the constituent elements of the divine holiness (Rom. 22: 22 ). In Gal. 5: 22 and Eph. 5: 9 goodness is mentioned as a fruit of the spirit.

It is common in this connection to append a theodicy, or at least to give the subject some consideration, By theodicy is meant the vindication of God's wisdom and goodness in the creation and government of the world. Within the sacred canon, the Book of Job may be said to be the theodicy of the Old Testament. In true philo­sophical form, the first work of importance on this sub­ject in modern times was that of Leibnitz (1747); and closely following were the works of Benedict (1822), Von Schaden (1842), Maret (1857), and Young, Evil and Good (1861). Dr. Summers gives a chapter to this important subject (Cf. SUMMERS, Syst. Th., I, pp. 122-146). Dr. Pope treats the subject briefly, introducing it as follows: "But the tremendous difficulty arises that evil exists. The goodness of God is the attribute which this fact most directly confronts: not His love, which does not emerge in its glory from the ground of His lovingkindness until sin already exists; not His holi­ness, which likewise implies the existence of what He forever rejects; not His wisdom, which has its grand­est illustration in its making evil subservient to His de­signs. But it is forever argued that a Creator of un­bounded benevolence and power, must, or might, or ought to have prevented the origination of evil. There are only two possible solutions of this profound difficulty. Either the desperate expedient must be adopted of re­nouncing a supreme God altogether; a solution which is really no solution, for atheism solves nothing but dis­solves all. Or, accepting the testimony of God himself, we must bow before an unfathomable mystery, and seek our refuge in the harmony of the divine attributes (Cf. POPE, Compend. Chr. Th., I, p. 322). Probably no better solution has ever been offered than that of John Wesley. "Why is sin in the world? Because man was created in the image of God; because he is not mere matter, a clod of earth, a lump of clay, without sense or understanding, but a spirit like his Creator; a being endued not only with sense and understanding, but also with a will ex­erting itself in various affections. To crown all the rest, he was endued with liberty, a power of directing his own affections and actions, a capacity of determining him­self, or of choosing good and evil. Indeed, had not man been endued with this, all the rest would have been of no use. Had he not been a free as well as an intelligent being, his understanding would have been as incapable of holiness or any other kind of virtue, as a tree or a block of marble. And having this power, a power of choosing good and evil, he chose the latter, he chose evil. Thus 'sin entered into the world.'" (WESLEY, Sermons).

There is another predicate which must be given consideration also, before passing from the absolute to the Relative Attributes, that of the Divine Freedom which we must posit in opposition to pantheism as a sufficient reason why anything not God exists at all. But in ascribing will to God, we have carried our study to a consideration of His spiritual nature in the light of our own as we have not done before. But the Spirit as it applies to God must embrace knowledge, sensibility and will. Personality has its essential factors, self-determination, and self-evalua­tion. The apostle sums up this idea of will as expressed in purpose and resulting in act in the Epistle to the Ephesians ( 1:11 ) Who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will. Here we have thelma or will in exercise; boula or determination of that will; and the issue in action as energountos. It is therefore one of the attributes which with the divine omniscience forms a link between the absolute perfections and those per­fections related to the creature. This needs to be understood, for it means that the act of God going toward His creatures is to be sought only in Himself; the will is indeed the necessity of His essence, like the attributes already considered, but it is itself under no necessity.-POPE, Compend. Chr. Tb.., I, p. 303.

Dr. Knudson treats the attribute of omnipresence as a specification under omnipotence. E. G. Robinson regards omnipresence as a com­pound of omnipotence and omniscience. Foster considers Immensity and Omnipresence together, regarding them as the same attribute under dif­ferent aspects. He makes this distinction in that he regards omni­presence as limiting the Divine essence to the bounds of creation, while immensity carries with it the thought that the essence is limitless beyond the bounds of creation. Wakefield defines the Omnipresence or Ubiquity of God as His being everywhere present at the same time.

We are not to conceive of the omnipresence of God, however, as a universal, material extension; so that a part of him is in one place and a part in another; for, being a spirit, God is not divisible into parts. Besides, something more than a part of God is needed here, and everywhere, for the performance of Divine works.-POND, Chr. Th., p. 50.

Turretin says, "Bodies are conceived of as existing in space circum­scriptively because occupying a certain portion of space, they are bound­ed by space on every side. Created spirits do not occupy any portion of space, nor are they embraced by any. They are in space definitively as here and not there. God is in space repletively, because in a transcend­ent manner His essence fills all space."

It was on this principle that the apostle argued when he disputed with the learned Athenians. God is not far from every one of us, that is, He is intimately near and present with us; for in him we live, and move, and have our being. If things live, God is in them and gives them life. If things move, God imparts to them their motion. If things have being, that being is in God. Every object that meets our eye on the sur­face of the earth, or in the expanse above us, announces His presence. By Him the sun shines, the winds blow, the earth is clothed with vege­tation, and the tides of the ocean rise and fall. Everywhere He exists in the fullness of perfection. The universe is a magnificent temple, erected by His own hands, in which He manifests Himself to His intelligent crea­tures. The Divine Inhabitant fills it, and every part shines with His glory.-WAKEFIELD, Chr. Th., p. 150.

Hahn remarks, that from the history of the various opinions which have prevailed respecting the omnipresence of God, it appears that most of the errors have arisen from confounding the ideas of body and sub­stance. In doing this our author has followed the example of Reinhard, Morus, Doederlein and others, who adopted the philosophy of Leibnitz and Wolf. In denying to God a body, and thus avoiding the errors of pantheism, they seemed at the same time unconsciously to deny Him sub­stance, and to transmute Him into an unessential thought, and then to locate Him somewhat beyond the limits of the universe, from whence He looks forth, and exerts His power upon all His works; in which, therefore, He is not otherwise present than by His knowledge and agency. -KNAPP, Chr. Th., p. 106.

Knapp points out that some of the older theologians entertained more than others the scriptural position that both the substantial and efficient presence of God were involved in His omnipresence. The tendency to separate between these two, were it possible, leads to a misplaced em­phasis. Thus Dr. Miley sees only in omnipresence the divine efficiency, and tends to minify the notion of an omnipresent divine essence as the necessary ground of omniscience and omnipotence. He maintains that personal agency is for us the only vital reality of this presence. It is to this position that Dr. Hills objects, maintaining that this omnipresence is not to be understood as a mere presence in knowledge and power, but an omnipresence of the divine essence. This, however, is in nowise inter­preted in the pantheistic sense (Cf. HILLS, Fund. Tb.., I, p. 230ff). Dr. Raymond, with his usual comprehensive grasp of truth, gathers up both phases of the truth in the statement, "Such assumptions as are incon­sistent with the Bible representations and the common apprehensions must be rejected. For example, if it be affirmed that God is every­where present by extension or diffusion, so that it may be said that a part of God is here and a part of God there; or if it be said that God is present everywhere solely by His knowledge and His power, such views are to be rejected, since truth requires us to conceive that the divine essence is unlimited as fully and as perfectly as are the divine attributes. God, as to all that is God, is everywhere always; the infinite essence is incapable of division and separation; essence and attribute, immutably inseparable, fill immensity; all of God everywhere is a truth cognized both by piety and sound philosophy."-RAYMOND, Syst. Th., I, p. 328.

Proceeding from this principle, we may dwell on a few important inferences. (I) The omnipotence of God is the ground and secret of all efficiency, or what we call causality. No argument, however specious, can rob us of the indestructible conviction that there is such a power in the nature of things as we call cause; that there is a connection be­tween events which is more than sequence. As in regard to almost every attribute of God, but in this case with more than usual distinctness we perceive in ourselves the finite reflection of the Infinite. We are conscious of producing effects as ourselves their cause. From that, remembering two things, we rise to the Divine Omnipotence. (II) The range of our direct causation is exceedingly limited: very decisive so far as it extends, it soon reaches its term. In the interior economy of our spiritual nature it is comparatively great; in the government of our bodily constitution less; in our action upon others it has decreased rapidly; and in our action upon external nature it is gone. (III) All power in us is derived from Him: He is the absolute source of all causation. It is not simply that He can do all things; but all things that are done are done by the operation of causes that owe their efficiency to Him, though in many cases the efficiency is contrary to His will-POPE, Compend. Chr. Tb.., I, pp. 311, 312.

In explanation of the foregoing paradox, Dr. Pope says, "In the in­finite wisdom of God things contrary to His will in one sense are per­mitted by His will in another. This leads up to the original mystery that the Almighty created beings capable of falling from Him; and down again to the present mystery that omnipotence sustains in being creatures opposing His authority; and then forward to the same mystery in its consummate form that omnipotence will preserve in being, not indeed active rebels against His authority, but spirits separated from Himself. It is the solemn peculiarity of this attribute, in common with wisdom and goodness, that it is traversed and thwarted, so to speak, by the creatures that owe to it their origin. But the same three attributes are conspicuous in the redeeming economy-POPE, Compend. Chr. Th., I, p. 313

God cannot do that which is repugnant to any of His perfections. He cannot lie, or deceive, or deny Himself, for to do so would be injurious to His truth. He cannot love sin, for this would be inconsistent with His holiness. He cannot punish the innocent, for this would destroy His goodness. This, however, is not a physical, but a moral impossibility, and is, therefore, no limitation of omnipotence; but to ascribe a power to God which is inconsistent with the rectitude of His nature, is not to magnify, but to abase Him.-WAKEFIELD, Cbs. Tb.., pp. 148, 149.

Concerning the distinction between potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata as he expresses these terms, Dr. Charles Hodge says, "This distinction is important, as it draws the line between the natural and the supernatural, between what is due to the operation of natural causes, sustained and guided by the providential efficiency of God, and what is due to the immediate exorcise of His power. This distinction indeed, is rejected by modern philosophy." Modern philosophy holds that God in creating and sustaining the world, does it as a whole. Nothing is there­fore isolated and consequently there are no individual acts, but only a general efficiency on the part of God. Nothing is referred to His im­mediate agency. Everything is natural, and hence both miracles and special providences are rejected. (Cf. HODGE, Syst. Tb.., I, p. 410.)

Dr. Raymond says of the Scripture representations of divine power, that they are "incomparable in their perspicuity and their sublimity; perspicuous because written by the inspiration of the Almighty, who alone can comprehend the measure of His power; and sublime because the thing described is itself the perfection of sublimity. These are not the invented words of a poetic fancy, but the words of truth and sober­ness, literally presenting the thought intended.-RAYMOND, Syst. Tb., I, p. 320ff.

Foster affirms that aside from the first chapter of Genesis, perhaps the finest description of physical omnipotence is the description found in Job, chapter thirty-eight.

William Newton Clarke attempts an explanation similar to that of Pope by maintaining a twofold aspect of omniscience, a knowledge of the universe as it exists eternally as His own idea, and a knowledge of that universe as existing in time and space, and therefore as a per­petual process of becoming. This goes back to the Logos idea of a pleroma. Dr. Clarke offers this as an explanation as to how God may have at once a foreknowledge of things as under the temporal order and a simultaneous knowledge in the eternal order (Cf. CLARKE, Outline of Chr. Th., p. 82).

"This whole difficulty," says Hodge, "arises out of the assumption that contingency is essential to free agency. If an act may be certain as to its occurrence, and yet free as to the mode of its occurrence, the difficulty vanishes. That free acts may be absolutely certain, is plain, because they have in a multitude of cases been predicted. It was certain that the acts of Christ would be holy, yet they were free. The continued holiness of the saints in heaven is certain, and yet they are perfectly free. The foreknowledge of God is inconsistent with a false theory of free agency, but not with the true doctrine on that subject. After Augustine, the common way of meeting the difficulty of reconciling foreknowledge with liberty, was to represent it as merely subjective. The distinction between knowledge and foreknowledge is only in us." -Honor, Syst. Th., I, p. 401.

Knapp states the argument as follows: "The foreknowledge of God, which is contended for, invades the freedom of the will in man and other moral beings. For if God foreknows all things, and is infallible in His knowledge, whatever He knows must take place, is therefore necessary, and no longer dependent on the freedom of man. But this argument is fallacious; for man does not perform one action, or another because it was foreknown by God; but God foreknew the action, be­cause man in the exercise of his free will would perform it."-KNAPP, Chr. Th., p. 104.

Watson's great argument may be summarized as follows: "The great fallacy in the argument that the certain prescience of a moral action destroys its contingent nature, lies in supposing that contingency and certainty are the opposites of each other       If, however, the term contingent in this controversy has any definite meaning at all, as applied to the moral actions of men, it must mean their freedom and stands opposed not to certainty, but to necessity. Free actions fore­known will not, therefore, cease to be contingent. But how stands the case as to their certainty? Precisely on the same ground. The cer­tainty of a necessary action foreknown, does not result from the knowl­edge of the action, but from the operation of the necessitating cause; and in like manner, the certainty of a free action does not result from the knowledge of it, which is no cause at all, but from the voluntary cause, that is, the determination of the will. It alters not the case in the least to say that the voluntary action might have been otherwise. Had it been otherwise, the knowledge of it would have been other­wise; but as the will which gives birth to the action, is not dependent upon the previous knowledge of God, but the knowledge of the action upon foresight of the choice of the will, neither the will nor the act is controlled by knowledge, and the action though foreseen, is still free and contingent. The foreknowledge of God then has no influence upon either the freedom or the certainty of actions, for this plain reason, that it is knowledge and not influence; and actions may be certainly fore­known, without their being rendered necessary by that foreknowledge.- WATSON, Institutes, I, pp. 379ff.

Richard Watson gives the following marks of wisdom: (1) The first character of wisdom is to act for worthy ends. To act with design is a sufficient character of intelligence; but wisdom is the fit and proper exercise of the understanding. (2) It is another mark of wisdom when the process by which any work is accomplished is simple, and many effects are produced from one or a few elements. "When every several effort has a particular separate cause, this gives no pleasure to the spectators, as not discovering contrivance; but that work is beheld with admiration and delight as the result of deep counsel, which is com­plicated in its parts, and yet simple in its operation, when a great variety of effects are seen to arise from one principle operating uniformly (ABERNATHY on Attributes). (Cf. WATSON, Institutes, I, p. 405ff.)

Watson gives an interesting and helpful discussion of this subject in that he gives the older viewpoint, with rather extended excerpts from Paley's Natural Theology, King's Origin of Evil, Gisborne's Testimony of Natural Philosophy to Christianity, and Scott's Remarks on the Refuta­tion of Calvinism. The tone of the apology is to place nature in a better light than is commonly done by those who viewing it under the curse and consequences of sin, find in it nothing of good.

In recent times, The Philosophy of the Christian Religion, by A. M. Fairbairn, Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford , is a sincere and reverent attempt to present a true philosophy of the Christian religion. Whatever the judgment which may be formed as to his conclusions, all will admit that for scholarship and candor, the book is of a high order.


The moral attributes of God relate to His govern­ment over free and intelligent creatures. Since moral bonds are essential to the existence and perpetuity of society, the knowledge of God must ever be a determin­ing factor in the community life of men. Clear views of the divine nature are indispensable to both stability and progress. There is abundant proof from history that society is ultimately dependent upon the strength of its moral bonds, and when these are relaxed or decay, the social structure collapses. There is a marked difference also between the metaphysical attributes and the ethical in this, that while both may in a measure be compre­hended by finite reason, the latter depend more particu­larly upon a common experience. Man being made in the image of God, may as a rational being comprehend within the limits of his finiteness, the natural attributes of God; but man having fallen into sin lacks the sub­jective basis for the perception of God's moral and spirit­ual character. It is only the pure in heart who see God. God's holiness forbids the approach of sinful man. There is no meeting place, no common basis for understanding. It is evident, therefore, that only through the mediator-ship of Jesus Christ can man become a partaker of the divine nature, and hence come to know in the deepest and truest sense His holiness and His love. It is at this point of the moral attributes of God, that natural revela­tion is most defective. Man cannot rest satisfied with it. To no inconsiderable extent, the errors in theology have grown out of the confused notions of God which are consequent upon it. Our question then is, "What is the nature and character of God made known to us through this redemptive revelation?" Herein lies the importance of this department of theology.

We need first of all to remind ourselves that the term personality, as we have used it in its application to God, conveys the idea of a richer content than that given to it by metaphysics alone. It embraces not only self-consciousness but self-determination. It involves the per­fection of reason, power and love, and has, therefore, not only metaphysical existence but ethical and moral quality. Every objection urged against ascribing a Nature to the Divine Being, rests upon a false and unreal conception of the absolute. The arguments for the ex­istence of God presuppose His ethical character, in order to account for the moral nature of man. But to ascribe a moral nature to God carries with it something more than merely ethical distinctions. It means that moral feel­ing must be coordinated with perfect knowledge and unlimited power. It means, further, that the Divine Will must give perfect expression to that which consti­tutes His Being, so that He wills that holiness which forms the essential quality of His nature. It follows, then, that the moral nature of God is not merely a qui­escent state, but active with infinite intensity in the free and unlimited range of His personal powers. If in the metaphysical realm we may speak of the existence of God under the twofold distinction of essence and at­tribute, we may also with equal propriety in the realm of God's moral government, observe the distinction be­tween the divine nature and the moral attributes; and if we may regard the metaphysical attributes as inhering in the essence of God and expressive of it; so we may regard the moral attributes as inhering in a Divine Na­ture or Moral Character, to which likewise they give ex­pression.

All the perfections of God as manifested in His moral government may be resolved into two: His holiness and His love. These in their essence and relation can be un­derstood only through a proper analysis of the nature of personal life. It is a characteristic of personality to mark itself off as separate and distinct from all other existences, personal or otherwise, in what is commonly known as self-grasp or self-affirmation. But it likewise belongs to personality to reveal and impart itself. If, then, we view the ethical nature of God from this standpoint of self-grasp or self-affirmation, we have the con­cept of divine holiness; if we view it from the stand­point of self-impartation or self-communication, we have the concept of divine love. We may with perfect pro­priety say, therefore, that the nature of God consists in holy love, but in this statement we neither identify nor confuse the terms.

Holiness as Nature or Attribute. Theologians have greatly differed in their positions concerning the holiness of God. Three positions may be and are taken concern­ing this subject: first, it may be regarded as one at­tribute alongside of and coordinate with other attri­butes; second, it may be regarded as the sum total of all the attributes; and third, it may be regarded not as an attribute, but as a nature, of which the attributes are the expression. "The holiness of God," says Wakefield , "is commonly regarded as an attribute distinct from His other perfections; but this, we think, is a mistake. Holi­ness is a complex term, and denotes not so much a par­ticular attribute, as that general character of God which results from all his moral perfections. The holiness of man is not a distinct quality from his virtuous disposi­tion, but signifies the state of his mind and heart as in­fluenced by these. When we proceed to analyze his holiness, or to show in what it consists, we say that he is a devout man, a man of integrity, a man faithful to ail his engagements and conscientious in all his relative duties, a man who abhors sin and loves righteousness. In like manner, the holiness of God is not, and cannot be, something different from the moral perfections of his nature, but is a general term under which all these per­fections are comprehended" (WAKEFIELD, Christian Theology, p. 168). This is similar to the position of Dr. Dick who held that holiness was not a particular attri­bute, but "the general character of God as resulting from His moral attributes" (DICK, Theology, I, p. 274). Dr. Wardlow defines holiness as "the union of all the at­tributes, as pure white light is the union of all the colored rays of the spectrum" (WARDLAW, Systematic Theology, I, p. 619). Dr. Strong regards holiness as the fundamental attribute of God. Veracity and faithful­ness he regards as transitive truth; mercy and good­ness as transitive love; and justice and righteousness as transitive holiness. To this position Dr. Dickie ob­jects, refusing to classify either love or holiness as dis­tinct attributes. To make either holiness or love funda­mental would, he thinks, either subordinate the one to the other, or formally countenance a dualistic concep­tion of the divine nature, as if love and holiness were opposed to each other. To him, the love of God is holy and the holiness of God loving. For this reason he maintains that Dr. Strong's position falls short of the full statement of Christian truth. Dr. Pope takes the dual position just mentioned, but to him, holiness and love as attributes are co-ordinate with each other, "two ascend­encies in their yet not fully explained union and har­mony."  They therefore become the foundation for two classes of prominent attributes, justice, righteousness and truth belonging to God's holiness, and grace and its related attributes to His love (Cf. DICKIE, Organism of Christian Truth, p. 94; POPE, Compendium of Christian Theology, I, p. 329). Dr. Sheldon takes a position similar to that of Dr. Dickie, maintaining that the ethical nature of God is best expressed in the phrase, holy love, or with nearly equal propriety, loving righteousness. He recognizes, however, the distinction between them which Dr. Pope indicates, and holds that holiness may not be subsumed under love, nor love under righteousness, but are to be regarded as terms of a couplet which stand for closely related and perfectly harmonious perfections (SHELDON, Syst. of Chr. Doct., p. 184). Dr. Summers treats holiness under the head of goodness, which he re­gards as both essential and relative. Essential goodness he defines as holiness (SUMMERS, Systematic Theology, I, p. 98). In this connection, also, we may refer briefly to those theologians who attach the idea of holiness to some faculty of personality such as the will or the af­fections. Those theologians who make will the highest expression of personality commonly treat holiness in relation to it. Thus Dr. Fairchild holds that holiness or virtue is a benevolent regard for the good. This is a voluntary attitude, a state of will, a simple exercise, not changed in its character by changing perceptions or feel­ings (FAIRCHILD, Elements of Theology, p. 127). Dr. Foster likewise defines holiness as an attribute of the divine will, but in so doing is not to be understood as limiting it to the volitions. The will itself is holy. "All his self-determinations are holy, whether we conceive of them as eternal or temporal. If God is a person, we cannot conceive of Him as thinking, without first con­ceiving of Him as one who wills to think. If we speak of His thoughts as holy, it is because we regard them as the expression of His eternally holy will. If we regard His very essence as holy, as indeed we must, it is because we must at the same time regard it as personal essence; and we regard it as an eternally personal essence because it exists eternally as an essence willing. This will is the form of an immanent, and of course, conscious prefer­ence" (FOSTER, Christian Theology, p. 227). Dr. Miley, on the other hand, relates holiness more closely to the divine sentiency, affirming that there is a truth of moral feeling in God which is deeper than the more definite distinctions of mode, the moral feeling which is intrinsic to the holiness of the divine nature (MILEY, Systematic Theology, I, p. 199). From this brief review of the va­rious positions held, it is evident that holiness occupies a central position of importance in the moral govern­ment of God; and that when it is limited to one faculty in contradistinction to others, it is only because this particular faculty is regarded as supreme in personal life.

We may say then, that holiness belongs to the es­sential nature of God in a deeper and more profound sense than merely as one attribute among others. If it be objected that holiness could not be known were it of the essence and not of the attributes, we may refer the reader to our discussion of the absolute. It was in­dicated that the term is used in three different senses, first, as that which is entirely unrelated, which leads directly to agnosticism; second, as the totality of all relations, which leads to pantheism; and third, as that which is independent and self-existent. This is the theistic and Christian position. The Christian main­tains that his knowledge of God is limited but that it is true so far as it goes; and that this knowledge to any degree or extent is due solely to the self-revelation of God. This is as true of the ethical as of the metaphysical nature of God. God can be known only as He reveals Himself through the eternal Son and the ever blessed Spirit. And this knowledge of God which comes through the mystical contact of Spirit with spirit, is unfolded to the understanding in an ever deepening and widen­ing concept of the moral attributes. We are not, how­ever, averse to the position of Dr. Pope, who holds that the two divine perfections, holiness and love, may be called the moral nature of God; and that these two are the only terms which unite in one the attributes and the essence of God (Cf. POPE, Compend. Chr. Th., I, p. 331). As essence, these constitute the moral nature of God; as attributes they are the revelation of this nature through the economy of divine grace.

The moral attributes differ in a peculiar sense from the natural attributes, in that they cannot be understood without that subjective character in man which corre­sponds to the moral nature of God, and therefore can­not be separated from the redemptive work of Christ. The perfect revelation of God's holiness is found in the incarnate Son of whom it is written, Thou hast loved righteousness, and hated iniquity; therefore God, even thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows (Heb. 1: 9). Holiness, then, is pri­marily that disposition which is back of all the attri­butes-a disposition or a nature which manifests itself in a love for righteousness and in a hatred for iniquity. It is holy love. But as previously indicated, holiness be­longs to the self-affirmation of personality, rather than self-impartation; and self-affirmation is always deeper and more fundamental than self-manifestation. That which severs God from the creaturely nature, even apart from sin, that by which the soleness and integrity of His being is maintained, is holiness. Nor must this idea of separateness be forgotten or overlooked. Holiness is not merely synonymous with perfection generally, nor can it be interpreted as communicative goodness, an in­definite flowing over of love into man's nature apart from moral distinctions. Holy love demands a com­munity of persons, each separate and distinct, and the purity of the love depends upon the strict regard which is paid to the limits which separate one from the other. Holiness in the ethical aspect of the Divine Being is characterized by the separateness of God in essence from all other beings. It belongs to the integrity of His being rather than to His relationships. Holiness is immanent and essential to the very idea of God. Love indeed has its seat in the free relations of the persons of the Divine Trinity, but holiness belongs to the neces­sary relationships. Holiness is therefore more funda­mental in some sense than love, at least it must be given logical priority, though love may occupy the more exalted sphere. "The kingdom of love," says Martensen, "is established on the foundation of holiness. Holi­ness is the principle that guards the eternal distinction between the Creator and the creature, between God and man, in the union affected between them; it preserves the divine dignity and majesty from being infringed by the divine love; it eternally excludes everything evil and impure from the divine nature. The Christian mind knows nothing of a love without holiness" (MARTENSEN, Christian Dogmatics, p. 99ff).

We may further refer in this connection to the tri­sagion found in Isaiah 6: 3, Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of hosts, and also in Rev. 4: 8 where the "living creatures" corresponding to the seraphim of Isaiah, rest not day nor night saying, Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Al­mighty, which was, and is, and is to come. The Church has always maintained that this threefold ascription refers to the Divine Trinity, and therefore that holiness belongs equally to the Father, the Son and the ever blessed Spirit. The glory which by Isaiah is ascribed to the Lord of Hosts, is by St. John ascribed to the Son (John 12: 41 ) and by St. Paul to the Holy Spirit (Acts 28: 25, 26). If we may be permitted to refer again to our discussion of the Christian conception of God, we found there as basic to this concept, the statement of our Lord that God is a Spirit (John 4: 24), and this was further interpreted by the New Testament writers as life (John 5: 26), light (I John 1: 5) and love (I John 4: 8). In the Trinity, therefore, life is peculiarly the property of the Father, Light of the Son, and Love of the Spirit. But basic and fundamental to each is ascribed a nature char­acterized as holy, and the threefold ascription of adora­tion and praise is not on the ground of life or light or love, but of holiness. We may say, then, that holiness in the Father is the mystery of life, separate, distinct and unoriginated; holiness in the Son is light, which down to the depths of His infinite being, reveals no darkness, nothing undiscovered, nothing unfulfilled, nothing which needs to be brought to perfection; holiness in the Spirit is the disclosure of love which exists between the Father and the Son, and is by St. Paul called the bond of perfectness. In the Father, holiness is original and underived, in the Son holiness is revealed, and in the Spirit holiness is imparted. It is therefore not by mere chance that we find the expression partakers of the divine nature (II Peter 1: 4), associated with partakers of his holiness (Heb. 12: 10 ); and partakers of the glory (I Peter 5: 1) with partakers of Christ (Heb. 3: 14 ) and of the Holy Ghost (Heb. 6: 4). These distinctions must be further considered as "The Biblical Concept of Holiness" and "The Concept of Divine Love."

The Biblical Concept of Holiness. The term holiness has had a long and complex history. In the religion of <st1:country-region> Israel </st1:country-region> it first appears as expressive of the nature of God in Exodus 15: 11, Who is like unto thee, O Lord, among the gods? who is like unto thee, glorious in holiness, fearful in praises, doing wonders. It occurs in the same relation for the last time in Revelation 15:4, Who shall not fear thee, O Lord, and glorify thy name? for thou

only art holy; for all nations shall come and worship be­fore thee; for thy judgments are made manifest. It is significant also, that the term first occurs as a revela­tion of Jehovah to His chosen people in His redemptive relation, and not in His revelation of Himself as Creator. This fact marks it as the ground of His ethical character in the moral government of a free and responsible peo­ple. The word indeed occurs in Genesis, but there it is associated with the perfection of the works of God. And God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it; because that in it he had rested from all his work which God created and made (Gen. 2: 3). While the idea of per­fection stands out more prominently, there is even here the idea of separateness. Holiness attaches to the day be­cause of the presence of God. God's resting place, or the place of His abiding presence is holy. Later the same idea attaches to the house of God, concerning which the psalmist declares, Holiness becometh thine house, O Lord, for ever (Psalm 93: 5). The idea of separation in order to possession attaches to both the day and the house. The day is set apart or devoted as a memorial of the finished creation. It is holy, because it is separated in devotion to God, and thus becoming peculiarly His pos­session, He rests or abides in it. Of the house it is written, Let them make me a sanctuary; that I may dwell among them (Exod. 25: 8). We may say, then, that even at this early date the two ideas of separation and possession at­tach to the word holiness. Both of these qualities come into clearer light with the Abrahamic covenant, and are set forth in their perfection by the redemptive Trinity in the New Covenant. Following the suggestion of the tn­sagion we shall consider the term holiness in its three­fold aspect as it relates to the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.

Holiness as it relates to the Father, expresses the per­fection of moral excellence which in Him exists un­originated and underived. It is therefore first, the ground of reverence and adoration. Who shall not fear thee, O Lord, and glorify thy name? (Rev. 15: 4). It was because of this resplendent glory that the psalmist exclaimed, Holy and reverend is his name (Psalm 111: 9). Here the idea is suggestive of majesty. This is true also of the passage his holy arm hath gotten him the victory, and again, Exalt the Lord our God, and worship at his holy hill; for the Lord our God is holy (Psalm 99: 9). Second, holiness is the standard of all moral goodness. It is in this connection that the concept of holiness held by William Newton Clarke is peculiarly appropriate. As previously indicated, he regards holi­ness as the glorious fullness of God's moral excellence, held as the principle of His own action and the standard for His creatures (CLARKE, An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 89). Here it is evident that holiness is not only the inward character of God as perfect goodness, but consistency with this character as a standard for His own activity; and further, it is a requirement for His morally responsible creatures. It is for this reason that we have the injunction, Be ye holy, for I am holy (I Peter 1: 13 ). Holiness demands character, consistency and requirement. The character of God as holy could not be such unless it possessed all moral goodness. It is the sum of all excellencies, not as a mathematical total but as a nature which includes every perfection, not one of which could be diminished without destroying His holiness. In God's consistency with His perfections, we have the action of the will to which holiness is sometimes ascribed. But perfect character demands perfect con­duct, and for this reason His perfect freedom must be in perfect harmony with His character. During the scholas­tic period the question was frequently debated, as to whether God willed the good because it was good, or whether it was good because He willed it. Thomas Aquinas held to the former position, and Duns Scotus to the latter. But the question is a meaningless one, for God's holiness is not determined by something outside of Him but within Him. He cannot contradict Himself and is therefore morally incapable of that which does not truly express His nature as holy. He cannot make evil good without ceasing to be God. By omnipotence in God we mean that He is not limited by anything out­side of Himself, but we do insist that He is limited by His own divine nature or character. He cannot will any­thing contrary to His nature or in anywise be untrue to Himself. Third, and closely related to the foregoing, holiness as the standard of goodness is eternally opposed to sin. Consequently we read Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not look upon iniquity (Hab. 1:13 ), and again, Who is able to stand before this holy Lord God? (I Sam. 6: 20). Holiness is there­fore not only the standard of all good, but as such must necessarily include the repulsion of all evil. It is evi­dent that this aspect of the divine nature comes into clearer light by contrast, and it may be as Dr. Pope suggests, that it is always "displayed against the dark background of sin." This brings us to a discussion of holiness as related to the redemptive work of Christ.

Holiness as it relates to the Son is found in both His revealing and redemptive mission. Holiness in God can be known only by those who like Him are holy. It is for this reason, as we have previously indicated, that He says, Be ye holy, for I am holy (I Peter 1: 16 ). Holi­ness repels every approach of defilement. It is evident, therefore, that the holiness of God may be known by sin­ful man only through an economy of divine grace is this conception which underlies and gives significance to the ritualistic system of Judaism, as preparatory to the redemptive work of Christ. The idea of sacrifice in the Scriptures carries with it the thought of unclean­ness in the offerer, who by a propitiatory act must be cleansed or made holy. The love of the Father finds its highest expression in the gift of His Son, but this gift is specifically declared to be a propitiatory offering for sin. By it man may be made holy and again enter into fellow­ship with the Father. Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins (I John 4: 10). Thus love made the offering or propitiation for sin which holiness required. (The word "to be" is better omitted. Love sent the Son the propitiation for our sins, i.e., already a propitiation, the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world.) The same thought underlies the familiar text, For God so loved the world, that he gave his only be­gotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life (John 3: 16). Here the love of God rests upon His divine holiness as an immut­able basis. It was this alone which required and made possible the stupendous exhibition of divine love. If love sent the Son, it was His holiness that demanded the sacrifice-our God is a consuming fire (Heb. 12: 29 ). Sanctification is not by an effusion of love, but by the sprinkling of blood. Wherefore Jesus also, that he might sanctify the people with his own blood, suffered without the gate. Let us go forth therefore unto him without the camp, bearing his reproach (Heb. 13: 12 , 13). Holiness and love in the nature of God assume the form of righteousness and grace in the redemptive economy. For this reason it is declared that the right­eousness of God is revealed from faith to faith (Rom. 1: 17 ); while from the standpoint of divine love, St. Paul declares that the grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men (Titus 2: 11 ).

Holiness as it relates to the Spirit is holiness imparted or made accessible to men. It is through the Spirit that we become "partakers of the divine nature." Hence the term "Holy Spirit" affirms not only the nature of the Spirit as in Himself holy, but declares also that it is His office and work to make men holy. Holiness and love thus appear to be closely conjoined if not identified in the Holy Spirit. He is at once the Spirit of holiness and the Spirit of love. The distinction, however, remains, and must be given due consideration. For this reason we must not overlook the distinctions made by our Lord in His high priestly prayer: I have declared unto them thy name, and will declare it; that the love wherewith thou hast loved me may be in them, and I in them (John 17: 26 ). Here is a revelation of both the holiness and love of God which is to be imparted or communi­cated through the Spirit. The "name" or nature must be declared before the love can be manifested. The Spirit by His hallowing act must identify man with the sanctifying blood of Christ, the propitiatory offering, before there can be any free inflow of divine love. There must be a partaking of His holiness before there can be the fullness of His love. Hence to be partakers of the divine nature is to share in both His holiness and His love. This is further set forth in the declaration, I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one; and that the world may know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them, as thou hast loved me (John 17: 23). St. Peter approaches this truth differently from St. Paul or even St. John . Elect according to the fore­knowledge of God the Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ (I Peter 1: 2); and again, Seeing ye have purified your souls in obeying the truth through the Spirit unto unfeigned love of the brethren, see that ye love one another with a pure heart fervently (I Peter 1: 22). We may say then that our partaking of the divine holiness is by the sanctification of the Spirit; while our partaking of the divine love is explained to be because he hath given us of his Spirit. While the act of the Holy Spirit in sanctification must ever precede logically that communication of Himself by which "the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts," yet in human experience the two may be said to be concomitant (Cf. <st1:country-region> Rom. </st1:country-region> 5: 5 and IJohn 4:13 ).

The Concept of Divine Love. In our discussion of the holiness of God we found it necessary to mention briefly the nature of divine love. This subject, how­ever, is of such vast importance both to religion and to theology, that it now demands further consideration, first as to its origin; second as to its nature; and third as to its relation to holiness. We may say then, (1) that love has its origin in the triunity of God. In the mysterious intercommunion of the Father and the Son, love is the bond of union. Thus St. Paul characterizes charity or divine love as the "bond of perfectness" (Col. 3: 14). While the more extended treatment of this subject belongs to the following chapter we must at this point call attention to the personal nature of this relationship. The communion of the Father and the Son is vital and real, as between a personal subject and a personal object. But not only are the terms Father and Son personal, the organ of reciprocal interaction and intercommunion must likewise be personal. The bond of union which exists between the Father and the Son as personal Beings, and furnishes both the condition and ground of communion, is the personal Holy Ghost, the Third Person of the Trinity. And this absolute inter-communion and reciprocity of love, demands the equality and consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit with that of the Father and Son, "the glory equal, the majesty co­eternal." It is for this reason that He is called the Spirit of communion in the apostolic benedictions, The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be with you all (II Cor. 13: 14). The Father loves the Son and is in turn loved by the Son, and the bond of love which is the ground of communion is the Holy Spirit. We may then regard love as the moral or ethical expression of the Divine Unity, and therefore the focal point of all the moral at­tributes. Here is displayed the profound truth that God is love; and he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him (I John 4: 16 ). We may also, on the authority of the sacred Scriptures, confidently be­lieve that the Triune God exists eternally in the sphere of love; that this love gave Jesus Christ our Lord as a propitiation for sin; and that it is into this holy fellowship of divine love that His finite creatures are to be received through the gift of the Holy Spirit. It was for this reason that our Lord in the fulfillment of His mission concluded His high priestly prayer with the words, I have declared unto them thy name, and will declare it; that the love wherewith thou hast loved me may be in them, and I in them (John 17: 26).

We must consider (2) the Nature of Divine Love. Schleiermacher defines love as "that attribute in virtue of which God communicates Himself"; Dr. Francis J. Hall, as "the attribute by reason of which God wills a personal fellowship with Himself of those who are holy or capable of being made so" (HALL, Theological Out­lines, p. 89); while William Newton Clarke whose defi­nitions are always concise and clear, regards it as "God's desire to impart Himself and all good to other beings, and to possess them for His own spiritual fellowship" (CLARKE, Outline of Christian Theology, p. 95). From these definitions, it is evident that there are at least three essential principles in love: self-communication, fellow­ship, and a desire to possess the object loved. Referring again to our characterization of holiness as the self-affirming aspect of God's nature as holy love, we in­sisted that holiness is not merely self-affirmed purity in the negative sense of the term, but includes also a positive delight or complacency in the right. Here we see these qualities reappearing in a new light within love itself. Love must come to expression in the two­fold desire to possess other beings for Himself, and to impart to them Himself and all other good. It is fre­quently pointed out that the self-sacrificing mother who gives herself for her child, is the one whose longing for the answering love of the child is most deep and inex­tinguishable. However great the self-surrender and sacrifice of love, it is always accompanied by the desire for reciprocation. But in the very devotion of a mother to her son, that mother affirms her distinct personality. The self-surrender and the self-assertion must be equal, nor can either increase without the other if love is to be maintained. If self-assertion is not accompanied by its equivalent in self-surrender, we have not love but selfishness under the guise of love; if self-surrender be not balanced by self-assertion, we have not love but weakness. As love develops, it grows richer in self-sacrificing, and increases its desire for possession of the object loved. When therefore St. John declares that We love him, because he first loved us (I John 4: 19 ) he is giving voice to that reciprocal love which delights the heart of God. From the standpoint of divine love, it is well also to remember that without God man is an orphan; without man, God is bereaved.

One of the outstanding contributions to modern the­ology will be found in Ritschl's analysis of love (Cf. RITSCHL, Justification and Reconciliation, p. 277ff). After defining love as "will, aiming either at the appro­priation of an object, or at the enrichment of its exist­ence, because moved by a feeling of its worth," he enumerates several conditions necessary to its existence. We may summarize these briefly as follows: (1) It is necessary that the objects loved should be of like nature to the subject which loves, that is, persons. To speak of love for things or animals, is to degrade the conception of love beneath its proper meaning. (2) Love implies a will which is constant in its aim. If objects change, we may have fancies but cannot have love. (3) Love aims at the promotion of another's personal end, whether known or conjectured. Nor is love interested merely in those things which are accidental, it estimates every­thing which concerns the other by its bearing on the character of the loved one. Love desires either to pro­mote, to maintain, and through sympathetic interest to enjoy the individuality of the character acquired by the others, or to assist him in securing those blessings which are necessary to insure the attainment of his personal ideal. (4) If love is to be a constant attitude of will, and if the appropriation and the promotion of the other's interests and ideals are not to diverge but to coincide in each act, then the will of the person who loves must take up the other's personal interests and make them a part of his own. Love continually strives to appropriate the other personality, regarding this as a task necessary to his own conscious individuality. This characteristic im­plies that the will as love does not give itself up for the other's sake.

We must consider (3) the Relation of Holiness to Love. We have all along carefully guarded against any confusion of these terms, and therefore the question is forced upon us as to the relation which the one bears to the other. If the nature of God as holy love is, from the standpoint of self-affirmation to be defined as holy, and from the standpoint of self-communication to be in­terpreted as love, then holiness and love are equally of the essence of God. Holiness is considered fundamental solely from logical priority, for self-affirmation must al­ways precede self-communication. Holiness and love in God are related in much the same manner as integrity and generosity in man. Holiness demands not only a nature, but a nature consistent with itself. Since that nature is in its out-goings always love, then holiness in God requires that He always act out of pure love. Hence in the first Christian Council at Jerusalem, St. Peter says concerning the Gentiles that God, which knoweth the hearts, bare them witness, giving them the Holy Ghost, even as he did unto us; and put no difference be­tween us and them, purifying their hearts by faith (Acts 15: 8, 9); and in his general epistle, Seeing ye have purified your souls in obeying the truth through the Spirit unto unfeigned love of the brethren, see that ye love one another with a pure heart fervently (I Peter 1: 22). If, on the other hand, we view the nature of God from the standpoint of love or self-communication, then it is God's nature to impart Himself and that sell is holy. Holiness must always act according to love, and love must always win its object to holiness. We may say then with Dr. Clarke, that love is in fact the desire to impart holiness, and this desire is satisfied only when the beings whom it seeks are rendered holy (Cf. CLARKE, Outlines Chr. Th., p. 100). Consequently we read that God commendeth his love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us (Rom. 5: 8); and again, Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the pro pitia­tion for our sins (I John 4: 10).

There is, however, a danger here which we must not fail to take into consideration. Dr. Strong defines holi­ness as self-affirming purity, and in virtue of this attri­bute of His nature, God eternally wills and maintains His own moral excellence. This purity is not only nega­tive, but positive, not only the absence of all moral stain, but complacency in all moral good. Hence in God's moral nature as necessary acting, there are the two elements of willing and being, but the passive logically precedes the active, and being comes before willing. God is pure before He wills purity. God is holy in that His nature is the source and standard of right. Holiness furnishes the norm for love and therefore must be superior to it. God is not holy because He loves, but loves because He is holy. Dr. Strong thus preserves the distinction between holiness and love and makes holiness logically prior to it. In all this he is true and strong. But he goes farther, he makes holiness fundamental, in that it is a necessity of the divine nature while love is vol­untary. For this reason, justice as transitive holiness must be exercised, while mercy as transitive love is op­tional. Hence God was under no obligation to provide a redemption for sinners. Thus there is laid the basis for the Calvinistic concept of divine grace which finds its logical issue in election and predestination. The same position is taken by Dr. Shedd who states that God can apply the salvation after He has wrought it out to whomsoever He will (Cf. SHEDD, Discourses and Es­says, p. 277ff). Dr. G. B. Stevens in his review of Dr. Strong's Philosophy and Religion states that this view underlies the whole soteriology of this author's System­atic Theology as it does that of Dr. Shedd's Dogmatic Theology (Cf. STEVENS, Johannine Theology, pp. 285, 286). Dr. Pope avoids this error and states the true Arminian view when, as we have previously indicated, he takes the position that holiness and love are the two perfections which together may be called the nature of God, and that these are the only two terms which unite in one the attributes and essence (Cf. POPE, Compend. Chr. Th., I, p. 331). Both holiness and love belong to the divine essence as well as to the attributes and cannot be separated except in thought. Justice, therefore, can never be necessary and mercy optional, but are always conjoined; and in the redemptive economy, holiness and mercy are supreme.

It may be well also, to note at this time the close con­nection existing between holiness and perfect love, be­tween purity and perfection. These qualities are all strangely blended in the divine nature. We have al­ready shown that God could not be love if He were not holy. Love being the impulse to give all, then perfect love in its highest degree can exist only as it has all to give. If He were not perfect it could not be said of Him, God is love. Thus perfection and perfect love are in­separably conjoined. Nor can there be perfect love in the creature unless to the measure of his capacity he gives his all. But, on the other hand, love desires to possess another in fellowship, a fellowship which de­mands the highest good of the object loved. There must be no touch of selfishness, else it would not be pure love. Purity is, therefore, love free from all defilement, and the self-affirmation of this purity is holiness.

Two other subjects are closely connected with this concept of divine love, the idea of blessedness, and the idea of wrath. These demand only brief mention at this time. (1) The Idea of Blessedness. This subject is rarely mentioned in the general works on theology, yet the word itself was frequently on the lips of our Lord (Cf. Matt. 5: 3-11, 11: 6, 13: 16, 25: 34, Luke 11:28, John 20: 29). Bishop Martensen defines blessed­ness as a term "expressive of a life which is complete in itself," and further describes it as "the reflection of the rays of love back on God, after passing through His kingdom" (MARTENSEN, Chr. Dogm., p. 101). The word is frequently translated happiness, but this is too weak to convey the full meaning of the original term. However, it is so translated in the words, I think myself happy, king Agrippa (Acts 26: 2). The term may be said to convey the delight which God has in the recip­rocation of His love on the part of His creatures, and this delight He communicates to those who respond to His love. It is closely akin to the peace and joy which Christ communicates to His disciples apart from the happiness which arises from favorable circumstances. Peace I leave with you, my peace I give unto you: not as the world giveth, give I unto you (John 14:27 ); and again, These things have I spoken unto you, that my joy might remain in you, and that your joy might be full (John 15: 11 ). Blessedness is closely akin also to the rest of faith (Heb. 4: 3) or the keeping of the sabbath (Heb. 4: 9), but the idea of rest must be sharply distin­guished from the eudaimonia or idle enjoyment attrib­uted to the gods of paganism. (2) The Idea of Divine Wrath. There are two positions which have been taken in the church concerning the subject of divine wrath. The common view is that wrath is not incompatible with divine love, and this has the support of the Scriptures. Speculative theologians, in order to avoid the difficulties which attach to this subject, have sought to explain it as a mere mode of human speech without any reality in the nature of God. The common view was contested very early in the Church, due doubtless to the influence of pagan philosophy. The Neo-Platonists and the Stoics with their pantheistic views of God and the world, held that God could not be subject to any emotion, for this necessitated passivity. Wrath, therefore, was impossible to God. To this position Lactantius (c. 320 A.D.) ob­jected, maintaining that God must be capable of just re­sentment or His character would be imperfect. Augus­tine seems to reveal the influence of philosophy in his own thought when he identifies the wrath of God with the sentence which He pronounces against sin. "God's anger does not inflame His mind," he says, "nor disturb His unchangeable tranquillity." During the Deistical Period in <st1:country-region> England </st1:country-region> when divine love was reduced to com­placent indulgence, Bishop Butler met the arguments of the Deists in his sermons on Resentment and The Love of God, which are usually regarded as the English classics on this subject. Ritschl, whose analysis of love we have already cited, attempted a mediating position, main­taining that wrath in God was purely eschatological, and consisted in the final sentence against sin which He would pronounce at the end of the world.

The Christian position generally, is that wrath is but the obverse side of love and necessary to the perfection of the Divine Personality, or even to love itself. God re­vealed Himself in Jesus Christ as loving righteousness and hating iniquity; and the hatred of iniquity is as es­sential to Perfect Personality as the love of righteous­ness. Divine wrath, therefore, must be regarded as the hatred of iniquity, and is in some proper sense the same emotion which exercised towards righteousness is known as divine love.

As the concept of holiness has developed through an age-long process of history, so love also had its his­torical development. The two are always associated in the Scriptures. It is interesting to note, however, that in the earlier history of the chosen people, the idea of holiness seems to precede that of love. The divine majesty is essential to adoration, and adoration to love. Holiness is ever the guardian of love, excluding every approach of evil. Thus we have the concept of God as glorious in holiness, fearful in praises, doing wonders (Exod. 15: 11 ). While the aspect of holiness here is that of separation, a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, there is immediately following, the declaration that He shows mercy unto thousands of them that love Him and keep His com­mandments (Exodus 20: 6). At a later period in the progressive unfolding of divine grace, the revelation of love precedes that of holiness. The Lord passed by be­fore him, and proclaimed, The Lord, The Lord God, merciful and gracious, longsuffering, and abundant in goodness and truth (Exod. 34: 6). It is only in the Word incarnate that the supreme revelation of God's holiness and His love is to be found. Christ was the holy One. He loved righteousness and hated iniquity. He was also the revelation of the Father's love. For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life (John 3: 16 ). Here we begin to sound the depths of the mystery of the atoning work of our Lord Jesus Christ. Here do we find for the first time an identification of love with the very Being of God. St. John makes bold to speak it, God is love (I John 4:8).

The nature of God as holy love exhibits itself in two great branches of the moral attributes-the one cor­responding more nearly to the idea of holiness, the other to that of love. From the aspect of the divine holiness we may mention; (1) justice or righteousness, which though sometimes given separate treatment are usually considered together; and (2) truth, which divides itself into veracity and faithfulness. From the aspect of divine love, we may mention mercy, benevolence, long-suffering, compassion, and all those qualities which are generally known as the fruit of the Spirit.

Justice and Righteousness. Dr. Strong regards jus­tice and righteousness as transitive holiness, by which he means that the treatment of His creatures always con­forms to the purity or holiness of His nature. While closely related, justice and righteousness may be dis­tinguished from each other, and both from holiness. The term holiness applies to the nature or essence of God as such, while righteousness is His standard of activity in conformity to that nature. This refers both to Himself and to His creatures. Justice may be said to be the counterpart of God's righteousness but is sometimes identified with it. Righteousness is the foundation of the divine law, justice the administration of that law. When we regard God as the author of our moral nature, we conceive of Him as holy; when we think of that na­ture as the standard of action, we conceive of Him as righteous; when we think of Him as administering that law in the bestowment of rewards and penalties, we con­ceive of Him as just. Justice is sometimes considered in the wider sense of justitia interna, or moral excellence, and sometimes in the narrower sense as justitia externa, or moral rectitude. A further division of the term is (1) Legislative Justice which determines the moral duty of man and defines the consequences in rewards or penalties; and (2) Judicial Justice, sometimes known as Distributive Justice, by which God renders to all men according to their works. The justice by which He re­wards the obedient is sometimes known as remunera­tive justice, while that by which He punishes the guilty is retributive or vindictive justice. But whether as legis­lator or judge, God is eternally just.

In the following scripture references no distinction is made between the terms justice and righteousness. The careful student of this subject will be impressed with the many and various ways in which these attributes are combined. The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether (Psalm 19: 9). Justice and judg­ment are the habitation of thy throne: mercy and truth shall go before thy face (Psalm 89: 14). There is no God else beside me; a just God and a Saviour; there is none beside me (Isa. 45: 21). The just Lord is in the midst thereof; he will not do iniquity (Zeph. 3: 5). Who will render to every man according to his deeds ( <st1:country-region> Rom. </st1:country-region> 2: 6). Great and marvellous are thy works, Lord God Almighty; just and true are thy ways (Rev. 15: 3).

Dr. Strong takes the position that neither justice nor righteousness can bestow rewards, in that obedience is due to God and therefore no creature can claim a reward for that which he justly owes. Dr. Pope takes a more scriptural position, insisting that while all that is praise­worthy in human nature is of God, either by prevenient grace or the renewing of the Spirit, there can be no men­tion of merit except as the word is used in divine con­descension. Nevertheless, He who crowns the work of His own hands in glorifying the sanctified believer, con­stantly speaks of his own works of faith as a matter of reward. God is not unrighteous to forget your work and labour of love (Heb. 6: 10 ). Is God unrighteous who taketh vengeance? (I speak as a man) God forbid for then how shall God judge the world? ( <st1:country-region> Rom. </st1:country-region> 3: 5, 6). (Cf. STRONG, Syst. Th., I, p. 293 and POPE, Compend. Chr. Th., I, p. 341.) The rewards of God's judicial or distributive justice are, therefore, according to St. Paul , to be reckoned not of debt but of grace ( <st1:country-region> Rom. </st1:country-region> 4: 4). The last day is, by the same apostle, called the revelation of the righteous judgment of God ( <st1:country-region> Rom. </st1:country-region> 2: 5). We may therefore with confidence believe that the punishment of evil-doers, will be at once an infliction of the divine judgment and the consequences of the treasuring up of wrath against the day of wrath. And we may equally assure ourselves that the rewards of the righteous will be at once the decision of a Just Judge, and the fruitage of their own sowing in righteousness.

Truth. This perfection, like justice or righteousness, is closely related to holiness. It is commonly treated from the twofold aspect of veracity and faithfulness. (1) By veracity is meant that all God's manifestations to His creatures, whether natural or supernatural, are in strict conformity to His own divine nature. Thus when the Scriptures speak of the "true" God, the intention is to distinguish Him from the false gods of the heathen; but when they mention Him as the "God of truth," they intend to convey the idea of His veracity. (2) By faith­fulness is meant God's fulfillment of His promises, whether these promises are given directly by His Word, or whether they are indirectly implied in. the constitution and nature of man.

The Bible abounds with references to both God's veracity and His faithfulness. (1) As to His veracity, the psalmist declares Thou hast redeemed me, O Lord God of truth (Psalm 31: 5); The truth of the Lord en­dureth forever (Psalm 117: 2); The sum of thy word is truth (Psalm 119: 160, R.V.); and further refers to God as He which keepeth truth forever (Psalm 146: 6). The references to truth in the New Testament are equally specific. Jesus saith unto him, I am the way, the truth, and the life; no man cometh unto the Father, but by me (John 14: 6). In His high priestly prayer Jesus says, Sanctify them through thy truth; thy word is truth (John 17: 17 ). Here the first clause evidently refers to the faithfulness of God, but this is grounded in His ver­acity-thy word is truth. St. Paul in his description of the heathen, asserts that they changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature mpre than the Creator (Rom. 1: 25 ); and again, let God be.

God is the synthesis of all good by virtue of His very being; He is perfection, both metaphysical and ethical.-KUBEL

The God whose glory filled the temple, and revealed only the un­holiness of all who approached Him, nevertheless bade the unholy draw near to be sanctified. Was it then by the rays of His holiness shining upon and around them? Most assuredly not. The mystery of this paradox, that the attribute which separated God from sinners and Himself, is solved only by the system of sacrificial expiation typifying the great atonement, which through a satisfaction offered to the divine righteousness opened the fellowship of love between God and man.- POPE, Cornpend. Chr. Th., I, p. 334.

The well-known query: Is the good good because God wills it? or does God will it because it is good? is not properly put The question is not as to God's willing, but as to His essence. The good is good for the simple reason that it is an outflow, a self-manifestation, of God Himself. This answers the question also as to the ground of right. Right is God; a creature does right when it harmonizes with God-that is, when it fulfills the divinely fixed end of its being. The definitions of the divine holiness and righteousness are of the same character. God's holiness is that attribute in virtue of which He takes His own absolutely perfect self as the norm of his entire activity. His holiness as revealed to man, and as revealing to man God's purpose in creating him, con­stitute God's and man's righteousness."--Summers, Systematic Theology, p. 99.

 Julius Mueller in his doctrine of the Trinity states that 'its inmost significance is that God has in Himself the eternal and wholly adequate object of His love, independent of all relation to the world. Thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world (John 17:24 ). This requires alike the unity of the essence, and the distinctness of the Persons. For with­out the distinction of Persons, without an I and Thou, there could be no love. Again, without the unity of the essence there would follow from the love of God a necessary relation to an essence distinct from God. Both are therefore implied in what is said of the Logos in the beginning of St. John's Gospel."-MUELLER, The Chr. Doct. of Sin, II, p. 136ff.

Dr. Pope states that if we take the words, Thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world, and connect them with those which immediately precede, and thou hast loved them, as thou hast loved me, and these again with the assurance, as the Father hath loved me, so have I loved you, and these once more with the command, that ye love one another, as I have loved you, it will appear how perfect is the identity in kind between the finite and infinite love, between the reflection in us and the reality in the essential Trinity, and how profound is the meaning of those words, "Love is of God," a form of expression used of no other grace. "Thus," he says, "we may boldly repeat that more glorious things are spoken of the divine perfection of love than of any other."-POPE, Compend. Chr. Th., pp. 344, 345.

Ritschl's application of these principles is vitiated by two things, (1) he makes love to lie solely in the will, and therefore views the love of God as will without emotional content; (2) his lack of a proper con­ception of the Trinity makes it impossible for him to furnish any true ground for either love or holiness. He fails to see that God's love is primarily directed to the Son and only secondarily toward the Chris­tian community, and consequently ignores the immanent or essential Trinity.

This sentiment or feeling in God, originating and directing the economy of redemption, was not fully revealed until the Lord himself revealed it. And when revealed, it is reserved for one service: to pre­side over the cross and the recovery of mankind. No record or register of the Divine Perfections, related to the created universe as such, con­tains that of love. His goodness and His loving-kindness are often al­luded to as the nearest approach to the attribute that is never turned toward any but the objects of redeeming love. But at length the set time came for the new revelation, or at least the fuller revelation, of the attribute that governs all the rest: that which to adopt St. James' word, is the royal law in God as in man.-POPE, Compendium of Christian Theology, I, pp. 345ff.

Scanned by John Mitchel Giannatala. Edited by John Patterson. Corrections by George Lyons.