THE

LIVING TEMPLE.

PART 1:

Concerning God's Existence, and his Conversableness with Man. Against Atheism, or the Epicurean Deism.

CHAPTER 1:

I. IT is so well known that this notion has long obtained in the world, that we need not quote sayings to avouch it; wherewith not the sacred writings only, but others even of Pagans themselves, would plentifully furnish us.

But as authorities are, in a plain case, needless to unprejudiced minds; so will they be useless to the prejudiced, be the case never so plain. Nor is any prejudice deeper, or less vincible, that that of profane minds against religion. With such, it would, in the present argument, signify little to tell them what has been said or thought by others. Not because it is their general course to be so very circumspect, as never to approve or assent to any thing, unless upon the most- convincing demonstration; but from their peculiar dislike of those things only, that are of this special import and tendency. Discourse to them what you will of a temple, and it will be nauseous and unsavory; not as being cross to their reason (which they are as little curious to gratify as any other sort of men) but to their ill-humor, and the disaffected temper of their mind; whence also, they do what they can to believe religion nothing else but the effect of timorous fancy; and a temple consequently one of the most idle impertinences in the world.

To these, the discussion of the notion we have proposed to consider, will be thought an endeavor to give consistency to a shadow; and if their reason and power could as well serve their purpose as their anger and scorn, they would soon tear up the holy ground on which a temple is set, and wholly subvert the sacred frame.

I speak of such as deny the existence of the ever, blessed Deity, or (if they are not arrived to that express” and formed misbelief) whose hearts are inclined, and ready to determine, even against their mis-giving and more suspicious minds,” there is no GOD.” And with whom it is'so far' from being a grateful sound, that” the tabernacle of God is with men on earth,” that they grudge to allow him a place in heaven. At least if they are willing to admit the existence of any GOD at all, they say to him,” Depart from us;” and would have him so confined to heaven, that He and they may have nothing to do with one another.

II. These content not themselves to encounter this or that sect, but mankind; and reckon it too mean and inglorious au achievement, to overturn one sort of temple or another; but would down with them all, even to the ground. And they are in, reason and justice to pardon the emulation which they provoke, of vying with them as to the universality of their design; and not regret it, if they find there be any, that think it their duty to waive a while serving the temple of this or that party, as less considerable, to defend that one wherein all men have a common interest.

Since matters are brought to that exigency and hazard; that it seems less necessary to contend about this or that mode of religion, than whether there ought to be any at all; what was said of a former age, could never better agree to any than our own, that none was ever more fruitful of religions, and barren of religion, or true piety. It concerns us to consider, whether the fertility of those many doth not as well cause, as accompany a barrenness in this one. And (since the iniquity of the world has made that too. suitable, which were otherwise unseemly in itself, to speak of a temple as of a fortified place, whose own sacredness ought ever to have been its sufficient fortification) it is time to be aware, lest our forgetful heat and zeal, in defense of this or that outwork, expose (not to say betray) the main fortress - to assault and danger: Whilst it h.4th long been by this means a neglected, forsaken thing; and is more decayed by vacancy and disuse, than it could ever have been by the most forcible battery; so as even to promise the rude assailant an easy victory. Who fears to insult over an empty, dispirited, dead religion which, alive, and shining in its native glory (as that temple doth, which is compacted of lively stones united to the living Corner Stone) bears with it a magnificence and state that would check a profane look, and dazzle the presumptuous eye that durst venture to glance at it with disrespect. The temple, of the living God, manifestly animated by his vital presence, would not only dismay opposition, but command veneration also, and be its own both ornament, and defense. Nor can it be destitute of that presence, if we ourselves render it not inhospitable, and make not its proper inhabitant become a stranger at home.

If we preserve in ourselves a capacity of the Divine presence, and keep the temple of God in a posture fit to receive him; he would then no more forsake it, than the soul, a sound and healthy body, not violated in any healthy part: But if be forsake it once, it then becomes an exposed and despised thing. And as the most impotent, inconsiderable enemy can securely trample on the dead body of the greatest hero, that alive carried awfulness, and terror in his looks; so is the weak spirited Atheist become as bold now, as he was willing before, to make rude attempts upon the temple of God, when He bath been provoked to leave it, who is its life, strength, and glory.

III. IT would be both an ungrateful and insignificant labor to discourse of religion, with persons `that have abjured all seriousness, and that cannot endure to think. But it wants neither its use nor pleasure, to the most composed minds, and that are most exempt from wavering herein, to view the frame of their religion, as it aptly, and even naturally rises and grows up from its very foundations, and to contemplate its first principles, which they may in the mean time find no present cause or inclination to dispute.

They will know how to consider its most fundamental grounds, not with doubt, or suspicion, but with admiration and delight; and can, with. a calm and silent pleasure, enjoy the repose and rest of a quiet and well assured mind: Rejoicing and contented to know to themselves, _(when others refuse to partake with them in this joy,) and feel all firm and stable under them, whereupon either the practice or the hopes of their religion depend.

And there may be also many others, of good and pious inclinations, that have never yet applied themselves to consider the principal, and most fundamental grounds of religion, so as to be able to give, or discern any tolerable reason of them. F or either the sluggishness of their own temper may have indisposed them to any more painful, and laborious exercise of their minds, and made them to be content with the easier course of taking every thing upon trust, or they have been- unhappily mis-informed, that it consists not with the reverence due to religion, to search into the grounds of it: Yea, and may have laid this for one of its main grounds, that no exercise of reason may have any place about it. Or perhaps, having never tried, they apprehend a greater difficulty in coming to a clear and certain resolution herein, than indeed there is.

Now such need to be excited to set their own thoughts a work. this way, and to be assisted herein. They should therefore consider who gave them the understandings which they fear to use And can they use them to better purpose, or with more gratitude to Him who made them intelligent, and not brute creatures, than in laboring to know that. they may also, by a reasonable service, worship and adore their Maker Are they not to use their very senses about the matters of religion For the invisible things of God, even his eternal Power and Godhead, are clearly seen; and their -faith comes by hearing. But what, are these more sacred and divine, and more akin to religion than their reason and judgment without which also their sense can be of no use to them herein. Or is it the best way of making use of what God has revealed of himself, not to understand what He bath revealed It is most true indeed, that when we once come clearly to be informed that GOD has revealed this or that thing, we are then readily to subject our feeble reasonings to his plain revelation. And it were a most insolent arrogance, to contend or not yield Him the cause, though things have to us seemed otherwise. But it were as inexcusable negligence, not to make use of our -understandings to the best advantage; that we may both know that such a revelation is divine, and what it signifies, after we know whence it is.

And any one that considers, will soon see it very unseasonable, at least, to allege the written divine revelation as the ground- of his religion, till he have gone lower, and fore-known some things (by and by to be insisted on) as preparatory, and fundamental to the knowledge of this.

And because it is obvious to suppose how great an increase of strength and vigour pious minds may receive hence, how much it may animate them to the service of the temple, and contribute to their more cheerful progress in a religious course; it will therefore not be besides our present purpose to consider a while, not in the contentious way of disputation, (the noise whereof is as unsuitable to the temple as that of axes and hammers,) but of calm and sober discourse, the more principal and lowermost grounds upon which the frame of religion rests; and to the supposal whereof the notion, and use of any such thing as a temple in the world do owe themselves.

THE LIVING TEMPLE.

CHAPTER 2:

1. Now the grounds more necessary to be laid down, and which are supposed in the most general notion of a temple, are especially these two The Existence of GOD, and his Conversableness with men. For no notion of a temple can more easily occur to any one's thoughts, or is more agreeable to common acceptation, than that it is an habitation wherein GOD is pleased to dwell among men.

Therefore to the designation and use of it, or (which is all one) to the intention and exercise of religion, the belief or persuasion is necessary of those two things, (the same which we find made necessary on the same account,)” That GOD is, and that He is a Rewarder of them that diligently seek him;” (glee. 11: 6;) as will appear when the manner and design of that his abode with men shall be considered.

These are the grounds upon which the sacred frame of a temple ought to stand, and without which it must be acknowledged an unsupported, airy fabric. And since it were vain to discourse what a temple is, or whereto the notion of it may be applied, unless it be well resolved that there is, or ought to be such a thing; the strength and firmness of this its double ground should be tried and searched.

And though it be not necessary, in a matter that is so plain, and wherein so much is to be said otherwise; yet it will not be impertinent to consider, First, What prescription will signify in the present case. And, For the Existence of GOD, we need not labor much to show how constantly and generally it has been acknowledged, through the whole world; it being so difficult to produce an uncontroverted instance, of any that ever denied it, in more ancient times. For as for them whose names have been infamous among men heretofore upon that account, there has been that said that, at least, wants not probability for the clearing them of so foul an imputation; that is, that they were maliciously represented as having denied the existence of a Deity, because they derided the vulgar conceits, and poetical fictions of those days, concerning the multitude, and, ridiculous attributes of their imaginary deities.

But whatever the apprehensions of those few (and some others that are wont to be. mentioned) were in this matter; yet so inconsiderable has the dissent been, that, as an ingenious Pagan (MAXIM. TYR. Dim. 1.) writes,’ In so great a contention and variety of opinions, (that is, concerning what GOD is,) herein you, shall see the law and rear. son of every country to be harmonious and one; that there is one GOD, the King' and Father of all; That the many are but the servants and co-rulers unto GOD. That herein the Greek and the Barbarian say the same thing.; the Islander and the inhabitant of the Continent; the wise and the foolish. Go to the utmost bounds of the ocean; and you find GOD there. But if (says he) in all times, there have been two or three, an atheistical, vile, senseless sort of persons, whose own eyes and ears deceive them, and who are maimed in their very soul, an irrational and sterile sort, as monstrous creatures, as a lion without courage, an ox without horns, or a bird without wings; yet, out of those, you shall understand somewhat of God. For they know and confess him, whether they will or no.'

III. Yea, and the use of a temple, and the exercise of religion (which suppose the second ground also as well as the first) have been so very common, (though not altogether equally common with the former,) that it is the observation of that famed Moralist, (PLUTARCH adversus COLOTEM,)’ That if one travel the world, it is possible to find cities without walls, without letters; without Kings, without wealth, without coin, without schools and theatres; but a city without a temple, or that uses no worship, or prayers, no one ever saw. And he believes a city may more easily be built without a foundation, (or ground to Set it on,) than any community of men have or keep a consistency without religion.'

IV. And it is no mean argument of the commonness of religion, that there have been some in the world (and those no ideots neither) that have accounted it the most constituent, and distinguishing thing in human nature. So that the Platonic Jew judges invocation’ of God, with hope towards him, to be, if we will speak the truth, the only genuine property of man and says, that only he who is acted by such an hope, is a man, and he that is destitute of this hope is no man;' preferring this account to the ‘common definition, that he is a reasonable creature.

And a noble person (HERBERT De Verit.) of our own says, ’That upon accurate search, religion and faith appear the only ultimate differences of, man; whereof neither Divine perfection is capable, nor brutal imperfection.' Reason in his account descending low among the inferior creatures. But these agreeing more peculiarly to man, and so universally, that he affirms,’ There is no man well in his wits, that cloth not worship sonic Deity.'

V. Having seen what, common consent may contribute to the establishing of these principles jointly; we may now apply ourselves to consider and search into each of them severally and apart., Having still this mark in our eye, our own confirmation, in reference to what is the proper work of a temple, religion, and conversation with GOD; how little so ever any endeavor in this kind may be apt to signify with the otherwise-minded.

VI. And, first, for the existence of GOD that we may regularly make it out to ourselves that he doth exist; and may withal see what the, belief of his existence will contribute towards the evincing of the reasonableness of erecting a temple to him; it is requisite that we first settle a true notion of him in our minds, what it is that we mean by the name of GOD; otherwise we know not what we seek, nor when we have found him.

And though we must before-hand professedly avow, that we take him to be such an one as we can never comprehend, that this knowledge is too excellent for us, or he is more excellent than that we can perfectly know him; yet it will be sufficient to guide us in our search after his existence, if we can give such a description of his being as will severally, or together, distinguish him from all things else. For then we shall be able to call him by his own name, and say, This is God; whatever his being may contain more; or whatsoever other properties may belong to it, beyond what, we can as yet compass, in our present thoughts of him.

VII. And such an account we shall have of what we are inquiring after, if we have the conception in our minds of an eternal, uncaused, independent, necessary being, that bath active power, life, wisdom, goodness, and every other supposable excellency, in the highest perfection originally;. in and of itself.

VIII. We begin with God's existence. For the evincing whereof we may,

1. Be most assured, that there bath been somewhat or other from all eternity, or that looking backward, somewhat of real being must be confessed eternal. Let such as have not been used to think of any thing more, than what they could see with their eyes, and to whom reasoning: only seems difficult because they have not tried what they can do in it, but use their thoughts a little; and by moving them a few easy steps, they will soon find themselves as sure of this, as that they see, or hear, or understand, or are any thing.

For being sure that something now is, (that you see, for instance, or are something,) you must then acknowledge that certainly either somewhat always was, or bath ever been, or been from all eternity; or else you must say, that sometime nothing was, or that all being once was not. And so, since you find that something now is, that there was a time when any thing of being did begin to be, that is, that till that time there was nothing; but now, at that time, somewhat first began to be. For what can be plainer than that,. if all being sometime was not, and now some being is, every thing of being had a beginning And thence it would follow that some being, that is, the first that ever began to be, did of itself start up out of nothing, or made itself to be, when before nothing was.

But now, do you not plainly see that it is altogether impossible any thing should do so; that is, when it was as yet nothing, and when nothing at all as yet was, that it should make itself, or come into being of itself For sure, making itself is doing something. But can that which is nothing do anything Unto all doing there must be some doer; wherefore a thing must be, before it can do any thing; and therefore it would follow that it was, before it was; or was, and was not, was something and nothing at the same time: Yea, and it was diverse from itself; for a cause must be a distinct thing from that which is caused by ii; wherefore it is most apparent that some being has ever been, or did never begin to be. Whence further,

IX. 2. It is also evident, that some being was uncaused, or was ever of itself without any cause; for what never was from another, had never any cause, since nothing could be its own cause. And somewhat, as appears from what has been said, never was from another. Or it may be plainly argued thus, that either some being was uncaused, or all being was caused; but if all beings were caused, then some one at least was the cause of itself; which liath been already shown impossible.

X. 3. It is hence further evident, that some being is independent upon any other; that is, whereas it already appears that some being did never depend upon any other, as a productive cause, or was not beholden to any other that it might come into being; it is thereupon equally evident, that it is simply independent, or cannot be beholden to any for its continued being. For what did never need a productive cause, doth as little need a sustaining and conserving cause. And, to make this more plain, either some being is independent, or all being is dependent; but there is nothing, without the compass of all being, whereon it may depend; wherefore, to say that all being doth depend, is to say it depends on nothing, that is, that it depends. not; for to depend on nothing, is not to depend.

It is therefore a manifest contradiction to say, that all' being doth depend, against which it is no relief to say that. all beings do circularly depend on one another. For so,. However, the whole circle or sphere of being should depend on nothing, or one at least depend on itself; which, negatively taken, is true, and the thing we contend for, that one, the common support of all the rest, depends not on any thing without itself. Whence also it is plainly consequent.

XI. That 4. Such a being is necessary, or doth necessarily exist, that is, that it is of such a nature as that it could not, or cannot but be. For what is in being neither by its own choice, nor any other's, is necessarily. But what was not made by itself, (which bath been shown impossible that any thing should,) nor by any other, (as it has been proved, something was not,) it is manifest, it neither depended on its own choice, nor any other's that it is. And therefore its existence is not owing to choice at all, but to the necessity of its own nature. Wherefore it is always by a simple, absolute, natural necessity; being of such a nature, to which it is altogether repugnant, and impossible. ever not to have been, or ever to cease from being.

And now having, gone thus far, and being assured that hitherto we feel the ground firm under us; that is, having. gained a full certainty that there is an eternal, uncaused,, independent, necessary Being, and therefore actually and everlastingly existing; we may advance' one step further, and, with equal assurance, add.

XII. 5. That this eternal, independent, uncaused, necessary being, is self-active; that is, not such as acts upon itself, but that has the power of acting upon other things, in and of itself, without deriving it from any other. Or at least, that there is such a being as. is eternal, uncaused, having the power of action in and of itself.

For either such a being, as bath been already evinced, is of itself active, or unactive; or either has the power of action of itself, or not, If we will say the latter, let it be considered what we say, and to what purpose we say it. First, we are to weigh what it is we affirm, when we speak of an eternal, uncaused, independent, necessary being, that is of itself totally inactive, or destitute of any active power. If we will say there is some such thing, we will confess when we have called it something, it is a very silly, despicable, idle something, and a something (if we look upon it alone) as good as nothing. For there is but little odds between being nothing, and being able to do nothing. Wherefore, by the same reason that bath constrained us to acknowledge an eternal, uncaused, independent, necessary Being; we are also unavoidably led to acknowledge this being to be selfactive; or such as bath the power of action in and of itself: Or that there is certainly such a being as is the cause of all the things which our sense tells us are, besides, existent in the world.

XIII. For what else is left us to say or think Will we think fit to say, that all things we behold were, as they are, necessarily existent froth all eternity That were to speak against our own eyes, which continually behold the rise and fall of living things, of whatsoever kind, that can come under their notice. And it were to speak against the thing itself, that we say; and to say, and unsay the same thing in the same breath. For all the things we behold are, in some respect or other, (internal or external,) continually changing; and therefore could never long be beheld as they are. And to say' then, they have been continually changing from eternity, and yet have been necessarily, is unintelligible, and flat nonsense; for what is necessarily, is always the same; and what is in this or that posture necessarily, (that is, by an intrinsic, simple and absolute necessity, which must be here meant,) must be ever so. Wherefore to suppose the world in this or that state necessarily, and yet that such a state is changeable; is an impossible, and self-contradicting supposition. It is therefore manifest, that there is a necessary, selfactive being, the cause and author of this perpetually variable frame of things. And hence,

XI 5: 6. Since we can frame no notion of life which selfactive power doth not, at least, comprehend, (as upon trial we shall find that we cannot,) it is consequent that this being is also originally vital, and the root of all vitality; such as bath life in or of itself. and from whence it is propagated to every other living thing.

And so as we plainly see that this sensible world did sometime begin to be, it is also evident it took its beginning from a being essentially vital, and active, that had itself no beginning. Nor can we make a difficulty to conclude that this being, (which now we have shown is active, and all action implies some power) is.

XV. 7. Of vast and mighty power, (we will not say infinite, lest we should step too far at once,) when we contemplate the vastness of the work performed by it; unto which (if we were to make our estimate by nothing else) we must, at least, judge this power to be proportionable. For when our eyes behold an effect exceeding the power of any cause which they behold, our mind must step in and supply the defect of our feebler sense; so as to make a judgment there is a cause we see not, equal to this effect. As when we behold a great and magnificent fabric, and entering in we see not the master, or any living thing, besides mice and weasels, we will not think that mice or weasels built it. Nor need we, in a matter so obvious, insist further. But only when our reason bath made us confess, our further contemplation should make us admire a power which is at once both so apparent, and so stupendous.

And now from what bath been hitherto discoursed, it seems a plain and necessary consectary, that this world had a cause diverse from the matter whereof it is composed.

For otherwise matter that is altogether inactive, must be stated the only cause and fountain of all the action and motion that is to be found in the whole universe. Which is a conceit absurd enough, not only as it opposes the common judgment of such as have with the greatest diligence inquired into things of this nature, but as being in itself manifestly impossible to be true.

1. WE therefore add, that this being is wise and intelligent, as well as powerful; upon the very view of this world, it will appear so vast power was guided by equal wisdom, in the framing of it. No place of doubt seems to remain, but that this was an intelligent cause; and that this world was the product of wisdom and counsel, and not of mere power alone.

For what imagination can lie more grossly absurd, than to suppose this orderly frame of things to have green the result of so mighty a power, not accompanied by wisdom and counsel That is, (as the case must now unavoidably be understood,) that there is some being necessarily existent, of an essentially active nature, of inconceivably vast and mighty power, destitute of all understanding and knowledge, and consequently of any self-moderating principle; but acting always by the necessity of its own nature, and therefore to its very uttermost; that raised up all the alterable matter of the universe (to whose nature it is plainly repugnant to be of itself) out of nothing; and, by the utmost exertion of that ungoverned power, put all the particles of that matter into a wild hurry of impetuous motion, by which they have been compacted and digested into particular beings, in that variety and order which we now behold. And surely to give this account of the world's original, is, as Cicero speaks, not to consider, but to cast lots what to say: And were as mad a supposition,’ As if one should suppose the one and twenty letters, formed, (as the same author elsewhere speaks,) in great numbers, and cast of any careless fashion together, and that of these loosely shaken out upon the ground, ENNIUS's Annals should result, so as to be distinctly legible, as now we see them.' Nay it were the supposition of a thing a thousand fold more manifestly impossible.

II. And let them that understand any thing of the composition of an human body, (or indeed of any living creature,) but bethink themselves whether there be not equal contrivance, at least, appearing in the composure of that admirable fabric, as of any the most admired machine, or engine, devised and made by human skill. If we pitch upon any tiring of known and common use, suppose a clock, or watch, which is no sooner seen than it is acknowledged the effect of a designing cause; will we not confess as much of the body of a man Yea, what comparison is there, when in the structure of some one single member, as an hand, a foot, an eye, or ear, there appears upon a diligent search, unspeakably greater curiosity, whether we consider the variety of parts, their exquisite figuration, or their apt disposition to the distinct uses these members serve for, than is to be see-n in any clock or watch. Concerning which uses of the several parts in man's body, GALEN so largely discoursing in seventeen books, inserts, on the by, this Epiphonema, upon the mention of one particular instance of our most wise Maker's provident care:’ Unto whom (says he) I compose these commentaries (meaning his present work of unfolding the useful figuration of the human body) as certain hymns (or songs of praise) esteeming true piety more to consist in this, that I first may know, and then declare to others his Wisdom, Power, Providence and Goodness, than in sacrificing to him many hecatombs.-And in the ignorance whereof there is greatest impiety, -rather than in abstaining from sacrifice. Nor (as he adds in the close of that excellent work) is the most perfect natural artifice to be seen in man only, but you. may find the like industrious design and wisdom of the author in any living creature which you shall please to dissect. And by how much the less it is, so much the greater admiration shall it raise in you, which those artists show that describe some great thing in a very small space; as that person who lately engraved PHAETON carried in his chariot, with his four horses, upon a little ring. A most incredible sight! But there is nothing, in matters of this nature, more strange than in the structure of the leg of a flea. How much more might it be said of all its inward parts! Therefore (as he adds) the greatest commodity of such a work accrues not to Physicians, but to them who are studious of nature, namely, the knowledge of our Maker's perfection, and that it establishes the principle of the most perfect Theology; which theology is much more excellent than all Medicine.'

It were too great an undertaking, and beyond the designed limits of this discourse, (though it would be to excellent purpose, if it could be done in that easy, familiar way, as to be capable of common use,) to pursue and trace distinctly' the prints and footsteps of the admirable Wisdom which appears in the structure and frame of this outer temple. (For even our bodies themselves are said to be the temples of the HOLY GHOST.) And to dwell a while, in the contemplation and discovery of those numerous instances of apparent sagacity and providence which offer themselves to view in every part of this fabric. How most commodiously all things are ordered in it! With how strangely cautious circumspection and foresight, not only destructive, but even vexatious and afflicting incongruities are avoided and provided against! For instance: How comes it to pass that the several parts which we find to be double in our bodies, are not single only Is this altogether by chance That there are two eyes, ears, nostrils, hands, feet What a miserable shiftless creature had man been, if there had only been allowed him one foot! A. seeing, hearing, talking, unmoving statue! That the hand is divided into fingers Those so conveniently situate, one in so fitly opposite a posture to the rest

And what if some one pair, or other, of these parts had been universally wanting The hands, the feet, the eyes, the ears How great a misery had it inferred upon mankind! And is it only a casualty that it is not so That the back-bone is composed of so many joints, (twenty-four, besides those of that which is the basis and sustainer of the whole,) and is not all of a piece, by which stooping, or any motion of the head or neck, diverse from that of the whole body, had been altogether impossible. That there is such variety and curiosity in the ways of joining the bones together in that and other parts of the body. That in some parts they are joined by mere adherence of one to another, either with or without an intervening medium, and both these ways so diversely. That others are fastened together by proper jointing, so as to suit and be accompanied with motion, either more obscure or more manifest: And this either by a deeper or more superficial insertion of one bone into another, or by a mutual insertion, and that so different ways: And that all these should be so exactly accommodated to the several parts and uses to which they belong, and serve. Was all this without design

Who that views the curious texture of the eye, can think it was not made on purpose to see with, and the ear, upon the like view, for hearing; when so many things must concur, that these actions might be performed by these organs, and are found to do so Or who can think that the sundry little engines belonging to the eye were not made with design to move it upwards, downwards, to this side, or that, or whirl it about, as there should be occasion; without which instruments, and their appendages, no such motion could have been Who, that is not stupidly perverse, can think that the sundry inward parts (which it would require a volume distinctly to speak of) were not made purposely, by a designing agent, for the ends they so aptly and constantly serve The want of some one among divers whereof, or but a little misplacing, or if things had been but a little otherwise than they are, had inferred an impossibility that such a creature as man could have subsisted, or been propagated upon the face of the earth.

And what if there had not been such a receptacle prepared as the stomach is, and so formed and placed as it is to receive and digest necessary nutriment; had not the whole frame of man besides been in vain Or what if the passage from it downward had not been made somewhat, a little way, ascending, so as to detain a convenient time what is received; but that what was taken in, were suddenly transmitted It is evident the whole structure had been ruined, as soon as made. What (to instance in what seems so small a matter) if that little cover had been wanting, at the entrance of that passage through which we breathe, (the depression whereof, by the weight of what we eat or drink, shuts it, and prevents meat and drink from going down that way,) had not unavoidable suffocation ensued And who can number the instances that might be given besides Now when there is a concurrence of so many things absolutely necessary (concerning which the common saying is as applicable, more frequently wont to be applied to matters of morality,’ Goodness is from the concurrence of all causes; evil, from any defect') each so aptly serving its own proper use, and all one common end; certainly to say that so manifold, so regular and stated a subserviency to that end, and the end itself were undesigned, and things casually, fell out thus, is to say we know, or care not what.

We will only before we close this consideration, concerning the mere frame of an human body, offer a supposition, that the whole external covering of the body of a man were made, instead of skin and flesh, of some very transparent substance, flexible, but clear as very crystal, through which, and the other more inward (and as transparent) integuments, or enfoldings, we could plainly perceive the situation and order of all the internal parts, and how they each of them perform their distinct offices. If we could discern the continual motion of the blood, how it is conveyed, by its proper conduits, from its first source and fountain, partly downwards to the lower entrails, (if rather it ascend. not from thence, as at least what afterwards becomes blood doth,) partly upwards to its admirable elaboratory the heart, where it is refined, and furnished with fresh vital spirits, and so transmitted thence by the distinct vessels prepared for this purpose; could we perceive the curious contrivance of those little doors by which it is let in and out, on this side and on that; the order and course of its circulation, its most commodious distribution, by two social channels, or conduit-pipes that every where accompany one another throughout the body. Could we discern the curious artifices of the brain, its ways of purgation, and were it possible to pry into the secret chambers and receptacles of the less, or more pure spirits there, perceive their manifold conveyances, and the rare texture of that net commonly called the wonderful one. Could we behold the veins, arteries and nerves, all of them arising from their proper and distinct originals; and their orderly dispersion, for the most part by pairs, and conjugations, on this side' and that, from the middle of the back, with the curiously wrought branches, which supposing these to appear duly diversified, as so many more duskish strokes in this transparent frame, they would be found to make throughout -the whole of it, were every smaller fiber thus made at once discernible; especially those innumerable threads into which the spinal marrow is distributed at the bottom of the back: And could we, through the same medium, perceive those numerous little machines made to serve unto voluntary motions, (which in the whole body are computed by some to the number of four hundred and thirty, or thereabouts, or so many of them as according to the present supposition could possibly come in view,) and discern their composition, their various and elegant figures, round, square, long, triangular, &c., and behold them do their offices, and see how they ply to and fro, and work in their respective places, as any motion is to be performed by them. Were all these things, I say, thus made liable to an easy and distinct view, who would not admiringly cry out,” How fearfully and wonderfully am I made!” And sure there is no man sober, who would not, upon such a sight, pronounce that man mad that should suppose such a production to have been a mere undesigned casualty. The necessarily existent being is therefore not only of infinite power, but likewise of infinite wisdom.

III. I add, and of equal goodness; for unto that eternal Being, goodness also cannot but appertain, together with those other attributes we have spoken of. The name of Goodness is of a significancy large enough to comprehend all other perfections that belong to, or may any way commend the will of a free agent. Particularly whatsoever is wont to be signified (as attributable unto GOD) by the names of Holiness, as a steady inclination unto what is intellectually pure, with an aversion to the contrary;-Justice,. as that signifies an inclination to deal equally, which is included in the former; yet as more expressly denoting what is more proper to a governor over others, namely, a resolution not to let the transgression of laws, made for the preservation of common order, pass without due punishment; Truth, whose signification also may be wholly contained under those former more general terms; but more directly contains sincerity, unaptness to deceive, and constancy to one's word: For these may properly be styled good things in a moral sense. These are mentioned, as more directly tending to represent to us an amiable object of religion; and are referred hither, out of an unwillingness to multiply, without necessity, particular subjects of discourse.

In the mean time, what we principally intend is, that the Being, whose existence we have been endeavoring to evince, is good, as that imports a ready inclination to communicate to others what may be good to them; creating, first, its own object, and then issuing forth to it, in acts of free beneficence, suitable to the nature of every thing created by it. Which though it be the primary, or first thing carried in the notion of this goodness, yet, because that inclination is not otherwise good than as it consists with holiness, justice, and truth; these therefore may be esteemed, secondarily at least, to belong to it as inseparable qualifications thereof.

Wherefore it is not a merely natural and necessary emanation we here intend, that prevents any act or exercise of counsel or design; which would no way consist with the liberty of the Divine Will; and would make the Deity as well a necessary agent, as a necessary Being. This is provided against, by our having first asserted the Wisdom of that Being, whereunto we also attribute Goodness; which guides all the issues of it, according to those measures or rules which the essential rectitude of the Divine Will gives, or rather is, unto it. Whereby also a foundation is laid of answering such cavils, against- the Divine goodness, as they are apt to raise to themselves, who are wont to magnify this attribute to the suppression of others; which is indeed, in the end, to: magnify it to nothing.

And such Goodness needs no other demonstration than the visible effects we have of it, in the creation and conservation of this world; and particularly in his large munificent bounty and kindness towards man; whereof his designing him for his temple and residence, will be a full and manifest proof.

And of all this, his own self-sufficient fullness leaves it impossible to us to imagine another reason, than the delight he takes in dispensing his own free and large communications. Besides, that when we see some semblances of this Goodness in the natures of some men, they must needs have some fountain and original, which can be no other than the common Cause and Author of all things; in whom, therefore, this Goodness Both first and most perfectly consist.

CHAPTER 4:

I. Some account bath been thus far given of that Being, whereunto we have been designing to assert the honor of a temple; each of the particulars having been severally insisted on, that concur to make up that notion of this, Being which was at first laid down. But because in that fore-mentioned account of God, there was added to the particulars there enumerated (out of a just consciousness of human inability to comprehend every thing that may possibly belong to him) this general supplement,

That all other supposable excellencies whatsoever, do in the highest perfection appertain also originally unto this Being,' it is requisite that somewhat be said concerning this addition; especially inasmuch as it comprehends in it some things (not yet expressly mentioned) which may be thought necessary to the evincing the reasonableness of religion, or our self-dedication as a temple to him.

For instance, it ~may possibly be alleged, that if it were admitted there is somewhat that is eternal, uncaused, independent, necessarily existent, that is self-active, living, powerful, wise, and good; yet all this will not infer upon us an universal obligation to religion, unless it can also be evinced, 1. That this being is every way sufficient to satisfy all our, real wants, and just desires. 2. And that this Being is but one, and so that all be at a certainty where their religion ought to terminate; and that the worship of every temple must concentre and meet in the same object.

Now the eviction of an absolute perfect Being would include each of these, and answer both the purposes which may seem hitherto not so fully satisfied. It is therefore requisite that we endeavor,

First, To show that the Being hitherto described is absolutely perfect.

Secondly, To deduce, from the same grounds, the absolute Infinity, and the Unity thereof.

II. For the former part of this undertaking, it must be acknowledged, absolute or universal Perfection cannot be pretended to have been expressed in any, or in all the works of God together. Neither in number, for ought we know (for as we cannot conceive, nor consequently speak of Divine Perfections, but under the notion of many, whatsoever their real identity may be; so we do not know, but that within the compass of universal Perfection, there may be some particular ones, of which there is no footstep in the creation, and whereof we have never formed any thought) nor (certainly) in degree; for surely the world, and the particular creatures in it, are not so perfect in correspondence to those attributes of its great Architect, which we have mentioned, namely, his Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, as he might have made them, if he had pleased: And indeed, to say the world were absolutely and universally perfect, were to make that God.

Wherefore it must also be acknowledged, that an absolutely perfect Being cannot be immediately demonstrated from its effects, as whereto they neither do, nor is it within the capacity of created nature that they can adequately correspond; therefore, all that can be done for the evincing of the absolute and universal Perfection of God, must be in some other way or method of reasoning.

And though it be acknowledged that it cannot be immediately evidenced from the creation, yet it is to be hoped that mediately it may; for from thence (as we have seen) a necessary self-originate Being, such as has been described, is with the greatest certainty to be concluded; and from thence, if we attentively consider, we shall be led to an absolutely perfect one. That is, since we have the same certainty of such a necessary self-originate Being, as we have that there is any thing existent at all; if we seriously weigh what kind of Being this must needs be, we shall not be found much to fall short of our present aim.

Here therefore let us make a stand, and more distinctly consider how far we are already advanced; that we may with the better order and advantage, make our further progress. These two things then are already evident: First, That there is a necessary Being that bath been-eternally of itself, without dependence upon any thing, either as a productive or conserving cause; and, of itself, full of activity and vital energy, so as to be a productive and sustaining cause to other things. Secondly, That this necessary self-originate, vital, active Being bath vast Power, admirable Wisdom, and most free and large Goodness. Now, that we may proceed, what can self-essentiate, underived Power, Wisdom, Goodness be, bit most perfect Power, Wisdom, Goodness

For since there can be no Wisdom, Power, or Goodness, which is not either original or derived from thence; who sees not that the former must be the more perfect yea, and comprehend all the other (as what was from it) in itself and consequently that it is simply the most perfect And the reason will be the same, concerning any other perfection, the stamps and characters whereof we find signed upon the creatures.

But that the Being, unto which these belong, is absolutely and universally perfect in every kind, must be further evidenced by considering more at large the notion of such a self-originate necessary Being.

And in general, this seems manifestly imported in the notion of the necessary Being, that it have in it (some way or other) the entire sum and utmost fullness of being; beyond which, or without the compass whereof, no perfection is conceivable.

But that we may entertain ourselves with some more particular considerations of this necessary Being, which may evince that general assertion of its absolute fullness of essence; it appears to be such,

III. As Is, First, at the greatest imaginable distance from non-entity; for what can be at a greater than that which is necessarily Which signifies as much as whereto not to be is utterly impossible. Now an utter impossibility not to be, or the uttermost distance from no being, seems plainly to imply the absolute plenitude of all being. We add,

IV. That necessary being is most unmixed or purest being, without allay. That is pure which is full of itself. Purity is not here meant in a corporeal sense, nor in the moral; but as it signifies simplicity of essence. Necessary being imports purest actuality, which is the ultimate and highest perfection of being; for it signifies no remaining possibility, yet urreplete or not filled up, and consequently the fullest exuberancy and entire confluence of all being, as in its fountain and original source.

V. Moreover, necessary being is the cause and author of all being besides. Whatsoever is not necessary, is caused; for not having being of itself, it must be put into being by somewhat else. And inasmuch as there is no middle sort of being betwixt necessary and not necessary, and all that is not necessary is caused; it is plain, that which is necessary must be the cause of all the rest.

Wherefore how inexhaustible a fountain of life, being, and all perfection have we here represented to our thoughts! from whence this vast universe is sprung, and is continually springing, and that in the mean time receiving no recruits or foreign supplies, yet suffers no impairment or lessening of itself! What is this but absolute All-fullness And it is so far from arguing any deficiency; or mutability in his nature, that there is this continual issue of, power and virtue from him, that it demonstrates its high excellency that this can be without decay or mutation.

VI. We only say further, that this necessary Being is such, to which nothing can be added; so as that it should be really greater, or better, or more perfect than it was before. Now what can be supposed to import fullness of being, and perfection more than this imposssibility of addition, or that there can be nothing greater or more perfect

Having dispatched that former part of this undertaking; the eviction of an every way perfect Being; we shall now need, to labor little in the other, namely,

VII. Secondly, The more express deduction of the infiniteness and unity thereof.

For as to the former of these, it is in effect the same thing that bath been already proved since to the fullest notion of infiniteness, absolute perfection seems every way most fully to correspond; for absolute perfection includes all conceivable perfection, leaves nothing excluded. And what doth most simple infiniteness import, but to have nothing for a boundary, or (which is the same) not to be bounded at all

We intend now, principally, infiniteness extrinsically considered, with respect to time and place, as to be eternal and immense import but likewise intrinsically, as importing bottomless profundity of essence, and the full confluence of all kinds and degrees of perfection, without bound or limit.

VIII. And as to the unity of this Being, the deduction thereof seems plain and easy, from what bath been already proved, that is, from the absolute perfection thereof. For though some toil much about this matter, and others plainly conclude that is not to be proved at all in a rational way, but only by Divine Revelation; yet I conceive, they that follow the method (having proved some necessary self-subsisting Being, the root and original spring of all being and perfection, actual and possible) of deducing, from thence, the absolute, all-comprehending perfection of such necessary Being, will find their work as good as done. For nothing seems more evident, than that there cannot be two (much less more) such beings,. inasmuch as one comprehends in itself all being and perfection; for, there can be but one All, without which is nothing. So that one such Being supposed, another can have nothing remaining to it. Yea, so far is it therefore, if we suppose one infinite and absolutely perfect Being, that there can be another independent thereon; that there cannot be the minutest finite thing imaginable, which that supposed infinity doth not comprehend, or that can stand apart from it.

We might, more at large, and with a (much more pompous) number of arguments, have shown, that there can be no more Gods than-one; but to such as had rather be informed, than bewildered and lost, clear proof, that is shorter and more comprehensive, will be more grateful.

Nor doth this proof of the unity of the Godhead, any way impugn the Trinity, which is” by Christians believed therein, (and whereof some Heathens, as is known, have not been wholly without some apprehension,)’or exclude a sufficient, untreated ground of trinal distinction: As would be seen if that great difference of beings necessary and contingent be well stated; and what is by eternal, necessary emanation of the Divine nature,; be duly distinguished from the arbitrary products of the Divine will, and the matter be throughly examined, whether herein be not a sufficient distinction of that which is uncreated, and that which is created. In this way it is possible it might be cleared, how a Trinity in the Godhead may be very consistently with the Unity thereof. But that it is, we cannot know but by his telling us so; it being among the many things of God, which are not to be known but by the SPIRIT of GOD revealing and testifying them, in and according to the Holy Scriptures.

CHAPTER 5:

I. Arm if any one should in the mean time still remain either doubtful, or apt to cavil, after all that bath been said for proof of that Being's existence; I would only add these few things by way of inquiry or demand. First, Do they believe upon supposition of the existence of such a Being, that it is possible it may be made known to us in our present state, by means not unsuitable to the order and government of the world, that it doth exist

It were strange to say, or suppose that a Being, of so high perfection, if he is, cannot make it known that he is, to intelligent creatures. If indeed he is, and be the common cause, author, and Loan of us, and all things, (which we do now but suppose, that we may defy cavil to allege any thing that is so much as colorable, against the possibility of the supposition,) surely he bath done greater things than the making of it known that he is.

There bath been no inconsistent notion hitherto given of him, nothing said concerning him, but will well admit. that it is possible such a Being may be now. existent. Yea, we not only can conceive, but we actually have (and cannot but have) some conception of the several attributes we have ascribed to him; so as to apply them (severally) to somewhat else, if we will not apply them (jointly) to him. We cannot but- admit there is some eternal necessary Being; somewhat. that is of itself active; somewhat that is powerful, wise, and good. And these notions have in them no repugnancy to one another; wherefore it is not impossible they may meet, and agree together in full perfection: And hence itis manifestly no inapprehensible thing that such a Being doth exist.

Now supposing it doth exist, and bath been to us the cause and author of our being, bath given us the intelligent nature which we find ourselves possessors of, and that very power whereby we apprehend the existence of such a Being as He is to be possible, while also his actual existence is not inapprehensible: Were it not the greatest madness imaginable to say, that if he doth exist, he cannot make us understand' that he doth exist We will therefore take it for granted, and as a thing which no man in his wits will deny, that upon supposition such a Being, the cause and author of all things, do exist; he might in some way or other, with sufficient evidence, make it known to such creatures as we, so as to beget in us a rational certainty that he doth exist.

Upon which ground we will only reason thus, that there is no possible and fit way of doing it, which is not liable to as much exception, as the evidence we already have;, whence it will be consequent, that if the thing be possible to be fitly done, it is done already;' that if we can apprehend, how it may be possible -such a Being, actually existent, might give us that evidence of his existence that should be suitable to our present state, and sufficient to out-weigh all objections to the contrary, (without which it were not rationally sufficient,) and that we can apprehend no possible way of doing this, which will not be liable to the same or equal objections, as may be made against the present means we have for begetting this certainty in us;-then we have already sufficient evidence of this Being's existence; that is, such as ought to prevail against all objections.

Here it is only needful to be considered what way can lie thought of, which might assure us in this matter, that we already have not. And what might be objected against them, equally, as against the means we now have.

II. Will we say, such a Being, if He did actually exist, might ascertain us of his existence, by some powerful impression of that truth upon our minds We will not insist what there is of this already, let them consider, who gainsay what they can find of it in their own minds; and whether they are not engaged, by their atheistical inclinations, in a contention against themselves, and their more natural sentiments; from which they find it a matter of no small difficulty to be delivered It was not for nothing, that even Ericuitus himself calls this of an existing Deity, a proleptical uption.. But you may say, the impression might have been simply universal, and so irresistible, as to prevent or over-bear all doubt.

And first, for the Universality of it: Why may we not suppose it already sufficiently universal With what confidence can the few dissenting Atheists, that have professed to be of another persuasion, put that value upon themselves, as to reckon their dissent considerable enough to implead the Universality of this impression! Or what signify some few instances of persons so stupidly foolish, as to give much less discovery of any rational faculty than some beasts

Besides that, your contrary profession is no sufficient argument of your contrary persuasion, much less that you never had any stamp or impression of a Deity upon your minds, or that you have quite razed it out. It is much to be suspected, that you hold not your contrary persuasion with unshaken confidence; but that you have those qualmishfits, which betray, the impression that you will not confess, and yet cannot utterly deface.

But if this you had quite won the day, and were masters of your design; were it not pretty to suppose that the common consent of mankind would be a good argument of the existence of, a Deity, except only that it wants your concurrence, If it were so universal, as to include your vote and suffrage, it would then be a firm and solid argument; (as no doubt it is, without you, a stronger one than you can answer;) but when you have made a hard shift to withdraw your assent, you have undone the Deity, and religion! Doth this cause stand and fall with you, unto which you can contribute about as much as the fly to thee triumph Was that true before, which now your hard labored dissent bath made false

And for the irresistibleness of this impression, it is true it would take away all disposition to oppose; but it maybe presumed, this is none of the rational evidence which you mean, when you admit that some way or other the existence of such a Being might be (possibly) made so evident, as to induce a rational certainty thereof. For to believe such a thing to be true, only upon a strong impulse, (how certain so ever the thing be,) is not to assent to it upon a foregoing reason; nor can any, in that case, tell why they believe it, but that they believe it. You will not sure think any thing the truer for this only, that such and such believe it with a steady confidence.

It is true, that the universality and naturalness of such a persuasion, as pointing us to a common cause thereof, affords the matter of an argument; or is a medium not contemptible, nor capable of answer, as bath been said before: But to be irresistibly captivated into an assent, is no medium at all; but an immediate persuasion of the thing itself, without a reason.

III. Therefore must it yet be demanded, what means that you yet have not, would you think sufficient to put this matter out of doubt Will you say, some kind of very glorious apparitions, becoming the majesty of such an one as this Being is represented But if you know how to fancy that such a thing as the sun, or other luminaries, might have been compacted of a certain peculiar sort of atoms, coming together of their own accord, without the direction of a wise agent; yea, and consist so long, and hold so strangely regular motions: How easy would it be to object that, with much more advantage, against any temporary apparition!

Would dreadful loud voices proclaiming him to be, of whose existence you doubt, have served the turn It is likely, if your fear would have permitted you to use your wit, you would have had some subtle invention how, by some odd reencounter of angry atoms, the air or clouds might become thus terribly vocal. And when you know already, that they do sometimes salute your ears with very loud sounds (as when it thunders) there is little doubt but your great wit can devise a way, how possibly such sounds might become articulate. And for the sense and coherent import of what were spoken, you that are so good at conjecturing how things might casually happen, would not be long in making a guess, that might serve that turn also except you were grown very dull and barren, and that fancy that served you to imagine how the whole frame of the universe, and the rare structure of the -bodies of animals, yea and even the reasonable soul itself, might be all casual, productions, cannot now devise how, by chance, a few words (for you do not say you expect long orations) might fall out to be sense, though there were no intelligent speaker.

But would strange and wonderful effects, that might surprise and amaze you, do, the business We may challenge you to try your faculty, and stretch it to the uttermost; and then tell us, what imagination you have formed of any thing more strange and wonderful, than the already extant frame of nature, in the whole, and in the several parts of it. Will he that bath a while considered the composition of the world, the exact and orderly motions of the sun, moon, and stars, the fabric of his own body, and

the powers of his soul, expect yet a wonder, to prove to him there is a GOD

But if that be the complexion of your minds, that it is not the greatness of any work, but the novelty and surprisingness of it, that will convince you; it is not rational evidence you seek. Nor is it your reason, but your idle curiosity you would have gratified; which deserves no more satisfaction than that fond wish, that one might come, from the dead to warn men on earth, lest they should come into the place of torment.

And if such means as these, that have been mentioned, should be thought necessary; I would ask, Are they necessary to every individual person, so as that no man shall be esteemed to have had sufficient means of conviction, who bath not with his own eyes beheld some glorious apparition, or himself heard some such terrible voice, or been the immediate witness, or subject of some prodigious wonderful work Or will the once seeing, hearing, or feeling suffice Is it not necessary there should be a frequent repetition and renewal of those amazing things, lest the impression wearing off, there be a relapse, and a gradual sliding into an oblivion of that Being's existence, whereof they had some’ time received a conviction

Now if such a continual iteration of these strange things were thought necessary, would, they not soon cease to be strange And then if their strangeness was necessary, by that very thing wherein their sufficiency for conviction is said to consist, they should become useless. Or if by their frequent variations (which it is possible to suppose) a perpetual amusement be still kept up in the minds of men, and they be always full of consternation and wonder; doth this temper so much befriend the exercise of reason, or contribute to the sober consideration of things; as if men could not be, rational, without being half mad And indeed they might soon become altogether so, by being but a while beset with objects so full of terror, as are, by this supposition, made the necessary means to convince them of a Deity.

And were this a fit means of ruling the world, of preserving order among mankind; what business could then be followed Who could attend the affairs of their callings Who could- either be capable of governing, or of being governed, while all men's minds should be wholly taken up, either in the amazed view, or the suspenseful expectation of nought else but strange things

This course, as our present condition is, what could it do but craze men's understandings, as a too bright and dazzling light causes blindness, or any over- excelling sensible object destroy the sense; so that we should' soon. have cause to apply the proverb: ` Shut the ’windows, that the house may be light;' and might learn to put a sense, not intolerable, upon those passages of some mystical: writers, that ’God is to be seen in’ a Divine cloud or darkness;' as: one; and’ with closed eyes,' as another speaks:_ (though: what was their sense I will not pretend to tell.).

Wherefore, all this being considered, it is likely it would not be insisted upon as necessary to our being persuaded of GOD'S existence, that he should so multiply strange and astonishing things, as that every man might be a daily amazed beholder and witness of them.

IV. And if their frequency be acknowledged not necessary, but indeed wholly inconvenient; more rare discoveries of him, in the very ways we have been speaking of, have riot been wanting. What would we think of such an appearance of Gun as that was upon Mount Sinai, when he came down in the sight of all that great people, wherein the several things concurred that were-above-mentioned

Let us but suppose. such an appearance, in all the concurrent circumstances of it, as that is said to have, been:' That is, we will suppose an equally great assembly or multitude of people is gathered together, and a solemn forewarning is given and proclaimed among them, by appointed heralds or officers of state, that on such a prefixed day, now nigh at hand, the Divine Majesty and Glory will visibly appear. They are most severely enjoined to prepare them-selves, and be in readiness against that day; great care is taken to sanctify the people, and-the place; bounds are -set about the designed theatre of this great appearance; all are strictly required to observe their due and awful distances, and abstain from more audacious approaches and gazings, lest that terrible Glory breakforth upon them, and they perish An irreverent or disrespectful look, they are told, will be mortal to them, or a very touch of any part of this sacred in closure. In the morning of the appointed day, there are thunders, and lightnings, and a thick cloud upon the hallowed mount; the exceeding loud sound of a trumpet proclaims the LORD'S descent. He descends in fire, the flames whereof envelop the trembling mount, (now floored with a sapphire pavement, clear as the body of heaven,) and ascend into the middle region, or (as it is expressed) into the midst or heart of the heavens.” The voice of words,” (a loud and dreadful voice;) audible to all that mighty assembly, in which were six hundred thousand men, issues forth from amidst that terrible glory, pronouncing to them, “I am JEHOVAH, thy GOD.”-And thence proceeding to give them precepts so plain and clear, so comprehensive and full, so unexceptionably just and righteous, so agreeable to the nature of man, and subservient to his good; that nothing could be more worthy the great Creator, or more aptly suitable to such a sort of creatures.

It is very likely, indeed, that such a demonstration would leave no spectator in doubt, concerning the existence of GOD; and would puzzle the philosophy of the most skeptical Atheist to give an account, otherwise, of the phenomenon. And if such could devise any thing that should seem plausible to some half-witted persons, that were not present, they would have a hard task of it to quiet the minds of those that were;' or make them believe this was nothing else but some odd conjuncture of certain fiery atoms, that, by some strange accident, happened into this conflict with one another; or some illusion of fancy, by which so great a multitude were all at once, imposed upon: So as that they only seemed to themselves to hear, and see, what they heard and saw not.. Nor is it likely they would be very confident of the truth of their own conjecture, or be apt to venture much upon it themselves; having been the eye and ear-witnesses of these things.

But is it necessary this course snail be taken to make the world know there is a GOD Such an appearance, indeed, would more powerfully strike sense; but unto sober and. considerate reason, were it a greater thing than the making such a world as this And the disposing this great variety of particular beings in it, into so exact and elegant an order, And the sustaining and preserving it in the same state, through so many ages Let the vast and unknown extent of the whole, the admirable variety, the elegant shapes, the regular motions, the excellent faculties and powers of that inconceivable number of creatures contained in it, be considered: And is there any comparison between that, temporary, transient, occasional, and this steady, permanent, and universal discovery of GOD Nor (supposing the truth of the history) can it be thought the design of this appearance, to these Hebrews, was to convince them of the existence of a Deity, to be worshipped; when, both they had so convincing evidence thereof many ways before; and the other nations, that which they left, and those whither they went, were not without their religion and worship, such as it was: But to engage them by so majestic a representation thereof, to a more exact observance of His will, now made known: Though, had there been any doubt of the former, (as we can hardly suppose they could, before, have more doubted of the being of a God, than that there were men on earth,) this might collaterally, and besides its chief intention, be a means to confirm them concerning that also; but that it was necessary for that end, we have no pretence to imagine.

The like may be said concerning other miracles heretofore wrought, that the intent of them was to justify the Divine authority of Him who wrought them, to prove Him sent by God; and so countenance the doctrine -or message delivered by him: Not that they tended (otherwise than on the by) to prove GOD's existence. Much less, was this so amazing an appearance needful, or intended for that end; and least of all, was it necessary that this should be GOD's ordinary way of making it known to men that He Cloth exist: So as that, for this purpose, He should often repeat so terrible representations of himself. And how inconvenient it were to mortal men, as well as unnecessary, the astonishment wherewith it possessed that people is an evidence; and their passionate affrighted wish thereupon,

Let not God any more speak to us, lest we die.” They apprehended it impossible for them to out-live such another sight! And if that so amazing am appearance of the Divine majesty (sometime afforded) were not necessary, but some way on the by useful, for the confirming that people in the persuasion of God's existence; why may it not be useful also for the same purpose, even now to us Is it that we think that can be less true now, which was so gloriously evident to be true four thousand years ago Or is it that we can disbelieve or doubt the truth of the history What should be the ground, or pretence of doubt If it were a fiction, it is manifest it was feigned by some person that had the use of his understanding, and was not besides himself; as the coherence and contexture of parts doth plainly show.

But would any man not besides himself, designing to gain credit to a forged report to a matter of fact, ever say there were six hundred thousand persons present at the doing of it Would it not rather have been pretended done in a corner Or is it imaginable it should never have met with contradiction That none of the pretended by-standers should disclaim it, and say, They knew of no such matter Especially if it be considered, that the laws said to be given at that time, chiefly those which were reported to have been written in the two tables, were not so favorable to vicious inclinations, nor that people so scrupulous observers of them, but that they would have been glad to have. had any thing to pretend against the authority of the legislature. When they discovered, in that and succeeding time, so violently prone a propension to idolatry, and other, wickednesses, directly against the very letter of that law how welcome a plea had it been, in their frequent. and sometimes almost universal apostasies, could they have had such a thing to pretend, that the law itself that curbed them was a cheat! But we always find, that though they labored in some of their degeneracies, and when they were lapsed into a more corrupted state, to render it more easy to themselves by favorable interpretations; yet, even in the most corrupt, they never went about to deny or impede its Divine original; whereof they were ever so religious assertors, as no people under heaven could be more and the awful apprehension whereof prevailed so far with them, as that care was taken (as is notoriously known) by those appointed to that charge, that the very letters should' be numbered of the sacred writings, lest there should happen any minutest alteration in them.

Much more might be said, if it were needful, for the evincing the truth of this -particular piece of history; and it is little to be-doubted but any man, who with impartial reason considers the circumstances relating to it, the easily evidenceable antiquity of the records whereof this is a part; the certain nearness of the time, of writing them, to the time when this thing is said to. have been done; the great reputation of the writer, even among Pagans; the great multitude of the alleged witnesses and spectators; the no-contradiction ever heard of; the universal consent and suffrage of that nation through all. times to this day, even when their practice has been most contrary to the laws then given; the securely confident and unsuspicious reference of later pieces of sacred Scripture thereto, (even some part of -the New Testament,) as a most known and undoubted thin; the long series of time, through which that people are said to have had extraordinary and sensible indications of the Divine presence (which if it had been false, could not in so long a time ’but have been evicted of falsehood:) Their -miraculous and wonderful education out of Egypt not denied by any, and more obscurely: acknowledged -by some Heathen writers.; their conduct through the wilderness, and settlement in, Canaan, their constitution, and form-of polity, known for many ages to have been, a theocracy; their usual ways of consulting God, upon all more important occasions: Whosoever, I say, shall soberly consider these things, (and many more might easily occur,) will not only from some of them think it highly improbable; but from others of them plainly impossible, that the history of this appearance should have been a contrived piece of falsehood.

Yea, and though, as was said, the view of such a thing, with one's own eyes, would make a more powerful impression upon our imagination; yet, if we speak of rational evidence, (which is quite another thing,) of the truth of a matter of fact that were of this astonishing nature, I should think it were as much (at least if I were credibly told that so many hundred thousand persons saw it at once) as if I had been the single unaccompanied spectator of it myself.

Not to say that it were apparently,' in some respect, much greater, could we but obtain of ourselves, to distinguish between the pleasing of our curiosity; and the satisfying of our reason.

So that upon the whole, I see not why it may not be concluded, with the greatest confidence, that both the existence of a Deity is possible to be certainly known to men on earth, in some way that is suitable to their present state that there are no means titter to he ordinary, than those we already have; and that more extraordinary, additional Confirmations are partly not necessary, and partly not wanting.

V. Again, it may be further demanded, (as that which doth immediately serve our main purpose, and may also show the reasonableness of what was last said,) Is it sufficiently evident to such subjects of some great Prince, as live remote from the royal residence, that there is such an one now ruling over them

To say No, is to raze the foundation of civil government, and reduce it wholly to domestical, by such a ruler as may ever-be in present view; which, yet, is upon such terms never possible to be preserved also. It is plain, many do firmly enough believe that there is a King reigning over them, who not only never saw the King, but never heard any distinct account of the splendor of his court, the pomp of his attendance; or it may be, never saw the man that had seen the King And is not all dutiful obedience wont to be challenged of such, as well as other subjects Or would it be thought a reasonable excuse of disloyalty, that any such persons should say they had never seen the King Or a reasonable demand, as the condition of required subjection, that the court be kept sometime in their village, that they might have the opportunity of beholding at least some more splendid appearances of that majesty, which claims subjection from them Much more would it be deemed unreasonable and insolent, that every subject should expect to see the face of the Prince every day, otherwise they will not obey, nor believe there is any such person. Whereas it has been judged rather more expedient to the continuing the veneration of majesty, (and in a monarchy of no mean reputation for wisdom and greatness,) that the Prince did' very rarely offer himself to the view of the people.

Surely more ordinary, and remote discoveries of an existing Prince (the effects of his power, and the influences of his government) will be reckoned sufficient, even as to many parts of his dominions, that possibly through many succeeding generations, never had other. And yet how unspeakably less sensible, less immediate, less constant, less necessary, less numerous, are the effects and instances of regal human power and wisdom, than of the Divine; which latter we behold, which way so ever we look, and feel in every thing we touch, or have any sense of; and may reflect upon, in our very senses themselves, and in all the parts and powers that belong to us! And so certainly, that if we would allow ourselves the- liberty of serious thoughts, we might soon find it were utterly impossible - such effects should ever have been without that only cause.

That, without its influence, it had never been possible that we could hear, or see, or speak, or think, or live, or be any thing, nor that any other thing could ever, have been; when as the effects that serve so justly to endear and recommend us to civil government, (as peace, safety, order, quiet possession of our rights,)- we cannot but know are not inseparably appropriate, or to be attributed to the person of this or that particular, and mortal governor, but may also proceed from another; yea, and the same benefits may (for some time at least) be continued without any such government at all.

In short, there is unspeakably less evidence to most people in the world, under civil government, that there actually is such a government existent over them, and that they are under obligation to be subject to it; than there is of the existence of a Deity, and the (consequent) reasonableness of religion. If therefore the ordinary effects; and indications of the former be sufficient, why shall not the more certain ordinary discoveries of the latter be judged sufficient, though the most have not the immediate notice of any such extraordinary appearances as those are, which have been before-mentioned

VII. I demand further, whether it may be thought possible for any one to have a full rational certainty, that another person is a reasonable creature; so as to judge he bath sufficient ground and obligation to converse with him, and carry towards him as a man without the supposition of this, the foundation of all human society and civil conversation is taken away. And what evidence have we of it, whereunto, that which we have of the being of God will not at least be found equivalent

Will we say, that mere human shape is enough to prove such an one a man A philosopher would deride us. But we will not be so nice, we acknowledge it is, if no circumstances concur that plainly evince the contrary, so far as to infer upon us an obligation not to be rude and uncivil; that we use no. violence, nor carry ourselves abusively towards one, that only thus appears a human creature: Yea, and to perform any-duty of justice or charity towards him, within our power, which we owe to man as a man.

As suppose we see him wronged, or in necessity, and can presently right or relieve him; though he do not, or cannot represent to us more of his case, than our own eyes inform us of. And shall an act of murder be committed upon one, whose true humanity was not otherwise evident, would not the offender be justly liable to the common punishment of that offence Nor could he acquit himself of transgressing the laws of humanity, if he should only neglect any seasonable act of justice, or mercy towards him.

But if any one were disposed to cavil, how much more might be said, to oppose this single instance of any one's true humanity; than can be brought against the entire concurrent evidence we have of the existence of GOD! It is here most manifestly just, thus to state the case, and compare the whole evidence we have of the latter, with that one of the former; inasmuch as that one alone is apparently enough to oblige us to carry towards such an one as a man. And if that alone be sufficient to oblige us to acts of justice, or charity towards man, he is strangely blind that cannot see infinitely more to oblige him to acts of piety towards GOD.

But if we would take a more strict view of this parallel, we would state the general, and more obvious aspect of this world, on the one hand, and the external aspect and shape of a man, on the other; and should then see the former doth evidence to us an in-dwelling Deity, diffused through the whole, and actuating every part, with incomparably greater certainty, than the latter doth an in-dwelling reasonable soul. In which way we shall find what will aptly serve our present purpose, though we are far from apprehending any such union of the blessed GOD with this world, as between the soul and body of a man. It is manifestly possible to our understandings, that there may be, and (if any history or testimony of others be worthy to be believed) certain to experience and sense, that there often has been, the appearance of human shape and actions, without a real man. But it is no way possible, such a world as this should have ever been without a GOD.

That there is a world, proves that eternal Being to exist, whom we take to' be GOD; suppose we it as rude an heap as it was at first, or as we can suppose it, as external appearance represents to us that creature which we take to be a- man:. But that, as a certain infallible discovery, necessarily true; this, but a probable and conjectural one, and (though highly probable) not impossible to be false.

And if we will yet descend to a more particular inquiry into this matter, which way will we be fully ascertained that this supposed man is truly and really what he seems to be This we know not how to go about, without recollecting what is the differencing notion we have of a man; that he is, namely, a reasonable living creature, or a reasonable soul, inhabiting and united with a body. And how do we think to descry that here, which may answer this common notion we have of a man Have we any way, besides that discovery which the acts, or effects of reason make of a rational or intelligent being We will look more narrowly, that is, unto somewhat else than his external, appearance; and observe the actions that proceed from a more distin= guishing principle in him; that he reasons, discourses, doth business, pursues designs, in short, he talks, and acts as a reasonable creature; and hence we conclude him to be one, or to have a reasonable soul in him.

And have we not the same way of procedure in the other case Our first view of a world full of life and motion, assures us of an eternal active Being, besides it; which we take to be God, having now before our eyes, a darker shadow of him only, as the external bulk of the human body is only the shadow of a man. Which, when we behold it stirring and moving, assures us there is somewhat besides that grosser bulk, (that of itself could not so move,)' which we take to be the soul of man. Yet as a principle that can move the body, makes not up this entire notion of this soul; so an eternal active Being, that moves the matter of the universe, makes not up the full notion of God. We are thus far sure, in both cases, that is, of some Mover distinct from what is moved; but we are not yet sure (by what we hitherto see) what the one or the other is.

But as when we have, upon the first sight, thought it was a reasonable soul that was acting in the former; or a man, (if we will speak according to their sense, who make the soul the man,) in order to being sure (as sure as the case can admit) we have no other way but to consider what belongs more distinguishingly to the notion of a man, or of a reasonable soul; and observe how actions and effects, which we have opportunity to take notice of, answer thereto, or Serve to' discover that. So when” we would be sure, what the eternal active Being is, (which that it is, we are already sure, and,) which we have taken to be God, that, r say, we may be sure of that also, we have the same thing to do.

That is, ’to consider what more peculiarly belongs to the entire notion of God, and see whether his works, more narrowly inspected, do not bear as manifest correspondence to that notion of GOD, as the works and actions of a man, do to the notion we have of him: And certainly, we cannot but find they do correspond as much; and that upon a serious view of the works, and appearances of God in the world, having diligently observed the vastness and beauty of this universe, the variety, the multitude, -the order, the exquisite shapes, and numerous parts, the admirable and useful composure of particular creatures; and especially, the constitution and powers of the reasonable soul of man itself: We cannot, surely, if we be not under the possession of a very voluntary, and obstinate blindness, and the power of a most vicious prejudice, but acknowledge the making, sustaining, and governing such a world; is as worthy of GOD, and as becoming him, according to the notion that has been assigned of him, as at least the common actions of ordinary men are of a man; or evidence the doer of them to be a human creature. Yea, and with this advantageous difference, that the actions of a man evidence a human creature more uncertainly and so as it is possible the matter may be otherwise: But these works of God do with so plain demonstrative evidence discover him the Author of them, that it is altogether impossible they could ever otherwise have been done.

Now, if we have as clear evidence of a Deity, as we can. have in a way suitable to the - nature and present state of man; if we have clearer, and more certain evidence of GOD'S government over the world than most men have, or can have of the existence of their secular rulers; yea, more sure than that there are men on earth, and that thence (as far as the existence of GOD will make towards it) there is a less disputable ground for religious than civil conversation We have no longer reason to delay, the dedication of a temple to him, upon any pretence of doubt whether we have an object of worship existing, or no.

Wherefore, we may also by the way take notice how impudent a thing is Atheism, that by the same poisonous breath whereby it would blast religion, it would despoil a man of his reason; would blow away the rights of Princes, and all foundation of policy and government, and destroy all civil commerce and conversation out of the world, and yet blushes not at the attempt of so foul things.

In the mean time, they, upon whom this dreadful plague is not fallen, may plainly see before them the object of that worship which is promoted by a temple; an existing Deity, a GOD to be worshipped. Unto whom we shall yet see further reason to design_ and consecrate a temple, when we have considered (what comes next to be spoken of) his, conversableness with men.

CHAPTER 6:

I. Non is the thing here intended less necessary to a temple, and religion, than what we have hitherto been discoursing of. For such a sort of deity as should shut up itself from. all converse with men, would render a temple on earth as vain a thing, as if there were none at all. It were a being not to be worshipped, nor with any propriety to be called GOD, more (in some respect less) than an image or statue.

We might, with as rational design, worship for a God, what were scarce worthy to be called the shadow of a man; as dedicate temples to a wholly unconversable deity: That is, such an one as not only will not vouchsafe to converse with men; but whose nature were altogether incapable of such converse.

For that measure, and latitude of sense must be allowed unto the expression’ conversableness with men' as that it signifies both capacity, and propension to such converse; that GOD is both by his nature capable of it, and bath a gracious inclination of will thereunto. Yea, and we will add, (what is also not without the compass of our present theme, nor the import of this word whereby we generally express it,) that he is not only inclined to converse with men; but that he actually doth it; as we call him a conversable person, that, upon all befitting occasions, doth freely converse with such as have any concern with him it will indeed be necessary to distinguish God's converse with men, into,

1. That which he has in common with all men: so as to sustain them in their beings, and some way influence their actions, and, That which he more peculiarly bath with good men. It is the former only we have now to consider: Together with his gracious. Propension 'to the latter also.

As the great Apostle, in his discourse at Athens, lays, the same ground for acquaintance with God, that he bath given to all breath, and being, and all things; and that he is near and ready (whence they should seek him, if haply they might feel after him, and find him) in order to further converse.

And here we shall have little else to do, besides the applying of principles already asserted to this purpose. From which principles it will appear, that he not only can, but that.(in -the former sense) he doth converse with, men, and is graciously inclined thereto (in the latter.)

II. Having proved, that there is an eternal, self-subsisting, independent, necessary Being, of so great activity,, life, power, wisdom, and goodness, as to have been, the Maker of -this world; and by this medium, that we see this, world is in being, which otherwise could never have been, much less. such as we see it is; it follows that this great Creator can have influence upon the creatures he bath made, in a way suitable to their natures,

It follows, I say, from the same medium (the present visible existence of this world, which could not otherwise be now, in being) that he can thus have influence upon his creatures, for it, is; hence manifest that he bath; they depend on him, and are sustained by, him Nor could, more subsist by themselves, than they could make, themselves, or of themselves have sprung out of nothing.

And if it were possible they could, being raised up into being, continue in being of themselves;; yet since our present. question, is not concerning what they need, but what GOD can do;, and our adversaries in the present cause do not, (as bath been noted), upon_ any, other pretence deny that he doth concern himself in the affairs of: the universe, but that, he: cannot: (that is, that it, consists not with his felicity, and he cannot be happy:) Is it not plain that he can, “with the same facility, continue the influence which he at first gave forth And with as little prejudice to his felicity For if it be necessary to him to be happy, or impossible not to be so; he must be ever so. His happiness was not capable, of being, discontinued, so long as while he made the world, settled the several orders and kinds, and formed the first individuals of every kind of creatures.

Therefore having done this, and without, diminution to his happiness, was it a more toilsome labor to keep things as they were, than to make them so If it was (which no man that understands common sense would, say) surely that blind, thing,,which.they, more blindly call nature (not being able to tell what they mean by it), and would have be the only cause of all things, acting at first, to' the uttermost, and having no way to, recruit its vigor, and. reinforce itself, its labor and business being so much increased, and jaded and grown weary; had given out, and patiently suffered all things to dissolve, and relapse into the old chaos long ago. But if the labor was not greater to continue things in the state wherein they were made, than to make them surely a wise, intelligent Deity, which we have proved made them, could as well sustain them, being made, as their brutal nature do both.

So much then of intercourse God could have with his creatures, as his continual communication of his influence, to.,be received by them, amounts to; and then man, not being excluded their number, must share in this possible privilege; according to the, capacity of his nature.

And inasmuch as we have also proved, (more. particularly,). concerning man, that he immediately owes the peculiar excellencies. of his intelligent nature, as such, to God only; it is apparently consequent, that having formed this his more excellent creature, according to his own more express likeness, stamped it with the glorious characters of his living image, given it. a nature suitable to his own, and -. thereby made it capable of a rational and -intelligent converse with him; he bath it ever in his power to maintain a continual converse with this creature, by agreeable communications. By letting in upon it, the vital beams, and influences of his own light and love; and receiving back the return of its grateful acknowledgments.

Wherein it is manifest he should do no greater thing than he bath done; for who sees not that it is a matter of no, greater, difculty to converse with, than to make a reasonable, creature Or who would not be ashamed to deny,, that he:wbo bath been the only Author of the soul of man,. and of the excellent powers and faculties belonging to it, can more easily sustain what he bath made And converse with that his creature, suitably to the' way wherein he bath' made it capable of his converse Whereto the consideration being added of his gracious nature, (manifested in this creation itself,) it is further evident that he is not only able, but apt and ready to converse with men, in such a way as shall tend to the improving of their being, unto that blessedness whereof he bath made them naturally capable: If their own voluntary alienation, and aversion to him, do not obstruct the way of that intercourse.

And even this were sufficient to give foundation to a temple, and both afford encouragement, and infer an obligation to religion; although no other perfection had been, or could be demonstrated of the Divine Being, than what is immediately to-be collected from his works, and the things whereof he bath_ been the sole Author. For what if no more were possible to be proved, have we not even by thus much, a representation of an object sufficiently worthy of our homage. He that could make and sustain such a world as this, how inexpressibly doth he surpass in greatness, the most excellent of all mortal creatures! To some or other of whom, upon some (merely accidental) circumstances, we justly esteem ourselves to owe a dutiful observance.

He that made us, knows us thoroughly, can apply himself inwardly to us, receive our addresses and applications, our acknowledgments and adoration; whereunto we should have, even upon these terms, great and manifest obligation, although nothing more of excellency, and perfection of our, Creator were certainly known to us.

III. But it has been further shown, that the necessary Being, from whence we sprang, is also an absolutely and infinitely perfect Being. That necessary Being cannot be less perfect, than to include the entire and inexhaustible fullness of all being and perfection. Therefore the God, to whom this notion belongs, must be every way sufficient to all, and be himself but one; the only Source and Fountain of all life and being; the common Basis and Support of the universe; the absolute LOAD of this great creation; and the central Object of the common concurrent trust, fear, love, and other worship of his intelligent and reasonable creatures.

And therefore there remains no other difficulty in apprehending how he can, without disturbance to himself, or interruption of his own felicity, intend all the concernments of his creatures, apply himself to them according to their several exigencies, satisfy their desires, inspect and govern their actions and affairs; than we have to apprehend a Being absolutely and every way perfect. Whereof if we cannot have a distinct apprehension all at once, that is, though we cannot comprehend every particular perfection of GOD in the same thought, (as our eye cannot behold, at one view, every part of an over-large object, unto which However, part by part, it may be successively applied,) we can yet in the general apprehend him absolutely perfect; or such to whom, we are sure, no perfection is wanting And can successively contemplate this or that, as we are occasionally led to consider them: And can answer to ourselves difficulties that occur to us, with this easy, sure, and ever-ready solution, that he can do all things, that nothing is too hard for him, that he is full, all-sufficient, and every way perfect:' Whereof we are the more confirmed, that we find we cannot, by the utmost range of our most enlarged thoughts, ever reach- any bound or end of that perfection, which yet we must conclude is necessarily to be attributed to an absolutely perfect Being.

IV. This general perfection of his being, as it modifies all his attributes, so we shall particularly take notice that it doth so as to those that have a more direct influence upon, and tend more fully to evince, his conversableness with men. As first his wisdom and knowledge (for we need not be so curious as at present to distinguish them) must be Omniscience. About which, if any place were left for rational doubt, it would be, obvious to them to allege it who are of slower inclinations towards religion, and object, that if we be not sure he knows simply all' things so as wisely to consider them, and resolve fitly about them, it will be no little difficulty to determine which he doth, and which not; we may therefore conclude, that the knowledge of God is every way perfect, and being so, extends to all our concernments: And that nothing remains, upon that account, to make us decline applying ourselves to religious converse with him, or deny him the honor and entertainment of a temple For which we shall yet see further cause, when we consider next,

V. That his Power is also omnipotent. Nor indeed is it enough that He knows our concernments, except he can also provide effectually about them, and dispose of them to our advantage. And we cannot doubt but He, who could create us acid such a world as this, can do so, even though He were supposed not omnipotent: But even that itself seems a very unreasonable supposition, that less than infinite Power should suffice to the creation of any thing. For However liable it may be to controversy, what a second cause might do herein, being assisted by the infinite Power of the first; it seems altogether unimaginable to us, how, though the power of all men were met in one, (which we will easily suppose to be a very vast power,) it could, alone, be sufficient to make the minutest atom arise into being out of nothing.

Therefore when we cannot devise what finite Power can ever suffice to the doing of that which we are sure is done; what is left us to suppose, but that the Power which did it is simply infinite: Much more when we consider, not only that something is actually produced out of nothing, but do also seriously contemplate the nature of the production Which carries so much of amazing wonder in it, every where, that even the least and most minute things might serve for sufficient instances of the unlimited greatness of that Power which made them; as would be seen, if we did industriously set ourselves to compare the effects of Divine Power with those of human art and skill. As is the ingenious and pious observation of Mr. Hooke, who, upon his viewing with his microscope the point of a small and very sharp needle, (than which we cannot conceive a smaller thing labored by the hand of man,) takes notice of sundry sorts of natural things that have points many thousand times sharper; those of the hairs of insects, &c.; that appearing broad, irregular and uneven, having marks upon it of the rudeness and bungling of art. So inaccurate (says he) it is in all its productions, even in those that seem most neat; that if examined truly, with an organ more acute than that by which they were made, the more we see of their shape, the less appearance will there be of their beauty: Whereas in the works of nature, the deepest discoveries show us the greatest excellencies. An evident argument that He that was the Author of these things, was no other than omnipotent; being able to include as great a variety of parts, in the yet smallest discernible point, as in the vaster bodies, (which comparatively are called also points,) such as the earth, sun, or planets.' And I may add, when those appear but points, in comparison of his so much vaster work, how plainly doth that also argue to us the same thing!

Join herewith the boundlessness of his Goodness, which upon the same ground of his absolute Perfection, must be infinite also, (and which it is of equal concernment to us to consider,. that we may understand He not only can effectually provide about our concernments, but is most graciously inclined so to do,) and then; what rational inducement is wanting to religion, and the dedication of a temple; if we consider the joint encouragement that arises from so unlimited Power and Goodness Or what man would not become entirely devoted to Him, who by the one of these, we are assured, can do all things; and by the other, will do what is best

Nor therefore is there any thing immediately needful to our present purpose (the eviction of GOD'S Conversableness, with men) more than bath been already said; that is, there is nothing else to be thought on, that bath any nearer--influence thereon.: The things that can be supposed to have such influence, being none else than his Power, Knowledge and' Goodness; which have been particularly evinced from the creation of the world, both to have been in' some former subject, and to have all originally met in a necessary Being, that alone could be the Creator of it. Which necessary Being, as it is such, appearing also to be infinite, and absolutely perfect; the influence of these cannot but the more abundantly appear to be such as can, and may most sufficiently and fully correspond, both in general to the several exigencies of all creatures, and more especially to all the real necessities and reasonable desires of man.