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SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY -- VOLUME II
By Miner Raymond

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SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
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BOOK THIRD.

ANTHROPOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

ORIGINAL RIGHTEOUSNESS.

THE topics of discussion in Systematic Divinity are usually divided into five parts: Apologetics, Theology Proper, Anthropology, Soteriology, and Eschatology. Apologetics treats of the evidences of Christianity; an apology, in the sense of the word as here used, is not an excuse for a blunder, but a reason for a belief. The term "theology," as used in common discourse, is taken in a generic sense, and made to embrace all of the five above named; hence, in technical use, it is qualified by the term "proper," and is restricted to its proper etymological meaning. It is a compound of the two words *theos*, God, and *logos*, a word, a discourse, a treatise, a science, and signifies, in strict construction, a treatise concerning God, or the science of God. The special topics embraced under this head are the being and attributes of God, the trinity, christology (including these four: 1. The true and proper deity of Christ; 2. His true and proper humanity; 3. The union of two natures, the human and the divine, in one person called the hypostatic union; and 4. The distinction between the two natures, so that the person of Christ is both God and man, not a somewhat between the two), and the personality and divinity of the Holy Ghost. These topics we have discussed, and come now to consider the third general head, Anthropology.

This term, as its composition indicates (*anthropos*, man, and *logos*, science), signifies the science of man. In a generic sense it would include all sciences which have special reference to man, such as anatomy, physiology, psychology, ethics, æsthetics, and sociology even, as well as religion; here it is used with special reference to man considered as a moral and religious being, and takes into account his intellectual and physical constitution, and his earthly environments, only indirectly or only so far forth as these bear upon the doctrine of his spiritual, moral, and religious nature.

The first question for discussion is, What was man by creation? How are we to think of man as to his physical, intellectual, moral and religious

nature, and as to his relations to his surroundings, considered as he was when he came from the hands of his Creator? The answer to this question evolves what is called in theological language the doctrine of Original Righteousness. The second question, recognizing the fact of the fall, postulating the actuality of sin, is, What did man become by sin? and the answer to this evolves the doctrine of Original Sin, so called, or, as it is sometimes called, Natural Depravity, or again, Inherited Sinfulness. A third question, What may man become by grace? might seem to follow in natural order, but as the answer to this question must necessarily be founded upon some theory of salvation, it is naturally deferred till after the doctrine of Atonement is discussed, and is classified as belonging to the department of soteriology. We have, then, as marking out our line of thought, first, the doctrine of original righteousness; second, the historical fact of the fall; and third, the doctrine of original sin. These involve a discussion of all theories respecting the origin, unity, and antiquity of the race; respecting sin, its nature, possibility, origin, and actuality, and the consequences thereof as developed in this life, and anticipated in the life to come.

The Bible, as interpreted by the Church from the beginning until now, teaches that some six, eight, or perhaps ten thousand years ago, at a very recent geological period, God formed man's body of the dust of the earth, and united to his body thus formed a living soul; that this making of man, though not a creation out of nothing, was equivalent to it—the same as if then and there God, by a nusus of the infinite will, had caused two distinct entities—mind and matter—to come into being and to be united in one individual person; that man thus created was a perfect man in maturity, not an infant in process of growth toward manhood; not a somewhat to be evolved or developed into a man, but truly, properly, and perfectly a man; that his nature and his condition were in perfect adjustment and adaptation the one to the other; that he was made under law free and responsible, endowed with the power of voluntary obedience to all God's commandments, which power was also itself a power to the contrary; that in the abuse of free-will he voluntarily sinned against God; that by reason of sin he lost his first estate, became mortal as to his body, and alien from God as to his soul; that directly or indirectly, all the ills of the present life, and all the perils of the life to come, exist by reason of sin; and finally, that without a Savior, man, because of his sins, is in a condition of hopeless ruin.

Such is a brief and imperfect outline of Biblical anthropology according to the prevailing interpretations of the Church. A definite examination of the several factors involved demands attention; and first, as to the

ORIGIN OF MAN.

The Bible testimony, stated in its own terms, is as follows: "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them. And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and he became a living soul. This is the book of the generations of Adam. In the day that God created man, in the likeness of God made he him. The Spirit of God hath made me, and the breath of the Almighty hath given me life. But none saith, Where is God my maker, who giveth song in the night? The hearing ear and the seeing eye the Lord hath made, even both of them. Thus saith God the Lord, he that created the heaven and stretched them out, he that spread forth the earth and that which cometh out of it, he that giveth breath unto the people upon it, and spirit to them that walk therein, I have made the earth and created man upon it; I, even my hands have stretched out the

heavens, and all their host have I commanded. But now, O Lord, thou art our Father; we are the clay and thou our potter, and we all are the work of thy hand. I have made the earth, the man and the beast that are upon the ground, by my power and by my outstretched arm and have given it unto whom it seemed meet unto me. In him we live and move and have our being, as certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring. Forasmuch, then, as we are the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold or silver, or stone graven by art and man's device."

Whatever be the theory of inspiration as to the Book of Genesis, it can not be disputed that it has all the characteristics of an historical record. If God caused the work of creation to pass before Moses' mind in vision, he recorded what he saw, and the record is a record of what took place. If Moses gathered his cosmos from the traditions of the ancients, the gathering and the construction were directed by the inspiration of the Almighty, and the record is what it purports to be, a history of what actually occurred. If God directly instructed Moses what to write when he composed the Book of Genesis, then is it a history of the creation indited by him who only hath perfect knowledge of the event recorded. All the references to the work of creation contained in the subsequent sacred writings are but echoes of what is recorded in Genesis; all assume that the record is an authentic history. What, then, does this record affirm?

It affirms, we remark in the first place, that the creation of man—his formation, his making, whatever it be called—was a somewhat that was the subject of previous deliberation, choice, decision. "Let us make man." It was itself, therefore, the result of volition; a thing dependent upon the voluntary act of the divine mind, a result that might not have been, a pure contingency, not a necessity of nature, not a necessitated evolution of an eternal substance, not an unavoidable development of pre-existent matter, but, I repeat, a resultant of the free volitions of the infinite mind. It affirms, I remark, secondly, that the creation of man—that event recorded in Genesis, that which took place at the definite point of time referred to in the record, whenever it was—was a work which required unlimited power, the power of an infinite will, that which "speaks and it is done," "commands and it stands fast"—a power competent to create out of nothing; for not only does this thought lie upon the surface of the record itself, but every-where in the Scriptures where the creation of man is referred to, the reference is such as implies all power in man's Maker. The forming of man from the dust of the earth, and the making him to become a living soul, requires a power to which the possibilities of things are equal to the possibilities of thought. The record in Genesis affirms, I remark, thirdly, for the reasons just given, that the origin of man is found in creation—in what modern scientists call special creation—a work of omnipotent power then and there exerted for that purpose.

The fact that the body was formed of the dust of the ground and the soul was of the breath of God does not antagonize this thought; for without the formation and the breathing the man had not been, though the dust and the breath had been from everlasting and would continue to everlasting; the interposition of God on that occasion was the interposition of omnipotence, and was the equivalent of a creation out of nothing.

THE ANTIQUITY OF MAN AND THE UNITY OF THE RACE.

The differences among the chronologies are of no account in this connection, for if the arguments adduced to show that man has inhabited the earth more than six thousand years prove any thing they prove that he has inhabited it more than ten thousand, and that therefore the Bible account is false. Again, whether the flood were universal, so that the entire race, with the exception of Noah and his family, were destroyed by it, or whether it were limited so that the inhabitants of a large portion of the earth were

unaffected by it, needs not be considered here, for if the arguments adduced to prove that the varieties of the human race could not have been descended from the family of Noah prove any thing they prove that these varieties can not be all of them of the posterity of Adam. All the difficulties of the common interpretation must be accepted. The Bible stands or falls with the theory, that the Adam and Eve of Genesis were the first and only created members of the human family—that the race has existed only about six or eight thousand years, and that all the generations of men and women, with all their varieties and differences, are descendants of that one sole pair.

But it will be asked, may it not be that the interpretation is at fault? Is not an exegesis possible that will avoid the difficulties of a common interpretation, and harmonize more perfectly with the theories of scientists? I reply: the common interpretation not only lies upon the surface of the record, regarded as an accurate history, and is implied in all subsequent references, but it also underlies several of the leading doctrines of the Christian system. The Bible theories of sin and of salvation are all of them founded upon the assumption, that the first and the second Adam were representatives of the race. The origin of sin, the introduction of evil into the world, and the universal sinfulness of mankind are every-where in the Bible referred to the Adamic transgression, and are accounted for by it. If the Adam of Genesis was not the father and representative of the human race, then the Bible theory of sin is not the true theory. The possibility of pardon and the possible salvation of all men is based upon the common relation of mankind to the second Adam—Christ, which relation has its correlative in the relation of the race to the first Adam; so that the theory of redemption is void of meaning except as correlated to the theory of the fall in the first pair. If the facts of science, or any facts, require a new interpretation of the account given of the origin of the race, in the book of Genesis,—if the origin of the race be found anywhere else than in the special creation of a single pair, from whom all others have descended, then is the whole Bible a misleading and an unintelligible book.

ANTI-SCRIPTURAL THEORIES.

The differences in the theories which oppose the Bible anthropology are not important to the present argument. All, whatever be the title by which they are known—whether spontaneous generation, development, evolution, or other title, seem to agree in the affirmation that matter was the sole original substance, and that all the differences that subsist in the things that are is simply a difference in molecular disposition. The ultimate particles of matter arranged and combined in one form constitute a senseless stone. The same ultimate particles arranged and combined in another form constitute a rational, sensitive, volitionating mind. The arrangements and combinations though they occur, it may be, in accordance with some law, as natural selection, are nevertheless fortuities, are by chance or accident, since their occurrence is in the total absence of all intelligent intention or design. The eye was not made to see, but it sees because it chanced to be what it is. Man is a rational, sensitive, æsthetic, religious being, not because he was made or created with intention that he should be such, but because in the infinite possibilities of molecular combinations, it came to pass in the course of unlimited duration that matter chanced to assume the form of a human body, and became a living soul. This is in substance, and I see not to the contrary that it is in form, the theory of all anti-scriptural anthropologists. If this is not their account of the origin of man, then what their theory is, is not apparent; and be it what it may, it is not deserving of the theologian's notice.

Of this theory we have already treated under the head of antitheistic theories, in connection with the chapters on the being of God, to which the i

reader may refer. (See Vol, I, p. 287, Materialism). Suffice it, therefore, to say in this place: 1. That since the theories opposed to the Scripture record antagonize the evidences of religion, they are in logical fairness bound first to dispose of all the arguments by which it is proved that what the Bible says, God says. 2. The theories themselves are preposterous. If any thing in the grossest superstitions of ancient or modern mythology is more chimerical than the supposition that such a being as man is, came into existence without design; that all the difference between a man and a tree is a difference of molecular arrangement, we have failed to find it. 3. The proofs alleged in support of these anti-scriptural theories are all of them mere inferences from observed facts in nature, and though it be admitted that the facts are correctly reported, and that the inferences are logically drawn, the conclusion proved is only that the theory possibly may be true—positive proof is out of the question. When man originated, no one but God and the angels was present, and if revelation be impossible, as our opponents aver, then we can not know certainly whence, how, or by what agency we came to be. 4. The theories are pronounced materialism, and, as such, contradict the common intelligence of mankind, since all men must, materialists themselves not excepted, intuitively apprehend mind and matter, as differing from each other by the greatest difference known to human thought. 5. Some of these anti-scriptural theories are professedly atheistic, and all of them are atheistic in their natural tendencies. If such a being as man might come into existence without a creator, then the universe itself might come to be in the same way. If the potency and promise of all forms of being inhere in inert matter, the cosmos does not demand a deity, and man has no evidence that God exists—matter may be eternal and First Cause a chimera.

If the Bible account of the origin of man be admitted, the question of his antiquity and of the unity of the race are settled.

The affirmation that man has existed on the earth longer than the chronology of the Bible allows is supported by inferences made from the fact that fossil remains evincing man's existence have been found under circumstances which, it is affirmed, could not have occurred during the time allotted for human history. That these inferences are not reliable is sufficiently evidenced by the fact that many of the alleged cases, for a time relied upon with all confidence, as determining the question at issue, have afterwards been satisfactorily shown to ; be fossils of recent date. To say the least on the one side, and perhaps the most on the other, science has not as yet presented any determinative case; how long man has lived on the earth the rocks do not tell us. If the Bible record is not reliable for what it professedly teaches, then we have no knowledge on the subject. The specified facts urged in proof of a greater antiquity for man than that of the Bible are, the existence of villages built on piles now submerged in lakes, the discovery of human remains in a fossil state in deposits to which geologists assign an age of tens of thousands of years, the discovery of utensils made of flint, in connection with the remains of extinct animals, and the early separation of men into the different races in which they now exist; all of which may be accounted for on other hypotheses than on that which they are adduced to prove. The discussion of them from scientific stand-points belongs to those scientists who have made that class of studies a specialty. It is enough for us to see that they are not determinative proofs. We accept the Bible testimony on the evidences of its inspiration. These are such and so many that we confidently postpone minute examination of alleged antagonisms until scientists are themselves agreed as to what true science teaches, and shall present a case in which men of general learning shall be able to see indubitable evidence that Bible archaeology is not reliable.

The objection to the doctrine of the unity of the race is not specially scientific. It is found in the difficulty—obvious to all, learned or

unlearned--everyone meets in attempting to account for the differences subsisting among men on the supposition that they are all children of the same single pair. To conceive how Caucasian, Mongolian, and African could have come to be what they are if all have a common ancestor, seems next to an impossibility. But it is one thing to show that a theory has its difficulties, and quite another to prove that it is untrue. Such proof in this case is wanting; moreover, all men know that great differences among vegetables and animals are produced in short periods of time--differences which become permanent, and constitute distinct varieties; differences so great that it seems next to impossible to anticipate them. If, then, known varieties, differing by characteristics which the common judgment would declare to be results impossible to mere culture, are produced in tens of years, is it a thing manifestly impossible that such differences as subsist among the different varieties of the human race may be produced by the influence of circumstances, when centuries are allowed for the occurrence of transitions? Manifestly the case does not belong to the category of impossibilities.

If differences in structure, form, color, and whatever is merely external may be referred to the influence of climate, soil, food, pursuits in life, to the circumstances of our earthly being, then it only remains to inquire as to what is essential to variety of species.

Scientists are not agreed as to what it is that constitutes a species, and their disagreement warrants the assertion that it does not consist in any thing external or material. In the initial point on the yolk of the egg, there is no difference of form, no difference discernible by the microscope, or discoverable by chemical analysis between one germ and another, between the initial cell of a bird and that of a fish. And yet the whole difference is there, and that difference must be what some scientists call the "immaterial principle," and others the "potential idea." It is a somewhat constituting a part of, or inseparably connected with, the embryonic substance that determines what it shall be as to its essential characteristics. These essentials developed in the life of the vegetable or animal are the exponents of the species to which the specimen belongs. They are not anyone thing, but the aggregate of several. Unity in organic structure in physical and psychological nature with permanence and capability of indefinite propagation is sufficient to determine the species. In all these respects the whole human family agree. An Anatomy, a Physiology, a Psychology, a Treatise on æsthetics, a system of morals and religion, true to nature, faithfully representing what man is by original constitution, and what he may become by culture, that should be appropriate to anyone of the varieties of the human family would be appropriate to all. The skeleton consists of the same number of bones similarly arranged, and indicating unity of design or plan. So of the nerves, and the same of the muscles. The system of nutrition, digestion, circulation, respiration, secretion, and absorption are the same. Perception, conception, memory, association, judgment, reason, emotion, desire, affection, and volition are the same in all, and are in all subject to the same laws. Apprehensions of the true, the beautiful, and the good are essentially the same. The social and governmental institutions that are beneficial to one are beneficial to all; and the reverse is equally true. The offspring of every race can be indefinitely combined and indefinitely propagated. The languages spoken by a vast majority of mankind have, according to the testimony of the best philologists, a common origin. These, with other equally convincing evidences, such as the universal conviction of a common apostasy and a common need of redemption, are sufficient proofs of unity of race; and that being admitted, the unity of origin will not be questioned.

The Bible anthropology, so far as the origin, antiquity and unity of the race is concerned, though not unchallenged, though not without controversy, is still without successful contradiction. No antagonistic theory has yet been

sustained by such evidences as make it incumbent upon the theologian even to review the common interpretation, much less to discount the evidences of Bible inspiration. God hath made of one blood all the nations of men. He made them by an act of special creation, in the persons of a single pair, not more than about eight thousand years ago.

NATURE OF MAN.

God formed man's body of the dust of the earth, and breathed into him the breath of life, and he became a living soul. This has been understood to teach that there are two, and only two, elements in the human constitution—one material and the other spiritual—the one matter and the other mind. These two are substances, entities, actually existing things, united in a manner to human thought, inscrutable, mysterious, incomprehensible, yet really united, and so united as to constitute one nature—a nature individualized, one, and yet both material and spiritual. It is only by the actuality of such a union that certain facts of consciousness can be conceivably possible, such as pain from a fleshly wound. A spirit can not be punctured by a pin, and though a dead body be punctured pain is not produced. Matter is indispensable to the phenomenon, and mind to the consciousness produced by it. Man is not materialized mind, nor spiritualized matter, nor is he a somewhat that is neither—or a somewhat between the two; but he is both—material as to his body, spiritual as to his mind, mysteriously united during his earthly existence in one individual person. Whether the union subsisting between the two, considered as to their substances or essences, admits of separation, perhaps, it is useless for man to inquire, since we have no knowledge of what substance is either material or spiritual. Yet, if the nature be a resultant of the union, then must the union continue while the nature exists. But certain it is that the *form* of the material, as it is during man's earthly life may be laid aside, separated from the man while he himself continues conscious of personal identity. This is evident from the Bible doctrine of the intermediate state, from what the Scriptures teach respecting man's condition between death and judgment, more especially also from the general manner in which the soul and body are referred to by the sacred writers. The soul is the master, and the body the servant—the soul is the inhabitant, the body the habitation—the soul the superior, and the body the inferior.

Again, the universal conviction of the human mind recognizes a distinction between that which each one calls himself and which constitutes his bodily frame. And since all men anticipate death, knowing that the body returns to the earth as it was, so far forth as they have faith in their own immortality, so far do they cognize the distinction between the material and the spiritual, and so far do they accept the doctrine of the duality of the human constitution. It needs to be distinctly understood that the duality here spoken of is in substance, essence, entity, not in phenomena. In phenomena man is as multiform as there are different properties of matter added to all the different states of consciousness. It is of that in which the properties of matter inhere, and that to which the states of mind belong, that we affirm duality. Man, then, we affirm, is a being in whose nature two entities, and only two, are so united as to constitute one being; and this affirmation is what in psychological terms is called realistic dualism—the doctrine of the Bible, of the Church, of sound philosophy, and of common sense.

To a limited extent this doctrine has been opposed by the affirmation that man has three natures. The technical name of this theory is trichotomy. It finds its chief support in St. Paul's prayer for the Thessalonians, "that their whole spirit and soul and body be preserved blameless." In this theory the term body has its usual signification; the term soul is made to signify animal life, and that part of man's intellectual, sensitive and volitional

nature which he has in common with other animals, by which he and they are capable of sensations, emotions, passions, desires, affections and self-action. The term spirit represents man's moral and religious nature, that by which he has a consciousness of God, an apprehension of dependence upon God, and of obligation to him. It is manifest that this is mere theory, unsustained by any argument in philosophy, not required by scientific classification in psychology, and without any advantage in language. If St. Paul, in his prayer for the Thessalonians, had in thought a distinction between soul and spirit, the most that could be said of that would be, that it was a classification of mental powers, not necessarily a distinction of natures; not an enumeration of elements in the human constitution. To our thought, the specifications of the text are only designed to be an exhaustive category; the idea is the idea of the whole man, the same as in the commandment, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength." This passage proves as conclusively that there are four entities in human nature as the one in Thessalonians proves that there are three.

To the doctrine of realistic dualism there are several philosophical objections. The first we notice is that found in the philosophy which in modern times has assumed the name of Positivism. This philosophy asserts that man knows nothing but phenomena—he cognizes in matter nothing but properties, and in mind nothing but mental states; hence, all ontological discussions are unphilosophical—are vain and useless speculations. To this it were sufficient for the theologian to reply, The Bible every-where assumes the actual existence of an absolute and infinite entity—God; and also everywhere assumes the actual existence of two finite entities, mind and matter. But more, it may be insisted upon in philosophy, that man has, and from his nature must have, an ineradicable conviction—call it faith, if this pleases, no matter—man has an ineffaceable impression that properties inhere in something, that mental states belong to some thing: that which acts is; and what is, is an entity. Positivism, so far forth as it discounts ontology, contradicts the common sense of mankind, and is therefore unphilosophical as well as anti-scriptural. The second anti-dualistic theory we notice is the first, with an appendix, assuming that man knows nothing but phenomena, and making therefrom the tremendous inference that there is nothing else,—that is, because man does not know entities, therefore there are none. It further affirms that man knows nothing but mental phenomena; he knows nothing of matter, not even its properties; he knows nothing but that of which he is conscious, that is, ideas. This is idealism.

Philosophical skepticism takes one step further, and affirms that man does not certainly know any thing. Such folly, though put forth in the name of philosophy, and honored by the advocacy of distinguished men, scarcely deserves a mention, much less an attempt at sober reply. Universal skepticism is impossible; man must believe something, and there is nothing of which he can be more confident than he is that that which he calls himself is a rational spirit and inhabits a material body. Realistic dualism is philosophic as well as scriptural, and accords with the common intelligence of mankind. Of materialism, the third theory we have in mind, which affirms that there is but one substance and one nature in the universe, we have treated sufficiently in preceding pages.

REALISM.

This term, though it has a generic sense common to all theories bearing the name, has several different applications. It is in one of its senses opposed to Idealism, of which we have spoken just above. The idealist affirms the actual existence only of the subjective—of mental states, of ideas. The realist affirms the actual existence of the objective—of things, realities,

entities. In another sense the term realism is opposed to nominalism. This difference arises in the discussion of the ideas of genera and species. When it is said man is a rational animal, or a mountain is a high elevation of land, or a lake is a large body of water entirely surrounded by land, or, in a word, when any general term is defined, are we speaking of something or of nothing? What are genera? What are species? What are general terms? Are they mere names? or are they names of really existing things? The nominalist replies, they are merely names, there are no really existing things that correspond to them. The realist replies, they are names of actually existing entities. A third sect of philosophers, called conceptualists, reply, they are names of conceptions of the mind, or, they are names given to inadequate ideas of things, which is probably, of the three, nearest the truth. We are at present concerned with the affirmation of the realist, that genus and species are entities, actually existing things, existing separate and independent of individuals. Of realism as opposed to nominalism there are several forms, such as that which affirms that universals are *before* individuals; and that which affirms that universals are *in* individuals; but those differences are unimportant in the present discussion. The thought we have in view is, that the individual man is to the genus man what a magnet is to magnetism, what a wave is to the ocean; all men considered as individuals are but forms of the one universal man-mankind. The generic man has an existence separate from and independent of the individual man.

It is not necessary here to consider the philosophical speculations and controversies of the realists and nominalists. We are concerned only with the bearings of this form of realism upon the theology. And first, the step from realism to pantheism is but a very short one, and so natural and easy that it seems next to an impossibility that the realists should not take it. If we may conceive that men are but forms, which one and the same thing, humanity, assumes-puts on for a time-then may we very readily conceive that all the things we know are but forms of the one sole substance, the *anima mundi*, the soul of the universe-God. God is every thing, and every thing is God. Secondly, if realism be true, then the immortality of the individual man is out of the question. The genus man may continue forever, as the ocean remains the same during time, indefinitely long, but the actual man ceases when he returns to God as he was, just as the wave ceases to be when its waters are absorbed in the ocean mass. Third, realism has an unfavorable bearing on the doctrine of the Trinity. If men be only one and identically the same substance in different forms, if individualization be only specific forms of the same entity, then, three men are one man in the same sense that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are one, three personal manifestations of one essence; and the converse of this will certainly follow, that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one in the same sense that Peter, James, and John are one, which is to the common apprehension, a total denial of the whole doctrine of Trinity. Fourthly, a use is made of realism in the interpretation of the Adamic transgression, and the relation of the race to it, which essentially modifies the whole doctrine of anthropology.

It is alleged that the Adam of Genesis was not an individual man, but the generic man-the whole race actually existent then and there as the *genus homo*, one humanity, one separate, independent entity, rational and voluntary, a subject of government and on probation for destiny. From this idea of generic existence comes the idea of generic transgression and generic condemnation. Human nature apostatizes, and the consequences appear in the human individual. In the order of nature, it is said, mankind exists before the generations of mankind; the nature is prior to the individuals produced out of it. Above, we have said realism is pantheistic in its tendency. It makes the immortality of individual man extremely improbable, if not impossible; it has an unfavorable bearing, upon trinitarianism, and we here add, it loads the Scripture anthropology with the burden of a false philosophy; it fails to accomplish the end for which it is produced. The

theologian who introduces realism into his system, assuming that all the sufferings of man's earthly life are *punishments for sin*, reasons thus: All suffer, even infants, before they have done good or evil; but under a perfect and just government, none are punished but the guilty. Therefore, all are guilty. When? how? where? Generically in the first transgression. Adam was the race; the race sinned; the race are punished.

We reply, if the sin were generic, the punishment, to be in justice, must be generic also. If the *genus homo* had for the first transgression been punished with the death due to sin, the individual man had not been. Thus the whole argument falls to the ground, and realism becomes a burden, and not a benefit, to theology. Again, the idea that Adam was only a generic man is, at least, a mere theory, not supported by a single argument that commends itself to common sense. No such thought is found in the Scripture record; contrariwise, the sons of Adam are begotten in the likeness of their parents, and conversely, the parent is like unto the son. Adam's body was formed of the dust of the earth; it was like the bodies of his children. He became a living soul, such essentially as is the soul of each of his posterity. The Adam of Genesis was an individual man, the first of his race. Human nature, the *genus homo*, had its beginning in him, nor was there any such entity as a generic man existent antecedent to his creation from the dust of the earth and the breath of God. Again, the testimony of consciousness is conclusive of the whole matter. If realism be true, then the souls of all men are one identical entity. But every man knows that he is not another, as well as he knows that he is himself. A consciousness of personal identity is a consciousness of a difference between self and not self, and that not self is every thing but self.

ORIGIN OF SOULS.

There are three theories respecting the origin of souls, called respectively, Pre-existence, Creationism, and Traducianism. Pre-existence affirms that all souls were created at the same time, before the creation of the material universe, which affirmation is usually associated with metempsychosis, or the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, with also the belief that all human souls dwelling upon the earth sinned in some previous state, and that the sufferings of this present life are consequences of those pre-existent sins. This world is either a prison for the punishment of sin, or a hospital for its cure, or perhaps partly both. Generally the abettors of this theory entertain the belief that all souls, some through the remedial agencies of the present life, others through those of some future existence, will ultimately be restored to original righteousness, to permanent, perpetual holiness and happiness. It is manifest that this is pure individualism—each soul stands or falls for itself. There is little or no margin for the idea of a race sin, or a race salvation. Inherited depravity and redemption by a substituted propitiation can not well harmonize with these views. The doctrine has had but a very limited influence in the Church; it has been said that it lived and died with Origen.

Creationism affirms that souls are created when bodies for them are formed; that by the immediate act of God a soul is created from nothing in every instance that a new individual of the human family is born. Traducianism is an affirmation that souls are propagated; that as each newborn child derives its body from its parents so also, though perhaps not at all in like manner, it derives its soul from them; that as fecundity is a power of reproduction as to the material nature so also is man endowed with a somewhat which is a power of reproducing the spiritual part of man's nature. By far the larger portion of Christian thinkers have either entertained no opinion as to the origin of souls, not finding to their minds any thing decisive in revelation, and not seeking to be wise above what is written, or have been

divided between creationists and traducianists. It is conceded on the one hand, that if one can hold the doctrine of immediate creation, without affirming that God creates sinful souls, without denying inherited depravity, and without supposing that God in any way or degree sanctions every act of procreation with which his creative power is connected, his theory, though an error, will probably do him no harm. And on the other hand it is conceded that if one can hold to the doctrine of traduction without affirming the numerical unity of the substance of all human souls, without affirming also the abscission and division of the essence of the human soul (that is, by asserting that the human person is only a part of the common humanity—an individualized portion of humanity), and without affirming the guilt and sinfulness of the humanity of Jesus Christ, then probably, though traduction be an error, it will as to him be harmless.

The Scripture argument for creationism is founded on those passages which represent the body as from the earth and the soul as from God, "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit to God who gave it;" or passages which speak of our earthly parents as the fathers of our flesh, and of God as the Father of our spirits; "We have had fathers of our flesh which corrected us, and we gave them reverence; shall we shall we not much rather be subject unto the Father of spirits and live; and on similar passages, none of which will be claim:d as decisive, since a rational exegesis may be given of each and all of them that will harmonize with the opposite theory. The Scripture argument for traducianism is founded on those passages which speak of parents as begetting children in their own likeness, evidently referring to likeness in intellectual and moral character, as well as to likeness in physical nature; and on those passages (especially in the fifth chapter of Romans), in which the moral and religious character as well as the relations of mankind to the moral government of God are referred to the Adamic transgression. In conclusion of this topic, let it suffice to say that, to our thought, traducianism, when disconnected from the vagaries of realism, and from the abhorrent doctrine of inherited obligation to punishment, seems most consistent with the teachings of Scripture, and with the facts of human experience.

THE ORIGINAL STATE OF MAN.

"So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him, male and female created he them. And God saw \very thing that he had made, and behold it was very good. Lo, this only have I found, that God hath made man upright, but they have sought out many inventions. Ye have put off the old man with his deeds, and have put on th~ new man which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him. Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness."

All the works of God are, on the authority of inspiration, pronounced to be in the judgment of God very good. The term good, especially in its application to the material world, and also to vegetables and to brute animals, signifies automatic excellence. The animal or thing of which it is predicated is pronounced to be adapted to that for which it is made. A good watch is one that keeps time; a good horse is one that serves the purpose, performs the labor, for which his owner bought him and for which he keeps him. If the term, in its application to man, be restricted to this sense—yet in that case, as man, is an intelligent, moral, and religious being, was made to know, to feel, and to do, in accordance with law and right; if he was created good, if in his original state he served the intellectual, moral, and religious purposes for which he was made—then was he created in righteousness and true holiness. Automatic excellence in such a being as man, implies moral excellence, and in a sense, moral desert. But the distinguishing

characteristic of man's original state is, that he was created in the image or likeness of God. The question, In what does the image of God consist? has elicited much discussion. Some have found that image in man's physical constitution, some in his rational, intellectual nature, some in his moral and religious nature, some in his dominion, and some in a supernatural *ab extra* gift or endowment.

These theories need not here be examined, for to our thought, it is obvious that the term "image of God," as used in the Scriptures, is an indefinite description of likeness, the likeness consisting not so much in anyone feature of the image as in a general similarity. God is a spirit; man is in this respect like him. Man is the conscious subject of thoughts, emotions, and volitions; he is by creation a spiritual being. God is perfect; man according to his measure, under the limitations inseparable from the finite, was in the creation like his Maker, a perfect being—perfect in completeness, and adjustment. If we were to select any one particular in which the image of God consisted, it would be this of perfection in the constitution of his being. It is certain, that in some sense, the image was lost by sin, and may be recovered by grace. To suppose intellect, sensibility, or will absolutely lost is to suppose that the loser ceases to be a man. To suppose the thing but an endowment is to suppose something lost in which the loser was not created. But man was *created* in the image of God, not *endowed with* it. The loss, then, at least in one view of it, was derangement rather than annihilation or subtraction. The thought here is, that the image of God, in which man was created, included a state or condition of perfection, completeness, maturity, as to all that constituted him a man, and as to all that pertained to his then existing relations.

We next inquire, how much does this imply?

First, as to his physical constitution. The idea of a perfect man certainly involves the idea of a man in perfect physical health. There must be a total absence of disease; the systems of digestion, respiration, circulation, and all the organs of the whole system must each and all of them perform their functions rightly, vigorously, so that the whole body be fully adequate for all the duties requisite to the accomplishment of highest destiny. It is not necessary to indulge a poetic fancy, and imagine a superhuman body of gigantic proportions and of angelic beauty. It is sufficient to conceive that man, such as we now find him, enjoyed perfect health, and possessed sufficient vigor and strength for all his duties, such as probably many enjoy at some portions of their lives even now. It is not necessary to conceive that hunger and weariness were impossible, nor that wounds would not produce pain, nor that poison would not produce disease, but that for all such exigencies some preventive or antidote was ever at hand. It is not necessary to conceive that the body was naturally immortal; on the contrary, it may be readily admitted that dissolution is an organic law of animal life, and that therefore man being an animal was subject to that law. Being of the dust of the ground, there was a natural, perhaps a necessary, tendency in his body to return to the dust as it was. But perfection in a being destined to immortality forbids the fact of death as man now experiences it. But for sin, death, as a fact in history, would not have entered into the world of human experience. Sin entered the world, and death by sin. How the historical fact of death would have been prevented we are not told, but may infer that the power and providence which preserves man always would have secured perfect health till probation terminated. Providence would have preserved man till the purposes of his earthly life were accomplished, and then, like Enoch and Elijah, he would have been translated—changed in the twinkling of an eye, as it will be with the quick at the last day; he would have put on immortality, and mortality had been swallowed up of life. It is not a senseless fancy to suppose that the tree of life in the midst of the

garden, at least, symbolizes the means which Providence would have employed to secure for our naturally mortal bodies health, life, and immortality.

Second. How are we to conceive of the first man considered as to his intellect? A perfect mental constitution certainly requires that the powers of perception, memory, judgment, reason—all the faculties presentative, intuitive, representative, elaborative—be each and all of them competent to perform their functions promptly, correctly, vigorously. It is not necessary to conceive that Adam perceived every thing, with all its qualities, that lay at any time in his field of view; nor that he remembered every thing that he ever learned; nor that in his judgments he never made mistakes; nor that his reasonings were never inconclusive; nor that his premises were never unduly assumed. He was a being of limited capacities, and subject to all the exigencies necessarily involved in limitations; but if he were perfect as God is perfect, if he were created in the likeness of the divine completeness, the make-up of his constitution, his endowments and acquirements must have been commensurate with his responsibilities—must have been adequate for all the ends or purposes of truth, duty, and interest.

Third. How are we to think of the first man, while he retained his normal condition, as to his moral and religious nature? A perfect conscience accurately apprehends all obligations, impels to the right, and restrains from the wrong with an intensity corresponding with the interests involved, rewards virtue with an approval corresponding with its inherent excellence, and punishes vice with a remorse in accordance with its deservings. A pure and perfect heart regards all existences, from inert matter to the infinite God, according to their real and relative worth, loves God supremely, the equal of self as self, and all persons and things as they deserve. A perfect will is a power to volitionate in exact accordance with what the greatest good requires. That man was created with such a nature, with such endowments, faculties, capacities, is what we understand to be affirmed when it is said that God made man upright, in his own image and likeness. Moreover our view requires us to conceive that he was endowed, as by inspiration, with language to the full extent required for the intercourse of his then existing situation. Again, his relations to the material world were those of a perfect adjustment. The world without, and the world within answered each to the other in perfect harmony.

ORIGINAL RIGHTEOUSNESS.

This term is used by theological writers in different senses. Some use it to signify a "determination of the mind and will to virtue," which conceive belonged to the normal condition. To our thought, a "determination to virtue" is decisive; it is the direct contradictory of the possibility of its opposite. If man were created with a positive determination to virtue inhering in his nature, I see not how his fall were possible. He is automatically a holy being, eternally shut up to the necessity of doing right. Others use the term original righteousness to signify the influences and agencies of the Holy Spirit which man enjoyed in his primeval state. That man enjoyed communion with his Maker; that the divine spirit revealed to man knowledge of God, and was with man a power of moral suasion to holy affections and holy volitions, can not be doubted. But to call this the righteousness of the man is plainly a misnomer. Thee term, to be of any valuable service, to represent any actually existing trait in man's original character, or any characteristic of his primal nature, should be used to express the perfection, the completeness of the whole nature and character. Man was originally righteous, constitutionally right, considered as to the whole and the parts of his being. He was a perfect man by creation. More of this "original righteousness" when we come to consider the nature and effects of sin. The original man was a perfect man, and we here add, he was a mature man, of full

stature physically, and of well-developed and well balanced mind, not an infant to increase in stature by growth, and to acquire the beginnings of wisdom by education.

THEORY OF PRIMAL BARBARISM.

Without doubt, many Christian thinkers and writers indulge in fancy sketches, which are too poetic for the facts of the case, when they attempt to conceive and describe Eden and its occupants before sin entered the world. They do so, evidently, when they conceive a condition not consistent with a state of trial and probation. Again, to conceive accurately and minutely the case as it was must be difficult if not impossible, since the materials for the construction are so few, and possibly, as some strenuously insist, themselves symbolical. Genesis is a very brief history at best, and if it be a symbol, the case is the more difficult. But discounting difficulties, we insist that Genesis is utterly unmeaning, and all Bible references to it are misleading if the conception above given is not substantially correct. Adam was an example of perfect manhood, and Eve of perfect womanhood; their character and their relations to each other and to their surroundings were the highest consistent with a condition of probation for a higher destiny. They plant themselves manifestly upon another extreme position, who affirm that the original state of mankind was one of barbarism; such an affirmation is opposed not only to the testimony of the Scriptures and to the faith the Church, but also to all the records of history. We have no account of any people, barbarous at first, who arose to civilization of themselves. In cases known to history where barbarians have become civilized, their advancement has been prompted and conducted by those more civilized than themselves. "Egypt derived its civilization from the East, Greece from Phenicia and Egypt, Italy from Phenicia and Greece; the rest of Europe from Italy." The unanimous testimony of history warrants the inference, that if at any time in the world's history all men had been barbarians, left to themselves they would continue barbarians and soon become extinct.

Again, all nations have traditions of a past golden age. The oldest records, written and monumental, give evidence of high civilization in very ancient times. The pyramids of Egypt, dating back of historic times, are an example; surely they were not built by barbarians. But it is alleged, that during the historic periods there has been progress in the line of improvement, and that it is fair to infer by analogy that the same was true in more ancient times, therefore the beginning was in barbarism. The premise is an undue assumption, and the argument a *non sequitur*. It is true, that improvements in the arts and sciences have been made all along through the ages of history, and are now being made apparently with greater rapidity than ever; but in philosophy, in morals, and in religion, the same thing can not be maintained, and it is in respect to these that a high character is claimed for the ancients and a superiority for the most ancient.

But, again, even on the supposition that the progress of modern ages is toward a millennium of a higher civilization than the world has ever seen, it does not, therefore, follow that barbarism was at the beginning. A class of scientists point to the use of flint for edged tools as proof that the world has passed through successively what they are pleased to call the stone, then the bronze, and then the iron ages; that is, from barbarism to civilization,—another illogical inference: just the same as if it were inferred from the fact that some tribes of men made voyages at sea in canoes, therefore, all men living on earth in the times of barbarians were as ignorant of navigation as they. The more probable conclusion, as agreeing with known facts, would be, that while some were cunning workmen in brass, iron, and all kinds of metal, other men, living at the same but in different parts of the world, knew of nothing better than a flint for an edged tool. The facts of history would

indicate that the stone, the bronze, and the iron ages have all subsisted at the same time. The only objection to the theory of man's original state that can justly claim any force as an argument, is the difficulty found in attempting to conceive how a civilized people could so deteriorate as to return to barbarism; but this is precisely the difficulty of conceiving how a good man could ever become a bad man; it is the difficulty of attempting to find a reason for the most unreasonable thing in the universe, a reason for sin.

The fact, which is of frequent occurrence, that colonies of enlightened people when removed from the refining influences of cultured society to frontier settlements, if they remain in isolation for any appreciable length of time, do deteriorate, is sufficient to overbalance all the difficulties we find in conceiving how the thing occurs. With this fact in view, it is not incredible that the descendants of Adam and of Noah, spreading themselves abroad in the earth, removing far from the centers of civilization with at most but very limited inter-communication, should give themselves to hunting and to fishing rather than to pastoral and agricultural pursuits, and so deteriorate that in a few generations their posterity should become barbarians: not that this was the case with all; it was not so, for at all ages of known history the human family have been divided, as it now is, into peoples at different stages of cultivation. Among the most ancient known, there have been as great men as have ever lived. What poet exceeds Homer? What generals, even among the most modern, are the superiors of Cæsar or Alexander? What cities equal the splendors of Babylon, of Nineveh? What philosopher greater than Socrates and Plato, and what theologian more orthodox than Abel? and what rationalist more scientific, philosophic, and devout, and more consistent with his faith, than Cain?

The underlying principles of philosophy, of ethics and of religion, and these form the basis of all true greatness, were revealed at first. In respect to these there is nothing new under the sun. The trains of thought which made Socrates a theist and Pyrrho a rationalist were familiar to the mind of Cain, and as a consequence he rejected all ideas of atonement, and brought to the great Father of us all an eucharistic offering. Through the ages from the first, true and false systems religion have together and alternately occupied minds of men. As the truth in respect to God and his government has prevailed civilization has advanced, and the predominance of false doctrines through generations has resulted in barbarism.

CHAPTER II.

THE FALL OF MAN.

THE first ten chapters of Genesis are made the subject of severe criticism at every point, and not among the least of the points considered objectionable is the record concerning the fall. The following are some of the questions proposed by objectors as so many interrogative arguments against the credibility not only of this part of the record, but also of the whole account with which it stands connected. What is the probability that God ever regarded a thing innocent in itself, the eating of fruit, as a great sin? How could the eating of fruit impart knowledge? How could a serpent talk? If he did, why is no surprise indicated at so strange an event? What is the probability that sensible persons would believe a serpent when he contradicted God? Above all, how can it be credible that persons of high mental endowments, with the fear and love of God in their hearts, could, at the suggestion of an animal inferior to themselves, in so slight a matter as the choice of food, disobey a command which they positively knew was a command of Almighty God? These and similar questions are plainly exponential of the animus of the objector. He is a rationalist predetermined not to receive as

valid any testimony that affirms what is contrary to common observation and experience. In common experience serpents, asses, brute animals and superhuman beings, if there are any, are never known to communicate thought in human language. Therefore, no serpent ever spoke to Eve, no ass to Balaam, and no angel or god, to any man, and the whole record of the Fall of Man, with all connected therewith that is miraculous or mysterious, is at best but a silly myth.

In reply we remark: First, if the credibility of this record depended solely upon internal evidence, if the record were to be received or rejected as in the light of thought it seemed probable or improbable, then, and in that case, to say the least, doubt would not be censurable, and most likely the majority of mankind would reject it. We remark, secondly, if the record, as commonly interpreted be carefully and candidly considered, it is not, even on mere rational grounds, such an improbability as obligates rejection. The force of this remark will be more apparent when we come to consider, as we shall do presently, what is the import of this record and what doctrines it affirms.

It will be found that its teachings are in perfect harmony with the character and condition of man as a free moral probationer, and with the principles of the divine government, as evinced by the facts of human history. Thirdly, the Bible is authenticated by adequate external evidences, and is received on these grounds as the Word of God. If, therefore, it affirms that a serpent on a given occasion did converse with our first mother, we are to accept it as a well verified fact; and though we do not see how a serpent could talk, and never ourselves heard one talk, these are not sufficient reasons for the rejection of the record.

Again, some who accept the Bible as the Word of God, who make no exceptions to the canon, who receive the first chapters of Genesis as they do the entire Bible, as given by inspiration of God, doubt whether the account of the fall be historical, and are disposed to inquire whether the garden, the trees, the serpent, and the eating of the fruit may not be symbols, and the whole account mythological as to form and style, though truthful and vastly important as to its substance and doctrine. Why so? we ask: *cui bono*? Will reading the record as a myth, regarding its terms as symbols, make more evident what the doctrines taught are? will it teach those doctrines with greater perspicuity, strength, and beauty? Are there any difficulties in it, considered as a history, that make such a rendering necessary? If there are difficulties, does the symbolic interpretation avoid them? We would not insist so strongly upon a literal exegesis as to say it is impossible that the account is figurative, but, on the other hand, we do insist that there is no necessity that we should so consider it, and no advantage in doing so if we did. The book of Genesis is historical in all its characteristics; it does not claim to be, nor does it appear to be, any thing else than a literal record of actually occurring events. The account given of the Garden of Eden is a part of that continuous history, and there is no more authority for regarding Adam as a symbolical man, and Eden as a symbolical garden, than there is for regarding Abraham and Canaan symbolically. The case most carefully stated is this: If Moses made the record under the guidance of the Spirit of truth, the reader will not mistake the intent of the writer by regarding what he reads as a literal record of facts; we, therefore, accept it as such; Adam was a real individual man, Eve a woman; Eden a garden, the trees thereof literal trees; the serpent a serpent who spoke with an audible voice words of temptation which the woman and the man heard and understood; the fruit of the tree of life was an effectual preventive of disease and death, those who ate thereof would never die; the fruit of the tree of knowledge in some way made the partaker thereof wise in the knowledge of good and evil. God appeared in visible form, spake to our first parents with an audible

voice, gave them permission to partake of the fruit of all the trees of the garden save one, and by positive commandment prohibited them, under penalty of death, from partaking of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. The serpent persuaded Eve that there was no danger of death in transgression, but, on the contrary, assurance of great increase in wisdom. She partook of the forbidden fruit; gave to her husband, and he ate also. We are to regard the account as literal history, not only because it is given in that form, but also because it is referred to by the writers of both the Old and New Testament, in every case where any reference is made, as though it were historical, never as though it were an allegory or a myth. Again, the doctrines taught underlie the whole system of religion set forth in the Bible. The Bible theories of sin and of salvation are founded upon the facts set forth in Genesis; these facts furnish the ground of all God's subsequent revelations and dispensations.

NATURE AND ORIGIN OF SIN.

The primary idea designated by the term sin in the Scriptures is want of conformity to law, a transgression, a transgression of law, a doing that which is forbidden or a neglecting to do that which is required. The term used in the Greek Testament for this specific thought is *anomia*, a, privative, and *nomos*, law, without law, or contrary to law. Some writers denominate the doing of that which is forbidden a sin of commission, and the neglecting to do that which is required a sin of omission. In this view, sin pertains exclusively to conduct, not, however, to mere muscular activities; the thoughts, emotions, desires, affections, and volitions of the mind may be what they ought not to be, may not be conformed to law, may be transgressions of law, may be sin in the primary sense of the term. In a secondary sense the term applies to character; not to what one does, but to what he thinks, desires, wills, but to what he is. A man may be what he ought not to be, what the law forbids he should be, or he may not be what the law requires him to be. This want of conformity to law in character is in the Greek Testament usually termed *hamartia*, though in 1 John iii, 4, it is used as a synonym with *anomia*. "Sin is a transgression of the law," *hamartia* is *anomia*. In Rom. vii, 20, "Now, if I do that I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me," it is evident that the term sin, *hamartia*, is used to signify some defect, disorder, disease, derangement, depravity, whatever it may be called, in the state and condition of the mind; it pertains to character, to what the man is. In a word, it is sufficiently accurate, though not perfectly so, to say that in New Testament use the term signifies, generically, *want of conformity to law*, and that under this generic sense there are two species, one having respect to conduct, and the other to character. The former is sometimes called in common discourse actual transgression, and the latter, to distinguish it from the former, is called original sin, natural depravity, inherited or inherent unrighteousness. Man regarded with reference to the first is said to be a sinner, with reference to the second sinful.

The term sin, as above defined, may be taken abstractly. or concretely; if the former, it refers solely to the thing done as actually performed, and to the character as actually existing. If the latter, it takes into account, in addition to the deed done and the character sustained, the personal relations of the agent to these. Abstractly, a man may be both sinful and a sinner, and yet not be responsibly such. If depravity be outside of his control, and if under its influence his conduct be necessitated, he is sinful and a sinner in the sense that his character and conduct are not conformed to law; but he is not a guilty sinner, is not under obligation to punishment for his sins. It might be said that he is not a sinner in such a case, because in such a case he is not under law, and therefore can not be a sinner in any proper sense of the word. This would be stating the facts under another formula, would be true and Scriptural as to doctrine, but not in exact

conformity with the Scriptural use of terms. The Scriptures do use the terms righteousness and unrighteousness, holiness and sin in the abstract sense of conformity and non-conformity to law. Before we can fully fix the sense of the term sin, and define the nature of that which is intended, it is necessary to inquire, What is law? Perhaps it is sufficient for our present purpose to say God's will is man's law. God, as Creator and Preserver, has the natural right of proprietorship. He has in man, as in all things he has made, the absolute right of unlimited possession; and man is therefore naturally under the obligation of universal obedience. It is sometimes asked whether this is right because God wills it, or does he will it because it is right? It is impossible for finite thought to get anterior or exterior to God. There can be nothing to the infinite antecedent in time or external in space, that limits him, or by constraint determines what his will shall be. It is therefore in accordance with truth, and sufficient for all purposes of science to say that this is right because God commands it, and its opposite is wrong because God has forbidden it.

The will of God is the ground of moral obligation, and yet it is impossible to think that right and wrong depend upon the will of God, in such a sense as that we could conceive a reversal of the case possible. We can not think that a volition of the divine mind could make ill-will among social beings right, and good-will wrong. There is a sense in which moral principles are as eternal and immutable as God, and the will of God is immutably in harmony with them. How does God make known his will? How does this law become a law to man? By natural conscience, by the works of God in nature, by the ways of God in providence, and by the words of God in revelation. Man is the conscious subject of various impulses—impulses that constitute to him grounds of action, motives or movers toward volition. Some of these are in his own estimation higher than others. He sees that a greater good will be secured by action in accordance with the higher. Under these circumstances, from the necessities of his nature, he must feel an obligation to choose the higher. He feels what is expressed in English by the words ought and ought not. This is more than a verdict of propriety or fitness. It is the recognition of a superior, who has a right, authoritatively, to command obedience. It is an acknowledgment of law and of obligation. By experience and observation man finds that obedience to the higher impulse is useful; to the lower injurious, and he hence infers that He who established this order of things will that the good should be chosen and the evil rejected. This also is recognizing law, recognizing an established order of sequence between actions and their results, and is also a recognition of obligation to obedience.

In the book of revelation God has distinctly in words said, thou shalt, and thou shalt not. Thou shalt love God supremely and thy neighbor as thyself. These voices of God in natural conscience, nature, providence and revelation harmonize with each other; separately and collectively; they make known what is right and what is wrong. God's will, then, made known is man's law; conformity therewith in conduct and character is righteousness, a want of conformity is sin. But it is manifest that under the limitations of human knowledge man may think he knows God's will when, in fact, he is mistaken; so that that may obligate his conscience which is not conformed to law. Here the case will be better understood by observing the distinction between a right action and a righteous agent, between a wrong action and a guilty agent.

The right or wrong of an action depends upon its relations to the will of God. The guilt or innocence of an agent depends upon his intentions. If a man perform a right act, one that corresponds with his relations, is in accordance with the laws of his being, in any case the natural results of such an act will accrue to him; but the judicial results thereof will depend upon the motives with which he did it. If, because of ignorance of the law or in

indifference to it, he performed the act without reference to moral obligation, he has no reward. The act is not to him an act of righteousness, he has not a righteous man's reward. It is not certain that he is even innocent, for if he might have known his duty, he was obligated by it, and is censurable for his neglect of moral obligation; if, in his misapprehensions of relations and law, he supposed the act wrong in itself, and did it with the intent to do a wrong thing, he is guilty, and may be justly punished for the sin of an evil intent.

Again, if a man do a wrong thing.—that is, an act in violation of relations and laws,—the natural results inevitably follow, but the judicial results will depend upon the motives with which he did it. If he did not and could not know his duty in the case, or if knowing the right he was necessitated to do the act by any constraint, either physical or mental, he is innocent. Yea more, if in unavoidable misapprehensions of duty he supposed the act a right one, and did it from a sense of duty, he is virtuous and may be justly rewarded for his righteous intent. The same principles and distinctions apply to character as to conduct. The distinctions here are more clearly marked by the use of the terms automatic excellence and moral desert. When a man is what he is by creation, inheritance, by any necessity, by any thing beyond his control, he is automatically excellent, or the reverse; when he is what he is by voluntary self-culture, then moral desert attaches to his character. If he has disciplined himself in holy thoughts, affections, and purposes, so that by reason of such discipline holiness has become the habit of his mind, become a trait of his character, and if he has done so under a recognition of moral obligation, he is entitled to a reward for his inhering excellencies. Contrariwise, if a man is a bad man, because of voluntary neglect of the means of culture and voluntary disregard of his duty in this respect, he is to be blamed, and may be justly punished because of his inherent badness.

Natural results follow goodness and badness, irrespective of their source and moral deservings. God and all right-minded beings will esteem and treat all persons and things according to their worth. As a man will place a higher estimate upon a good watch than upon a worthless one, so will all right-minded persons esteem and treat a good man according to his excellence, whatever be the source of his inherent worth. As a man kills a snake because he is a snake, not because he is to blame for being a snake, so will he refuse to take a bad man into his confidence, whether the man be to blame for his badness or not. The natural results of goodness and badness are not of the nature of rewards and punishments. Automatic excellence, with its results, is a different thing from moral desert and its results.

What are the elements of a moral action? Power, intelligence, free-will, and an apprehension of moral obligation. Power, executive efficiency, causation, ability to bring something to pass. Intelligence, ability to apprehend an end, and the means adapted to its accomplishment. Free-will, alternative power, first cause, power to volitionate in the absence of constraint, both in the choice and in the executive nisus. Apprehension of obligation, a sense of duty, a feeling of ought and ought not. These principles of law and of obligation, as stated above, are to our thought, obviously correct, and they make obvious what is the nature of sin, taking the term in what we have called its primary sense; sin properly so called. It is as St. John has defined it a transgression of the law. This postulates a righteous commandment, issued by righteous authority, adequately made known to the subject. The subject being fully endowed with the power of obedience, which power is itself alternative, equally efficient for obedience or disobedience, and the subject being also endowed with a clear apprehension of personal responsibility and obligation. To sin, then, is to intelligently, freely, and morally volitionate contrary to the requirements of a known

righteous and acknowledged commandment. If this be an explication of the nature of sin properly so called, then is it also an explication of the *origin*. Sin originated in the abuse of free-will; it was the act of an unconstrained first cause, a creation *de nihilo* of a free moral agent.

So far as the human race is concerned, sin had its beginning in the minds of Adam and Eve, in that volition which caused the outward act of partaking the forbidden fruit. Should it be here remarked that sin had its beginning among the angels who by it fell from their first state, and that our first parents sinned because they were tempted by Satan in the form of a serpent, we reply, the remark is not pertinent, first, because if admitted it only removes the discussion backward from Adam to the first sinner, whoever he might be, whenever and wherever he might have sinned, and the principles determining the case would be the same as if we consider Adam the first sinner. Again, the temptation was not causative; it was not a necessitating persuasion, it was only one of the constituents of environment, one of the ingredients in the conditions of the case—not in itself, nor in its connections determinative. The case is the same as if the agency of Satan were left out of the account.

CHAPTER III.

ORIGINAL SIN.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE FIRST SIN.

"IN the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die. Cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life. Thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee. In the sweat of thy face, shalt thou eat bread till thou return unto the ground; for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return. The soul that sinneth it shall die. The wages of sin is death."

The first fact evolved, in the execution of the penalty threatened against sin, has respect to man's physical nature and relations. "Therefore, the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden to till the ground from whence he was taken. So he drove out the man, and he placed at the east of the garden of Eden cherubim and a flaming sword, which turned every way to keep the way of the tree of life." Here are two facts plainly stated: First, access to the tree of life was barred; in other words, the means divinely appointed for the preservation of physical health and life were taken away, and as a consequence man became subject, say the least, to all the diseases, to the decay and dissolution which naturally belong to a material organization. He that was of the dust, because of his sin, became doomed to return to the ground from whence he was taken. Because of sin, the actuality of disease and death, as facts in history, entered into the world." By sin came death."

The second fact stated in the quotation is, that man's relations to the material world were changed. He was driven from the garden, where an agreeable care and exercise in dressing and keeping it were sufficient for the production of an adequate supply of fruit, adapted to meet all his physical requirements, to go forth into an open field, there to till a thorn and thistle covered ground, where a bare sustenance would require a sweat-producing toil. The ground was cursed for man's sake. Either by the multiplication of man's wants, or by the direct curse of God, rendering the soil less fertile, or both, the spontaneous productions of the the earth, before an abundant supply, are now inadequate, and man is compelled to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow. Not protected as aforetime by providential preservation, he is now exposed to all the adversities that come from

inclement climates, storms, tempests, hurricanes, inundations, conflagrations, earthquakes, pestilences, diseases, epidemics, and whatever may be included in the groaning and travailing together in pain of the whole material world.

The natural order of thought calls attention, secondly, to the effects of sin upon man's intellectual nature. Man is a unit, so that if one member suffer the whole body suffers with it. The mind during our earthly existence is so connected with the body, and so dependent, that physical infirmities and diseases naturally produce corresponding mental weakness and derangement. But intellectual defect comes not wholly from bodily disease. The death threatened as the penalty for sin is *par eminence* a death of the soul. "The soul that sinneth it shall die." How much this may mean in its consummation in the world to come, what may be the import of the term eternal death, we do not here inquire; but, direct attention to the mental dying realized here and now. The second fact evolved in the execution of the penalty threatened against sin, blindness of mind, weakness in the powers of thought. We affirm that by reason of the first sin Adam became intellectually enfeebled, and that all his posterity have inherited his mental infirmities, are born into the world as to their intellect in an abnormal condition. Having eyes they see not, having ears they hear not, and having hands they handle not; that is, having organs of sense and powers of perception they do not acquire the knowledge perception was normally designed and adapted to furnish. No man perceives all the qualities of any object of thought, and most men perceive but very few of those qualities; the knowledge most men have of things is a very limited and superficial knowledge; a few of the characteristics of things, and those lying upon the surface, make the complement of the circle of common knowledge, and the wisest of men are not very appreciably in advance of the masses. The things that men know are so few, and those that they know certainly so much fewer, the desire for, and the importance of, knowledge is so great, that it would seem extremely strange that any sensible person would ever think that man in his earthly life was in his natural normal state; certainly he must have irreverent views of the divine fatherhood, who can think that this is the way God treats his loving and obedient children.

But not only are the perceptive faculties impaired, but the *judgment* is also enfeebled, perverted; men not only fail to apprehend the *qualities* of things as they are, but they fail also to apprehend rightly the *relations* different objects of thought bear to each other. They see differences where there are none, and no difference where there is great diversity. Classifications are formed on similitudes that do not exist, and are, therefore, confusing, and, often confounding. Human science requires perpetual reconstruction, and is seldom satisfactory; philosophy is next to impossible with most men, and the philosophies are nearly as numerous as the persons who philosophize. As with the presentative faculties, which give a knowledge of the qualities and relations of the external world, so with the intuitive faculty, the reason which reveals the inner and the supersensuous. Many of the philosophers discard ontological science altogether, and the mass of mankind, though by the necessities of their nature they have some apprehensions of being, of substance duration, space, and personal identity, are utterly incompetent to articulately formulate one of their thoughts on these subjects. They believe in matter as to substance and quality; in mind as to essence and phenomena, in the finite and infinite, in the necessary and contingent; but their faith comes inevitably from the constitution of their minds, and is to themselves but a vague and indefinite seem-so.

The representative faculties, memory and imagination, are in a condition as abnormal and unnatural as are the presentative and intuitive. No man remembers all he learns, not even all that he values and desires to retain, and most men can say truthfully at any period of life, "I have forgotten more than I now know." And the imagination, how strangely it is wont to wander in

dream-land; what fantasies and chimeras does it construct! what ghosts and hobgoblins does it create! how filthy, how vile, how debasing, and how degrading are many of its conceptions! how diverse from the ideals of rational and truthful creations! how at variance with dictates of pure taste and holy affection! The taste, that part of our nature which apprehends and enjoys the beautiful and the sublime, is not such as a perfect nature requires. A brute will travel over and through a garden of flowers as utterly indifferent to his surroundings as if he were in an uncultivated, open field; he has no power to apprehend the beautiful, he is devoid of taste. No man is thus utterly destitute of an æsthetic nature. All have some appreciation of that which is beautiful; very young children frequently give evidence of special delight, when a thing of beauty is before them. In a word, taste pertains to human nature. Is it in a normal condition? The answer to this question is too obvious to require the use of words. Look at the habitations in which the mass of mankind dwell, with their internal arrangements and furniture, with their external surroundings. Look at their clothing, listen to their conversation and note their habitual social deportment. Are these things in good taste? Do they indicate a natural and normal apprehension of the beautiful? If these observations do not satisfy, turn your regards to the devotees of fashion, to persons who give their thoughts to dress, to equipage, to etiquette. If men employed in the ordinary avocations of life, as seen in the thoroughfares of business, and in primary political assemblies, as they present themselves on every-day occasions, may not be expected to evince their appreciation of the beautiful, surely those who devote their time, their talents, and their money, who employ their thoughts and give up their whole interest to making themselves agreeable and to enjoying that which pleases,—such persons, if taste be in its normal condition, must find the object of their pursuit, must apprehend and enjoy the beautiful themselves, and must in their equipments and in deportment evince to others the correctness and delicacy of their tastes. For some reason the natural relation between the outer and the inner world has been abrupted; the correlation between the internal power and the external object of æsthetic apprehension has been disturbed. Disproportions, maladjustments, absolute ugliness, stare at us from well-nigh all points of observation. Correctness and delicacy in taste and skill in the fine arts are not spontaneous effusions of a normal nature, but are achievements of much study, results of long-continued and laborious self-culture. The beautiful and the sublime abound in the works of the Creator, but only the few, and those generally highly educated persons, have minds to appreciate and enjoy them.

The elaborative faculty, the power by which thought passes from the concrete to the abstract, and, through abstraction and comparison, forms classes, species, and genera; the power also by which through analysis thought passes from generals to particulars, from premises to conclusions, is a natural endowment; all men have it in some degree. But is this power in all men such as evidences that man's present state and condition in this respect is normal and natural? Is the reasoning faculty, as we find it among men generally, such as an all-wise and infinitely powerful creator would pronounce very good? very well adapted and fully adequate to the work it was designed to perform? Surely not. Men frequently employ words not distinctly defined in their own minds, pass judgments that are not correct, and use arguments that are not conclusive. Ambiguous terms, untrue propositions, and inconclusive arguments constitute to most men an effectual bar to reliable inferences. Skill in logic is a rare attainment, seldom, if ever, the product of untutored endowment, but generally the result of persevering practice in argumentation, by those who have made large acquisitions in the knowledge of men and things.

We have thus directed attention to man's intellectual powers, to perception and intuition, to judgment, memory, imagination, taste, abstraction, and reasoning; we have affirmed that the state or condition of

these faculties, as they exist in men generally, is not a condition of health and perfect adjustment; that they are evidently in an abnormal condition, and evince a universal decline or fall from the condition of original completeness and perfection in which man was created." The whole head is sick."

We now pass to inquire, "Is the whole heart faint?" What are the effects of the first sin upon man's moral and religious nature? Did the death, threatened as the penalty of sin, include any depravation of the sensibility and the will? Is the conscience seared? Are the affections alienated? Is the will enslaved? The functions of conscience are chiefly three--discriminating, impulsive, and retributive. When any course of conduct is proposed, we may inquire concerning it, Is it wise or unwise, profitable or unprofitable, polite or discourteous, honorable or discreditable? but among these and other inquiries, we may also ask, Is it right or wrong? This last inquiry involves an apprehension of the law of righteousness, the eternal and immutable principle of integrity, of honor, and of right, or, in other words, an apprehension of the existence of a moral quality in human actions. It also involves a comparison of the course of conduct proposed with that apprehended law of right, and an affirmation of the judgment that it does or does not correspond therewith.

This power of the mind thus to cognize moral obligation in given cases is called the discriminatory power of conscience. It pronounces, Judges, that a given course of conduct is right, and its opposite wrong. On such an affirmation of the judgment a feeling arises which is an impulse to do the right, a restraint from doing the wrong. This is called the impulsive power of conscience. In a perfect moral constitution these functions would be spontaneous, and in every case adequate to all the purposes of a strictly moral life. Does the moral conduct and character of mankind evince the existence of such a faculty, in a condition of moral completeness and perfection? We answer negatively, with an emphasis. The perversions of the judgment are nowhere more evident than in the department of morals. Great blindness of mind is evinced by the every-day opinions men form and entertain respecting questions of right and wrong. It is true there are great underlying fundamental principles in ethics, which the intuitions of the common mind clearly cognize. Concerning these there is no room for discussion or difference of opinion, but in the application of these principles to every-day practice, to the duties of life in detail, it often happens that what one considers wrong another will indulge without remorse, and, perhaps, even think in doing it that he is doing God service. No man has perfect confidence in the dictates of natural conscience. This is evident, and is the same as to say, men are conscious of defects in their moral constitution. As conscientious a man as the Apostle Paul, said, "I know nothing by myself, yet am I not hereby justified. He that judgeth me is the Lord." That is, he had a conscience void of offense; he knew not but he was right, and yet that did not prove that he was right. God judgeth. The natural conscience, though true to fundamental principles, is not an adequate exponent of right and wrong. Everyone is bound to act conscientiously, but though conscientious no one is certain that he strictly obeys the law of righteousness. Such blindness of mind hath happened unto all mankind, as that they are perpetually liable to error in abstract questions of right and wrong. As it is with the discriminating power of conscience, so also is it with the impulsive and retributive. Conscience is the most authoritative impulse of human nature; but, though most authoritative, it is not strongest. Appetites and passions clamor, conscience whispers; temptations are as the rushing of many waters. The sense of duty is a still small voice. Remorse is sometimes well-nigh intolerable; but the sinner, accustomed to the neglect of conscience, becomes seared to all sense of shame, and not unfrequently dead to all fear of either God or man. Men are not all equally wicked as to conduct, nor equally depraved as to character; but though men differ in their moral constitutions in those conditions of the soul which are inherited, so that some are

naturally more, even very much more, depraved than others, yet all are in some degree subjects of moral defection. Natural conscience is defective, it does not perform the functions, which in the constitution of the mind belong to it. Thus much as to the conscience.

Let us pass to the affections. Either by a figure of speech, a putting of apart for the whole, or because the sacred writers would teach that it is literally true that the heart is the chief seat of depravity, the Scriptures speak more frequently and distinctly of the alienation of the affections than of any other feature of natural depravity. "The heart is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked. The imaginations of the heart are evil, and only evil, and that continually. The carnal mind is enmity against God, and is not subject to his law, neither indeed can be." These representations are truthful; they correspond with observed facts. Affections are placed on forbidden, unlawful, and improper objects. Lusts crave selfish indulgences, and the desires go out after that which purity prohibits. Lawful objects of affections are loved inordinately, the sensuous is preferred to the spiritual, the temporal to the eternal; men love the creature more than the Creator, and oftentimes self more than any other person or thing. In the normal condition of a perfect mind, all known objects of affection would be regarded and treated according to their real and relative worth. Therefore, the present condition of the natural heart evinces clearly a decline, a fall from its original, primeval state. God made man to know, to love, and to enjoy his Maker. As the eye was made for seeing, so was the heart made for loving; and to love worthy objects, and in such measure as corresponds with their worth—to love God supremely, and the equal of self as self, and all persons and things as they deserve. Men do not thus love; therefore, they are fallen from original righteousness.

THE WILL.

To our thought, the most distinctly marked, and the most deplorable consequence of the first sin is the enslavement of the will,—the will, that characteristic of human nature, in which, more than in any other, man was created in the image of his Maker,—the power of alternative choice, of unconstrained volition; that by which moral desert is possible, by which man becomes a responsible agent and the arbiter of destiny; that by which virtue and vice, holiness and sin may be predicated of his character and conduct; that in which consciousness finds personality and self-hood, the man himself; that that he calls I, the seat and basis of character and accountability. The creed of the Church, in its article on Free Will, affirms that "the condition of man after the fall of Adam is such that he can not turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and works, to faith and calling upon God; wherefore, we have no power to do good works, pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will." The testimony of Scripture is even more explicit. "I am carnal, sold under sin; for that which I do, I allow not; for that I would, that do I not, but what I hate that do I. I find then a law, that when I would do good, evil is present with me; for I delight in the law of God after the inward man; but I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members. O, wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

We do not say that sin has annihilated the man, that he has utterly lost the power of choice, that he is incapable of alternative volition. Contrariwise, it is manifest that such a power pertains to human nature. To divest one of it, were to destroy his manhood and reduce him to machinery. But the affirmation has respect to the choice of good as such, and affirms that for the natural man to choose virtue on its own account, and to practice

it because it is virtue, to choose God and holiness because of inherent excellence, to make the glory of God the chief end of existence, the will of God as the rule of faith and practice, and the enjoyment of God as the source of happiness—in a word, to be a holy man from the choice of his unaided will, is an impossibility. As the man, who has become so accustomed to do evil that he can no more do well than a leopard can change his spots, or an Ethiopian his skin, so the race, by reason of the inherited results of the first sin, have no power to make the law of righteousness the governing motive of life.

For those acts of will by which essential character before God is determined, the race are disqualified by inherited depravation—by an enslavement of the voluntary power. This enslavement may consist in either or both of two facts. The will itself may be constitutionally weak, the man may be deficient in what is sometimes called decision of character. When solicitations to evil are present the man has not power of will, decision of character sufficient to say *no*; or the passion, appetite, or desire, which prompts to evil is so strong, that though ordinarily he be a man of positive character and strength of purpose, in this case he is too weak for resistance; the temptation too strong for his strength. The same is true when he strives to form a purpose of holiness; his will is too weak for so high a resolve, or opposing tendencies are too strong, difficulties are too many and too great. Though he would do good, evil is so present with him that, of his own unaided strength, he can not volitionate a determining choice for the good. He is carnal, sold in sin—a slave to his appetites, passions, lusts, and habits.

We have herein affirmed, that consequences of sin of Adam and Eve, the sin historically or perhaps symbolically set forth in the Book of Genesis as partaking of forbidden fruit, have accrued to the entire race; that the race, considered as a race and each individual thereof considered as an individual are not what they were by creation; God made man pure and holy; man sinned, and thereby became corrupt and unholy. These consequences, we have affirmed, affect not only every individual of the race, but also every part of human nature, every relation of man's earthly life, every interest of humanity. Sin has blinded the eye, deafened the ear, hardened the heart, corrupted the nature; sin has killed; men are dead in trespasses and in sins. The body, perhaps, naturally mortal, has by sin been rendered actually so; its relations to its earthly habitat have been changed so that burdensome toil is necessary for sustenance. Perception has been weakened and obscured, judgment perverted, memory enfeebled, imagination and taste vitiated, reason dethroned, passion inflamed, affection alienated, conscience seared, and will enslaved. The domestic, social, and civil relations of mankind are in a condition of maladjustment. Domestic infidelities, social wrongs, and civil oppressions flow forth from the fountains of corrupted nature; "from within, out of the heart of men, proceed evil thoughts, adulteries, fornications, murders, thefts, covetousness, wickedness, deceit, lasciviousness, an evil eye, blasphemy, pride, foolishness."

The view above taken furnishes a ready answer to the question, Is original sin, natural depravity, an entity, an actually existing thing, a created substance implanted in the human mind, or infused therein? Certainly not; it is a derangement, an enfeeblement, "a depravation from a deprivation." This question is sometimes put in another form, Is depravity a somewhat subtracted from or added to the mind of man? To the question in this form our answer is, naturally, *no*; supernaturally, *yes*. No power or faculty of the mind is lost; intellect, sensibility, and will remain constitutionally the same as they were by creation; constitutionally the same, but as to state or condition different. Supernaturally, there was both a subtraction and an addition. In his primeval state, man enjoyed direct intercourse with his Maker; in New Testament language, he enjoyed "the communion of the Holy Ghost," his heart was God's temple; the abiding presence of the Holy Trinity

was his high-born privilege. Sin separated man from his Creator; grieved the holy spirit of God; divine influences, supernatural communings, were withdrawn. In this sense sin caused a deprivation,—if it pleases, call it a subtraction, a taking away, an abandonment.

Again, we here postulate the doctrine of a diabolical influence sufficiently set forth and proved by account given in Genesis of the agency of the serpent, or rather of the serpent's instrumentality in the work of temptation. A superhuman spirit had access to the human mind even in man's first estate. By yielding himself a servant to obey Satan, man became more the subject of satanic influences. As the spirit of God left him, the spirit of the Evil One possessed him; and, in this sense, there was an addition, an incoming of what was previously absent.

Is depravity total? This question is ambiguous, and must be differently stated to be intelligently answered. By reason of heated controversy great extravagance has been indulged in speaking of the moral character of men. On the one hand, total depravity has been affirmed in terms that imply an utter destitution of all forms of good; it would seem that even automatic excellence, even in a low degree, was denied to man; he is not allowed to be good, in the sense in which brute animals or even blocks of wood or stone are said to be good; a good and faithful dog would not fairly represent him; he is a dog run mad; he is a demon incarnate. Such extravagance does not deserve sober reply. It may be reasonably questioned whether any person or thing exists in the universe of God so utterly useless and injurious as man is sometimes represented to be. On the other hand, man, even in his lowest estate, has been affirmed to be of such high origin, of such exalted possibilities, of so dignified and noble nature, as to be deserving of the high consideration of his fellows, of angels, and of God. The question of depravity is a theological question, and has respect not to automatic excellence, but to moral desert. In respect to the former, man may be good without any merit of his own, and may be bad without deserving reproach. The question of depravity, in its theological sense, has respect to man's ability to perform by his own unaided powers, works of moral merit; or, more especially, it has respect to man's ability to save himself from the consequences of his past sins, and from the practice of sin in the future. What is the condition of man after the fall as to his power to do works of moral merit, or as to his ability to save himself from sin? Are there inhering in human nature, fallen and sinful, any recuperating forces? or any force adequate for salvation? Is a sinner, considered apart from the grace of God, and without supernatural aid, in a condition of hopeless and remediless wretchedness? To the question put in these or similar terms the Church has always, with a well-nigh unanimous voice, given answers, all of which have same import. A sinner against God by his sin places himself in a condition from which there is no escape by any force or power within his own resources. "The condition of man after the fall of Adam is such that he can not turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and works, to faith, to calling upon God, wherefore we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a goodwill, and working with us when we have that goodwill." Taking, then, the term total depravity in the sense of total helplessness, the question, "Is man totally depraved?" must be answered affirmatively. With these explanations, then, it may be said that man, apart from the grace of God, is in a condition of total depravity; but, because of the necessity of such explanations, arising as it does from the ambiguity and abuse of the term, it is, as we think, better to discard the term altogether.

But others think differently, and find use for the term in discussing the doctrine in another view of it. Do the posterity of Adam come into existence actually in a condition of utter loss, helplessness and

hopelessness? and does that condition continue till regeneration? Are mankind previous to conversion in a condition of total depravity? Some affirm; we deny. We will admit, if it please, that man considered apart from the grace of God, if he can be so considered, is totally depraved. With such an admission our formula would be, He is totally depraved, but not totally deprived; but the admission and accompanying formula is made in accommodation to those who have a partiality for the term, in which partiality we do not at all participate. The fact, as we see it, is, that the race came into existence under grace. But for redemption the race had become extinct in the first pair, and the posterity of Adam would never have had personal, individual existence. Not only is existence secured for the posterity of Adam by the second Adam, but also justification. From whatever of the displeasure or wrath of God, or condemnation that theoretically rested upon the race, because of corruption or guilt accruing from the first sin, they are justified through Christ. "As by the offense of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life." Not only does man come to conscious being, sustaining the relation of a justified, pardoned sinner, but as such he is entitled to and actually possesses all the requisites of a fair probation. Whatever influences and agencies of the Holy Spirit are necessary to qualify him for the exercise of free moral choices are graciously vouchsafed to him.

Is it said that it is not pertinent to take into account supernatural presences and powers in a discussion concerning man's estate, since what is supernatural does not at all pertain to man? We reply, the spirit of God in the mind of man is not a by-stander, but is to the faculties and capacities of the mind an enlightening, a quickening, and an energizing power. Man is, therefore, by grace, not by his fallen nature, a moral being, capable of knowing, loving, obeying, and enjoying God. Such he is, and ever will be, if he does not frustrate the grace of God; and though he should resist and grieve the Spirit, he still, through long-suffering grace, retains a state and condition of mind in which and by which salvation is possible, until by persistent rebellion his probation terminates in a failure. When his destiny is fixed, when he is abandoned of God, when the Spirit takes a final departure, then, and not till then, is he in a condition that can properly be called a condition of total depravity. But it is objected, if this be so then is it possible for men to pass a life-time without actual transgression, without committing voluntary sin. But no man liveth and sinneth not; all go astray from their youth. If these all, as soon as they come to years of understanding, do voluntarily transgress the law of God, this fact can be accounted for only on the supposition that their natural character renders the opposite impossible. We concede that this objection has much force, and we are aware that the asserters of total depravity are not slow to make the most of it, but we accept the difficulties of the case and maintain our position notwithstanding. We do conceive it as at least theoretically possible, that a child may be so educated, so trained in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, as that he will never knowingly and voluntarily transgress the law of God—in which case he will certainly grow up into regeneration and final salvation. To such a conception a weak objection is sometimes strongly made, that it supposes salvation by works without grace and without Christ possible—plainly a flat contradiction to the conception itself. It is grace that gives the child existence, grace that endows him with moral powers, grace that gives efficiency to his educational advantages, grace that preserves him from sin, that regenerates and saves him. And what greater grace can a creature of God have than that by which he can forever keep himself from sin? Is not prevention better than cure? Plainly, it is because the absolute prevention of sin on the part of God is not consistent with the moral agency of man, that God does not universally do that which, were it possible, were a greater grace than to permit sin and then pardon it. Must a human being be guilty of overt rebellion against God, as the indispensable condition of experiencing divine

grace? As well might it be said that man can not enjoy heaven unless he has first had an experience in hell.

But some one will say, this is only a possible conception in theory, but is never a realized fact of history; no human being ever did come to years of understanding and accountability without very soon thereafter committing actual transgressions of the law of God, knowingly and willingly. This is a statement of an historical fact, which none but the omniscient One is competent to make. Does the Bible affirm it? Let it be remembered that this discussion does not include sins of ignorance, of infirmity, short-comings, unavoidable failures, necessary want of conformity to the abstract law of righteousness; but to willful, voluntary transgressions. Those passages of Scripture which affirm that "all have gone out of the way," may be taken as universal in their import and application, including saints and sinners, including all men, and referring to the whole of their earthly life, if reference be had to imperfections, infirmities, mistakes, evil actions performed in the absence of evil intent. Experience and observation lead us to conclude, that the affirmation that "all have gone out of the way" is true in a very general sense, when reference is had to overt sin; but we affirm that the Scripture testimony does not unqualifiedly require that it be construed as universal, in respect to those sins for which the sinner is personally responsible and punishable.

When God looked down from heaven to see if there were any that did good, the looking implied an expectation and a possibility that some such could be found. Indeed, the whole doctrine of human responsibility and of divine commandment postulates in man an ability to obey God and avoid sin. Necessitated sin, taking the term sin in the sense now considered, is self-contradictory, for a necessitated act is not a sin in this sense.

Again, conversion is a restoration to the condition of childhood; a condition in which, by walking not after the flesh, man may in Christ Jesus live without condemnation. "There is, therefore, now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit." The whole economy of grace tends to purify unto God a peculiar people zealous of good works, to destroy the works of the devil, and introduce the kingdom of God, in which men shall do the will of God on earth as it is done in heaven. Total depravity, in any proper of the term, we discard, and also in the sense in which it is taken by those who most strenuously insist upon it as a doctrine of the Christian faith; but the doctrine of natural depravity, the corruption of our nature by sin and the total inability of man by his own unaided powers to perform good works, good works having moral merit, we affirm.

PROOFS OF THE DOCTRINE.

What we have stated, as to the character and condition of mankind in this world, has been chiefly a statement of facts fully cognized in consciousness, verified by universal experience and observation, and confirmed by all historical records. When we say that man as to himself, his physical, intellectual, moral, and religious constitution, as to his relations to his fellow-men, to the earth on which he lives, to the air he breathes, to all his environments, is in a condition of defect, derangement, disorder, disease, abnormal limitations and imperfections, we say only what everyone has ample opportunity to know are facts. This statement does not require proof, and proof, in fairness, ought not to be demanded. This statement is our doctrine of natural depravity. If further argument be required, we allege that this affirmation as to the state and condition of man is sustained by the prevalence of actual sin among men of all classes and conditions in life, and in all ages of human history.

That most men, yea, all men, sometimes do that which ought not to be done, few if any will question. That human conduct does not conform to the absolute law of righteousness, and that in this sense sin is very generally prevalent, will be admitted. Proofs will be required only for the theory that sinning comes from sinfulness; that man is naturally sinful, and, therefore, becomes a sinner. Taking the word sin in its generic sense, a want of conformity to law, we assume that "there is no man that sinneth not." That "if we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." If we say we have not sinned we make him a liar, and his word is not in us." All go astray, committing many actual transgressions, and we affirm that the fact of universal sinning is proof of universal sinfulness. What men do is fairly and logically exponential of what they are. It is reasonable and right to judge a tree by its fruits. The prevalence of sin, whether it be admitted to be universal or only general, can not be adequately accounted for on any other theory than that of natural depravity. This conviction that conduct comes from character, is a conviction of the common mind; men naturally and reasonably refer the actions of their fellow-men to constitutional temperaments, to natural propensities, to individual idiosyncrasies. Phrenologists refer conduct and character to the organic structure, quality, and quantity of brain. In the common judgment of mankind, men do as they do, because they are as they are; internal nature determines, molds, and fashions the external act. When some men commit enormous crimes, their neighbors are not surprised; for, say they, such conduct is just like them. It is in perfect accord with their immanent character. Cases of special propensities illustrate this principle. Take the propensity for misrepresentation. Generally, when men tell a falsehood, they do so for some supposed advantage to be gained thereby; but some will tell lies when they know well that it will be to their detriment to do so; and they lie because it is in their nature to misrepresent and to deceive; they have a passion for that vice. Others steal, solely because acquisitiveness and secretiveness are prevailing ingredients in the composition of their minds; it is their nature to steal, and they practice theft without the shadow of a prospect of advantage; in them kleptomania is constitutional. So of all other special propensities. The illustration is pertinent; the principle as to kind is the same in all, differing only in degree.

All sin partakes of the nature of a moral insanity, or, perhaps more properly, all sinners are in a degree morally insane. Conduct is the outflowing of character, evidently so much so that we are warranted in affirming that the prevalence of vice proves the prevalence of vicious natures, proves the doctrine of natural depravity. Pelagians, who affirm that man, as to constitutional character, is in his normal condition, is as his Creator made him, attempt to account for the prevalence of vice by referring it to the principle of limitation, to education, and to example. If men commit crimes because there is in human nature an implanted disposition to do what we see others do, then, surely, that principle of imitation is itself vitiated, because it is a well-known fact that imitators more frequently imitate the vices than the virtues of their associates. If the principle itself is not in an abnormal condition, then this habit of imitating vices rather than virtues comes of an accompanying proclivity toward vice and against virtue. To adopt either of these explanations of the facts in the case is to adopt the theory of natural depravity.

To account for the prevalence of vice by referring it to education is bad philosophy, for it is well known that all the appliances of youthful training are designed and adapted to build up a noble character. Parents and teachers, even those who are themselves vicious, strive to teach their children and pupils lessons of virtue. The topics for study, the textbooks employed, tend to intellectual and moral culture in the right direction. He

were a monster, such as it is to be hoped there are but very few among men, who would punish a child or a pupil for doing right, or for refusing to do wrong. Education tends to that which is noble, high endowments, and to virtuous practices. Again, if mankind are not naturally inclined to evil, are susceptible equally to good and evil influences, then the results of educational processes ought to be at least as favorable to virtue as to its opposite; and, therefore, education does not account for the fact that at least a very large majority of mankind are sinners. The same things may said of the effects of example; if men are naturally indifferent, not antecedently inclined either to good or ill, then example, at least in the case of half the race, should be promotive of virtue. The prevalence of its opposite is not then accounted for. Again, if either imitation, education, or example, or all of them together, is alleged as accounting for sinful practices, it may be inquired, How came the commencement? How came it to pass at first that the example to be imitated was vicious, at least so generally vicious that the imitation in a large majority of cases was in the wrong direction?

Besides the very general, if not universal, prevalence of actual sin we also cite, as a proof of natural depravity, the fact that sins of great enormity are not unfrequently committed. It is conceded, that the hardened wretch who commits prodigious crimes in cold blood comes to the preparation for such crimes, to the insensibility and hardness of heart which renders such crimes possible, by slow degrees, by long-continued practice in lesser crimes; but we still insist that, in the absence of a natural proclivity to the wrong, such depravation of character as makes such crimes possible could not be of so frequent occurrence as it evidently is. Great badness of moral character may be self-imposed, may come to be from sinful indulgence in the smaller vices; but the frequency of enormous crimes proves the existence of a depth of depravity not supposable in mind naturally indifferent to vice, much less in minds at all inclined to virtue—a depravity that can not be supposably superinduced upon innocent minds, so readily as the numerous instances of great crime require. Unless there be supposed in man's fallen nature a proclivity towards the wrong, a vicious propensity, not accounted for that so many men can commit such enormous crimes as are recorded in the pages of history.

Again, we ask attention to the restraints against which men sin. It not unfrequently happens that the impulsions of conscience, the sense obligation, the feeling of ought and ought not, the fear of God, the admonitions of supernatural impulses, or the warning of the every-where present spirit, the dictates of enlightened judgment, of cultivated taste, of sound reason, and the attachments of pure affection, all the better impulses and susceptibilities of our nature, rise up in opposition to a proposed crime, and yet the crime is committed. In like manner the fear of man, the love of approbation, the desire for the good opinion of friends and acquaintances, or regard for reputation as well as all sentiments of self-respect, are internal restraints from vicious practices. Added to these, sacred, uncompromising, and authoritative impulses from within, all voices from without are voices of warning against crime. The observed evil effects of vice upon every interest dear to man, upon character, reputation, wealth, health, social position, domestic peace, well-being every regard, together with the sanction of government and the authority of civil law, sustained by threatened and frequently executed penalty, all are checks to crime.

Again, the Just Judgments of God, not unfrequently discernible in the dispensations of providence, warn man not to transgress God's well-known laws, and not only judgments many, but also mercies innumerable, persuade men to be obedient unto that they know to be right. Men living in Christian communities are appealed to by all the affecting warnings: entreaties, and persuasions of the Gospel. Exhibitions of love and mercy, adapted to melt, it would seem,

the hardest heart, present themselves to the sinner at every turn, to dissuade him from the commission of crime. The fact that men sin in opposition to checks and restraints so many and so great can be accounted for only on the supposition that temptation meets a favoring response from within; or, in other words, that the character is depraved, the nature is viciously inclined.

Again, the vigorous efforts required for the maintenance of the practice of virtue, and especially the difficulties attending an attempt at reformation, are reasonably accounted for on no other theory than that we are here defending. A man may become so accustomed to do evil, that he can no more learn to do well than an Ethiopian can change his skin, or a leopard his spots. In all cases, the attempt to reform is difficult; nothing short of a most vigorous purpose, with a persistent resistance to temptation, can avail; nay, more, man, in his own strength, can not change his habits when he has become at all accustomed to vicious practices; a permanent reformation is possible only by the sustaining power of supernatural aid. Men resolve and reresolve, and live the same. When they would do good, evil is present with them. Such is the bondage of corruption and the power of habit, that without assistance man is a slave to sin. A strictly conscientious life is maintained at the price of a most resolute determination, with ceaseless vigilance and self-denying practices.

Now, if man were naturally without moral character, more especially if he were inclined to virtue, such difficulties could not occur; contrariwise, a holy life would be most convenient, most general, and its opposite would be not the general rule, but the rare exception. But what is decisive with unbiased minds, and ought to be with all is, that the testimony of universal consciousness is a clear affirmation of the doctrine of natural depravity. Men not only know, and know as well as they know their personal existence, that they do wrong, think wrong, and feel wrong, but also that they are wrong. Should it here be objected, that consciousness does not testify as to character, but only as to phenomena, we reply, men are conscious of conviction that their natures are impaired—that they are not what they ought to be, and the universal consciousness of such conviction is determinative of the question.

SCRIPTURE PROOFS.

The testimony of the Scriptures concerning the actual sins of men, their prevalence, their enormity, in a word, the multitude and the magnitude thereof, is too voluminous for quotation. We quote a few of the passages which, to our mind, clearly affirm or imply the corruption and depravity of our nature—the doctrine of innate depravity. "The heart is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked. Who can know it? Thou art in the gall of bitterness, and in the bond of iniquity. The carnal mind is enmity against God; it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. They that are in the flesh can not please God. The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, and these are contrary, the one to the other, so that ye can not do the things that ye would. I am carnal, sold under sin. The natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God. They are foolishness unto him. And you hath he quickened who were dead in trespasses and sins, wherein in time past ye walked according to the course of this world, according to the prince of the power of the air, the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience, among whom also we all had our conversation m times past, in the lusts of the flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind, and were by nature children of wrath, even as others. Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me. And God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts ?f his heart was only evil continually."

THE RELATION OF ADAM TO HIS POSTERITY.

The doctrine of original sin, as set forth in these pages, and as maintained by the Church, with inconsiderable exceptions, during the whole period of ecclesiastical history, involves the assertion that death, with all that it includes and implies, was brought into the world by the first sin. Physical, intellectual, moral, and religious disabilities, have been inherited, and are common to the race, and are consequent upon the first transgression. This assertion naturally gives rise to the following inquiries: What possible relation of Adam to his posterity can be the cause or occasion of such vast results to the one from the single act of the other? What is the philosophy of this connection? Wherein does its fitness, its propriety, its justice appear? Among believers in the doctrine of innate depravity there are three theories, affirming severally identity (if that is not a misnomer), representation, and parentage. The first affirms that the relation of Adam to his posterity is that of a genus to its species. Adam is the race. The second, that of a representative to his constituents, Adam represents his race. The third, that of a parent to his children; Adam is the father of his race. The theory of identity postulates the doctrine of realism; namely, that genera are really existing things, entities, which doctrine is a mere theory, is not supported by any facts or conclusive arguments, and is wholly repugnant to common sense. Therefore, the assertion, that Adam was the race, or that each individual of the race existed generically in him, is founded in a bad philosophy.

Again, we affirm that this theory is resorted to by the theologian, in the interests of error. It is asserted that the transmitted results of the first sin are of the nature of punishments, and as under the government of God none can be punished but the guilty, it is therefore asserted that the posterity of Adam are guilty of his sin. The question, How can this be? forces itself for an answer, and the theory of generic existence, generic transgression, and generic guilt is resorted to for a reply. The posterity of Adam are punished for his sin because they were in him, were identical with him in the sin, that is, they sinned. We deny that inherited infirmities are punishments. Mankind are responsible for what they are no further than their character is self-imposed; what comes necessarily by transmission from ancestors, is no fault of those upon whom they come. They may be said to be of the nature of penal sanctions, so far forth as they are exponential of God's displeasure with sin; but they are not punishments. The theory is therefore founded in a bad philosophy, and is resorted to as an apology for an assumption of what is erroneous. But what is worse than all this is, that it is made the basis of what vitiates the whole science of anthropology.

The assumption that Adam was the race is made the ground of an affirmation that the race have passed their probation, are under the doom of eternal death, and that their salvation depends not at all, in any sense, upon themselves, but results entirely in the case of such as are saved from an arbitrary decree of unconditioned election. The theory of generic existence in the first man asserts very strongly the doctrine of traducianism, to which we make no objection; besides this, it has no merit whatever. It is asserted by but a very few, and deserves no further consideration.

The theory of representation is more plausible, but is nevertheless objectionable. Its characteristic thought is, that the first man was a federal head, a natural representative of his race, and that therefore his posterity are responsible for his acts, in the same way as a nation is responsible for the acts of its representative or minister plenipotentiary in a foreign court. Again, some affirm that Adam was federal head, a representative with full power to act for his constituents, not only by his natural relations as the father of the family, but also by the will and

appointment of God. Here much is said about a covenant of works, supposed to be made with the race in Adam, which is also contrasted with a supposed covenant of grace made with the elect in Christ. Respecting this term, "Covenant of Works," because of the prominence given to it, rather than because of any merit in it, it may be needful to indulge a brief discussion.

It is matter of history that God said to Adam, "Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat, for in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die. "That is, God promised life on condition of obedience, and threatened death on condition of disobedience. This is of the nature of a contract or covenant, and may be so called, if it pleases. More is *implied* in the covenant than is expressed. The simple act of eating fruit was representative of universal obedience, and being a positive command, and a case where the only obvious reason for obedience was that it was a divine law, it was the most fitting test of loyalty. It was an impressive setting forth, in a fact of history, of the whole economy of the divine government. It recognizes man as a subject of government, under the obligations of unlimited obedience, with assurances of suitable retributions. This is manifestly the covenant under which all moral beings are created, a covenant common to all the intelligences of the universe capable of moral responsibility. It is the universal law of supreme love to God, and mutual, equal love among equal social beings. It is the promise of God to all his creatures, that, if they, on their part, voluntarily keep all his commandments, he, on his part, will give them eternal life. This covenant regards the creature in his normal condition and relations, and summarily stated it is, *do and live*. Under the economy of redemption, the creature is regarded as a sinner, rendered by his sins incapable of the perfect obedience required of him when in his normal state; and eternal life is conditioned, not on works, but on faith. He that believeth shall be saved. He that believeth on the Son of God hath eternal life; or, summarily, *believe and live*. The economy of salvation, under the scheme of redemption, or, in other words, the promise of eternal life on condition of faith, is called in the New Testament a new covenant, which is adequate Scripture authority for calling the promise of eternal life on condition of good works the old covenant. The condition in the one case is good works, and the covenant may therefore be called the covenant of works; in the other case the condition is faith, and the covenant may be called the covenant of faith. It is, however, losing sight of the antithesis, generally called the covenant of grace.

So far, all is well enough, but those who evince a partiality for these formulas go further, and so use the terms employed as to make them teach what, to our thought, is a false view of the doctrine of federal headship. According to the theory in question, the parties to the covenant of works are God on the one part and the race, in the person of Adam, on the other. In like manner the parties in the covenant of grace are God on the one part and the elect, in the person of Christ, on the other. Adam acts for the race; his acts are their acts, and the results of his action accrue to the race. Also, Christ acts for the elect; his acts are their acts, and the results of his acts accrue to them. So that it, of course, follows, that man's only probation began and ended in the garden. If Adam had been obedient, he and his posterity would have been immediately placed in eternal life, beyond the possibility of sinning; but being disobedient, he and his posterity fell immediately under the doom of eternal death. No member of the human family ever had, has, or can have, any other probation. All fell in Adam, all are doomed to eternal death, because of his transgression. In the covenant of grace it was promised, on the part of God on condition of Christ's obedience into death, that his elected people should have eternal life. Their salvation from death and elevation to eternal life was made dependent, not at all on any thing that they should be or do, but wholly on the active and passive righteousness of Christ. No son or daughter of the first pair has any

part, either in their perdition or their salvation. Those that are lost were lost in Adam; those saved, saved in Christ. The lost are doomed to a necessity of sinning, and the saved were elected to a necessity of repenting, believing, and loving; they were elected to faith, to holiness, and to salvation. The covenant of works and the covenant of grace cover the whole ground; the one was commenced and consummated in Eden; the other on Calvary. Adam and Christ are the only active agents in the whole matter. The history and destiny of the entire race was determined by the individual acts of the first and second Adam.

Now, can the refutation of such a theory require argument? To our thought, it is so repugnant to our intuitive sense of justice, honor, and right, that to state it seems sufficient for its rejection. Adam, being a father, might act for his children, but certainly within limits. The natural relation of parent to child can not in justice convey the right to make final a final disposal of all that pertains to the child; certainly not to seal his eternal destiny. The child, is an individual, has personal rights which the parent can not invade without injustice.

As the natural relation of parent to child is not the ground of federal headship, in the sense of the theory here disputed; so, neither is the office of representative or minister plenipotentiary the ground or reason of any such power to dispose of the interests and welfare of constituents. The posterity of Adam never were his constituents in any such sense. They certainly never conferred upon him such powers, and if in any sense, and by any authority, he sustained an official relation as a representative of his race, his powers could not extend to the disposal of eternal destiny. No such office could be justly constituted by any authority in the universe. But the abettors of this theory are so zealous for its maintenance, that they do even assert that the first man was such a federal head, such a representative by divine appointment. If this thing had not been said by some very pious people, we should be disposed to pronounce it blasphemy. Certainly it is difficult to conceive of any course of conduct more dishonorable to God than to conceive that he has made the eternal destiny of uncounted millions of intelligent and sentient beings depend upon the single volition of one individual man.

Connected with this view of federal headship is the doctrine of Imputation, so called. This, also, on account of its prominence in theological discussions, can not be passed unnoticed. Imputation, in the theory under discussion, has three applications. (1). Adam's sins are imputed to his posterity. (2). The sins of the elect are imputed to Christ. (3). The righteousness of Christ is imputed to the elect. That is to say, God thinks Adam's race as guilty of his sins; of Christ as guilty of the sins of the elect, and of the elect as having performed the active righteousness of Christ, and in Christ's person been obedient unto death. The second of these three views, that God thinks of Christ as guilty of all the sins of all for whom he died, is too horrible to be endurable, and therefore does not often appear. But the first, that God imputes the sins of Adam to his race, and the third, that he imputes the righteousness of Christ to the elect, are quite popular, and, in a proper sense, deservedly so. But, taken in the sense above alluded to,—namely, that by imputation Adam's act was the act of his posterity, and that therefore they deserve eternal death; that God thinks of the race as committing the first sin, and, so thinking, therefore punishes them for it,—is simply abhorrent to common sense. God thinks of things as they are. The whole doctrine of imputation, taken in the sense that God thinks of one individual as having done what another did, that he punishes one for the sins of another, is evidently contrary to the common convictions of mankind as to what is just, right, honorable, and Godlike, that it may be fairly affirmed that but for excessive zeal in the support of mere theory, such an idea had never been entertained. The doctrine of imputation, in the

sense here objected to, is of no service except to form an apology for the "horrible decree" of unconditional personal reprobation to eternal death.

But, it will be said the doctrine of imputation is a Bible doctrine. The paronyms of the term are of frequent use in the Scriptures. The doctrine in its proper sense will be discussed where it belongs, under the head of justification by faith. Justification, the pardon of sin, the forgiveness of sin, the remission of sin, the non-imputation of sin, and the imputation of righteousness are synonymous terms, and all mean exemption from the punishment due to sin. When it is said God doth not impute iniquity, the meaning plainly is, that as the executive of law he orders the non-execution of the penalty due to sin. In Romans iv, 7, 8, "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven and whose sins are covered; blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin," it is evident that imputation and pardon are the same thing. Not to impute sin, is not to think that the accused did not commit sin, but it is to pardon sin, to grant exemption from punishment. Whatever countenance, therefore, the Scriptures may give to the idea that God imputes the Adamic transgressions to Adam's posterity, which by the way is not a Bible formula, does not warrant the thought that God regards the race as guilty of the first sin, and therefore punishes them for it, but simply, that in some way, in some sense, the consequences of Adam's sin accrue to his posterity. In what way, and in what sense, remains to be stated.

We think it has been clearly shown, that the relation of the first man to the race is not the relation of a genus to its species, is not such a relation of a representative to his constituents as involves unlimited power in the representative to dispose of every interest of his constituents. We feel no partiality for the idea of federal headship or representation; but, with proper explanation, it may be admitted; it is at best but a figurative illustration, and is of doubtful service. Adam was the head of his race, and represented his race just as a father is the head and representative of his family. Consequences of the character and conduct of parents naturally accrue to their children. The physiological, the psychological, the æsthetical and moral characteristics of the parents (those characteristics which belong to the parents naturally, not those that come by grace) are inherited by the children; parents beget children in their own likeness. Again, if parents are idle and improvident, the children suffer the deprivations of poverty; if they are vicious, the children are affected by the detrimental influences of bad example and a vicious education. But can any man say that these disadvantages are *punishments*? Does God consider the children guilty of their parent's sins? Certainly not. But, still, it is said, since these are consequences of *sin*, are even of the nature of penal sanctions, how can any suffer them unless the sufferer be guilty? This question is the same as the question, how can the innocent ever be allowed to suffer at all? That the innocent do, under the providence of God, oftentimes suffer with the guilty is matter of well-known fact. The justification of God's ways with man, in this respect, is the same as in the case of the permission of evil, at any time, in any degree, and under any circumstances; it is the question of theodicy. Our answer was given in our discussion of the doctrine of the divine goodness. God's goodness in the permission of these things is vindicated not only by the fact that he has provided an adequate remedy, but also has provided means by which these evils may themselves be rendered blessings--afflictions may be made to work a far more and exceeding and eternal weight of glory. The wrath of man may be made to praise God. All things may be made to work together for good.

We here assume, that competent reasons for belief in the doctrine of natural depravity, in the affirmation that by reason of the first sin the race came into being in an abnormal condition, have been given, and that competent definitions and explanations of the doctrine itself as to its nature and its methods, have also been assigned. It remains only to notice more particularly

than could be done in the course of the discussion, some of the many

ANTI-SCRIPTURAL THEORIES OF SIN.

The fact of that which is commonly called evil, let it be called by whatever name, or let it be left nameless, can not be rationally questioned. Mankind are subject to physical pain, disease, and death, to mental weaknesses and maladjustments, to vicious propensities, and to volitional enslavement. Pride, envy, evil surmisings, covetousness, concupiscence, malevolent passions, anger, revenge, selfishness, deceit, aversion to the practice of virtue, inordinate affection, impatience of restraint, self-will, enmity against righteous laws, rebellion against lawful authority, are traits of character more or less common among men. Different persons are the subjects of different propensities, but all are characterized in a greater or less degree by some one or several of these evil proclivities. This, I repeat, is a matter of fact, which no man, having even a superficial knowledge of human nature, can obtain the consent of his own mind to question. It is also matter of fact that men commit what are called sins—transgressions of righteous laws. Manslaughters, murders, wars, frauds, thefts, robberies, slanders, evil-speakings, slaveries, oppressions, violations of natural rights, intemperance, licentiousness, idleness, improvidence, are practices of frequent occurrence among all classes of the world's population, in all conditions of barbarism and culture, and in all periods of human history.

It is, again, matter of fact that man's environments are not in perfect adjustment to his normal nature. Burdensome toil is necessary for adequate sustenance; sterility of soil, weeds, thorns, thistles increase his labors; inclement seasons, storms, tempests, and destructive insects destroy the fruits of his toil; thunder-bolts strike him; earthquakes engulf him; fire lays low in ashes the cities he builds; the winds and the waves of the sea render commerce perilous, and frequently the strength of the storm destroys vast stores of wealth, with many precious lives. Again, it is matter of fact that man's relations to his fellow-man, and the institutions which grow out of those relations, are not in harmony with the purposes for which the relations were appointed and the institutions established. Annoying, and sometimes destructive, frictions are manifest in all the agencies of the family, the school, the State, and the Church. The griefs, the sorrows, the heart-burnings, and the heart-breakings, that come from the disturbances of man's domestic, social, civil, and ecclesiastical relations, are both innumerable and indescribable. These things are facts; no controversy concerning their existence is for a moment admissible. How are they to be accounted for? This is that that concerns the philosopher and the theologian; and here is where men find a margin for difference of opinion. The determinative question has respect to the doctrine of free will. Is man a subject of moral government? Is he created under moral law? Is he responsible for his conduct and character? Is he capable of moral desert? Is he justly and rightly a subject of praise or blame? Can he *be* that, or *do* that that obligates him to punishment? In a word, is *guilt*, just liability to penalty, predicable of a human being? If these questions, all of them of the same import, be answered affirmatively, then the common conviction of mankind—the intuitive sense of justice and right—affirms that man must be free, must have power over that for which he is responsible—must be exempt from constraint both *to* and *from* the act for which he may be praised or blamed; that is, man must be endowed with alternative power, must be, within the limits of his responsibility, a first cause.

When it is once admitted that man is a first cause, then the proposition that sin originated in the abuse of free will will also be admitted, and the reference of the evils of human life to sin as their cause will naturally follow in train. We inquire, then, is there any thing in human character and

conduct that is worthy of praise or blame? Is man capable of guilt? Can he be justly punished for what he is, or for what he does? The fatalist answers negatively, whatever is is, because it could not be otherwise; what is not is not, because it could not be; there is no such thing as contingency, alternativity, and no such thing as moral law or moral government; no such thing as a blameworthy or praiseworthy act; no guilt, no just punishment. The man we call wicked is simply unfortunate,—not sinful,—and the man we call virtuous is only lucky—not rewardable. What we call good and what we call evil are alike necessitated—the one has no merit, and the other no demerit. The atheist affirms that all things are by fate, or by chance. In either case there is no place for virtue, or its opposite; and, besides, since there is no lawgiver there can be no law, and since there is no being to whom man is obligated there can be no obligation. The materialist, affirming that matter is the sole substance in the universe, and that its phenomena are determined by fixed, necessitating laws, ignores, or denies, the possibility of free will, rewardable virtue, and punishable vice.

The pantheist, who affirms that mind is God in the mode of thought, and matter is God in the mode of extension, that is, that God is every thing, and in a sense conversely, every thing is God, can not consistently make any distinction between virtue and vice, since all things, whatever they are, and whatever men call them, are alike God, equally good and equally bad. Dualists, both those who affirm two eternal spirits, one good and the other evil, in perpetual and eternal conflict with each other, and those who affirm the eternity of both spirit and matter, and ascribe to matter an eternal, essential antagonism to spirit, with proclivity to evil—both classes make evil a necessity, and thus exonerate created beings from moral responsibility; they must, to be consistent with their theories, deny the possibility of rewardable virtue and punishable vice.

Optimists affirm that whatever is is best. Sin and its consequent evils exist; therefore, they are for the best. One class of optimists allow that sin is naturally destructive of the greatest good, detrimental to every valuable interest, but affirm that it is, in spite of itself, made to contribute to the general welfare by the overruling grace and providence of God. To this view no objection needs be made. But some optimists seem to teach that what we call evil is a good, *per se*, that it is an indispensable condition of that we call good, and that it is the direct product of the infinite will. This view affiliates naturally with the excessively pantheistic idea that the infinite will is the only agent in the universe. Pantheistic optimism, then, is an affirmation, that all existences and all events, sin and evil included, are brought to being directly by the divine efficiency, and that they are volitionated by the divine will, because infinite wisdom sees that their existence is essentially necessary to the greatest good. This, equally with atheism and materialism, annihilates the possibility of sin, and robs evil of its real character. It is even worse than atheistic fatalism, for it supposes a God, a personal deity, of benevolent intent, and then transforms him into an infinite demon. Instead of pantheism it is pansatanism. Manicheism seems to have been the result of an effort to incorporate into the Christian system some features of the Persian and Gnostic philosophies. Manes, the founder of the system, and from whom it takes its name, adopted the Persian philosophy, so far as to affirm that there are two eternal principles, light and darkness; that light created good, and darkness evil. He also adopted Gnosticism so far as to assert that matter, being, as he affirmed, the creature of darkness, was essentially evil. Then, so far as our present topic is concerned, Manicheism differs from materialism only in allowing that matter is the product of creation, or, in other words, in denying that matter is eternal. It partakes slightly of both forms of dualism,—with the one in affirming two eternal spirits or principles, and with the other in affirming the essential evil of matter. It, however, as a theory

of sin, is one with all of the above mentioned theories in affirming the absolute necessity of evil. It is hylozoism—from the Greek, *hulē*, matter—an affirmation that all evil pertains to, and comes from, the material. All systems of asceticism, monasticism, and whatever teaches the efficacy of abstinence and austerities as the remedy for sin, have their basis in this idea that evil or sin pertains to the body.

Among the philosophies, the theory that sin or evil is a negation or a limitation of being, has occupied, and still occupies, a place of considerable prominence. All being is good; the loss of being, the loss of good; and absolute nothing is absolute evil. What is, and what happens, has a right to be. Power is virtue; weakness vice. The victor is always right and the victim wrong; might gives right; the fittest survives; the murderer and the pirate are more worthy of admiration than their victims; Satan is more moral than the best of men! Such philosophers as Cousin and Carlyle advocate this demoniacal system with unblushing confidence. Leibnitz, in his theodicy, to vindicate God and exonerate him from all responsibility as to the existence of evil, adopted a theory of sin similar to the above, and differing chiefly in the terms employed. According to his formulas, evil is privation; the infinite is the absolute good, the finite is evil. If, then, any thing or person less than the infinite exists, it must be evil. Evil is necessarily connected with creation; God could not create without it; therefore, necessity, and not God, is the source of evil—the author of sin. This, as to its argument, is a manifest failure, since, by refusing to create, God might have avoided the evil, and, as to its doctrine, it is false, since it affirms the self-contradictory proposition that sin is necessary.

Another philosophic theory affirms that sin is necessary antagonism. The heavenly bodies are kept in place by centripetal and centrifugal forces; mind is developed, and truth determined, by conflict with error. So far, then, as created being is concerned, without evil to resist, resistance, or good, is impossible; evil is a necessary condition of good, not a thing to be deplored or condemned—an inseparable factor in the nature of created beings—a somewhat which conscience can not condemn, and God can not punish!

Allied to the above theories—all of which make sin a necessity, either because evil is eternal in spirit or in matter, or because matter, though created, is essentially incorrigible, unmanageable, and inherently evil, or because evil is inseparable from limited or finite existence—allied to them is the theory that locates sin in the sensuous nature. Many, perhaps all, thinkers who adopt this theory, are trichotomists.

Man is a compound being, of three distinct natures: *soma*, the body; *psyche*, the soul, and *pneuma*, the spirit. The first is the material; the second includes the principle of animal life, together with the sensuous appetites and passions that relate to the physical world; and the third, the rational and spiritual principle, including the will and moral affections. Probably most advocates of the trichotomous theory are believers either in pre-existence or creationism. The *soma* and the *psyche* are propagated; *pneuma* is not propagated, but created. If we add to trichotomy and creationism the Romish idea of original righteousness, that it consisted in the supernatural presence and agency of the Holy Spirit, the origin, nature, and location of sin would be on this wise: Originally, man, by constitution a compound being, having three natures—the material, the sensuous, and the spiritual—was required to seek his greatest good in the gratification of his higher nature, but the appetencies of his material and sensuous natures were antagonistic to the spiritual, and naturally overpowering, so that only by supernatural assistance was virtue, or obedience to the dictates of the higher nature, possible. Man rejected, by an unconstrained volition, the Spirit's aid, and thus became a slave to sin. If we now eliminate the supernatural, and suppose

man had power, by natural endowment, to reject the lower and choose the higher, the case is substantially the same, and the origin of sin is found in the abuse of free-will, and its nature consists in the preferring lower to higher gratifications. As an account of the nature and origin of actual transgression-of sin in the proper sense of the term-no objection needs to be made to this theory; but its account of natural depravity is wholly vicious. The theory teaches that the material and sensuous natures are inherently and naturally evil; that the natural evil, with whatever corruption may have been added by man's voluntary sin, is propagated, so that the race inherit a nature, evil essentially and by corruption; this evil, however, pertains exclusively to the sensuous nature; the spirit is not propagated, is the product of creation, and is pure, uncorrupted, and unaffected by sin. That is to say, original sin, natural depravity, the corruption of our nature, sin as to character, pertains wholly to the material and the sensuous, not to the spiritual; to the body and the soul, not to the spirit. This is evidently not so, for the wickedest beings of whom we have any knowledge have no bodies, and, of course, no appetites and passions that relate to the physical world. Again, pride, malice, envy, ambition, unbelief, enmity to God, are sins purely spiritual; they pertain not at all to the physical. Again, the common consciousness of sin plainly indicates that it is something vastly different from mere weakness-mere inability to resist the solicitations of our lower natures. If this theory were true, asceticism would be an efficacious remedy for sin, and all people in old age, when the lusts of the flesh become extinct, would be necessarily pure and holy.

The theory that all sin is selfishness is faulty in several respects. All selfishness is sin, but all sin is not selfishness. There is no selfishness in malice, in enmity to God, in hardness of heart, in impenitence, in unbelief, in ingratitude, and these forms of vice are much more sinful than mere selfishness. Then all virtue is disinterestedness benevolence. But it is not. Justice, fidelity, humility, forbearance, patience, constancy, spiritual blindness, the love of God, gratitude, with many other virtues, may be cultivated and practiced, not as forms of benevolence, but as virtues inherently excellent, required of us by the moral law because of what they are in themselves, and not merely because of their tendency to promote the happiness of others.

PELAGIANISM.

This heresy teaches that the first man, as he came from the hands of his Creator, had no moral character, and that the same is true of all his posterity as they are born into the world. Adam was not morally good by creation, nor are his children morally bad by inheritance. The products of creation and of propagation are characterless. Virtue and vice, good and evil, holiness and sin, are predicable only of voluntary acts. The habit of sinning constitutes the character only of him who sins; and the effects of sin upon the nature of the sinner can not be transmitted by propagation to his children. Adam was naturally mortal as to his body; physical death is not any part of the penalty of sin, all the race come into individual existence in the same condition as that in which the first man was created. Each individual has a probation on the same terms, under the same relations to law, with the same obligations, responsibilities, powers, and capabilities, that the first man had. Adam's sin did not affect his posterity in any way beyond the influence of a bad example. In a word, the doctrine of original sin as held by the Church, Pelagianism denies in whole and in part. Its definition of sin, in the sense of actual transgression, that it consists in a voluntary disregard of righteous authority, a volitionated transgression of positive law, is correct. Its assertion that all responsible agents are and must be endowed with free-will-with alternative causative power-is also correct; but its affirmation that this power is a natural endowment, that it belongs to,

and is inseparable from, the nature of man, is, so far as the power to do good is concerned, anti-scriptural and contrary to the conscious experience of universal humanity. Unregenerate human nature is carnal, sold under sin; what the man would it does and what it does the man would not. There is a conflict between the spirit and unregenerated nature, and without divine interposition, the latter is overpowering.

It is true that the race, in their earthly life, are on probation, and are in possession of adequate power to choose between good and evil, but this power is not a natural endowment, it is a gracious gift. Pelagius was himself orthodox as to the doctrines of theology proper, and many, in the early days of the Church, who adopted the Pelagian anthropology, were believers in the trinity; but the theory naturally affiliates with rationalism, and, in modern times, Pelagians are also Unitarians. Their theory of salvation is made to harmonize with their theory of sin. Sin is doing wrong; salvation is ceasing to do evil and learning to do well. The means of salvation are purely educational. Proper self-discipline is the adequate preparation for eternal life, and the efficacious means of obtaining it; regeneration is enlightenment obtained by the natural processes of acquiring knowledge. Christ is a prophet, a teacher, not a priest or atoner. To regard the Holy Spirit as a person is mythological, and to conceive of any thing supernatural as essential to the conviction, conversion, and salvation of the soul, is simply superstitious. The supports of this theory are purely rationalistic. It is supposed that it so commends itself to the common sense of mankind, that its statement is sufficient ground for acceptance. Pelagians defend their system more by assuming objections alleged by opponents, and by making objection to antagonistic doctrines, than by alleging direct proofs of their own theory. The Scriptures are, of course, wrested from the orthodox interpretation, and such an exegesis is adopted as is suited to the system.

The universal prevalence of sin, the frequent occurrence of enormous crimes, the existence of sin in spite of many and powerful checks and restraints, and the well-nigh insurmountable difficulties attending reformation, are accounted for by referring them to the influence of education and example, rendered powerful by man's natural disposition to imitate his associates. These arguments and replies have been noticed above, and need not be repeated. But the main position, the characteristic feature, of Pelagianism, namely, the affirmation that sin consists wholly in voluntary acts and not at all in immanent character, for several reasons deserves and must receive special attention. It deserves attention chiefly for two reasons: first, the affirmation that man is not morally responsible for immanent character is not true; second, the affirmation that he is responsible is frequently vitiated by the additional affirmation that he is responsible for character irrespective of his origin. It is said that man is responsible for what he is, no matter how he came to be what he is; whether his immanent character be concreated, infused, or self-imposed, he deserves to be rewarded or punished for what he really is. The truth lies between these extreme errors. Man is morally responsible for character; but he is responsible only so far as his character is self-imposed. That mankind are good and bad, holy and unholy, righteous and unrighteous, as to character, seems so obvious, that had it not been stoutly contested by theorists, the common mind would never think of questioning it. Indeed, moral distinctions, in the common judgment of mankind, apply primarily and chiefly to immanent character. The opinions men form of each other relate not so much to what is done—to acts performed—as to the principles from which such actions proceed. The moral relations of an agent to his actions are always determined by the motives in view of which he has acted, and the motives to which his conduct is referred are those which are consonant with the known character of the man—those which men of his constitutional and habitual proclivities are accustomed to select. Our acquaintances are judged to be morally thus and thus, whether active or

inactive, whether awake or asleep, and we confidently expect they will do so and so, because we know them to be of this or that character. We are sure that this good man will neither lie nor steal, and are equally sure that that miser will hoard money and grind the face of the poor. When men become specially interested in the question of their moral relations--when they give special attention to their religious prospects--when they are convicted of sin--they almost universally are more concerned about what they are than about what they have done. The fact that they are proud, vain, self-conceited, worldly-minded, envious, malicious, passionate, lovers of pleasure more than lovers of God, that they constitutionally neither fear God nor regard man, gives them incomparably more pain than the fact that they have committed sin and neglected duty! Their pain may be of the nature of grief, not remorse; is so, so far as the cause of their grief is unavoidable; but it is not always thus. Sometimes a man knows he is not as good as he ought to be, might have been, and would have been, if he had not willfully neglected his duty and willfully indulged in sin. In such a case the man feels remorse, and the deepest possible degree of remorse, for being what he is. He is justly condemned, and may be justly punished, on account of immanent character.

The Scripture idea that a tree is known by its fruit, a figure used to illustrate the idea that conduct springs from character, that the inner man determines the outward act, is a most distinct avowal of the orthodox doctrine of sin in man's constitutional and habitual nature. Corresponding with this is the further explicit assertion, that "out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, and blasphemies." In a word, the common consciousness of mankind, expressed in such terms as benevolence, justice, integrity, fidelity, indicates a conviction that moral character, and moral responsibility pertain to that which is within the man, is immanent, lies back of will, and lower than consciousness. Man is inherently good or bad; was originally created good, by sin became bad; is bad by propagation or inheritance, and can be made good only by regeneration. Regenerated and sanctified by the Holy Spirit, he will regain the image of God, the original righteousness in which he was created. In that state, and that only, can his conduct be in conformity with the law of righteousness.

NECESSITARIANISM.

Hitherto we have considered those theories of sin which are chiefly philosophic and rationalistic; we have directed special attention to generic views of the fact of sin, of its origin and nature, both as respects conduct and character, both as to actual transgression and to natural depravity. We come now to consider what we have termed necessitarianism, an anthropology most firmly believed and strenuously advocated by many of the most pious believers of the Christian faith, men of high intellectual endowments and extensive learned acquirements, whose perspicuity and strength in thought and expression are not excelled. To differ from such high authority is a bold undertaking, and can be justified only by the fact of a strong and conscientious conviction that their system is erroneous; and yet if authority be a consideration of weight, it is an encouragement to know that the opinions we entertain have been held by a large majority of Christian believers, and that among them there has been an amount of talent and scholarship, to say the least, quite equal to that of their opponents. Because of the influence and agency of Augustine in giving form and shape to the system, it has been, and still is, called the Augustinian Anthropology. What are its distinguishing features? Adam was the race, or represented the race. The whole human family had their only probation in him. He was created positively holy. Original righteousness consisted in an inclination and determination of will to holiness. Additional to this power and inclination to volitionate the right, he was endowed, for probationary purposes, with a power to the contrary. He

was forbidden to use this power to the contrary; but he did use it, and lost it for himself and his posterity. He and all mankind thereby fell under the doom of eternal death. All individuals of the human family, the first pair only excepted, come into personal consciousness under sentence to endless perdition, and in a condition of total depravity, especially of total inability to volitionate any thing morally good. All remain in this state of total inability and depravity from birth to regeneration. Regeneration is the sole work of the Holy Spirit; it is wrought by an efficacious, irresistible grace; its subject does not, can not, co-operate either antecedently or contemporaneously. The will, conquered, subdued, subjugated, changed in all its inclinations and determinations by an irresistible power, is made to volitionate under the resistless workings of the Holy Spirit, repentance, faith, love, and obedience. Holiness and salvation are wholly of the sovereign grace of God. Whom God elects to save, them he saves by resistless power; all others are passed by and left under the original doom of eternal death.

It is due here to say, that the abettors of this theory strongly assert that the saved are not saved by a constraint against their will; but they as strongly assert that the saved are *made* willing; they *will*, to be sure, but they will because they can not help it; neither can they will otherwise. The same is said of the lost: they sin voluntarily, that is, they will their own sins: but it is also said they can not will otherwise. The controversies between this system and its opposite have turned chiefly upon the question of free will.

To the question, Is man's power to good diminished by sin, and if so, to what extent? Pelagianism replies: Sin does not affect the power to good at all. Semipelagianism replies: Sin weakens, but does not destroy the power to good. Augustinianism replies: Sin destroys the power to good, and it is never restored. Arminianism replies: Sin destroys the power to good, but it is restored by grace. To the question, What is the precise relation which the agency of the human will sustains to the workings of the Holy Spirit in regeneration? Pelagianism replies, there is nothing supernatural in regeneration; the unaided free will of man is adequate to all the essentials of salvation. Semipelagianism replies, the Spirit aids the natural will, supplementing its weakness. Augustinianism replies, regeneration is the sole work of the Spirit; man does not, and can not co-operate with the Spirit, either antecedently or contemporaneously. Arminianism replies, the will quickened, and the power to good restored, co-operates antecedently and contemporaneously with the Spirit towards and through the work of regeneration, and onward to complete and final salvation.

The theory that regeneration is the sole work of the Spirit is called monergism, and the theory that the will co-operates with the Spirit is called synergism. Augustinian anthropology is monergistic; Arminian anthropology is synergistic, and the controversy between the two theories turns chiefly on this simple question, Do unregenerate persons possess the power to volitionate good? Or, in other words, is the will an alternative power in the choice between good and evil? Both parties to the controversy agree that by the first sin this power was lost. Augustinianism affirms that it was lost forever. Arminians affirm that the race came into personal consciousness under redemption, and that in the provisions of that redemption freedom of will was so far restored that man may, and must, if he be saved, co-operate with the Spirit in his salvation. The question may be stated in another form. Are the descendants of Adam probationers, or are they not? Arminians affirm, Augustinians deny.

We shall presently attempt the discussion of this pivotal question; but, before proceeding to so, we state more definitely than the discussion thus far

has permitted, our objections to several of the cognate positions affirmed in Augustinianism.

(1). Adam was not the race, nor did he represent the race in such a sense as that they could be justly doomed to eternal death for his sin. We have above, in these pages, said all we deem it necessary to say in vindication of this objection.

(2). The image of God in which man was created, or, as it is sometimes termed, original righteousness, did not consist in an inclination and determination of the will to holiness. The argument alleged in support of the affirmation that it did so consist, is, that all holiness is either absolute or relative. Absolute holiness belongs only to God; therefore, the holiness of a creature must be relative; that is, it is said, it must be the result of a divine efficiency. No created being can originate holiness by his own ultimate efficiency, for if he did, he would be worthy of the veneration and worship due to holiness. The holiness, the original righteousness of the first man, therefore, was a determination of his will, by a divine efficiency. If this be so, how could he do otherwise than volitionate obedience? If he sinned, must not the divine efficiency be withdrawn? If so, was not God the sinner? Without that divine efficiency he could not volitionate holiness; with it how could he do otherwise? There was a concreated holiness; man was made in the divine image; but it did not consist in an efficacious determination of his will. The will is not determined; it is itself determiner. Nor does the supposition that a created being originates by his own free choice an act of obedience to God make him an object of worship. The whole argument is an unwarranted assumption. The image of God, in which man was created, consisted in spirituality. Man was a spirit, made in the likeness of God, in that he possessed the power of thought, emotion, and volition. His concreated holiness, or original righteousness, consisted in the perfection and completeness of his entire nature; body, soul, and spirit were perfect in their kind—in perfect adjustment as to their several faculties, and in harmony with all environments.

(3.) The power to the contrary is not an accident given only for probationary purposes, but is an essential factor in free volition. Not only probationers possess it, but also all free beings—all beings capable of moral actions. Without it, moral action and moral responsibility are impossible. An argument frequently adduced in support of the position that this power to the contrary is only accidental, and is requisite only for probation, is as follows: God, the holy angels, and glorified men are moral beings, are positively holy in the highest possible sense, and yet they have no power to sin. They are free, have the greatest conceivable liberty, and yet they can not do wrong. They can volitionate only in the direction of a perfect holiness. Our conception of holy beings is, not that they are necessitated to do right, but that their volitions are always in accordance with right. The security that their acts will always be in obedience to the eternal, immutable law of righteousness is not that they *can not* do otherwise, but that they certainly will *not*.

The Augustinian conception of infinite holiness, as we see it, differs from a necessitated mechanism only as mind differs from matter—it is the same in kind, and differs only in degrees of automatic excellence. Necessitated holiness is better than mechanical perfection, only as a good horse has a higher degree of excellence than a good hoe. We insist upon it that a trust in God founded upon a conviction that he is such, not only in his constitutional but also in his self-imposed character, that he will certainly always do right, honors God more than a confidence in him founded upon a conviction that it is metaphysically impossible for him to do wrong. The inhabitants of heaven, to our thought, remain there not because they are

prisoners, but but because they freely choose holiness and heaven; not because a change in their conduct and character is a metaphysical impossibility, but because their habit of holiness has become so confirmed that it is morally certain that they never will renounce their allegiance to the right. The permanency of their ultimate holiness consists not in an eternal *can not*, but in an eternal *will not*.

(4.) Mere voluntariness—that is, {self-motion in the absence of restraint—is not all that is requisite for freedom and responsibility. That it is is supported not only by such arguments as have been just have alluded to, but further, it is said a man walks freely, and is, therefore, responsible for his walking, though he has no power to fly. This is evidently a case in which the absence is not the absence of a power to the contrary, but the absence of a power to something else not relevant. A man may walk freely who has no power to fly, he does not walk freely, nor is he responsible for his walking, unless he has the power not to walk. (By the way, it is strange indeed that great and learned men would ever put forth such an argument; that they do so is just ground for suspicion that they are committed to a theory, and feel bound to support it at any expense.) To define freedom—that freedom which the common consciousness of mankind regards as an indispensable basis of moral responsibility—to be voluntariness, self-motion, in the absence of constraint, is to give an inadequate definition. This is evident from the purpose for which the definition is given, which is in every case to eliminate alternativity, the power to the contrary. The agent is free and responsible, because he volitionates the act himself, in the absence of constraint, though it be utterly impossible for him to will otherwise.

We insist upon it that this elimination is vicious. Without alternativity, freedom and responsibility can not exist. Again, the definition is not only inadequate, but, taken in connection with its purpose and intent, it is self-contradictory. It contains, as a factor, the idea of absence of constraint when, at the same time, it postulates the impossibility of an opposite, which is the same thing as to affirm the necessity of the thing; and, moreover, the system of philosophy with which it is connected universally affirms the determining power of antecedent motives. There is, then, no such absence of constraint as the definition requires; the volition is constrained by the motives in view of which it is put forth.

(5.) It is not true that the race, as individuals, stood their probation in Adam. It is not true that Adam was the only individual person of the human family who was, or is, or will be, placed on probation; but it is true that every individual person of the human race capable of moral actions, and responsible for his conduct and character, is a probationer. Augustine assumes that if the first pair had remained obedient and retained their primal virtue through their probation, they, and with them their race, would have been admitted to a state of permanent and eternal holiness. This, so far as the posterity of the first pair is concerned, is mere theory, unsupported by any teachings of the Scriptures, either expressed or implied, not encouraged by any fact of human experience, and totally at variance with the consciousness of all responsible persons. This consciousness is totally repugnant to the idea that individual destiny can be wholly determined by another.

The Augustinian anthropology asserts that the probation of the race—they having sinned in Adam—terminated with his transgression. The destiny of each individual person subsequent to that event is determined solely by the sovereignty of God, he electing and saving, by efficacious grace, whom he chooses, and passing by the residue, leaving them to suffer the doom brought upon them by the Adamic transgression; that is, man does nothing determinative of his destiny—man's earthly life is not a probation. The opposite of this doctrine is directly taught, or plainly implied, in all the commandments,

precepts, exhortations, entreaties, promises, and threatenings of the Word of God. Indeed, it underlies the whole system of revelation. The redemption by Christ, the agency of the Spirit, the ministration of angels, and the instrumentalities of the Church, are all presented in a manner implying that the accomplishment of their end is conditioned upon the co-operation of man's free and unconstrained volition. In the command, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart," there is an authoritative requirement of personal service—a something to be done by the person commanded. If you are elected to be saved, God will cause you to love him with all your heart, is not the sense of the text. "He that believeth shall be saved," is not equivalent to, If anyone is saved he will be made to believe." Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do his good pleasure," is not an affirmation that when God works in you you will infallibly be constrained to work out your salvation; it is rather a command to do something—a something on which the salvation of the person commanded is conditioned. The command is enforced by the assurance that that sense of duty, that impulsion of conscience toward the right, of which the person addressed is conscious, that working in him to will and to do, is divine—it is God that, from within you, moves you toward works of salvation; therefore, work out, or do, that to which you are thus divinely prompted. Or, perhaps the latter clause is an encouragement: do your duty without fear of failure, for you are divinely prompted, and will surely be divinely assisted. In any case, the text does not admit of such a construction as implies that the work of the Spirit in salvation is monergistic. Upon its face its obvious meaning is, that man has something to do, and that that something consists in co-operation with an inward divine moving thereto.

(6). Contrary to the Augustinian theory, we affirm that, ability limits obligation. The theory plainly implies that God requires of men, fallen in Adam, that which it is utterly impossible for them to do, and punishes them for not doing it! Total inability to volitionate good is the common inheritance; in this condition all are born into the world, and so remain, with the exception of such as are elected to a sovereign salvation effected by efficacious grace. The lost, then, are lost because they do not what it is utterly impossible for them to do, or because they do that which it is utterly impossible for them to leave undone; that is, ability does not limit obligation. In support of this propositio, an appeal is made to the common consciousness of men.

It is said, "Every man knows that he is bound to be better than he is, and better than he can make himself by any exertion of his will. We are bound to love God perfectly, but we know that such perfect love is beyond our power. We recognize the obligation to be free from all sin and absolutely conformed to the perfect law of God, yet no man is so infatuated or so blinded to his real character as really to believe that he is thus perfect, or has the power to make himself so." Now, this appeal will be sustained by the response of universal consciousness, in such a sense as makes it an effectual refutation of Pelagianism. Obligation is not limited by natural ability; the unaided will of unregenerate men is not able to meet all moral obligations: the appeal is not sustained in such a sense as proves that men are morally obligated to that for which, without any fault of theirs, they are totally disqualified: but the appeal is sustained in a sense that harmonizes perfectly with Wesleyan Arminianism. Men feel under obligation to be better than they can make themselves by any ultimate efficiency of their own, unassisted by the grace of God; they do not feel under obligation to be that which they can not be, or to do that which they can not do. Ability, either natural or gracious, must limit obligation. Of course, voluntary inability is excepted.

(7.) The agency of the Spirit is not monergistic, and is not resistless.

Man may, and if he be saved he must, co-operate. He may resist, and if he persist in resistance, he is lost.

(8.) The salvation of man is not the result of a supposed predestinating decree of personal unconditional election, but is the resultant of two cooperating efficiencies—the divine and the human. The difference between Augustinianism and Arminianism is not, as has been said, that according to the former, God, and according to the latter, man, determines who shall be saved; but according to Arminianism, each individual man, by the help of God, determines whether he himself will be saved.

THE DOCTRINE OF FREE WILL.

Atheists, materialists, dualists, and most pantheists deny entirely the existence and the possibility of free will, and affirm either the doctrine of chance, that is, that whatever is is, because it stood the same chance to be that any thing else did—or the doctrine of fate, that is, that whatever is is, because it could not not be, and whatever is not is not, because it was not possible that it could be. Concerning the theories of chance and fate, it is sufficient here to say that they contradict the testimony of universal consciousness. Without stopping for a reply to the senseless speculations indulged in these matters, we affirm that all men have a distinct, resistless and ineradicable conviction that many things connected with their experience and observation might have been different from what they are, and are equally certain that these same things are not causeless, haphazard occurrences. All men have a conviction that, in some sense, man is free. Universal consciousness testifies to the fact of human liberty.

All theists, all who postulate the doctrine of a personal first cause of all things, affirm the universality of law and deny the doctrine of fate. The controversies among them have respect to the conception of freedom, and the issue is stated when the term freedom, as applied to will, is defined. It may, perhaps, be serviceable in this place to notice an opinion prevailing extensively in our times concerning this and cognate controversies. This opinion is, that all interest in these questions has died out of the public mind, and that the cessation of interest comes from a change of opinion. In other words, the parties to the controversies do not believe as they did in times past. By mutual concessions, they have come well-nigh to an agreement. There is some ground for this opinion; and yet it is not well founded in such a sense as renders further discussion nugatory. All parties do, of course, believe in the objective certainty of all existences and events. What has been has been; what is is; and what will be will be. The Augustinian, or, as he is more commonly called in modern times, the Calvinist, says to his opponent, If you do unqualifiedly affirm certainty, then our controversy is ended; but you do not mean that; you affirm uncertainty; your statements of the doctrine of spontaneity, of contingency, of volitional freedom, to my thoughts, mean uncertainty, chance, causelessness. On the other hand, the Arminian says to his opponent, If certainty is all you mean, then our controversy is ended. But that is not all you mean; you affirm necessity; your statement of the doctrine of divine sovereignty, decrees, election, invariable antecedency, to my thought, mean fate, metaphysical necessity.

When knowledge on these subjects shall be so increased that the apprehensions of all parties shall be distinct and perspicuous, when theological science shall be so far advanced that the formulas in which these subjects are stated and discussed are adequate exponents of accurate and exhaustive apprehensions, then it may be reasonably expected the watchmen will see eye to eye; all thinkers will be able to come to a satisfactory agreement. That time may not be far distant; certainly we may hope not, but evidently it

is not yet.

The most recent publication on Systematic Theology, that by Hodge, of Princeton, a work in many respects unsurpassed in ability and scholarship by any work on Christian doctrines of this or any other age, though, at times, apparently conceding all that an Arminian can reasonably require; still, throughout the whole work, whenever the subject under discussion stands related to the points in controversy, strongly asserts and vigorously defends the most objectionable features of Augustinianism. The same thing may be said of other recent productions; so that though it is frequently affirmed that the Calvinism of the past is not the Calvinism of the present, and that the great body of the ministers and members of the so-called Calvinistic Churches do not believe as did their fathers; yet it is true that no author of note among them abates one jot or tittle of what substantially pertains to the system. We take heart, therefore, in continuing the discussion.

The topic now specially before us is the doctrine of free will. (Will has been defined to be that power of the mind by which it is the conscious author of an intentional act. We do not apprehend any objection to this definition. The generic idea of freedom is exemption from constraint. Force, mental or physical, may be said to be free when not antagonized by superior force; in this all are agreed. The issue we make is with that theory which, though professedly anti-fatalistic, affirms that the law of necessity governs all events. Some writers of the class here referred to object to the use of the term necessity, because, as they say, it may be understood to mean fate. Such prefer the term invariable antecedency, or even sometimes say that the term certainty adequately expresses the thought intended. But, while objecting to the use of the word necessity, they, equally with others of their class, strongly affirm that the law of cause and effect, of stated antecedent and consequent, pervades all events, mental as well as physical, volitional as well as intellectual and emotional. Perception is as its external object; emotion is as the intellectual apprehension, and volition as the emotion. This chain is unbreakable. It is not only certain that any given event which will actually occur will occur, but it is also impossible that the event should be otherwise than it will be. Human liberty is defined by some of this class of thinkers as consisting in power to *do as we will*, by others as power to *will as we choose*. The first is a definition of muscular, but not of mental freedom. The second is no definition at all,—is unmeaning, since choosing is willing, or it means that liberty consists in choosing that which pleases; which is the same thing as saying that volition in choice is always as the antecedent emotion. This is probably what is intended, and accords with the whole system, as just above stated.

External object determines perception; perception determines emotion; emotion determines volition in choice, and volition in choice determines volition in the executive *nisus*, and this determines the external muscular action. The law of necessity pervades the whole process. There is a fixed and invariable connection between antecedent and consequent. There is liberty in this one sole direction. The whole process is equally free, for there is equal exemption from constraint, and this is the only freedom possible in the universe. Exemption from external constraint is the whole idea of liberty. If a man perform an act himself, in the absence of constraint,—not compelled as when a stronger seizes his person and forces movements,—he is free—free in the highest sense of the term—has all the liberty possible or conceivable. It is not necessary to the highest possible liberty that he have power to do otherwise. This is necessitarian freedom. Freedomists object to this definition that it is only freedom *to* an act, not, also, freedom *from* it. It is mere physical or mechanical freedom; the freedom water has to run in its channel when not obstructed; the freedom a clock hammer has to strike when not constrained by superior force.

Necessitarians contend that their theory distinguishes between physical and volitional necessity; but the only difference made apparent is the difference between the subjects. In the one, the antecedent is a material cause, and the consequent a material effect. In the other, the antecedent and consequent are mental states; but the connection between the two is precisely the same. The consequent in both cases is equally inseparable from its antecedent. The idea conveyed by the word necessity is one and the same; namely, absence of power to be otherwise; and whatever be the subjects of which this idea is predicated, though they be as different as mind is from matter, the predicated necessity is always the same thing. Human liberty, according to the freedomistic theory, consists in a power of will to put forth volitions in exemption from overpowering constraint of every kind and in every direction. Freedom of will is freedom both to and from the act. Will is, by its nature, a first cause, an either causal power; it chooses, makes selections with an alternative, is itself a power, both to the act performed and to its contrary. The argument for free will, in the sense of the freedomistic theory, is, that it is implied in, and arises out of, the conscious sense of moral obligation. The argument assumes that a man can not feel that he is under obligation to an act, and is responsible for it, unless he have power over it. If he be responsible for the act, he must be so exempt from all constraint as that he may either do it or leave it undone. Not that there are two distinct and separate powers, one to do and another not to do, but the one same power called the will, is itself a power equally competent for the one or the other. Or, more correctly, the man himself must be an either causal power, or he is not a moral agent, is not morally responsible.

It is noteworthy here that necessitarians themselves unanimously concede that the power to the contrary is essential to probation, and that the first man had it but lost it; and as he was the only probationer of all the human race, none but him ever possessed it. It may be also remarked that if it can be shown that the earthly life of men is probationary, then the concession involves the whole issue, and our controversy is ended.

To the argument that moral obligation is based upon free-will in the sense of the freedomistic theory, is replied, Moral responsibility rests not on a power to the contrary, but on voluntariness; that is, on self-motion in the absence of constraint. It is said if a man perform an act himself without constraint he is responsible for that act, though he had no power to do otherwise. Responsibility, all agree, includes obligation to punishment for what is not in conformity to law. We rejoin that to say a man is guilty—under obligation to punishment—for doing what he does when it is impossible for him to do otherwise, outrages every sense of justice, and represents the government which holds its subjects to such a responsibility and executes penalty in such cases, as oppressive and tyrannical, in the highest sense attached to those terms.

A second argument in support of the freedomistic theory is found in the absurdities logically inferable from the admission of its opposite. Not that the inferences to which we refer are a part of the necessitarian theory, nor that the abettors of the theory adopt them, but that, to our thought, the inference is logical. To affirm that the law of necessity governs all events; to declare that the contrary of what is could not be, if not fatalism itself, is fatalistic—is fatalism in essence. The logical inferences are the same.

The arguments adduced to prove the doctrine of necessity prove, if they prove any thing, not the mere non-existence of a power to the contrary, but its impossibility. If it be impossible, it does not exist either in man or in God. Then, personality is impossible, and the logical inference is atheistic fatalism. But if a God be postulated, then is he the only active agent in the

universe—the author of all things, sin included. God is the author of sin, or, more correctly, sin is impossible, and a moral government is impossible. Right and wrong, virtue and vice, moral obligation, rewards and punishments, are chimeras, consciousness is a lie, and existence an enigma!

The arguments commonly adduced in support of the theory of necessity are the following:

(1.) The argument from cause and effect. Every event must have a cause. Volition is an event; therefore, it has a cause. The cause being what it is, the volition must be what it is—it could not be otherwise. This assumes that all causes are unipotent, powerful for one sole effect. We affirm that will is a pluripotent cause, powerful for either of several effects. The assumption is a begging of the question—a taking for granted the point in dispute. When volition is referred to the will, it is referred to an adequate cause. But admitting that will is adequate cause for volition, still the question, What causes the will to specify, to put forth one volition rather than another? is urged, as though it were not only the crucial question, but also determinative of the whole dispute. When diversity of objects are before the mind and a selection is made, it is asked, What causes the will to select one rather than another? That it does so is an event; every event must have a cause; what is the cause in this case? We answer, The will is cause of the volition, and insist that the answer is complete. To inquire further is to ask what causes the cause to cause?—an unphilosophical question: but if an answer be demanded, we say, nothing causes the will to cause; it is itself first cause. The question may be retorted: If the will be bound in all cases to one sole volition, what causes it to be so bound? and if a cause be adduced, we still inquire what causes that cause to be bound to its sole causation? and if the fastener be found, what fastens the fastener? Evidently the questioner is a bad philosopher to ask such a question.

(2.) The Edwardian *reductio ad absurdum*, known as the infinite series, is much relied upon in this controversy. It is on this wise: We have a given volition (call it x). Now, says the argument, the freedomists affirm that the mind, in putting forth that volition, was not free unless it was self-determined; but if it was self-determined, the argument continues, it must be determined in the same way that mind determines other things, such as muscular action, that is, by an antecedent volition (call that antecedent volition a). But volition a is not free unless it be self-determined. This, then, for the same reason as before, requires another preceding volition (call it b), and another (call it c), and so on without end. The doctrine of free-will, therefore, requires an infinite series of definite acts, which is absurd; therefore, the doctrine itself is absurd.

Now, it must be manifest that this whole argument turns on the term self-determined, which, perhaps unfortunately, has been frequently used by all parties in the controversy. The question is asked, How does the mind or will determine itself? and the argument tells us how; namely, by an antecedent volition. We reply, it does not determine itself at all. It is not *determined*, it is *determiner*. The question, How determined? is nugatory, the answer useless, and the series is cut off at its beginning.

(3.) With the appearance of argumentation the question is asked, What is the use of a power to the contrary—a power which confessedly is never used? Evidently all the argument there is in this question turns on the term, power to the contrary, as though freedomists taught that there are two powers—one to do, and another not to do—whereas the truth in the case is, that the will is one power, equipotent for either of several results. If the question were, What is the use of an either causal power? What is the use of alternativity? What is the use of the power of choice, of free-will?—which is the only

question of utility pertinent to the case—the argument disappears.

(4.) Again, the doctrine of motive influence is resorted to in support of necessitarianism, and it is boldly affirmed that volition is always as the strongest motive—not the strongest objectively considered, it is conceded, for in that case all beings capable of virtue would be necessarily virtuous—but the strongest motive considered subjectively; that is to say, the volition is always as that motive which the agent considers strongest.

But when a standard of strength is demanded—when a criterion for determining the strength of motives is required—none can be given; and the only reason given for affirming that any particular motive was the strongest, is the fact that the agent volitionated in accordance with it. To say that the will is as the strongest motive, and then to define the strongest motive by saying, it is that which the will obeys, is certainly reasoning in a vicious circle. To avoid this, it is said the will is always as that which is most agreeable to the sensibilities. Volition is determined by antecedent emotion. This is placing the issue on fair ground, and if the statement correspond with fact, the freedomistic idea of liberty must be discounted, necessitarianism has the field. Does the strongest, the most agreeable, the most pleasing emotion, move, determine, decide, fix, settle, the will? Does the will invariably volitionate in accordance with the most pleasing antecedent emotion, in such a sense as that it can volitionate otherwise? Again, in the absence of a most pleasing emotion, in the absence of all motive, or, which is the same thing, in an equilibrium of motives, is the will incapacitated for volition? These questions appeal to consciousness, and each man must answer them for himself.

We affirm, that every man that lives volitionates a thousand and more times every day of his life, in the total absence from consciousness of any emotion moving him thereto. In innumerable little matters of every-day life there is perfect indifference, clearly cognized in consciousness, whether the thing be this or that, and yet, notwithstanding that indifference, the mind wills with perfect ease. In guessing, as when a man is challenged to tell of an unknown number, whether it be odd or even, if mind acts only as it is acted upon, if will stands still till emotion moves it, the guesser could never speak. All men can and do, every day of life, volitionate freely in just such cases. The action may be unimportant in itself, and in all cases such action is void of moral character, but its existence proves the existence of power in the will to volitionate independent of emotion, and disproves the doctrine of necessity. To our thought, motives are not things that control the mind, but contrariwise, in frequent cases the mind controls them; certainly in all cases of doubt and deliberation, where there are several strong reasons for action, each prompting a course of conduct diverse from the others, it is the will itself that determines which it will adopt; it is the action of the will that makes the selected motive the strongest. Motives are reasons or considerations, in view of which the man volitionates. They are not objective or subjective entities that constrain, limit, compel, or necessitate him in his choices and action. The so-called strength of a motive, considered as a somewhat existing antecedent to choice and action, is the probability that the agent will act in accordance with it. Events may be very highly improbable, that are at the same time possible; if not possible, they do not belong to the category of improbabilities. The impossible is found only in the domain of fate and necessity. The probable and improbable belong to the domain of contingency, of freedom, of liberty. Motives before the mind of a free agent are probable grounds of action, not necessitating causes of action.

(5.) An argument from the foreknowledge of God is usually adduced with unbounded confidence. It is said, if God knows the future volitions of men, then are those volitions certain. They can not be otherwise, and the doctrine

of contingencies must be excluded. We reply, this argument identifies two things that are not the same—certainty is not the same as necessity. *Will be* is not the same as *must be*. It may be certain that an event will be, when there is existent adequate power for the contrary; it will be, though it may not be. If an event be necessary, it is made so by the absence of any power to the contrary. The presence or absence of this power to the contrary is the essential and only difference between *may be* and *must be*, between contingency and necessity. This difference is more than world-wide, and to identify two things, differentiated by so vast a difference—a difference clearly cognized in the universal consciousness of mankind, is, to say the least, bad logic.

The fallacy of this argument from foreknowledge is manifest from the fact, that foreknowledge may be eliminated without any change in the merit of the question. All agree that knowledge is not causative; foreknowledge does not make events certain—it only proves them so. But all future events are certain, whether God knows them or not. What will be will be, is a truism which none can dispute. The whole future history of the universe will be in one way, and not in two. If, then, certainty is the same as necessity, necessity must be affirmed, whether foreknowledge be postulated or not. Prescience need not be taken into account. Certainty and necessity are the same, the controversy is ended. Our dispute is, at best, only about words; there is no real issue in the case. It is here noteworthy, that this argument especially, as well as all other necessitarian arguments, proves, if it prove any thing, not merely the non-existence of contingencies, but their impossibility. From any stand-point in eternity past, we may cast thought forward and affirm that what will be will be. All events conceivable were at some time future and certain. If then, certainty and necessity are the same, all conceivable events were from eternity necessary. This is fatalism. Neither God, angel, man, nor demon, ever thought, felt, or did any thing with a power to think, feel, or do otherwise. All existences and events that ever have been, that are, or that ever will be, have, from eternity, been fixed in one unbreakable chain of necessitated existence and occurrence.

(6.) Arguments for necessitarianism are constructed from the ideas of a divine plan and a divine government. To suppose that God has created the world, and governs it without any plan or purpose, or, to suppose that he governs the world without reference to his plan and purpose, is to conceive of an un wisdom which no sane man will ascribe to God. All things, therefore, it is said, are efficiently governed and put under contribution to the accomplishment of God's will and purpose; hence they can not be otherwise than they are. We reply, this statement, to be of any service to necessitarianism, must postulate the conception that God can not govern the world unless all things be reduced to the condition of machinery. All created existences must be made subject to the law of necessity, or God can not govern them. We affirm that God's plan and government includes the existence and agency of free moral beings, and that Omnipotence is competent to put such beings under contribution for the accomplishment of wise and benevolent purposes, without constraining their liberties. And, by the way, though our opponents seem to conceive that they are specially charged with the defense of the divine sovereignty, we insist that the freedomistic conception of the divine government is incomparably superior to theirs; for, in seeming at least, they conceive that all government is impossible, except the government of things. We believe in a government of persons, and worship a deity who is competent to manage the affairs of the universe in accordance with purposes of infinite wisdom, though there be existent an innumerable company of rational beings, who, like their Creator, are endowed with liberty of will.

We conclude, then, that the sense of obligation, of which all men are conscious, is in accordance with the truth of things, and that the conviction of liberty, which naturally and necessarily arises out of such a sense, is

reliable; that man is free, within limits a first cause, has alternative power, has freedom both to and from all acts and states of mind for which he is held responsible. The freedom of will for which we contend is not the natural freedom of Pelagianism, but a freedom by grace; not the perfect freedom of Adam before his sin, but a freedom adequate to all the purposes of a fair probation. We have deemed it necessary to discuss this topic in this place, because, in anthropological discussion, it is scarcely possible to consider the doctrines of original sin and free-will apart. It is obvious that, inasmuch as the freedom for which we contend is a gracious gift, and not a natural inheritance, this subject might take its place in soteriology, but the close connection just now referred to justifies our anticipation.

OBJECTIONS.

We here recapitulate several objections noticed in the discussion, and add other miscellaneous objections to the anthropology of Genesis.

It may be fairly presumed, that so much of Jewish history as is found in the writings of Moses was familiar among well-informed Jews in the times of Moses. From the eleventh chapter of Genesis, that is, from the commencement of Jewish history beginning with the call of Abraham, without doubt the history is compiled from well authenticated sources. But whence Moses obtained a knowledge of the history of the creation, of the fall, of the antediluvian times, of the flood, of the families of Noah, their dispersion and successive generations, is not known. The record does not inform us, and there are no contemporary writings. The first ten chapters of the Bible stand alone in the world. What was their source? Here, of course, there is margin for speculation, and it is not wanting. Upon the surface it is a part of a continuous history, and in the faith of the Church it is so received. But objectors claim that it is void of authority—that it is poetic in its style, and appears more like a psalm of creation than any thing else. It is supposed that it was sung in the congregations of antediluvian worshipers, and is entitled only to the consideration which is due similar poetic effusions. Assuming that it is such, it is affirmed that it is highly figurative or symbolical; that its allusions to what it treats as facts are ornamented with the writer's fancies, and that therefore it is not to be regarded as authentic history. The unhistorical but poetic character of the composition is further urged by the fact, that the six days of creation are evidently not six times twenty-four hours, but that if they be historical in any sense, they are six geological periods of indefinite long time. Now, it is urged, if the days of creation are symbolic, the creation itself, the Creator the persons and things created; the circumstances of the creation, together with all the relations and correlations of the account, may also be symbolic, and as we have no key to the interpretation, the poem is unintelligible. To regard it as a history, and to found upon that history a system of morals and religion for all mankind, is considered as vicious in criticism, unsound in philosophy, and perilous to truth and righteousness. What can be said in reply to so grave an objection?

1. These chapters can not be rejected from the canon, because inspired psalmists, prophets, and apostles have referred to them in such a way as fully indorses their canonicity and inspiration; they form apart of and underlie the whole teachings of the book of God; their rejection, therefore, antagonizes all the evidences by which the inspiration of the Scriptures is sustained.

2. To say they are inspired and written for the profit of the Church in times yet future—that as yet we have not the knowledge requisite to their interpretation—is, if not cowardly, certainly modest, and may, therefore, be endured; but if these chapters are unintelligible, then most of the Bible is unintelligible, and the whole book may be pronounced as misleading, and if not

injurious, at least useless.

3. We insist that what, by the common accepted rules of interpretation, may be said to be asserted in these chapters is true; the facts there recorded as having taken place did occur. What does this book of Genesis affirm? It affirms that the material universe came to be by creation—it is not eternal; that the resultant of the first act of creation was in a chaotic condition; that the Creator, by a positive act, established the existing order of things, separating light from darkness, and the waters from the dry land; that he caused the waters to bring forth fish, and the land to bring forth vegetables and animals; and that he, by special act, caused the fish of the sea and the vegetables and animals of the dry land to come to being, everyone after its kind; that he made species distinct each from the other, and made them capable of propagating each its own kind. That is to say, the thing affirmed is, that the present existence and order of the material universe is the product of the creating power of a personal First Cause. That is the affirmation; that is on surface of the record; and that is true. I look upon a man, a tree, a mountain, an ocean or a lake, and if I have the Book of Genesis in my hand it tells me that God made that person or thing before me. He made it as it is; not something else that has become that, but that thing itself as I see it. The fact itself, also plainly stated in the record, that this particular person, vegetable, or animal, with all the generations with which it is connected, came into individual existence through propagation, affects not at all the main affirmation that God made it. This is the great truth asserted in this book of Genesis, and with it the whole Bible stands or falls! More than this a sound criticism will regard as unimportant, and as not in the least affecting the authenticity and authority of the record.

It is equally evident, that what is said about the compound nature of man—that his body is matter, his soul spirit—about the fact that he was placed under law, which law he transgressed, and that by transgression he displeased God and brought upon himself great detriment, is truth without the mixture of error, clearly stated and circumstantially delineated. The teachings are not unintelligible or obscure, they are historical records of plain matters of fact; the whole account is to be taken for what it appears to be, namely, a part of a continuous history. But descending to particulars, it is objected that the account of the serpent's agency is highly improbable. That a serpent should talk, that our first parents expressed no surprise at such an event, that they should be deceived by a brute, especially when he contradicted God, are among the many little cavils with which unbelievers attempt to disparage the Bible record. The fact that difficulties exist in adjusting the unimportant details of an account ought not to be allowed to overbalance convincing arguments that pertain to the essentials of that account.

Let it be admitted that it is in itself highly improbable that such a creature as a snake should be employed even as an instrument in transactions so important as those recorded in the book of Genesis, yet, since the thing itself is not an impossibility—is at most merely improbable—and since the main account is adequately authenticated, the improbability in the case ought to be omitted when estimating the credibility of the record. But perhaps the improbability is not really as great as appears. The record itself more than intimates, that the creature called a serpent was not the same as that since known as serpents. The curse pronounced upon him implies a change in his entire nature—implies that he once walked erect. It also certainly affirms that he was the most subtle of beasts. If we knew, therefore, precisely what the serpent was, probably the present difficulties in the case would disappear. But on this supposition it is objected, that to punish the serpent thus for his unintelligent and involuntary instrumentality, when the real agent was Satan, is an injustice not to be ascribed to the divine administration. We reply, that the curse was not of nature of punishment,

except as it was exponential of the divine displeasure at sin. The serpents, that now are, are no more punished for sin, even though we suppose them descendants of species once more honorable, than if they were first created such as we now see them.

Again, it is objected that the Scripture affirmation that death entered into the world by sin, when understood, as it commonly is, that the sin of Adam in eating forbidden fruit caused the diseases, pains, and deaths incident to the earthly life of the race, ascribes to a diminutive source results vastly too momentous for such an origin. In other words, it is highly improbable that God would condition so vast a train of evils as come to men unavoidably, upon so trifling an event as the eating of an apple! This objection assumes, that the sinfulness of sin is determined by the amount of injury effected or mischief done. A steam boiler that by explosion shatters a ship, sinks a valuable cargo, and destroys many useful lives, is, then, a great sinner! The truth in the case is, that the turpitude of crime is determined by the authority against which the crime is committed. A boy who disobeys his elder brother does not commit so great a crime, though the thing done be the same, as when he disobeys the command of his father; and sometimes the more trifling the thing done, the greater the crime. In the case before us, that our first parents should violate such obligations as bound them to obedience to God, for so trifling a gratification as the eating of fruit, it would seem that the diminutive importance of the thing forbidden aggravates, rather than extenuates, the crime.

Again, the motive to disobedience, in this case, was not merely the gratification of appetite, but it was an ambition to become as gods. All criticisms as to the slight importance attached to the matter of partaking of the forbidden fruit are ill-advised, since it must be manifest that this was a well-chosen test of loyalty. If a son obeys his father only when, and because, he sees that it is wise and proper that the thing required should be done, he does not thereby evince filial obedience as he does, who faithfully performs the required service solely because parental authority demands it. A positive law requiring a service, for the performance of which no reason is obvious except that it is lawfully required, is the best possible test of loyalty to government. The situation in the garden was wondrously well adapted to determine the question whether man would, or would not, uncompromisingly and unqualifiedly obey God's commandments.

Again, it is objected, that for any crime man was competent to commit, however heinous, it is unreasonable and unjust that such results should follow, as are the many unavoidable and terrible evils of man's earthly life. We reply, it is no more incumbent upon the Christian believer to solve the difficulties of this objection, if there are any, than it is incumbent upon the objector himself. The evils exist, and exist under the government of God. Man comes into the world unavoidably exposed to them. They meet him at his birth and attend him to his grave. No theist will admit that there is any injustice on the part of God in permitting such a state of things to exist. How to reconcile the permission of evil with the righteousness of God is a problem whose solution may be required of every man with the same propriety that it can be required of any man. We accept the Bible account; the evils of this present world come because of man's sin; they are exponents of God's displeasure; they admonish men not to transgress God's law. That the innocent sometimes suffer, is fully compensated by the provision of grace; yea, more than compensated; for every one has ability and opportunity through grace to render the evils of life occasions of blessings. The administration of the divine government, through the whole period of human history, is an administration of redemptive agencies. Redemption, to our thought, solves the mysteries of theodicy.

To the objection that literal fruit has and can have no power to impart life and knowledge, we can only say, it is not manifestly impossible. The condition of our first parents in Eden evidently is not fully described. We know not precisely their modes of sustenance; and, if liable to incipient disease, and to pain from wounds, to fracture of bones by accident, we know not precisely how preventive and remedial agencies were applied. In their then existing condition and circumstances, literally eating of the fruit of a given tree, may have been the appointed means of acquiring knowledge; and eating of the fruit of another tree may have been the means of preserving life and perfect health. More likely there is something figurative here, but we insist not necessarily so, in any such sense as that truth suffers by regarding the record as literal history. Such objections as that our first parents expressed no surprise when the serpent commenced conversation, come so evidently from a captious hypercriticism that it were undignified to attempt a reply.

In this catalogue of objections, the great objection of Pelagianism, that sin pertains solely to conduct and not at all to character, must not be omitted, though it has already been noticed, perhaps, sufficiently. Suffice it to say, in this place, that all men are conscious that there is in them a strange and strong aversion to many practices which they themselves judge to be right and proper, advantageous to themselves and to others, and also a strange and strong inclination toward practices they do not approve, practices unsuitable and injurious. What they are thus conscious of, as true of themselves, they are persuaded is also true of others. To find a perfect man is, in the common judgment, impossible. Pelagians must concede an all prevalent imperfection in the natural and immanent character of men. The only resort is in the affirmation, that it is the will of God that men should be thus imperfect. God made them thus; their constitutional character is not an inherited result of ancestral sin, but a result of the Creator's will. If any man can thus believe that our Heavenly Father directly willed our present estate, to contend with him is, to our thought, a useless waste of words. The God we worship has no pleasure in our sinful, low estate. To save the world therefrom, he has given his only begotten Son, sent his Holy Spirit, employed the ministration of angels, inspired the Holy Scriptures, instituted the militant Church, and commissioned a living ministry. He constantly governs the world with reference to this great end; the salvation of men from sin is God's great work in the world; for its accomplishment the resources of infinite wealth, wisdom, and power are continually under contribution.

RECAPITULATION.

We conclude, then, that man originated from six to eight thousand years ago, in an act of special creation; that, as he came from the hands of his Creator, he was perfect and in maturity—he was the resultant of the combination of two substances, matter and spirit; that he was adequately endowed with all the elements of a moral agent namely, power, intelligence, free-will, and an apprehension of moral obligation—that is, he was created under law, made responsible for his conduct, and put under probation for an endless destiny; that his relations involved the conditions of a trial making the temptation to sin, and its actual occurrence, possible; that he was fully competent to maintain a life of perfect obedience to the divine commandments, and was equally competent, by the same endowments, voluntarily to rebel against the divine government and commit actual transgressions of the divine law; that, as a fact of history, he did transgress, and in that transgression, sin and evil, so far as man is concerned, had their origin—that is, sin consists of, and has its origin in, the abuse of free-will; that sin separated man from his Maker, the communion and fellowship previously enjoyed ceased, God was displeased with man on account of his sin, and withheld his favor; that man, naturally mortal as to his body, but preserved from actual death by

the providence of God, forfeited that immunity and was left in defenseless exposure to physical diseases and to death; that his relations to his physical environments were changed, so that toilsome labor became requisite for sustenance; that, being deprived of supernatural aids, the natural results of transgression, as to his mental powers, ensued—perception was enfeebled and restricted within narrower limits, judgment perverted, reason dethroned, imagination and taste vitiated, conscience seared, affection alienated, and will enslaved; that, left to himself in this condition, he was necessitated to the practice of wrong, which naturally induces the enslaving and unconquerable habit of wrong doing; that living in the habitual practice of sin, a love of it was thereby begotten, and the issue of all was, or must have been, a condition of total alienation from God and righteousness, and an entire corruption and depravity of man's whole nature—physical, intellectual, æsthetic, moral, and religious; that such a condition would, of itself, naturally and necessarily result, in a brief period, in the extinction of the race; that by the prompt execution of the judicial consequence of sin, the threatened penalty of law—namely, death—the extinction of the race would have been effected by the immediate death of the first transgressors; that in this condition of things a plan of redemption and salvation was interposed; that by reason thereof the sentence against sin was not speedily executed, the threatened death did not literally and fully take place, opportunity for escape was provided, the earthly life of the first pair was prolonged, mercy and grace were vouchsafed in their behalf, and the propagation of their species commenced; that human nature, in its condition of sinfulness, was that which was propagated—not divine grace or its supersensuous results; that accordingly the posterity of the first pair come to individuality and personal consciousness in a state of depravity; that all mankind are the offspring of Adam and Eve; that, therefore, all mankind are, as to their natural unregenerate condition morally corrupted, depraved, alien from God, and constantly inclined to evil; that by reason of their common relation to the scheme of redemption they come to personal consciousness—not under obligation to punishment, not exposed to penalty by reason of their natural sinfulness, but, if not actually justified, in a condition to be justified if called to final adjudication in their infancy, or before the commission of actual sin; that also, through grace, they come to moral responsibility under the conditions of a fair probation, though depraved as to their nature, not wholly deprived of grace; that a world-enlightening light enlightens the eyes of their understanding and a gracious manifestation of the Spirit so far quickens the power of free choice that they are fully competent to choose holiness and life, or rejecting it, choose sin and death; and that, finally, they are, each one for himself, placed on probation to determine, by their own free, unconstrained choice, the momentous question of eternal destiny.

What the plan of redemption adopted for the salvation of sinful men was; its relations to the government and character of God; its relations to human agency and responsibility; the historical details of its execution; the agencies employed for its accomplishment; its provisions, conditions, and results, constitute the topics of that part of systematic theology which is technically called soteriology, and will engage our attention in the pages that immediately follow.

Book Fourth

SOTERIOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

THE PERIL OF SIN.

THE term Soteriology is derived from two Greek words, *Soter*, "Savior,"

and logos, "discourse;" and signifies "the science of salvation." In Christian science, its technical meaning is the doctrine of Salvation by Jesus Christ. The idea signified by the word salvation postulates peril; therefore, soteriology must be constructed in the light of the peril from which it proposes to provide exemption or escape. Besides the nature of the peril, the means of escape at command must be taken into account; and the relation of the means of escape to the peril impending must determine the theory of the salvation proposed.

When persons whose lives are in peril by shipwreck at sea inquire, "What must I do to be saved?" the answer, if it be wise, must be determined by the circumstances of the case; by the means of escape at command. The answer may be, "Cling to the wreck as long as any thing is left:" it may be, "Take this life-preserver, and commit yourself to the waves." If a youth, foreseeing the evils of ignorance, inquire, "How shall I escape these impending calamities," the reply would direct attention to the means of acquiring knowledge. If his anticipations had respect to the evils of poverty, and he inquired after the methods of avoiding these, the answer would direct attention to habits of industry and economy. The salvation of theology postulates the perils of sin; that is, the whole catalogue of consequences which accrue from want of conformity in conduct and character to the law of righteousness. Sin is transgression of law, and the perils of the sinner are all the penalties and penal sanctions threatened in the law; all the sanctions, by the threatening and execution of which, the law and through the law the government is sustained. Punishment for crime is not, however, an end of government, but a means to an end. Human governments are organized for the protection of life, liberty, property, character, and reputation. Penalties are annexed to law, to serve as a motive to deter the tempted in times of temptation, from violating the rights of others. In cases of transgression, the threatened penalty is executed lest the majesty of law should be diminished; lest its motive influence should be annihilated.

To the question, What are the ends of the divine government? different answers are given. Some say the glory of God, some say the happiness of man, and others the glory of the Creator through and by the well-being of the creature. To our thought, the last mentioned reply is correct. It is manifest, on a cursory examination, that whatever is for the good of the creature is for the glory of the Creator, and conversely, whatever promotes the glory of God is also promotive of the well-being of his creatures. It would seem, therefore, that the question respecting the specific end of the divine government is not important. It would not be, were it not that soteriologies, widely different from each other have been constructed, whose differences seem to be based on the different replies given to this specific question. It will be found, we think, in the course of the discussion upon which we are now entering, that this difference consists really in diverse conceptions of the glory of God. That which some seem to conceive to be for the divine glory, others regard as immeasurably shameful. For illustration, we here state, without discussion, that Supralapsarianism teaches that God, for the glory of his mercy, elected a certain number of creatable persons, or persons to be created, to eternal life, and decreed their fall, by sin, into hopeless depravity, that he might show mercy by efficacious grace. From such a standpoint, it is evident that the end of creation, redemption, preservation, and providence is to make certain the decree of election. The same system also teaches that in like manner, for the glory of his justice, God reprobated and doomed to eternal death a certain number of other creatable persons, and as to them by consequence, the end of his entire administration is to make certain his decree of reprobation. Now, to us, it is manifest, that a most monstrous conception of the glory of God underlies this system, and we can not well forbear adding all other systems that affiliate with it.

The glory of God and the greatest good of the universe are two inseparable things, and any theory of the divine administration which perfectly harmonizes with either, or, what is better, with both, or the one in the other, must be the true theory; and any theories which are founded upon the conception that these two things are antagonistic must be false. Of course, no sensible man supposes that he can see *how it is*, or can foresee *how it will be*, that the divine administration, as to each individual person, is, in all its particulars, promotive of that person's best good; yea, more, it is evident that a perfectly satisfactory justification of God's ways with men, considered collectively, is too profound a problem for shortsighted man. But no truth can be periled by assuming that the end of creation, redemption, and providence is the highest good of created beings; that the end of divine government is the well-being of its subjects. For, if we suppose that God created, and that he preserves and governs the world for the purpose of making known to the intelligences of the universe his own inherent character, we must also suppose that he is not benevolent, to justify the conception that *his honor* and the good of his creatures are antagonistic. Penalty, therefore, must be designed and adapted to subserve the ends of a benevolent government, and if salvation or exemption from penalty ensue, in any case, it must also be in conformity with the same governmental ends; it must be such as does not sacrifice, but does fully secure those ends.

The topic of discussion in soteriology first in order is, the problem of pardon. The problem is solved, when, and only when, conditions are found under which the non-execution of penalty can be ordered without the sacrifice of the governmental ends for which penalty is annexed to law. Whether the exemption from punishment be ordered by the judge announcing in open court that, under law, and according to law, the demands of justice are satisfied, as some theologians affirm it is, or whether it be by the executive reversing the sentence of condemnation and obligation to punishment previously pronounced by the judiciary, in either case, the purpose for which penalty has been threatened must be effectually and fully secured. The motive influence, which threatened penalty has upon the public mind to deter the subjects of the government from the commission of crime, must be preserved. Government is established, law is enacted, for the protection of the common weal; rectoral righteousness, therefore, requires that law and government be maintained; government must not be annihilated; law must not be abrogated.

In some theologies another view is taken, and therein it is stoutly maintained that the relations of penalty to the ends of government, to the well-being of the governed, are but secondary; that penalty is that which is naturally and necessarily due from the criminal because of his crime; penalty is a debt due to essential justice. The same thing is stated in still another form. The justice of God, considered as an attribute of his nature, is that state of mind which prompts him to render to all existences—either persons or things—precisely what is their due, and penalty is just that which the criminal deserves. From this standpoint it is evident that pardon, if not absolutely impossible, becomes a problem of extreme difficulty. Penalty is due to the divine justice; how can it be remitted? Evidently it can not, unless some condition interpose by which justice is satisfied. God can not be unjust; he must render what is due. So the theory teaches, and, unless it be admitted that what may be justly demanded may be remitted without injustice, we see not to the contrary but that, in this view, pardon is an utter impossibility; but more of this further on. For the present it will suffice to say that, in any view that can be taken of a just penalty annexed to a righteous law, exemption therefrom in case of transgression can not take place without the interposition of conditions which conserve the ends of law and the demands of justice. In preceding pages we have attempted to show to some extent what the penalty due to sin is; our present topic requires that this theme be resumed, and that we endeavor to place in thought as distinct and as

complete an apprehension of what is involved in penalty as is possible.

In Bible formulas the penalty of sin is "death." Theologians say death temporal, spiritual, and eternal. As to the death of the body we have elsewhere said it is to be regarded rather as a consequence of sin than as its penalty, and we may here say, or even as a part of that penalty. As matter, the body naturally tends toward dissolution; dust naturally returns to dust. But for sin that tendency would have been effectually counteracted and finally destroyed; mortality would have put on immortality. Sin deprived man of this preventive, and death, as a fact in history, occurred. It may, therefore, be catalogued as a consequence of sin; it may be regarded as a penal sanction so far forth as it is exponential of the divine displeasure toward sin. But it is not *the* penalty, nor, in strict construction, is it a part of the penalty, threatened in the divine law against sin.

The same thing may be said of what is called spiritual death—the separation of the soul from God. It is a deprivation in which the intercourse and communion between man and his Maker cease; the Holy Spirit is withdrawn; God refuses to manifest himself as a loving Father dispensing blessings; if manifest at all, he is a sovereign judge, executing law and punishing transgressors; it is an abandonment, in which man is left in an abnormal condition and with abnormal relations, for since he was created to know, love, and enjoy God, to be separate from God is unnatural, abnormal. From such a deprivation and abandonment there naturally and necessarily comes a depravation which we have elsewhere characterized as a derangement, a disease, a defect, an enfeeblement, a limitation of the mental and moral powers. This depravity, in another view of it, is a corruption, an alienation from truth, duty, and, holiness. This, from whatever standpoint it is viewed, and however it may be described, is to be regarded as the natural and necessary consequence of sin, not the judicial penalty, the punishment threatened—at least not such in any special sense. Spiritual death, natural depravity, separation from God, is most impressively exponential of God's displeasure on account of sin, and so far forth it may be regarded as of the nature of a penal sanction, but not *the* penalty; or, in strict construction, a part of the penalty judicially pronounced against the sinner as justly due him because of his sin.

What we know of physical and spiritual death is that which is manifest within the domain of probation; *the* death due to sin as its punishment, its desert, belongs to retribution, and remains to be manifested in a future world. If no Savior had been provided, if Adam and Eve had been cut off from all probationary privileges and doomed to retribution without mercy, they would have experienced the death that is due to sin. It is supposed that the angels who kept not their first estate, postulating that that first estate was an administration of law without redemption, are in a condition of retribution; are suffering what is intended by the term eternal death; are experiencing the death due to sin—the penalty annexed to the divine law. It is affirmed that all of the human race who reject the remedy provided for sin, who voluntarily reject the provided preventive of sin, commit sin, and persistently continue in sin and rebellion against God to the terminus of their probation, will also, in the final issue, be doomed to eternal death—called, in the book of Revelation the second death. We fix attention upon this, the issue of probation, the results of sin in retribution, as, *par excellence*, the penalty of sin; that which rectoral righteousness required as the necessary means of securing the ends of government—namely, the highest good of the governed. The theologians just above alluded to would say it is that which the essential righteousness of God required; that which in the nature of things is justly due; that desert which immutable and eternal justice must award.

We, of course, postulate that probation has a terminus—an idea plainly involved in the idea of a probation; for a probation that issues in nothing, or which is the same thing, has no issue, is self-contradictory. Should it here be asked whether there may not be a probation in the future world or state of being, we answer, the question is not pertinent, inasmuch as it makes no difference with the present discussion whether there be or not. We find penalty, properly considered as such, only in retribution subsequent to probation, whenever or wherever the latter may terminate. The salvation of the Gospel, so far forth as it refers to the pardon of sin, has primary regard to the second death, or death in the world of retribution.

What is eternal death? The future is known to none but God, and to him to whom God has revealed it. The nature of the case, and the established order of things in this present world, furnish ground for a rational inference that a retribution of some kind awaits the children of men in the world to come; but a future retribution, as a fact of history, can be certainly known only to Him who sees the end from the beginning—who knows the future as he knows the present. More especially are we dependent upon revelation for any apprehension we may have of the nature of that retribution. Precisely what eternal life and eternal death may be, we can know no further than what is definitely said in the revealed word. As to the righteous, it is said they know not what they shall be. When Christ shall appear his people will be like him, and will see him as he is; but as to all conceptions of the heavenly state, it is affirmed that at best we see but as in a glass, darkly. St. Paul, in his vision of paradise, heard unspeakable words; human language can not convey a knowledge of heavenly things. The same affirmation may, without doubt, be made concerning the final condition of the incorrigibly wicked; precisely what it will be to be lost is, to man in this life, an impossible conception; eternal death is not articulately conceivable.

A discussion of the different theories of future punishment belongs, in systematic arrangement, to eschatology, but a brief notice seems unavoidable here.

ANNIHILATION.

It is affirmed that the second death is annihilation, or, which is substantially the same thing, the cessation of consciousness, the termination of personality. This is a definite conception, and is capable of articulate statement; therefore, if it be the real destiny of the wicked, and there be any revelation on the subject, the anticipation is reasonable that it would be so stated in distinct and unmistakable terms. Is the doctrine of annihilation plainly affirmed in the Scriptures? The fact that a very large majority of the readers of the Bible do not find the doctrine there is not only a negative reply, but is also itself ground for a strong suspicion that the doctrine is not true. The principal support relied upon in proof of annihilation is the affirmation that the term death itself means that. But if death means non-existence, life must mean existence; but many things exist that do not live; life, therefore, is a condition of being, and death, its opposite, must also be a condition of being. It is universally assumed, without controversy, that the term eternal life signifies a state of blessedness; we should reasonably infer that the term eternal death signifies a condition of wretchedness.

Another argument alleged for the doctrine of annihilation is, that the Scriptures, generally, which describe divine judgments upon the wicked, are figures which express or imply utter destruction, such as unquenchable fire; undying worm, everlasting destruction. The earth and the works that are therein are to be burnt up, and the proud, and all that do wickedly are to be as stubble, and the day that cometh shall burn them up, that it shall leave them neither root nor branch, and they shall be as ashes under the feet of

them that fear the name of the Lord. If the fire be unquenchable, then, it is said, the fuel must ultimately be entirely consumed; if the worm be undying, that on which it feeds must in the end be wholly eaten. That these and similar figures would be appropriate to express the idea of utter destruction, the equivalent of annihilation, may be conceded; but, in the interpretation of figurative language, it is not allowed that every idea that the figure might express be predicated of the subject about which the figure is employed; the question is, what was the primary and principal intent of the figure? In this case, the question is, what was the thought in the mind of the writer to express which he used these figures? For example, in 2 Thess. i, 9, "Who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his power," did the writer write the words "everlasting destruction" to express an idea of the entireness of the destruction, or the duration of the destroying process, or was it the unutterable terribleness of the punishment that shall come upon them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ? The most that can be positively affirmed respecting the figurative representations of future retribution is, that they teach that the doom of incorrigibly lost sinners is inconceivably terrible.

Again, figurative language is to be interpreted by literal, and not the literal by the figurative. In Matthew xxv, 46, the doom of the wicked is literally described as everlasting punishment, and these words stand in antithesis with the term everlasting life; where, to say the least, whatever the meaning of those words may be, annihilation is not affirmed. It may be further remarked, that what gives this thought plausibility is, the reluctance everyone must feel in admitting what seems to be its contrary. The retribution of the wicked is a condition of misery; the idea of misery in any condition and in any degree of it, if prolonged indefinitely, without remedy and without hope, especially if conceived as endless becomes a thought too terrible to be thought of as true, so that assurances of annihilation even would to many minds, perhaps to most, be a relief. If, however, it be taken into account that existence, though to the thought of others so wretched that non-existence were better, may, nevertheless, be to those who endure it better than non-existence, this plausibility in favor of annihilation disappears, and many persons affirm that, to their thought, a total cessation of being, or endless unconsciousness, is more terrible than any condition of conscious being that can by possibility be endured.

An argument from analogy is relied upon by some. Certain forms of vice, especially intemperance and licentiousness, tend to dementation, and some victims of those vices have gone down so low that but little, if any thing, of mind seemed to be left to them. The conclusion is, that all sin tends to the same result, and that when prolonged, ultimately ends in utter unconsciousness. That this is an unwarranted inference must be admitted by all who regard mind and matter as two separate and independent entities. If mind be a resultant of material combinations, that is, if materialism be true, then, of course, that which destroys the body will destroy the soul. But, if the body be in man's present life only the tabernacle of the soul, having but a temporary influence on the soul's condition, the argument fails.

Again, the fact, well-known, and of frequent occurrence, that persons who through physical disease have sunk to unconsciousness do revive, and in many cases, in spite of acute and mortal diseases, the mind retains its full life and vigor, renders the argument entirely void. Still another view is urged in favor of this theory. Within limits man kind are endowed with freedom of choice as to destiny; they are not *destined* to endless existence, but are *invited* thereto. Eternal life is placed before them for their choice; if they make themselves unworthy thereof, and thus refuse the proffered blessing, it will not be forced upon them; voluntarily casting the crown of immortality from their brow, they are permitted to return to the nonentity

from which they came. This evidently is mere theory, and if void of inherent probability, is of no force; and besides, a question is pertinent as to the probability that infinite wisdom would call to being the possibility of intelligent, sentient, glorious immortality, and then return the same to original non-existence. We conclude that, however desirable it maybe to the minds of many as a relief from the terrible idea of endless misery, the theory of annihilation is not proved; if that be the final destiny of the ultimately incorrigible, no man knows it; if it be the purpose of God in the issue of this world's history to extirpate sin and blot out its results, to leave in the universe no trace of its existence, he has not revealed to man his purpose in this regard.

UNIVERSALISM.

The affirmation that the evils of sin are limited to man's earthly life, and that all men at death pass into a condition of permanent holiness and happiness, or, in other words, that there is no such thing as punishment in the future world, is generally based upon some conception of the infinite goodness. God is infinitely good, therefore he will not inflict punishment upon any of his creatures. This thought is antagonized by the analogies of the present life. The divine goodness is not a bar to suffering in the present world, therefore it may not be in the future. Again, the inequalities of condition in this life are inexplicable upon any theory that excludes an adjustment in the future life. Greater men and better men are providentially in a lower condition than the less and the worse; yea, even the righteous suffer when the wicked flourish. These things admit of no explication consistent with the idea of an impartial and equitable administration, except as they are referred to a future retribution. But what is decisive on this point is the express declaration of the word of God that "many shall seek to enter in at the strait gate and shall not be able." The salvation of the Gospel, whatever it is, will not be attained unto by all men; some, and the passage just quoted says many, will fail; the peril of sin in the future world, from which the saved shall escape, will be endured by some.

Again, universal salvation is sometimes affirmed to be resultant from the redemption by Christ. All men, it is said, will be immediately at death admitted to heaven for Christ's sake. He is the Savior of all men, in that he saves all men from eternal death, and the special Savior of those that believe, in that he dispenses special favors to some of the saved, not granted to others. Besides the express declaration of Scripture just above quoted, we expect to show, in its appropriate place, that the salvation of the Gospel, as to its final issue with all persons held morally responsible, is provisional, and is conditioned upon the voluntary acceptance of its recipient. The whole tenor of Gospel commands, exhortations, entreaties, and precepts, together with the nature and intent of all Gospel agencies and instrumentalities, postulate an immanent peril. If the unconditional salvation of all men is effectually secured, by what Christ did eighteen centuries ago, then the whole economy of the Gospel is an inexplicable enigma. The sincerity of the inspirer of the sacred writers in the warnings and threatenings of the Holy Scriptures may be honestly and earnestly challenged. "The wages of sin is death." "These shall go away into everlasting punishment." Universalism is not the doctrine of the Bible.

RESTORATIONISM.

This theory admits the doctrine of punishment in a future world, but affirms that it will be limited; admits a future retribution but denies that it is eternal; all men will at last come to holiness and happiness. This is an inference from several different postulates:

1. It is affirmed that no finite being can do what deserves endless punishment; as sin is by finite beings it must itself be finite, and its deserts finite; therefore, if men be left to suffer the full measure due to their iniquities, the time must come when they will be entitled to full release. This assumes to measure the demerit of sin, at least so far as to determine a limitation. That a finite being can not commit a sin whose just punishment will require duration without limit is not an axiom to all minds, and may not, therefore, be assumed as such. But suppose that for a single sin, or for any definite number of sins, the sinner could not be justly punished endlessly, still, if the sinning be repeated and the sins become infinite in number, it must be admitted that the punishment in that case must also be everlasting. Now, the doctrine of final future punishment assumes that none are so punished—none are assigned a final doom—except such as have voluntarily and fully abandoned themselves to the perpetual practice of disloyalty and rebellion against God. While the probability—nay, more, the possibility—of a voluntary and complete surrender to God, of sincere repentance, trust, and obedience remains, the final doom is undetermined. Eternal punishment, then, is predicated only in cases where endless sinning is, by unconstrained and voluntary choice, made certain. In this view, even if we admit that the postulate is axiomatic, the final restoration of all sinners as their legal right, the full claims of law having been met by the full execution of penalty, not only does not follow, but is also plainly impossible.

2. It is affirmed that those who pass out of the present life with the character and in the condition of sinners will have a more favorable probation in the future world. The supposition of a future probation, to be of any service to restorationism, must also suppose that the issue is, in some way, infallibly secured. Probation in itself does not secure results; on the contrary, it supposes that results are undetermined. If, by some addenda, favorable results are secured, no reason is apparent why the same thing might not be done in the present probation—indeed, why it might not be done at first without any probation at all. Is it said if that without supposing any determining factor inconsistent with the conditions of a proper trial, favorable circumstances may be supposed that will so increase the probabilities of a successful issue that it will be morally certain that all will be saved thereby, we reply, by supposition the result is, in this case, a contingency; it may in all cases be favorable, and it may not; whether it will or will not is known only to Omniscience; if the Bible says it is so, it is so; if not, no man knows it.

3. Again, it is said that in this world virtue has not an even chance. The difficulties of avoiding vice and practicing virtue are too many and too great; the human will is too weak, and time is too short, for the decision of a question so momentous as eternal destiny; therefore, a future trial may be reasonably anticipated. If it be admitted that the present probation is not as favorable as might possibly be provided, all that can be inferred is, a future and more favorable trial; but still, it being a trial, the result is contingent, and if it fail, then, for the same reason as now, another and still another trial may be expected, and for the same reason other trials indefinitely, which is to suppose a trial without an issue, which is a self-contradictory supposition. But admit a future probation, and several, if it pleases; when the termination of the last one comes, we are precisely where our present discussion places us on the supposition that the present life is man's only probation; the unsaved pass into a condition of hopeless loss; the final restoration of all sinners is not infallibly secured by any conditions that belong to what is really and properly a trial or probation.

But again, it needs not be admitted that the present life is such as warrants a reasonable expectation of a future trial. The scales of justice

are balanced, if in no other way, by the principle that a man is judged and rewarded according to that which he hath, and not according to that which he hath not; of him that hath much, the more will be required; of him that hath less, less will be required. No man can say that time is too short for a preparation for eternity, unless he has first improved his time and failed for want of more; nor can a man say that the difficulties of virtue are too many and too great, unless he has first done his best to conquer them and failed for want of ability; for any failure in securing life's great purpose that is made necessary or unavoidable by life's untoward circumstances man can not feel condemned, and we are sure that, for such failures, a just and merciful God will never punish any of his creatures.

4. The doctrine of final restoration is by some based upon the affirmation that pains and penalties are not punitive but reformatory; that future punishment is not retributive but disciplinary, is designed for, and adapted to, reformation, and will, in the final issue, be made efficacious to that end; that when the penalties become sufficiently severe the culprit will relent, repent, and reform; when those who remain incorrigible through the present life come to wake up amid the realities of the eternal world, and experience the sad consequences of a rebellious life as developed in that future state of being, they will turn in sorrow to God and pray for mercy.

This theory entirely mistakes the natural tendency and influence of the consequences of sinful practices. They constitute strong motives to reformation, but do not make reformation more convenient; there is nothing in them tending toward reform, but, contrariwise, they tend continually toward an enslavement, in which reformation is impossible. For illustration: it is often said there is more hope of a gutter-drunkard than of a moderate drinker. Now, the fact is, the former has stronger motives to total abstinence; there is more hope that a friend may succeed in persuading him to sign a pledge; but suppose both the gutter-drunkard and the moderate drinker do sign a pledge to total abstinence, which will find it more convenient to keep his pledge? If the evil consequences of sin are reformatory and furnish their victim with recuperative power, the gutter-drunkard must be more certain of success; but everyone knows that the contrary is the fact. Penitentiaries do not improve the character of criminals; if they reform within prison walls it is by agencies carried thither by Christian zeal and charity. All the tendencies of sin, with all the consequences thereof, are toward conditions worse and worse—less and less favorable to reformation and salvation. Is it still insisted that men are in this life stimulated to reformation by what they suffer—that before they are afflicted they go astray, but when sorrow comes they repent—we reply, this is all within the limits of probation; this is while reformation is possible; and the recuperating force is found not in the sorrow, not in the pain, not in affliction, but in the energies of will and in the grace of God. I repeat, sin and its consequent misery have not, in themselves, any tendency toward holiness and happiness, but contrariwise, all their forces press in the opposite direction.

5. Another basis of the theory of restoration is what is called the law of progress. It is affirmed that progress, in the line of improvement, is a universal law of human nature and of all that pertains to human character and destiny. This is wholly an assumption; it can be inferred from nothing except the analogies of this life, and though some of these favor the theory, others directly oppose it. Some men improve during the whole of life, and die at the summit of their attainments, but more ascend for a time, and then sink, and for aught that any law of progress assures to the contrary, they sink to rise no more.

6. A theory of the future life, always associated with the above theory of progress, teaches that men commence the future as they close the present

and enter upon different spheres according to their advancement in culture attained in the present life, and that by educational processes, much the same as those of this life, they will certainly advance indefinitely from sphere to sphere, with a rapidity dependent upon their diligence in the improvement of privilege.

This theory has one merit; it teaches distinctly that the future is determined by the present. This harmonizes with revelation and with all the analogies of human life, but it entirely eliminates all ideas of trial, of judgment, and of retribution, in any proper sense of those terms. It is also usually associated with Swedenborgian speculations respecting the spheres, and well-nigh materializes all conceptions of the spirit world. Of restorationism, then, we say, as of annihilation, and of Universalism, it is not based on any reliable, rational evidence, and is not assured in revelation; it is not proved.

These theories, just now considered, may be said to be faulty through an excess of hope. They are prompted by the hope that the future may not be as terrible as the fears of some seem to apprehend. Perhaps others verge toward, if they do not reach, an opposite extreme. To be sure, upon the surface of the subject, it would seem that there can be no possibility of an apprehension extremely fearful. It is so in this life; no man can know, except by experience, how great are the sufferings consequent upon sin; and yet views which may be questioned are entertained by some, whom, for want of a better term, we here designate as extremists. They teach that eternal death consists chiefly in the positive infliction of pain in the highest degree possible, continued perpetually through endless ages. Eternal torment, unmitigated agony, all that a conscious being can suffer without cessation or termination, are formulas which faintly express the thought intended.

The argument usually adduced in support of this view is on this wise: It is due to the holiness of God and to the welfare of the universe, it is required by essential justice, that virtue be encouraged by the promise of the greatest possible good, and that vice be discouraged by the threat of the greatest possible evil. Again, infinite righteousness or holiness !s, in its essential nature, opposition to sin and displeasure with sinners on account of their sins; that, therefore, which is exponential of the intensity of the infinite displeasure, or, as it is called in Scripture, "the wrath of God," must be nothing less than the greatest possible evil.

Evidently to many minds it is much easier to admit this argument as conclusive than to show that it is not so. But we venture a suggestion. That the Supreme Sovereign is obligated, by his own nature and by the demands of his government, to encourage virtue and discourage vice, by the greatest motive that he foresees will operate as a motive, to our thought, can not be reasonably questioned; but if he foresee that all who reject a given motive would also reject all motives, however great, we do not see that he would be obligated to present any greater than that given motive. The Christian doctrine of retribution supposes that, in the case of the lost, all motives to holiness are nugatory; the lost are dead to all persuasions, however great. When such a state of mind is reached, trial terminates and retribution begins. It is manifest, that when motives sufficiently great to move the will, if it could be moved at all, have been presented, it is of no service to present greater motives; a persistently obstinate will once evinced and the case is decided. If our Heavenly Father punish, It is because he must, and the punishment is just so much and no more than the case necessarily and unavoidably requires. It is not irreverent to think that God strives to make hell not as terrible, but as tolerable as possibilities admit; vengeance is no chosen work of his; he repays, because truth, justice, righteousness, and the greatest good require it.

Still another reply to the question, What is eternal death? which hardly claims to be a theory, and for which we can not think of any appropriate name by which to designate it, demands a brief notice in this connection. It is sometimes said that God has not revealed, and therefore man does not know, the divine purpose in respect to man's future state. Of course, it is not intended that there is a total silence on the subject, for this would contradict plain matter of fact. The whole Bible, directly or indirectly, refers to a future state of being. Revelation and the nature of the case furnish ground for numerous reflections, and some things may be positively affirmed. If all that is intended be that there is not either in rational or in authenticated evidence, or in both, material for the formation of a complete and adequate conception—that is, if it is intended only to say that an accurate definition in human language can not be given—doubtless all will agree that the affirmation is well-founded. But that more than this is intended may be inferred from the general drift of the following exegesis. It is said the passage, "these shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal," may be translated, "these shall go away into the punishment of the eternal world, but the righteous into the life of the eternal world;" thus simply affirming a difference between the future history of the righteous and that of the wicked, and also plainly implying that one will be rewarded and the other punished, no intimation being allowed as to the nature or duration of either reward or punishment. In this view annihilation or restoration may either of them be true; we do not know, and can not know any thing to the contrary. We only know that God is sovereign, and will reward virtue and punish sin; more than this is not revealed.

That the nature of the case and the revelations of the Scriptures do furnish grounds for some affirmations more than the bare fact of future retribution, and for some specific conceptions, will appear, we think, in what follows.

SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF FUTURE RETRIBUTION.

1. Sin, by definition, is non-conformity to law; law is the will of God: that is to say, the infinite will is opposed to sin; all the attributes of the divine nature are in harmony with the divine will; God's wisdom, power, goodness, holiness, truth, justice, and righteousness, are opposed to sin, and opposed with infinite intensity. The divine opposition to sin, and displeasure with sinners on account of their sins, is, in the Scriptures, called the wrath of God. To be the subject of such displeasure, the displeasure of such a being as God is, sustaining to us such relations as subsist between us and him, is, of itself, an evil inconceivably great.

2. Again, sin against God is a disregard of, a disrespect toward, an indifference in respect to authority, than which it is impossible any should be more just and righteous. It is a violation of obligations, than which none that can by possibility obligate a moral being are higher and stronger. To disregard the highest authority existent, and to violate the strongest obligation conceivable, involve the principle of the greatest possible crime, and, even though it may not incur the greatest possible demerit, it does incur a demerit which to finite conception is immeasurably great. The fact that God takes up sin into his plan of government, that he even causes the wrath of man to praise him, and puts all things—sin and its consequences not excepted—under contribution to work out the greatest good, discounts nothing from this view. To say that God prefers sin to holiness, in cases where it occurs, is self-contradictory. What God prefers is not sin; sin is opposition to the divine will; God is displeased with sin in an infinite degree. The sinner must sometime, sooner or later, come to know that he is the subject of an unlimited displeasure, and that that displeasure is in the mind of him upon whom the

sinner is dependent absolutely, and in all respects. He must know and feel that he who has all power unchangeably and unceasingly condemns both his character and his conduct. This is, in itself, an unlimited evil.

3. The sinner is by his character disqualified for, and by his conduct shut out from, the greatest good; to him heaven itself would be hell; he must go to his own place, to the society and surroundings for which he is most naturally fitted. To lose that for which he was created, to which he was normally adapted, is to lose himself. The grace of God is thwarted; the designs of infinite wisdom in his creation, the purpose of infinite love in his redemption, are subverted; his existence, so far as he is concerned, is a failure; it is an infinite loss, an infinite evil.

4. That sin is an infinite evil is clearly demonstrated by the cost of redemption. To declare God's righteousness, that he might be just and the justifier of him that believeth, required an expenditure no less than the incarnation, sufferings, and death of God's own Son. A salvation securable only by an infinite price must be a salvation from an infinite peril. Is it said that the security of an infinite good indicates the wisdom of paying a price infinitely great? We reply, that comes to the same thing; for the peril of an unlimited good is itself an unlimited evil.

5. The Scriptures every-where represent the doom of the wicked as including something more than the necessary natural consequences of sin—something more than mere loss. In all human jurisprudence the criminal incurs penalty. The thief, besides the loss of self-respect and public confidence, besides self-condemnation and the censure of his fellow-citizens, besides the obligation to restore what he had stolen, and to make restitution by paying damages, is held under obligation to fine, to imprisonment, to the pains and penalties of the law. Law is sustained by the threatening and the execution of judicial sentence; the positive infliction of punishment is involved in legal administration. The Scriptures represent that this is true in the divine government; "Vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord." What this can be, probably finite thought is incompetent to conceive. What the essential justice of God may require, what the ends of divine government may demand, is doubtless more than any creature can estimate. As unspeakable words constitute the language of heaven, as the saint knows not what he shall be when he has attained unto the glory of eternal life, so are the woes and the wailings of the lost unutterable in earthly language, and the thoughts of men incompetent to conceive the import of eternal death.

6. These evident principles involved in the I nature of the case, and these solemn and impressive intimations from the holy Scriptures, are fully sustained by all the analogies of the present life that bear upon the subject. The tendencies of sin are universally toward a condition of remediless wretchedness. The drunkard may practice intemperance many years and still reform; but the recuperative power is not in his sin or its consequences, but in the energies of a will not yet wholly enslaved, but quickened and strengthened by divine grace; his sin, with all its effects, bears him downward, steadily, constantly downward, and unless arrested and counteracted by opposing force, will bring him, in time, to a condition of remediless ruin.

We conclude, then, that whatever be the purpose of God as to the ultimate destiny of his creatures, to human thought the everlasting punishment, or, if it pleases, the punishment of the eternal world, which the Scriptures affirm as the destiny of the finally impenitent, is an infinite evil.

The use of the term eternal death has the following Scripture warrant: In Mark iii, 29, the blasphemer against the Holy Ghost is declared to be in

danger of "eternal damnation." In Matthew xxv, 46, the reward of the righteous is called "eternal life," and the doom of the wicked, "everlasting punishment." The term punishment is the antithesis of the term life, and evidently expresses all that, and something more than the term death would have expressed had it been used in the place of the term punishment. The word translated everlasting is the same in the original as the word translated in the other clause eternal. The term everlasting punishment is, therefore, certainly equivalent to the term eternal death; it expresses nothing less, but rather something more. The state of the blessed is very frequently designated by the term eternal life, and its opposite is not unfrequently called the second death. Sin, then, the transgression of God's law, exposes the sinner to an infinite peril, which is appropriately called danger of eternal death.

Had sentence against the first sin been executed speedily, the history of the first pair had been the history of the race; the termination of their earthly life, and of their probation, would have been immediately successive to the commission of their crime; that is to say, the prompt and literal execution of the penalty threatened would have placed them within the domain of retribution; probation would have ceased, and retribution, the punishment of the eternal world, would have instantly ensued. The fact that their earthly life was prolonged; that the propagation of their species was permitted; that their posterity come to personal, individual existence under probationary conditions; that, as in the case of the parents, so in the case of the children, sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily; that space is given for repentance; that reformation and a partial salvation is matter of fact and consciousness and that there is, in the universal consciousness of mankind, a conviction that there is mercy with God for the pardon of sin and for complete salvation from all the consequences and penalties of sin, proves conclusively, demonstrates beyond the possibility of a reasonable doubt, that the history of mankind is a history of redemption; that the administration of the divine government in its application to the human race is an administration of grace and mercy. The pardon of sin is, in some way, provided for; the non-execution of the penalty as to the guilty—as to those from whom penalty is due—is, in some way, authoritatively ordered.

That this occurs in such a way as is consistent with the divine character and with the ends and principles of the divine government, must be taken for granted. Salvation, however desirable, even if it be of a race of beings before whom is the possibility of a destiny infinitely glorious, can not be secured at so great an expense as the prostitution of the divine character, or the subversion of the divine government, or the abrogation of the divine law. The infinite Lawgiver and Judge is "a just God and a Savior." How this can be is the problem of soteriology. God has said, "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." All men have sinned; how, then, can they live? How can God, consistently with his own character and with the claims of his government, pardon sin? Not how can he, as an individual person, feel kindly disposed toward the sinner, but how can he, as the administrator of law, authoritatively order the non-execution of the penalty? This question has respect not to what is absolutely possible or impossible with God, but to what is, in the light of human thought, rational, consistent, and in accordance with the teachings of the Scriptures. For feeble, erring man to pronounce dogmatically what God can do and what he can not do, is plainly preposterous! If, on mere human authority, it be pronounced that God can not pardon sin thus and thus, the announcement may be wisely set at naught. The intelligent theologian does not attempt the discussion of divine possibilities; but he discourses on the reasonableness of human thought, and on the accordance of human systems with divine revelation. The question otherwise stated is this: I have sinned against God; on what ground may I reasonably indulge the hope that God will forgive me? Can I rationally and Scripturally expect that if I be thus and thus, if I do so and so, he will restore me to his favor and

exonerate me from all obligation to punishment? Can God pardon sin?

CHAPTER II.

THEORIES OF SALVATION.

PARDON IMPOSSIBLE.

SOME thinkers boldly and strongly affirm that pardon is impossible; that in a perfect government it is an absurdity. In human governments the executive is invested with the pardoning power, because the government is imperfect. All the officers of government are fallible men; the legislator may enact an unjust law; the judge may interpret law incorrectly, and apply it where it is not applicable; the witnesses may not rightly understand the facts, they may falsify them; the jury may misinterpret and misapply the testimony; there are many ways in which, according to law, an innocent man may be exposed to penalty. To make all possible provisions against the legal punishment of innocent persons, the executive has authority, when, in his judgment, the case requires the exercise of executive clemency, to countermand the sentence of the judge—to exonerate the condemned from the punishment to which he is sentenced. But evidently, it is said, under the divine government no such case can ever occur. The law is just and good; its requirements are exacted in perfect righteousness; that which is justly due, and nothing more, is demanded; its penalties are exact demerits—that which the criminal deserves and the greatest good requires; the Judge is all-wise, can not mistake the law nor its just application; the evidence is conclusive; the verdict is in accordance with truth; the sentence is rightly pronounced; there is no possible margin for the exercise of executive clemency; whoever transgresses God's law must himself suffer the penalty, there can be no reprieve, no pardon; the soul that sinneth, it must die, it can not live.

Such a theory can not subsist in any mind, except with it there be a low estimate of the evil of sin and a conviction that the penalties of sin are trifling. The theory naturally affiliates with the idea that most men suffer all that is due immediately or soon after the commission of crime; that if, for flagrant transgressions, more is due than can be inflicted in this life, it will reach not far into the future life, and that, at some future period comparatively not far distant, all men will be obedient to law, loving toward God, and happy in a secured and permanent holiness. This theory, doubtless seems plausible to men whose consciences are seared; but to men whose moral judgments are deserving of consideration, it is infinitely at fault in its estimate of sin and the consequences thereof, and most men, if not all men, at times have apprehensions respecting the peril of sin, which are utterly at variance with this estimate, and constitute an adequate refutation of the whole theory. Sin is exceedingly sinful; the peril thereof is inconceivably great; and yet there is a conviction in the common consciousness of mankind that somehow there is mercy with God for the forgiveness of sin. The Bible speaks in unmistakable terms; all its teachings, from first to last, declare or imply that sin is a great offense to God, and also that on conditions it may be forgiven.

2. PARDON BY PREROGATIVE.

God is an absolute sovereign. He has a right to do whatever it pleases him to do. He giveth no account of his matters, and none can say, Why doest thou thus and thus? He is good, infinitely good, and as such is well disposed even toward the worst. No finite being can so displease him as to overcome his infinite good will. He can if he will, because he is sovereign; he will, if he can, because he is good, secure for, and confer upon, all his creatures their highest possible well-being. He will freely and unconditionally forgive

all their transgressions, blot out their iniquities, and think of them and deal with them the same as though they had never sinned.

Is this thinkable? Is it conceivably consistent with infinite holiness to be thus indifferent to what is just and right? thus to disregard law and authority? thus to annihilate the distinction between virtue and vice, loyalty and rebellion? To our thought, the theory is in itself inherently abhorrent. It is utterly inconsistent with itself; for it supposes a law, a government, the peril of penalty, and yet affirms an issue that can subsist only in the absence of all law and government; nay, worse than this, it supposes a government, and then affirms an issue which is worse than if no government had ever existed. It is, evidently, better not to frame a law than to frame one, attempt its enforcement, make a failure, and then annihilate its power. A country may more safely depend upon volunteer soldiers for protection against foreign invasion than upon drafted recruits, whose fidelity in time of peril is secured by the threat of death for desertion, which threat is never executed even though desertions be of frequent occurrence; better no law at all than a law unsustained. Is it said that in the absolute sovereignty of God the unconditional pardon of some may be granted; while by the same sovereignty pardon may be withheld from others, and the government sustained by the punishment of the latter? We reply, this is impossible in an impartial government. In a word, then, if pardon can be granted to one on mere prerogative, it can, in the same way be granted to all. If it be thus granted to some and not to others, the impartiality of the administration may be justly challenged. If it be granted to all, the law is abrogated, and the government annihilated. We speak reverently when we say, the divine prerogative does not avail to such an extent. The divine sovereignty is not rightly interpreted by the theory in question; it is not recklessness, arbitrariness. The Supreme Being governs the universe in harmony with his character; his administration is like himself, and in accordance with the relations he sustains to his creatures. The very idea of law, of penalty, of pardon, involves the relation of sovereign and subject. A sovereign can not, arbitrarily and irrespective of the rights of his subjects, do his individual will. He owes as a person somewhat to himself as a sovereign; as a sovereign he owes somewhat to his government, and has rights which he is bound to maintain, and can not sacrifice on mere prerogative. A governor, though an absolute monarch, has no right to discourage loyalty, and encourage rebellion or treason by trampling under foot, for mere personal reasons, the principles of justice and equity.

We affirm, then, that universal pardon by mere prerogative plainly abrogates law, annihilates government, postulates a failure of authority, a want of wisdom in the legislation, and utter weakness in the administration; and that on the supposition that some are pardoned and others are punished, the executive is rightly chargeable with an arbitrary partiality.

3. PARDON ON CONDITION OF REPENTANCE.

(1.) It is said that between man and man, when an aggressor with penitence confesses his fault, and asks forgiveness, the aggrieved, if a good man, will surely forgive him. If, then, pardon, on condition of repentance, be characteristic of human goodness, surely we may reasonably infer as much from the infinite goodness of God. We reply, repentance may be an adequate adjustment of personal injuries, as between one individual and another, but evidently it does not at all affect the legal relations subsisting between the criminal before the law and the chief magistrate required by the claims of administrative justice to execute the penalties of the law on all subjects clearly convicted of crime. Were the case of each individual transgressor the same as if he and God were the only intelligences existent, and if also it were possible for the transgressor to change his own character, and become truly loyal and sincerely penitent, it may be admitted that in such a case

forgiveness would ensue on repentance. But forgiveness in such a case would be simply a change of feeling on the part of the aggrieved toward the aggressor; the case does not suppose an administration of public law; it is a mere matter of personal feeling between one individual and another, not at all the case we have under consideration. Our inquiry is, can the chief magistrate, consistently with his obligations to his government, order the non-execution of the penalty on the sole condition that the culprit, clearly convicted and legally sentenced, do confess his crime, profess penitence and ask for pardon? The term repentance may signify the sorrow a criminal has on account of the evil consequences of his crime. In this sense, all criminals will sooner or later repent. If on condition of such repentance penalty must be remitted, all criminals must be pardoned. This is evidently equivalent to universal, unconditional pardon, and is, as in the case of pardon by prerogative, an effectual abrogation of law and an annihilation of government.

(2.) But it is said that, if the criminal suffer consequences sufficiently severe, he will be moved thereby to reformation, and will not only be sorry on account of the consequences of his crimes, but will also regret the crimes themselves, and form sincere purposes of amendment, and that on such a repentance God will surely forgive him. This supposes that the disposition to sin remains in him; he prefers sin to holiness, rebellion to loyalty; he really wishes he could walk in the sight of his own eyes, in the ways of his own heart; he wishes it were lawful for him to do what God has forbidden, but because transgression brings consequences too terrible to be borne, he chooses obedience, he submits to law; he does so, not because the heart of a loyal subject is in him, but because he desires to avoid the evil consequences of transgression. Now, to forgive such a one, to regard and treat him the same as if he were at heart loyal, is action not in accordance with truth; it would be unwarranted between man and man, much more between magistrate and criminal; it annihilates all distinctions in character; the righteous and the wicked are all the same, if so be their outward acts are not in open violation of law. That such is not the method of the divine administration is obvious; for God looks more to the state of the heart than to the outward acts of the life; indeed, the outward act is judged by the inward motive from which it springs. The Bible distinction between the righteous and the wicked is a distinction which pertains more to the internal character than to the external conduct.

(3.) Should it be said, that the repentance contemplated in the theory of pardon on condition of repentance is a godly sorrow for sin, not the sorrow of the world that worketh death, but a repentance that needeth not to be repented of; that the sinner grieves because he has grieved God, has abused goodness, despised authority, violated obligation, inflicted injury, done harm—we reply, such a state of mind is possible only to the soul already saved from the perils of penalty, already adopted as a child of God, such a state of mind is itself salvation, is to be catalogued among the sequences of pardon, and, therefore, can not precede it as its condition. The theory proposes an impossible condition. The unregenerate, unsaved soul is not the subject of so high a grace as sincere, godly sorrow for sin. If ally one come to God, seeking pardon, with such a sorrow, he. has been aided thereto by grace that cometh through redemption. It is true that such a sorrow in some degree of it, is a condition of pardon and salvation, but it is possible only through Christ. The sinner, without a Savior from the sole resources of his own mind, can not exercise any such repentance. The theory fails at a vital point.

4. PARDON THROUGH CHRIST.

{1.) The Bible clearly connects the salvation of men with the death of Christ, and that connection is every-where represented as of vital importance; "The Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give

his life a ransom for many. Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past. When we were yet without strength, in due time Christ died for the ungodly. God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us. When we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son. I delivered unto you first of all that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures. Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us, for it is written, Cursed is everyone that hangeth on a tree. In whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins. Ye who were sometime afar off are made nigh by the blood of Christ. If the blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of a heifer sprinkling the unclean sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh, how much more shall the blood of Christ, who, through the eternal spirit, offered himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God. Now once in the end of the world hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself. Then he said, lo, I come to do thy will, O God. By the which will we are sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ. Having, therefore, brethren, boldness to enter into the holiest by the blood of Jesus, by a new and living way, which he hath consecrated for us through the veil,—that is to say, his flesh,—let us draw near with a true heart, in full assurance of faith. Jesus, that he might sanctify the people with his own blood, suffered without the gate. Ye know that ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot, who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree. By whose stripes ye were healed. Christ hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the spirit. If we walk in the light as he is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin. These are they that have come out of great tribulation, and have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb."

The doctrine of Christ crucified for the sins of the world is the central idea of revelation. It is taught in the first promise, "the seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head, and he shall bruise his heel." It is symbolized by the sacrifices of antediluvian times, and by those, also, of both the patriarchal and the Mosaic dispensations. To him gave all the prophets witness that "he was bruised for our iniquities," that "the chastisement of our peace was upon him," and that "with his stripes we are healed." John the Baptist cried, "Behold the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world." Christ himself said that "as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up." Again, "I lay down my life for the sheep." St. Paul determined to know nothing among men but Jesus Christ, and him crucified; and he affirmed that it is "a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners," and is "a propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the world." He also said, "The Jews require a sign, the Greeks seek after wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified: to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks foolishness, but unto them that are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ, the wisdom of God and the power of God." It must be manifest, even to a cursory reader, that by the tenor of all the sacred writings, as well as by the passages above quoted, the salvation of men, especially the forgiveness or pardon of sin, is connected, in some very important and vital sense, with the death of Christ. All concede the connection, but some attempt explanations not satisfactory, and, as we think, essentially defective.

In the Socinian theory Christ is a prophet, a teacher. He saves his people as a teacher saves his pupils—by instruction, he saves them from the

evils of ignorance, and blesses them with the immunities and benefits of knowledge. Christ teaches the will of God and the way to heaven, and thus saves them who heed his instructions from sin and its evils, and blesses them with a holy life and its benefits. As a teacher sent from God, it was needful that his mission be divinely authenticated. The miracle chosen for this authentication was, his resurrection from the dead; hence his death, as a necessary antecedent to his resurrection, is an important factor in his saving work. Again, his death is the martyr-seal he set to his testimony—his prime attestation to the truth and divine authority of his teachings; and, again, his death was an example by which he taught his disciples moral heroism in the cause of truth. But chiefly, in the theory of Socinianism, the death of Christ, in connection with his life, is a means of inducing repentance in the minds of men; it is a powerful persuasive; it is a manifestation of interest in the welfare of sinful men, an evidence of disinterested affection for them, that naturally tends to awaken in them a thoughtful consideration of the error of their ways, and to induce them to convert, to repent, to cease evil doing, and to learn and practice the ways of wisdom.

Now, all this is true—gloriously, impressively true; but it is not the whole truth, nor, in any sense, an important part of the truth it is intended to state and explain. It makes but a mere intimation of the importance of Christ's death, without even hinting at the chief point of interest. Orthodox Christianity does not fail in its appreciation of Christ's prophetic work. He is, in the most emphatic sense conceivable, a teacher sent from God. The Father bore his testimony to this effect both at the baptism and the transfiguration—"This is my beloved son, hear ye him." Woe be to us if we do not, as disciples, sit at his feet and learn of him. His whole life, from the manger to the cross, is replete with words and examples of wisdom and eternal life, which are not only adapted, but also designed, to give instruction in the way of salvation.

But man has other needs besides instruction. He is not only an ignorant being, requiring knowledge, but he is also a polluted being, requiring purity; he is weak, and requires strength; he is a child of sorrow, and requires comfort; he is mortal, and aspires after immortality; and, what concerns us most in this discussion, he is a guilty being, and, to be saved, must be pardoned. The Savior of mankind must be more than a teacher, more than a prophet; he must be a priest, a king; indeed, he must be to man all in all. Man, as a sinner, is lost; so far as his own resources are concerned, irretrievably lost. He is nothing, has nothing, can do nothing, without a Savior. A mere teacher could do nothing but aggravate his condition, for, to the hopeless and helpless, ignorance is comparative bliss. What could it avail to a criminal, legally and righteously under sentence of death, to be further instructed as to the claims of justice, as to the turpitude of crime, as to the excellent and benevolent designs of government, as to the equity of law? What would it avail him to receive instruction on any subject whatever, unless escape from the sentence of death was somehow provided for? His savior is the one who procures a pardon for him. To him the announcement that pardon is possible is a gospel, is good tidings, and he that brings it is an evangelist; he that procures it is a savior. Instruction, in such a case, as to the means by which a possible pardon may become actual, is a power unto salvation. Pardon is first, and without it all else is naught, since without it naught else can be. Orthodox Christianity, therefore, while it yields nothing of appreciation as to the life and teachings of Christ, is a voice to a sinful world like that of the Baptist—"Behold the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world." It turns special attention to the *Lamb* slain; to the vicarious sacrifice offered; to the expiatory death upon the cross, as that event eminently, essentially necessary to the taking away the sin of the world.

In the Arian theory, Christ's incarnation, humiliation, sufferings, and death give him influence in the Divine Presence as an intercessor. It is said that it was pleasing to God that the first created, the highest and greatest of all created beings, the intelligence next to himself, his only Son, the only begotten, did voluntarily forego the blessings and beatitudes of the divine presence in heaven; did become incarnate, labor for the good of men, and suffer and die in their behalf; and it is said that, because this manifestation of disinterested love pleased God, therefore he grants unto men, in answer to Christ's intercessions, such blessings as it pleases Christ to ask for them. This, also, is true, but defective; true as far as it goes, but incomparably far short of the whole truth.

The Socinian and Arian theories both emphasize the influence of Christ's death upon the minds of men; its character as a persuasive seems to be its chief saving power. That the death of Christ looks manward; that it has attractive power; that it is a manifestation of love adapted to win even the rebellious, is not doubted. That we love God because he first loved us, and gave his Son to die for us, is not only affirmed in Scripture, but is a truth confirmed by all the facts of Christian experience. This glory of Gospel truth shines brightly in the evangelical faith, but it is insisted that this is only one view of our Savior's work. The death of Christ not only looks manward, but it also looks Godward. He is a propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the world. More of this presently.

(2.) The Scriptures teach that the death of Christ was a necessary antecedent to the pardon of sin and the salvation of men. Not necessary metaphysically, as opposed to contingency; the death of Christ was not an event which could not not be; it was a pure contingency, it might not have been. Nor necessary in the sense of constraint, as opposed to liberty or freedom; Christ was not compelled to surrender up his life for the sins of men; he gave himself voluntarily and freely as a ransom for our souls; but necessary as a *sine qua non*—a somewhat without which something else could not be; that is, the death of Christ was an event without which, under the government of God, the pardon of sin, the non-execution of the penalty threatened in the law, could not be. Postulating that the death of Christ is the event which makes pardon a possibility, and that Logos is God, equal in power and eternity with the Father, the argument is brief and conclusive: the position is fully sustained that Jesus Christ is not only the only name that is given among men whereby we must be saved, but it is also the only name that could be given. There is no greater being who could undertake the work of man's salvation, and if a less being could accomplish it, or if it could be accomplished at an expense less than incarnation, sufferings, and death, there has been an unwise expenditure of resources.

From this it seems manifest, that the incarnation and death of God's only begotten Son are the only method of human salvation possible. If the only one possible, then is it a *sine qua non* in a most emphatic sense. Corresponding with this view are all those passages of Scripture which speak of God as man's Savior. "I am God, and besides me there is no Savior. Look unto me, all ye ends of the earth, and be ye saved, for I am God, and besides me there is none else. God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself. He is a just God and a Savior." Indeed, all Scripture, that refers to the question of salvation, teaches or implies that Christ is the way, the truth and the life—the way, emphatically implying, if it does not affirm, that he is the only way actual, and the only way possible. In Luke xxiv, 46, the Savior says, "Thus it is written, and thus it behooved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day." In the original the term translated "it behooved" signifies, it is necessary—at least this is its common meaning. To say that it was necessary in order to fulfill the Scriptures does not meet the case. It was also necessary for some other reason; evidently for the same

reason that the Scriptures concerning him were themselves written,—namely, without doubt in order to fulfill the great scheme of salvation,—it was an integral, an indispensable part of the plan of salvation. Without the shedding of blood is no remission, and no blood less than the blood of Deity incarnate is of sufficient value for so high a purpose as the declaration of God's righteousness in the remission of sins; nothing less could avail to make it possible that God should be "just and the justifier of him that believeth."

If the question be asked, Why was the death of Christ necessary for the pardon of sin; or what is the vinculum that binds the two events in such inseparable connection? we reply, possibly, no man knows; but ignorance as to the reason or philosophy of the fact is no bar to faith in the fact, if it be plainly taught in the Word of God, or be evidently a necessary factor in the system of grace revealed in the Scriptures. What we think the inspired Word authorizes us to say on this confessedly difficult question will be said further on.

(3.) The death of Christ is vicarious. "When we were yet without strength, in due time Christ died for the ungodly. Scarcely for a righteous man will one die; yet, peradventure, for a good man some would even dare to die; but God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us. Christ also hath once suffered for our sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in "the flesh but quickened by the spirit." "Christ died for us," is the Scripture formula, and teaches that the death of Christ is vicarious or substitutional. The opponents of the doctrine of atonement as held by the Church, construe the expression "for us," in the sense of on our account, or in our behalf, for our benefit. This construction of the word "for," or the original *hyper*, is correct in many cases, and in some where the death of Christ is spoken of; as, he died for our sins, of course on account of our sins, not instead of our sins. But, in the passages above quoted, and in others, this construction is not admissible. In Romans v, 8, it is said, "God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." Here the sense of the word "for" is determined by its use in the seventh verse, "For scarcely for a righteous man will one die, yet, peradventure, for a good man some would even dare to die;" where, beyond question, substitution is the idea, since it is not supposable that one would offer his life in behalf of another unless the life of the other was in peril, and could be saved only by giving up his own life. In the passage, "Christ died for our sins, the just for the unjust," the second clause explains the first. To die for another, then, is to substitute one's death for the death of another. The case under consideration is this: If no Savior had appeared in man's behalf, man would have suffered the penalty annexed to the law he had transgressed; he would have died; Christ interposed and died; his death prevented man's death; that is to say, the death of Christ was in some way and in some sense, substituted for the death of man. The race did not perish in the persons of the first pair; the second death was not inflicted in the day of their sin, and, as we believe, never was and never will be inflicted upon them personally.

But the race have personal existence under circumstances of individual responsibility and probation. In this condition of personal responsibility all have sinned, and are, therefore, exposed to the peril of the second death. The death of Christ is the event by which escape from that death is possible; that is, the death of Christ may be substituted for, or in place of, the death incurred by sin; hence, each individual may say, If Christ had not died, I must. At least, in this low sense, the death of Christ is vicarious. The question whether Christ's death is a substituted penalty, or a substitute for a penalty, involves the same difficulty that is met in answering the question, Why was the death of Christ necessary? which we have already deferred for future discussion.

It is objected to this idea of either a substituted penalty, or a substitute for a penalty, that substitution, in any and every sense, is inadmissible in cases of penalty. Where money, as between debtor and creditor, is due, or where service, as when a citizen is drafted as a soldier, is required, another than he from whom the money or service is due may meet the claims, may satisfy the demand; substitution in such cases may be a perfect, just, and equitable satisfaction. But in cases of crime, none but the guilty can be made or allowed to suffer the penalty. Further, it is said, that so far from Christ's death being a satisfaction to justice for the sins of men, it is the most unjust thing; possible for any government to punish the innocent and let the guilty escape. We reply, that to *compel* the innocent to suffer what is due to the guilty, is the highest injustice; but, if the innocent voluntarily consent to suffer, especially, if he benevolently desire so to do, the injustice, to say the least, is not the greatest. Again, if the innocent are made to suffer, and the guilty allowed to escape in the interest of crime, then is the injustice the greatest possible; but if the substitution be in the interests of virtue, of loyalty, and of good government, the case is materially changed. But we reply, chiefly, that if the suffering be not the penalty, but a substitute for a penalty, if it be voluntarily assumed by the sufferer, if it serve all the purposes for which penalty was threatened, and all the purposes that would be subserved if penalty were inflicted, if administrative justice be satisfied, if the life, loyalty, and virtue of the criminal be secured, and if the executive be disposed to show mercy, then, and in that case, all injustice entirely disappears from the transaction; vicarious suffer)tnng may, without injustice, be allowed.

(4.) The death of Christ is propitiatory. "Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath set forth a propitiation through faith in his blood to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God, to declare; I say at this time, his righteousness, that he might be just and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus. He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world. Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins. Much more, then, being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him, for, if when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life; and not only so, but we also joy in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the atonement. All things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation, to wit, that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them, and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation. Now, then, we are ambassadors for Christ; as though God did beseech you by us, we pray you in Christ's stead be ye reconciled to God. For he hath made him to be sin for us who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him."

These are the most important New Testament passages in which the terms propitiation, reconciliation, and atonement, occur. The word propitiation is found in Rom. iii, 25, and in 1 John ii, 2, and iv, 10. In the first, the original word is *hilasterion*, and in the second and third it is *hilasmos*. The word atonement occurs but once in the New Testament—in Rom. v, 1—and the original is the same as is elsewhere translated by the word reconciliation. *Katallasso* and its derivatives, translated by the terms reconcile, reconciliation, and their paronyms, are the terms most frequently employed to express the idea intended in these passages. If the reader will turn back and read again these quotations, or turn to the New Testament and read them with their connections, he can not fail to see at once that pardon and salvation, by the death of Christ, is prominently the topic of discourse, and that the

death of Christ is represented as securing pardon by its propitiatory power; it is, in its nature, a propitiation, a reconciliation, an atonement; the three terms evidently meaning the same thing. These terms in the English language, and those in the Greek rendered by them, always imply two parties at variance—the one an aggrieved person, and the other the aggressor. A propitiation is a somewhat which renders the aggrieved party propitious; which, to him, is a satisfaction, and reconciles him to the aggressor—disposes him to show favor toward one with whom he had been displeased.

These terms may be sometimes used in cases of offense between equals, between one individual and another in matters purely personal, in which no others but the two parties concerned have any interest. In such cases, the consideration which reconciles consists in the removal of the cause of the offense; it is the rendering of that which is due; the aggressor pays or suffers what his demerits require. In commercial transactions the thing obligated is the fulfillment of contracts, the payment of debts. When this is done, no matter by whom, whether by the debtor himself or by another in his behalf, the demands of commutative justice are satisfied. The creditor may, if he pleases, remit the debt, or any part of it; he may remit, without injustice, what he might justly demand. He has the same right to forgive a debt that he has to make a present. In all cases of commutative justice, the idea of propitiation is not pertinent; there is no condescension, mercy, or grace, on the part of a creditor receiving the payment of a debt. So much for so much is claimed, and when the claim is met the debtor is free from any further demands. In judicial proceedings, where the accused sustains a plea of innocence, or of full and legal justification or atonement, justice has no demands against him. It is only when, having been found guilty and having been sentenced by the judge, the criminal is in the hands of the executive, that there is any opportunity for the exercise of clemency. In such cases propitiation is applicable, and it evidently is that consideration which makes it consistent with the ends of government for the chief magistrate to exercise executive clemency, and order the non-execution of penalty.

The terms translated propitiation, reconciliation, and atonement, as used in the New Testament, in the Greek version of the Old Testament, and in the classical Greek of the ancient mythologies, together with their Hebrew synonyms in the Old Testament, all refer to the relations subsisting between men as sinners and God (or the gods) as having power or disposition to punish for sin. To say the least, these terms always contemplate God (or the gods) as displeased with sinners on account of their sins. That somewhat which is signified by the terms themselves is that which removes from the mind of God (or the gods) the bar to forgiveness and pardon. What the bar to pardon in the mind of God may be is the question already twice deferred for future discussion. Here our direct affirmation is, that in some sense the death of Christ looks Godward; that in that sense, whatever it may be, it is propitiatory, and that it is propitiatory in such a sense as that it removes in the mind of God the bar to pardon, whatever that bar may be.

That the death of Christ is propitiatory toward God, in any sense whatever, is denied by all rationalists and Socinians. To their thought, since God is immutably in the right, the only reconciliation thinkable between him and sinners must consist of their repentance and return to duty, and whatever any mediator or savior might do to secure such a reconciliation must be wholly with man, and of the nature of a persuasion to piety. Whatever, therefore, is said in the Scriptures respecting Christ's work in saving men must look wholly manward, and the terms under discussion must be so interpreted.

This view is defended on exegetical ground. Propitiation, reconciliation, atonement, expiation, redemption, have all the same meaning, but

reconciliation looks wholly manward; therefore, all these, it is said, and similar terms, are to be understood in the same sense. To prove that reconciliation refers solely to man, 2 Cor. v, 19 is quoted: "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself." This passage is quoted as saying that Christ's sole work in the world, his life of obedience and love, his sufferings and his death, was wholly that of persuading men to repent and turn to God. A reference to the context will show that this is not the sense of the passage. Christ's work of reconciliation and the committing of the ministry of reconciliation to the apostles are spoken of as having been already accomplished. The ministry of reconciliation consists in two particulars: first, the announcement that God had reconciled the world unto himself by Jesus Christ; and, second, as ambassadors for Christ, the persuading men to be reconciled to God. The second is founded upon the first. The whole is the same as if it said, God is reconciled to you, therefore be ye reconciled to God. Again, what was that thing which the apostles, as ambassadors for Christ, besought and prayed men to do? Was it solely to repent and live rightly? or did they every-where preach faith in Jesus Christ as the condition of pardon and salvation? What is here intended by the entreaty, Be ye reconciled to God? It is plainly this: by repentance toward God and faith in Jesus Christ—faith, confidence, trust in him that he has reconciled God—avail yourselves of this reconciliation, "for he hath made him to be sin [sin offering] for us, who knew no sin, that we might be the righteousness of God in him;" in other words, take the atonement made by Jesus Christ, and by faith and prayer present it before God as the ground of your pardon, justification, and hope of eternal life. Our affirmation is, that the expression "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself," signifies that God had provided, by Christ, the means by which he could be reconciled to the world in not imputing their trespasses unto them. That this is in accordance with the New Testament use of the term reconcile is evident from Matthew v, 23, 24: "If thou bring thy gift to the altar and there rememberest that thy brother hath aught against thee, leave there thy gift before the altar and go thy way; first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift"—where it is evident that though in the form of the expression according to modern use, the offerer was directed to reconcile himself to his brother, the meaning is, he should reconcile his brother to him. This also accords with the Old Testament use of the term, 1 Sam. xxix, 4: "Wherewith should he reconcile himself unto his master? Should it not be with the heads of these men?" Here David is spoken of as reconciling himself unto Saul, when the intent plainly is that he should reconcile Saul unto him. Not to multiply words unnecessarily in a plain case, we affirm that in modern as well as in ancient use, reconciliation refers, in all cases, whatever be the form of the expression, primarily to the aggrieved party. "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself," means that God, through Christ, removed from his own mind the bar to the pardon of sin. Christ's death so declared the righteousness of God, that he can be just and the justifier of him that believeth in, Jesus. Christ reconciled God unto the world, made an atonement, an expiation, a propitiation for them.

That the terms *hilasterion*, and *hilasmos*, rendered in our English translation "propitiation;" the term *katallage*, rendered "reconciliation and atonement;" and *katallasso*, rendered "reconcile," do in the classical Greek of the ancient mythologies signify the propitiation of, the appeasement of the wrath of, the restoration to the favor of, the aggrieved party is not questioned; and this is, by the opponents of the Church doctrine of atonement, made an objection to the doctrine itself, as though evangelical faith regarded God as vindictive, revengeful, and implacable.

It is said that orthodoxy teaches in its doctrine of atonement, that God takes pleasure in the misery of his enemies, that he is wrathful toward them, that he seeks their destruction, and has delight therein, and that his

avenging disposition could not be satisfied with any thing as a substitute short of the agony and death of his own Son. It seems scarcely necessary to say, that this is a mere caricature; that intelligent piety never indulged even an approximation to any thought of the kind. Evangelical faith, in whole and in part, from its *alpha* to its *omega*, teaches that God is love, and that the death of his only begotten Son is *par eminence* the manifestation and demonstration of his love. "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life. God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us. He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things." But because the word propitiation can not be accepted in such a sense as implies that God is passionately revengeful, it does not follow that the term is inapplicable in every sense. Figurative illustrations never apply to the subject illustrated in all their particulars. In the usages of all languages, illustrations are taken where there are marked resemblances in some respects, while there are great differences in others. If there be resemblance in respect to the point illustrated, differences in other respects do not destroy or vitiate the figure. In the case under consideration, the thought to be illustrated is that the death of Christ is a satisfaction to God, or his justice, for the sins of men; a consideration, in view of which he could be just and justify (that is, not punish) him that believeth. In this generic, idea of a satisfaction to the party aggrieved, the death of Christ resembles the offerings made by pagans to their offended deities. Therefore, the words used by New Testament writers, although also used by pagan idolaters, have, in these sacred writings, their appropriate, generic signification: The death of Christ is a propitiation; it removes the bar to pardon, confidence, and communion. Sin had separated between man and his Maker; the death of Christ bridged the gulf made by sin. By and through this reconciliation man may draw near to God, and God will draw near to him. Abrupted communion, fellowship, and mutual confidence may be restored.

(5.) The death of Christ is redemptive. "When the fullness of the time was come, God sent forth his Son to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons. Looking for that blessed hope and the glorious appearing of the great God and our Savior Jesus Christ, who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity. Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us; for it is written, cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree. Ye know that ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot. Thou art worthy to take the book and to open the seals thereof, for thou wast slain and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood out of every kindred and tongue, and people and nation. Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus. Of him are ye in Christ Jesus, who of God is made unto us wisdom and righteousness, and sanctification and redemption. In whom ye have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins according to the riches of his grace. By his own blood he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption."

The term *lutroo*, to redeem, and *lutrosis*, redemption, with all their paronyms, compounds and derivatives, always when employed in their literal sense (they may sometimes be used figuratively for mere deliverance) express the idea of buying back, as when captives taken in war are liberated in consideration of a price paid. Slaves, or persons held under bondage, are said to be redeemed when liberated by purchase; the liberation itself is called a *lutrosis*, a redemption, and the price paid is a *lutron*, also rendered in English by the word redemption. This idea, as applied to the saving work of Christ, is manifestly the same as that presented by the term propitiation and its synonyms; it is the same idea viewed from another stand-point, or

illustrated by another figure. When we affirm that the salvation of men is through and by the death of Christ, that his death is a *sine qua non* to pardon, standing in the relation of an antecedent to its consequent; that it is vicarious, a substitute for the death of men, that it is propitiatory, reconciles God, removes the bar to pardon, the affirmation in all these cases is in substance that the death of Christ is a consideration, in view of which it became consistent with the character of God, with his obligations as a sovereign, and with all the ends of government, to grant a free and full pardon to transgressors of the divine law.

The opponents of this statement affirm either that pardon under the divine government is impossible, or that it may be granted without any consideration whatever, or that if a consideration be required, repentance is adequate. The first is held either by atheists, materialists, and fatalists, who deny the existence of sin and the need of pardon, or rationalists, who reject the Scriptures and base their theories on their own philosophy; the second and third—the one or the other, or both—are held mostly by persons who profess some respect for the Bible, but are practically rationalists, and by a few others who sincerely believe the Bible to be the book of God, and strive honestly, certainly earnestly, to eliminate from the Scripture all ideas of atonement and expiatory sacrifices. Our present argument is with the latter, and we submit that the texts just above quoted are decisive. Take, for example, 1 Peter i, 18, 19: "Ye know that ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot." Here the privileges and blessings of Christian experience and the hopes of eternal life are plainly the topic of discourse. The persons addressed are persons enjoying these blessings and hopes. They had come to their present happy condition from former vain conversation and traditions of their fathers; this transition, or deliverance, was by a redemption, and the redemption price—the consideration paid for their deliverance—was the precious blood of Christ.

The objections to the doctrine of atonement made from the stand-point of redemption, are several. Early in the history of the Church some of the Fathers, calling their own rhetoric into requisition, represented that the price of man's redemption was paid to Satan, and this historic fact has been made available for many sneers and jests toward the idea of redemption itself. Bad rhetoric may disparage the truth, but does not refute it. The fact that some believers in atonement have entertained views manifestly erroneous in connection with their faith in the doctrine militates nothing against the doctrine itself.

That the idea of the term redemption is the idea of a price paid, a consideration rendered is objected to by all opponents of the doctrine; that it is contradictory of the Bible doctrine of salvation by grace, salvation by the free gift of God. It is said, If a consideration be rendered, then pardon and salvation are not of mercy and grace. In this objection, it is evident that the distinction between commutative and penal justice is lost sight of, the two are identified. In commercial transactions an adequate consideration is a complete adjustment; a *quid pro quo* is an even balance; a debt fully paid leaves no margin for mercy, grace, or favor, though even in this case, if a debtor have no means wherewith to cancel his indebtedness, and a friend pay his debts for him, so far forth as his friend thereby relieves him from embarrassments he does a work of mercy and grace, and places the debtor under obligations of gratitude. But this is not pertinent to the question of salvation from the perils of sin. The thing due here is penalty, and the party to be propitiated or satisfied is an administrator of law, and not one having personal claims for commercial values. The theory of atonement is a theory of grace in its commencement, continuance, and consummation; its foundation is laid in mercy, and its top stone is brought forth with shouting

of Grace, grace unto it! God was under no obligation to provide a redeemer. He gave his Son, that whosoever believeth should not perish, because he loved the world. Herein is love, and here as nowhere else, that God sent his Son to die for us. Christ gave himself a ransom for our deliverance from sin voluntarily, freely, and purely through pity toward us in our lost estate. The ability we have to appropriate the provisions made for us is wholly of the grace and mercy of the Holy Spirit, vouchsafed to us by the free and unmerited love of God.

Again, it is objected to the Church doctrine of redemption, and urged as an argument in favor of its opposite, that the terms redemption and redeemer are used in Scripture where evidently nothing but deliverance is intended, where no consideration is involved, as in Acts vii, 35, where Moses is called a deliverer (*lutrotes*), the original being the term usually translated redeemer. This is a part and parcel of the Pelagian anthropology and soteriology. Christ was a teacher sent from God. As a teacher, he saves and delivers his disciples from the ills of ignorance. He is, therefore, a Savior, a Deliverer, a Redeemer. As a moral reformer he suffered martyrdom; his death, therefore, was for, on account of, for the benefit of, sinful men. That is to say, Christ was one of the large army of teachers, prophets, apostles, moral reformers, and martyrs, that at different times and places have appeared among men, distinguished themselves by benevolent and charitable deeds, and thereby became famous in historic records. The theory allows Christ an honorable distinction among his fellow-teachers; he may even be allowed to stand at the head of his profession, but he differs from others only in degrees of excellence, not at all in the character of his work, or the methods of its execution.

That this theory is not the theory of the Bible it would seem is sufficiently evident on the surface of the subject. The theory, on mere announcement, appears as variant from what readers of common intelligence would understand the Bible to teach, as if the two had no points of contact or resemblance. Christ is a teacher sent from God, but he taught not as the scribes, but as one having authority. Others may be called saviors, deliverers, benefactors of men, but that they are so called in the same sense as Christ is Savior and Redeemer is plainly preposterous, and perhaps ought to be characterized by severer terms. The saying that Christ cast out devils by Beelzebub, was the occasion of our Lord's discourse on blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. The saying that he saves men as men save each other, though not so great a sin, makes a fearful approach in that direction! Christ, by his blood, redeemed us from the death of sin, the curse of the law, not merely because his death was the death of a martyr and persuades men to believe the truth he taught and for the defense of which he died, but also, and chiefly, because his death declared the righteousness of God—was the consideration in view of which God could righteously, pardon sin, be just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus.

(6.) The death of Christ is declarative. It declares the righteousness of God; is a declaration that God is a righteous being and a righteous sovereign; it satisfies the justice of God, both essential and rectoral, in that it satisfactorily proclaims them and vindicates them by securing their ends—the glory of God and the welfare of his creatures. "Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past through the forbearance of God; to declare, I say, at this time, his righteousness, that he might be just and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus."

What is the vinculum that binds the two events, the death of Christ and the pardon of sin? Why was the death of Christ necessary to make the pardon

of sin possible? In what sense is the death of Christ vicarious, or a substitute for the penalty of sin? In what sense is the death of Christ propitiatory, or what in the mind of God is the bar to pardon, or in what sense is the death of Christ a satisfaction to justice for the sins of men? These questions are one and the same; that is, they relate to the same subject; the difference in form varies from the different stand-point which, the subject to which they relate is viewed. An answer to one is an answer to all. They imply that there is a necessary and inseparable connection between the two events. Of course; this discussion has no reference to those theories which affirm that there is no connection at all, and has no reference to those which assert or imply that the connection is only incidental and unimportant. The parties in this discussion are theologians, who are agreed in affirming that without the shedding of blood there is no remission, and that it is the blood of Christ alone that makes atonement for sin. Among these there are five theories which deserve attention.

a. It is affirmed that the questions proposed are unanswerable; that the subject to which they relate lies outside the range of human knowledge; that that in the divine mind which rendered it necessary that Christ should die to make the pardon of sin possible can be known only by revelation, and that there is no revelation on the subject; on the authority of the Word of God, we know the fact that Christ by his death saves men from eternal death, and that without the one the other could not be; more than this is not revealed, and can not be found out by searching.

This theory deserves respect, because it is very confidently entertained by many pious and intelligent thinkers. But its abettors themselves are not so confident as to affirm that all discussion on the subject is useless, much less do they affirm that it is seeking to be wise above what is written in matters where the writing is the only source of knowledge. They must allow that the questions proposed are involved in any and every intelligent discussion of the doctrine of atonement. To seek, therefore, a solution of the problem they present is prompted, to say the least, by an innocent desire for knowledge. But we insist upon it, that inasmuch as we are distinctly assured by the passage above quoted, that Christ died to declare God's righteousness, it is pertinent to inquire what this passage means; and further, that the nature of the subject as made known in the general import and teachings of the Scriptures, furnish grounds for intelligent discussion, and for some confident beliefs.

b. The second theory affirms that the connection between the death of Christ and the pardon of sin is purely arbitrary; if necessary, it is made so by the decree of God; it was originally competent for God to save men by any means, and in any manner that it might please him to adopt; "every oblation avails for so much as, and for no more than, God pleases to accept it."

This theory concedes that the death of Christ is the ground of pardon, and that faith in that death as such is the condition of salvation, but it affirms that it is made so by divine appointment, and not by any inherent necessity. This is evidently equivalent to no necessity at all. God may forgive sin with or without consideration, and if he choose to require a consideration, it may be one thing as well as another, the blood of a goat as well as the blood of the eternal Son of God. Pardon is a mere question of prerogative, of the arbitrary will of God; if he chooses, God may grant unconditional pardon to all sinners, and thus abrogate all law, and annihilate all government; yea, for the same reason, God may, by an arbitrary estimate, consider wrong right, vice virtue, sin holiness, error truth; if an oblation be what God chooses to consider it, why not every thing else? But, above all, the theory is inherently objectionable, in that it teaches that God did send his only begotten Son into the world to suffer and die for sinners, when the

same end could have been accomplished in some other way. It is inconceivable that the eternal Logos would become incarnate, that a theanthropic person would live the life that Jesus lived, and die the death that Jesus died, an expenditure less costly could have availed to secure the salvation of sinners. An event less than the death of Deity incarnate could not solve the problem of pardon; it behooved (that is, it was necessary) that Christ should suffer and die, and rise from the dead to bring to pass a condition of things in which God could be just and the justifier of him that believeth.

c. A third theory teaches that the death of Christ is to be regarded solely as a governmental expedient. This theory is objectionable, not because it teaches that the death of Christ is a governmental measure, but because it teaches that it is solely that, and implies that it is only one of several expedients that might have been adopted. Beyond all question, the death of Christ secures governmental ends, the same ends as would be secured by the execution of penalty, and secures them as fully and effectually as the actual infliction of penalty would do, if not more so. But a demonstration that the government of God is a righteous government, or that God is a righteous governor, is not itself necessarily a complete and adequate declaration of God's righteousness. He is just, not only in the administration of law, but is also essentially just in inherent character. A demonstration may be such as to evidence fully both that God is a righteous being and a righteous sovereign. The death of Christ is such a demonstration, and is not, therefore to be considered solely in its governmental relations; The death of Christ secures not only the welfare of men by securing the ends of government, but it also defends the honor and glory of God by fully proclaiming the essential righteousness of his character. That those who fully believe in the essential deity of the eternal Logos should think of the incarnation, sufferings, and death of God's eternal Son, as only one of several possible expedients, by which the ruined race of men might be saved from the peril of eternal death is, to say the least, strangely inconsistent; to our thought the thing is impossible. No being less than God is competent to be the savior of men. If it be said that God might have saved men by some other method, we shall not contend; but this is not the thought opposed. It is that some inferior being might have been man's savior, and might have accomplished the ends of government for which Christ died by some, means other than death. To this we say, It is impossible.

d. The fourth theory we notice, teaches that the death of Christ is a satisfaction to retributive justice, in the sense of having fully met its claims. Retributive justice renders to every one exactly that which is his due. It has respect to the merits and demerits, to the good and ill deserts, of him toward whom it is exercised. The common idea of the divine justice, considered as an attribute, may be defined as that trait of the divine character which prompts him to render to all his creatures precisely what is their due. Divine law requires just what, and no more than, the subject ought to be and do; its penalty, is what the transgressor deserves; death is a consequence of sin, not merely because God has said, the soul that sinneth shall die, but because in the natural and normal relations of creatures to their Creator it is justly due. God's law is God's will expressed; God's will is, in a proper sense, God himself. Sin, then, against the divine nature, and its penalty is due from the sinner, because of what God is.

Now, the theory under consideration affirms, that since penalty is required by the divine nature—is due to the immutable infinite justice of God—its non-execution is not admissible. If God were to permit sin without punishment, he would thereby undeify himself. It is due the theory to say, in this place, that it distinctly discards all ideas of vindictiveness. God is vindicatory, not vindictive; he is a righteous magistrate, not a malicious murderer; he vindicates his law and himself by demanding what is due. The

theory, then, is, that the death of Christ was itself the equivalent of all the demands of retributive justice against all for whom Christ died. In other words, Christ took upon himself, and suffered in his death, the whole penalty due to sin. According to this theory, the necessity of Christ's death is found in the divine nature. God could not pardon sin without the death of Christ, because he is what he is—an infinitely just being. The vinculum that binds the two events—Christ's death and the pardon of sin—is found in the fact that the former is a full equivalent of the penalty due to the sins pardoned. The death of Christ is vicarious, in the sense of being itself a substituted penalty; it is propitiatory, in the sense of being a full satisfaction to divine justice for the sins of men. Perhaps some of the abettors of the theory might object to the form of this statement, though we do not see wherein; yet, substantially, as we believe, all will admit that the statement is fair and accurate. It had its first scientific formulation and vindication in Anselm's "*Cur Deus homo?*" It long since passed, at least in outline, into the current soteriologies of the Church, and is advocated by some of the most distinguished theologians of our times

We object, first, if the justice of God immutably require that precisely what is due be invariably rendered, then, for the same reason, it is required not only that *what* is due be rendered, but also that it be rendered to *whom* it is due. This must be an effectual bar to substitution, and must render pardon an impossibility. If God can not, without injustice, remit what he might justly demand, then there is no salvation for a sinner!

It is usually said, in this connection, that though in cases of debt the creditor may remit what he might justly demand, it is not so in cases of legal administration where the thing due is penalty. We reply, This is precisely what the death of Christ has done; it has removed the bar to executive clemency, and made the case precisely the same as that of a debt due, which may or may not be forgiven, as in the mind of the administrator it may seem fit and proper in any given case to do. The debt is not paid by the death of Christ, but a provision is made whereby, without injustice, it may be forgiven. The death of Christ affects not man's deserts; all sinners deserve to die, just the same as if Christ had never died. The death of Christ is not a substituted penalty, but a substitute for a penalty. The necessity of an atonement is not found in the fact that the justice of God requires an invariable execution of deserved penalty, but in the fact that the honor and glory of God and the welfare of his creatures require that his essential and rectoral righteousness be adequately declared. The death of Christ is exponential of divine justice, and is a satisfaction in that sense, and not in the sense that it is, as of a debt, the full and complete payment of all its demands. Pardon, or justification, is not "an announcement in open court by the judge that under law, and according to law, the demands of justice are satisfied;" but it is the mandate of the chief magistrate or executive officer ordering the non-execution of penalty which, under the sentence of the judge, is due from the criminal.

To the theory under consideration we object, secondly, that if the debt be fully paid, if the penalty has been fully executed, if all the demands of justice have been completely satisfied in the sense claimed by the theory, then the question of salvation is fully determined, and Christ's death has, of itself, separate from, and independent of, any and all co-operation or consent on the part of the saved, fully and completely effectuated the salvation of all for whom he died. (This conclusion is not only admitted, but also stoutly affirmed, by the abettors of the theory. This thought affiliates naturally with the idea that Christ died only for the elect.) But as we believe that Christ died for all men—for every man in the same sense as for any man—if we admit the theory, we must also admit that all men are saved; that form of universalism which teaches that Christ, on the cross, finished, completed,

effectuated the salvation of all men, must be true. But the Scriptures affirm that many shall seek to enter in, and shall not be able; some shall go away into everlasting punishment; therefore the conclusion is not true; and we infer, logically, as we think, that the premise from which it is inferred is not true.

e. The fifth theory is that announced as the doctrine of this section: The death of Christ is declarative; is a declaration that God is a righteous being and a righteous sovereign. It satisfies the justice of God, both essential and rectoral, in that it satisfactorily proclaims them and vindicates them by fully securing their ends—the glory of God and the welfare of his creatures.

If anywhere in the Bible the precise purpose of Christ's death is distinctly and literally stated, it is in the passage quoted at the head of this section—Rom. iii, 25, 26—where it is affirmed that "God hath set forth Christ Jesus to be a propitiation through faith in his blood *to declare* his righteousness, *to declare*, I say, his righteousness that he might be just and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus." If this be not a direct assertion that an adequate declaration of God's righteousness or justice satisfactorily vindicates his justice, it certainly furnishes ground for a fair inference that that is the fact in the case. But, to say the least, the theory of atonement which directs special and primary attention to the declarative or exponential character of Christ's death, has the merit of keeping within the record, and of announcing precisely what is announced, and no more than is announced, in the sacred Scriptures.

Let us now look at the facts in the case, and, as far forth as we are able in the light of thought, inquire what the facts themselves demand. A man has committed sin; through the death of Christ his sin is forgiven—that is, the penalty due to his sin is not executed upon himself; in other words, a verdict of guilty is pronounced against him, and through Christ an edict of pardon is proclaimed in his favor. Now, what did the death of Christ do in this case? Did it bring it to pass that the man was not guilty? A verdict of guilty involves four things: 1. The accused performed the act charged against him; 2. He was responsible for the act, and is justly censured for doing it; 3. He deserves to suffer the penalty incurred by so doing; 4. He may be justly punished, or, the penalty may be justly inflicted upon *him*.

The death of Christ does not bring it to pass that the man did not do the deed; this is impossible; the deed is done, and it can never become true that it was not done. The death of Christ does not bring it to pass that he was not to blame for doing the deed; he did it voluntarily, with the ability to leave it undone, and with an apprehension of obligation not to do it; it can never be brought to pass that he was not responsible, nor can any event ever bring it to pass that he does not deserve to be punished, nor can the death of Christ, or any other possible event, ever bring it to pass that the penalty may not justly and equitably be actually inflicted upon himself. The death of Christ brings to pass a state of things under which it is possible for the administrator of justice to order the non-execution of the penalty, without any compromise of law, without any possible reflection upon the righteous character of the administrator, and without any sacrifice of the ends for which government is established and maintained.

How does it do this? This is the crucial question. It is said that it is a substituted penalty; we say it is a substitute for a penalty; it is not itself a penalty, it takes the place of a penalty. It is again said, it is equivalent to a penalty; we say it is equivalent in the sense that it secures the same ends, not that it is an equivalent penalty, but the equivalent of a penalty. Again, it is said that it satisfies justice in the sense of meeting

its demands—the same as when a silver dollar pays a demand for a hundred copper cents; we say it satisfies justice, not by paying its dues, but by securing its ends. Again, it is said it is a propitiation, but here the theory we oppose breaks down, for in the nature of the case it is impossible that the thing itself, or an equivalent of that thing, the withholding of which is the cause of grief or displeasure on the part of the aggrieved, should be rendered; for the thing claimed, the withholding of which is the cause of displeasure, is obedience; disobedience having become a fact, neither obedience nor its equivalent can be rendered. Satisfaction, in such a case, can be nothing else than that which vindicates the righteousness of the claim.

It may be said that the death of Christ is the equivalent of obedience, but manifestly it is its equivalent in no other sense than that it saves the subject from penalty as fully and perfectly as obedience would have saved him; it is not obedience itself, nor a substituted obedience. If a substituted obedience to the law would save the sinner, the death of Christ was not necessary; the obedience of his *life* would have been adequate to all the purposes of salvation. The idea that Christ's obedience unto death, or that both his active and passive righteousness are imputed unto his people in such a sense as that God thinks of men as having done what Christ did, is simply unthinkable; they did not do it, and, therefore, God can not think they did. The imputation in the case consists in the fact that Christ's people receive the benefits of his life and death, not that they lived his life and died his death, or are thought of as having done thus. Our affirmation is, that the incarnation, sufferings, and death of Jesus Christ is in itself such an event as, in its connection with and relation to the salvation of men from the penalty of sin, so declares the righteousness of God, as renders it consistent with the character of God and the ends of his government to remit the penalty; that is, to leave the penalty forever unexecuted.

To show this more fully let us inquire, What are the purposes of penalty? What ends do the threatening and execution of penalties subserve? The obvious answer is, that the purpose of penalty is, either to punish crime, or to prevent it, or both. It is to render the criminal what he deserves, or to secure the common weal by preventing crime, or it is both of these. The law threatens death to those who kill, to prevent murder, and thus protect life. It threatens imprisonment to those who steal, to prevent theft, and thus protect property. It threatens fines to those who slander, to prevent defamation, and thus protect reputation. It threatens death to the deserter, and in case of desertion, it executes its threat to prevent desertion, and thus protect the liberties of the people. But it is manifest in all these cases, that if the criminal suffer merely for the public good, an injustice is done him. The deserter must not be shot, the murderer must not be hung, unless they deserve to die; no penalty can be executed justly, merely for the public good; the criminal must be treated according to his deserts. Retributive justice, that which has respect to deserts, and administrative justice, that which has respect to governmental ends, are inseparable, or perhaps it were better to say, the latter is conditioned upon the former. If we ask the question, Why does the criminal deserve to suffer? the most obvious answer is, because his conduct is detrimental to the public weal. It may be said, truthfully, he deserves to suffer, because he has violated obligations, which, in the case before us, is saying the sinner deserves eternal death, because he has violated the obligation which bound him to obedience to God's commands. But if it be true that God's command's are just what, and only what, is required by the the public good, especially if the public good be the reason why God commands the duty required, then, though the deserts of the sinner and the demands of the government may, in thought, be two things, they are, in fact, the same thing; they are at least, inseparable, or are the same thing viewed from different stand-points.

It is obvious to remark here, that the common discussion of the question whether Christ's death is a satisfaction to retributive or to administrative justice, taking the word satisfaction in the sense usually employed in the discussion, namely, in the sense of rendering an exact equivalent of the thing required, is a nugatory discussion; for first, if it be a satisfaction to one, in any sense, it must be a satisfaction to the other in the same sense. Secondly, it is plainly not a satisfaction to either in the sense contemplated; and thirdly, it is a satisfaction to both in the proper sense, namely, in the sense of securing their ends. To satisfy, is to do enough; in commutative justice, to do enough is to do the thing required, as in paying debts, the exact value of the debt due must be paid. A complete satisfaction is a liquidation of the debt.

In retributive justice the case is different. Retribution can never come into requisition until the obedience required is withheld and the possibility of rendering it has passed away. Retribution is penalty; it may be one thing or another; it may be a fine, it may be imprisonment, it may be death. To do enough, in form and kind, in such a case, requires that the criminal himself pay the fine, endure the imprisonment, or suffer the death. If retributive justice can not be satisfied until the exact thing required be rendered, both in form and kind, then there is no salvation for a sinner; but if retributive justice may be satisfied by that which accomplishes its ends, then a margin is found for substitution, for the non-execution of penalty, for the salvation of the criminal. In cases of personal injury, and of consequent displeasure on the part of the aggrieved, towards the aggressor, satisfaction, or the doing enough, depends solely on the will of the aggrieved. He may be exacting and overbearing to an extent that renders satisfaction impossible, or he may be so kindly disposed as that the least thing the nature of the case allows the aggressor to do might be enough. In the personal relations subsisting between man and his Maker, we know in advance that though "God is angry with the wicked every day," and as a being of infinite holiness can not be otherwise, yet in the moment that the sinner ceases to do evil and begins to learn to do well, all personal grievances are adjusted. It is only by reason of God's public relations, that an atonement is called into requisition. It is, however, true that, in the present condition of mankind, the sinner can not, he certainly will not, cease to do evil until he has received some of the benefits of atonement; and in that regard atonement affects our personal relations to God; but evidently this needs not be taken into account, at this point in the discussion.

Now, how do these principles apply to the case before us? A transgressor of the law of God, exposed by his transgression to the penalty of eternal death, escapes that penalty and attains unto eternal life. The death of Christ is the satisfaction that renders such an issue possible. The transgressor does not suffer what he deserves; he does not satisfy the demands the government has against him. In what manner, by what process, does the death of Christ bring about such a result? We reply by Inquiring, What harm would issue if the same result were to come about without the death of Christ, or any other consideration? The answer is obvious, the government then ceases to be "a terror to evil doers and a praise to those who do well;" the administrator is no longer regarded as a righteous sovereign; the government in whole, and in part, as to its officers, its laws, its adjudication, and execution, becomes a farce; its threats of penalty are but empty sounds; government ceases, and anarchy ensues. What, then, is the necessity of some consideration, what the bar to pardon, other than the necessity of avoiding such a disastrous result? Is it said, that to pardon unconditionally, indiscriminately, is an injury to the criminal himself? We reply, not in regard to his past transgression, not in regard to that for which he is pardoned, but in regard to his subsequent character and conduct as a subject of government—it would injure him, as it would injure every other citizen, by

being an encouragement to vice. If, then, the public confidence that the sovereign is a righteous sovereign, that the government efficiently encourages virtue and discourages vice, can be maintained, the bar to pardon is removed. Under these circumstances, whenever the administrator has evidence of a change of character in the criminal, and thereby assurances of his future good conduct, pardon may be granted; the non-execution of the penalty may be ordered; that penalty may remain forever unexecuted, and no harm, but, contrariwise, great good will result to all parties and interests involved; God's justice is vindicated, and his mercy is manifest; the sinner is saved, and the kingdom of God has received a valuable acquisition. But it is still asked; How does the death of Christ do this? To our thought, the question is superfluous. Does not the death of God's eternal Son fully vindicate the righteous character of God and his government?

But let the question be urged, and we reply. In the far off future of eternity, when the earthly history of the human race shall be completed, will the fact that Adam, Eve, and an innumerable company of their posterity—all once sinners against God, and deserving eternal death—will the fact that they are happy in heaven, having attained unto eternal life, be to any newly created intelligences, or to any of "the principalities and powers in heavenly places," a ground or occasion of suspicion that God does not regard his own laws, or that sin may, under the government of God, be with impunity? Is this possible, especially when it is at the same time known that the salvation of men was effected by and through the shed blood of Him who sitteth upon the throne? To ask the question if such a result be possible, is to answer it. Of course, no thoughtful person will here interpose as an objection, that though this may be so when viewed in the light of eternity, it is not so now; that here, and now, the death of Christ does not so vindicate the law of God as to make it an efficient encouragement to virtue, since sin and iniquity abound notwithstanding. If, however, this thought occur, let a brief reminder reply. It is not of the nature of law, under any possible condition, to secure obedience. Secured obedience results only from the exercise of power. Omnipotence is competent to secure universal accordance with the divine will, but it must do so by reducing all existences to machinery, and the product is automatic excellence, not moral desert. Law is made for moral beings, and is itself only a moral power persuading to virtue, but never compelling it. Sin, in all cases, is an abuse of goodness; sin against the grace of Christ is an abuse of mercy. It is true, terribly, lamentably true, that "because sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore the heart of the children of men is fully set in them to do evil." The riches of grace in Christ Jesus, whereby sentence is suspended and space given for repentance, are abused, and hence it is that to some the grace of Christ becomes "a savor of death unto death." The death of Christ fully vindicates the law of God by maintaining its persuasive power; no moral law is ever a compelling force. The fact of sin and the abounding of iniquity, if an argument against one theory of atonement, is equally an argument against any other theory; indeed, it is equally an argument against the efficiency of the divine government itself, on any theory of that government we may please to adopt; since, in any case, the fact alleged does exist; iniquity abounds, whatever be the nature of the law, whatever be the functions of the government, and whatever the policy of the administration.

From this digression, to answer an anticipated objection which, though not pertinent, might be made, we return to the question, How does the death of Christ remove the bar to pardon? and answer as above, It declares the righteousness of God; it is an act expressive of divine thoughts and feelings; it proclaims that in God's estimation sin is an infinite evil, and incurs an infinite peril; it makes known his love of holiness and his regard for the holy; it is exponential of his aversion to sin, and his displeasure toward sinners; it announces his regard for law; it asserts his right to obedience,

and his purpose to maintain his right; it evinces his love for his creatures, especially his love for man, made in his image and invited to companionship with himself in the blessedness of eternal life; in a word, it is a manifestation of God; it proclaims him more than any other event, more than all other events in human history; (may we not say in all history?) it is a declaration of God's righteousness not only to human beings, but angels look into its import and intent with intense desire; it is a manifestation made "according to an eternal purpose which God purposed in Christ Jesus to the intent that now, unto principalities and powers in heavenly places might be known by the Church the manifold wisdom of Go."

"Redemption is the science and the song
Of all eternity; archangels, day
And night, into its glories look; the saints,
The elders round the throne, old in the years
Of heaven, examine it perpetually,
And every hour get clearer, ampler views
Of right and wrong, see virtue's beauty more,
And daily love with a more perfect love."

But it is still insisted that there is, in every man's sense of justice, a demand that the criminal suffer for his crimes; that that demand is independent of the character of the magistrate, and independent of the public good; that that demand is never satisfied till the culprit is punished; that our only idea of divine justice is this same sentiment infinitely intensified; and that therefore divine justice can not be satisfied until punishment is inflicted.

We reply, Our sense of justice requires that the criminal himself suffer; it will not allow that what is due to him be inflicted upon another; it will not allow that another shall voluntarily take the suffering upon himself; if another should suffer, the sense of justice is not satisfied; there is no place for substitution; pardon is impossible, unless, somehow, a just demand may, without injustice, be remitted. Again, what a horrible idea it is, to think that our Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ, suffered the demerit of all the sins of all men; that he suffered as a culprit—a culprit guilty of all the sins committed, and to be committed, by the whole race, from Adam to the latest born! It is of no avail to say that he did not suffer that, but that, being God, his sufferings had an equivalent merit, for this is substantially giving up the idea that his sufferings were of the nature of penalty. We affirm, that his sufferings were equivalent in the ends secured, but not equivalent in the sense that they are of the same nature.

We stated, as our second objection to the doctrine of a substituted penalty, to the idea that the atonement is a satisfaction to justice in the sense that it liquidates its claims, is the actual payment of the debt due, that it must then be completely determinative of the question of salvation. This its abettors allow and aver, and those of them not Universalists reply to the Universalist inference that all men are effectually saved by Christ's cross and passion, that, "as God himself paid the debt, it is his property, and he may dispose of it as he will;" and as his own glory is the end of creation and redemption, he may, for the glory of his grace and mercy, apply the benefits of Christ's death to whomsoever he may sovereignly select for that purpose, and for the glory of his justice withhold those benefits from those upon whom it may be his pleasure to make known his wrath. This is, to our thought, straining a figure to serve a purpose; but we reply in the language of the figure itself: If a theanthropic person, in behalf of mankind, did render unto the sense of justice in the infinite and absolute mind a full and complete satisfaction for all the sins of all men, then the benefits of atonement are not God's property in such a sense as admits of an arbitrary

application of them. In the light of such an apology for Augustinianism, the whole doctrine of atonement seems like solemn trifling. To the Antinomian inference from the doctrine of a substituted penalty—namely, that since "Jesus paid it all, all the debt I owe," it matters not what I am or what I do, the common reply is, All Augustinians are not Antinomians; contrariwise, most of them are evangelical in practice and experience. The fact is joyfully conceded; many of the best examples of Christian piety are found among Augustinians, and as a class, they compare favorably with any class of professed Christian believers. But as we think the Antinomian inference is strictly logical, we are obliged to think that the holiness of Augustinians is in spite of their creed, and not because of it. It must be that, though the creed affirms that the question of salvation is determined, settled, unalterably fixed, there is in their mind, with a belief of the creed, a profound conviction that somehow their salvation is yet dependent upon themselves.

We conclude this particular part of our discussion by saying, that if any, because of the fear of heresy, or because of partiality to old formulas, or for any reason, are still inclined despairingly and mournfully to repeat, "In Adam's fall we sinned all," and then, anon, hopefully and joyfully to sing, "Jesus paid it all, all the debt I owe," it is in our heart to caution them against carrying such theology into their practical and experimental life. If the atonement must be thought of as the acquisition of funds for the payment of a debt, it is advisable to regard those funds as not yet actually applied, to regard the debt as not yet actually liquidated, but to think of those funds as deposited in the bank of heaven, for the payment of the debt when the proper draft or promise of God shall, by faith, with repentance and prayer, be presented. That with such a view the draft will be promptly honored, there can be no manner of doubt. The doctrine of a substituted penalty, though erroneous, must, in such a case, be harmless.

(7.) The death of Christ is theanthropic. It was the death of a theanthropic person; the God-man died. "Giving thanks unto the Father which hath made us meet to be partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light; who hath delivered us from the power of darkness and hath translated us into the kingdom of his dear Son: in whom we have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins; who is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature; for by him were all things created that are in heaven and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones or dominions, or principalities or powers; all things were created by him and for him, and he is before all things, and by him all things consist. And they sung a new song, saying, Thou art worthy to take the book and to open the seals thereof, for thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation, and hast made us unto our God kings and priests."

These passages, as well as very many others, teach distinctly that *He*, the same person who is before all things, who created all things, who upholds all things, who is the image of the invisible God, redeemed the saved by his blood. The Creator is the Savior, and the Savior saves by his blood. Whatever view of atonement any believer in the Scriptures may entertain, whatever theory he may adopt (the Socinian excepted), or whether he reject all theories constructed by human science, and allow himself no forms of thought and expression except those of the Bible, he must believe that interests of infinite import, issues affecting eternal destinies, are in some way conditioned upon the death of Christ; that the death of Christ affects infinite possibilities. It seems, therefore, unavoidable that such a one should inquire, Whence come such measureless merits? What is it that gives to the single death of an individual such infinite value? Whence is it that a single fact of history should avail so much as to remove just deserts from

innumerable millions, and leave forever unexecuted the sentence of eternal death justly due from each of so vast a multitude? Whence the potent eloquence of the garden agony, of the crucifixion prayer and passion, of the "Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani," that it should awaken songs of everlasting joy and hope among so many spirits, all justly doomed to endless sorrow and despair? The unanimous response of evangelical faith cries out, "The sufferer is 'God manifest in the flesh.'" "What!" says the objector, "did God die?" This question is put forth in purpose and intent as a rhetorical argument, interrogative in form, but positively affirmative in import. It is the same as if the objector should say, "If the doctrine of atonement be true, then God died; but God can not die; therefore the doctrine of atonement is not true." We do not care to antagonize this argument directly, for it does not affect the doctrine we affirm. To the question, Did God die? we answer, the God-man died. Evidently the Infinite and Absolute can not be conceived as capable of death, in any sense in which the term death may be taken. But we may be allowed to say, that all the argument there is in this question is based upon the assumption that death is a cessation of being. This is not so; life is not mere existence; many things exist that do not live. Death, then, is not non-existence; like its contrary, it is a condition of being.

Again, the argument assumes that Deity is incapable of suffering. That this is a true conception of the Infinite and Absolute is a position against which we shall not contend; but the Bible ascribes grief to the Holy One; his love for a world of sinners is an infinite pity; in a word, God is not a stock or a stone, but a person having in consciousness an apprehension of all existences, conditions and experiences; is displeased with what is offensive, and sympathetic toward those who suffer. That the Deity, considered as such, is totally insensible as to evil and its consequences, is not axiomatic, it needs not be admitted, it may not be assumed; we do not believe it is true. But this matters not as to our present discussion; our affirmation is, that Christ Jesus, God manifest in the flesh, the Logos made flesh, the God-man, the theanthropic Savior, "tasted death for every man." Our belief is, that in the person of Jesus Christ two natures, the divine and the human, were so united as to constitute one person. The natures are not confounded; the person is not divided; this person is man's Savior. We rely upon and trust in Jesus Christ as our all-sufficient Savior, not only because he is our brother, but chiefly because he is God's Son, he is divine. Our confidence in his ability to save to the uttermost all that come unto God by him is founded upon our belief in his divinity. We refer our salvation more to his death than to any other event, more than to all other events in history or in providence. Now, to trust in him as Savior, because he is divine, to trust in his death as that which saves, and at the same time to eliminate entirely divinity from that death, is, to say the least, a strange inconsistency.

Many who believe firmly in the essential deity of the eternal Logos, who believe that Logos became incarnate in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, who believe that Christ's death is infinitely meritorious, a provision fully adequate to the salvation of the whole human race from the deserved doom of eternal death, nevertheless, finding it difficult to predicate death of Deity in any sense, therefore affirm that it was only the humanity of Jesus that suffered and died. It is common for such to maintain, that while it was only the human nature of Christ that suffered death, still his death has infinite merit, because of the connection subsisting between the human and divine. A common illustration quoted is, "the altar sanctifies the gift;" the altar of divinity sanctifies the gift of humanity, and thereby renders it infinitely meritorious. The difficulty here is, that the "connection" is a union of natures such that the person is but one. Eliminate the divine nature, and the person ceases to be. But, perhaps, if those holding this idea, knew precisely what they mean by the "connection" between the divine and the human natures of Christ, and if we who think differently knew precisely what we mean by the

hypostatic union of those natures, our opinion and theirs would at once harmonize. Very probably our whole trouble lies in the mysteries of the incarnation. "The word was made flesh," we know not how. We insist only that our trust shall be in a divine Savior, that all our hopes of pardon and salvation be founded upon a divine expiation, an expiation which has a merit and an efficacy that can pertain to no act or event that is not divine. This thought is not distinguishable from the conception that the God-man, Christ, died for the sins of the world.

"O Love divine, what hast thou done!
Th' incarnate God hath died for me!
The Father's co-eternal Son
Bore all my sins upon the tree!
The Son of God for me hath died;
My Lord, my Love is crucified."

If matters of infinite import may be illustrated by what seems analogous in matters of finite observation and experience, we may venture here to try and help our feeble thinkings by considering the phenomena of consciousness in instances of sensation and perception. Human seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting, and smelling are facts that could not exist without the union of mind and matter in one distinct and conscious personality. A perfect eye without a soul would be nothing more than a senseless camera obscura; a soul without an eye could never have that which now constitutes a human sight; though the soul might gain the same knowledge by other methods, the phenomena would not be the same. The same is true of all the other senses. A spirit could not be punctured by sharpened steel, and a wound in a lifeless body would produce no pain. To apply the illustration, God, as God, could not so declare his righteousness as to justify his ways with men in pardoning their sins; and man, as man, is evidently incompetent to so high a demonstration. God and man, united in one conscious personality, is the only name given under heaven, and the only name that could be given, whereby we must be saved. The declaration of God's righteousness—that *sine qua non*, that without which pardon could not be, was an act, an event which required a divine-human personality and consciousness.

So we think it; so we think the word and the testimony teaches. Christ tasted death for every man, and Christ was Logos made flesh—God and man in one Christ, two natures in one person. "Because it is not possible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sins, therefore when he cometh into the world he saith, Sacrifice and offering thou wouldst not, but a body hast thou prepared me. In burnt-offerings and sacrifices for sin thou hast had no pleasure; then said I, Lo I come, in the volume of the book it is written of me, to do thy will, O God." It was the will of God that the eternal Word should make atonement for sin. For the accomplishment of this, a body was prepared, not that the divine Redeemer took possession of a human body *merely*, for he was a man, of like passions with ourselves; he increased in wisdom as in stature, and was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin. The prepared body was a human being; he that came was divine. The divine and human natures were united in one person, and that person died for our sins and rose again for our justification.

8. The death of Christ, considered as to the end it proposes, is efficacious, provisional, and universal; considered as to its results, or the benefits it confers, it is in part unconditional and in part conditional. It efficaciously provides for the salvation of all men. Some of its benefits or results are unconditionally applied to all men. The application of its full benefits, or completed salvation, is conditioned upon the faith of its recipient. "Jesus Christ, by the grace of God, tasted death for every man. He is a propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the

sins of the whole world. God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him might not perish, but have everlasting life. He is the Savior of all men, especially of them that believe." The work Christ came to do, he did fully, efficaciously, completely; there was no defect, deficiency, or failure. He came to make the salvation of all the children of men a possibility, and did it. He said, "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me;" and on the cross he said, "It is finished." The character, condition, duties, and destinies of all men are affected by the death of Christ. All the posterity of the first pair come into personal existence and consciousness, with all the requisite of a fait probation, by reason of, in consequence of, the shed blood of Jesus Christ. The pardon of their personal sins, the regeneration of their nature, and final salvation in eternal life, are conditioned upon their voluntary acceptance, by faith, of Christ as their Savior, and upon their cordial co-operation with the Holy Spirit, whose presence and power is, through Christ, vouchsafed for their aid and support. Through Christ, God, by his Spirit, "works in them to will and to do his good pleasure," whereby they are effectually enabled "to work out their salvation with fear and trembling." All men are prisoners of hope; Christ has opened the door of their prison, they are invited to go forth and enjoy the blessings of liberty and citizenship. The opening of the door is one thing; that Christ has done: going forth and appropriating the blessings of liberty is another; that the prisoner must do, or, leaving it undone, he will forever remain in his dungeon.

All men are polluted by sin; a fountain is opened in the house of David for sin and uncleanness: that is one thing; Christ did it. To approach, plunge, be cleansed, and rise renewed in the image of God, is another thing; that the unclean must do, or, leaving it undone, their uncleanness will forever remain upon them. All men are, for lack of bread, perishing with hunger. A feast has been provided-bountiful, adequate, enough for all, and enough forever. Christ spread the table, and loaded it with the bread of life and the water of salvation; that is one thing: to approach, eat, drink, and live forever is another; this the hungry, starving soul must do, or, leaving it undone, must die in his destitution.

Sin separated between man and his maker; Christ's death bridged the gulf, and gave all men passport and means of passage. To build the bridge is one thing; that Christ did: to pass over is another; that the alien must do, or, leaving it undone, remain forever in the territory of his enemy. This is the doctrine of universal atonement and conditioned salvation. Its chief antagonist, among the theologies, is found in the Augustinian doctrine of personal and unconditional election. In the light of that doctrine, Christ's death is one of a series of means adopted to make the decree of election sure. Not only were the number and the names of those to be saved fixed and irrevocably determined by the decree of election, but also the means to that end. Among those means were the death of Christ, the agency of the Spirit, the faith and obedience of the elect. Human history, in part and in whole, is a drama, every act and scene of which is determined by a pre-ordained programme. That there are decrees of God, and decrees of election, is plainly attested in the sacred Scriptures, and it is in accordance with the common intelligence of mankind that there should be. These doctrines must, therefore, in a work like this, be articulately stated, and the true theory, as the writer sees it, defended. The further discussion of this particular topic is, therefore, deferred till we shall come to the place assigned, in the order of thought we have adopted, to the consideration of these doctrines.

9. The death of Christ was symbolized in the sacrifices and offerings of both the patriarchal and the Levitical priesthoods. All Christian soteriologies—and we see not to the contrary why we may not say all the

religions of mankind—recognize in some form, with more or less distinctness, the idea that human history is a history of remedies provided for, and applied to, actually existing evils. In Christian terms, the human race exists under a system of redemption. We know not but God has created intelligent, sentient beings, whom he governs strictly by law without mercy, to whom sin is remediless, and, of course, the first sin fatal. The Bible does not distinctly teach that this is not the condition of angels. Again, we know not but God has created some intelligent, sentient beings whom he, at creation, places in conditions free from the peril of sin—beings who, from creation, are forever and ever in a condition of secured purity and happiness. The common doctrine of the secured salvation of those dying in infancy differs not essentially from this supposition; they are forever pure and happy, without precedent probation. I say these things may be so, for aught we know to the contrary. But in the light of thought, it seems reasonable to believe that heaven is, in all cases, conditioned upon a successful probation, and that wherever sin is possible there a remedy is provided. In other words, redemption is co-extensive with created, rational existence.

Be this as it may, human redemption is as ancient as human existence; the purpose to redeem is as ancient as the purpose to create. The purpose in Christ Jesus is an "eternal purpose." The Church doctrine that redemption characterizes and modifies the entire administration of the divine government, in its application to the human race, is antagonized by the Socinian and Pelagian theories, and it is common for Socinians and Pelagians to affirm that the doctrine of atonement is of recent date. They aver that it had its beginning with Anselm, in the eleventh century of the Christian era; that he inferred it from figurative allusions to the Jewish sacrifices in the writings of Paul; that Paul himself entertained no idea of salvation by blood, but compared the death of Christ with Jewish sacrifices for other purposes, chiefly to show that the office of Christ superseded the Levitical priesthood; that the Christian dispensation superseded the Jewish. Of course, the Church doctrine of atonement being true, Christ's blood is the efficacious cause of salvation in all dispensations of the true religion. The patriarchal, Aaronic, and Levitical sacrifices and oblations were expiatory, and were so because they were typical or symbolic of the one great sacrifice for sin—the death of our Lord Jesus Christ. Hebrews xi, 4: "By faith Abel offered unto God a more excellent sacrifice than Cain, by which he obtained witness that he was righteous, God testifying of his gifts, and by it, he being dead, yet speaketh." We have here inspired information respecting the first sacrifice recorded in history; and though the events occurred and the actors passed away from earth more than fifty centuries ago, those actors being dead, through their deeds speak to us, lucidly illustrating the central doctrine of our holy religion. In what did the difference between Cain and Abel consist? or was the difference a difference in the offerings they presented? What was that which, pertaining to Abel or his offering, was the cause or occasion of the divine approval and the acceptance of the offerer, the absence of which was the cause or occasion of Cain's rejection? Some have said, the difference was in the value of the offerings presented. To this we reply, There is no evidence of this in the record; the term "more excellent sacrifice" in the original signifies merely superiority, without designating in what that superiority consisted, whether in quantity, in utility, in value, or in related circumstances.

Again, we are assured by inspired authority that the commercial value of oblations offered unto God is of no account in the divine estimation. The mite of the poor widow, in the estimate of Him who stood over against the treasury, was more than the whole amount contributed from the abundance of the wealthy.

Some have said that the difference was in the moral character of the

offerers; that Abel was a good man, and Cain a wicked man, that is, previously to the time of their sacrifices. This is nowhere stated; Abel "obtained witness that he was righteous," but in what sense was he righteous? In the sense that he had never committed sin?—"no man liveth and sinneth not." He obtained the witness that his sins were forgiven, the only sense in which it can be witnessed of any human being, Christ Jesus alone excepted, that he is righteous. To obtain this divine testimony was that for which he offered his gift and made his prayer.

Is it said that the difference pertained to external morals? We reply that these do not require a divine testimony. If a man's moral conduct does, or does not, conform to law, he knows it of himself by natural processes. If he steal, commit adultery, or be guilty of murder, he knows it, and needs not divine revelations to assure him of the fact. But whatever difference or differences there might or might not be, either in the offerings in themselves considered, or in the life and character of the offerers, none of these were determinative of the result—the difference was in their faith. "By *faith* Abel offered unto God a more excellent sacrifice than Cain." The fact that Cain brought an offering, and was grieved at his rejection, is proof that he was not an atheist, or pantheist, or polytheist, or modern deist. He believed in God, in his being, his unity and his personality. He believed in a divine providence, and in the rewardableness or utility of worship, else he had never brought an offering unto the Lord God; would never have made supplication unto him, seeking his blessing; would never have grieved that his prayer was not answered according to his desire. In a word, Cain was a mere theist, a rationalist, in modern terms, a liberal Christian. He recognized his obligations of gratitude to God for the fruitfulness of his field, for the abundance of his harvests, and he brought an eucharistic offering. He ignored, if he did not despise, a blood religion; he rejected all propitiation, atonement, expiation, and mediation; he worshiped the common Father of mankind in his own name; he went to God in his own person, in the total absence of all mediation and intercession. The fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man and the propriety and utility of individual and social worship constituted the alpha and omega of his creed. He came and stood before God and said: "God, I thank thee for my being and its blessings; be gracious unto me; be pleased to accept my oblation, and vouchsafe a continuance of thy favor." Abel, taught by a pious mother and a godly father, that all men are sinners, that pardon and salvation is proffered through the bruising of the serpent's head by the seed of the woman, came with shed blood, and through and in the name of a mediating Savior, said, "God be merciful to me a sinner;" and God said, "Go in peace, thy sins are forgiven." The difference between the two, then, is precisely the difference between a rationalistic and a Christian faith. Abel believed that salvation is conditioned upon faith in an expiatory sacrifice for sin; his faith molded his character and his conduct, and, as a consequence, "he obtained witness that he was righteous," that is, he "received not the spirit of bondage again to fear, but the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father," and the Spirit bore witness with his spirit that he was a child of God; being justified by faith in an atoning sacrifice, he had peace with God.

But it is objected that the record does not warrant these affirmations, that it contains no intimation that Abel had any knowledge of the doctrine of atonement. We reply, If it were true that the record in Genesis contained nothing on the subject, it would not be strange, since that record is too brief to indicate, in full, the creed of the Church. Again, that fact, if a fact, would not at all militate against the opinion we entertain, since the nature of the case, interpreted by the teachings of subsequent revelations, would furnish adequate ground for a fair inference that Abel was not ignorant of the doctrine as subsequently taught. But we affirm, that the doctrine of atonement is contained in the first promise—"the seed of the woman shall

bruise the serpent's head, and he shall bruise his heel." We think no one will claim that Adam supposed the serpent nothing more than a subtle beast. If he so supposed at first, the issue must have taught him better. He considered himself the victim of a superhuman enemy; the deliverer promised is greater than his enemy—that is, he was to be a supersatanic being. I doubt not that Adam was instructed, somewhat, as to the divinity of his promised Savior. But he was also the seed of the woman. Here, plainly, is at least the incarnation of a supersatanic deliverer. He was to conquer by suffering—by the bruising of his heel. The doctrine of salvation from the dominion of sin by the vicarious suffering of an incarnated superhuman, supersatanic being, is certainly taught in this first recorded promise. If this be not the import of the passage, what is its import? To say that all there is in it is the simple statement of the fact that men hate snakes, frequently kill them, and are sometimes bitten by them, is simply silly. So trifling a remark could not find place in discourse upon so momentous concerns. If the doctrine be there at all, since it was taught by Jehovah in direct instruction, face to face, who can doubt that the pupil, with such a teacher, received an adequate knowledge of it?

But again, more explicitly and more decisively does the affirmation in Hebrews xi, 4, that Abel's offering was made acceptable by faith, prove that a promise of pardon and salvation, with its conditions, was distinctly made to our first parents, and clearly understood by them. Faith is not only an intellectual belief of a doctrine, but it is also a trust or confidence in a promise. If Abel had faith in God, that saved him from sin; and he had, for he obtained the witness that he was righteous; then God had given him a promise. Once more, this same fact is still further evinced by the fact of sacrifice. How came it to pass that both Cain and Abel offered sacrifice unto God? What would ever have suggested to either of them that God would be pleased with such a procedure? On rationalistic grounds, the fact of sacrifice can never be accounted for. To destroy a gift in the presence of the giver would be the last thing a man would think of as a means of expressing gratitude for the gift conferred. That a benefactor would be pleased with the destruction of what he had bestowed is most unnatural. It must, then, have been made known to our first parents by a direct revelation, that "without the shedding of blood is no remission," and that by the blood of an incarnate Savior, a way is opened into the holy of holies and into the paradise of God for sinful men. This hope of our race was in the beginning; it is our only hope, and is equally needful for all; it remains for all, with all, and is in all, unless will-fully rejected. Redemption underlies the divine administration, in all ages of human history; it can not be eliminated from the divine government in respect to any individual of the race.

Since these things are so, but little needs be said concerning the oblations of the Levitical priesthood. That they were expiatory and typical is abundantly obvious upon the surface of all the Old Testament writings. This thought is important, not only because it tends to show that atonement is the foundation and corner-stone of all dispensations of Bible religion, but also because it is determinative of the question of the sacrificial character of our Lord's passion and death. The frequent comparison of our Lord's death with the sacrifices of the Mosaic dispensation, and the abundant use of sacrificial terms in the New Testament, would be fatally misleading, both to Jews and pagans, if the sacrifices of olden times were expiatory and the death of Christ was not. The proof, then, that the Jewish oblations were expiatory and typical must, at least, be briefly stated. It is not affirmed that all the offerings required by the Mosaic law were sacrificial, much less that all were expiatory sacrifices for sin. There were the tithes and other taxes levied for the support of the State and of the Church. There were ceremonial oblations offered for the purification of the priests and other worshipers. (These, however, as they referred to pollution by sin, had at least a remote

relation to the idea of expiation.) There were also voluntary contributions, as those contributed for the building of the tabernacle, and those for the erection of the temple, and those offered on the occasions of the dedication of these places of public worship. In some cases of transgression the law imposed a fine as a satisfaction to civil law, apart from all considerations of moral and religious obligation. All these, and similar cases, are clearly distinguished by the letter of the law, and need not be specified.

To quote the Scriptures which require the offering of sacrifices unto the Lord, and describe the manner thereof, would be to transcribe a large part of the books of Exodus and Leviticus. In the sixteenth chapter of Leviticus we have the directions given for the manner in which the high-priest might enter "into the holy place within the veil before the mercy-seat which is upon the ark," the place in which God said, "I will appear in the cloud upon the mercy-seat." Except on extraordinary occasions, this entrance into the holy of holies was permitted only once in a year, and that on the tenth day of the seventh month. This day was to be, by a statute, forever a Sabbath of rest—a day in which the people were to afflict their souls and do no work at all. On that day the priest made an atonement, first for himself and family, and then for the people, that they might be clean from all their sins before the Lord. If, to the offerings specially prescribed for this day, those of the daily morning and evening sacrifice be added, the whole number of beasts offered on this solemn yearly expiation day was fifteen; some of them prescribed for "reconciling the holy place and the tabernacle of the congregation and the altar," but all of them designed, directly or indirectly, to make an atonement for the sins of the people. The burnt-offerings and the sin-offerings having been made, the priest laid his hands upon the head of a goat selected by lot for that purpose, and confessed the trespasses, transgressions, and sins of the people, putting "all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in all their sins, upon the head of the goat, and sent him away by the hand of a fit man into the wilderness." Thus the scapegoat "bore upon him all their iniquities unto a land not inhabited." We remark, that it must be manifest, on even a cursory reading of this record, that if the events recorded have no reference to sin as before God, no bearing upon the question of pardon, no connection with salvation from the death penalty due to sin, then is the whole merely an expensive, burdensome, unmeaning ceremony, utterly unworthy of observance by sensible men, and so far forth as it may claim to be of the nature of religious worship, it is a sacrilegious insult to the deity to whom the devotion is offered. The sacrifices were piacular; they made atonement for the sins of the worshipers; the deaths of the beasts slain were substituted for the deaths of the priests and the people, whose lives had been forfeited and were in peril by reason of their sins.

That the death of a brute, considered in itself alone, could be in any way a legal substitute for the eternal death of the soul of a man is too preposterous to allow the supposition, that any Jew ever offered his bullock, or his ram, or any animal sacrifice, in the faith that the salvation of his soul was conditioned solely upon such an offering. The oblation was not only piacular, it was in the mind of the devout, intelligent worshiper also typical of the sufferings and death of Christ. "The prophets inquired and searched diligently, searching what or what manner of time the spirit of Christ which was in them did signify, when it testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ." Whatever might have been the opinions and the faith of the ancient Jews respecting their oblations offered unto God, the intent and purpose of Jehovah, when he enacted the law contained in this sixteenth chapter of Leviticus to be observed by Aaron and the high priests forever, is clearly made known by the inspired comment found in the ninth chapter of Hebrews: "Into the second [tabernacle] went the high-priest alone every year, not without blood, which he offered for himself, and for the errors of the people:

the Holy Ghost this signifying, that the way into the holiest of all was not yet made manifest, while as the first tabernacle was yet standing: which was a figure for the time then present, in which were offered both gifts and sacrifices, that could not make him that did the service perfect, as pertaining to the conscience; which stood only in meats and drinks, and divers washings, and carnal ordinances imposed on them until the time of reformation. But Christ being come a high priest of good things to come, by a greater and more perfect tabernacle, not made with hands, that is to say, not of this building; neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us. For if the blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of a heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh; how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God? And for this cause he is the mediator of the new testament, that by means of death, for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first testament, they which are called might receive the promise of eternal inheritance. For Christ is not entered into the holy places made with hands, which are figures of the true; but into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God for us: nor yet that he should offer himself often, as the high priest entereth into the holy place every year with the blood of others: for then must he often have suffered since the foundation of the world: but now once in the end of the world hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself."

That this ninth chapter of Hebrews refers to the fifteenth of Leviticus, and that the blood of atonement offered by the high priest in the holy of holies, and the blood of Christ shed on Calvary, and conceived of as carried by the great High-priest, Christ himself, into heaven itself, to obtain eternal redemption for us—that these are compared can not be questioned. So much is beyond dispute. Now, we ask, on what resemblance is this comparison founded? It is said, the death of Christ was the martyr seal he set to his testimony, and teachings; it was the necessary antecedent to his resurrection; the miracle by which the divine authority of his mission, as a teacher sent from God, was authenticated; it was an example of heroic self-sacrifice in the cause of truth; it is a manifestation of affectionate regard for sinful men which is adapted to bring them to repentance. Now, when all ideas of expiation are eliminated from our conceptions of Christ's death, we see not how any or all of these theories account for the value and special importance so abundantly attached to it in the New Testament writings. Nor do we see how the death of Christ, it being nothing more than the death of a distinguished reformer and martyr, can be relied upon as the means of bringing men to repentance. But with these difficulties we are not now specially concerned; we ask attention to the Levitical oblations, and inquire if the death of Christ be truthfully represented in the above theories; if these theories explain its full import and intent, in what respect do the Levitical oblations resemble it? Were they martyr seals to testimony? Did they authenticate, directly or indirectly, the mission of any divinely commissioned teacher? Were they examples of moral heroism in the cause of truth? Did the death agonies of bullocks, rams, and goats break the hearts of impenitent sinners, and induce in them repentance and holy affections? Manifestly, no point of resemblance can be found between the two, and the comparison is utterly senseless.

Now, if we take into account the obvious fact that a large part of the New Testament writings, from the testimony of John the Baptist, "Behold the lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world," to the heavenly song of the four living beings and the four and twenty elders who sang a new song, saying, "Thou art worthy, for thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood out of every kindred. and tongue and people and nation,"—I say, if

we take into account the fact that a large part of the New Testament writings are allusions, comparisons, and illustrations, drawn from the sacrifices and services of the Jewish tabernacle in the wilderness and temple at Jerusalem, and admit that these are only rhetorical figures, and that even as such they are not warranted by any points of resemblance, we thereby emphatically challenge not only the common sense of the New Testament writers, but also set at naught the whole book as senseless jargon, as a collection of unintelligible and unmeaning words. If the blood of Christ be regarded as a sacrificial offering, an atonement for sin, and the patriarchal and Levitical sacrifices as types, as divinely appointed symbols of the one great sacrifice, then obvious harmony, unity and perspicuity pervade the whole divine testimony; the Holy Bible appears to be what it claims—a God-given book, divinely inspired instruction in doctrine, duty, and destiny.

To the doctrine that the Levitical sacrifices were expiatory, it has been objected that according to the Mosaic law, murder, adultery, and blasphemy were punishable with death, and no substitution was ever admitted. This is accounted for by the fact, that capital punishment in such cases was required by the *civil law*. This does not, however, at all militate against the idea that, under the ecclesiastical law, the death of a brute might be substituted for the death of a man. The Jewish government was a theocracy; every sin against God is punishable with death, so that while it might be true that the civil code made no provision for the exercise of executive clemency in cases of capital crime, it might be also true that the polity of the Church provided, in case where the penalty according to ecclesiastical law was death, that the criminal might make an atonement for his sin, and escape the penalty due to his crime.

It has been said that the Levitical sacrifices were of the nature of a fine. That the blood of an animal offered in sacrifice would be regarded as a legal tender in the payment of a fine, is highly improbable; but a single passage from the law will settle this question. Leviticus v, 15, 16: "If a soul commit a trespass and sin through ignorance in the holy things of the Lord, then he shall bring for his trespass unto the Lord a ram without blemish out of his flocks, and he shall make amends for the harm that he hath done in the holy thing, and shall add the fifth part thereto and give it unto the priest; and the priest shall make an atonement for him with the ram of the trespass-offering, and it shall be forgiven him." Here the transgressor is required to "make amends," that is, to pay what he had taken or withheld unlawfully, and, then to "add the fifth part thereto;" here is the fine imposed. Having made restitution and paid his fine, he was also required to bring a ram for a trespass-offering, and when the priest had, with this trespass-offering, made an atonement for his sin, his sin was forgiven him. The trespass-offering was not, then, of the nature of a fine, for that was the fifth part added; it was as the text affirms, an atonement; it was an expiatory sacrifice offered unto God, through which he obtained, before God, the pardon of his sin. The rigor of the Mosaic law, the scrupulous exactness with which that law guarded against the idea that under the divine government sin could be with impunity, is here evinced by the fact that this requirement of restitution, of fine, and of atonement, was in a case of trespass through ignorance. All sin against God, even very great crimes, may be forgiven; but no sin, not even the least, can be forgiven under circumstances which would, by any possibility, reflect upon the righteousness of his character or of his administration; adequate declaration that God is a righteous being and a righteous governor must be made, if not by some other means, by the rigorous execution of the penalties threatened in his law. Such a declaration is found in the death of God's eternal Son. The primitive sacrifices and the sacrifices of the law were declarative of God's righteousness, because symbolic of Christ's propitiatory sufferings and death. Very much of the ceremonial law has immediate reference to the cleanliness of the worshipers

and the place of worship. Even the sprinkling of blood upon the altar is spoken of as a purification, and all things pertaining to the temple and its worship were purified by blood. Hence, it has been said that the sacrifices prescribed in the Jewish ritual were not for purposes of atonement, but of purification. This allegation is scarcely worthy of notice. Evidently water is more suitable than blood, where physical cleanliness is the only thing taken into account; in this regard, blood is rather a defilement than a purification. Manifestly the primary idea is mental purity. The sanctification of the temple, the altar, and the implements used in the temple service was by means of blood, because of the relation subsisting between the shed blood of the covenant and the purity of the soul. The primary defilement was the defilement of sin, and the secondary or physical impurity was cleansed away by blood, because of its relation to spiritual uncleanness.

We conclude this discussion, by a brief summary of the opinions we have endeavored to maintain: Man is created under law; law is precept with penalty; the penalty is death in the eternal world; all men have sinned, and are in peril of eternal death; the problem of soteriology first in the order of thought, is the problem of pardon or salvation from this impending peril; pardon is possible only under conditions which vindicate the character of God and the righteousness of his government; the glory of God and the good of his creatures are so related, that whatever is promotive of the one is also promotive of the other, and either or both may be considered as the end or ends of his government; whatever secures the ends of government vindicates both the essential and rectoral righteousness of God. The problem of soteriology, then, is this: Given a world of sinners in peril of eternal death, to find the condition or conditions under which death may be averted and the ends of government secured; the problem is a problem in human thought, not a determination, *a priori*, of what pertains to the absolute and the infinite, but an *a posteriori* inquiry of what, under given conditions and relations, may, to human thought, be rationally regarded as an adequate ground of hope that pardon may be obtained, the absolute sovereignty of God, his prerogative as sovereign, considered in connection with his infinite goodness, his good will toward his creatures, is not the required condition, since pardon on mere prerogative, if not universal, would impeach the divine impartiality, and if universal, would annihilate government; repentance is not the required condition, for to accept a selfish repentance would universally subvert the ends of law, and to require a sincere repentance would be to require what is impracticable and to render pardon impossible. Repentance serves no purpose for which penalty is threatened, and secures no end for which government is established; the death of Christ is the condition required. Concerning this we affirm: 1. That the Scriptures represent that the salvation of men and the death of Christ are in some way connected, and that that connection is of vital importance: 2. The death of Christ is necessary—not metaphysically necessary, as opposed to contingency, it might not have been; nor necessary in the sense of constraint as opposed to liberty, —it was perfectly voluntary; but necessary as a *sine qua non*, that without which pardon could not be: 3. The death of Christ is vicarious, is substitutional, in the sense that if Christ had not died, then death eternal would have been actually inflicted upon all to whom it was due: 4. The death of Christ is propitiatory, is an atonement, a reconciliation between God as a sovereign and man as a sinner; is a satisfaction to divine justice for the sins of men, in the sense that it removes from the mind of God the bar to pardon, whatever that may be: 5. The death of Christ is redemptive, is a price paid, a consideration rendered, in view of which pardon may be granted, salvation may be obtained: 6. The death of Christ is declarative; it declares the righteousness of God; is a declaration that God is a righteous being and a righteous sovereign; it satisfies the justice of God, both essential and rectoral, in that it satisfactorily proclaims them and vindicates them by securing their ends—the glory of God and the welfare of his creatures: 7. The

death of Christ is theanthropic; it is the death of a theanthropic person, a God-man, a person in whom two distinct and perfect natures, the human and the divine, are united in one individuality: 8. The death of Christ, considered as to the end it proposes, is efficacious, provisional and universal; considered as to its results or the benefits it confers, it is in part unconditional and in part conditioned: 9. The death of Christ was symbolized in the sacrifices and offerings of both the patriarchal and the Levitical priesthoods; those sacrifices were expiatory, because symbolic or typical of the one great sacrifice—the death of the incarnate Son of God.

CHAPTER III.

RESULTS OF THE DEATH OF CHRIST—BENEFITS OF ATONEMENT.

I. UNCONDITIONAL BENEFITS.

1. *Personal Existence.* Assuming, as to the origin of souls, that Pre-existence is a mere theory unsupported by Scripture, and in itself entirely improbable, postulating either creationism or traducianism, and giving a very decided preference to the latter, as most in harmony with the scope of Scripture doctrine, we infer that the personal existence of every individual of the race, the first pair only excepted, is a result of atonement. But for the interposition of the plan of redemption, no other result could have followed the first transgression, at least, so it seems evident in the light of rational thought, than the immediate death of the first pair. Temporal death, or the death of the body, would have terminated their earthly existence, and the second death must have instantly ensued. That the death of the body would render propagation impossible is too evident to require distinct statement. Human nature being what it is, the idea souls without bodies can be propagated is too preposterous for a moment's indulgence. The only conception admissible in the case, is that, but for redemption, the race would have become extinct in the persons of our parents. For being and its blessings all mankind are indebted to the garden agonies, to the crucifixion and death of Lord Jesus Christ. Consciousness of thought, emotion, and volition, all the pleasures of knowledge, love and hope, all we are or may hope to be, all we have, and all we enjoy, are the purchase of Savior's death. We are bought with a price, even the precious blood of the Son of God. Does any one conceive here an incongruity in calling existence a blessing, a gracious gift, the result of a benevolent interposition, in the case of those whose existence issues in eternal death? We reply, the same incongruity is equally apparent in existence by creation. If Christ could not by redemption confer existence upon a being who he foresaw would thwart the grace bestowed, then, for the same reason God could not create such a being; if the one is not a work of good will, then the other is not. The conclusion is, either misery is impossible because of divine foresight and goodness (but this we know is not so, for misery does exist), or it is a work of benevolence to bring to pass the possibility of an infinite good, though such a possibility involves even the actuality of an infinite evil. Again, if, however, any existence that infinite goodness will permit is better than non-existence, the incongruity disappears. Existence is a blessing greater than finite thought can estimate. For this inestimable gift everlasting gratitude is due, especially because of "the unspeakable gift" through which it is bestowed.

2. *Universal Redemption—The eternal life of all men made possible.*—The death of Christ so declared the essential and rectoral righteousness of God, as that all the purposes of penalty, found either in the nature of God or the claims of his government, were thereby secured; the bar to the exercise of executive clemency was thereby removed, pardon was made possible, was made consistent with the character of a righteous sovereign and the demands of a righteous law; not that the work of atonement was itself the bestowment of

pardon, but a provision for it, to be applied, as in the mind of the Supreme Magistrate, in any given case, it might seem fit and proper. Now, these things being thus, it is apparent that the death of Christ sustains the same relation to every man that it does to any man. "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him might not perish, but have everlasting life. Jesus Christ, by the grace of God, tasted death for every man. He is a propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world." He has

"For all a ransom paid
For all a full atonement made."

He is the Savior of all men, not only because by him all men have personal conscious existence, but also because by him the salvation of all men is made possible. This topic has already been deferred for a more articulate discussion of its antagonistic doctrines of limited atonement and unconditional personal election; we have made mention of it in this place, because it naturally belongs to the category of the unconditional benefits of atonement which we are here considering. For the present, let the above suffice.

3. *Salvation secured for those dying in infancy.* The doctrine of inherited depravity involves the idea of inherited disqualification for eternal life. The salvation of infants, then, has primary regard to a preparation for the blessedness of heaven—it may have regard to a title thereto; not all newly created beings, nor those sustaining similar relations, are by any natural right entitled to a place among holy angels and glorified saints. The salvation of infants can not be regarded as a salvation from the peril of eternal death. They have not committed sin, the only thing that incurs such a peril. The idea that they are in danger of eternal death because of Adam's transgression, is, at most, nothing more than the idea of a theoretic peril. But if it be insisted that "by the offense of one, judgment came upon all men to [a literal and actual] condemnation," we insist that from that condemnation, be it what it may, theoretic or literal, all men are saved; for "by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life," so that the condition and relations of the race in infancy differ from those of newly created beings solely in that, by the natural law of propagation, a corrupted nature is inherited. As no unclean thing or unholy person can be admitted to the presence of God and to the society of holy angels and glorified saints, it follows that if infants are taken to heaven some power, purifying, sanctifying their souls, must be vouchsafed unto them: the saving influence of the Holy Spirit must be, for Christ's sake, unconditionally bestowed. Not only their preparation for, but also their title to, and enjoyment of the blessedness of heaven comes, as came their existence, through the shed blood of our Lord Jesus Christ. That those dying in infancy are thus sanctified and glorified seems sufficiently attested by our Lord's gracious words, "Suffer the little children to come unto me and forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom of heaven." Should it be said that the blessed are persons of a child-like disposition, that they are such as, or similar to, children, we reply, if to be converted and become as a little child constitute a title to the heavenly inheritance, certainly to be a little child must a *fortiori* constitute a clearer title thereto. Should it be said the kingdom of heaven is the Church of God on earth, we reply, If membership in the Church militant be a title to membership in the Church triumphant for adults, it must, for a stronger reason, be a title thereto for infants. With regard to the difficulty involved in supposing that a large portion of the human race are, without the peril of sin and without the tests of probation, at once, as if newly created, introduced into a condition of secured purity and happiness, while the remainder are left to determine eternal destiny by lives of conflict with temptation; perhaps, we may say that

this difficulty may find adjustment in the distinction between salvation and reward; it is one thing to be saved, another to be rewarded; we are saved by faith, rewarded according to our deeds. "Our light affliction which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory. As one star differeth from another, star in glory, so is the resurrection of the dead." But we know not what we shall be, and where we are ignorant it is wise to be silent, Our Lord's assurance of infant salvation is sufficient; that if saved, they are saved by his blood admits of no doubt; hence we catalogue among the unconditional benefits of atonement the secured salvation of those dying in infancy.

4. *The conditions of a fair probation.* To show inductively from facts of experience that pagans and persons in low condition have what may, in good faith, be pronounced the conditions of a fair probation for eternal destiny, is impossible. Such an induction would require an exhaustive knowledge of the inner life—a knowledge of those secret thoughts and intents of the heart which make up the experience of the persons concerned; we must find the bottom of consciousness, we must exhaust and examine its contents. This is possible only to him who searcheth the heart and trieth the reins of the children of men. Though such a demonstration is impossible, grounds for a fair inference are obvious.

First. Should it be found that some human beings are utterly destitute of the knowledge of God, and, of course, ignorant of law, and of moral obligation, it is manifest that of such moral responsibility can not be predicated. They belong, morally, to the category of idiotic and insane persons.

Second. The universal consciousness of sin and of obligation to virtue proves that the race, as a rule, have, in actual, personal possession, all the elements essential to a moral character. The universal prevalence of religion proves that man is naturally a religious being; he has naturally (intuitively or otherwise) some apprehension of a superior power that makes for righteousness; some apprehension of dependence upon and obligation to that supreme power. Whatever is essential to moral obligation is not left to the contingencies of a man's circumstances. Obligation is modified by circumstances, but is not dependent upon them. Power, or ability to bring something to pass; intelligence, or ability to apprehend an end and its means; free-will, ability to do or not to do, and an apprehension of obligation, constitute the elements of a moral action, and all men are conscious of possessing these elements. That consciousness is their personality; it is because of it that they cognize personal responsibility. Every time a man says, I did this, or, I did not do that, he evinces this sense of personal obligation and responsibility.

Third. Whoever may be lost may be saved; the one involves the other. Whoever is able to commit a sin which incurs the peril of eternal death has ability to avoid that sin; or, having committed it, to repent of it, obtain pardon, and attain unto eternal life.

Fourth. The case contains the conditions of a perfect equation: ability equals obligation; "unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required," and unto whom less is given, of him less shall be required. A man is judged according to that which he hath, and not according to that which he hath not. The unequal distribution of probationary privileges, so obvious in this life, will be accurately adjusted by a corresponding retribution. The infinite love of our Heavenly Father is sufficient assurance of an impartial administration. God loves all his children with an equal love, and surely will, in his own wise way, confer upon all an equal opportunity to secure his favor and their own greatest good.

Fifth. The doctrine of natural depravity affirms the total inability of man to turn himself to faith and calling upon God. This being postulated, the affirmation that all have a fair probation involves the doctrine of a gracious influence unconditionally secured as the common inheritance of the race: this gracious influence is so secured; the same blood that purchased for mankind a conscious existence procured for them all grace needful for the responsibilities of that existence. "The true light lighteth every man that cometh into the world. John bore witness of that Light, that all men through him might believe. The grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared unto all men." Whatever of divine influence, enlightening the eyes of our understanding, quickening conscience, and strengthening the volitionating faculty, may be necessary to constitute man a free, moral agent, capable of choosing life, and also having power to refuse it, is efficaciously secured to every individual of the race by the same redeeming process by which he has a personal, conscious existence. Is it objected here, that this represents the benefits of atonement, even the gracious influences of the Holy spirit, as of the nature of a debt due to man, not a manifestation of mercy, of grace to the undeserving, or that these benefits are of the nature of a compensation for the disabilities of inherited depravity? We reply, the relations of the posterity of the first pair to God are substantially those of newly created beings—each individual person is obligated to God, and God to him, precisely the same as if God had created him such as he is; and the intuitive principles of honor and of right, to which God appeals when he inquires, "Are not my ways equal," clearly indicate that ability must in all cases equal obligation. God was not obligated to provide a Redeemer for the first transgressors; but having provided redemption for them, and through it permitted them to propagate a degenerate race, we can not see to the contrary, but that an adequate compensation is due. We accept what is here alleged as an objection, and regard it as the truth in the case, but do not allow that therefore the unconditional benefits of atonement are in no sense gifts of grace; contrariwise, we maintain the whole of human existence is illustrative of the riches of grace in Christ Jesus.

Sixth. To the essential conditions of a probationary state common to all mankind, additional blessings of providence and grace are bestowed—to some two, to others five, talents of privilege and endowment. These are composed of and constitute the diversified conditions of mankind in the whole of their earthly life. Men differ in personal qualities, in natural endowments, and in learned acquirements; their domestic, social, and civil institutions differ; differences in constitutional characters, in educational advantages, in social positions, in wealth, in personal influence, all differences in providential and gracious bestowments, are differences in probationary privilege,—all are gifts of God bestowed in the exercise of an absolute sovereignty, according to the good pleasure of his will—but our being and its blessings are given us through the redemption by our Lord Jesus Christ. They are all benefits of his death. The inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, the organization of the Christian Church, the preaching of the Gospel, all the agencies and instrumentalities of religious instruction and culture are specially to be regarded as divinely bestowed blessings and benefits of the redeeming blood. They are probationary privileges granted for Christ's sake, and to be appropriated by their recipients for God's glory, which is their own good and the general welfare of mankind. Christ is the savior in these regards; by him all men have personal existence; all men may possibly be saved; the salvation of all dying in infancy is secured, and all men have the conditions of a fair probation. He is the special Savior of them that believe. The blessings efficaciously secured for all men are unconditioned; the blessings of special salvation are conditioned upon the faith of the recipient. We proceed to discuss,

II. THE CONDITIONAL BLESSINGS OF ATONEMENT.

1. *Justification*.— The term justification, with its paronyms, is used in the Scriptures chiefly in one or the other of two senses; in the one case, it is usually qualified by the term "by works," and in the other, by the term "by faith;" the one is hypothetical, the other actual; the one legal, the other evangelical. If a man be supposed to have kept the whole law, never to have transgressed—if he be supposed entirely innocent, strictly and fully virtuous—he is a just man; is justified by his works. This is a merely hypothetical justification, because no man liveth and sinneth not—no man is justified by the deeds of the law. The only actual and possible justification, that can be predicated of mankind, is the Gospel justification by faith. In common language, the term is used more frequently than otherwise in the sense of acquittal—as when a man has done what, as to the external act, is contrary to law, yet he has done it for reasons which render it an innocent act, perhaps even virtuous; as when a man has committed homicide and is accused of murder, but shows that the homicide was committed in self-defense, he is said to be justified in doing as he did. To justify, then, is a term having three significations: in the first, it is a declaration of innocence or virtue, an affirmation that the party concerned had fully and literally kept the whole law; in the second, it is a verdict of acquittal in cases of alleged criminality; the party concerned has been accused, an appearance of crime is admitted or proved, but the accused has set up and maintained a plea which, in the judgment of the jury, justifies the deed done; they affirm that the man was justified in doing as he did. This, evidently, does not differ essentially from the first sense of the term; it is, substantially, an affirmation of innocence—the party is justified by his works. The third sense of the term is, that in which it is generally used in the Scriptures; it is not a verdict of innocence or acquittal; the party concerned is confessedly guilty of the crime alleged against him; there are no extenuating circumstances, no commendable or praiseworthy motives; the accused is justly, legally condemned; he is deservedly under sentence, has received sentence, and is awaiting the day of execution. The justification of such a one is precisely the justification of a sinner before God; it is what the derivative sense of the term, to make just, would indicate. The word justify is derived from two Latin words—*justus*, just; *facere*, to make. This is the Gospel idea; an unjust man, a sinner somehow made a just, a righteous man, or he is considered and treated as such, or both of these ideas are included.

To make a man just as to character is a work of grace in his soul by the Spirit of God, and when this is the sole idea intended, the terms regeneration, sanctification, new creation, born again, are used. Justification and regeneration, or the new birth, are contemporary, and doubtless the term justify and its paronyms are frequently used in Scripture, when the writer has in thought the whole work wrought both for and in the subject at the time of justification—a part put for the whole. Some theologians strenuously insist that the Inspirer of the Scriptures specially intended to include the idea of regeneration in the sense of the term justification, and that therefore the word ought to be used in that sense; but for what reason they do so is not apparent, unless it be to abet the theory that regeneration is the ground of justification—that God makes a man just and then pronounces him just because he is so, thus avoiding the common formula, God justifies the sinner, which seems to imply that God pronounces a man just when he is not. This is, of course, a misapprehension, and may be laid aside. As we see it, the question is merely a dictionary question, and beyond this has no merit. The ideas are distinctly different. To pardon sin, release from obligation to punishment, is a decree or decision in the mind of God—a work done for the sinner, changing his relations to law; to regenerate, to create anew, is a work of the Holy Spirit wrought in the mind of the sinner, changing his moral and religious character. The one is to treat a sinner the

same as he would be treated if he were a just man; the other is to make him a just man. The change wrought in the character of a sinner by the power of the Holy Spirit is distinctly expressed by the term regeneration and its synonyms, and certainly in scientific treatises, in systematic theology, and in all doctrinal discourses, the idea of pardon should also be expressed by some term which distinctly designates it. Justification is so used in the Word of God, though sometimes used in the more comprehensive sense. It is the term most generally used by theological writers, as synonymous with the term pardon. We conform to the prevailing custom, and use the word specifically in that sense. The Scripture synonyms for this specific idea are justification, the pardon of sin, the forgiveness of sin, the remission of sin, the non-imputation of sin, and the imputation of righteousness.

The words forgiveness and remission have, sometimes, each a specific sense. The word pardon is sometimes specifically synonymous with remission, and sometimes equal to both forgiveness and remission. When an aggrieved party forgives the aggressor, there is a change in the feelings of the aggrieved toward the aggressor; he regards him, feels toward him, and treats him the same as though he had never done him an injury. This may occur between private individuals in cases where the offense is not a violation of public law, where the aggrieved has no authority to inflict penalty. Divine pardon includes this sense: "Though thou wast angry with me thine anger is turned away and thou comfortedst me." Remission has respect not to the feelings of the aggrieved, or to the personal feelings of the magistrate, but to the penalty incurred by transgression. To remit sin is to release from obligation to punishment; it is to order authoritatively the non-execution of penalty. Now, when God pardons sin he both forgives and remits; he regards and treats him who had been an enemy and a rebel as a beloved child. This involves the idea of adoption, and will be treated of further on. He remits the penalty due to the sins of him whom he pardons.

Eliminating all ideas of regeneration, of adoption, and of whatever else accompanies justification, we here direct attention exclusively to the single idea of the remission of penalty. Justification, in its primary idea, is an act of God, as chief magistrate, ordering the non-execution of penalty. The law says, Let the sinner die; God says, Let the sinner live. This is justification; it is making just, in the sense of treating the sinner, so far as penalty is concerned, the same as if he were just—the same as if he had not been guilty of transgression. "The law entered that the offense might abound; but where sin abounded grace did much more abound; that as sin hath reigned unto death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life by Jesus Christ our Lord; who was delivered for our offenses, and was raised again for our justification; therefore, being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ; much more, then, being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him; for if when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life.

These passages, with or without the collocation we have here given them, teach, upon their surface, first, that the reign of sin is unto death—not merely temporal death, or the death of the body, nor specially that, but specially the second death, the death of the soul in the eternal world. Second, that the death of the Son of God reconciled us unto God, which, in Scripture usage, means, reconciled God unto us; that is, the death of the Son of God was an event which, in the mind of God, made it consistent with his own character and with the claims of his government, to save the sinner from the wrath to come; and, third, the fact that such a provision had been made for the pardon of our sins, and made for us when we were yet enemies, is abundant ground for an assured hope that the provision will be applied and we shall be saved from the wrath to which we were exposed; especially so when it has come

to pass not only that God is reconciled unto us, but that we are also, through Christ, reconciled to God.

Justification before God is the special topic of discussion in several of the first chapters of Paul's Epistle to the Romans. Therein the peril of sin is called the wrath of God, worthiness of death, judgment of God, wrath against the day of wrath, revelation of the righteous judgment of God, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, to perish without law, to be judged by the law, taking vengeance, just damnation. Salvation from the peril of sin is called the righteousness of God, being justified freely by grace, being justified by faith, sins covered, iniquities forgiven, remission of sins that are past. To save is to justify the ungodly, to justify by faith, to count faith unto the believer for righteousness, to impute righteousness, to reckon faith for righteousness, not to impute sin. God is called the justifier of him that believeth. The source, ground, or procuring cause of salvation is called the redemption that is in Christ Jesus—a propitiation set forth for the remission of sins; Christ is said to be delivered for our offenses and raised for our justification. The condition of this salvation is faith in Jesus Christ—faith in his blood, faith without the deeds of the law. One that is saved is described as he that believeth in Jesus; he that worketh not but believeth. Abraham was justified because he believed in God. It is evident that these forms of speech, the connection in which they stand, and the doctrine of the whole discourse, teach most distinctly that salvation from the wrath to come, the second death, release from obligation to it, is made possible by the incarnation, sufferings, and death of our Lord Jesus Christ—by atonement; that this salvation is made actual by the decree or act of God as Supreme Sovereign, by justification; and that this decree of God, or act of justification, is conditioned solely upon the faith of its recipient. The fathers in the ministry of the Methodist Church, in public discourse, used frequently to speak of salvation in three regards: first, salvation from the guilt of sin; second, from the reigning power of sin; and third, from the inbeing of sin. The first they called justification; the second, regeneration, or initial sanctification; and the third, entire sanctification. That they intended, by the guilt of sin obligation to punishment admits of no manner of doubt; indeed, there is no other sense in which a man can be saved from the guilt of sin. The fact of sin, the responsibility for it, and the demerit of it, having become actual, can not not be. The deed being done, it can never come to pass that it was not done; and so also of the responsibility and demerit of the doer. To save them from the guilt of sin is to exempt the sinner from the punishment due, from the penalty incurred. To justify is to order, authoritatively, the non-execution of penalty—just this, and nothing more.

Under a perfect government this can occur only under two conditions: first, the righteousness of the sovereign and of the administration must be adequately declared, made known; the administrator must be known to be just, and his decree of pardon, the act of justification, must be known to be in harmony with the ends of government; the purpose for which government is organized, law enacted, and penalty threatened, must not be defeated; the moral motive power of law must be sustained; the subjects of the government must not be allowed to infer from the fact of pardon that the administration connives at sin; there must be no occasion, even in appearance, for a suspicion that sin is a trifle, or can be committed with impunity. This condition is found in the sacrificial death of our Lord Jesus Christ. Having discussed this condition under the head of atonement, its discussion needs not be repeated here. The second condition requisite to constitute the act of pardon a just and righteous act, is some adequate pledge or assurance that the future conduct of the pardoned criminal will be in accordance with the requirements of the law, some evidence that the criminal has the spirit of loyal citizenship; the magistrate must be persuaded that he who is pardoned

will henceforth obey the law, will not repeat his transgressions. This is a demand of good government; the executive has no right to peril the common weal; it is not consistent with his obligations as sovereign that he should pardon the criminal when he has reason to anticipate the repetition of crime. As in human governments, when a thief has been incarcerated the governor would be recreant to his trust and defeat the purpose of the government he is appointed to administer, by pardoning the thief when he had reason to believe that, so soon as the culprit was at liberty, he would make depredations upon the property of others, thus exposing property which it was his duty to protect; so in the divine government, a sinner can not be consistently pardoned if his release would, in any degree or in any respect, detrimental to public morals, or in reasonable anticipation expose the welfare of others to detriment. Governments are for the protection of the public good, the common interests, and individual rights. Whatever, therefore, withdraws protection defeats government.

This condition of pardon, the security of the future good conduct of the pardoned, is found in faith of him that believeth in Jesus. Faith implies a conviction of sin, penitence on account of sin, a purpose of righteousness, and prayer for pardon. If a man believes himself an entirely innocent person, he is confident that God regards him as such; he, therefore, does not think himself exposed to penalty, has no occasion to ask for pardon, and does not pray for it. If he prays for pardon, it is because he knows he is guilty, deserves punishment, and is exposed to it—he is convicted of sin. A man can not pray for pardon, and believe that God hears and answers his prayer, if he is conscious at the same moment of the love of sin. A mere desire to escape the penalty of sin when there is co-existent a desire for its indulgence, is not adequate ground for faith. One can not believe his prayer for pardon is granted unless he is conscious of a sincere sorrow on account of his sins; he must have repentance toward God, or he can never exercise saving faith. Again, faith is impossible where there is a purpose to continue in sin; yea, more, it is impossible where there is a want of purpose of amendment and obedience. When the eyes of the understanding have been enlightened, when by the Spirit's teachings a man's sins have been set in order before him, so that he apprehends the transgressions of his life, when he sees the exceeding sinfulness of sin, and abhors it in dust and ashes; when the sentence of condemnation, the spirit of bondage again to fear, the conviction of just exposure to righteous punishment has taken full possession of his soul; when sorrow on account of his sins presses him as a cart beneath its sheaves, and when full purpose of reformation and future obedience is distinctly formed in his mind, then, and not till then, he may, in confident trust, in the exercise of evangelical saving faith, cry, God be merciful to me a sinner. Faith is not an arbitrary requirement; it is an indispensable condition; the nature of the case demands it. The blood of Christ having adequately declared the righteousness of God, and the faith of him that believeth being adequate security of his future good conduct, all the ends of government being fully secured, and the welfare of the commonwealth fully protected, pardon may be granted, executive clemency may be safely and honorably, as well as graciously and mercifully, exercised. God is glorified, the law is honored, and the sinner is saved.

This view is fully sustained by the testimony of the Scriptures that bear upon the subject. "Being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ. Justification is a fact of history; faith and our Lord Jesus Christ are the underlying conditions rendering the fact righteously possible, and peace with God is the blessed consequent.

The above will suffice to show in what sense the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith *only*, is both rational and Scriptural. Faith is said to be that condition of justification, or the pardon of sin, which, if a man

have, no matter what else he is destitute of, he can not be lost, and without which, whatever else he may have, he can not be saved. Though faith be that only, and that alone, that justifies, it is not solitary and arbitrary; it is that which, in the nature of the case, is essential, as meeting an indispensable requirement, and is, in itself, such as secures, atonement having been made, all the remaining interests involved. It is not a mere speculative belief in the doctrines of Christianity. It is confidence in Christ, as the Son of God and Savior of men. It is a state of mind, which, naturally, intuitively; assimilates the believer to the Spirit of Christ, adopts his sentiments, co-operates with his plans, takes him as a leader and guide. Faith in Christ is a voluntary act, by which Christ accepted as prophet, priest, and king. The moment, therefore, a man exercises this confidence in Christ, he is a saved man. This is itself the spirit of loyalty; it is in harmony with law; it seeks the ends of government; it approves, admires the righteousness of God; in it rebellion against God dies. The carnal mind, at enmity with God, and not subject to his law, is put away, is displaced by its opposite; faith is the spirit of filial obedience. It implies repentance, sorrow on account of sin, together with a turning from sin; it brings forth fruits meet for repentance. It implies, further, a purpose of righteousness; it is such a trust in Christ as embraces him in all his offices, and by a strong figure may be said to identify the believer with Christ. The believer, in a sense, becomes, by his act of faith, one with Christ. Christ is the vine; he, by faith, becomes a branch engrafted in the vine. In a word, faith is the act of appropriating the blessings and benefits of atonement. The sacrificial death of Christ is a provision made for man's necessities, as amoral and religious being who has sinned against God. Faith is the volitionating act by which man takes possession of the benefits proffered. In this view, the doctrine of salvation by faith only is rational and intelligible as well as Scriptural. "He that believeth shall be saved," might be read, he that believeth is saved, and "he that believeth not shall be damned," may be interchanged for the parallel. "he that believeth not is condemned already."

OBJECTIONS.

In James ii, 24, it is said, "by works a man is justified, and not by faith only, and this passage is quoted as opposing the common doctrine of justification by faith. In reply, Paul is quoted, Romans iii, 28, "Therefore, we conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law;" and iv, 5, "to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness." Evidently, the truth will be manifest when these two testimonies shall be rationally and Scripturally reconciled. In Paul's testimony he is specially discussing the doctrine in question. James speaks of it only incidentally; therefore, James is to be interpreted by Paul, and not Paul by James. Paul is reproving and correcting the errors of the ritualistic Jews. His opponent is the Jew who affirms that the observance of the ceremonial law given by Moses is the condition of eternal life. James is reproving and correcting the errors of Antinomian believers; his opponent is the professed Christian who affirms that faith is belief in Christ as the Messiah, a theoretic acceptance of Jesus as the promised Redeemer, and that this is the sole condition of eternal life; so that if a man have speculative faith in Christ he is saved, no matter what he does. Paul opposes ritualism; James enthusiasm. Again, they are not speaking of faith in the same sense. Paul has in mind trust, confidence, evangelical, saving faith; that which is conditioned upon repentance, and is productive of obedience. James has in mind mere intellectual assent, a dead faith, such as devils have, a faith that might be without works, and not such as is shown by good works. And yet again the two are discoursing of justification in a different sense. Paul has in mind the judicial act of God, by which pardon is granted a penitent believer in this life. James has more immediate reference

to justification in the day of judgment when men are to be judged, that is, rewarded according to their works, when, as our Lord said, by our words we shall be justified, and by our words we shall be condemned, or, at most, when works shall be required as evidence of faith. Plainly, there is no antagonism between St. Paul and St. James. Paul's doctrine of pardon or justification, on the sole condition of trust in God through Jesus Christ, is not only not contradicted by James, but is plainly implied in what he says of a dead faith, and of showing his faith by his works.

It has been objected that this doctrine is detrimental to morals. That sinners abuse the goodness of God, that they discard his mercies, and even trample on his redeeming blood, is not disputed; that some may presume on divine goodness, and encourage themselves in so doing by the presumptuous hope that at the last they may, through repentance toward God, and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, escape the consequences of their crimes, is not improbable. But, if anyone supposes that such presumption and abuse of divine mercy is characteristic of evangelical faith, it is obvious such a one has no correct apprehension of what faith is. Faith works by love and purifies the heart. This objection is evidently too trivial for extended notice.

Again, it is objected, that to teach that salvation is conditioned upon faith, and at the same time teach that faith is an act of the human will, is to teach, after all, salvation by works; if by works, then not of grace, as the Bible affirms it is. We reply, Grace implies a voluntary recipient; machinery is not an object of grace or mercy. Again, faith itself, considered as a volitionating power, is the gift of God; indeed, existence itself, and all a man is and has, are of grace; there is no merit, *per se*, in whatever a man is or does; there needs be no controversy here. But the exercise of man's God-given powers is with the man himself, and is made within limits subject to his own free choice. God no more believes for a man than he breathes and eats, walks and works, for him; faith, as a power to believe, is the gift of God; believing, the exercise of faith, is the act of man. This act he must put forth or be damned; if he put it forth, he will be saved; he can not be lost while believing in Christ. If any choose to call that act of faith works, we shall not contend; if they still affirm that, in asserting that this faith is an act of the human will, we teach the doctrine of salvation by works, very well; we care not by what name it is called; we abide the affirmation of the doctrine that man's eternal destiny is dependent upon a somewhat which he himself may do or leave undone, and that somewhat is called, in the Bible, faith. To those to whom the Gospel is preached, it is a cordial confiding in Jesus Christ as the Son of God and Savior of men; to those who have not heard the Gospel, it is the same faith in the form of a filial trust in the mercy of God; or, as it has been designate~, "the spirit of faith with a purpose of righteousness."

IMPUTATION.

We have, in another place, considered the idea that the sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity. We endeavored to maintain that the only sense in which that sin is so imputed is, that consequences of Adam's sin, by the law of propagation and inheritance, naturally accrue to his posterity. We strenuously reject the idea that children are, in any sense, personally responsible for the acts of their parents; especially are we opposed to the thought that children are, in any proper sense, punished for their parents' sins. The notion-held, to be sure, by but a very few-that the sins of mankind, or any portion of them, were imputed to Christ-that is, that he took upon him our iniquities in such a sense as that he was considered guilty, or that they were accounted to him, or that he suffered the punishment due on account of those sins-in a word, the idea that the Son of God died as a culprit, taking the place of culprits and having their transgressions imputed

to him, accounted as his—have characterized as well-nigh bordering upon blasphemy; it is, to say the least, a horrible thing think of. The term impute can not, in any good sense, be applied in this case. If, however, it be insisted upon that the sins of mankind, or of the elect, were imputed to Christ, the only sense permissible—and even in that sense the formula is eminently awkward—is, that consequences of man's sins were placed upon him; he suffered because of sin, not at all that he was punished for sin, or suffered the penalty of sin.

The doctrine, that the active and passive righteousness of Christ is imputed to his people, must here be considered more at length, as it properly belongs to the subject now in hand. To justify, to pardon, to remit sin, not to impute sin, and to impute righteousness, are synonymous terms. When the true import of one of these terms is found, we have found the import of all of them; they are different expressions for one and the same act. Acts xxii, 38, 39: "Be it known unto you, men and brethren, that through this man is preached unto you the forgiveness of sins, and by him all that believe are justified from all things from which you could not be justified by the law of Moses." Romans iv, 3-8: "What saith the Scripture? Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness. Now to him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt. But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness. Even as David also describeth the blessedness of the man unto whom God imputeth righteousness without works, saying, Blessed are "they whose iniquities are forgiven and whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin." That the terms above specified are in these passages used synonymously can not be reasonably questioned. Let it be remembered, that in this passage from Romans, and in its context, the Apostle is specifically and argumentatively, discussing the doctrine of justification before God, so that if anywhere in Scripture the precise import of that doctrine is found, it is found here, and, I repeat, beyond reasonable question, the terms "justified," "justifieth," "forgiveness of sins," "iniquities are forgiven," "sins are covered," "counted unto him for righteousness," "imputeth righteousness," and "will not impute sin," are used to designate the same thing.

Now, what that thing is may be distinctly discovered by considering the obvious import of the passage, "Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness." What did Abraham's faith do? What did it bring to pass? It certainly did not bring it to pass that he never had sinned; for no man is justified by the deeds of the law—no man liveth and sinneth not. Abraham, having done what he ought not to do, or having left undone what he ought to have done, it can never be brought to pass, or become true, that he did not do thus. Abraham's faith could not bring it to pass that God thought of him as having always kept the commandments, or counted, or considered him as having always been legally righteous; or that righteousness was in any such sense put to his account; for God thinks of things as they are, and he puts to the account of his creatures precisely what his creatures are, and what they do. His thoughts and dealings are in truth and not in fiction. Again, Abraham's faith was not regarded as a substitute for righteousness, as though, in a ledger account, obedience was debited and the account was balanced by a credit of faith. Faith is an act of obedience to a single command, but is not obedience to all commands, nor is it an equivalent thereto. It is not so in fact, and God does not deal in any fiction that can make it so. Abraham's faith did not bring it to pass that Christ's righteousness was counted to him in the sense that he did it. He did not do it, and he can not in truth be credited as having done it. Abraham was, as are all of his fellow-men, a sinner before God; he had done wrong, he was responsible for what he had done, was justly and legally guilty, was exposed to penalty, and punishment might have been justly inflicted upon him. Neither the death of Christ nor his faith, nor both together, made any change in these things; but he believed

God; and his faith, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, brought it to pass that he was exonerated from obligation to punishment; he was, on condition of his faith, saved from punishment as fully, as effectually, as he would have been if he had been righteous. His faith, so far as penalty is concerned, brought to pass the same thing that righteousness would have done. This is the sense in which his faith was imputed to him for righteousness. The idea is the same, as is expressed when it is said that faith is the condition of justification, of pardon, of forgiveness, of remission, each of which means that, through the declaration of God's righteousness made by the death of our Lord Jesus Christ, on condition of faith in the recipient, the grace and mercy of God is manifest by the exercise of executive clemency in ordering the non-execution of the penalty due to the sins of which the pardoned sinner is guilty.

The Scriptures usually quoted to maintain the doctrine of imputation, in the sense of counting or reckoning the active and passive righteousness of Christ to his people as their righteousness, are "He hath made him to be sin for us who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him. As by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so, by the obedience of one, shall many be made righteous. And this is the name whereby he shall be called, The Lord Our Righteousness. But of him are ye in Christ Jesus, who of God is made unto us wisdom and righteousness, and sanctification and redemption." The terms of expression here employed seem to favor the doctrine in support of which they are quoted. They contain the whole strength of the Scripture argument, on that side of the question. If the doctrine is not here, it is not in the Bible. It is obvious that nothing similar to the formula, Christ's righteousness is counted our righteousness, is found in these passages. Such a construction is but a construction, an interpretation, not an affirmation. The doctrine is not stated in these passages. It is also obvious, on a slight examination, that all these passages may be reasonably interpreted by the theory above advocated; and as the above interpretation is the obvious exegesis of those other passages, especially those quoted from Romans, where the doctrine of justification is specifically discussed, we hold that we are bound to interpret these incidental references by those explicit statements. There is a class of figurative expressions in the Scriptures such as, "clothed with garments of salvation, robes of righteousness and white linen, the righteousness of the saints;" and also such expressions as "putting on Christ," which have led Christians, in speaking of their experience, to speak of putting away the filthy garments of self-righteousness and putting on the righteousness of Christ. We Wesleyans sing,

"Jesus, thy blood and righteousness
My beauty are, my glorious dress;
Midst flaming worlds in these arrayed,
With joy shall I lift up my head."

This is evidently rhetorical; it is poetical adornment, and not literal statement of doctrinal truth. The saints in glory are clothed with garments washed and made white in the blood of the Lamb. Surely Christ's righteousness was not washed in his blood; it never needed cleansing. Rhetorical expressions are not logical arguments. The fact that such fancies are even cherished thoughts among the deeply pious, is not proof that the doctrine they imply is true.

The doctrine of imputation, in the sense here opposed, affiliates, and stands or falls with that view of atonement which regards Christ's death as substituted penalty for the sins of men. If the race stood their probation in Adam; if his sin is their sin, his guilt their guilt; if Christ suffered the penalty due to the sins of the elect; if their sins were his sins, and his death their punishment, then, as consistently as these things may be said, it

may also be said, that Christ's righteousness was the righteousness of his people. Such a system may claim the merit of self-consistency; but that it is founded, constructed, cemented, and completed in fiction; that it is a continuous process of putting one thing for another, and never in any instance regarding and treating things as they are, is most astoundingly obvious.

In treatises on the doctrine of justification it is common to discuss at length the Romish affirmation that the term, signifying, as its derivation and Imposition indicate, to make just, is used in Scripture to designate a change in the moral and religious character of its subject. The justified are in the act of justification made just, righteous in the full sense of the terms employed.

If it be intended to assert that the pardon of sin, the remission of penalty, the change of relation to law, be all the change that is implied in salvation from sin, that justification being pardon, and being also making just, therefore, a pardoned sinner is by virtue of his pardon, *per se*, a just man; that baptism changes a man's relation to law, and, thus, itself, by its own working, constitutes him just and righteous, so that there is no other change, no work of the Holy Spirit requisite to make men righteous; then, of course, this affirmation is to be antagonized, as it will be, in the discussion next succeeding this.

If, however, it be intended to assert that justification is making just in the sense of regenerating, creating anew in the proper sense of the word regenerating, then the question is purely verbal—a dictionary question, not worthy of extended notice. Salvation includes the pardon of sin; this we call justification: also a change in moral character; this we call regeneration; these are contemporaneous, and, in common discourse, the terms may be used interchangeably without misleading. If any, in systematic discussion, choose so to use them, by giving due notice, they may so do, probably without detriment. We pass now to the consideration of the second conditioned blessing or benefit of atonement—the change wrought by the Holy Spirit in the moral and religious character of the believer.

REGENERATION.

"Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the Word of God, which liveth and abideth forever. Whereby are given unto us exceeding great and precious promises, that by these ye might be partakers of the divine nature, having escaped the corruption that is in the world through lust. A new heart will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you, and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh. Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean from all your filthiness, and from all your idols will I cleanse you. Therefore, if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature; old things have passed away, behold, all things have become new. And I will put my spirit within you and cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments and do them. And you hath he quickened who were dead in trespasses and sins. Which were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. But after that the kindness and love of God our Savior toward men appeared, not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy, he saved us by the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost, which he shed on us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Savior. That ye put off concerning the former conversation, the old man which is corrupt according to the deceitful lists, and be renewed in the spirit of your mind; and that ye put on the new man, which is after God, created in righteousness and true holiness. Verily, verily I say unto thee, except a man is born again he can not see the kingdom of God. That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit."

In our treatment of the subject of justification, we have confined the term to the single idea commonly expressed by the term pardon. It is an act or decision of the Supreme Sovereign by which a sinner is exonerated from obligation to punishment. This act changes a man's relation to law so far as penalty is concerned. The Scriptures teach that at the same time (some say by the same act—this distinction is, however, of no account), God changes the relations of the sinner to the law, to the government, and to himself, in all those respects in which the relations of a rebel differ from those of a loyal subject—the pardoned sinner is regarded and treated in all respects as a righteous person; nay, more, contemporaneously with the pardon of sin, the sinner is made a member of the divine family—he is a child of God. This change in his relations is called, in Scripture, adoption; we so designate; justification is pardon; all other changes in the sinner's relations we call adoption, which will be treated of further on.

We come now to consider that change in the moral and religious character of the believer, which the Scriptures designate by the terms regeneration, born again, created anew, washing of regeneration, renewing of the Holy Ghost, putting off the old man and putting on the new. In this changed character, the believer is said to be a new creature, partaker of the divine nature; he has a new heart, and a new spirit is put within him; he is sprinkled with clean water, and is cleansed from all filthiness; he has escaped the corruption that is in the world through lust; he who was dead in trespasses and sins is quickened, he is renewed in the spirit of his mind.

The doctrine of original or natural depravity is an affirmation that man is, in character, morally corrupt. In our discussion of that topic, we endeavored to maintain, that by the natural law of propagation the race had inherited, as a result or consequence of the first sin, an abnormal nature; that all our faculties—physical, intellectual, moral, and religious—are affected, are in themselves different from what they were by creation, and are differently conditioned; that by reason of sin the body has become subject to disease and death, the understanding is darkened, the judgment perverted, the reason dethroned, the imagination and taste vitiated, the heart alienated, the conscience seared, and the will enslaved; the whole head is sick, and the whole heart faint. The carnal mind is enmity against God; the heart is deceitful and desperately wicked; and the will is carnal, sold under sin. Salvation from sin involves the idea of a restoration of man's diseased, deranged, depraved nature to its original purity and holiness. A completed, perfect salvation from all the inherited consequences of the first transgression, is not attainable in this life—will not be realized until after the resurrection of the body. The results of sin will not fully terminate till the redeemed saints are glorified in heaven.

Some change from a condition of total deprivation and depravity is implied in the conditions of a fair probation, and we have placed, among the unconditional benefits of atonement, whatever of divine grace and whatever change of character a proper probation requires. Some further change—a change from the condition of one in possession only of the unconditioned blessings of atonement—is requisite to the exercise of acceptable repentance and of saving faith. One who improves the common grace given to all mankind, and the special privileges providentially his, is enlightened as to the eyes of his understanding, or as to the discriminating power of conscience, so as to see his duties and obligations, to apprehend his sins and his sinfulness, and to become fully persuaded of his need of a divine Savior and his entire dependence upon the grace and mercy of God. If he does not resist the Holy Spirit, but voluntarily gives the Spirit free course, his heart becomes so far changed from its natural love of sin as to sorrow on account of sin, and in a degree to hate it; he is truly penitent; has initial godly sorrow for sin; his

will is emancipated from its natural bondage to unbelief, and is so far invigorated by divine grace as to be able to volitionate a determined purpose of amendment and of future obedience; nay, more, he actually does volitionate living faith.

But all this is not what theologians call regeneration. It is antecedent to regeneration, and constitutes the state of mind on which regeneration is conditioned. Faith, the evidence of justification, and regeneration are contemporaneous, not separable in consciousness, but in the order of thought faith is first, justification second, and generation third. We have said that some of the inherited effects of the first transgression remain till the redeemed saint is glorified in heaven. We here distinctly state, and will more fully discuss hereafter when we come to consider the doctrine of entire sanctification, that not all of original sin or natural depravity is removed in regeneration. Regeneration does not restore the mind to the condition of original righteousness; there are still weaknesses of judgment, imperfections in affection, and so far forth as the volitionating power is conditioned upon antecedent intellections and sensibilities, it may be said that the will remains, to that degree and extent, under bondage to corruption. These remains of original sin are subsequently removed, generally by a gradual process, perhaps sometimes instantaneously, as the subject improves his privileges, grows in grace and knowledge, and comes to the exercise of an intelligent, evangelical, saving faith for this special attainment, this higher Christian life.

Now, in view of the greatness of this change in the moral and religious life of the believer, in view of its continuous process from the first enlightening of the understanding to the full possession of perfect love, it must be manifest that to state the precise change that takes place at any period of this experience, is a difficult thing to do. To state in terms that will accurately and exhaustively designate the precise thing the Holy Spmt does when he regenerates the believer, to distinguish that work from antecedent and subsequent changes in the religious character of its subject, if not impossible to human thought and speech, is extremely difficult. This difficulty is, perhaps unnecessarily, but very naturally, increased by the efforts we are wont to make to distinguish in this change between natural and supernatural agencies. Salvation is the resultant of the co-operation of the human and divine—of the will of man and the Spirit of God. Precisely what man does and what the Spirit does is not clearly cognizable in consciousness. Divine operations upon the mind of man are in harmony with those laws of thought, feeling, and volition which God originated when he made mind what it is; the supernatural harmonizes with the natural, and they are concomitant; therefore, to distinguish between them, however scrutinizing our introspection or self-examination, is, to say the least, extremely difficult. The more legitimate investigation has respect to the change itself. That regeneration is synergistic, we shall presently attempt to prove; at present we inquire exclusively, What is the change we call regeneration? What takes place when a man is born again?

We have said above, that our fathers defined it salvation from the reigning power of sin, and this, to our thought, is the testimony of the Scriptures on the subject, "I will put my spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments." Here we are taught that walking in the divine statutes and keeping the divine judgments is the result of putting the divine spirit in man. Translating this into psychological terms, the spirit emancipates the will from its bondage to sin, and empowers it to volitionate acts of obedience to the divine commandments. The same idea is expressed in the following passages, "That ye put off concerning the former conversation the old man, which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts; and be renewed in the spirit of your minds; and that ye put on the new man

which is after God, created in righteousness and true holiness. How much more shall the blood of Christ, who, through the eternal Spirit, offered himself unto God, purge your consciences from dead works to serve the living God. The thought is, that by a supernatural agency the will is endowed with power to keep God's commandments. In Romans vii and viii this topic is specifically discussed. The man whose experience is delineated in the seventh chapter is not a careless, reckless, benighted transgressor; he is one to whom the commandment has come, that is, whose mind has been enlightened to apprehend his sins and sinfulness, who, by the coming of the commandment has been made to see the exceeding sinfulness of sin; his perverted judgment has been so far corrected that he approves virtue and piety, and his heart and will have come to that condition in which he would do that which his judgment approves. But he is still under bondage to sin; he is carnal, sold under sin; when he would do good evil is present with him; he has delight in the law of the Lord, but another law in his members is warring against the law of his mind, and bringing him into captivity. He is not a passive sufferer, but a struggling captive, striving to obtain release from bondage. Thus far conquered, in self-despair, he bemoans his wretchedness, and, inquires, Who shall deliver me from the body of this death? He finds Jesus Christ our Lord his desired deliverer. By faith in Jesus Christ he is regenerate, born anew; his volitionating power is invigorated, and now he is able to live without condemnation—having power to walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit. The law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus has made him free from the law of sin and death; for what the law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin condemned sin in the flesh; that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us who walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit.

The point we make here will be obvious if it be noted that what has occurred is not a complete removal of what is called the flesh, or its weakness, not an entire removal of the carnal mind, but a bestowment of power to conquer it, to walk not after it, but to walk after the spirit, and so to conquer the flesh and live after the spirit as to maintain a constant freedom from condemnation. The thing done is salvation from the reigning power of inbred or original sin; it is deliverance from captivity; he is free whom the Son maketh free; it is bestowment, by the grace and power of God by which the man is empowered to volitionate obedience. Its chief effect is, therefore, upon the volitionating faculty. To regenerate, then, is, primarily and chiefly, to strengthen the will. But it must be evident, from the manifest fact that man is a unit, so that whatever affects one faculty of his nature, in some measure and in some degree affects all, that this change we call regeneration has some relation to the entire of human nature; if a man be in Christ Jesus by the washing of regeneration and the renewal of the Holy Ghost, he is a new creature; old things are passed away, all things are become new; that is, he and all that pertains to him are, in some respects and to some extent, different from their former condition.

Some teachers of religion refer the work of regeneration chiefly to the affections. Regeneration is a change of heart. That a regenerate soul loves what he had before loved less, or hated, is beyond question, and perhaps it is with good reason that this change is regarded as chief and primary. As the affections are conditioned upon knowledge, it might be said that regeneration is a change of intellect; and if anyone choose to regard that even as chief, we shall not contend: yea, more, as regeneration is by the word of God, or, in other words, as the instrumental cause is the preaching of the Gospel, it may be claimed that the enlightenment of the intellect is not only first in the order of time, but chief in importance and efficiency. But this is evidently entirely changing the sense of the term, and making it include the whole process antecedent to justification. Some have defined regeneration to be such a change of heart as enables man to conform perfectly to the law of love,

to love God supremely with all the heart, and our neighbor as ourselves. Some, even, who affirm the doctrine of entire sanctification, and teach that it takes place subsequent to the new birth, have so defined regeneration, but with what consistency is not apparent. We regard regeneration as the work of the Holy Spirit in the mind of man, which affects the entire moral and religious nature of its subject, but whose chief and most important function is to so change the volitionating faculty that it is thenceforth free from the bondage to sin. The man has the power to so obey the dictates of his conscience as that he lives without condemnation. In a word, regeneration is salvation from the reigning power of sin. This does not include perfect conformity to law, either in respect to character or conduct. It excludes natural, unavoidable, imperfections in constitutional or inherited character, and all sins of ignorance—all those cases of non-conformity to law, which arise from errors of judgment and other natural and necessary imperfections inseparable from man's condition in this, his earthly life.

The work of regeneration is synergistic and not monergistic, as is affirmed by the Augustinian anthropology.

From the stand-point in which the above discussion places us, the controversy between monergists and synergists is reduced to narrow limits, is confined to one single view. Monergism affirms that the work of regeneration is the sole work of the Spirit. Synergism affirms that the will of man co-operates in this work. Now, of course, to affirm that the Spirit does what he does, is an identical proposition; there can be no controversy so far. Again, that creating anew is a divine work; that the only agency competent to effect the change we call regeneration is the omnipotent will of God is also evident; all evangelical Christians are agreed on this point. Pelagianism, which affirms that all moral changes are by natural processes, and are within the power of the human will, is here discounted. Regeneration is a divine work; it is effected immediately by the divine volition operating upon the mind of man; it is without the intervention of second causes; it is of the nature of a miracle; as in the beginning God said Light be, and light was, so now he says to the penitent believer, I will, be thou clean; he speaks, and it is done; he wills, and the soul of man is created anew. The point of controversy is found in the question, Is the work of regeneration conditioned upon any volition of the human mind, or is it wholly unconditioned? The work is divine—wholly divine—but whether the doing, the fact of its being done, depends solely upon the sovereign will of God, entirely separate from, and independent of, the human will, or is made dependent upon the co-operating consent of both the human and the divine will, is the question.

Monergism is a part of the Augustinian theory of anthropology and soteriology. If the doctrine of unconditional personal election to eternal life be true, if the condition of the unregenerate be a condition of total depravity, if the first saving work of the Divine Spirit upon the mind of man be the work of an irresistible efficacious grace, then the monergistic theory is true; salvation is wholly unconditional, man is a passive recipient of God's grace, and the question of regeneration, and the whole question of human salvation as well, is solely dependent on the sovereign will of God. This view synergism antagonizes by asserting the freedom of the human will, and its ability to resist the Spirit, or, through grace, to co-operate with the Spirit; and by also affirming that the fact of regeneration, in the case of any and of every individual person, is conditioned upon his consent and co-operation. The human agency is not employed in the work of regenerating—this is God's work—but in the performance of antecedent conditions; in hearing the word and giving good heed thereto, in repenting of sin and doing works meet for repentance, and in believing and trusting in the grace and mercy of God through Jesus Christ. Through the whole process of salvation, man receives grace for grace; the grace of faith is given when the grace of repentance has

been improved; and the power to believe given by grace, being used, the grace of justification, regeneration, and adoption succeeds; each succeeding is conditioned upon the proper improvement of antecedent grace. Man works out what God work~ in, and on condition of his so working, God works further, and thus man grows in grace, from the first enlightening of the understanding, to the full completion of preparation for heaven.

The exhortation to work out our salvation, encouraged by the assurance that the conscious inward working prompting thereto is divine, harmonizes with the facts of Christian experience, and with the whole economy of divine grace. To say to an unregenerate man, When God works in you to will and to do of his good pleasure, you will certainly work out your salvation, you can not avoid it, is to pervert Scripture, to contradict common consciousness, and to teach what is wholly subversive of the divine plan of salvation. That salvation is conditioned upon man's acceptance, and co-operation by faith is implied in all the commands, precepts, exhortations, admonitions, entreaties, promises, and persuasions of the Word of God; and such passages as the following are equivalent to a direct affirmation that man determines the question of his salvation: "He that believeth shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be damned. As many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name. Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish. As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live; turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways, for why will ye die, O house of Israel? Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him return unto the Lord, who will have mercy upon him, and to our God, who will abundantly pardon. When the righteous turneth from his righteousness and committeth iniquity, he shall even die thereby; but if the wicked turn from his wickedness, and do that which is lawful and right, he shall live thereby."

ADOPTION.

"For ye have not received the spirit of bondage gain to fear, but ye have received the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry Abba, Father. As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. Ye are all children of God by faith in Jesus Christ. Because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father. Ye are no more strangers and foreigners, but fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household of God. Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called the sons of God. The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God; and if children, then heirs, heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ." Justification is a change in legal relations. It contemplates man as a subject of government, and God as an administrator of law. Adoption is a change in personal relations; it regards man as a member of the royal family, and God the sovereign as the father of the heavenly household. As creatures of God, made in his image, the Scriptures regard men as normally and naturally children of God. But by sin they became prodigal and alien; they not only became rebels against the government, and transgressors of the law, but they also became personally inimical toward the sovereign; and more, as rebellious children, they came to hate their natural father.

God, though immutably a loving father, is also a righteous sovereign and a holy being; he not only condemns, as a sovereign, the conduct of his rebellious subjects, but he is also personally displeased with the rebels themselves. His essential holiness is infinitely indignant toward sin and toward sinners; he is angry with the wicked every day, his wrath abides upon them perpetually. They are disinherited and cast out as righteously deserving the displeasure of their sovereign, and as having fully forfeited the natural love of their father. By adoption these disinherited children are restored to

their normal relations; they are again heirs to the forfeited inheritance; the affection of their father, which they had alienated, again embraces them as children beloved; they are prodigals returned to their father's house, and are restored to all the natural and normal relations that belong to loyal, filial, obedient children of God. When God pardons he forgives; as a sovereign, he justifies; as a father, he adopts; and as a gracious and wonder-working God, he also regenerates. These are concomitant, contemporary; in the order of thought justification is first, regeneration second, and adoption third; all, as if they were one—as in an obvious sense they are—are conditioned upon faith in the recipient. "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life, and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him." "Though thou wast angry with me, thine anger is turned away and thou comfortedst me."

WITNESS OF THE SPIRIT.

If we consider the momentous interests involved in man's personal and legal relations to God; if, especially, we take into account the idea that eternal destiny is thereon dependent; if we have any appreciative apprehension of the infinite expense of redemption, it will be to our thought a reasonable anticipation that, in some way, a conviction of certainty in respect to personal salvation will be attainable. To suppose that through the infinite love of God the eternal Logos became incarnate, suffered, and died; that the eternal Spirit visits man with enlightening, sanctifying, guiding, comforting, and saving influences; that holy angels are commissioned to minister unto men; that the Scriptures have been divinely inspired; that the Christian ministry has been divinely appointed; and that the Church, with all its ordinances and appliances, is divinely employed—all for the accomplishment of man's personal salvation—and at the same time to suppose that at best the result of all this in the mind of man is but a doubtful impression—a ground for only an uncertain hope—is, to say the least, a great incongruity, and precisely the opposite of all reasonable expectations.

Again, if, in respect to the question of personal salvation, there is a necessary and unavoidable uncertainty, the more religious a man becomes, the more miserable he must be. When one is dead in trespasses and in sins, with a darkened understanding, a seared conscience, and obtuse sensibilities, he is comparatively undisturbed; whereas when conscience is quickened and the exceeding sinfulness of sin and its infinite peril are apprehended, his anxieties become painful, his remorse bitter, his fear has torment. The more intensely he desires the love and favor of God, the more distressing any doubt as to whether he be or be not indeed a child of God.

But the Scriptures every-where represent that the man is indeed blessed to whom God does not impute sin: being justified by faith, we have peace with God; great peace have they that love thy law; a good man may rejoice evermore, and in all things give thanks. The joy unspeakable and full of glory which the Scriptures represent as attainable in Christian experience, must be founded upon a satisfactory conviction that, through grace, its subject has passed from death unto life—has been translated from the kingdom of darkness into the kingdom of God's dear Son. Again, the change which is effected by regeneration in a man's opinions, judgments, affections, desires, volitions—in all that makes up the contents of consciousness—is sufficiently distinct for reliable cognition, and so great as to furnish ground for a reasonable inference that that change was wrought by a divine agency.

All Christians, with very inconsiderable exceptions, hold and teach that a comfortable persuasion or conviction of present acceptance with God, and a cheerful hope of eternal life, are attainable, and as a matter of fact, are enjoyed by well-nigh all Christian believers.

This opinion is very fully sustained by the very confident language employed in the Scriptures. Job, in very ancient times said, I know that my redeemer liveth, and though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God, whom I shall see for myself and not another. David affirmed most confidently that the Lord had brought him from the pit and the clay, and had placed him upon a rock, and had put a new song in his mouth. He has removed transgressions from us as far as the east is from the west. Paul said, We know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle be dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal and in the heavens. This doctrine as held by a great majority of evangelical Christians is not the same as that that is by some called the faith of assurance. This latter, assuming the doctrine of an eternal election of particular individual persons to eternal life, teaches that some of these elected persons are so highly and specially favored of the Lord that it is revealed to them that they are of the elect; they are assured of their eternal salvation. This we reject as eminently improbable in itself and utterly without warrant from the Word of God.

The doctrine herein maintained is, that present acceptance with God, and a consequent hope of eternal life, may be assured to the mind of the believer in Christ; that this assurance, as a matter of fact, varies in degree. With some it is a conviction of certainty; they know that they have passed from death unto life, that they are children of God, and therefore heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ. With others this assurance is less distinct and positive; it is a comfortable persuasion, ground for encouraging hope. It may subsist with some degrees of doubt, and with seasons of even distressing darkness, when God seems to them to have withdrawn the light of his countenance. The only question for distinct discussion has respect to the agency and the method by which the believer comes into possession of this comfortable persuasion of his acceptance with God.

In Romans viii, 16, it is affirmed that "the Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God." Here is a distinct affirmation that adoption is assured by a divine testimony. Is this testimony of the nature of a revelation? Is there distinctly cognized in consciousness a supernatural agency producing a conviction, making an impression, that we are accepted of God and adopted as his children?

Multitudes who profess and call themselves Christians, and who have the confidence of the Church that they are such, do not find themselves able to distinguish in their minds a separate and distinct testimony, which they are also able to recognize as wholly the result of a supernatural agency. They have the conviction that they are, through Christ, accepted and saved; they are conscious of filial dispositions; they cry Abba, Father; they have hope, joy, and peace in believing; their hope of eternal life is to them a comfortable assurance; but how, when, by what agency, they come to this state of mind, or how this happy conviction is perpetuated, they are not able to state distinctly; they infer from their recollections of themselves as they were aforetime, and from the teachings of the Scriptures on the subject, that the change wrought in their minds has been effected by the Spirit of God. But all this does not seem to them to be of the nature of a revelation; they can not affirm that the Divine Spirit has ever been present with them, as a special witness, to bear testimony distinctly and separately from every thing else to their adoption as the children of God. As a consequence of this very general difficulty in cognizing a supernatural testimony, doubts are entertained respecting what is called the witness of the Spirit, and the conclusion is, that a Christian's assurance of acceptance is wholly a matter of inference.

Now, postulating a divine witness, two suppositions are admissible: first, the Spirit of God may impress the mind by a direct volition, without the intervention of second causes, and it is possible the supernatural origin of the impression may be known to its subject; in such a case, should it occur, the recipient of such an impression would affirm that the witness of the Spirit is a direct testimony: secondly, the Spirit of God may operate on the mind of man through the agency of second causes or instrumentalities; in such cases the impression made would be in accordance with the ordinary laws of thought and feeling, and the subject of such impressions might not be able to distinguish between the natural and the supernatural; such an one would naturally be doubtful as to any direct divine agency, and be inclined to regard his hope and confidence as the result of a natural inference from the changes wrought in his mind at conversion and subsequent to it.

It is manifest that in both cases the testimony is equally divine. The Spirit volitionates an impression upon the mind of the believer, either a conviction of certainty, or a comfortable persuasion, assuring him of acceptance, adoption and heirship—in the one case immediately, in the other mediately, in the one without instrumentalities, and in the other with them; but in both cases the impression made is the testimony of the Spirit; it is the result of a divine working to that end.

The idea that a Christian's knowledge of his acceptance with God is wholly a matter of inference from the consciousness of holy affections, and that this persuasion is divine as to its origin only in the sense that the change in his character, by which such holy affections have become possible to him, is a divine work, deserves careful consideration.

If a man be conscious of repentance toward God, and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, may he not infer from hence that he is now a child of God? We answer, the Scriptures do not describe repentance and faith as to kind and degree so accurately and so definitely, that a man may know thereby positively that he does exercise precisely the repentance and the faith, both in kind and degree, on which adoption is conditioned. Of course, if a man knows positively that he has fulfilled the precise condition on which God has promised any blessing, he then knows that, by the promise of God, the blessing is his, and he may so trust; but until he has received it, he can not truthfully say he has it; he believes, he trusts, he knows, that by promise he has the things he asks for; that is, he is entitled to them, and they are so assuredly his, that he will certainly come into possession of them, and in the exercise of this confidence he receives the answer to his prayer.

Now, since the Scriptures do not so describe faith that by them a man may know he has saving faith, if he knows it, he must have obtained his knowledge by revelation. When the Spirit assures him that his repentance and faith are accepted, then, and not till then, can he consistently trust that adoption is his—his by promise; so trusting, he will receive the assurance of adoption, the witness of the Spirit, the conviction of filial relations, the spirit in him crying, Abba, Father. In a word, perhaps it is enough to say, faith is the condition on which adoption is received, and is not, therefore, the evidence of its actual possession; faith is antecedent to adoption, and is, therefore, not the evidence of it. What man does is not exponential of what God does.

Let it not be here supposed that there is any necessary uncertainty in this matter; for when one consciously does his best, however poor that best may be, he may be confidently assured that his case is in God's hands, and that persevering in doing his best, his efforts, through God's blessing and guidance, will issue in salvation. He will, in due time and by due process, come into possession of all that is implied in justification, regeneration,

and adoption; but he is not required to believe, nor ought he to believe, that he has come into actual possession, until he has adequate ground or reason for such a trust; and, as we see it, that ground or reason is a conviction divinely wrought in his mind, is what is termed in theological language, the witness of the Spirit.

Again, it is asked if a man be conscious of love, joy, and peace, may he not infer therefrom that he is a child of God? We answer, a consciousness of the fruits of the Spirit is the testimony of our own spirit and not of the divine Spirit. It is confirmatory, but is not primary—not first in order—not basal or fundamental. The love which evidences adoption is filial love; but filial love is conditioned upon a knowledge of filial relations; one does not love another as a father until he recognizes him as a father. Man can not love God as his father, until he knows God is his father; when the Spirit is given, and the recipient in heart says Abba, Father, then, and not till then, he loves as a child. The witness of the Spirit, then, must be antecedent to filial affections. The same may be said of joy and peace. These spring from a sense of salvation; they do not arise till the assurance of adoption has been given; they are evidences of adoption, but evidently do not render the divine testimony useless; so far from rendering a divine testimony unnecessary, they are founded upon and flow from it.

We conclude that it is one of the offices of the Spirit to produce in the mind of the believer in Christ a conviction of his acceptance with God; that the Spirit performs this office in different minds differently; in some perhaps immediately,—that is, without the intervention of second causes,—but in most persons through instrumentalities, such as the preaching of the Word and other means of grace; that in some minds the result of the Spirit's working to this end is a conviction of certainty, but in most minds it is a comfortable persuasion, for the most part abiding with peace and hope, but at times subsisting with some degrees of doubt; that the attainment of this testimony of the Spirit is possible to all of the true children of God who seek it with persistent faith and prayer; and yet that many Christian believers do, through weakness of faith, perhaps because of erroneous opinions, fail to avail themselves of this high privilege; and though they fear God and are careful to work righteousness, they live on hoping, yet scarcely daring to believe, that our heavenly Father numbers them among his beloved children.

We have spoken of the testimony of consciousness, our own spirit, as confirmatory and secondary; but we have not done so through any design to minify its importance. Contrariwise, we regard it as indispensable; for whatever impression a man may have, and however confidently he regards the impression as divine, persuading him that he is a child of God, if such an impression has not succeeded conscious repentance and faith, and is not allowed with love, peace, joy, meekness, patience, and other fruits of the Spirit, he may be assured that his impression is delusive; it is not the testimony of the Spirit; he may be self-deceived, he may be under the temptation of the devil; he certainly is not under the guidance of God's Holy Spirit. Whenever God justifies and adopts, he gives his Holy Spirit to regenerate; the love of God is shed abroad in the believer's heart by the Holy Ghost given unto him. If any man be in Christ Jesus he is a new creature; if a man have not the Spirit of Christ he is none of his. Unless a man can confidently say, as did the blind man, whereas, I was once blind, now I see, he will rely upon inward impressions at his peril. Both the divine and the human testimony are, in our circumstances, indispensable to a reliable verdict. Out of the mouth of these two witnesses the assurances of salvation are established; neither of them can exist without the other; they are concomitant and inseparable.

ENTIRE SANCTIFICATION.

"He gave some, apostles; and some, prophets; and some, evangelists; and some, pastors and teachers; for the perfecting of the-saints, till we all come in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of God unto a perfect man; unto the stature of. the fullness of Christ. The kingdom of heaven is like unto leaven which a woman took and hid in three measures of meal till the whole was leavened. First the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear. We are glad when we are weak and ye are strong, and this we also wish, even your perfection. Leaving the principles of the doctrine of Christ let us go on unto perfection, not laying again the foundation of repentance from dead works and of faith toward God. And the very God of peace sanctify you whol)y; and I pray God your whole spirit and soul and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Faithful is he that calleth you, who also will do it. For this cause I bow my knees unto the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named, that he would grant you according to the riches of his glory to be strengthened with might by his spirit in the inner man; that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith; that ye, being rooted and grounded in love, may be able to comprehend with all saints what is the breadth and length, and depth and height, and to know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge; that ye might be filled with all the fullness of God. Now unto him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think according to the power that worketh in us, unto him be glory, in the Church by Christ Jesus, throughout all ages, world without end. Amen."

That progress should be a law of experimental religion is what might be expected from the nature of the case. The knowledge of God is the life of the soul; to know God and Jesus Christ, whom he hath sent, is eternal life. God possesses all possible perfections in an infinite degree; he can be known perfectly by none but himself. Man is, in the infancy of his being, under the natural limitations of finite existence, with faculties impaired and enfeebled by sin. Therefore, it is manifest upon the surface of the subject that progress in the knowledge of God, and advancement in the line of improvement in the affections and volitions which are conditioned upon that knowledge, is possible for man to an indefinite and unlimited extent. The nature of the case also warrants the expectation that it is God's will that such improvement, growth in grace, knowledge, and holiness should become actual in the personal experience of all his loving and obedient children. The Scriptures abundantly confirm this reasonable expectation. The believer receives grace for grace—whoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance; we are to go on unto perfection—are commanded to love God with all the heart, might, mind, and strength, and to love our neighbors as ourselves.

But in this line of unlimited advancement in Christian experience, there is, somewhere, a point that is in Scripture designated as a point of maturity. "Be perfect, as your Father in heaven is perfect; be perfect, be of good cheer; mark the perfect man, the end of that man is peace; the path of the just shineth more and more unto the perfect day; there is first the blade, then the ear, and then the full corn in the ear." We are first children, then youths, then perfect men, "having attained unto the stature of the fullness of Christ." Where is the point of maturity in Christian grace and character?

We remark, first, Entire sanctification is not usually, if ever, contemporary with regeneration. Regeneration is, in most cases of Christian experience, if not in all, initial sanctification—not completed, perfect renewal. The regenerated person is not, at the moment of his regeneration, "wholly sanctified;" he is not born into the kingdom of God a full-grown man; his new creation is not in stature of the fullness of Christ; nor is he

a child born into perfect spiritual life and health. In a good sense it may be figuratively said, as it is often said, he is a perfect child; but pleasant as the figure may be, it must not be pressed beyond the truth; though a perfect child, evincing good health, there are still in his moral nature susceptibilities, liabilities, perhaps actualities, of disease, which may develop into speedy death, and, unless counteracted by additional grace, will certainly do so. Does anyone argumentatively ask, Does God bring into his kingdom sickly children? we must answer, He certainly does. Many such are born naturally, and there are many such among God's spiritual children—children requiring much nursing to keep in them the breath of life. Alas, how many do actually die! how many run well for a season, and then turn back to the beggarly elements of the world! But dropping this figure, so great a favorite with those who affirm that regeneration is entire sanctification, let us look at the facts of the case, and let us represent them in literal terms. A man is naturally proud; he has what phrenologists call large self-esteem; his pride leads him into many follies and many sins; by the enlightenings of the Spirit he sees his sins and sees himself; he repents and seeks salvation; his faith in Christ is honored; his prayer is heard; he is converted; by the regenerating power of the Holy Ghost, the grace of humility is begotten in his soul. Now, we do not say but it is possible that he may so thoroughly understand himself, and understand the provisions and conditions of Gospel grace, as to take hold of God by faith for full salvation, and, in his first experience of regenerating power, be fully saved from his natural pride; he may thenceforth be a perfectly humble man, never thinking of himself more highly than he ought to think, but always thinking soberly; but we do say that we have no warrant, either in the Scriptures or in the facts of Christian experience, for affirming that this is always the case; contrariwise, as we read the Scriptures and interpret the exponents of character exhibited in the lives of those whom we believe to be Christians, the contrary is the rule; such a case, if it occur, is, in our apprehension, a rare exception. Take a man naturally of an ardent temperament, quick passions, suspicious and quarrelsome disposition; let him be regenerated as the average believer is regenerated: the grace of meekness is begotten in his mind, he can now meet an insult or an injury, not without feelings of resentment, but with grace to control himself and avoid the impending quarrel; he is not as passionate as he once was, his anger is not as quick and violent as aforetime, but he has not attained unto perfect meekness; it will require a struggle with himself, much faith and prayer, to exercise perfect forgiveness toward those that injure him; it will require much discipline under the grace of God to make it natural and easy for him to turn the other cheek, and do good unto those that despitefully use him. Take a natural thief—the man who, in phrenological language, has large acquisitiveness and secretiveness, with small conscientiousness—let him be regenerate: he can now control himself so that, however great the temptation, he avoids theft; but the thought of thieving, and the propensity toward it, and perhaps even the desire to indulge his propensity, remain to trouble him; and doubtless, in most cases, such persons are not wholly emancipated till after many a struggle and many a baptism of holy cleansing.

We remark, secondly, that sanctification, in its commencement, through the whole process, and in its completion, being a matter of personal experience, must be as variable as are the mental constitutions, habits, and conditions of the persons sanctified. Love is the fulfilling of the law; therefore, if perfection be found, it must be in this affection. But the Scriptures speak of perfect love, and speak of it in such a way as implies that it is not only a possible attainment, but is also actually attained. "God is love, and he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God and God in him; herein is love made perfect, that we may have boldness in the day of judgment; there is no fear in love, but perfect love casteth out fear, because fear hath torment; he that feareth is not made perfect in love." There is, then, such a

thing as perfect love. But love is conditioned upon knowledge; one can not be said to love that of which he is ignorant, and the appreciation of the affections must be as the apprehension of excellence—the more one knows of the divine attributes, the more exalted his admiration of the divine character; the more he knows of the riches of grace in Christ Jesus, the more exalted his sense of obligation. Admiration toward God because of what he is, and gratitude toward him because of what he has done and is doing for us, is dependent upon, and proportioned to, our intellectual apprehensions of the divine character and of his manifested love toward us. Love, then, is measurable; it may be judged of by a standard, and at some definite point pronounced perfect; and yet it is without limit, variable.

We remark, thirdly, that sanctification, being a matter of experience, and therefore known only by experience, and being variable, different in different persons and in the same person at different times, is incapable of logical definition; that is, the precise idea can not be revealed to one otherwise ignorant of it by any formula in language. This evidently pertains to the nature of the case; it is not peculiar to that which is called Christian perfection, it belongs as well to regeneration, to all varieties of constitutional character. Mental status is not definable in logical terms; what a man is, is known by what he does—as a tree is known by its fruits. The natural process by which a man knows himself, knows what he is as to his nature, is by his consciousness of mental states—by phenomena, not by direct examination of himself as an entity. Mind itself can not be logically defined; we say it is that which feels, thinks, and wills; this is telling what mind does, not what it is. The terms employed on all such subjects are defined by nominal, not real, definitions; as on material subjects we define the term matter by specifying its qualities, and define terms expressing qualities, either by synonymous terms or by referring to the substances in which they inhere; so on mental subjects we define the term mind by its phenomena, and terms expressing mental states, by synonymous terms, or by referring to the occasions on which they arise. For example, yellow is the color of gold; sorrow is the feeling a good man has when he has done wrong. You can not, by words, communicate to a man born blind an idea of color, nor to a man who has never known sorrow the idea of that emotion. In like manner, if a man has himself been regenerated, and another wishes to converse with him on the subject of regeneration, by using such words and forms of expression as will refer the man to his own experience, he is made to understand what is said. And the same thing is true of all degrees of the regenerate state, from its commencement at conversion to its completion in entire sanctification. We may sometimes sufficiently define a term by specifying some accident of the thing defined by which it is distinguished from all others of its kind, as when we say, man is an animal that cooks his food; also sometimes by negations, by specifying what the thing defined is not.

We here introduce these analogies and illustrations, lest it should be thought that since entire sanctification or Christian perfection is not accurately definable, it may, therefore, for aught we know, be a nonentity; there may be no such thing: lest it should be thought that affirmations and discussions respecting the doctrine are nugatory and useless. We affirm God is eternal, are confident that we say something, and that what we say is true; but we have no logical definition of either the terms employed—we have no accurate conception either of God or eternity, yet we confidently predicate the one of the other. In like manner, we may say that Christian love is perfect, though we are not able to cognize either love or perfection, considered as distinct objects of thought.

We remark, fourthly, that though entire sanctification is salvation from inbred sin, and is, in a sense, a completed salvation, it is not salvation from all of the inherited effects of the first transgression; it is a complete

salvation, but not complete in the sense of being a full restoration to original righteousness. Redemption and grace may place man in a better condition than that in which he was placed by creation, but the conditions are not the same. Christian perfection is not Adamic perfection; it may be better—where sin abounded grace may much more abound—but it is not identical, certainly not identical if better. The inherited effects of the fall, as to man's physical nature, will not be entirely removed until the resurrection from the dead; nor will all of the inherited effects of the fall as to man's intellectual nature be entirely removed till the saint is glorified in heaven; and as man's moral and religious natures are conditioned directly upon his physical and intellectual natures, and indirectly upon his earthly surroundings, it is reasonable to infer that some traces of the inherited results of the first sin will remain in these latter natures, till man is released from the conditions and limitations of his earthly state, and is, body, soul, and spirit, prepared for and admitted to his heavenly estate. Limitations and imperfections abide, while man remains in this, his earthly tabernacle; but these limitations and imperfections, even those which remain after regeneration, much more those that remain after entire sanctification, are not of the nature of sins for which man is responsible. They are infirmities—thorns in the flesh, and, if it pleases, we hesitate not to say thorns in the mind—for which grace is abundantly sufficient; they are not detriments to character—they are not even blemishes, such as limit the divine affection. God loves the sanctified saints as his dear children, notwithstanding all those remaining infirmities and imperfections; but if sin, properly so called, if moral corruption remained in them, how could infinite holiness regard them as his children well beloved?

But it will still be asked, if traces of the fall remain in man's physical, intellectual, moral, and religious natures till glorification in heaven remove them, wherein consists the pertinence and propriety of the doctrine of a perfected or completed salvation from inbred sin in this life? We do not attempt what we regard as impossible; namely, a definite designation of that in which Christian perfection consists. Mr. Wesley defines Christian perfection by saying, it is perfect love. He finds perfection in the affections. We understand him as teaching that when the Holy Spirit so sheds abroad the love of God in the heart of man, as that man is thereby enabled to love God with all his soul, might, mind and strength; such a shedding abroad of the love of God is sanctifying the man wholly; this is entire sanctification; the man in such a state is a perfect Christian—is cleansed from all unrighteousness, is saved from all sin. But, as love is a variable quantity, as man's might, mind, and strength, or, in other words, his ability to love, depends upon the extent and correctness of his antecedent knowledge, as we see it, Mr. Wesley's definition tells us where to find perfection, but does not give us a knowledge of what it is. Should it be said, as it sometimes is, that a man's love is perfect when he does his best, when he loves God all he can love in his present condition, we reply, this dodges the difficulty; it does not remove or solve it; it makes perfection consist of a series of acts, and not at all in the condition or status of the mind. Regeneration and entire sanctification pertain to the nature and character of the man; they are works wrought in him, so that he becomes a new creature, a different person from what he was before. Simply doing one's best, then, whatever that best may be, is not Christian perfection.

The propriety of affirming the doctrine of Christian perfection consists in the following facts: (1.) The Scriptures recognize a state of grace which they speak of as a state of maturity. (2.) The Scriptures call that grace perfect love; and as love is the fulfilling of the law, perfection, if anywhere, must be found in the affectional nature. The heart must be capable of a pure and a supreme love toward God. (3.) We are then assured of the actual existence of such a state of grace; we know where to find that grace,

or perhaps more properly in what it chiefly consists. Therefore, though we may not accurately and exhaustively define or cognize the precise idea of Christian perfection, it is a proper object of thought and discussion. It is a state of grace which may be sought, obtained, and enjoyed. The difficulty of apprehending and of stating in language the full import of the terms used is not a bar to actual experience at this point, any more than at every other point of the soul's transition from nature to grace, a knowledge of what is actual in personal experience, can not be communicated by language to one who has no experience in the matter spoken of.

We remark, fifthly, that the state of grace designated as a state of maturity in Christian experience is most perfectly delineated in Paul's prayer to the Ephesians, chapter iii, 16-19. Commentators in good repute regard this prayer as of the nature of a dedication of the "holy temple," "the habitation of God," spoken of in the second chapter, verses 19-22. That is, the Ephesian Church considered as a corporate body, is a temple "for a habitation of God through the Spirit." This temple Paul devoutly dedicates in this prayer. This being admitted, it is nevertheless obvious that the terms employed, as well as the nature of the case, compel us to refer the blessings prayed for to the individual experience of the members of that Church. If the prayer be answered, and the body corporate be such "a habitation of God" as is prayed for, the individual members of that Church will be mature Christians, will have attained "unto the stature of the fullness of Christ." Among commentators some differ as to the object to which the terms breadth, length, depth, and height apply; some suppose these terms refer to the dimensions of the "holy temple," which is here being dedicated; others that they apply to "the love of Christ." This difference, however, does not vary the import of the prayer; for if the writer has in mind the Church under the figure of a temple or habitation of God, his prayer that the Ephesian Church may know the full dimensions of this temple, is a prayer that they may know the full extent of Church privileges; but as Church privileges are valuable or important only so far as they promote piety and virtue in the individual membership, the prayer is for a knowledge of all that a believer may enjoy. If the terms refer to the love of Christ, the result is the same. The blessing prayed for is a knowledge of the fullness of redemption, the length of which may be its extent in duration, from the eternal purpose of God in Christ Jesus throughout all ages, world without end; its breadth may be the extent of its provisions, being a salvation provided for the whole human family; its depths the peril from which it saves—the depths of depravity and perdition; its height the eternal glory to which it elevates. To know the love of Christ, to apprehend the vastness, fullness, and completeness of redemption, is of no avail, if the knowledge be merely an intellectual apprehension; the prayer evidently reaches to the designed results of such knowledge in the affections and volitions of him who has it.

As to the other terms employed, there can be no difference of opinion; the language is literal, the construction natural and easily understood. What is the import of this remarkable prayer?

The first blessing sought is a supernatural strengthening of the intellectual powers, especially the ability to know. "I bow my knees unto the Father that he would grant you to be strengthened with might by his Spirit, in the inner man." Here a direct operation of the Holy Ghost upon man's spiritual nature is prayed for. The abundant measure and intense energy of that operation is characterized by several forms of speech; it is to be according to the riches of the divine glory; it is to be with might; it is to be done by him who is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think. The end or purpose of this strengthening by the Divine Spirit of the inner power of apprehension, is that the Ephesians might be able to comprehend. Here in the original there are two intensives: The apostle prays

that the Church may be very able, very strongly, to take hold of, to apprehend and to appropriate the fullness of Christian privilege and the love of Christ. He prays that they may be able to know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge. The extent of this ability to know, to comprehend, is not defined, but the measure thereof lies upon the surface of the thoughts expressed. The love of Christ, being infinite, passes finite knowledge; but the apostle prays that the Ephesian Church may be able to know that knowledge-surpassing love. There is evidently no limitation here but in the capacity of the knower, and the plain import of the petition is, that the knowledge of Christ might be given to the full extent requisite for completeness and maturity in Christian love. Whatever mental ability is requisite for such an apprehension of God's love in Christ toward men as will awaken in man perfect love toward God is most fervently prayed for.

The second blessing sought (second in the order of thought) is the actuality of that comprehension and affection for which the intellectual strengthening was an antecedent requisite. The prayer is not merely that the Ephesians might be able to know and comprehend, but that they might actually know; and it is also prayed not only that they might know Christ's love to them, but also so know it as to awaken their love toward Christ. As a tree is rooted in the soil in which it grows, as a building rests upon its site, so would the apostle have the Ephesian Church rooted and grounded in love—evidently their love toward all proper objects of affection. He would have love the basis of their spiritual character, that that character, being rightly and adequately founded, might be genuine and permanent.

The figures here employed do not in themselves necessarily involve the idea of perfection; but this part of the prayer taken in connection with other parts and with the whole does more than imply that the apostle's desire and prayer for this Church was that they might love God, their neighbors, truth, virtue, and all objects of pure love, as fully, as intensely, as perfectly as possible, with no other limitations than those naturally belonging to them as finite beings, and inseparable from the conditions of their then existing life.

The third and chief blessing, and that to which all else tends, and is subordinate, is the presence of the Holy Trinity abiding in its fullness in the soul of man.

The strengthening of the inner man is by the Divine Spirit. Christ dwells in the heart by faith, and the measure of this strengthening and indwelling is the fullness of God. "That he would grant you according to the riches of his glory to be strengthened with might by his Spirit in the inner man, that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith, and that ye might be filled with all the fullness of God."

When Judas (not Iscariot) said, "Lord, how is that thou wilt manifest thyself unto us and not unto the world? Jesus answered and said unto him, if a man love me he will keep my words, and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him and make our abode with him;" and in immediate connection he said, "I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you forever, even the Spirit of truth, whom ye know, for he dwelleth with you, and shall be in you." The abiding presence of God with his loving and obedient children is here promised in these words of our Lord; and in the prayer for the Ephesian Church the apostle prays that this presence may be granted them in its greatest fulness.

The expression, "filled with all the fullness of God" is considered by some as figurative; perhaps it so, but the precise figure is not apparent. It is sometimes said that a room is filled with all the fullness of sunlight when

it is as light as sunlight can make it. Again, the figure is of the holy temple filled with Shekinah ; and, again, the particle *eis* is translated by the word "into," and figure becomes that of a sponge or vessel plunged into water and filled. Evidently the idea is that of completeness, fullness, all the subject can contain." To be filled with all the fullness of God" is an expression that admits of no limitation except the capacity of the person so filled.

That a state of grace is here presented, far, very far, above the ordinary attainments of Christian believers, must be manifest to any observer of the conduct, conversation, and spirit of those composing the membership of the Christian Church. It is a state of grace to be sought after and prayed for by regenerated persons. It is the highest which we conceive of as attainable in this life. If attained, it may, with great propriety, be called Christian perfection.

All must admit, that to be filled with all the fullness of God is to enjoy a state of grace above the usual experience of ordinary Christians—even of many who have the witness of the Spirit that they are the children of God and heirs of eternal life.

The only question, then, with the believer in the Scriptures who earnestly seeks to know the full measure of his Christian privilege is, whether such a state of grace is attainable in the present life. That an inspired apostle prayed that an infant Church just emerged from the pollutions of paganism might enjoy this blessing, and prayed that it might be communicated "according to the power that worketh in us"—that is, according to the usual agencies and methods of the spiritual life—would seem sufficient assurance that believers, having enjoyed from childhood the advantages of a Christian education, might successfully seek after and pray for this same blessing. But this assurance is confirmed by the doxology of the prayer, in which we are reminded that God "is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think;" and, assuming that he is as willing as he is able, there is ascribed to him "glory in the Church by Christ Jesus throughout all ages, world without end. Amen." This is in harmony with the prayer for the Thessalonians, "that the God of peace would sanctify them wholly, and that their whole spirit and soul and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ," after which we are reminded that God, who hath called us, is faithful and will also do it.

On what is this blessed attainment conditioned? If we turn our regards to the "might in the inner man" with which the perfect Christian is "strengthened;" or, in other words, if we think of his ability to comprehend the fullness of Christian privilege and the fullness of redemption, our question, so far forth as this phase of it is concerned, assumes this form, On what is mental ability, intellectual endowment, conditioned? and the answer is obvious. Some intelligences are more highly endowed by creation than others are; again, God can, by a new creation, endow an ordinary mind with extraordinary power; but again, usually all minds, however naturally endowed, acquire increased mental power by exercise—the proper use of educational advantages not only increases knowledge, but it also increases the power to know. If, therefore, the mental strengthening be according to the usual methods of intellectual culture, the conditions are prayer with faith for the influence of the Spirit, together with a faithful use of those means which, in the provisions of Providence and grace, are adapted to the acquisitions of knowledge and the development of mind. When one has reached the point where he is able to comprehend the length and breadth and depth and height, there is nothing left but to do it—when the door is opened, he has nothing to do but to step in; that is, he appropriates the blessing he comprehends; his emotions and volitions are in accordance with his intellections; he loves with a

perfect love; he wills a perfect obedience. This, in Scriptural language, is faith; it is faithfulness; it is being a true man, knowing, loving, and volitionating according to truth. To such a one, God, the Holy Trinity, will surely come and make him his abode—will fill him with all the fullness of a completed Christian character.

In this view, it is obvious that the work of complete sanctification is both progressive and instantaneous; progressive as to the acquisition of knowledge and ability to know, and instantaneous as to the appropriation of the blessing comprehended. It may take time to acquire the ability to do, but the doing is a definite act, done in a definite individual instant. The Spirit may take time in preparing the holy temple for a habitation of God, but he enters and takes full possession, fills the temple with his presence in a single instant of time; the work may be long in the doing, but there is an instant when it is done, completed, finished.

But it is asked, Is this the only method by which a believer may attain unto maturity in Christian grace? We answer, It is obviously the ordinary method; but no one can say it is the only method. God may, in righteousness or righteously, cut short his work of grace in given cases, if, in his wisdom, he sees fit so to do—he may miraculously, instantaneously, endow an ordinary mind with extraordinary power. Many persons of even less than average natural ability, without culture, testify that in answer to prayer offered in faith, they have been instantly translated from a lower to a higher plane of spiritual life, and have, in their minds, satisfactory, even indubitable, evidence of entire sanctification, perfect faith, and perfect love. Before we can consistently reject their testimony as to the facts of their experience, we must discard all the laws of evidence. A wise and prudent man will listen to their testimony; he will learn from them many useful lessons in experimental religion; he will not accept persons of low attainments in intellectual and cesthetic culture as model men and model women; he will not place himself under their tuition for instruction in theoretic Christianity; he will not, in any sense, become their disciple and allow them to be his leaders; but he will not discard their testimony, nor refuse to be profited by their experience.

Many persons of high intellectual endowments, of extensive learned acquirements, and of profound knowledge in religious truth, testify to a similar experience; that is, to a sudden, instantaneous transition from a low state of religious enjoyment to a consciousness of completed salvation; and their testimony can not be reasonably discarded. But no man's experience should be the basis of another man's faith. I may not believe that I may be miraculously saved, because my brother has been so saved; it may be the means, if wisely used, of leading me to faith; but faith itself must founded upon the Word of God and the workings of the Spirit in my own mind. If God, by his Spirit clearly revealed to me, permits me, in reference to any thing that I shall ask of him, even to the removing of a mountain, to say, I will not let thee go except thou bless me, I may so say; in such a case God will surely honor my faith and certainly answer my prayer. That thousands have thus come unto God for full salvation, and have obtained it, we do not doubt; and that it is the privilege of all believers by patient continuance in well-doing and by diligent attention to the means of religious culture, to so grow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord and Savior as to attain unto the stature of the fullness of Christ, and live many years on earth in the full enjoyment of perfect love, we think is fully attested by the Scriptures above cited and discussed.

May the believer know that he has attained to maturity in Christian grace? if so, by what means and evidences? From what has been said above of the nature of sanctification, in its initial regeneration, and through its

progress to its completeness in "the fullness of God," it must be manifest that if a man know that he has so attained, he must have obtained his knowledge by an immediate and special revelation. The whole work of regeneration and entire sanctification is the work of the Holy Spirit on the mind of man; it is purely and entirely supernatural; if supernatural as to its nature, it must be eminently so as to its evidences. If the Spirit of God raise one to the summit of his privilege, it is certainly reasonable to expect that he would give to the recipient of so great grace the comfort of an assurance that he is so blessed and accepted of God as a perfect child in Christ Jesus. The doctrine of the witness of the Spirit is also rational ground for the inference that the Spirit's testimony on this subject may be reasonably expected. It is true that the promise of this witness has special reference to adoption—"the Spirit beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God"—but we say the fact of such an assurance, though not a positive promise that the Spirit will witness that the believer is sanctified wholly in all cases where entire sanctification takes place, is a reasonable ground for the expectation that he will so bear witness; so that if an intelligent believer, whose spirit, manner of life, and conversation—whose character and conduct are in harmony with a profession of perfect love—should testify that he has the witness of the Spirit, that he is cleansed from all unrighteousness, sanctified wholly, filled with all the fullness of God, there is no good reason why anyone should doubt his testimony; it may be fairly presumed that in his case the Comforter has given this great consolation, an assurance of full and complete acceptance with God.

OBJECTIONS.

It is sometimes said that the above theory of Christian experience implies, if it does not directly teach, either that God honors a deficient faith, or that he answers a perfect faith with an imperfect work. It is affirmed, that the theory is contrary to the promise, "When ye shall search for me with all your heart, I will be found of you, saith the Lord." The objection assumes that God will never answer prayer at all, in any sense or degree, unless it be offered in full faith, with the whole heart, and that then he answers by doing for him that prays all that can be done. This is saying no man is a Christian unless he stands upon the summit of his privilege; or, in other words, every Christian believer is a perfect Christian—no man enjoys any degree of grace, except him that enjoys all he can enjoy! This, everyone must know, is not true. God favors with his grace every degree of trust and confidence; yea, every unwhispered desire for salvation, however feeble, is graciously encouraged; and there are all conceivable degrees of grace—from the first gleaming of the day-dawn in the enlightenment of the understanding to the meridian splendors of the fullness of God—from the darkness and depravity of sin to the light and purity of perfect holiness.

Again, it is said the high attainments spoken of in the Scriptures are placed there as marks to be aimed at; but, it is affirmed, that they are never attained unto in this life. In proof of this affirmation, such Scriptures are quoted as follows: "No man liveth and sinneth not;" "Forgive us our trespasses." We answer, All men, at some time in their lives, commit actual transgressions; no one is, from infancy through life, wholly guiltless. Again, all men, through the whole of their lives, because of the limitations and imperfections of their fallen natures, come short of entire conformity to the law of their normal being. In a state of grace their past transgressions are forgiven, and they have power to live free from condemnation; but their infirmities, defects, and deficiencies may subsist with mature grace; they may love God with all the heart, and yet, through imperfection, have occasion to pray, "Forgive us our trespasses."

Probably the objection having the largest number of abettors and having most influence with doubters is found in a conceived incongruity between the limitations and defects inseparable from man in his earthly life, and the state of mind implied in this doctrine of a higher life. It is thought that if a man be sanctified wholly, if he pray without ceasing, rejoice ever more, and in all things give thanks; if he perfect holiness in the fear of the Lord; if he be filled with all the fullness of God, he will be disqualified for the every-day duties of ordinary life: or, to state the case conversely, it is conceived that if a man attend, as it is his duty to do, to the common affairs of life, he will thereby neither have opportunity, disposition, nor ability so to devote himself to religious matters, as to secure and maintain a spiritual state so elevated as that implied in the idea of Christian perfection. Most objectors of this class admit that perfect holiness is an essential, an indispensable, requisite as a preparation for heaven; and, therefore, they conceive that the children of God are entirely sanctified at the time of their death. Without doubt there are several errors involved in these views. First, most likely, the idea of a state of maturity in grace is identified with the idea of the state of the glorified in heaven. Entire sanctification is made, at least in most respects, to equal glorification. Second, it is admitted by all parties to this controversy that infant children and justified believers, though still affected as to their mental, moral, and religious natures by the inherited results of the first sin, are nevertheless the children of God and heirs of heaven; that dying in this state, they are prepared for and admitted to eternal life; that is to say, the work of the Spirit by which infants and adults of immature faith are, in case of their death, prepared for the kingdom of heaven, is a work performed at or near the time of their death; hence it is inferred that all the heirs of eternal life must, at their death, experience a similar sanctification. This is saying that the state of mind in which a soul fully saved enters the spirit world can not be attained at any point antecedent to death, which is manifestly an unwarranted assumption. Death has no sanctifying or saving efficacy; salvation is by the Holy Spirit through the blood of Christ, and no reason is apparent why the work of complete purification may not be wrought a moment before as well as a moment after the soul leaves the body; if one moment, many; and for aught that is apparent, many years as well. Third: earthly limitations and imperfections are not, *per se*, of the nature of punishable sins; they are disqualifications for heaven, and will certainly disappear as the soul enters into glory; but on this side they may subsist with perfect Christian faith, perfect love, and perfect peace. Fourth: entire sanctification does not consist, nor is it manifested, chiefly or specially, by ecstasies of devotion; but rather by practical godliness; so that so far as it is from a disqualification for earthly duties that it is the highest and most suitable of all possible qualifications therefor.

Another objection sometimes made, whether seriously or captiously it would seem might be reasonably doubted, since it is most evidently baseless, is that the perfect Christian must be impeccable. If our first parents, in primeval purity, in original righteousness, were subject to temptation, were liable to sin, and did sin; if our Lord Jesus Christ was subject to temptation; and was tempted of the devil, then surely any intelligent being, however holy, may be placed under the conditions of a trial; and may make shipwreck of faith. Indeed, always, every-where, virtue, if praiseworthy, implies the possibility of its opposite; necessitated holiness is not the highest form of moral excellence.

FURTHER BENEFITS OF ATONEMENT.

Prayer. "Ask, and it shall be given you, seek and ye shall find, knock, and it shall be opened unto you; for everyone that asketh receiveth, and he that seeketh findeth, and to him that knocketh it shall be opened. If ye

being evil know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your heavenly Father give good things to them that ask him. I say unto you, that if two of you shall agree on earth as touching any thing that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of my Father which is in heaven."

To the human race, conscious being and all its blessings must be regarded as benefits of atonement. The privilege of prayer is specially mentioned as such, because it must be regarded as one of the highest, if not the highest, and most valuable of all privileges of man's earthly life. The mere intellectual apprehension of the all-pervading presence of God, possible to all intelligent beings, is of illcalculable value; but he who is favored with grace consciously to hold communion with the Holy Trinity enjoys the highest conceivable privilege pertaining to intelligent, sentient existence. To receive from the hand of God, the common, unconditioned blessings of his providence and grace, places man under obligations of gratitude, limited only by his capacity to be grateful; but to be permitted to make choice of divine blessings, and to ask for what we desire, with assurances that our requests will be granted, is a favor of grace as immeasurably great as is the boundless benevolence of him who grants it.

Prayer is the intercourse of the spirit of man with the spiritual and unseen Creator. It consists in the expression of such adoration as our limited apprehensions of the infinite perfections of the divine nature and attributes render us capable of; of such gratitude as the benefits and blessings we receive ought to inspire; of such penitence as is due in view of our sins and sinfulness; of such petitions as our wants and necessities have caused us sincerely to desire; of such intercessions as our interest in the welfare of others prompts us to make, and of such submission to the will of God, such confidence in his veracity, such trust in his promises, and such purposes of obedience to his commandments as our knowledge of his will and purposes, and of our relations to him enables us to exercise. Each individual person is permitted to pray first in secret; to hold private intercourse in his closet alone with God. Second, in the domestic circle; to associate himself with the other members of his family, and together with them offer unto God the sacrifices and offerings of a pious devotion. Third, in the assemblies of the saints, the congregations of Christian worshipers and attendants; to offer unto the author and giver of every good and perfect gift tributes of praise and petitions for needed grace and mercy. That such exercises are a duty, as well as a privilege, is distinctly indicated both by the conditions of our being and by the teachings of the Holy Scriptures.

Our dependence upon God is absolute and unlimited; for whatever we are and whatever we have, we are indebted wholly to his good will. In his Word he has commanded us to pray, to pray without ceasing; he has made prayer the condition on which we are to receive certain blessings. The habit of prayer is a distinguishing characteristic of the righteous; and the Scriptures abound with many recorded instances of answers given to the fervent effectual prayers of the righteous. It is sometimes said that the entire utility of prayer is found in its reflex influence upon the mind of him that prays. That prayer is an effectual means of cultivating the temper of mind which men should exercise toward God can not be questioned; but that this is its only office is not true. God does for a man that prays what he would not do if he did not pray. It is here objected that this supposes that finite, feeble man can change the unchangeable ways of an immutable being. We answer, the immutable God has made an immutable arrangement for the government of the universe by which he immutably answers such prayers as are offered according to his will. A full discussion of the nature, obligation, and utility of prayer belongs properly to the department of ethics, and should be treated of under the head of the duties of religion. We have here briefly considered prayer as a benefit of atonement, a privilege conferred through the sacrificial death of our Lord

Jesus Christ, and pass to mention, with still greater brevity, other benefits so conferred.

The Comfort of the Spirit.—"If ye love me, keep my commandments; and I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you forever; even the Spirit of truth, whom the world can not receive, because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him; but ye know him, for he dwelleth with you, and shall be in you." Here, conditioned upon loving obedience to Christ's commandments, the abiding presence of the Spirit, in a sense and manner that the world can not know, is promised, his special office being to comfort his people.

The Specially Favoring Providence of God.—And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose." Beyond doubt, God's providence is over all his works, and all things, even the wrath of man, are made to praise him. All forces, mental and material; all events, whether virtuous, vicious, or morally indifferent, are, without doubt, put under contribution to his will and are made subservient to his purposes. Those purposes are evidently benevolent, and aim to secure the highest good of the universe. Under this general providence, of which all are unconditioned subjects, in harmony with, and subservient to it, is also a particular providence, of which God's beloved children are the sole subjects; all things are specially made to work together for the good of those that love God.

Deliverance from the Fear of Death.—"Forasmuch, then, as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same, that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death—that is, the devil—and deliver them who, through fear of death, were all their lifetime subject to bondage. O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory? The sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law; but thanks be to God which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ."

CHAPTER IV.

EXTENT OF ATONEMENT.

WE have above affirmed that the death of Christ is provisional, and sustains the same relation to every man as to any man; that is, we have affirmed what is commonly called the doctrine of universal atonement—namely, that Christ died for all men; that his death is a provisional arrangement in the divine government, by which the salvation of all men is made possible. We here return to this phase of the subject for its more complete discussion, and specially for the examination of that theory of personal election which denies the universality of atonement and limits its intended benefits to the so-called "elect."

Whatever be Christ's relation to man; whatever be the reason why the benefits of his interposition in man's behalf accrue to man; certainly no consideration is apparent why that relation is not a common one, and why the blessing accruing therefrom may not be appropriated as well to every man as to any man. Whether Christ's death be a substituted penalty, so that the sinner is saved because the penalty due to his sin has been executed and all demands have been satisfied, or whether his death be a substitute for a penalty, so that the sinner is saved because the ends of government have been secured and the penalty due is remitted, not executed—in either case, that the death of Christ should avail to accomplish so much is due to the dignity of his person—is death avails because he is God manifest in the flesh. He is an infinite person, and therefore, his acts have infinite merit. Now, an infinite merit

is just as adequate to the salvation of an indefinite number of finite beings as it is to the salvation of a single person. The death of Christ is an event which makes pardon possible, and possible in such a way as does not limit the number of persons to whom pardon may be granted. The case is not a case of *quid pro quo*—so much for so much—so much suffering for such a number of pardons; it is the opening of a door, the bridging of a gulf, the casting up a highway—a proclamation of peace and amnesty, a provision equally available for all who are in the condition requiring the provision made; in a word, there is nothing in the plan of redemption that naturally limits its application; contrariwise, any intelligent and Scriptural view that can be taken of the doctrine of atonement presents the subject in the light of a benefit proffered to all who are in circumstances to need it, and actually conferred upon all who are pleased to accept it.

The testimony of the Scriptures is explicit: "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life; for God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved. God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them. Behold the Lamb of God who taketh away the sin of the world. God, who is the Savior of all men, especially of them that believe. Jesus Christ, by the grace of God, tasted death for every man. He is a propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world."

The exegesis which makes the terms "the world," "whosoever," "all men," and "every man," in these passages mean the whole of the elect, whosoever of the elect, all men of the elect, is unworthy of sober criticism. In the obvious sense of the passage, it is evident that the terms are used without limitation. They assure us that God, through Christ, has made salvation attainable by every man. Pardon, considered abstractly, irrespective of persons, is made possible, and all who need it may obtain it; the sins of all men are made remissible, and, therefore, all men may be saved.

Again: "For if through the offense of one many be dead, much more the grace of God and the gift by grace which is by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many; therefore, as by the offense of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life." Here the extent of atonement affirmed to be co-extensive with inherited depravity. As many as are affected by the sin of Adam, so many are also affected by the death of Christ.

Again: "Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died. And through thy knowledge shall the weak brother perish for whom, Christ died? False teachers, who privily shall bring in damnable heresies, even denying the Lord that bought them, and bring upon themselves swift destruction. Of how much sorer punishment suppose ye shall he be thought worthy who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and counted the blood of the covenant wherewith he was sanctified an unholy thing, and hath done despite unto the Spirit of grace?" Here persons for whom Christ died are spoken of as in peril of destruction.

Again: "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life, and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him. But these are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing, ye might have life through his name. He that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed on the name of the only begotten Son of God. Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned. How often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings,

and ye would not. Ye will not come unto me that ye may have life. Look unto me and be ye saved all the ends of the earth, for I am God, and there is none else. He hath no pleasure in the death of him that dieth. Turn ye, turn ye, for why will ye die, O house of Israel?" Here the Gospel of salvation is to be preached unto all men. It is made the duty of all men to whom the Gospel is preached to believe it; their salvation is conditioned upon their faith—if they believe they shall be saved; their condemnation and death is conditioned upon their unbelief—if they believe not they shall be damned. What can be more evident than that the doctrine of an unlimited salvation underlies all these declarations? The case does not demand the multiplication of quotations; nor are the interpretations by which the abettors of the doctrine of a limited atonement have attempted to avert the force of the passages already quoted deserving of a reply. The passages themselves as well as the obvious import and intent of the whole volume of inspiration, plainly teach or obviously imply that God, our heavenly Father, loves all mankind; that Jesus Christ, our all-sufficient Savior, died for all mankind; that the Holy Spirit, our sanctifier, strives with all mankind; that the Gospel of salvation is to be preached unto all mankind; and that the saints are to pray for, and labor to save, all mankind.

These truths so evidently accord with the Scriptures, with men's intuitive ideas of God's impartial love, with what all the facts of human existence require, and with what the common intelligence of mankind unhesitatingly declares must be, that in our times the doctrine of a limited atonement is seldom, almost never, asserted. It is conceded even by those whose soteriological theories make it extremely inconsistent for them to do so, that Christ died for all men. It is agreed that in some sense the death of Christ has made the salvation of all men possible; that the Gospel is to be preached to all; that it is the duty of all to believe, and that in the issue unbelievers will be justly punished for their want of faith.

But still Augustinians affirm that as Christ's death does save the elect, and does not save others, therefore, in the eternal purpose and intent of the divine mind, there was a distinction. Christ was given of the Father, and he gave himself and suffered and died for the elect, in a sense in which he was not given, did not give himself, and did not die for others. This is an attempt to put the doctrine of a limited atonement in a less objectionable form, but is evidently the same thing. It has the appearance of an argument. Some are saved, and some are not; therefore, saving agencies have different relations to their subjects. It assumes that God purposed that what is *should* be, and that the opposite could not be. In the form in which this view is stated; it is also assumed that Christ's death effectuates salvation. Both of these assumptions we deny. God did not from eternity purpose that those who are lost *should* be lost, or that those who are saved *should* be saved. He had no purpose, enacted no decree, that caused it to be true, or proves that it is true, that the lost could not have been saved, or that the saved could not have been lost. Nor is it true that the death of Christ, *per se*, saves men, so that the fact that some are, and others are not, saved through him, does not prove that his death was, either in its purpose, or its efficiency, offered in behalf of the saved in any sense in which it was not offered in behalf of the lost.

The Calvinistic doctrine of atonement is a part and parcel of a system, the whole of which, and every part of which, lies back upon an assumed decree of predestination. God from eternity decreed the existence and eternal salvation of a certain number of designated persons; he also decreed the incarnation, life, and death of his Son, the agency of his Spirit, the instrumentality of the Church, and the repentance, faith, and obedience of the elect, as so many means to secure to the elect the predestinated salvation and eternal life. He also decreed the existence and eternal misery of a certain

number of designated persons, and decreed such an administration toward them a should secure the decree of reprobation. Of course, these things being so, God never intended purposed, or decreed that the death of Christ should save a reprobate. Christ died to secure the salvation of the elect; he did not die to secure the salvation of reprobates.

THE SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION.

It must be conceived that the infinitely wise Creator has a will, a purpose, concerning every person and thing which he has created. God has a place for every person and thing, and he has an end to subserve by all that he does, and by all that he permits. He has elected certain men for certain places, and all persons for some place. Cyrus was elected to rebuild the temple; Paul was elected to preach the Gospel to the Gentiles. Ministers are elected to the work of the ministry; governors, kings, emperors, to the administration of civil affairs, and, for aught that we know, God has chosen each human being for his particular place. Again, the sovereign of the world has exercised his absolute sovereignty in distributing his gifts among his creatures; to one he has given five talents, and to another two, and to still a third but one; and he has prescribed whatever he pleased as the condition of the bestowment of blessings. The posterity of Abraham were elected to the privileges of the Jewish Church, and they were thereby advantaged much every way, chiefly because that unto them were committed the oracles of God. By covenant with Abraham all the nations of the earth were to be blessed in his seed; that is, the promised Messiah was to be born of his posterity. This same covenant was renewed and confirmed to Isaac, afterwards to Jacob, and then again to David. This lineage was elected to this high distinction and honor. Under the Christian dispensation, believers were elected to the privileges of the visible Church. Faith in Jesus Christ, as the promised Messiah, was substituted for birthright in Abraham, as the condition of membership in the visible Church. The subjects of either of these two kinds of election, either of persons to particular offices or of classes to peculiar privileges, are spoken of in the Scriptures as "the elect," as "chosen," "ordained," "called." The election of the Gentiles to equal privileges with the Jews, or, in other words, the election of all persons, both Jews and Gentiles, to Church privileges on condition of faith in Christ, is the election chiefly, if not exclusively spoken of in the Epistle to the Romans; especially so, in the notable ninth chapter, from which, by a false interpretation, Augustinianism has derived its main support.

Let this chapter be here briefly noted. Paul avers great heaviness and continual sorrow of heart. Why? Not because he thought God had from eternity, by a decree of reprobation, doomed all Jews, or any of them, to eternal death; but because many of them willfully, stubbornly, persistently rejected Christ and the blessings of the Gospel. Not because God on his part had failed to fulfill his covenant with Abraham, or that the word of God to Abraham had taken no effect, as the objecting Jew is supposed to reply, saying, if there be cause for your sorrow on Israel's account, the God has failed in his promise. Not so, Paul answers, for the covenant with Abraham did not extend to all his posterity. It included Isaac, but rejected Ishmael; it included Jacob, but rejected Esau. Here it is evident that "the purpose of God according to election," has reference to the lineage of Abraham, who should constitute his Jewish Church, and be the line in which the Messiah should be born, for Jacob is chosen and Esau rejected; not they personally, for Esau, the elder, never did, personally, serve Jacob, the younger, but the Edomites were servants to the Israelites.

The objector again replies, If God rejects any from among his people as you, Paul, represent he does, he is certainly unfaithful to his promise; there is :unrighteousness with God." Not so, Paul answers, for in the distribution

of special privileges God is absolute sovereign. When Moses asked the high privilege of seeing the divine glory, God granted his request, saying, "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy." Again, the divine sovereignty extends also to the use of man's wrath for God's praise, as "The Scripture saith unto Pharaoh, for this purpose have I raised thee up, that I might show my power in thee, and that my name might be declared throughout the earth." In annulling all distinctions between Jews and Gentiles, and conditioning the divine blessings, both of Church privileges and of saving grace solely upon faith, and that equally and alike to all, God has done what he had a perfect right to do, and what is perfectly consistent not only with his covenant with Abraham, but also with every principle of honor and of right; therefore my fellow-countrymen, "my kinsmen according to the flesh," who are making this "election" of the Gentiles to equal privileges with the Jews a "stumbling-stone," "a rock of offense," have not attained unto the law of righteousness." They are seeking salvation "by the works of the law," and are thus fighting against God; this is to me just cause of "great heaviness and continual sorrow in my heart."

The argument as above stated is pertinent, logical, conclusive; in harmony with the general scope of the Epistle; accordant with the teachings of the whole Scriptures; and its doctrine is commended by the common sense of mankind as just and true. The whole is perspicuous, and leaves no margin for controversy. The reply in the 19th verse, and the answer in the following verse, seem not accordant with the above exegesis. Here the predestinarian takes his stand, and, in appearance, has an advantage. The objector's reply and Paul's answer are certainly such as might have been used, if Paul had been a predestinarian and his opponent an Arminian. If Paul had been teaching that whatsoever comes to pass was but the execution of God's will, the objector's question would be eminently pertinent Why doth he yet find fault? for who hath resisted his will?" and if Paul had been teaching that the judgment of God upon the Jews was for sins in them which God had decreed they should commit, and which God had made it impossible for them not to commit, then, to the objector's sense of outraged justice, no better reply was possible than that he gave, taken in the Calvinistic sense. In such a case he had nothing more to say for himself than that man may reply against God, even in a case of the most manifest and most malignant injustice—Nay, but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? But this is too obviously outrageous to be admitted for a moment. Paul does not enjoin silence in a case of outraged justice, but rebukes impertinent reply in a case of obvious right and equity. The admission of Gentiles to equal privileges with the Jews was not an occasion on which the Jews might make any sort of a reply against God for so doing. They, inconsistently with their profound faith in God and in the inspiration of the Mosaic Scriptures, "being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, had not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God," and were thereby bringing upon themselves swift destruction, without any occasion of reply against the divine administration.

But whatever interpretation may be given to isolated passages in this chapter, it is conclusive against its quotation in proof of the doctrine of unconditional personal election to eternal life, that the topic of discourse is manifestly the election of the Gentiles to equality of religious privileges, and not at all an election of any person or persons to eternal life.

A third use of the terms "elect," "elected," "called," "chosen," and other terms of similar import, is found in the Scriptures. "Many are called but few are chosen. Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus," Here, evidently, the choosing is after the calling—that is, it is an act done in time. The election is by and through the sanctification

of the Spirit; that is, it is a selection, a choosing out of the world, a separation from the world, by regeneration, conversion, the new birth; in a word, when God justifies a sinner, regenerates his nature, adopts him as a child of God, makes him an heir of eternal life, he thereby, then and there, separates him from sinners of the world—elects him to be his child and an heir of eternal life. The sinner, by this election, becomes a saint, an elect person, and is frequently so called in the Scriptures.

This election is almost universally spoken of as conditioned upon repentance toward God and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ; and if in any passages, the condition is not specifically mentioned, it is plainly implied. If, in any sense, this election is eternal, it is so only in the purpose of the Divine Being to elect; and as the election itself is conditioned upon faith, it follows that the eternal purpose to elect was based upon that foreseen faith.

If Calvinistic election be anywhere in the Bible, it is in the twenty-ninth and thirtieth verses of the eighth chapter of Romans, which, in brief, affirms that whom God foreknew he predestinated, called, justified, and glorified. The whole question turns upon the clause, "*whom he foreknew*." If the subjects of God's foreknowledge were men simply considered as actually existing beings—since he foreknew all men in this sense—then the text affirms Universalism; if they were particular persons, as Peter, James, and John, then Calvinism is affirmed, and the controversy is closed. If, however, they are a class of persons, distinguished by some designated characteristic, it will only be necessary to find that distinguishing characteristic to determine the sense of the text. Now, no one will affirm that the text or context exhibits any evidence that particular persons are the "*whom he foreknew*." To affirm that, is an assumption without warrant. We affirm that the foreknown were a class described in the twenty-eighth verse as "they that love God, who are the called according to his purpose." This corresponds with the scope of the context. Paul was comforting the Church under "the sufferings of this present time," and assures them "that all things work together for good to them that love God," and confirms the assurance by affirming, "that whom he did foreknow," as loving God, he did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, and be ultimately glorified in heaven.

The Calvinistic controversy has met us in the progress of our discussion at nearly every point in anthropology and soteriology, and we are apprehensive that the reader has, before this, thought we have given it more attention than in our time it deserves. If an apology is needed, it has already been given, and is found in the fact that the Augustinian theory is, in substance, though not in all its particulars, still held and advocated by some of the greatest and best men in the Church.

The commonly called five points; namely Predestination, Universal Redemption, The Operation of Grace, Freedom of the Will, and Perseverance, interpenetrate so perfectly, that if Calvinism break down in the discussion at anyone of these points, the system fails entirely. Were it not so, it might be thought necessary in this place, under the head of The Extent of Atonement, to discuss the question of Efficacious Grace. Many who profess to hold the doctrine of universal redemption, limit atonement, not in its provisions, but in its application. Christ's merits are adequate to the salvation of all men; but those merits are applied by the offices of the Spirit. He calls all men with a "common call," and offers salvation to all; but he irresistibly impels the elect to accept, and leaves others to reject. All would reject, and could not do otherwise, unless irresistibly impelled to accept. We hold that the influences of the Spirit on the minds of men, so far forth as is necessary to constitute men free agents in accepting or rejecting salvation, are irresistible. God places life and death before men, places men in

circumstances to choose or refuse, independent of their agency; but he does not constrain their choice; they may, and many do, resist and grieve the Holy Ghost. They quench the Spirit; they do despite unto the Spirit of grace. The influences of the Spirit may be resisted to the final destruction, even of those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the good word of God. Men may do despite unto the Spirit of grace by which they have been sanctified. Till probation terminates, final destiny is a contingency. Two opposite eternities are either of them possible, and the question is decided, never by any thing external to the man himself, but by his own free choice, aided by the grace of God.

Book Fifth

ESCHATOLOGY

CHAPTER I.

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

THAT the death of the body is not the terminus of human existence; that man will exist in a state of conscious personality after death; that his existence in a future world will be a continuance of his present existence; in a word, that man is immortal, in the common acceptation of that term, is an intuition of man's moral nature. The sense of moral obligation is a sense of accountability which always looks to the future. That is to say, whenever one does any thing which he apprehends as right or wrong, that doing invariably awakens expectations of future results, results immediately connected with his conduct considered as right or wrong. The idea of moral law involves this expectation. "Moral law is a form of expression denoting the order of sequence established between the moral quality of actions and their results." Every idea of moral desert, of responsibility, of accountability, of reward and punishment, of God as a moral governor, or of moral government in any of its respects, involves an expectation of future results, results that are sure to ensue.

It is true that, "because sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore the heart of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil;" but this comes not of man's moral nature in its normal condition, nor is it a conviction of his rational nature; it is purely, wholly, abnormal. Both the rational and the moral natures give sure indications of a coming retribution, and no apprehensions of the human mind are entertained with a firmer conviction of certainty than are these expectations. Every bad man is sure that his bad conduct will sooner or later come back to trouble him; and every good man, though he apprehends no merit in himself, feels perfectly confident that it is not in vain that he has cleansed his hands in innocency, and walked in righteousness before God. But these expectations are only partially realized in the present life, and in many instances are not realized at all. The mixed condition of the life that now is, the unequal distribution of good and ill, the fact that the righteous suffer and the wicked are in prosperity, and especially that many men end their earthly life perpetrating most atrocious crimes, are, to all minds, palpable evidence that retribution is reserved for a future state. Indeed, every man, however good or however bad, whatever be his earthly experience, whether of pleasure or of pain, of prosperity or of adversity is fully satisfied that the account of his responsibilities is not fully adjusted here. All, all, intuitively, rationally, from the necessities of their nature, and from the obvious facts in the case, make habitual reference of the events of life to far off and future results.

We do not say that all men, in all conditions of life, have, and, in all

ages of the world's history, have had, those clear apprehensions of immortality that are attained by study prosecuted in the light of New Testament teachings; but that the idea, in some form, is a universal possession of the human mind: it is a natural and necessary intuition of the moral nature; a deliverance of the intuitive faculty occasioned by the apprehended facts of human experience. No man ever did, and no man ever can, without doubt confidently believe that death is the terminus of human existence. Doubt is not difficult; it may assume innumerable forms; it may be intensified in degree almost without limit; it may attain formidable dimensions; it may darken into despair; it may become damnation; but to doubt about immortality is one thing, to believe confidently that there is no future life is quite another thing. God, man, the universe, morals, accountability, immortality, present probation, and future retribution are truths that no philosophic speculation or religious infidelity can by any possibility annihilate. Nor can a conviction of their truth be totally obliterated from the human mind.

We are aware that the universality of this idea of a future state is stoutly denied, and we are also aware that we have very respectable authority for affirming that the Hebrew religion contained no idea of immortality. But all such denials are of the same species, whether they relate to the Hebrew Religion or to that pagan religion which is most pagan. Philosophical speculations have in all the historic ages questioned man's immortality; but religion has never questioned it. The idea is as universal as religion. If there is, or ever has been, a people entirely destitute of all religious ideas, let them be shown, and let it be demonstrated that they are so destitute. We deny the existence of such a people. But if such should be found, what of it?—the same as if a tribe or nation of idiots were found. As the existence of the latter would not prove that man is not a rational being, so the existence of the former would not prove that man is not a religious being. Some form of religion must subsist wherever man subsists, and religion, in every form of it, even the lowest, postulates a future existence and a future retribution.

Some have said that the conviction of a future state arises out of man's desire for continued existence, sometimes called the love of life. It can not be questioned that all men have such a desire. This desire is in intensity equal to any other desire of our nature; perhaps in most minds it is stronger than any other desire; "all that a man hath will he give for his life." Suicide occurs, not because of the absence of such a desire, but in spite of it, in opposition to it. Self-destruction is, in the judgment of all men, unnatural, unaccountable; we can not see how a man can obtain the consent of his own mind to take his life. We have no reason to believe that suicides terminate their earthly existence because they believe that death is the end of them. They evidently determine, in view of present ills, to take their chances for the future, and they rush into eternity reckless as to what destiny may be. Suicide is exceptional; love of life, desire for continued existence is the rule. It is manifest that if the belief in a future state could be obliterated, and man could come to a confident assurance that existence terminates at death, suicide would be frequent; and more, if it were true that death is the end of us, it would be the most rational thing that most men could do, to set themselves down, fold their arms and die as soon as possible. If, therefore, one were to reason thus: all men have an instinctive desire for continued existence; it is evident that our Creator designed that all implanted desires should be gratified; therefore, he has provided for the means of such gratification, and man is, in the divine purpose, destined to existence without end—such an argument would not be destitute of force. The natural desire for being, and the inference deducible from it, harmonize with the intuitions of our moral nature in respect to a future life. And more than this, on the theory of extinction at death this desire is wholly unaccounted

for, and it serves no other purpose than to prompt multitudes to prolong a miserable existence.

The immortality of the soul is inferred from the powers of the soul itself, especially from its capacity for indefinite improvement. It is doubted whether the highest development attainable within the limits of this life is ever actually attained by any individual of the race. Some have even said that every man is capable of being, even here, greater than any man is. Whether this be so or not, it is certain that the masses of mankind die with undeveloped faculties, and probably every man feels that but for the untoward circumstances of his life, he would be much more than he is. The greatest men seem to themselves conscious of undeveloped strength; to their own thoughts they are in the infancy of their being, and certainly if what some have done is at all indicative of what all may do, the whole of our earthly life is, to all of us, but the early morning of our existence. It is said that three-fifths of the race die in infancy. Now, the argument is briefly this: it is not supposable that infinite wisdom would call to being capacities for indefinite increase and advancement, and then speedily return such capacities to nonentity; the human race have capacities that are not, and can not be, developed in this life; therefore, there is a life to come.

Again, it is natural to man to inquire in reference to every thing that pertains to him, "Cui bono?"—for what good? Is it said that duty is man's only lawful motive? We reply, The sense of duty is conditioned upon apprehensions of truth and interest. Conflict between duty and interest is only apparent, not real. It is never man's duty to do what is, on the whole, injurious to him. We assume that self-love is an implanted principle, instinctive to human nature, and that it is sustained by the rational and intellectual natures. We inquire lawfully, normally, in reference to all the parts, and to the whole of our lives, "What advantageth it me?" Our present argument is this: Most men have good reasons for affirming that their existence is to them of no advantage, if death be its terminus. We will admit, if it be desired, that this life, even in any of its conditions, is a boon, a blessing, for which men ought to be, and good men are, grateful; but still we insist that though a blessing, earthly life is not a satisfaction. However valuable it may be, it comes so far short of a satisfaction that the instinctive demand of our nature for advantage, the requirements of self-love must, in every case, pronounce the whole a failure, a vanity, vanity of vanities. If there be nothing for us on the other shore, we might as well not have been. If threescore and ten years be the maximum of conscious being, it, in comparison with two eternities of nonentity, might as well be blotted out; subtracting it from all duration past, or from all duration to come, produces no appreciable diminution; in a word, it were as well that it had never been at all. But in admitting that life is in itself a blessing, we have admitted more than, to our thought, the truth will allow. Human life can not be estimated apart from immortality, because it is in thought inseparably connected with it. The estimates men make of any present possession depend upon the anticipated bearing of that possession upon their future well-being, and the truly wise form their estimates in view of the far-off future. It is only because God has joined in inseparable connection the history of time with the retributions of eternity, that men see any real value in the experiences we have under the sun.

Arguments forcibly confirming our intuition of immortality might be constructed from nearly every particular in the contents of consciousness, and from well-nigh all the constituent elements in the condition of human life. Man, considered as to what he is in his intellectual, æsthetic, moral, and religious natures—considered in his relations to the material world—is wholly an enigma if his earthly life be the whole of his existence; shut out the light of the future life, and no man can tell what he is, why he is here, or

how he may best conduct himself.

But some one will say, Plato reasoned well, and Cicero coned his arguments, and yet the latter made his collocutor say of the arguments of the former, "I know not how it is, but so it is, that while I read I give my assent, but when I have laid aside the book, and begin to reflect upon the immortality of the soul by myself, all my assent glides away."

When men assume that the truth of an intuition depends upon argument, and begin to reason upon it, they manufacture more doubts than they remove. To doubt about a doctrine is not the same as to believe it untrue. Socrates, Plato, and Cicero reasoned of immortality as though the truth of the doctrine depended upon the conclusiveness of their arguments. Many of their arguments were sophistries, and it is not wonderful that they themselves, as well as their readers, when they should come to see that the premise was false or the argument inconclusive, should infer that the conclusion drawn was itself also untrue. For example: Cicero assumed the existence of the gods, and that the gods were once men, and from these assumptions argued the immortality of man. Now, when doubt concerning the premises came, doubt concerning the conclusion very naturally followed. Not favored with the light of revelation, left to natural intuition and to unaided reason, their apprehensions at best, as compared with those having the New Testament Scriptures, were obscure, and, in many respects, imperfect. Yet, with argument or without it, or even against it, they had some faith in the doctrine of man's immortality, as all men, whether philosophers or peasants, do have and must have.

For the views Christian believers entertain of man's immortality, they are indebted to the writings of the New Testament. These explicitly assure us by the facts they furnish, Jesus Christ came from the other world, and spake of it as none could speak who had not been there. St. Paul, whether in the body or out of the body he knew not, but of the fact he was certain, was caught up to the third heaven, and heard what could not be represented in human language. St. John, in vision, saw the New Jerusalem, and learned much about the heavenly state. Christ said, "Fear not them which kill the body but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear Him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell. In my Father's house are many mansions; I go to prepare a place for you; I will come again and receive you unto myself, that where I am, ye may be also." St. Paul said, "We know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens."

To quote all the Scriptures which expressly declare, or plainly imply, man's immortality would be to quote well-nigh the whole of the Word of God; for all of which the Scriptures treat, even its historic accounts of God's dealings with men on earth, postulate man's moral responsibility and his relation to a future retribution; the doctrine of the soul's immortality underlies all Scriptural instruction.

Some have said that we are wholly indebted to inspiration for our convictions on this subject, and even for the origin of the idea; and yet more, some have even affirmed that the doctrine of immortality is not taught in the Old Testament—that life and immortality are brought to light in the Gospel, but nowhere else. To our thought, it would be as consistent to say that the doctrines of pardon and redemption were unknown to Old Testament saints. They were not as perfectly known as to the saints of the new dispensation, but how preposterous to say that none of the ancient worthies had any knowledge of these things!

We shall hereafter attempt to show that the resurrection of the body was a doctrine of Old Testament times, and if this shall be made to appear, of

course the existence of man in a future state, both as to soul and body must be admitted as a doctrine of those times. We therefore defer further consideration of this particular thought. We here assume as sufficiently manifest that the idea of immortality was among the first conceptions man had of himself; life was normal, death abnormal. That this idea permeated all traditions, was an underlying principle in all religions, and that by revelation the ideas men had of these things were expanded, explained, illustrated, and enforced, so that by reason of the more perfect knowledge, and of the assuring demonstrations of the New Testament, it is said "that life and immortality are brought to light by the Gospel."

OBJECTIONS.

Persons who reject all authority and all revelation, who deny the supernatural, and believe nothing but what is obvious to sense, very naturally say, that when a man dies, so far as we know, or can know, that is the end of him. Some of this class, not content with mere denial, attempt reasoning, thus: Man is an animal; when other animals die, we have no difficulty in regarding their death as a terminus of their existence; why should we, when man dies? We reply, if man were a mere animal, if the only difference between a horse and a man were a difference in degree, not in kind, the analogy would furnish ground for a plausible question. Or, if the horse possessed moral faculties in any degree, we could not, so readily, as we do now, admit that death is the end of him; but since there is no analogy whatever in that on which the intuition of immortality is founded, the argument fails entirely. Since man, in all the distinguishing characteristics of his nature, is wholly a different being from all other earthly existences, we rightly infer that his Creator will treat him differently. But for man's moral and religious nature, and his capacity for indefinite improvement, we might say to ourselves: Man is no more before God than is an insect before man; and as a man ends the existence of an insect, and feels that his act is of no account, so can God terminate the existence of a man, and if one man, a million, or an indefinite number of them. But as the case is, though we readily say, God *can* in an instant return us all to nonentity, no one believes he ever *will*.

The only objections to the doctrine of man's immortality really worthy of reply are those of the materialists. If the soul be matter, or if thought, emotion, and volition be but the results of material organization, then consciousness ceases with the dissolution of the body—at least, it would, in that case, probably be an easy thing so to think. The psychological argument is the chief support of materialism. Consciousness commences on the occasion of sensation. Without sight there would be no knowledge of colors; without hearing, none of sounds; without smell, none of odors; without taste, none of the sapid qualities of bodies; without touch, nothing of hardness, roughness, etc.; and without muscular resistance, probably nothing of self and not-self. Now, it is assumed that this proves that mental phenomena can not be without material organization, whereas, it only proves that man in his present constitution is dependent upon sensation for his first knowledge. Again, it is found that certain diseases of the body affect the operation of the mind, in some cases causing a total cessation of consciousness. From this, the same inference as above is made, when it only proves that in man's present existence mind and body are very intimately connected. On the contrary, we allege that there are no two objects of human thought, which, to our apprehensions, are more unlike, and more evidently two distinct and different things than mind and matter. By a necessity of thought, we postulate an underlying substance for the qualities of matter, and an underlying substance for the operations of mind. As these substances are known by entirely different phenomena, and are known by entirely different methods, we can not avoid regarding them as entirely different entities. The soul is immaterial, and, therefore, no argument as to its destiny can be drawn from the destiny of

what is material.

Materialism has been elsewhere in these pages, as we judge, sufficiently discussed; we therefore dismiss this objection here.

It is sometimes asked, Is man immortal by creation or by preservation? This is what is commonly called the question of natural immortality. Did God, in the beginning, make man such that if left to himself he would never cease to be? or, does God continue man's existence by a constant act of preservation? Of course no one will inquire whether God has brought into being a somewhat which omnipotence could not return to non-existence; but the question is, whether it belongs to the nature of man to live, or whether the soul, in its nature, is such as tends to dissolution, and is kept in being by the constant exercise of divine power. Those who affirm man's natural immortality, support their affirmation by the Scripture declarations that "man was made in the image of God," and that his soul is from the inspiration of the Living One—"God breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul." It is said, it is God's nature to live; in this feature of his image, as well as others, he made man. The breath of the Living One with which the body, made of the dust of the earth, was inspired, was itself a breath of life, a somewhat whose nature is to live—in short, a likeness unto the Everliving and Eternal. If this be so, then the question of unending existence is settled; all question of annihilation, or of return to unconsciousness, must be dismissed. But this exegesis of the passages in Genesis may be questioned, and seems to be antagonized by the declaration elsewhere that God "upholds all things by the word of his power." The doctrine of preservation by immediate divine power seems to pervade the Scriptures. Without God we can do nothing, and, by fair inference, without him we should be nothing—that is, should not be.

CHAPTER II.

INTERMEDIATE STATE.

THEREFORE we are always confident, knowing whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord; we are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body and to be present with the Lord."

These words occur in close connection with Paul's declaration of positive knowledge" that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens." The future state is, beyond question, the topic of discourse. To be absent from the body is to enter that future state, and to be present with the Lord, so that though we may not know precisely what is intended by the "building of God," or what by "being clothed upon with our house which is from heaven," it is plain that St. Paul here affirms a conscious presence with Christ, when, at the same time, we are absent from the body. Again, St. Paul, in another place, says, that for him to depart and be with Christ is far better—to die is gain. Here, also, the departed spirit is with Christ; and so with him, that to be with him thus is far better than to live in this world. Let it also be taken into account, that for Paul to live was Christ—it was needful for the Church. Now, to suppose that utter unconsciousness was better than a life so filled with interest to himself and with benefit to others as was the life of the Apostle Paul, is to make a supposition not admissible for a moment. The Savior said to the thief upon the cross, "This day shalt thou be with me in Paradise." The disciples saw Moses and Elias on the mount of transfiguration, and one of the prophets appeared to John in the Isle of Patmos.

The methods by which these Scriptures are so silenced as to admit of the

supposition that the soul slumbers in unconsciousness from death to the resurrection, are such as would make any writing mean any thing the critic desired; we can not consent to notice them. As certain as the Bible is God's word, so certain is it that there is an intermediate state of conscious existence between death and the resurrection. The only ground for an opposite opinion is the materialistic conception of a necessary connection between the soul and the body, or, rather, of a necessary dependence of the soul upon the body, which doctrine, for reasons above given, we totally discard. If it be inquired as to the particulars of this intermediate state, we shall not attempt to answer. We know not what we shall be, either immediately after death, or at the coming of Christ, or after that in the resurrection, or after the judgment, in the heavenly and eternal state. "To be with Christ " is certainly to be in a state of conscious blessedness. If we think of it as a place, it is to be where Christ is, in the Father's house, where there are many mansions—I take it that is heaven. The saints, then, enter immediately into heaven at death; with them the retributions of eternity commence when time ends, and by fair inference we conclude the same as to sinners.

It is here asked, why then a day of judgment? The doctrine of a future day of judgment will be discussed further on. Here we answer the question objected, simply by saying, that we should see what to us would be a satisfactory reason for a day of judgment is not a matter of sufficient weight to justify the supposition that the millions of our race who live and die before that event are to remain in a condition of doubt, betweenity, or especially of unconsciousness, for so many ages. The assurances that the saints go immediately at death to be with Christ, and the assurances that at the end of the world there shall be a day of judgment, both stand on their own foundations; and the fact that the reasons of a judgment are less obvious when both are admitted, does not invalidate either. The idea is sometimes advanced that paradise is not heaven, and that hell is not the lake of fire. If all that is intended be simply to affirm that the righteous, after the resurrection and the final judgment, will enter upon a more exalted and a more glorious state of being, and that the wicked will then commence a state of more distinctly expressed punishment, no reason is apparent why the conception should be objected to; but more than this is speculation. If it be intended to affirm that paradise is a state of trial, of doubt, of mixed experiences, a sort of second probation, and that in some sense hell is the same, we reject the affirmation as false; it is contradictory to the testimony of the Scriptures. Paradise is a place of blessedness, and hell is a place of torment; to one or the other of these mankind depart when they leave this world.

PURGATORY.

The Romish doctrine of purgatory assumes that many who are in favor with the Church, and therefore not in danger of eternal death, are nevertheless at death unfit for heaven. Hence the necessity of some purifying process after death. This purification the Romanists find in purgatorial fires. Offerings, penances, and prayers, by the living, for the benefit of the dead, suppose that purgatorial punishments may be remitted, and that it is in the power of the priesthood to grant such remission. The alleged support of the doctrine of purgatory chiefly relied upon is the opinions of the fathers. There are many passages in the patristic writings which may be fairly quoted as evidence that their authors believed in some sort of expiation by suffering after death, and that probably some of them believed in the doctrine of purification by fire. We reply, if the fathers did believe in and teach the doctrine of purgatory, this is not decisive evidence that the doctrine is true. Their faith in, or sympathy with, the doctrine may be accounted for. The idea of purification from sin by fire prevailed extensively in ancient times, and formed a part of many religions. With the Persians, fire was sacred. Grecian

philosophers, especially the Stoics, incorporated it into their systems, and Plato boldly advocated the doctrine. Even the Hebrews were not free from this error. Again, fire is naturally an effectual means of purification, and is, rhetorically, a most fitting figure to represent that process. The sacred writers seize upon it: "He is like a refiner's fire and like fuller's soap; he shall sit as a refiner and purifier of silver. I will bring the third part through the fire, and will refine them as silver is refined, and will try them gold is tried. If any man's work shall be burned, he shall suffer loss, but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire."

Probably most of the allusions to fire may be regarded as figurative, but evidently many of the fathers believed in expiation by suffering after death, and this error is to be accounted for by the prevalence of this opinion in their times, and by its influence as a tradition from their ancestors. It is not claimed that the doctrine of purgatory is taught directly in the Bible, but that it was a prevailing opinion is not contradicted and is implied in some passages. For example, when it is said that the sin against the Holy Ghost hath forgiveness, "neither in this world, neither in the world to come," it is claimed that this passage implies that some sins may be forgiven in the world to come. A feeble support, yet the strongest the Scriptures furnish. Purgatory is not proved; on the contrary it is disproved by the entire letter and spirit of the Gospel. It assumes that salvation from sin is to some extent secured by the sufferings of the sinner. This is wholly false. Salvation is by the grace of God through the propitiation made by our Lord Jesus Christ; not by works either of obedience or of penance are we saved, but by grace through faith. If it be claimed that purgatory, or probation, or any state of trial in the intermediate state is necessary, because time is too short, or human life is attended with too many difficulties for the determination of so great a question as eternal destiny, or because men are too great sinners to prepare for so holy a place as heaven in so short a life, such a claim assumes that holiness or fitness for heaven is attained, by some educational process, or by some service rendered, or by some amount of suffering endured, or by some other somewhat, requiring time and favorable circumstances, when according to the Gospel, salvation may be instantaneous, being conditioned upon faith only, and is always, whether progressive or instantaneous, by the sanctifying power of the Spirit through the merit of our Lord Jesus Christ—time, favorable circumstances, and facilities for culture being only means or instruments used by the Spirit when available, but never *essential* to his work of saving the soul.

If it be claimed that purgatory is a merciful provision for those who have neglected their opportunities; for those who might have been saved, but are not; and are not, wholly because of their own sinful neglect, this is equivalent to the doctrine of a future probation, to be considered hereafter.

The doctrine of expiation and purification after death is, in the Roman Church, intimately, if not inseparably connected with a more objectionable doctrine; namely, the pardon of sin by the authority of the priesthood. The authority to dismiss souls from purgatory, or to alleviate their sufferings, is the same as the authority to remit sin and grant indulgences to persons still in the flesh. This authority, it is claimed, is involved in what Romanists call "the power of the keys," committed to St. Peter, and through him to his successors, and to those whom they shall appoint and ordain. That fallible men have never been invested with a power so tremendous, and that the claim of infallibility on the part of the Roman priesthood is nugatory, and without any foundation in truth, is, to very Protestant obvious, without a word of discussion. None can forgive sin but God. The enormous abuse of priestly power which the doctrines of purgatory and of pardon by the authority of the priesthood have made possible and actual, are arguments against the doctrines themselves sufficient to justify their denunciation as religious

abominations.

CHAPTER III.

RESURRECTION.

"THY dead men shall live, together with my dead body shall they arise. Awake and sing, ye that dwell in the dust, for thy dew is as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall cast out the dead. And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake; some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt. Men and brethren, I am a Pharisee; of the hope and resurrection of the dead I am called in question. I confess that after the way they call heresy, so worship I the God of my fathers, believing all things which are written in the law and in the prophets, and have hope toward God that there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and of the unjust. Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you that God should raise the dead? Now, if Christ be preached that he rose from the dead, how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead? If there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen. As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive. Now, that the dead are raised, even Moses shewed at the bush, when he called the Lord, the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob; for he is not a God of the dead, but of the living. Jesus saith unto her, Thy brother shall rise again. Martha saith unto him, I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day."

The doctrine of the resurrection of the dead holds a prominent place, especially in the New Testament Scriptures; it is, therefore, legitimate to inquire definitely as to what is intended. Not that we may expect to obtain an exhaustive conception, or become satisfied that we know much of the minutiae or the methods; but inasmuch as revelation speaks so abundantly on the subject, it is reasonable to anticipate that a full knowledge of what is revealed will give an apprehension substantially correct.

1. The terms employed are used in their literal sense. We may speak figuratively of a resurrection from a death in trespasses and in sins to a life of holiness, but it were manifest folly to assume that the term resurrection is a synonym for the term sanctification. There is a spiritual resurrection, or a resurrection of the soul or spirit. This has passed, or rather is passing, and hath been from the beginning; but if there be a passage of Scripture in which this work of the Holy Spirit in regenerating the soul and making it anew in Christ Jesus is distinctly called a resurrection, it does not now occur to the present writer. The doctrine has respect to the physical, and not to the spiritual. It is a rising up of that which had fallen down—a rising again, not a mere escape from a catastrophe, an avoidance of the falling; not a new investment of the soul to take the place of the fallen body; not a vegetation from the fallen, but an uprising of itself. The term, resurrection of the dead, literally interpreted, can mean nothing else than that substantially the same bodies that are deposited in the grave come forth therefrom; that which had been dead is quickened into life; that which had lain in the grave arises and goes forth as a living thing.

2. The Old Testament Scriptures teach the doctrine. It is sometimes said that the idea of a resurrection, whatever it is, is wholly of New Testament origin—that it is not found in the Old. When Job says, "Though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God," it is claimed that he expresses only his confidence that he should recover from the loathsome disease then troubling him. This is a possible construction, but not probable, since, in that sense, it is too extremely poetical for a thought so prosaic, and its connection with Job's faith in a living Redeemer who

should stand in the latter day upon the earth, gives it a more exalted significance. So that, unless it can be positively shown that Job was ignorant of the hope of a resuscitation from the dead, we naturally interpret the passage in its literal sense. Isaiah, in the figure of his dead body arising, and of the earth casting out its dead; and Ezekiel in the vision of the valley of dry bones, represent the resuscitation of the Jewish state from a condition of prostration and death, showing most clearly that the resurrection of dead bodies was common and a familiar thought. Daniel, in terms as literal as possible, expressly declares the fact of a future resurrection. But it is conclusive of this question that at the coming of Christ the Jewish people were mostly of the sect of the Pharisees, one of whose distinguishing tenets was the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead; or, in other words, the existence of two sects—the Sadducees and the Pharisees—one of which denied and the other affirmed the resurrection of the dead, proves conclusively that the doctrine had come down to them from former generations; that is, it was a common doctrine of the Jewish religion in Old Testament times.

3. The doctrine of the resurrection is not the same as the doctrine of a future state. When the Bible speaks of the resurrection of the body it means something more than the immortality of the soul, and something different from it. In New Testament times, in the common controversies, the two were united, perhaps in many cases identified. When the Sadducees questioned our Lord about the woman of seven husbands, he replied, "As touching the resurrection of the dead, have ye not read that which was spoken unto you by God, saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? God is not a God of the dead, but of the living." Here our Lord gives an argument for the resurrection which proves only immortality; it proves that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, were living when God talked with Moses on Mount Sinai; that is to say, death is not the end of men; Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were living beings long after their bodies had gone down to the grave. The Sadducees whom our Lord thus answers denied both resurrection and immortality. So far as their interest in the discussion was concerned, to prove the one was to prove the other, or to refute them at the main point in controversy was total refutation. But that the two are not identical is manifest from the New Testament definition of these sects: "The Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, neither angel nor spirit; but the Pharisees confess both."

4. The resurrection does not occur at death. Certain phenomena, not yet explained, render it quite probable that nerve is not next to mind, but that there is, pervading our bodies, a subtle substance—call it animal magnetism or animalized electricity—forming another link in the connection between the inner and the outer world. Some philosophizing theologians, or theological philosophers, assuming that this is true, have put forth the theory that at death this body of subtle matter escapes with the soul, and serves for it in the spirit world the same purposes that the more material body does in this. The uprising of this psychical body is the resurrection. The grosser material body, made of the dust of the earth, returns to dust as it was, and is ever after no more to the man than is his cast-off clothing, or than are the three or four or more bodies which, by physiological changes, have passed away from him during his life-time. This theory receives some support from the idea entertained by some, that matter is an essential ingredient in the make-up of human nature. It is alleged that man is such by creation, that entirely to eliminate the material, is equivalent to an annihilation of the man; or, at least, it is to dehumanize him. In such a case he would cease to be a man and become another being. His relations to space and to time, and his knowledge of entities and relations, are all inseparably connected with matter. Assuming that this is true, and that man is conscious after death, a necessity for some such tabernacle as the above supposed psychical body is obvious.

In the light of philosophical speculation, all this is plausible, and for all that is patent, there is nothing in it specially objectionable in the light of religious truth, except when it is affirmed that the escape, at death, of this psychical body, and its companionship with the soul in the spirit world, is what is meant in the Scriptures by the resurrection the dead. That is not so. There is not in the Bible the most distant reference to any thing of the kind. The only thing that looks toward it is St. Paul's "house not made with hands," and that looks that way only in its antithetical relation to the "earthly house of this tabernacle" and the idea of being naked when absent from the body, and then being clothed upon with our house which is from heaven. But that house is a building of God; it is from heaven; it is spiritual, not made with hands; it is not a part of man's self, essential to his being, arising with the soul when it separates from the earthly house of this tabernacle. As an explanation of certain psychological phenomena, of spirit rappings, of clairvoyance, the idea of an intangible, invisible substance next to mind, may serve a valuable purpose, but the affirmation that the survival of this at death is what is in Scripture intended by the resurrection of the dead, is wholly an assumption, without even the semblance of any thing of the nature of proof.

5. The resurrection of Christ is both proof and example of the resurrection-proof of the fact, and illustration of the nature. In the fifteenth chapter of Paul's first Epistle to the Corinthians, the resurrection of the dead is the special topic of discussion. Here, if anywhere, we may expect to find definite and reliable information. The argument is with the Gnostic Christian, who, assuming that matter is eternally, essentially evil and unmanageable, and that the holy and the happy in the spirit world are entirely free from all connection with it, therefore affirmed that "*there is no resurrection.*" Paul argued that if there is no such thing, if the thing, in the nature of the case, be an impossibility, then it has never occurred, and Christ is not risen. But Christ has risen, for after his death and burial he was seen of Cephas, then of the twelve; after that of above five hundred brethren; after that he was seen of James, then of all the apostles, "and last of all," he says, "he was seen of me also, as of one born out of due time." Here is the testimony of unimpeached and unimpeachable witnesses who saw him, handled him, ate bread with him during forty days, had frequent occasions of private and public intercourse with him, and at last saw him ascend up into heaven out of their sight. He further argues thus: We have preached the Gospel, the burden of which is, "that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, and that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day according to the Scriptures." You Corinthians have believed what we have preached unto you, and through faith in this word you have been saved from your sins; but if there is no resurrection of the dead, we are false witnesses, you have trusted in a falsehood, and by consequence are yet in your sins. By all the assurances of your Christian experience, you know that Christ is risen from the dead. The resurrection is not, as your Gnostic philosophy teaches you, in itself an impossible thing; it has actually occurred in the person of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ; he has become the first fruits of them that slept, and all that are in their graves shall, like him come forth; "for since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead; for as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive."

But as if the objector, though refuted, was not convinced, Paul allows him to restate his objection, this time interrogatively—"How are the dead raised up? With what body do they come?" or, stated categorically, The dead can not be raised up; they go down to the grave, become dust of the earth, and their resurrection is the most incredible of all conceivable results. Paul replies, "Fool!" false reasoner! you base your argument upon the *a priori* improbability of the thing, and affirm an impossibility, when annually you

witness, in vegetation, what is antecedently equally improbable. That the seed sown should vegetate, is as unlikely to occur as that a dead body should arise from the grave. Again, you suppose that matter is inherently corrupt and corrupting; that whatever comes from dead matter must be dead and death diffusing, so that a body raised again must be a detriment to a holy, happy spirit; "but that which thou sowest thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain, and God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him;" in like manner the body raised again, though the same that was buried, is not the same; it shall be changed and "made suitable for its new offices and relations. Matter is not inherently and necessarily a bad thing. The body, as you now see it, is corrupt, dishonored, weak, and natural; in the resurrection it will be incorrupt, glorious, powerful, and spiritual.

The fact that Christ rose from the dead is proof that *such* an event is possible, such an event, not another-not something like it, or something merely called by the same name. So far forth as the fact of Christ's resurrection is an argument in proof of the Scripture doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, and so far forth as it is a pledge, a promise, a first fruit, of that resurrection, so far forth is it also an example, an illustration, of what that resurrection is to be. To suppose that the material substance which constituted the body of Jesus was annihilated, dissipated, made to disappear—that any thing became of it so that never after his death and burial it had any connection with his person, is to suppose what is entirely contrary to the obvious import of the record. If all that is true of the resurrection is that the man exists after death, and has the power to assume the semblance of what is visible and tangible—is capable of conversing, eating, walking, exhibiting all the phenomena of a real body—if this is what is meant by the term resurrection, then is the whole account misleading. Words are used which are utterly unfitted to communicate the thought intended. When the Jews required a sign, Jesus said "Destroy *this* body. and in three days I will raise it up." He did not say, Destroy this body and I will find another that will answer me the same purpose as that destroyed; he did not say, Crucify me, and I will show you that I am an immortal being; he did not say, Put my body in Joseph's tomb, and from it there shall come forth, as the grass comes forth from the seed sown, another something that can assume the forms and exhibit the phenomena of the body buried; he said, I will raise *this* body on the third day after *its* death; he said to Thomas, 'Reach hither thy finger and behold my hands, and reach hither thy hand and thrust it into my side." When the disciple supposed they had seen a spirit, he said, "Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myself; handle me and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have. And while they yet believed not for joy, and wondered, he said unto them, Have ye here any meat? and they gave him a piece of broiled fish and of an honey-comb, and he took it and did eat before them, and said, These are the words which I spake unto you while I was yet with you, Thus it behooved Christ to suffer and to rise from the dead the third day."

Nothing can be plainer than that the crucified and the risen body are identified. The body which the disciples saw and handled was the same that the soldiers had nailed to the cross. There was identity in some sense, in every sense essential to identity. If it be required that we show in what that identity consisted, we reply, The requirement is unscientific as well as unreasonable. Identity may be recognized where it is not possible to designate, precisely, in what it consists. I recognize my present body, now at threescore years and more, as the same body I had when a child, and yet can not tell, precisely, in what sense it is the same, for I am persuaded that during all these years it has been constantly changing.

The argument, then, for the resurrection of the dead—what the Scriptures teach on this subject—warrants the expectation that in the resurrection on the

last day, substantially, in every respect essential to identity, the same bodies buried in the graves shall come forth.

But again: Though the record requires us to believe that the risen body is the same as the crucified body, yet it also requires us to regard it as another—it is both the *same* and *another*. The disciples on the way to Emmaus, were with him for hours together, and yet did not know him. It is said, to be sure, in Luke, that "their eyes were holden that they should not know him," and that, in the breaking of bread, "their eyes were opened and they knew him;" but Mark says he appeared to them "in another form." The record being a history of facts as they appeared to those who witnessed them, it is not essential to accuracy that the supernatural in the case should be referred to definitely, so that we are at liberty, in this case, to conceive that the eyes of the beholder were affected so that he did not recognize a familiar form, or the form itself was changed. Now, Luke himself says, that when the disciples' eyes were opened, the Master "vanished out of their sight." And again: When these disciples returned to Jerusalem and reported to the assembled apostles and those that were with them, who were conversing about the reported resurrection, while the disciples from Emmaus were rehearsing the facts they had witnessed, "Jesus himself stood in the midst of them, and saith unto them, Peace be unto you. But they were terrified and affrighted, and supposed that they had seen a spirit." This looks as though the Master had come among them without opening the door.

Again, when Jesus appeared to his disciples on the shore of the Sea Tiberias, they knew not that it was Jesus until the miraculous draught of fishes. Mary knew him not at first when he appeared to her at the sepulcher. All this proves conclusively that the body had undergone some great change, and corresponds with Paul's assertion, that "it is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. And again, the same thing is asserted in respect to those who are alive and remain at the second coming: "We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet; for the trumpet shall sound and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed; for this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality. Our conversation is in heaven, from whence also we look for the Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body. I would not have you ignorant, brethren, concerning them which are asleep; for if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with him; for this we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that we which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord, shall not prevent them which are asleep; for the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God, and the dead in Christ shall rise first; then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air; and so shall we ever be with the Lord."

Once more: Christ's risen body—that which appeared during the forty days between the resurrection and the ascension—was not his glorified body. It was not the same as that seen in the transfiguration—"The fashion of his countenance was changed, and his face did shine as the sun, and his raiment was white and glistening, was white as the light." "It doth not y~t appear what we shall be, but we know that when he shall appear we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is."

The glorified body of the saints in heaven will have undergone a change subsequent to that occurring at the resurrection, more perfectly fitting it for its new residence—for its conditions and new relations in the spirit world. We think, then, of the glorified saint as the same person as he that

sojourned on earth—the same as to soul and body, yet changed as to both, so as to be qualified for the employments and enjoyments of the heavenly state. Whatever pertains exclusively to this earthly state is left behind; whatever does not belong to his earthly condition, but is necessary for his heavenly conditions, is added; he is the same, yet another; wonderfully changed, yet the same person.

OBJECTIONS.

1. It may be asked, Why insist upon the idea of identity? especially since identity is a difficult thing to define, and in this case confessedly can not be defined; and since it presents many difficulties, some of them, apparently at least, contradictory, all of them inexplicable, is not more lost than gained by insisting upon this idea?

We reply, Revelation is professedly an aid to thought in matters to us incomprehensible; it furnishes a stand-point from which to view what we could not otherwise see. We anticipate difficulties in such cases; they are not an embarrassment. If the telescope reveals to us what without it we could not see at all, we do not refuse to use it because it reveals what we do not fully understand. Imperfect knowledge is better than total ignorance. The idea of identity is precisely the idea revelation teaches; it is involved in the terms employed; a resurrection is arising up of that which had fallen down. The same idea is involved in all the Scriptural arguments for, illustrations of, and allusions to, the resurrection; we can not accept the Bible instructions on the subject, and reject the idea of identity.

2. It is a matter of scientific importance in Biblical exegesis. If we may, in one case, make the Bible teach what we please, because that seems to us more reasonable than what the Bible says, we may do the same in every case, and the Bible ceases to be a revelation from God; its authority, as a standard of faith and practice, is rejected; we become rationalists, and make natural reason the standard of truth, and the only ground of faith.

3. Faith in the doctrine of the resurrection of the bodies we now inhabit connects time with eternity, satisfies the desire for continued existence, enhances our personal interest in the future world; by it we realize more perfectly that it is we ourselves that are to be there, and not a something raised up to take our place; by it we anticipate that we shall be known and recognized, that we shall know and recognize our friends; by it we anticipate a personal acquaintance with those whose historic records now interest us; we anticipate the society of him who, in the morning of human history, offered an excellent sacrifice unto God and obtained witness that he was righteous; of him who was translated that he should not see death, and was not found because God had translated him; of him who, being warned of God, prepared an ark for the saving of his house; of him who was the father of the faithful; of Isaac, Jacob, Moses, David, Daniel, Isaiah; of all the prophets and the apostles who, through faith, subdued kingdoms, wrought righteousness, obtained promises, whose holy lives and happy deaths have instructed, comforted, and assured us; above all, we anticipate a glorified relation to the person of Jesus, to the flesh by which God was manifest, to the man who became our brother, and by whose theanthropic sufferings and death we are redeemed!

4. The difficulties which the doctrine of an identical resurrection encounters are easily dissipated, since the whole process is directly referred to the omnipotence of God. The resurrection is proof of Christ's mission, is a demonstration of the divinity of the Christian religion, because it is possible only by divine power. "What sign showest thou?" "Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up. I will raise him up in the last

day." It is Christ as God that effects the resurrection of the dead; before Omnipotence all difficulties disappear. It is not objectionable to refer the process, as far as may be, to what is natural. For example, some, to remove the difficulty suggested by the fact that the same particles of matter may form a part of different bodies, as when a buried body becomes dust, and then vegetable, and then animal, and then again human flesh, and descends again to the grave, and thus belongs to two, perhaps to a hundred, different resurrection bodies, have referred to the natural process of identification—to the power with which the man is invested, perhaps his soul, perhaps his body—of appropriating surrounding matter to itself, of identifying it with itself, making it like itself, a part of itself, and have supposed that the identity of the resurrection body, with the buried body is preserved in this way. This may be so; we do not object; to those to whom it is an explanation, it may be of service; to our thought it explains nothing, and is of no value. The illustration, not uncommonly used, of the caterpillar and the butterfly, serves to illustrate the idea that the same thing may undergo great changes, but it explains nothing as to the question of identity—perhaps embarrasses it. The resurrection is a mystery; we know not how it shall be; it is difficult to fill out the outline conception revelation furnishes, but what is revealed is the sure word of the Lord and is to be trusted. All difficulties are to be referred to the infinite power of God, and we are to comfort our hearts with the sure promises given us, to maintain the faith once delivered to the saints, and to cherish the hope that there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and of the unjust.

CHAPTER IV.

MILLENNIUM.

THE term millennium literally signifies "a thousand years." The twentieth chapter of Revelation was early so interpreted by some—never by all, never by the Church as such—as to teach that Christ would personally appear on earth; that at his coming the martyrs, and some other distinguished saints, would rise from the dead, and that Christ, with those having part in this first resurrection, so called, would reign on the earth a thousand years, during which time the Church should enjoy great prosperity. Satan was to be bound in prison during these thousand years; at the end thereof he was to be loosed, a great apostasy was to occur, and then would come the second and final resurrection, including all the dead, both small and great, the judgment-day, and the final issue of all earthly affairs.

This belief gave rise to a sect called Millenarians, Second Adventists, etc. During all Church history, every now and then, distinguished commentators have advocated these views, not unfrequently large numbers of Christian believers have embraced them, and sometimes extensive excitements have been awakened by a confident belief, not only that Christ would come again in person to dwell on earth, but also that his coming was near at hand.

Perhaps because of the prominence these views have held in Church history—perhaps for this with other reasons, no matter—the term millennium long since came to be used in a generic sense, to signify the time when the kingdom of Christ on earth should be in the ascendant, should be in its highest power, exaltation, and glory. All Christians now speak of a millennium in which they believe; all look forward to a time when the kingdom of Christ shall be perfected, shall be in completeness, when the highest earthly purposes contemplated in the Gospel dispensation shall be accomplished. All believe in a millennium, though there is now, as there always has been, great diversity of opinion as to what events will occur previous to its coming, and as to what will be the precise state of things when the millennium shall have fully come. The expectation of the Church that

the Gospel dispensation of God's grace and mercy among men will, at some future period, be completely successful, is well founded both in reason and in Scripture. Something greatly more glorious than has as yet been achieved, something in which a much larger portion of the human family than has as yet been affected by the Gospel shall be interested, and shall be thereby greatly benefited, something that shall elevate the mass of mankind to a higher plane of life, has been, and still is, the expectation of the Church; and we here affirm that that expectation is well grounded in adequate evidence.

The Son of God became a man to make the salvation of immortal souls from eternal death a possibility. This he did. If, therefore, the world come to an end to-morrow, no man can say the mission of Christ is a failure.

Subordinate to his ultimate purpose, he proposed for mankind a favorable probation; through and by him the responsibilities of all men are perfectly adjusted to their capabilities and opportunities, so that no one can say that Christ's mission is a failure in respect to man's condition in this life. And yet, these things being admitted, when we think of man as a creature made in the image of God, on probation for an eternal destiny; of Christ as the Son of God become man's brother for his rescue from the power of sin and of Satan, we almost instinctively expect something more than has yet been realized; we expect that mankind will rush hastily to the Savior's embrace; we are sure that when man comes to see his need and to know his Savior, he will gratefully accept, obey, and love him. When the truth shall be manifest and the minds of men are opened to apprehend that truth, it seems well-nigh inevitable that all will embrace it. The Gospel of the Son of God is good news, glad tidings unto all people, in a sense that has never yet been appreciated. It is adapted, and we therefore reasonably suppose it is designed, to accomplish for men in this life what has never yet been effected by it, or by any other agency. Surely our Heavenly Father must have benevolent designs respecting his children upon earth that have never yet been realized.

But this expectation of a better state of things is indulged, not so much because it is in itself reasonable, as because it is abundantly assured in the prophetic Scriptures. "All the ends of the world shall remember and return unto the Lord; and all the kindreds of the nations shall worship before thee. All nations whom thou hast made shall come and worship before thee, O Lord, and shall glorify thy name. And it shall come to pass in the last days, that the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow unto it. And many people shall go and say, Come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths; for out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the Lord of God from Jerusalem. And he will destroy in this mountain the face of the covering cast over all people, and the veil that is spread over all nations. He will swallow up death in victory, and the Lord God will wipe away tears from off all faces; and the rebuke of his people shall he take away from off all the earth, for the Lord hath spoken it. And it shall come to pass that from one new moon to another, and from one Sabbath to another, shall all flesh come to worship before me, saith the Lord. The earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the glory of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea. And they shall not teach every man his neighbor and every man his brother, saying, Know ye the Lord? for all shall know him, from the least unto the greatest. Come, behold the works of the Lord; he maketh wars to cease unto the end of the earth; he shall judge among the nations, and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall ye learn war any more. The wolf shall lie down with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together, and a little child shall lead them. They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy

mountain. But they shall sit every man under his own vine and under his fig-tree and none shall make them afraid. for the mouth of the Lord hosts hath spoken it. Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel unto every creature. The Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in all the world for a witness unto all nations, and then shall the end come. And I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me. Thy kingdom come, thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven."

The Gospel makes prominent the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of men. All middle walls of partition are broken down; all distinctions of class, condition, sex, color, or nationality are obliterated; whether Jew or Greek, Barbarian, or Scythian, all are one in Christ. The Gospel, adapted to all, is to be preached unto all, prayers are offered for all, and the whole Church are taught to pray for the coming of God's kingdom, and that his will may be done n earth as it is done in heaven. Indeed, the Church is an organization organized for this special purpose, to preach the Gospel unto every creature. The New Testament Church is an agency called into being and used for the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecies. The expectation of a millennium, during which the Gospel of Jesus Christ shall be universally proclaimed, and shall be glorified as it has not hitherto been glorified, is certainly a most reasonable and Scriptural expectation.

Is the millenarian theory, founded upon the interpretation of the twentieth chapter of Revelation above alluded to, the true theory? Are we to expect that the world will continue in its present condition, now making progress in the line of improvement, and then retrograding and tending toward barbarism—here advancing in purity and piety, and there waxing worse and worse in sin and every abomination, till at the appointed time Christ shall appear in the clouds of heaven, destroy all the wicked from off the whole face of the earth, raise the martyred dead, bind Satan with chains in prison, and in person reign on the earth a thousand years? And are we to expect that, after a thousand years of great peace and prosperity, there shall be a great apostasy, Satan be loosed from his millenarian imprisonment, go forth to cause great strifes and rebellions, gather Gog and Magog more numerous than the sands of the sea to battle, and that after their destruction by fire from God out of heaven, then shall occur the resurrection of all the dead, and the final judgment?

In reply we say: 1. This theory has in itself *prima facie* evidence of extreme improbability. According to it, the Gospel ceases to be the instrument of the world's salvation, and judgments take its place; the millennium is to be introduced, not by saving sinners, but by destroying them; Christ, who, after thirty and three years of earthly sojourn, ascended to be glorified with the glory which he had with the Father before the world was, is to return and dwell on earth a thousand years, before, with his people, he takes his place at the right hand of God. The martyred saints, many of whom have been thousands of years with Christ in the kingdom of heaven, who rest from their labors, and whose works do follow them, are to return and engage again in earth's battle strifes. There are two resurrections, two judgment-days, and three advents of Christ. Probation and retribution are mingled in inextricable confusion, and the location of heaven is both terrestrial and celestial.

2. The theory has no support, but in a literal interpretation of the twentieth chapter of Revelation. If that chapter contained all the information we have on the subject, we might be compelled to concede that post-millenarianism is the eschatology of the Bible, but the book of Revelation is confessedly highly figurative and symbolic, and its interpretation extremely difficult. It is an accepted rule of exegesis that the obscure is to be explained by the perspicuous, the figurative by the

literal, and not the reverse. That the theory conflicts with what other Scriptures teach as to the last things will appear, we think, in what follows.

In passing, it is due to say, that good authority finds an exegesis of this difficult chapter not absurd, not self-contradictory, not in conflict with accepted rules of interpretation, totally different from the theory in question. For example, since nothing is said of the bodies of the martyrs, it is alleged that the resurrection, called the first resurrection, may be a return to the earth in an eminent degree of the martyr spirit. Those who partake of this spirit are those blessed ones who have a part in the first resurrection. Again, as nothing is said of Christ's coming in personal presence, only that the martyrs lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years, it is an assumption to say that Christ is to be personally present on the earth during those years. We give this not as determinative of the question, but as showing a possible interpretation, which avoids the difficulties of the millenarian theory. We confess that to us the chapter contains what we can not satisfactorily explain; we, however, would much rather say we do not know what the chapter teaches, than accept the interpretation to which we here object. Assuming, therefore, that the Old Testament prophecies and the New Testament aims refer to man's probationary life, and are to be realized previous to the second advent of Christ, to the resurrection and other eschatological events, we next inquire, what conditions will satisfy the expectations these Scriptures awaken?

1. If all nations of the earth, all communities families, enjoyed educational and religious advantages equal to what are now enjoyed by the most advanced Christian communities, many, most of these prophecies would be fulfilled in a sense quite satisfactory to a reasonable exegesis. Of course, some latitude of interpretation must be allowed; for, if we take our Lord's Prayer in its most literal and highest sense, and expect that literally God's will will be done on earth as it is done in heaven, our conception will change earth to heaven, will terminate probation and introduce on earth the eternal state of the saints; our supplication would be, not a prayer for the success of the Gospel and for the salvation of sinners, but a prayer for the end of the world and the coming of the resurrection and eternal judgment. The lying down together of the lion and the lamb, of the leopard and the kid, can have no application to the heavenly state, and in the earthly must be figurative, or those animals must undergo a change of nature both as to species and genera. The cessation of wars, the knowledge of the Lord filling the earth, every man under his own vine and fig-tree, are descriptions of man's earthly estate, of his earthly estate under the conditions of the present dispensation, varied from the present only that these conditions have been improved toward, or have attained unto, perfection. To our thought, the prophecies above rehearsed, and the nature and evident intent of the Gospel, warrant the expectation that the time will come when a Christian Church and a seminary of learning will be within convenient distance of every family on the whole face of the earth; a Church in which the pure word of God shall be faithfully preached, the ordinances regularly administered, and all requisites of a life of Godliness fully enjoyed; a school in which all the sciences and arts needful for a correct interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, and for the acquisition of such other useful knowledge as a perfect Christian civilization requires, shall be efficiently taught, and to which all classes of the people shall have free access.

2. As yet, a judgment of charity, formed in view of obvious facts, would affirm that, even in the most advanced Christian community, the number of those who entirely neglect their religious opportunities is greater than the number of those who live fully up to their religious privileges; and if those who are neither perfect Christians nor total neglecters of religion were divided into two classes, one of which was composed of those who attend to the

minor matters of religion but neglect the weightier, and the other of those who attend to essentials and neglect the less important, the former class would be much more numerous than the latter. When the will of God is done on earth as it is in heaven, it is both reasonable and Scriptural to expect that this condition of things will be reversed, and the Church, as a whole, will stand on a much higher plane of Christian attainments; a more perfect knowledge of God, a more charitable and brotherly regard for man, a more profound consecration to duty, less of selfishness and worldly mindedness, a more genuine piety, and a more perfect morality will obtain among the masses of the people.

3. Nations and tribes and people now anti-christian shall, as nations, tribes, and people, become Christian. This expectation is warranted by the assurance that when the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains, all nations shall flow unto it; all the nations that dwell on the face of the whole earth shall come and worship before the Lord; kings shall be nursing fathers, and queens nursing mothers. Though Church and State are separate organizations, of different natures, and organized for different purposes, yet the necessarily intimate relation subsisting between the two renders it impossible that either can, for any appreciable period of time, enjoy a high prosperity while the two are antagonistic. This involves the idea that anti-christian systems of religion shall disappear. Paganism, Mohammedanism, Buddhism, shall be among the things that were; none shall have occasion to say to his brother, Know ye the Lord? for all shall know him, from the least unto the greatest; the knowledge of the Lord shall fill the earth as the waters fill the sea; many people shall go and say, Come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob, and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths.

4. The Jews shall, in some sense national, be converted to Christianity. This is involved in what is just now said above; but the special relation of the Jewish people to the true religion, and their history as the people of the Lord, make it appropriate that their probable future be made a subject of special consideration.

That a remarkable history is in reserve for this people may be rationally inferred from the wonderful fact of their preservation as a people during these eighteen centuries of their dispersion. They have had no local habitation, no country, no civil government, no army, no navy—nothing belonging to the whole people. They have their synagogues, but these are without federal connection, so that it may be said, they have no ecclesiastical polity, no national Church organization. They have nothing in common but birthright in Abraham and faith in Moses as the prophet of God. They have even ceased, as a people, to indulge the expectation of a coming Messiah. They are mere theists, with a shadow of religious worship. In these conditions they have been scattered among all the peoples of the earth; have lost the use and knowledge of their own language; speak the languages of the nations among whom they dwell, and become assimilated with them in business and political relations; and yet, in these conditions, they have been preserved a distinct people; for nearly two thousand years they have mingled with all the nations of the earth, and yet have been kept separate from those nations—a history utterly impossible without a miraculous interposition of Divine Providence. The hand of God is evidently in this thing, and it must have a purpose. This same thing is distinctly affirmed in the eleventh chapter of Romans. The first affirmation in the chapter is, that, to the individual Jew, salvation is as possible, and is on the same terms, as to any other person. God has not cast away his people, in the sense that they are all individually reprobated to eternal death. The second affirmation is, that, as a people, they are cast off from their former relation to God; that is, the middle wall of partition is broken down, so that the Gentiles now

have, as to Church relations, the same privileges, opportunities, and advantages that the Jews have. The third affirmation is, that though the Jews have been, in a sense, cast away, they shall hereafter, in some sense, be restored.

Hath God cast away his people so that all are eternally lost? By no means; for I, and many, other Christian believers, all having good hope of eternal life, are of the seed of Abraham. What, then, is the true state of the case? Israel, as a people, hath not obtained that which he seeketh for; but the election, the believer in Christ hath obtained it; and the rest, the rejecters of Christ, are blinded. God hath given them the spirit of slumber; eyes, that they should not see; a judicial blindness, as a judgment for the sin of rejecting their Messiah, hath been sent upon them. But is this for their utter and hopeless ruin as a people? By no means; but rather, through their fall, salvation has come unto the Gentiles. Now, if the fall of them be the riches of the world, and the diminishing of them the riches of the Gentiles, *how much more their fullness*. For if the casting away of them be the reconciling of the world, what shall the receiving of them be but life from the dead? I would not, brethren, that ye be ignorant of this mystery; that blindness in part is happened to Israel until the fullness of the Gentiles be come in, *and so all Israel shall be saved*. Plainly a restoration, a salvation of some kind, is in reserve for God's ancient people; and we infer from the fact that the "fullness," the "receiving," the salvation of all Israel, is, in this chapter, put in antithesis with their "casting away," their "blindness," their rejection, their "fall," which is evidently a national casting away; we infer, I say, that their receiving their fullness, their salvation, is to be national.

The only reasonable anticipation which these teachings warrant is, that it shall hereafter come to pass that a large majority of the children of Israel, living at the time, shall be believers in the Lord Jesus Christ. This does not imply that all Jews will be even nominal Christians, much, less that all will be children of God and heirs of eternal life, any more than their national rejection implied that all were thereby doomed to eternal death. The idea that the Jews, as a nation, are to return literally to Jerusalem and the Holy Land, either before or after their conversion to Christianity, is objectionable for many reasons, chiefly because the interpretation of Scripture, which would prove that they are so to return, would also prove the restoration of the Jewish religion, the worship of the temple with its sacrifices, priesthood, and entire ritual; in a word, if there be good reason found in Scripture for affirming the literal restoration of the Jewish people to the land of Palestine, the same reason would warrant the affirmation that Christianity is to be supplanted and that Judaism is to take its place. Again, the spirit and intent of the Gospel dispensation allow of no peerage in the Church of God; all are one—Jews, Gentiles, Barbarians, Scythians—"one is your master, even Christ, and all ye are brethren." Of course, there is no evidence to support an affirmation that the descendants of Abraham shall never gain possession of the land of Canaan; it may even be considered probable that they will; we only affirm that the argument for a confident belief in their return proves too much. On the supposition that they are to be, with other Christian nations, on any equal footing, and that their religion, when restored, shall be Christian in every sense in which the religion of other nations is Christian, no valid objection lies against the expectation of their return to the Holy Land. For what providential distinction they have, during these centuries, been so marvelously preserved, it were presumption to designate specifically. The purposes of God in this respect are not apparent, either in revelation or in the nature of the case, beyond the above affirmation, that as a people they shall be delivered from their present blindness, and be brought to see and accept the evidences of Christ's messiahship. Their conversion to Christianity is also spoken of as a

great and special blessing to the world. "If the fall of them be the riches of the world, and the diminishing of them the riches of the Gentiles, how much more their fullness?" Again, salvation is of the Jews; to them were committed the oracles of God; they were, in ancient times, channels of God's mercy to mankind; the Gospel was first preached to them; had they accepted it, they would have retained their office and honor as the world's missionaries, It is thought by some that this is the forfeited inheritance to which they shall be restored, and this thought is encouraged by the evident fact that were they as a people to be converted, they, as no other people can, might preach the Gospel to every creature. They are now in all the world, speak all languages, have knowledge of all customs, habits, prejudices, and are every way, if believing Christians, qualified for a Gospel ministration that would take the world in a single generation.

5. The Christian Church will, in some sense, be one. The above is equivalent to an affirmation that the Christian religion shall become universal—a religion prevailing over the whole surface of the globe—and in this view the question naturally arises, Will the Christian Church itself be one? Will all sects disappear? Will all unite in one organization? Will all believers profess one and the same faith? We answer, The Church will be one in some sense. This is inferable from our Lord's prayer, "that they all may be one, as thou, Father, art in me and I in thee, that they also may be one in us; that they may be one even as we are one, I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one." The union most manifestly intended in this prayer is in the spirit which the believer possesses. In another place our Lord said, "If a man love me he will keep my words, and the Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him." The abiding presence of the Holy Trinity in the hearts of the children of God is that which constitutes the oneness of God's people. But this must have an exponent; it must, in some way, manifest itself; and this manifestation, we understand from our Lord's prayer, is the world's demonstration of the divinity of Christ's mission; that they all may be one, as thou, Father, art in me and I in thee, that may also may be one in us, *that the world may believe that thou hast sent me*. I in them and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one, and that the world may know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them as thou hast loved me." In any age of the world, or in any part of it, among any people, in any condition of life, wherever and whenever a child of God manifests the spirit that is in him, unbelievers are convinced and believers are attracted. When the children of God recognize each other by the manifested spirit of the household, they are instantly one in the goodly fellowship of the saints. The bar to fellowship is want of opportunities for recognition. Denominational associations restrict intercourse within their own circles, and Christians of different sects fail to recognize each other for want of acquaintance. It is therefore only needful that those division walls which prevent personal intercourse, should be taken down, to secure the oneness in the Church for which our Savior prayed. It is not needful that all should be so well informed as to see the whole truth as it is, and thus come to be of one opinion on all subjects. Christian fellowship can subsist among people of different opinions. Beyond all question, the increase of knowledge and the lapse of time will bring Christians nearer together than they have ever yet been; and if the common interpretation given to the prophecy that in that day "the watchmen shall see eye to eye" be the true interpretation, then will the Church be one in more senses than we now anticipate.

6. Will all the inhabitants of the earth be true Christians in the time of the millennium? We think not; for to suppose they will be is to suppose that probation has ceased, and that men on earth have attained to the condition of their heavenly state. To affirm the certain salvation of a class requires the assumption of an agency which will secure results; such an assumption is the contrary of contingency. If the salvation of all living at

any given time be certainly secured, their salvation is not a contingency; they are not probationers. The true millennium is Gospel success; the Gospel is preached unto moral agents, capable of accepting or rejecting. That the many will accept and but a few reject, is a supposition consistent with the supposition of a true moral agency; but to affirm positively that all will accept, is, in itself, an incongruity. It is, to be sure, a possibility, and may be a fact; if so, however, it can be known to none but the Omniscient One, and to him to whom it may be revealed; we have no such revelation, and, therefore, can not affirm the fact. On the contrary, in what is said about the wise and foolish virgins, one company with, and the other without, oil for their lamps; what is said about two women grinding at the mill, the one taken and the other left, and especially what is said about the evil servant who shall say in his heart, "My Lord delayeth his coming," we have more than intimations that, at the coming of the Son of man to judge the world, he will find some want of faith. We do not accede to the idea that the judgment-day will find the world in its worst condition, but reason and Scripture warrant the fear that some will be found not watching and unprepared.

By what means are we to expect that the millennium will be ushered in?

We have assumed that the present is the last time; the last dispensation of grace and probation provided for men; that Christ's coming is at the end of the world; that the resurrection of the dead, both of the just and the unjust, will be at the coming of Christ, the resurrection of the unjust in immediate succession after that of the just. This assumption is equivalent to an affirmation that the means of Gospel success are the same as those now in operation, and that have been in operation from the beginning, changed only in that they shall be greatly increased in number and efficiency.

The opposite doctrine is apparently sustained by the fact that, in connection with many of the prophecies which affirm the triumphant success of the Gospel, there are passages which speak of the destruction of enemies by power and by judgments. For example, the passage in the second Psalm is of this kind: "Ask of me and I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession; thou shalt break them with a rod of iron; thou shalt dash them in pieces like a potter's vessel." But a moment's reflection will show that this is what is now and hath been from the beginning. God's judgments are abroad in the earth, and his enemies that will not be converted must be destroyed. The Lord reigneth and will reign, and none can hinder or successfully oppose. Civil governments, domestic, social, and religious institutions, all organizations have their influence upon individual character, and thus affect eternal destinies; all favor or oppose the divine administration, and, therefore, must be under divine control. The punishment of national, domestic, and social sins can in justice be inflicted only upon the organizations, as such, which are guilty of those sins; and such punishments must, therefore, be inflicted in this life. The sin of American slavery was punished, and the institution itself removed out of the way of Gospel progress, by the terrible calamities of a most grievous civil war.

Did the spirit of consecration to the work of spreading the Gospel, that is now abroad among the Churches, possess the whole Church that now is, the anticipation of a speedy spread of Gospel truth through the whole earth would not be unrealizable. Is it said, two thousand years have produced but partial progress? We reply, facilities have recently come into being unknown before, which, prudently employed, must produce results heretofore wholly unknown, and the success of missions within the last fifty years fully evinces that this is a reasonable anticipation. The railroads, steamships, printing-presses, telegraphic wires, scientific and literary discoveries of the present times, in the hands of a consecrated Church, fully imbued with the spirit of the

Master's commission to preach the Gospel to every creature, certainly would promise results, with which nothing in the past would be worthy to be compared.

To our thought, then, the idea of a millennium is the idea of complete success, as to the Church as now constituted, and as to the enterprises of the Church now in operation. When that time has fully come, there will be but one religion, and that the Christian religion, upon the whole surface of the globe; all will have adequate educational and religious privileges; the mass of mankind will have attained to an advanced Christian culture, and will maintain a commendable moral character; the pious will be more eminently pious than were their ancestors; universal peace and general prosperity will prevail over all the earth; but some will refuse to obey, will persist in rebellion, and men who are the enemies of God and holiness will be found on earth when the Lord comes to raise the dead and judge the world.

APOSTASY AND ANTICHRIST.

From the twentieth chapter in Revelation, it has also been inferred that, at the end of the millennium, there shall be a great apostasy; that Satan, being loosed from his thousand years' imprisonment, shall go forth among men, causing great rebellion, and that a great battle, the battle of Gog and Magog, shall be fought.

The substance of all this is, that after a season of great religious prosperity, the world shall become more wicked than ever before, and in this state of things, the Son of man will appear; all of which we believe is untrue. This passage in Revelation can not be accepted as literal; it is of doubtful interpretation, and therefore, standing alone as it does, in can not be authority for a theory. Excepting it, there is no intimation of any such state of things. The word of our Lord, affirming that it shall be in the coming of the Son of man as it was in the days of Noah, is simply an illustration or repetition of the statement that the day and the hour of the coming of the Son of man was unknown—"of that day and hour knoweth no man; not the angels, but my Father only; but as the days of Noah were, so shall also the coming of the Son of man be." That is to say, men shall be employed as usual—eating, drinking, marrying—having no expectation of the occurrence of any unusual event. The same thing is elsewhere affirmed, that the day shall come unanticipated as comes a thief in the night. But it is alleged that, in several places, it is affirmed, that "in the last days perilous times shall come;" that "that day shall not come except there be first a falling away, and the man of sin, the son of perdition appear, and antichrist come;" all of which has been fulfilled, I may say, a hundred times in this last dispensation. Nothing in all this teaches such an apostasy as is claimed, nor does any thing herein affirm that the falling away, the coming of antichrist, is to take place especially in the end of millennium. These things belong, to be sure, to the last days; but the term "last days" is a common New Testament term for the Gospel dispensation. "Little children, it is the last time, and as ye have heard that antichrist shall come, even now there are many antichrists, whereby we know that it is the last time." We see no reason for any other expectation than that the Church, as now marshaled under the Captain of her salvation, shall go on from conquering to conquer till she has conquered the world, and then, under the most favorable conditions, shall advance from glory to glory as by the spirit of God, and having attained unto the completeness of her possibilities, shall, without spot or wrinkle or any such thing, herself a redeemed and saved world, be presented unto God. In the height of her glory, the Lord Jesus Christ "shall come to be glorified in his saints, and to be admired in all them that believe."

Who or what is antichrist? St. John says, "He is antichrist that

denieth the Father and the Son; and every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God; and this is that spirit of antichrist whereof ye have heard that it should come, and even now already is it in the world." This antichrist, man of sin, son of perdition, when revealed, "the Lord shall consume with the spirit of his mouth, and shall destroy with the brightness of his coming." Not necessarily his coming at the last day, but his coming. Antichrist, whoever or whatever he or it may be, is counteracted, opposed, overcome, destroyed by "the spirit of the Lord's mouth, and the brightness of his coming;" by divine interpositions to that end whenever and wherever the revelation of "that wicked" renders such interposition needful for the cause of truth and for the triumphs of the Gospel.

There have been numerous and diverse opinions as to what this term antichrist means. According to its etymological composition, and according to St. John's testimony, we should naturally say any doctrine, system of doctrines; any policy, power, person or persons; any association or combination, ecclesiastical or civil, which opposes Christ, is antichrist. Whenever the spirit of antichrist is personified and spoken of as either "the little horn" of Daniel's vision, or St. Paul's "man of sin," son of perdition," or St. John's antichrist or his apocalyptic beast, doubtless some actually existing person or institution is in each case intended; some powerful opponent of the Christian faith, of the Church, or some bitter enemy of Christians is in the mind of the writer. That all refer to the same is more than improbable; it is quite certain they do not. To what or whom each does refer, as we see it now, it is impossible to tell. Protestants are sure, some of them, that "the man of sin" is papacy. Romanists think not, but see him in Protestantism, in rationalism, in whatever opposes Popery. It is plain that, subsequent to the times of the apostles, a great and powerful apostasy was to take place. The Church was to encounter well-nigh unconquerable opposition; a persecution bitter and persistent, which she was in her own strength incompetent to resist; her survival, and the discomfiture of her foes was dependent entirely upon the interposition of divine providence. But it was in the purpose of God that the gates of hell should not prevail against her. These things so distinctly foretold have certainly had adequate fulfillment. We are not left in this year of grace to think of these things as matters of future history. New Testament prophecies do not lead us to believe that the world is to be hereafter more wicked than it is now, or than it ever has been. Certainly, the time when "Gog and Magog, the number of whom is as the sand of the sea, shall compass the camp of the saints about, and the beloved city," is not in the culmination of millennial glory; it is not in the winding up of earth's history; it is not immediately antecedent to the coming of Christ and the end of the world.

CHAPTER V.

SECOND ADVENT.

IN Scripture usage any remarkable manifestation of divine presence and power, either in mercy or in judgment, is called a divine "coming." The Spirit's manifestation in Christian experience is called a coming of the Holy Trinity. The destruction of Jerusalem and the event of death are called coming of the Son of man. But the Church has in all ages interpreted certain prophecies as teaching that the bodily presence of Christ would once more appear on earth.

"And when he had spoken these things, while they beheld, he was taken up, and a cloud received him out of their sight; and while they looked steadfastly toward heaven as he went up, behold two men stood by them in white apparel, which also said, Ye men of Galilee, why stand ye gazing up into

heaven? This same Jesus which is taken from you into heaven shall so come in like manner as ye have seen him go into heaven. As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive, but every man in his own order, Christ the first fruits, afterward they that are Christ's at his coming; then cometh the end. Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many, and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time without sin unto salvation. Whosoever, therefore, shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him also shall the Son of man be ashamed when he cometh in the glory of his Father with the holy angels; and then shall they see the Son of man coming in the clouds with great power and glory. For our conversation is in heaven, from whence also we look for the Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ. Looking for that blessed hope and the glorious appearing of the great God and our, Savior Jesus Christ. When Christ, who is our life, shall appear, then shall ye also appear with him in glory. We which are alive, and remain unto the coming of the Lord, shall be caught up in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air, and so shall we ever be with the Lord. There is laid up for me a crown of righteousness which the Lord the righteous judge shall give me at that day, and not to me only, but unto all them also that love his appearing. But of that day and hour knoweth no man, no not the angels in heaven, but my Father only. The day of the Lord so cometh as a thief in the night; as the lightning cometh out of the east and shineth even unto the west, so shall also the coming of the Son of man be."

These passages abundantly show that as was the first coming, so also shall the second coming be; as was the ascension, so also shall the return, or second advent, be; that is, it is a coming of his bodily presence. Every eye shall see him; as the lightning cometh out of the east and shineth even unto the west is what everyone must see, so also shall the coming of the Son of man be. It is at the end, when all that die in Adam shall in Christ be raised from the dead; when his people shall appear with him in glory; when they shall be caught up to meet him, and so shall be ever with him; when the righteous judge shall give a crown of righteousness to all that love his appearing. If, in any sense, Christ comes at the beginning of the true millennium, before the close of probation and the end of time, the coming spoken of in the above passages is not that coming. The coming of our Lord Jesus Christ which the apostles looked for, and which they held as a blessed hope, which the two men in white apparel told the men of Galilee they should see, is a coming down from heaven in bodily presence such as he ascended up into heaven, and is to take place in the regeneration or consummation of all things at the end of the world, when time shall be no longer, when the dead are raised, when the judgment is set, and when eternal retribution begins.

OBJECTION.

It is alleged that, if anywhere in the New Testament such an advent is spoken of, it is in the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth chapters of Matthew. But it is there said, that the generation then living should not pass till all the things therein spoken of were fulfilled; therefore the coming of Christ is not a literal coming, but a manifestation in some other form.

We reply, Nothing is more manifestly true than that, in the conversation our Lord had with his disciples, recorded in these two chapters, he spoke of his coming at the end of the world for the final judgment of mankind, and that in the twenty-fifth chapter this is the sole topic. But the whole conversation is a reply to a three-fold question proposed on the occasion of our Savior's announcement that, of the buildings of the temple, there should not be left one stone upon another that should not be thrown down. Tell us, said the disciples, when shall these things be, and what shall be the sign of thy coming, and of the end of the world? In the minds of the inquirers, the three events were to be contemporary—the destruction of Jerusalem, the coming of Christ, and the end of the world. In our Savior's reply, as recorded in

the twenty-fourth chapter, it is difficult to maintain a distinction in what is said; some things apply to the one not applicable to the others, at least not obviously so, and vice versa. But distinctions are apparent. The day and hour of the end of the world was unknown; the destruction of Jerusalem was to be in the life-time of that generation; the end of the world was to come without harbingers, suddenly, unexpected; the destruction of Jerusalem was to be preceded with signs by which it might be known that it was near, even at the door; the one event was, even to the righteous, severely afflictive and perilous, a season of sorrow; the other was to them an event to be waited for hopefully, and met joyfully, a season of release and triumph. These distinctions must have been understood by the disciples, so that when our Savior said, "this generation shall not pass till all these things be fulfilled," they must have understood what things, and we may therefore assume, knowing as we do that the affirmation was literally true only of those things spoken of Jerusalem, that by "these things" the Savior meant what he had foretold respecting the doomed city.

This difficult passage is sometimes explained by supposing that the destruction of Jerusalem was symbolic of the end of the world, and that therefore the fulfillment of what is said of one was symbolically a fulfillment of what is said of the other. But the interpretation of Scripture by the method of a double sense is to be avoided wherever possible. Again, the term "this generation," in this passage, has been understood to mean the Jewish people, and the whole passage an affirmation that the Jewish nation should not become extinct till the end of the world; but such an interpretation is not congruous with the context, and does not squarely meet the difficulty, but dodges it.

Did the apostles expect the coming of Christ and the end of the world in their day? I have no doubt they entertained an impression to that effect, but they never affirmed any period or time for the occurrence of those events; contrariwise, they repeated the Lord's declaration that the day and the hour was not known. But since the judgment and the end of all things is as near to every man, practically, as is the day of his death, they constantly exhorted men to watch and pray and live with a constant reference to those events, as though they were near at hand, and even at the door.

CHAPTER VI.

DAY OF JUDGMENT.

"BECAUSE he hath appointed a day in the which he will judge the world in righteousness by that man he hath ordained; whereof he hath given assurance unto all men in that he hath raised him from the dead. The Lord knoweth how to deliver the godly out of temptation, and to reserve the unjust unto the day of judgment to be punished. For the Son of man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his angels, and then he shall reward every man according to his works. When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory, and before him shall be gathered all nations, and he shall separate them from another as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats; and shall set the sheep on his right and the goats on the left; then shall the King say unto them on his right hand, Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world; then shall he say also unto them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels. And I saw the dead, small and great, stand before God, and the books were opened, and another book was opened, which is the book of life; and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the books, according to their works. I say unto you, that every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give account thereof in the day of judgment. It shall be

more tolerable for the land of Sodom in the day of judgment than for thee. We must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ. In the time of harvest I will say to the reapers, Gather ye together first the tares, and bind them in bundles to burn them, but gather the wheat into my barn; the harvest is the end of the world, and the reapers are the angels; so shall it be at the end of the world; the angels shall come forth and sever the wicked from among the just. The Lord Jesus Christ shall judge the quick and the dead at his appearing and his kingdom."

From the stand-point of thought in which these passages, and very many others of similar import, place us, there is apparent but one single view.

1. God maintains a moral government over mankind; he holds every man strictly accountable for his character and conduct; he will at some time, in some way, call all men to an account he will reward virtue and punish vice.

2. The Lord Jesus Christ is appointed and ordained to be the judge of men; he will enter ostensibly upon the discharge of the functions of his office at the time of his second coming; he will be accompanied with, and assisted by, the holy angels; the whole human family will be under adjudication; the account rendered by each one and by all, and the sentence of reward or punishment awarded, will take place on an appointed day—not necessarily twenty-four hours, but a definite period of time; the judgment will have a commencement, a continuance, and a conclusion. It being passed, the Son will render up his mediatorial kingdom unto the Father; God shall become all in all; eternal retribution, or the retribution of the eternal world, will constitute the balance of human history. The judgment shall be in manifest righteousness, so that every knee shall bow and every tongue confess; heaven, earth, and hell shall join to say, He doeth all things well.

To all this no objection is made, except to the idea of a definite day, Chief among the objections is the question, "*Cui bono?*" If the righteous dead are with Christ during the long interval between their death and the resurrection, if the wicked are in torment, as is affirmed of the rich man; in a word, if the retribution of each individual commences immediately successive to his death, for what purpose is this judgment-day? Perhaps no man can tell; it is not revealed; the present writer can not suggest a purpose fully satisfactory to himself. Perhaps it may be for the purpose of a full and complete publication and revelation to each one, and to all the subjects of the divine government, of the mercy and justice exercised in the divine administration of human affairs. We are persuaded that all intelligences of the universe, having knowledge of the history of the human race and interest in it, will some day see and know that the Lord doeth all things well. All believers in God believe that he reigns, and that, though clouds and darkness are round about him, righteousness and judgment are the habitation of his throne. But this is faith founded on confidence in the divine character; the day will come when all shall know this, when there shall be such a revelation of God's ways with men as shall, on adequate grounds clearly apprehended, fully justify those ways. What he does we know not now, but shall know hereafter, and because of that knowledge every knee shall bow, and every tongue confess. The judgment-day, then, may be a day of proclamation, of publication, a day when the glory of the divine administration shall shine forth. Such a drama, as is human history, must have a closing scene, and where such vast interests are involved, it is certainly appropriate that the issues should be manifest.

But all this is not saying anything; it may be even vain speculation. The Bible teaches that there shall be a day of judgment, and we accept it, though we can not explain it; we neither propose to ourselves an exhaustive conception of the scene, with the minutiae of its transactions, nor attempt to

remove the difficulties which the conceptions of others present. All speculations as to the impossibility of gathering in one place, within sight and hearing of the judge, so vast an assembly are vain. All theories adopted to avoid these difficulties, such as that the judgment is in progress and has been since the first coming of Christ, and such as that the judgment will occupy a thousand years, are failures; they manufacture more difficulties than they dissipate; they are not satisfactory interpretations of the Bible testimonies on the subject.

It is true that the word judgment is frequently used in Scripture for the divine administration in rewarding virtue and punishing vice, and any marked instance of such judgment may be called a time or day of judgment. But to affirm that, in all instances where the Bible speaks of judgment, it does nothing more than to refer to the fact that God governs the world, is to make an unwarranted affirmation; leaves the fact that there are frequent references to "the day," to "that day," to the appointment of "a day," to the throne set, the King coming, the nations gathered and separated, wholly unaccounted for.

CHAPTER VII.

END OF THE WORLD.

The question, What shall become of this globe after the earthly history of the human race shall have closed, is, in theology, a question of no special importance. The Bible informs us that the earth was once without form and void; scientists suppose it was once nebulous vapor; geologists affirm that since its consolidation it has undergone great changes; reasoning from analogy, or inferring the future from the past, we should naturally conclude that its present constitution would not continue forever. The Scriptures affirm a change so great as that the present becomes the old, and that which is to be, the new, a new heavens and a new earth; a change so great that it is called "the end of the world." Though these Scriptures speak of both the heavens and the earth as passing away, they may be interpreted as referring to the heavens only so far as they relate to the earth. The phenomena they represent, as occurring at the end of the world, they speak of as they would appear to an inhabitant of the earth; to whom the starry heavens themselves would appear to be rushing in confused masses to ruin and utter destruction.

It is not competent to interpret all of the Scripture references to the end of the world as figurative expressions, though some of them may possibly be interpreted as rhetorically indicating great revolutions in Church and State. St. Peter, for example, describes the end of the world as a destruction by fire, and places it in distinct antithesis with its former destruction by water, so that since the one was a literal destruction by literal water, the other must be a literal destruction by literal fire, or his words are misleading. "There shall come in the last days scoffers, saying, Where is the promise of his coming? for since the fathers fell asleep all things continue as they were from the beginning of creation. For this they willingly are ignorant of, that by the word of God the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water and in the water, whereby the world that then was, being overflowed with water, perished; but the heavens and the earth which are now, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men. The day of the Lord will come, in which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth and the works that are therein shall be burned up. Seeing, then, that all these things shall be dissolved, what manner of persons ought ye to be in all holy conversation and godliness, looking for and hasting unto the coming of the day of God wherein the heavens being on fire shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat? Nevertheless, we, according to his promise, look for new

heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness. Thou Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the works of thy hands. They shall perish, but thou remainest; and they all shall wax old as a garment, and as a stature shalt thou fold them up, and they shall be changed; but thou art the same, and thy years shall not fail. And the angel which I saw stand upon the sea and upon the earth, lifted up his hand to heaven, and sware by him that liveth forever and ever, who created heaven and the things that therein are, and the earth, and the things that therein are, and the sea, and the things which are therein, that there should be time no longer. Behold I create new heavens and a new earth, and the former shall not be remembered nor come into mind. Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away. I saw a great white throne and him that sat on it, from whose face the earth and the heaven fled away, and there was found no place for them. I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the first heaven and the first earth were passed away and there was no more sea.

These representations warrant a conception of what, though not annihilation, is equivalent to it. The earth and the works that are therein are to be burned up; the present constitution of things is to terminate; anew earth is to be created. The fact that it is called a new *earth*, implies some relation to the present earth, and warrants a conception of a reconstruction of the materials of which the present earth is composed. There is no good reason for supposing that any thing God has ever created will ever be totally annihilated, but things come to an end. Burn up a tree, and the tree, as such, has ceased to be, though all its elementary substances are still existent in the form of ashes and gases.

Will the new earth, or the renewed earth, be the home, the heaven, of the saints in the future world? May this world be thought of as man's eternal abode? We think not, because the Savior said, "Father, I will that those thou hast given me be with me where I am. In my Father's house are many mansions; I go to prepare a place for you. I will come again and receive you unto myself, that where I am, there ye may be also." St. Paul says, "We know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. About fourteen years ago, whether in the body or out of the body I know not, I was caught up to the third heavens." All Scripture references to heaven express or imply that it is away from earth, when Jesus went away to prepare a place for his people, he went in a cloud, up out of sight, into heaven. I take it that where the body of Jesus now is, is the saints' eternal home.

CHAPTER VIII.

HEAVEN AND HELL.

THE system of religious truth taught in the Bible is one; all the parts interpenetrate; each separate doctrine implies all the others. Bible eschatology culminates in the doctrine of future retribution.

We have above adduced reasons for believing that the doctrine of the soul's immortality is an intuition, confirmed and illustrated by all the knowledge man has on the subject, and that it is logically inferable from man's natural desire for continued existence, and from the inequalities of providential blessings enjoyed in this life. We have also shown adequate grounds for the hope that there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and of the unjust; that all that are in their graves shall come forth, those that have done good unto a resurrection of life, and those that have done evil unto a resurrection of shame and everlasting contempt.

The eschatology of these pages teaches that each individual man at death

enters upon a conscious state of being, corresponding with his moral and religious character at death—the righteous are happy, and the wicked miserable; not in the full measure of future retribution, and yet not in a condition of trial or probation, or a condition of uncertainty and doubt.

We have further endeavored to show that the Gospel dispensation of grace and mercy is the last proposed in the divine plan of human redemption; we are living in the last times; the end of the present is the end of the world; also, that the Church of God is destined to a continued advancement toward completeness, toward perfection, and that in the termination of the world's history, the Gospel of the kingdom shall be universally triumphant; that is, the mass of mankind shall be Christian believers and children of God, the few remaining obstinate and rebellious.

The Bible theory of eschatology, as we see it, further teaches that in the consummation of all earthly things, the earth, and the works that are therein, shall be burnt, the Son of God shall come again in person with all the holy angels, to judge the world; he shall sit upon the throne of his glory; the whole human family—the dead having come forth from their graves and the living having been changed—shall be gathered before him to be judged according to their deeds done in the body. Then shall he separate them, the righteous from the wicked; and the wicked shall go thence into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal. Thus all implies, postulates, terminates in, and is consummated by, eternal retribution; without this, all is enigma, the whole is an inexplicable series of, to us, unmeaning events. A capacity for, and an invitation to an endless progressive existence, without its reality; redemption from an infinite evil on the supposition that the peril of such an evil is impossible; the purchase of an infinite good on the supposition that such a good is never realized, are unthinkable things. The creation, preservation, and redemption of a candidate for eternal destiny is not supposable if the actuality of such a destiny is never realized. The doctrine of heaven and hell interpenetrates, underlies the whole theory of human existence. The one implies the other; if there is a heaven, there is also a hell; if one is a condition of happiness, the other is a condition of misery; if heaven is a place, so is hell; and no reason is apparent why we may not continue the antithesis and say, if heaven is eternal, so also is hell; if the happiness of the saved is endless, so also is the misery of the lost endless.

Soteriology postulates peril; we therefore conceived it needful to discuss this peril under the head of soteriology. We have there, at least, indicated an outline of argument on this subject, to which the reader is referred. Let it suffice in this place to say, admitting that any condition of being which infinite goodness will permit is better than non-existence; yet the Scriptures, and rational thought as well, teach that the peril of sin is infinite; sin is itself an infinite evil; it causes the loss of an infinite good, to say the least that the nature of the case permits to be said. Whether that peril will be actually incurred by any creature of God is a matter of future history, a question of fact which can not be answered determinately by any being but God, the Omniscient One, who only sees the end from the beginning. If the Bible says distinctly that such is the fact, the question is answered; if it does not distinctly affirm the fact of endless misery, then no man can either affirm or deny. The arguments usually adduced for the doctrines of the unconditioned salvation of all men, of the annihilation of the wicked, of future probation, and the final restoration of the lost, are failures. Whether any of these doctrines are true, or all of them are false, no one of them is proved. The question is reduced to the single exegetical question, Does the Bible affirm the fact of endless misery? and the negative of this question is equivalent to the affirmation that man does not know what is the ultimate destiny of those who, on the day of

Judgment, will stand on the left of the judge, and from thence go away into everlasting punishment. This exegetical question, as we see it, is reduced to the single question whether the term "everlasting punishment" in the forty-sixth verse of the twenty-fifth chapter of Matthew may or may not be rendered "the punishment of the eternal world." If it may, then God has not revealed his purpose as to the ultimate destiny of the wicked; if it may not be so rendered, then it must be construed as the equivalent of "endless misery," and the common doctrine of an eternal hell, is the doctrine of the Bible.

The idea of endless torment is, beyond question, the most terrible idea ever conceived. It is the great burden of religious thought. It is not strange that generous minds have endeavored to avoid it. It is not *prima facie* evidence of the love of sin, or of enmity to truth, that men seek grounds for belief that it will never become a fact of history. But on the other hand, it is evidently vain for human philosophy to attempt decisive proof on the negative of this question; no man can affirm that endless torment will not be; it is not absurd or self-contradictory to affirm that it will be. Since evil and misery do exist and have existed now thousands of years, and are likely to exist, possibly many thousand years longer, it is not competent for man to fix a limit at which evil must cease; for all that man knows, evil may be eternal; if the Bible says it will be, it will be; if the Bible does not say it will be, then it says nothing about it, and affirmations and denials are both equally nugatory.

"These shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal. The wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life. Who will render to every man according to his deeds; to them, who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, eternal life; but unto them that are contentious and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil; but glory, honor, and peace to every man that worketh good. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be damned. Who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power; when he shall come to be glorified in his saints, and to be admired in all them that believe in that day. Be not deceived, God is not mocked; for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap; for he that soweth to the flesh, shall of the flesh reap corruption, but he that soweth to the spirit, shall of the spirit reap life everlasting."

In all these passages, life and death are placed in distinct antithesis; not continued existence over against non-existence, but a happy state of being over against wretchedness; reward against punishment; the results of virtue over against the results of vice; and this contrast is implied in all the doctrines, promises, threatenings, precepts, commandments, exhortations, entreaties, and persuasions of the Holy Scriptures; it underlies the whole system of religion, the whole economy of human life; and certainly, therefore, it is not without reason that the Church, with very inconsiderable exceptions, have understood these Scriptures as teaching the doctrine of an eternal hell. The wicked suffer the loss of all earthly good: "What shall a man be profited if he gain the whole world and lose himself?" They forfeit the favor of God and are excluded from his presence; "Depart from me, I know you not. Who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power." They must suffer from self-reproach, from the compunctions of conscience, from the dominion of their own unrestrained sinful passions, and from the selfishness and malignity of evil associates. Added to these and other natural consequences of sin, they are sentenced under judicial awards to abnormal and punitive conditions—"depart ye into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels." There are the punishment of loss, and the punishment of pain, the natural consequences of

sin and the penal sanctions of law.

The saints are delivered from all the ills of this present time. "There remaineth, therefore, a rest to the people of God. There the wicked cease from troubling and the weary are at rest; they rest from their labors and their works do follow after them; and God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes, and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain, for the former things are passed away."

The saints shall inherit the favor of God, and shall dwell in his presence. "He that overcometh shall inherit all things, and I will be his God, and he shall be my son. Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, which according to his abundant mercy hath begotten us again unto a lively hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, to an inheritance incorruptible and undefiled, and that fadeth not away, reserved in heaven for you, who are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation, ready to be revealed in the last time. Beloved, now are the the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is. Therefore, are they before the throne of God, and serve him day and night in his temple; and he that sitteth on the throne shall dwell among them."

The saints shall be rewarded with an exceedingly rich reward. "I reckon that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory that shall be revealed in us. Our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory. Thou shalt guide me with thy counsel and afterward receive me to glory. If any man serve me, him will my Father honor. To him that overcometh will I grant to sit with me in my throne, even as I also overcame and am set down with my Father in his throne. And there shall be no night there, and they need no candle, neither light of the sun, for the Lord God giveth them light, and they shall reign forever and ever. Well done, good and faithful servant; thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will make thee ruler over many things, enter thou into the *joy of thy Lord*."

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END OF VOLUME II