GOD AS INFINITE EFFICIENCY

We have pointed out that the Absolute as the world ground must be identical with the God of religion. But in viewing God as the Absolute, we have seen that the finite, whether in Being or knowledge, must rest in Him. What, then, is the character of the relations which He bears to the universe of finite things? Are they dependent upon him in a merely logical order, or do they emanate from his being as the Neo-Platonist would maintain? The theistic conception of God as personal, necessitates a belief in will as in intellect, and must therefore account for efficiency as well as absoluteness. It must regard God as the source as well as the ground of reality. While it is generally assumed that God stands in relation to the world as Creator, this truth needs to be given proper emphasis, as being a necessary and characteristic feature of the Christian idea of the universe. Unless the universe depends upon God as a world-ground, it cannot be the pliant instrument of his infinite efficiency.

Modern Speculative Theism. The necessity of the causal relations of God to the universe, is shown by the various theories of modern theistic speculation. This type of theism differs from the older deism in its conception of the relation of God to the world, mainly in its emphasis upon immanence rather than transcendence. It developed as a reaction to the barrenness of the speculations concerning the Absolute as transcendent and unknowable, and is represented by such writers as Theodore Parker and James Martineau. Specificallv stated, God is not to be identified with the world as in pantheism, but yet is so far one with it that His activity is rigidly confined within it and limited to the course of nature. The energy displayed in the world is the divine immanence revealing itself in the realm of both matter and mind, but in each according to its own laws. The theory has all the effect, therefore, in its consequences, as that of ancient Stoicism. It denies creative activity to God in the sense of a volitional act, and limits human freedom to a mere expression of the inner divine activity. These theists, however, guard carefully against pantheism in their insistence upon the distinctness of God from the world. Theodore Parker says, "If God be infinite, then He must be immanent, perfectly and totally present in nature and in spirit. Thus there is no point, no atom of matter, but God is there; no point of spirit, and no atom of soul, but God is there. And yet finite matter and finite spirit do not exhaust God. He transcends the world of matter and of spirit, and in virtue of that transcendence continually makes the world of matter fairer, and the world of spirit wiser. So there is really a progress in the manifestation of God, not a progress in God the manifesting. In thought you may annihilate the world of matter and of man; but you do not thereby in thought annihilate the Infinite God, or subtract anything from the existence of God. In thought you may double the world of matter and of man; but in so doing you do not in thought double the Being of the Infinite God; that remains the same as before. That is what I mean when I say that God is infinite, and transcends matter and spirit, and is different in kind from the finite universe (PARKER, Works, XI, p. 108). This form of theism, while closely related to pantheism must be classed with the older Deism. Delitzsch sums up the two positions in this statement, "While speculative theism in a one-sided manner emphasizes the immanence of God, the older deism emphasized with equal one-sidedness His transcendence. The former makes God the active ground of the world development according to natural law, which is dependent on Him, He in turn being dependent on it; the latter placed Him above the perpetunm mobile of the universe, and made Him a mere spectator of human history; both agreeing in the opinion that there is no need or room for a supernatural incursion of God into the natural course of development, and refusing to recognize in Christ a new creative beginning and all that goes along with that" (DELITZSCH, Christian Apologetics, p. 157) . Bruce says that the distinction may be made more vivid to the imagination by representing the immanent Deity as imprisoned within the world, and the transcendent Deity as banished to the outside of the world (Cf. BRUCE, Apologetics, p. 135). Hence, in carrying out the above statement in a truly Christian sense, Dr. Parker carries out the implications of his theory by a denial of the miraculous. "No whim in God, therefore no miracle in nature. The law of nature represents the modes of God himself, who is the only true cause and the only true power, and as He is infinite, unchangeably perfect, and perfectly unchangeable, His mode of action is therefore constant and universal, so that there can be no such thing as a violation of God's constant mode of action" (PARKER, Works, XI, p. 114) . It may readily be seen, therefore, that it is possible to regard the personal God as the Absolute in the sense of the world-ground, and deny to Him the Christian conception of volitional activity in the world, as it affects both creation and providence. It is for this reason that we must stress the infinite efficiency of the Spirit, if we are to maintain the Christian conception of the personality of God.

[If "God were simply living Nature," says Dorner, "not being Master of Himself, and therefore not being truly Almighty, because He is not another than Himself, He might create, but He could only work Himself out and produce Himself by physical necessity. All Cosmogony would thus be Theogony. On the contrary, if His Nature is the servant of His Will, then without prejudice to His original power or His Omnipotence, there will remain a place for the world and that a free world, by virtue of which alone is reciprocal action possible between God and it, and in which the Law of Causality finds its perfection anew. God cannot, it is true, be limited from without but can be conditioned only by Himself; but if He is Almighty, by virtue of His Omnipotence, and without limitation of it, He can freely determine to condition His action by causalities in the world He has formed upon whom He bestows the possibility of free determination. A more' thorough statement can be admitted only in the higher categories of the divine idea, and especially of the ethical attributes of God." - DORNER, System of Christian Doctrine, p. 261.]

THE IDEA OF A FINITE GOD

The attempt to harmonize the Absolute of philosophy with the God of religion, has given rise to various theories which have as their basis the idea of a finite God. It is frequently assumed that such a reconciliation of thought is impossible, and that religious belief must rest upon the basis of the ethical and religious feelings. Master Eckhart (1260-1329), the noted German mystic, made a distinction between the Godhead and God; and Dean Inge, who follows him in this particular, asserts that "the God of religion is not the Absolute, but the highest form under which the Absolute can manifest Himself to finite creatures" (INGE, Personal Idealism and Mysticism, pp.13, 14). The theory of a finite God is not a product of modern thought, but strikes its roots deep in both Greek philosophy and Greek religion. The Greeks had their pantheon in which one god while supreme was yet but one. among many. Plato identified God with the Idea of the Good, but at the same time admitted other ideas equally self-existent and eternal. To Aristotle, God was the "unmoved Mover" absolutely independent of the world, but to him the world was equally self-existent and eternal. In modern times. the idea of a finite God is closely associated with the skepticism of David Hume, but was given more definite form in the philosophy of John Stuart Mill. Here the motive is not so much ontological as ethical, and arises from the attempt to harmonize belief in the infinite goodness of God with the problem of existent evil. Hume held that it is impossible "to reconcile any mixture of evil in the universe with infinite attributes." He adopts, therefore, the idea of a finite God in order to account for evil, which he thinks lies outside and beyond the God of religion as we know Him. On this theory, infinity is not necessary to creatorship, but "benevolence regulated by wisdom, and limited by necessity, may produce just such a world as at present." Mill is equally specific in denying the possibility of "reconciling infinite benevolence and justice

[That God is finite rather than infinite roots back into Greek philosophy. To Plato God was the supreme Idea or Good, but there were other ideas equally self-existent, like the heavenly bodies in relation to the sun; and besides, He is not the author of all things; God is not the author of evil but of good only (Republic, Bk. II, p. 380). Aristotle conceived of God as a perfect self-consciousness, whose being was absolutely independent of the world which was, equally with God, self-existent and eternal. Windelband, History of Philosophy, p. 689.]

with infinite power in the Creator of such a world as this." The idea of finiteness has assumed different forms. First, there is the agnostic idea represented in modern times by Samuel Butler and H. G. Wells, which maintains that there is an unrevealed Reality back of the God of religion and which called the latter into existence. This theory is closely related to the Gnosticism and Neo-Platonism of the first Christian century, against which St. Paul warned the Colossians, and St. John wrote his First Epistle. Second, there is the idea of a finite God which is embraced in the community theory of the Absolute. Both Dr. Rashdall and Dr. A. E. Taylor hold that the Absolute is not to be identified with God, but must include God in a wider community of other consciousness. "The Ultimate Being is a single power," says Dr. Rashdall, "manifested in a plurality of consciousness, one consciousness which is omniscient and eternal, and many consciousnesses which are of limited knowledge, which having a beginning, and some of which, it is possible, or probable, have an end." Third, and closely related to the preceding is the idea of a growing or developing God. This is represented in the philosophy of Henri Bergson and his followers, and also by William James in his Pluralistic Universe and his Varieties of Religious Experience. With Bergson, philosophers appear to be undecided as to whether he believes in the growth of the totality of the universe, or whether he restricts it to that portion known as the phenomenal realm. William James, however, makes it very clear that he regards the growth of the universe as a whole, which to him, with his pluralistic conception, is an aggregate rather than an organism. Since finite individuals grow by drawing upon their environment, he regards God as "having an environment, being in time and working out a history just like ourselves." Fourth, we may mention the theory of Horace Bushnell which is set forth in his work entitled, "God in Christ," and is usuallv regarded as one of the earliest attempts in this country to prove the finiteness of God. The theory is directly related to the agnosticism of Hume, and is an attempt to bridge the chasm between an Absolute, inconceivable and unrevealed, and the God of religion, not by reasoned argument, but by the sense of religious need. "My heart wants the Father," he says, "my heart wants the Son, my heart wants the Holy Ghost!" Hence he conceives of the philosophical Absolute by an inner generative power, coming forth in a dramatic impersonation, giving us the God of religion and presenting Himself under a threefold aspect, that of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, each of which is finite. Dr. Bushnell maintained that in so far as the Absolute is unrevealed, it is wholly negligible and has the value only of Zero. Fifth, we may mention what is usually classed as a theory of a finite God, but which in reality amounts to a redefinition of the Absolute to conform to the theistic doctrine of God. Bishop Francis J. McConnell argues that the so-called "unlimited" idea of God as expressed in the Absolute of philosophy is in reality more limited than the Christian idea of God. He charges the abstract theologians as limiting God in that they tend to empty the idea of all concrete content, and so impoverish the idea of God by limiting Him to bare abstractions. In much the same strain, Dr. E. S. Brightman suggests that there is in God what he calls a "Given" which as a retarding factor needs to be overcome. This "Given" is something akin to sensation in man, and accounts for the irrational elements in creation and their consequences in suffering.

GOD AND THE UNIVERSE

Having indicated the positions of modern speculative theism concerning God's causal relation to the world, and having pointed out also, some of the attempts to harmonize the absolute of philosophy with the God of religion, we must now treat more directly of God's volitional relation to the world, reserving for a later chapter the various theories advanced to account for the nature of creation.

The church was forced very early to attempt an explanation of the universe in its relation to God. The current philosophy of the Stoics and Neo-Platonists made it necessary for the Church to present a Christian view of God and the world. The immediate occasion for this was the development of the heretical sects commonly known as gnostics. These varied widely, but their theories are generally classified as Eastern or Syrian Gnosticism, and Western or Alexandrian Gnosticism. Representatives of the former were Saturninus of Antioch, Bardesanes of Edessa, Marcion of Sinope and Tatian of Assyria. These were all of the second century and are sometimes known as Anti-Judaistic Gnostics. Representatives of the latter were Basilides and Valentinus, frequently known as Judaizing Gnostics. The various sects of Gnosticism had these things in common: (1) They all agreed that the world did not proceed imme~ately from the Supreme Being. In this they were agnostic despite their name. Valentinus regarded the Supreme being as the unfathomable Abyss, and Basilides as the Unnamable. (2) They related the world to God by the process of emanation. (3) The world proceeding from the essence of God was therefore of like essence with Him. In this they were pantheists. They believed in the eternity of both spirit and matter, good and evil, light and darkness, and were therefore dualists. The distinction between pantheism and dualism may be stated thus: Pantheism holds that God is in all things in the sense that God is all; Dualism holds that God moves in all things either as its soul, or the harmonizer of its discords. Agnosticism and Pantheism have been previously considered in connection with the idea of God as the absolute; attention must now be given to the dualistic theories which have been advanced in opposition to God's Infinite Efficiency.

Syrian Gnosticism was characterized by its emphasis upon emanation, and was in general more dualistic than that of Alexandria. It was a theory of the universe which maintained that the world was not created by a divine fiat, but was the consequence of the flowing forth of the divine essence, which with each succeeding aeon gradually deteriorated until it became matter. Their favorite illustration was that of the light, which proceeding from the sun is the most intense when nearest its source but decreases in intensity as it recedes until it is lost in darkness. The dual principles of light and darkness were eternal. The emanating aeons bridged the chasm between the Infinite and the finite, between good and evil. Gnosticism under the guise of a Christian philosophy made its influence felt in the churches of Asia, especially at Colosse, and for this reason is sometimes known as the Colossian Heresy. When, therefore, St. Paul in his Epistle to this church declares that by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by him, and for him (Col. 1:16) he is using similar if not the exact terminology which the Gnostics applied to the emanating aeons.

Alexandrian Gnosticism was more philosophical in its character, and its dualism more deeply veiled. In Valentinus and Basilides efforts were made to transcend dualism, and motives from both emanation and evolution are often strangely mingled. Gnosticism was the rationalism of the early church and closely related to Neo-Platonism. God is the unknown, the unfathomable, the Abyss (Buqov"). With him there is a pleroma (plhrwma) or spiritual world (kovsmo" nohvmato"), composed of a system of aeons which unfold the dark and mysterious Depth. Besides this spiritual world, matter as an eternal principle exists in the form of the kevnwma, or empty void, which appears to be a logical otherness, or a nonexistent existence. This unintelligent force God endowed with a portion of His own intelligence (nou'"), so that it becomes the Demiurgus or world-soul. The bridge between the pleroma (plhvrwma) and kenoma (kevnwma) is made by the last emanation, or wisdom (sofiva). Thus God is not Himself even the framer of the world. This is the work of the Demiurgus or world-soul, which pervades the visible universe and constitutes it one living animated whole.

Against Gnosticism in all forms, the Church reacted, and sought to employ instead, the ethical view of free, creative action. It held fast to the idea of personality as belonging to the Original Being, and consequently conceived of the world as proceeding from God, not by the physical or logical necessity of His unfolding essence, but as an act of will. It regarded it, therefore, not as an eternal process, but as a fact that had occurred once for all. It conceived also of the world as mediated through the Divine Word (logo"), in whom the transcendence and immanence of God as separate potencies remain united, the Logos or God within the world, furnishing a resting-place for the God without the world. Hence St. John sweeps away with a single stroke all thought of emanations and declares that In the beginning was the Word, [ejn ajrch/' hj'n oJ lovgo"] and the Word was with God, and the Word was God (John 1:1). It was the Word that bridged the chasm between the Infinite and the finite, between God and the world. This Word was creative. All things were made by him. This statement is in the emphatic form - (oujde eJVn oJV gevgonen) "without it was done not even one, that has been done." Furthermore, this Word is the pleroma (plhrwvmato" aujtou'). Of his fulness have all we received, and grace for grace (cavrin ajntiV cavrito" or favor upon favor) (John 1:16). Thus the Logos is both creative and redemptive, and Christ is the Mediator in both nature and grace. St. Paul likewise warns us against vain philosophy (Col. 2: 8) and science falsely so-called (I Tim. 6:20), having in mind, doubtless, the gnostic tendencies which were pressing for

[Reason demands for the universe unity of dependence on some common original ground or cause, unity of order and law, of common intelligibility and significance, and of rational end; and theism meets and satisfies these demands. It presents, as the absolute ground or cause from which all things originate, the absolute Reason, self-exerting and self-directing. In the last analysis of physical force, science always finds a power transcending it and suggestive of will-power. In all its explorations of nature and its explanations of it by natural laws, it carries us into sight of the mystery of the infinite which no natural law can explain. The constitution of the physical system is the archetypal thought of God expressed in it. Its invariable factual sequences which are called the laws of nature and constitute its uniformity and continuity, are accordant with the truths, laws, ideals and ends which are eternal in the absolute Reason. - Harris, Self-revelation of God, pp. 288ff.]

recognition in the Church. To him, Christ is the image of the invisible God, the first born of every creature; for by him were all things created. And he is before all things, and by him all things consist, or "He precedes all things and in him all things have been permanently placed" (Col. 1:15, 17). St. Paul also has his pleroma doctrine, and we might add, his avatar doctrine also. The pleroma finds expression in the words, For it pleased the Father that in him should all fulness dwell, (pa'n toV plhvrwma katoikh'sai or the whole fullness should dwell). To the Gnostic teaching concerning light and darkness as eternal principles of good and evil, and the whole bewildering attempt to bridge the chasm between them, both philosophically and religiously, St. Paul gives answer in a hymn of praise, Giving thanks unto the Father, which hath made us meet to be partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light; who hath delivered us from the power of darkness, and hath translated us into the kingdom of his dear Son: in whom we have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins (Col. 1: 12-14).

We have considered this subject at some length, in order to present the Christian idea of God in His creative aspect. We need not give attention to those philosophies, which from the time of Gnosticism to the present have sought to explain God's relation to the world without a Mediator; nor to those which, ignoring the Divine Word, have substituted in His stead a series of impersonal emanations. Pantheism without the mediation of the Logos or Word resolves the world into God; materialism on the other hand confines God to the realm of matter or falls into atheism. The more modern monistic philosophies are usually but thinly veiled pantheism, and rightly deserve the name of "facile monism." Pluralism apparently gives up any attempt at unity. Against all these theories Christianity posits the Infinite Efficiency of Absolute Personality. It sees creation as the result of a creative fiat, and finds its unity in the Logos as the Eternal Word. The will, however, as here used is something more than mere choice or volition, it is thought or purpose, it is reason or end.

This St. Paul states specifically in his Epistle to the Ephesians. He speaks first of the good pleasure of his will (thVn eujdokivan tou' qelhvmato" aujtou') or benevolent affection of His will (Eph. 1:5); then of the mystery of his will according to the good pleasure which he hath purposed in himself, (proevqeto ejn aujtw'/ or according to his own benevolent design, which He had previously purposed in Himself) (Eph. 1:9); and lastly of the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will (boulhVn tou' qelhvmato" aujtou' or who effectuates or is operating according to the counsel, purpose or design, of His own will) (Eph. 1:11). Here, then, according to the Christian view; the world is created by the Infinite Efficiency of God, divine love being the originating cause, the divine will the efficient cause. and the divine Word the instrumental cause.

[The sublime doctrine of the relation of the Eternal Son to the creature is the only secret of the continuity which is taught, the only bridge between the Creator and the creature. He is the Mediator-if such a use of the term may be allowed - between the infinite and the finite, between God and the creature. . . . St. Paul contradicts the Gnostic speculations as to the Demiurgus; the entire pleroma of the Godhead, and not an emanation, dwelt in Him and did not descend upon Him bodily, and not in semblance. And He who was the First begotten before every creature, was such as the jArchv or Beginnlng, in Whom and through whom creation began. By him were a1l things created: as if in Him the Absolute God, or the Father, originated creaturely existence, upholds it and administers it; by an incarnation before the Incarnation. We cannot conceive how the creaturely universe should have this specific relation to the Son, and how in Him the Infinite became finite, before God became flesh; but we must receive the mystery and adore it. Our Lord was the Firstborn of the new creation when He began its life in Himself; and He is the First begotten, or beginning of the creation of God which had its origin in Him. - POPE, Compend. Chr. Th., I, pp. 384, 385.]