Why therefore should any man be fond of such an uncomfortable, nay, such a sottish and debasing opinion Why should not a man rather hope well of himself, by cherishing an expectation that he may survive his body, and live eternally

 

 BIOPH. There is no question, SEBASTIAN, but that living for ever is very desirable, if a man could hope for such a thing absolutely, and not clogged with conditions. As for death itself, that would have no great matter of formidableness - in it, if it be (as I suppose it) a perfect intercision of all sense; much less, if it were (as the men of your persuasion, use to speak) only a dark passage to another life. But the mischief is, that upon your hypothesis, a judgment must pass upon a man first, before he can arrive at that other life. Now that is the terrible thing if I were rid of the danger of that, it would (as you say well) be my interest to believe all the rest, in spite of all objections to the contrary.

 

 SEBAST. I do not design to impose upon you; for it is very true, there is no passage into the other world, without undergoing a test or trial, whether we be fit for eternal life or no. And it is most certain also, that if a man die an impious, a base and wicked person, it were better for him that either he had -not been born, or else that the grave might cover him to all eternity. But what need this fright any man whilst he is alive, and may provide himself accordingly Especially since the grace of GOD puts it in our power to be so qualified, that we may be out of all danger of miscarrying in the judgment.

 

 For, BIOPHILUS, can it be thought that ALMIGHTY GOD should seek the ruin of his creatures Or that he can have any design upon them, to make them eternally miserable If he had, there would not be the solemnities of a day of judgment; for he need not to ensnare us in the forms of law, but might, without more ado, have destroyed us when he pleased; and who could resist him, or dispute the case with him Undoubtedly, he is too great a Majesty to have any little ends to serve, and therefore we can suspect no hurt from him; and there could be nothing but the overflowings of his own goodness, that provoked him to make us at the first; and therefore there can be nothing of envy, malignity, or cruelty, in any of his counsels and designs about us.

 

 And that all these are not mere conjectures of mine, but real truth, (besides all other ways of probation,) you may be assured by this consideration: That in all GOD's demands from us, as the terms and conditions of our happiness; or (which is all one) in all the duties he requires at our hands, and in all the obligations of religion, there is nothing severe and discouraging, much less impossible. Such is his wisdom and benignity, that he can impose nothing as a severe task-master, purely to abridge our liberty, or to break our spirits; but only to raise and improve us, according to our utmost capacities, and as necessary methods to train us up for eternal life.

 

 Why then should a man think so ill of GOD, as to be afraid or unwilling to fall into his hands You cannot forebode any evil from him, if you are satisfied that he is perfect and happy, full and glorious, just and good; and therefore you must condemn yourself of prodigious folly in not complying with reasonable and equitable laws, and of being willfully accessary to your own calamity, if you dare not undergo his judgment. So that upon the whole matter there can be no reason why you should be unwilling to believe there is such a thing: And that is all I desire of you at present, and I heartily conjure you to be true to yourself herein.

 

 BIOPH. Well, I am resolved to be as indifferent as it- is possible to be: Now therefore prove it.

 

 SEBAST. That I will do with all possible plainness and sincerity;- namely,-I will- make good that there is sufficient reason -to incline a prudent man to believe, that after this life, God will call men to account, and judge them according to their former actions.

 

 Now you know it is the nature of moral arguments, not to depend upon one single evidence, but to consist of the united force of several considerations. Accordingly, my present proof of a judgment to come, must comprise these three particulars.

 

 First, I will show, that the nature and condition of mankind are such, as to render him fit and capable to come to an account, and to undergo such a judgment as we speak of.

 

Secondly, That it is very agreeable to the nature and attributes of God, that he should call mankind to such an account.

 

 Thirdly, That God actually exercises such a Providence in this present world, as gives earnest beforehand, that he really intends to judge it hereafter. These three things make way for each other, and all together amount to a full proof of the point in hand. Wherefore, when I have opened them severally, in the order I have lain them down, I will leave it to you to collect the result of them.

 

 First, I say, the nature and condition of mankind are such, as renders him capable of undergoing a judgment in another world; and therefore it is reasonable that he expect it accordingly. This will appear by the instances following: In the first place, it is notorious, that man is endued with a large and comprehensive mind, which is not confined to the mere object of his senses, and things present before him; but has a vast scope and prospect, by means of which, he surveys the universe, embraces the whole world, and takes within his verge, as well things past and things to come, as those that are present; which no other creature is capable of but himself. The beast has no kind of notice of, or concern for, what was in former time; no solicitude about what may come after, but only applies itself to the present exigencies or conveniences of the body. But man is very curious, and inquisitive into history, and how things passed of old long before he was born and is also very thoughtful and anxious what may befall hereafter, when he shall be dead and gone. Now, this one consideration alone makes him look as if he were a being that were concerned in the whole frame of nature, and in all the revolutions of Providence, and, at least, of more consequence than to be a mere pageant for the short time of this life; or, as a mushroom to shoot out of the earth, and return to it again, and so be as if it had never been.

 

 Besides, we may observe, that the mind of man doth not only consider the absolute nature of things, as they he singly and severally before it; but compares them together, and estimates their relative natures, the mutual respects that they have to each other, and the various influences they have upon each other, and so comparing things together, raises observations, makes inferences, deduces conclusions, frames general maxims; thereby brings things into order and method, and raises arts and sciences. All, or any, of which things, no creature below himself makes any pretence to, or gives any tokens of. From whence we may conclude, not only the pre-eminence of nature, but that he is ordained to higher purposes.

 

 Moreover, mankind is endowed with liberty of choice, by virtue of which, he doth not only move himself by his own internal principles, and vital energy; but also can determine himself to this object, or that; and either resume or desist the prosecution at his own pleasure. Insomuch that he is neither carried by the swing of any superior causes, nor fatally allured by the powerful charms of any objects from without; no, nor by the efficacy of any arguments arising there from; nor any impression whatsoever (saving that of GOD) can overbear or supersede his own resolution, but that he can act or desist, suspend prosecution, or pursue his own choice; and apply himself to this object, or that; and follow this argument and motive or the other. He has such a helm within himself, that he can sail against wind and tide; he can move himself in a calm, and stay himself in a storm; in a word, he can move which way, when, and how far he will. The truth of this we find by daily experience, and we commonly please ourselves too much in this prerogative of our natures. We see that which is better, and follow that which we know to be worse; we hear arguments, and reject them, because we will do so; we are persuaded to the contrary, and yet go on; and when and whatsoever we act, we `find at the same time we could have done quite contrary if we had pleased. Other creatures either act merely as they are acted by superior causes, or fatally inclined by the objects and motives before them; but we are put into the hand of our own counsels, as to our inward resolutions and determinations. Now this, as it is a mighty discrimination of our natures from theirs, so it has this peculiar effect, that it renders a man's actions properly his own, and consequently fits him to undergo a judgment for them.

 

 But farther yet: To make man more capable of a judgment, he has a directive rule, or law within him, whereby to govern himself; he acts not only freely in respect of any cause without himself, but has a light within, to guide those free powers of his, by the means of which he is enabled both to make choice of his designs, and to select fit methods of accomplishing them. For, as he is not staked down to some one particular business, (as generally other creatures are,) but has great scope to expatiate in, and variety to please himself withal; so he has a card and compass given him to sail by in that vast ocean which he’s before him. He has a faculty of discerning the difference of things, and consequently can judge what is worthy to be pursued, and also to measure and adjust the means thereunto; which renders him more fit to give an account.

 

 Nay, farther yet, man, by the advantage of this light within him, has not only a capacity of apprehending and judging of natural good and evil, or such things as are pleasant and profitable, or the contrary; but has also notions of higher good and evil, which we commonly call moral: that is, he finds himself obliged to have regard to something besides, and better than his body; namely, either to the Deity, or to the community of mankind; or, at least, to his own better part, his soul; none of which are at all considered by any creatures below man. And there is hardly any part of mankind, (at least that deserve to be so esteemed,) which doth not think itself concerned in all these; for we see, whosoever has any thing of a man in him, doth think some actions to become, or not become him, merely as he is a man, which would admit of no difference, but be all alike in a beast: whereupon it is, that a man cannot dispense with himself in the doing of several things which are in his power to do; no, not in the dark, and the greatest privacy; because every man that in any measure understands himself, has a reverence of himself, and the effect of this betrays itself in that quick sense which mankind has peculiarly of shame and honor; which argues him to be accountable to something higher than his senses.

 

 Above all this, it is considerable that man has not only a speculative apprehension of moral good and evil, but a practical and very quick sense of it, which we call conscience; by which he not only remembers and calls to mind whatsoever has passed him, but reflecting also upon the ends and circumstances of his own actions, and comparing what he has done, both for matter and manner, either with the rule of reason within him, or some other law, he judges himself accordingly. If he has done well, he then applauds and comforts himself, and feels satisfaction in his own mind. As for example If a man has behaved himself gallantly towards his Prince and country,-if he has carried himself gratefully towards his friends, his patrons, or benefactors, if he has been beneficent to any part of mankind,-if he has demonstrated love to God, or goodness, and good men,-if he has restrained his own rage and passions, if he has rescued the innocent from the hand of the oppressor, or done' anything of like nature; the heart of every man, in such a case, feels such an inward delight as sweetens his spirits, and cheers his very countenance. On the contrary, if he has been false, treacherous, and ungrateful,if he has been cruel and oppressive, or has said or done any base thing, he is presently upbraided, accused, condemned, and tormented by himself. Now, what is all this but a kind of anticipation of the judgment to come.

 

 To all which add, in the last place, that the mind of man seems plainly to be above the body, and independent of it; forasmuch as we see, that not only our reason and the powers of our souls are so far from decaying with the body, that contrariwise, they grow more strong and vigorous by those very causes which impair the body I mean, by age, exercise, and experience. Besides, it is easily observable, that our souls, as often as they please; act quite contrary to the inclinations of our bodies, and frequently control the passions thereof, as well as overrule the verdict of our senses; therefore, it is not at all probable that they should perish with our bodies, but survive to some farther purposes; especially if we take in what I intimated before, namely,-the consideration of the shortness of life; which is so inconsiderable for so excellent a being as the soul to display itself in, that it seems unworthy of all the aforesaid perfections, and more unworthy of the contrivance of that Wisdom which made us, to order it so, unless it be that man is placed here in a state of probation, and is to be tried hereafter, in order to a more lasting duration: which, in consideration of all the premises, he cannot but be thought capable of, at least if there be a Judge as fit to judge him, as he is fit to undergo a judgment. Which brings me to my second branch.

 

 BIOPH. Hold a little, I pray, good SEBASTIAN. You have spoken many things well of the pre-eminence of human nature, and some of them such as are not only sufficient to erect a man's spirits, and to provoke him to hope well of- himself, but also to render it in some sort probable that we are designed for some higher uses than we commonly apply ourselves to; nevertheless, you have not reached your point, nor will all you have said attain the end you propounded, unless you go farther, and prove the soul of man to be a ,spirit, or immaterial substance, (as the men of your way are wont to speak,) that so there may be a plain foundation for its existence out of the body. without which, let it be as excellent a being as it can, and adorned with as many other perfections as you can imagine, it cannot be capable of standing at a tribunal, and undergoing such a judgment as we are speaking of.

 

 SEBAST. I could have wished you would have given me leave to lay all the parts of my argument together before you, that so you might have taken a view of it entire, and all at once; and then you might have objected as you should have seen cause. But, however, I will comply with your method and as to that which you have thought fit now to interpose, I answer these two things:

 

 First, I say, it is not necessary to the business in hand, that the soul be proved to be strictly immaterial, and capable of existing and acting out of the body; forasmuch as at the day of judgment I suppose the body shall be raised again: and then, if it should be so, that all the powers of the soul were laid asleep by death until that time, yet, upon a reunion with their proper organs, they would revive again. So that I did not, in my proof, fall short of the mark I aimed at; but you outshoot the point in your demand: for, whether the soul be a spiritual substance or no, so long as those perfections which we have enumerated belong to it, there is nothing wanting to make it capable of undergoing a judgment. But,

 

 Secondly, To speak my own mind plainly, and to come home to your satisfaction, I must tell you, that as for my part, I do not doubt but that the soul of man is, properly and strictly, a spiritual nature; so I am confident that those things which we have ascribed to it sufficiently prove it to be so, seeing it is impossible to solve those phenomena, or to give any tolerable account of those great accomplishments and performances of the soul, before specified, from mere matter, let it be modified how it can.

 

 Simple perception of objects is the lowest of human perfections; and, indeed, is not proper to human nature, but common to brutes; yet this seems impossible to be performed by mere matter; for the eye, though it be a very admirable organ, can by no means be said to perceive the objects of sight, but only to transmit or present them to some perceptive power. It doth, I say, only as a glass, represent the image of the thing; which even a dead eye, or a hole, will in some measure perform; but it makes no judgment of the object at all, as appears by this,-that all objects are transmitted, reversed, or with the heels upward, through the eye, and so left, until some higher powers set them right, and judge of their distance, and other circumstances.

 

 Now, if it be so, that matter thus advantageously disposed, as in the admirable structure of the eye, cannot perform that one act of simple perception, what shall become of all those nobler actions of the soul; and into what shall they be resolved Such as self-motion, the strange celerity of thought, memory of that which is past, prudence and forecast for that which is to come, and a thousand other strange operations. Is it imaginable that mere matter should understand, argue, dispute, and consider the relation of one thing to another, and thence infer consequences, and make conclusions Is it likely that mere body and quantity should be sensible of shame and honor; nay, be conscientious too, and accuse, condemn, and torture itself; or, which is most wonderful of all, check, control, deny, limit, and mortify itself He that will undertake to show how these things may be performed by atoms and motion only, is a subtle mechanist indeed; and I do not doubt but, at the same rate, such a man may be able to make a new world when he pleases, with the same atoms or materials; for it is evident there is more intricacy in this little world of man, than in the whole fabric of heaven and earth besides.

 

 Wherefore, if matter or body cannot perform the aforesaid operations, then the soul of man must be a spiritual substance.

 

 BIOPH. I cannot understand what you mean by this thing which you call spirit; and therefore I reject the notion as gibberish and nonsense.

 

 SEBAST. Softly, BIOPHILUS. What reason is there for that hasty conclusion Must we deny every such thing to be, as is hard to understand Must we, like dull boys, tear out the lesson that is difficult to learn But besides, let me tell you, there is not more difficulty in understanding the nature of spirits, than there is in conceiving how all the aforesaid operations should be performed without them; no, nor half so much neither; so that nothing is got by the objection; for it is a vain thing to object difficulty, when at the same time you are forced to acknowledge the thing to be necessary. But why, I pray you, is not spiritual substance as intelligible as corporeal

 

 BIOPH. O Sir, there is a vast difference in the case. I can see and feel the latter, but I cannot the former.

 

 SEBAST. Nay, believe me, there you are out. You see and feel only the accidents of a bodily substance, but not the substance itself, no more than you see or feel a spirit.

 

Biopic. Pardon me; at least I see and feel the bodily substance by the accidents; that is, I am assured of its presence and existence, and I can affirm such things of it upon that testimony of senses.

 

 SEBAST. And you may affirm as much of a soul, if you please, though you can neither see nor feel it forasmuch as you plainly perceive the properties and operations of it.

 

 BIOPH. That is close, and to the purpose, I confess; but still I cannot tell what to make of this thing called spirit; for I can frame no image of it in my imagination, as I can do of other things.

 

 SEBAST. Why, there it is now! I perceive you have a desire to see with your mouth, and hear with your eyes; for, as reasonably every jot may you expect to do either of those, as to frame a sensible imagination of a. spirit. That which we call imagination, you know, is nothing else but the impress of the color, bigness, or some other accidents of a thing that has been represented to our senses, retained in our fancy. But now, if a spirit have no color nor bulk, nor such other accidg^zits to be represented to our fancy, through our outward senses, how is it possible you should have any image of it there Spiritual beings are only capable of affording its an intellectual idea; namely, our higher faculty of reason, from observation of their effects and operations, concludes their essence, and takes an estimate of their nature: and, indeed, it is a contradiction to require any other evidence of that kind of beings.

 

 BIOPH. This kind of discourse is very subtle, and I cannot tell what to object farther to it. Go on, therefore, to your second branch; perhaps there I may better cope with you.

 

 SEBAST. The second step which I take towards the proof of the judgment to come, is, that as on the one side, mankind appear to be fit and capable of being judged hereafter; so on the other hand; it is agreeable to the nature and attributes of Got), and to those notions we have of a Deity, that he should call the world to such an account. And this appears briefly thus:- The most common and most natural notion which men have of the Divine Majesty is, that he is a Being absolutely perfect; that is, amongst other accomplishments, that he is a most powerful, wise, just, and good Being. There is hardly any body that thinks of a GOD, but considers him under these perfections: and he that divests him of any of these perfections, renders him neither an object of fear, nor of love, and consequently not a God.

 

 Now, if these things be included in the very notion of God, they not only capacitate him to judge the world, if he pleases, but give great assurance that he will do it. For, if he be a wise Being, he cannot but see how things go, and particularly how his creatures carry themselves here below. If he be powerful, he has it in his hand to rectify those disorders he observes amongst them; and both to punish the evil, and to reward the good. And if he be good and just, it cannot but be expected from him that he will set things to rights one time or other, when his wisdom shall think fit. But it is evident, this is not done in this world; therefore there is no reason to doubt but he will assuredly do it in another world: and therefore the Scripture tells us, `t he has appointed a day, wherein he will judge the world in righteousness."

 

 BIOPH. Not too fast, good SEBASTIAN. I know not certainly what apprehensions other men may have; but for my part, though I do acknowledge a GOD, Yet I must profess to you, I do not think the natural notion of God includes those attributes you speak of. Why may not GOD be a necessary agent And then there is no danger of an after-reckoning with him.

 

 SEBAST. I am sorry to find so unworthy a notion of GOD still to have any room in your thoughts. It is certain, indeed, that if he be only a necessary agent, then all fear of a judgment is discharged; and as certain, that all religion can be nothing, else but a groundless superstition for then GOD must needs be a very tame Deity, which men may play with and abuse at pleasure; as the frogs did by their wooden king in the fable.

 

But then, what need is there of any GOD at all, if a necessary agent will serve the turn! Why can we not as well suppose the world to be eternal, as make such a contemptible being, as a necessary agent is, to be eternal, only to give beginning to the world

 

 Or rather, if we attribute one perfection, 1: C., eternity, to him, why not all the rest, which appear, to be inseparable from it forasmuch as it is not imaginable how the First Cause should be the meanest of all; and he that gave those other perfections to other things, should be destitute, of them himself.

 

 Or, how can we believe that such a fettered, impotent, unthinking, and unwise being, should make a world in such beauty and perfection Or, at least, how is it possible that a necessary agent, which is like a galley-slave, chained down to his bench, and confined to his task and subject, should make a world with such curiosity and diversity of things, yet with that exquisite order and harmony which we observe in nature 

 

 Do you think that the frame of things could not possibly have been any otherwise than they are Can you fancy that nothing could have been better nor worse than it is now If you see any footsteps of wisdom or choice, any possibility that any thing should have been otherwise than it is, you forego your necessary agent.

 

 Do not you see great and manifest instances of design and contrivance in the order of things, viz., one thing fitted to another, and one. subordinate to another, and all together conspiring to some public end and use Now, sure a necessary agent could not guide things so, because it has no ends or designs.

 

 Again, if GOD be a necessary agent, I would fain be resolved how it came to pass that we are not so too I think you granted me, even now, that we choose our own way, propound ends to ourselves, and voluntarily pursue them, when we could, if we pleased, as freely choose and act contrary. Now, how to conceive that I should be a free agent, and that He who made me so should be a necessary one,--that is, that the effect should be more excellent than the cause,-neither I, nor (as I suspect) any body else can understand.

 

 But I need not, in this place, industriously set myself to confute this odd conceit of GOD's being only a necessary agent, because in my third branch I shall fundamentally undermine it; and therefore, with your leave, I now hasten to that.

 

 BIOPH. Go on then, by all means.

 

 SEBAST. My third and last proof for a judgment to come, is this:-God doth actually exercise such a providence in and over the world for the present, as gives great assurance that he will judge it hereafter; for these are, as it were, the two several ends of the same chain; a Providence here, and a Judgment hereafter. They naturally and mutually draw on each other. If there be a judgment to come, there must be a provident eye over the world for the present, in order to it; that is, God must so mind the world, that he perfectly understands how things go, how men carry themselves, what there is amiss amongst them, what requires punishment, and what deserves a reward otherwise he cannot be said to judge; forasmuch as, without this, it might rather be said, there is a day of execution conning, than a day of judgment. And, on the other side, if there be a providence in this world, and it be true that GOD observes how men carry themselves towards him, it must speak his intention to reward and punish hereafter, in proportion to such observation; for otherwise that providence would be fruitless, and to no purpose: it would be a mere matter of vain curiosity, and a needless trouble to the Divine Majesty; as the Epicureans objected. But now, that GOD doth exercise such a providence in this world, from whence we may reasonably presage a judgment to come, I think will abundantly appear by these three things:

 

 1. There has been such a thing as we call Prophecy, or prediction of things before they come to pass: which cannot be without a providence.

 

 2. There have been Miracles: which could not be without the Divine interposition.

 

 3. There are frequent instances, in all ages, of a divine presence in, and influence upon, the affairs of the world.

 

 1. First, I ground the assertion of a Providence upon the Prophecies and Predictions of things beforehand, which have been verified by real effects in their respective times and seasons. It is evident, that whosoever is able certainly to foretell things before they are, must see through all the series of causes which produce such events; especially if he define the precise time, and all other circumstances of the accomplishment; but above all, whosoever shall declare beforehand, not only what shall. come to pass, according to the course of natural and necessary causes, but also such things as are casual and contingent, or subject to the choice and indifferency of free and voluntary agents, must have a curious and accurate inspection into the conjunctions and conspiracy of all things, as well as into their particular natures and inclinations. For as every effect must have its causes before it can be, so the prediction of such effect must depend upon a certain knowledge of those respective causes which are pregnant of it. Therefore, if there ever has been such a thing as prophecy, there is a providence.

 

 Now for the matter of fact: That there have been certain and punctual predictions of things long before they came to pass, is the constant belief of all nations; and he that denies it, must give the he to the greatest and best part of mankind. You may remember that TULLY pursues this argument in his books de Divinations; and he there gives too many and too remarkable instances of it to be denied or eluded. 'Put I shall choose to set before you' only two passages out of the Holy Scripture; for though I perceive you have not such a reverence for those books as they deserve, yet such palpable matters of fact as I shall instance in, and which were of so public a concern, and general notice, as whereupon the revolution of whole nations depended, can afford no ground for calling in question the truth of them. And let me tell you, I make choice of these instances out of those writings, for no other cause but for the notoriety of the fact, and the easiness of confutation, if it had been otherwise.

 

 The former of the two passages is the prediction of the slavery of the children of Israel in the land of Egypt, and their miraculous deliverance thence, above four hundred years before it came to pass; and the accomplishment (when the time came) answering the prediction precisely to a day, so as to be observed by the whole body of the people, and the remembrance of it perpetuated by an anniversary solemnity ever after; as you may see, Exod, 12: 41.

 

 The other instance is, the Babylonish captivity, which was foretold above seventy years before it came to pass; and that, in a time of the greatest unlikelihood that any such calamity should befall: namely, it was prophesied of when the Jews were in the greatest peace and prosperity. And then for the term of this captivity, that was foretold to last seventy years; neither more nor less. And both these periods, as well as other circumstances, were exactly hit in the event of things.

 

 Now in both these instances, the things were prophesied of so long beforehand, there were so many obstacles in the way of their accomplishment, and so much of the will of man also interested in both the cases; and yet, notwithstanding such punctual exactness is- to be seen in the event, that it is plainly impossible that human wit should so much as guess probably at them; therefore the predictions must be grounded upon divine intimation; and then GOD is so far from being a necessary agent, that it is apparent he minds the world, and looks narrowly into all the parts of it, from one end to another, and governs and manages inferior causes.

 

 2. My second proof of an actual Providence is, from Miracles. By a miracle I mean any thing coming to pass, which is, either for the matter or manner of it, above the power of natural causes; or at least, contrary to their established course and order; whether it be effected by heightening them above their ordinary pitch, or accelerating their motion, or by suddenly bringing those causes together, which lay at a distance; or whether it be by depressing, suspending, or superseding any of them.

 

 And I reason thus:If any thing have ever been brought to pass above the capacity, or out of the method of natural and common causes, then there is an active Deity which exerts his power in that case. Or if ever the course of nature has been interrupted, it must be by the interposition of the Supreme Cause. For it is neither intelligible that nature should go out of course of itself; nor possible, that being once so out of course it should

 

ever be able to recover its former order, without the help of Omnipotency. Therefore, if ever there have been a miracle in the world, there is proof of a Providence.

 

 Now that such extraordinary things have happened, cannot be doubted without great ignorance, or denied without impudence. I know there is a sort of witty men (in their way) who endeavor to put a slight upon miracles, and therefore are very captious and critical in such cases as this; but if they can elude some occurrences that have been believed miraculous, yet they will never be able to evade them all. And if there have been but one acknowledged miracle in all the time of this world, it will be sufficient to prove a Providence. They will, perhaps, impute some cures that have been said to be done by miracle, to the efficacy of some medicine; although they can neither tell us what that remedy was, nor much less, how the symptoms should so suddenly cease upon the use of it.

 

 Or if they could speak tolerable sense in some of those particulars, yet, what natural account can be given of the raising of the dead; or, of unlearned men speaking all kind of languages in an instant What natural cause will they assign for the sun's standing still in JOSHUA'S time Or of that preternatural eclipse at our SAVIOR'S passion: What could intercept the sun's light, when the two luminaries were in opposition; or what restored it to its motion again, when it was interrupted, as in the former instance Or to its light again, when it intermitted, as in the latter instance To endeavor to give natural accounts of these things, will prove as absurd and ridiculous, as to deny the matter of fact.

 

 But if any of these instances will not pass with such men, because they were over long before our time, or because the truth of them depends upon the authority of Scripture, there are other innumerable passages in all ages, not liable to that exception, that cannot be resolved into any cause less than a supreme and Omnipotent.

 

 Amongst which, what will they say to this, which happens almost every year; namely, that after a long wet season, it shall suddenly clear up and be fair weather again; and, contrariwise, after a long dry season, it shall unexpectedly be wet and rainy Whereas, if they look only to natural causes, the quite contrary must happen Forasmuch as the more rain has been at any time, the more may be still, because there are the more vapors from whence clouds are raised: and the longer a dry season has lasted, there is every day the less reason to expect rain; because there want vapors out of which it should be raised. Now to impute the change only to-the winds, is to beg the question; for it is well enough known that the winds depend upon vapor, as well as rain; and to ascribe it to the stars, is to confess, that, right or wrong, we will shut GOD out of the world. But this leads me to my

 

 3. Third proof of a present Providence, viz., The more frequent and ordinary instances of a Divine influence upon the affairs of the world. The effects of which, though they are not accounted miraculous, because they are common, yet they give sufficient indication of Divine administration. And of this kind, there are so many which offer themselves to an observant mind, that to seek flaws, and go about to make specious objections against some few of them, will be rather an argument of resolved unwillingness to believe, than of any just grounds of infidelity.

 

 Now under this head I reckon, in the first place, as very observable, that there is scarcely any great thing ever brought about in the world, which GOD may not be seen to have a hand in: and that may be collected generally from the inadequateness of the visible means; as when great preparations are defeated and laid aside, and mean and inconsiderable ones do the business. This is that which SOLOMON observed long ago, That the battle is not to the strong, nor the race to the swift, nor bread to men of understanding: "And we cannot want an example for it nearer hand, when we remember the Restoration of King CHARLES 2:; for it ,pleased GOD to deal in that particular, as he did by GIDEON'S army, when he dismissed the greatest part of the forces, and did his business with a few, and those very unlikely for such an achievement.

 

 But more admirable than this is the preservation of the Holy Scriptures in all ages; both from total abolition by the flames of persecution, and from corruption by the capricious fancies of such men as would neither sincerely believe it, nor absolutely reject it. Such also is the preservation of. the Christian. religion, when all the wit, and all the power of the world, combined together against it: and such was the success of the Apostles in propagating that religion, and planting the Christian Church; when a few fishermen leavened the world with a doctrine quite against the grain of it, and naked truth prevailed against authority, art, and interest, in conjunction.

 

 Hitherto also I reduce the maintenance of magistracy and civil government; and I look upon it as a standing evidence of a Providence, that the strong bands of wicked and refractory men should stand in awe of a single man, like themselves, only because he is invested with authority. This, if it be duly considered, is very strange, and can be resolved into nothing but a Providence. Nor is it less strange, that, considering the great numbers of evil men, their secrecy and closeness, their cunning and falsehood, their envy and necessity, their activity and selfishness, they should' be able to do no more hurt in the world than they do. Why do they not swear men out of their lives and fortunes, and act whatsoever their revenge, or covetousness, or lust, shall prompt them to No account can be given of this, but the powerful restraint of Providence.

 

 Moreover, there are remarkable examples in all ages, of evil men, dogged by their own guilt, and tortured by their own consciences, when nobody else either accused or hurt them: and on the other side, as frequent instances of virtuous men, who have been very comfortable under great difficulties, and whose spirits have been borne up with an admirable bravery under such pressures as would crush and sink other men; and this, although the persons thus carrying themselves, were otherwise of no remarkable strength or courage. Neither of which passages can be resolved into any other causes than the mighty influence of a Providence.

 

 Nay, further: It is very observable how strangely sometimes secret sins are brought to light, especially such as murder and treachery, and where all arts and advantages were made use of for concealment; such persons becoming their own accusers, when nobody else could do it for them; and not unusually their own executioners too.

 

 Above all these, there are some instances of vengeance befalling very flagitious men, so signally, and with such pat and significant circumstances, that (without any uncharitableness) we may be led by the suffering to the sin-; as in the case of ADONIBEZEK, (Judy. 1: 7,) whose barbarous usage of threescore and ten Kings, cutting off their thumbs and great toes, and making them, like dogs, gather their meat under his table, was repaid upon himself, in the same severity. Of kin to which are those panic fears and shiverings, that oftentimes attend blood-guilty men, as long as they live; and though they may have escaped revenge from the hand of men, yet this, as a CAIN'S mark set upon them by the hand of God, indelibly sticks by them, and follows them to their graves.

 

 It is needless to say any thing more upon this subject; forasmuch as every man that doth not willfully shut his eyes, may collect instances to this purpose, both from the government of the world in general, and from his own fortunes in particular. For besides the quiet serenity, (in token of the Divine favor,) which usually attends a virtuous course of life; and the anxiety, and uneasiness, which as frequently (in testimony of the Divine dislike) attend a wicked one; it is not a very unusual, nor (to be sure) an unpleasant sight, to behold the former crowned with signal success, and the latter punished with shame and beggary. And this sometimes shall happen in such circumstances, when there is nothing to which this different success can be imputed, but Providence; forasmuch as the latter shall otherwise be more cunning for the world, and every whit as industrious and frugal as the former: but the one is under the blessing of heaven, and the other is apparently blasted and cursed.

 

 And now what think you, BIOPHILUS, upon the whole matter Have I not acquitted myself in all the three things I propounded And laying all these things together, is not here sufficient evidence to determine a prudent man in the case, and so satisfy him that there is a Providence in this world; and consequently, that there will be a judgment hereafter

 

 BIOPH. I cannot tell, SEBASTIAN. I confess you have said many very considerable things; and some of them beyond what I could have expected in the case. But I have one main objection, which especially touches the last branch of your argument; and which, if it stick by you, all you have said will signify nothing; but if you come clearly off from it, I shall not know what to think of the business. It is this, in short: I do not see any such settled method in the management of the affairs of this world, as must necessarily argue a Providence. For, in particular, notwithstanding all you have said, it cannot be denied, that very often the best of men are oppressed, and borne down by ill fortune; and contrariwise, evil men are very happy and prosperous. Therefore, it may seem that those instances which you collect in favor of your opinion, may happen by chance, rather than by Providence: and if there be no Providence in this world, by your own argument there can be no judgment hereafter.

 

 SEBAST. If that be all, or the main of what you have to object, I am in hope to see some good issue of this conference: For, in the first place, you know, that which is

 

impeached by this objection, is but one single instance out of many which I have brought for the assertion of a Providence; and consequently, if this should fail, yet, so long as the others are unshaken by it, that great doctrine way stand firm notwithstanding it. However, briefly say these three things in the case; viz.

 

 First, That some measure of intricacy or obscurity in the dispensation of Divine Providence, is no argument against it, but for it.

 

 Secondly, That there are very great reasons assignable, why it may please the Divine Majesty to proceed sometimes indiscriminately, and keep no constant visible method in the distributions of good and evil in this life.

 

 Thirdly, Yet, however this be sometimes obscure, there are at other times sufficient and legible instances of a distinguishing Providence.

 

 First, Some measure of intricacy in the dispensations of Divine Providence, is so far from being an argument against it, that it is a great argument for it. For if we do

 

not make God a mere necessary agent, (which I hope I have satisfied you in,) we must allow something to his prerogative and sovereignty; and, consequently, grant, that he

 

may do some things whereof he doth not make us acquainted with the reasons: and we may very well allow to his wisdom, to have a reach beyond us, and to have other measures to govern the world by, than we could have made for him. What! shall we call GOD to account for his management Shall he not govern the world at all unless he order it just as we would have him This is apparently so far from being reasonable, that it would be much more so to conclude on the contrary; namely, that if there were no depths in the Divine counsel which we could not fathom, no meanders in the way of Providence which we could not trace, it would be very suspicious whether there were any thing of Divinity in the whole business; for if things were constantly managed one way, without any variation, we should be apt to think all was under the rigid laws of a fatal necessity. If, on the other side, there were no rule to be observed, no footsteps of any method, then we should be tempted to think chance ruled the world. But when we observe an intermixture of these two, viz., that there is a rule, though there be some exceptions from it, then we have reason to conclude, that all is under a powerful and a free Agent, -;,,ho, if he be also infinitely wise, cannot but see reason for several things, which we cannot apprehend.

 

 Secondly, There are very great and weighty reasons assignable, why, in this particular instance of Providence, (namely, in the distribution of good and evil in this world,) the Divine Majesty should not gratify our curiosity with a plain account of his proceedings, but make some exceptions to his general rule: amongst which these following are considerable:

 

 First, Because such a constant and visible exercise of distributive justice, as your objection seems to require, would be such an irrefragable and palpable evidence of a Providence, as would leave no room for the discovery of ingenuity, or a virtuous disposition: for, it would be no argument of love to God, or goodness, that a man took care to serve GOD, if he constantly stood over us in a visible and undeniable Providence; so that every offender were taken in every fact, and presently led to execution; and, on the other side, every virtuous action were forthwith rewarded and crowned. In short, it is not agreeable to the mind of God, to overrun the freedom of our choice, since he has endowed us with it. Should he do so, he would act contrary to himself, and to his, own glory, as well as to the nature and condition of mankind.

 

 Again, secondly, a checkered and diversified method of Divine Providence, wherein there is an intertexture of prosperity and adversity in the fortunes of virtuous men, tends more to their improvement, than a more regular and constant Providence would do. 

 

 For, as a continued course of prosperity is too apt to tempt men to be wanton

 

and careless; so a perpetual series of adversity would be apt to sink and depress their spirits: but a middle way of interchange in their condition, balances them on both sides, and maintains them in a more even temper and conversation. And for this reason it pleases the Divine wisdom to make such false steps, as you are apt to imagine them to be.

 

 To which add, in the third place, that herein he is the very secret of Divine wisdom; and by this very way he doth most effectually assure us of the point in question, (namely a judgment to come,) in that there is such apparent necessity of it. For if the Divine Majesty should _ let the present world run at random, and interpose himself in no case to check the hurry, and punish the disorder, there would seem no reason to expect justice from him hereafter, who gave no token of it all this while: and, on the other side, if he interposed so frequently and constantly, as to leave no irregularity unpunished, nor any brave action unrewarded, there would be no business left, nor need of a day of judgment. Whereas by affording us some plain instances of his discrimination in this world, we are satisfied that he minds how things go, and is able to judge; and yet by permitting several other things to run riot, and seemingly to be unanimadverted upon, he has, as it were, cut out work for a day of judgment.

 

 Thirdly, Notwithstanding all this, as I said before, there are some sufficient and undeniable instances of a distinguishing Providence. I have granted to you, that sometimes the ways of GOD are intricate and involved; and I have offered at some reasons of it, to which many others might have been added; and, amongst the rest, that by this means we might be kept humble and modest, and taught to admire and reverence God, rather than to judge or pronounce of him. For these, I say, and other reasons best known to infinite wisdom, he thinks fit sometimes to lose us in the meander of his ways: yet, I say, they are not always thus obscure; but sometimes he treads such plain and direct paths, that we may easily follow him. And of this I have set before you several examples already, and whosoever will diligently attend to it, may easily collect more: But I will not omit to put you in mind of one great standing one, and (as far as is possible) beyond all exception; and that was in the history of the Jewish nation, who were infallibly sure to be happy and prosperous, so long as they stuck to the true GOD, and the laws he had given them by MOSES; and as sure to be signally miserable and calamitous, whensoever they apostatized from their GOD, or debauched their religion. So that that people were placed as a light upon a mountain, and were an illustrious instance to all the world, of that great truth we are now discoursing of; and if there were no more instances of this kind, that alone would be sufficient for the purpose.

 

 BIOPH. I must confess, if the story be true, there was a very strange fate attended that people.

 

 SEBAST. Fate, do you call it What color or pretence in the world is there for imputing those admirable revolutions to fate Could blind fate make distinction of persons and actions, and apply itself in the distribution of good or evil, in proportion to men's deserts or miscarriages Do not disparage your own discretion so much, as to use the word fate in such a case: No; assure yourself, that was a signal display of Divine Providence, and such a one as you cannot expect or demand a greater.

 

 BIOPH. But if it were the effect of Providence, I wonder how it comes to pass that there is no such thing now; or why all the rest of mankind was neglected by Divine Providence, and only that people, and in that age and corner of the world, so carefully managed by it.

 

 SEBAST. O BIOPHILUS; ask not God an account of his prerogative, much less prescribe to him how he should govern the world. What if he, pitying the dark state of the world then, did something extraordinary to relieve and enlighten it And what if, having once given such abundant proof of himself, he shall think that sufficient to all, after-ages Who shall expostulate the matter with him, especially since he has not left us destitute of sufficient grounds to determine a prudent man in the case!

 

 Which is all I have pretended to assert all this while, and I think I have made it good at last, though with some tediousness of discourse.

 

 BIOPH. I cannot tell what to say more for the present, but I will consider farther of it at leisure.

 

 PHIL. Aye, but do it quickly, good BIOPHILUS. You skeptical gentlemen are apt to take too, long time to consider of these matters. You know, die we must, and that shortly too; so that we have not any long time to consider in. What surprise would it be, if, whilst we stand doubting and disputing, we should hear the sound of the last trump, and be summoned to that great tribunal When death once arrests us, there is no bail will be taken; we must come to a strict account, and await an irreversible doom. So that there is no dallying in this matter.

 

 When NOAH, for no less than one hundred and twenty years together, preached repentance, and foretold a flood coming to drown all the world, no question but the generality of men laughed at him, as a timorous, hypochondriacal person: they could object how unusual a thing it was to be talked of; a thing that no Iran had seen, or had ever happened to the world before: they could discourse philosophically in the case too, and represent it as a very absurd thing to imagine, that the water should rise above the earth, and overflow the tops of their stately houses; for (might they say) where shall there be water enough to do it From whence should it come Or how should this fellow have notice of it, before all other men And perhaps they would conclude, that, at worst, they should have time to shift for themselves, and escape as well as others. Hereupon, they ate, and drank, and feasted, and made merry; and laughed at that precise coxcomb, with his new machine of an ark: but "so (says our SAVIOR) shall the coming of the Son of Man be."

 

 Alas, BIOPHILUS! whilst we dream, the judgment slumbers not; whilst we doubt and dispute, GOD is in earnest; and the time draws on apace, when "CHRIST Jesus, the Judge of the world, shall come in the glory of his Father, and of all the holy angels. The heavens shall then melt away, and the earth be on fire," from one end of it to another: " The dead shall rise out of their graves," and make a huge assembly: "The books" of all men's actions a shall be opened," and the Devil, together with every man's own conscience, shall be the accusers. Then shall all those that have lived virtuously and holily, look up with joy and comfort, to see their SAVIOR become their Judge; to find a vindication from all those unjust censures that have passed upon them here below; to come to an end of their labors, a reward of their services, the accomplishment of their faith and hope. What joy will be in their countenances! What glory upon their heads! How the angels smile upon them, and welcome them to their journey's end, and heaven opens in an admirable scene of light and glory to receive them.

 

 But, on the other side, all that have lived wickedly and unprofitably, shall look pale, and tremble, and " call upon the rocks and mountains to hide them from the face of the Lamb that sits upon the throne; " for they shall see all black and dismal about them; no tears will move pity, no rhetoric will persuade, no excuses will be admitted, no appeal allowed, no refuge to be found, nor reprieve to be hoped for; but they shall hear that dreadful sentence, " Depart, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for tile Devil and his angels;," and shall see hell open her mouth to receive them into unquenchable flames.

 

 BIOPH. I protest you speak with such feeling, PHILANDER, that your discourse has more power upon me, than all the arguments that ever I heard in my life: and I know not what is the matter, but my heart trembles; therefore let me once more entreat you to adjourn the remainder of this discourse until another time.

 

 PHIL. Ah, dear neighbor! do not prove like unhappy FELIX: do not go about to elude what you cannot evade. No; put not off this business a moment longer. Now that it seems God has touched your heart,, quench not his HOLY SPIRIT; it may be, you will never be in such a temper again, if you lose this opportunity.

 

 BIOPH. I assure you, I like this temper (as you call it) so ill, that I do not desire to feel more of it: but if you are resolved to go on to torment me, I pray do me the favor, first to answer me this question: If these things be so as you represent them, how comes it to pass, that men unconcerned about religion, die as comfortably as any others The reason of my question is this, because you will pretend that whilst men are well in health, and swimming with the tide of prosperity, they may either put off the thoughts of these things, though they be true; or the noise of business, and the caresses of their sense, may obscure all apprehension of another world. But sure, when men find themselves dying, it should be too late for them to flatter themselves, or to admit the flatteries of others; then surely prejudices cease, and men are at leisure to think. What then, I say, can be the reason, if these things be true, that there is not as remarkable a difference in men's tempers when they come to die, as there seems to be in their conversation whilst they are alive

 

 SEBAST. I apprehend your question very well, and the reasons of your asking it. And for answer to it, I pray tell, what is the reason that men who love their health and their estates both very well, will nevertheless be drunkards, and whoremasters, and gamesters; though they see by daily experience, that these are sure methods to deprive them of both You will tell me, I suppose, that they feed themselves with absurd and unreasonable hopes, which fool their discretion; or that they are bewitched and besotted with those kinds of pleasures, and so consider nothing at all. Why, just so it is here: the things we speak of are undoubtedly true, and the miscarriage in them is fatal; but men are careless and incogitant, and slip into the pit of destruction before they are aware: they live merrily, because they never think of any thing; and

 

they die as sottishly as they lived.

 

 Again, there is another sort of men, that are captious and conceited, who will chop logic, as we say, with GOD ALMIGHTY; they will have not only their reason satisfied,

 

but their curiosity also, or they will not believe; they must see a spirit, and heaven, and hell, or one must come from the dead, or they will not be contented. Now GOD will not indulge this humor of theirs, and they are resolved to venture him; that is, they will be damned rather than forego it.

 

 Besides, there are others who take a great deal of pains to disbelieve: they will use all the arts of sophistry, all the tricks and evasions of wit, in trench and fortify themselves

 

in their atheistical conceits: in a word, they will cheat their own reason, out-face their conscience, and bring upon themselves a stupid insensibility of all that is good and virtuous; and so in conclusion they die quietly, and go silently into the bottomless pit.

 

 Add to this, that it is very probable many of these men may be very far from dying cheerfully, though we are not able to observe their agonies and torments; for it may very well be, that when once they begin to consider what a desperate condition they are 'in, the very thoughts of that, together with their bodily disease, overwhelm their spirits, and make their passage out of the world more compendious, but never the more comfortable.

 

 After all, you shall find some of the aforesaid persons, when they come to die, sadly bewail their folly and carelessness: but wherever did you hear of a holy and virtuous man, that repented of his choice or pains in religion, or care of his soul, and solicitude in preparation for this occasion It is possible, indeed, such a man may express no transports, because his body is like other men's, and the strength of his disease may enfeeble his spirits, and cloud his reason, and so interrupt the exercise of his faith. And, on the other side, the irreligious man, though perhaps (as you suppose) he cannot, or will not dissemble at the approach of death, yet he may be sottish and insensible; and then, whatsoever difference of state they are entering upon, there may be no discernible difference in their departure hence. And so, you see, your question will not serve to the purpose you propounded it for.

 

 PHIL. Come, BIOPHILUS, leave these skeptical artifices; these captious questions; do not seek out ways to muzzle your own conscience, or impose upon your reason: a judgment there will be, and it is all the wisdom in the world to be prepared for it. It is in our power, by the grace of GOD, to order matters so, that we shall rather hope and wish for it, than fear it: and what vast odds is there between-them two You are sensible that it is only a judgment following death, that makes death terrible. Indeed it is possible our bodies may be disturbed at the assaults of it: but mere death can never shake our minds, or discompose one thought, if we are satisfied that all will be well after it. And what a happy and desirable condition were it, to be out of the reach of that king of terrors, to see light through that dark vault of the grave, to outlive all a man's fears, and to live to his hopes! What a strange alteration will that one thing make in a man's projections and designs, in his countenance, and in his spirit, and in the whole management of himself! For who can be afraid of any other accident, that has no cause to fear death Who would be much discomposed, whether his temporal affairs succeed well or ill, that is provided for eternity Who will stoop so low, as to lay any stress upon fame, that has approved himself to GOD and his own conscience, and can stand the shock of the great trial at the day of judgment He that is in a condition not to fear death, will have no reason to fear men, or devils; but may be as bold as a lion: he will crouch to nobody, flatter and humor nobody; for nobody can hurt him: and so his life is easy as well as comfortable, forasmuch as he has no one to please but GOD and his own conscience.

 

 But, as I was saying, this is to be prepared for. Salvation is not a matter of course, nor the judgment a mere piece of state and formality, but infinitely sacred and solemn, The Judge is wise, and holy, and just; the trial strict and severe, the doom irreversible, the misery intolerable, if a man miscarry; as well as the felicity unspeakable, if he stand right at that tribunal and to all this, the time draws on apace; we feel our selves daily dying, therefore it concerns us to do what is to be done out of hand.

 

 BIOPH. I am convinced that it is the wisest course to provide for it, if it could be done without too much trouble.

 

 PHIL. Ah, BIOPHILUS! can any care be too great in such a concern Can any thing seem troublesome, that may at once secure us from all other troubles But the trouble is not great neither; it is but being heartily religious, and all is done.

 

 BIOPH. That is soon said, I confess; but not so soon done. Besides, I am never the wiser for such a general advice: for there are so many religions in the world, that it is hard to know which to trust to. Some sublime religion to such a height of spirituality, (as they call it,) that a man cannot tell what to make of it: and again, some make no more of it, than honest morality. Some dress it up so fine, with so many trappings and ornaments, that it is hard to find what the naked truth of the thing is: and others render it so plain and coarse, that a man is tempted to despise it. In a word, it seems to me to be what the painter pleases, forasmuch as I see some describe it out of the pleasantness of their own sanguine fancy, and others out of the black humor of their hypochondriac passions; so that, upon the whole matter, I think I had as good maintain my own character, and withhold my assent until men are better agreed upon the point.

 

 SEBAST. God forbid, BIOPHILUS; for that you cannot do, unless you will adventure to be damned; as certainly you must, if you be found to be of no religion.

 

 BIOPH. Why have you less charity for men of my temper, than for all the world besides

 

 SEBAST. Far be it from me to be uncharitable towards any men. But I must tell you, I have less hope for that man that has no faith at all, than for him that has a bad one: and it must be a very bad religion indeed, that is no better than none. For though by reason of the variety of persuasions, a man may be so misled as to perish in a blind devotion; yet certainly he that is of no religion at all, cannot be saved. But what need is there for either of these There are a great many false religions, it is acknowledged; but there is a true one too, and that not so hard to discern as you represent it.

 

 Come, I will tell you a religion that all the world shall agree in; and my soul for yours, you shall be safe if you comply with it. Do not stare; it is no more but this Live soberly, righteously, and godly, in this present world." Or, if you will have it in other words: Resolve with yourself not to do that thing, whatever come of it, that you cannot answer to GOD, and your own conscience; and do every thing within your power, that may approve and recommend you to both; and thenceforward fear not a day of judgment.

 

 BIOPH. Now you speak to the purpose, indeed; that, I must needs say, is good counsel, and such as, I think, all the world is agreed in.

 

 I thank you both for your good company, and your charitable offices towards my satisfaction; and I do already assure you of this fruit of it,-That by. your conversation I have learned, that all religion is not acting a part, and playing the hypocrite, which I was apt to suspect heretofore; for I see you both are so hearty in it, and yet men of greater sagacity than myself, that I tell you truly, I begin to think it becomes me seriously to consider it. Good night to you, good SEBASTIAN.