JOHN WESLEY ON THE ORIGINS OF EVIL1
by,
Barry A. Bryant
One of the more important questions ever confronted by Christian
theologians has been how to reconcile the idea that God is loving, good, and just with
the presence of evil in the world. The Greek Epicurus summarized the issue well when he
asked, "What is the cause of evil?" In answering this question he concluded:
God. . . either wished to take away evils, and is unable; or He is
able, and is unwilling; or He is neither willing nor able, or He is both willing and able,
which alone is suitable to God, from what source then are evils? or why does He not remove
them?2
Epicurus maintained that the existence of evil is logically
inconsistent, and self-contradictory with the Christian belief that God is good,
all-knowing, and all-powerful.3 That, in brief, is the issue of theodicy, which
literally means "the justice of God."4 The presence of evil in the
world appears to place the Christian doctrine of a just and loving God into a no-win
situation.
Wesley had a long interest in theodicy,5 often asking,
"Whence came evil?"6 Without any semblance of impiety, Wesley sought
to "justify the ways of God to man"7 and ultimately saw theodicy as
an important test of God’s ability "to extract good out of evil."8 What
this essay will attempt to show is how Wesley answered the question, "Whence came
evil and why?" To look at Wesley’s understanding of the origin of evil, the
subject will be divided into two sections. The first section will deal with what I shall
call Wesley’s aesthetic theme. It will consider topics such as the goodness of God,
the goodness of creation, the "chain of being," good and bad angels. The second
section will treat his moral theme, which will show how Wesley accounted for evil, and how
he defined it. This theme will be developed within the context of his reaction to the
neo-Augustinians of his day, the eighteenth-century optimists. How Wesley answered this
question had profound consequences for the remainder of his theology. Finally, I will
suggest what I think is a resulting major implication.
1. The Aesthetic Theme
We will begin looking at Wesley’s theodicy by considering his
aesthetic theme. By this I am referring to Wesley’s appreciation of the beauty,
grandeur, and wonder of creation, both before and after the fall. The pronounced aesthetic
theme in Wesley’s doctrine of creation is perhaps one reason that some have been able
to argue for a connection between Wesley and English Romanticism.9 Wesley’s
was the day in which Locke and Newton reigned supreme as two of the more innovative and
boundary-pushing thinkers of the age. This resulted in a new science that caused others to
look at the world differently. Instead of solving most of the mysteries of creation, for
Wesley this new science only deepened the mysteries of creation by providing answers to
questions, answers that led to even more profound questions.10 As the questions
became more profound, so did Wesley’s appreciation for the wonder of creation.
The Goodness of God. While all of this is true, the aesthetic theme of
creation as an important part of Wesley’s understanding of the origins of evil is not
the starting point. The aesthetic theme must begin with the goodness of God. Wesley began
his search for the origins of evil by applying to God the moral attributes of justice and
goodness,11 while maintaining that God is all-powerful,12 all-knowing,13
and all-wise. A God with such attributes could only create something filled with
goodness. The goodness of God was thus the presupposition behind the aesthetic theme and
the goodness of creation. He came to this conclusion by observing creation and developed
these observations into a natural philosophy. That the wisdom and goodness of God could be
seen in creation was reflected in the title of his natural philosophy, A Survey of the
Wisdom of God in the Creation." or a Compendium of Natural Philosophy (1763).14
The Goodness of Creation. Wesley unequivocally believed in the total
goodness of creation and that the sum of its goodness was greater than the goodness of its
individual parts. He said, for instance: "as every creature was ‘good’ in
its primeval state, so, when all were compacted in on general system, ‘behold, they
were very good.’ "15 In the "very good" creation before the
fall, Wesley was convinced that all was "the most perfect order and harmony," no
"volcanoes or burning mountains," "no putrid lakes, no turbid or stagnating
waters," "no unwholesome vapors, no poisonous exhalations," "no
violent winter or sultry summer, no extreme either of heat or cold."16 All
this left Wesley to exclaim:
Such was the state of the creation, according to the scanty ideas that
we can now form concerning it, when its great Author, surveying the whole system at one
view, pronounced it "very good"! It was good in the highest degree whereof it
was capable, and without any mixture of evil.17
Now the wisdom, as well as the power of God, is abundantly
manifested in his creation, in the formation and arrangement of all his works, in heaven
above and in the earth beneath; and in adapting them all to the several ends for which
they were designed; insomuch that each of them apart from the rest is good, but all
together are very good; all conspiring together in one connected system, to the
glory of God in the happiness of his intelligent creatures.18
Here, the aesthetic theme clearly emerges. Wesley believed creation
before the fall was "very good," the best it could possibly have been. He was
convinced that the goodness of creation was a firm foundation laid on which we may stand
and answer all the cavils of minute philosophers; all the objections which "vain men
who would be wise" make to the goodness or wisdom of God in the creation. All these
are grounded upon an entire mistake, namely, that the world is now in the same state it
was at the beginning. And upon this supposition they plausibly build abundance of
objections. But all these objections fall to the ground when we observe this supposition
cannot be admitted. The world at the beginning was in a totally different state from that
wherein we find it now. Object therefore whatever you please to the present state either
of the animate or inanimate creation, whether in general or with regard to any particular
instances, and the answer is read: these are not now as they were in the beginning. Had
you therefore heard that vain King of Castile crying out with exquisite self-sufficiency,
"If I had made the world I would have made it better than God Almighty has made
it,"19 you might have replied: "No: God Almighty—whether you
know it or not— did not make it as it is now. He himself made it better, unspeakably
better than it is at present. He made it without any blemish, yea, without any defect. He
made no corruption, no destruction in the inanimate creation. He made not death in the
animal creation, neither its harbingers, sin and pain. It was only [. . .] after
man, in utter defiance of his Maker, had eaten of the tree of knowledge, that [. . .] a
whole army of evils, totally new, totally unknown till then, broke in upon rebel man, and
all other creatures, and overspread the face of the earth."20
Wesley’s argument for the "best possible world" was a
proposition that can be known to be true or false without any reference to experience,
something that is inconsistent with his method of deriving knowledge from observation, or
empiricism.21 He reached this conclusion only by imagining what the present
world would have been without evil and sin.
Once he did he was convinced a better world could not have been created
than this world without blemish, defect, corruption, or propensity to destruction. To have
imagined otherwise would have been an affront to "the goodness or the wisdom of God
in the creation." God in divine goodness and wisdom, attributes of divine morality
and omniscience, created from divine omnipotence the best world possible.
This did not prevent Wesley from appreciating nature even as it now has
been marred by the fall. His, Natural Philosophy was a well developed celebration
of God’s power, wisdom, and goodness even in a post-fall creation. He concludes that
natural philosophy as a disciplined observation of even a fallen creation is still capable
of demonstrating to its observers the existence of God,22 not replacing
standing Revelation (i.e., Scriptures), but as support to it, subordinate to the Holy
Spirit. There is implied by this a natural revelation, or a revelation through nature that
can be seen in Wesley’s natural philosophy as a whole, all of which was presupposed
by the aesthetic theme within his search for the origins of evil and the goodness of
creation.
Wesley and the "Chain of Being." The principle concept and
structure beneath Wesley’s doctrine of the utter goodness of creation is what has
been called by some the "chain of being," or the "principle of
plenitude." Wesley described it in this way:
Every part was exactly suited to the others, and conducive to the good
of the whole. There was "a golden chain" (to use the expression of Plato)23
"let down from the throne of God"—an exactly connected series of
beings, from the highest to the lowest: from dead earth, through fossils, vegetables,
animals, to man, created in the image of God, and designed to know, to love, and enjoy his
Creator to all eternity.24
This entire concept was developed at great length in his Natural
Philosophy.25 Wesley began this discussion by acknowledging Locke’s
thoughts on the subject,26 but quickly proceeded to add: "This reflection
upon the scale of beings is pursued at large by one of the finest writers of the
age, Mr. Bonnet of Geneva, in that beautiful work, ‘The Contemplation of
Nature.’ "27 From there he proceeded to extract Bonnet’s work. In the
"chain of being," referred to by Wesley as the "golden chain," all the
parts "are admirably connected together, to make up one universal whole."28
There has never been a time in which such a variety of writers from such a variety of
disciplines talked so much about the chain of being than in the eighteenth century.
Writers such as Joseph Addison, William King, Lord Bolingbroke, Pope, Hailer, Thomson,
Akenside, Count De Buffon,29 Goldsmith, Diderot, Kant, Lambert, Herder, and
Schilier all drew from this theme new or previously evaded consequences.30 It
was within this rich context that Wesley constructed his own understanding of the chain of
being.
One aspect of his understanding was that in the paradise state this
"chain of being" was used to convey the blessings of God as they "flowed
through man to the inferior creatures; as man was the great channel of communication
between the Creator and the whole brute creation; so when man made himself incapable of
transmitting those blessings, that communication was necessarily cut off."31 This
based Wesley’s hierarchical construction of the chain on the role of mediation, not
on function and usefulness. The implication is that, in the Wesleyan model, Adam and Eve
were there to serve creation in a "quasi-sacramental" way—by being a means
of God’s grace.
Another part of his understanding was that while the creation of human
beings may have been the pinnacle of the Genesis creation account, man and woman were only
the "via media," the middle link in the chain of being.32 It must be
noted, however, that in his comments on Psalm 8:5 ("Thou hast made him a
little lower than the angels") in Explanatory Notes on the Old Testament, Wesley
said,
the words more literally rendered are, Thou madest him a little less
than God. And hence some have inferred, that man in his original state was the highest
of all creatures.33
With this possible exception aside, we are still left with the
question, "What is above humanity in the chain of being?"
"Chain of Being" and "Plurality of Habitable
Worlds." Many in the eighteenth century supposed that higher life forms on other
planets were above humanity in the chain. As Lovejoy has shown, in 1764 Bonnet supposed
there could be life on other planets, and on those other planets higher life forms could
be found to fill the gaps in the chain of being between humanity and God, leaving angelic
life forms to fill the gap beyond that.34
Bonnet was not the first to contemplate the plurality of habitable
worlds. The plurality of worlds was a tradition of thought with a history in its own
right, a tradition familiar to Wesley. It was suggested as early as Cicero in On the
Nature of the Gods,35 a work well known by Wesley and quoted no less than
eight times in his sermons alone.36
Additionally, Wesley displayed familiarity with at least three popular
authors on the subject.37 Two make something of an obscure appearance in his A
Survey of the Wisdom of God in Creation—Louis Dutens, Inquiry into the Origin
of the Discoveries Attributed to the Moderns (1769) and Bernard Le Bovier de
Fontenelle, Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds.38 The other,
Christian Huygens (1629-95) and his work, Celestial Worlds Discovered, Or
Conjectures on the Planetary Worlds (English translation, 1689), Wesley quoted in his
sermon, "What is Man" (1787). Wesley first read this work in September 1759 and
remarked:
I read Mr. Hygens’s [sic] Conjectures on the Planetary World. He
surprised me. I think he clearly proves that the moon is not inhabitable; that there are
neither "Rivers nor mountains on her spotty globe";39 that there is
no sea, no water on her surface, nor any atmosphere. And hence he very rationally infers
that "Neither are any of the secondary planets inhabited." And who can prove
that the primary are? I know the earth is. Of the rest I know nothing.40
The important thing is what Wesley made of all this speculation about
the plurality of habitable worlds. In the end, he called it
a very favorite notion with all those who deny the Christian
revelation—and for this reason: because it affords them a foundation for so plausible
an objection to it. But the more I consider that supposition, the more I doubt it.
Insomuch that if it were allowed by all the philosophers in Europe, still I could not
allow it without stronger proof than any I have met with yet [. . .].
"But," you will say, "‘suppose this argument fails, we may infer the
same conclusion, the plurality of worlds, from the unbounded wisdom, and power, and
goodness of the Creator. It was full as easy to him to create thousands or millions of
worlds as one. Can anyone then believe that he would exert all his power and wisdom in
creating a single world? What proportion is there between this speck of creation and the
great God that filleth heaven and earth! While
We know the power of his Almighty hand
could form another world from every sand!"41
To this boasted proof, this argumentum palmarium42 of
the learned infidels, I answer, Do you expect to find any proportion between finite and
infinite? Suppose God had created a thousand more worlds than there are grains of sand in
the universe, what proportion would all these together bear to the infinite Creator?
Still, in comparison of him, they would be, not a thousand times, but infinitely less than
a mite compared to the universe.43
Here, Wesley anticipated an argument for the plurality of worlds
because of the tremendous gap in the gradation between this creation (i.e., the empirical,
observable world) and the "great God that filleth heaven and earth.’"
Wesley’s own "argumentum palmarium" was that all the habitable worlds
combined could still not compare to the "infinite Creator." The plurality of
worlds did not solve the gaps in the chain of being.
The Chain of Being and Angelology.
In Wesley’s view, higher up in the chain of being from
humanity are angels, not extra-terrestrials.44 He said:
But the scale of the creation does not terminate at man. Another
universe commences there, whose extent, perhaps, compared to that of this, is as the space
of the solar vortex to the capacity of a nut. There shine the CELESTIAL HIERARCHIES, like
glittering STARS.45
Although angels exist in the chain of being beyond empirical
observation, we know through philosophy and Scripture that they exist. Wesley started his
argument for their existence from Plato and Socrates. Ultimately, however, their existence
can be understood only by revelation, which supplies the defect of philosophy. Only
revelation "gives us a clear, rational, consistent account of those whom our eyes
have not seen, nor our ears heard. . . ."46 Since the reality of
angels exists beyond sensory perception, they can only be known by faith.47 Where
empiricism (or experience) fails, philosophy (or reason) and revelation complete our
knowledge.
Revelation and Greek philosophy alone were not enough to supply Wesley
with what he knew about angels. Another source of influence was Milton’s Paradise Lost. This was by far the most significant
source of influence on Wesley’s angelology. Not only did he quote Milton at least 77
times in his sermons alone, he also published An Extract from Milton’s Paradise
Lost (1763), an attempt to popularize Milton for Methodists.48
His regard for Milton was such that he once said Milton’s account
of the creation and fall was "not only simple, easy, and comprehensible, but
consistent with the highest reason, and altogether worthy of God."49
Fletcher’s thesis is that Milton’s doctrine of angels was
partially influenced by the Scholastics who were decidedly Christian and non-Jewish. But
mostly,
Milton has obviously used rabbinical material in developing his
conceptions of individual Angels and in his whole idea of the order and arrangement of the
Angels. His use of the quadrumvirate of Jewish angelology instead of the triad of
Christian angelology is an indication of how greatly he depended upon rabbinical sources
for his whole treatment of Angels.50
Fletcher presents a strong case, which has obvious implications for
Wesley’s angelology, suggesting a second-hand connection between Wesley and Medieval
Christian and Rabbinic angelology.
Whatever its historical connection, Wesley’s angelology was worked
out in three sermons, "Of Good Angels" (1783), "Of Evil Angels"
(1783), and "On Guardian Angels" (1726). In his "Introductory Comment"
to the sermons on good and evil angels, Albert Outler writes:
He must have thought that he needed to say something about the place
and role of angels in "the great chain of being" that, along with the Christian
Platonists, Wesley conceived of as the general structure of creation. . . . But
angelology was not one of his prime interests [. . . and] references to angels are
few and scattered in his writings as a whole.5 1
Regarding angels, Wesley believed that sometime before the foundations
of the earth were laid God created angels. "And what is the duration which has passed
since the creation of angels to that which passed before they were created—to
unbeginning eternity? to that half of eternity (if one may so speak) which had then
elapsed!"52
As created beings, they were finite. When God created angels, they were
God’s "first-born sons intelligent beings,"53 created as,
"spirits, even the highest angels, even cherubim and seraphim, to dwell in material
vehicles, though of an exceeding light and subtle substance."54 Through an
interesting exegesis of Psalm 104:4, he concluded that angels are
not material or corporeal beings; not clogged with flesh and blood like
us, having bodies, if any, not gross and earthly like ours, but of a finer substance,
resembling fire or flame more than any other of these lower elements. And is not something
like this intimated in those words of the Psalmist, "Who maketh his angels spirits,
and his ministers a flame of fire!"?55
The understanding, sight, knowledge, wisdom, holiness, and strength of
angels are all beyond our human comprehension.56 After being endowed with these
"super-human" traits, the moral law, written by "the finger of God" on
the "inmost spirit," was given to the angels.57 By the moral law they
knew the perfect will of God, which they did willingly, perfectly, and continually.58
They were able to do this because...
As spirits he has endued them with understanding, will, or affections
(which are indeed the same thing, as the affections are only the will exerting itself
various ways), and liberty. And are not these—understanding, will, and
liberty—essential to, if not the essence of, a spirit?59
All of which enabled even the angels to
discern truth from falsehood, good from evil; and as a necessary result
of this, with liberty, a capacity of choosing the one and refusing the other. By this they
were likewise enabled to offer him a free and willing service: a service rewardable in
itself, as well as most acceptable to their gracious Maséer.60
Because they were given a will, even the angels are said to be capable
of sinning. Eventually this liberty became the cause of the heavenly revolt.
"How came evil into the world?" It came from "Lucifer,
son of the morning": it was "the work of the devil." "For the
devil," saith the Apostle, "sinneth from the beginning";61 that
is, was the first sinner in the universe; the author of sin; the first being who by the
abuse of his liberty introduced evil into the creation. "He, of the first, if
not the first archangel,"62 was tempted to think too highly of himself. He
freely yielded to the temptation, and gave way first to pride, then to self-will.63
This was reiterated in another sermon.
See how this was first planted [the general root of sin] in
heaven itself by Lucifer, "Son of the morning"64 till then
undoubtedly "one of the first, if not the first archangel."65
"Thou saidst, I will sit upon the side of the north."66 See
self-will, the first-born of Satan!67 "I will be like the Most High."68
See Pride, the twin sister of self-will. Here was the true origin of evil. Hence
came the inexhaustible flood of evils upon the lower world. When Satan had once transfused
his own self-will and pride into the parents of mankind, together with a new species of
sin—love of the world, the loving the creature above the Creator—all manner of
wickedness soon rushed in, all ungodliness and unrighteousness, shooting out into crimes
of every kind, soon covering the whole face of the earth with all manner of abominations. .
. . From the devil the spirit of independence, self-will, and pride, productive of all
ungodliness and unrighteousness, quickly infused themselves into the hearts of our first
parents in paradise.69
The abuse of liberty, penultimately caused evil. But the ultimate
answer to "Unde malum?" had to be Lucifer’s self-will. Furthermore, he was
not the only self-willed angel. When Lucifer fell, "He did not fall alone, but soon
drew after him a third part of the stars of heaven; in consequence of which they lost
their glory and happiness, and were driven from their former habitation."70
In Wesley’s angelology, this fall occurred in spite of their
existing without flesh and blood, and in spite of their being endued with superhuman
traits of understanding, sight, knowledge, wisdom, holiness, and strength, many privileges
not to be enjoyed by Adam. The angelic revolt occurred, and evil came about because of
self-will, pride, and the abuse of free-will. The consequence of this revolt was that it
divided the upper part of the chain of being between good angels and evil angels, creating
two opposing moral forces in creation, those obedient to God, and those disobedient to
God. God and the good angels are working for humanity, and against Satan and the evil
angels.7 1 This struggle—what we shall call a cosmological
dualism—was what preceded Adam’s temptation and fall.
Wesley’s aesthetic theme consists of these parts: (1) the goodness
of God; (2) and the goodness of creation; (3) the ‘"chain of being" within
creation which serves as a channel of God’s grace to the remainder of creation; (4)
an angelology in which angels are seen as the pinnacle of the chain of being; (5) the
angelic fall that brought evil into the world and divided the chain of being, resulting in
a cosmological dualism.
2. Wesley’s Moral Theme
What begins to emerge from these points is that Wesley’s
definition of evil is not derived from his aesthetic theme, but from a moral theme. His
doctrine of an impeccable creation indicates that evil cannot be defined in those terms.
He thought evil could be completely accounted for through the abuse of free-will, which
was defined by Wesley as being "a power of choosing or refusing either good or
evil."72 How Wesley came to this conclusion can be seen particularly in
his reactions to the works of William King, Soame Jenyns, two of the "optimists"
and eighteenth-century heirs of the Augustinian tradition. It is now time to turn our
attention to this moral theme for a closer investigation.
King, Jenyns, and the Eighteenth-Century Optimists. William King
argued, like G. W. Leibniz, that when God created the world, God created the best world
possible.73 Like Augustine, he also argued that because it was created from
nothing it was by necessity imperfect. From the imperfection of creation King explained
natural evil, saying it arose by necessity from matter in motion.74 not all of
which is necessarily bad, as pain warns the soul against danger and thus operates to
preserve life.75 To account for moral evil, King introduced his second main
argument. Within this imperfect, but best of possible worlds, God created the first humans
and endowed them with a will to choose between good and evil, saying that unless God had
done so, "more arid greater evils would befall the universe from such an
interposition, than from the abuse of freewill."76 The universe simply required
free-will to benefit the universe.77
Soame Jenyns, in A Free Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Evil
(1757), did not argue for free-will at all. He maintained
that natural Evils exist from some necessity in the Nature of things
which no power can dispense with or prevent, the expediency of moral Evil will follow on
course: for if misery could not be excluded from the works of a benevolent Creator by
infinite power, these miseries must be endured by some creatures or other for the good of
the whole. . . .78
All of this comes from the "Evils of Imperfection" which
"‘are in truth no Evils at all, but rather the absence of some comparative
Good."79 This meant for Jenyns that:
The true solution then of this incomprehensible paradox must be this, that all Evils
owe their existence solely to the necessity of their own natures, by which I mean they
could not possibly have been prevented, without the loss of some superior Good, or the
permission of some greater Evil than themselves; or that many will unavoidably insinuate
themselves by the natural relations and circumstances of things into the most perfect
system of Created Beings, even in opposition to the will of an almighty Creator, by reason
they cannot be excluded without working contradictions; which not being proper objects of
power, it is not diminution of omnipotence to affirm that it cannot effect them.80
Jenyns was clearly more radical in his assertion of the defective
nature of creation as a result of his denial of free-will. This introduced a necessitarian
strand in Jenyns’ thoughts. Nonetheless, Jenyns was confident his system could unlock
all the mysteries and perplexing doctrines of. . . all those
abstruse speculations of Original Sin, Grace and Predestination. . . which the most
learned have never yet been able to make consistent with Reason or Common-sense.81
Wesley’s Response to the Optimists. Wesley was aware of
both works by King and Jenyns. He would have been familiar with King’s work as it
appeared in Latin without Gay’s introduction, or Law’s copious footnotes. On
December 11, 1730, Wesley wrote a letter to his father saying:
A week or two ago I pleased myself mightily with the hopes of sending
you a fully satisfactory solution of your great question, have at last procured the
celebrated treatise of Archbishop King, De Origine Mali. But on looking farther
into it I was strangely disappointed, finding it the least satisfactory account of any
given by any author whom I ever read in my life. He contradicts almost every man that
ever writ on the subject, and builds an hypothesis on the ruins of theirs which he takes
to be entirely few, though if I do not much mistake, part of it is at least two thousand
years old. The purport of this is, "that natural evils flow naturally and necessarily
from the essence of matter, so that God himself could not have prevented them, unless by
not creating matter at all." Now this new supposition seems extremely like the old
one of the Stoics, who I fancy always affirmed, totidem verbis, that "all
natural evils were owing not to God’s want of will, but to his want of power to
redress them, as necessarily flowing from the nature of matter."82
In his next letter Wesley revealed something of a better regard for
King. He published it in the Arminian Magazine in 1780.83 It is a rather
straightforward extraction with no critical notes inserted into the text, apart from this
introductory remark:
Though some of the postulata upon which Archbishop King builds
his hypothesis of the origin of evil be such as very few will admit of, yet since the
superstructure is regular and well contrived I thought you would not be unwilling to see
the scheme of that celebrated work.84
Wesley was aware that King asserted the necessity of imperfection of
created beings, and also that King saw God and man both endued with a self-determining
power. Of this latter point Wesley, in his extraction of King, said
That man partakes of this principle I conclude (1) because experience
shows it [and] (2) because we observe in ourselves the signs and properties of such a
power. We observe we can counteract our appetites, senses, and even our reason if we so
choose; which we can not otherwise account for than by admitting such a power in
ourselves.85
Wesley would certainly not have disagreed with this. However, the
"postulata" upon which King built his "hypothesis" was what Wesley
disagreed with and what initially led him to call King a "Stoic." It was not
because King denied free-will, but because he held that evil flows by necessity from the
constitutive manner of matter’s existence. This point became more abundantly clear in
Wesley’s objection to Jenyns, when he said
evil did not exist at all in the original nature of things. It was no
more the necessary result of matter than it was the necessary result of spirit. All things
then, without exception were very good. And how could they be otherwise?86
In another place, Wesley declared free-will alone was the
full answer to that plausible account "of the origin of evil"
published to the world some years since, and supposed to be unanswerable "that it
necessarily resulted from the nature of matter, which God was not able to alter." It
is very kind of this sweet-tongued orator to make an excuse for God!87 But
there is really no occasion for it. . . .88
If evil did not arise from creation, "Unde malum?", or
"Whence came evil?" For Wesley, evil was caused only by the will. What followed
in the quotation just above were these words:
God hath answered for himself. He made man in his own image, a spirit
endued with understanding and liberty. Man abusing that liberty produced evil, brought sin
and pain into the world. This God permitted in order to a fuller manifestation of his
wisdom, justice, arid mercy, by bestowing on all who would receive it in infinitely
greater happiness than they could possibly have attained if Adam had not fallen.89
We must put aside the last and perhaps the most provocative part of
this quotation which says that if Adam had not sinned, Christ had not died.90
What should be pointed out is Wesley’s belief that evil can be accounted for entirely
by the will.
This can been seen in his extraction of Humphrey Ditton.91 Wesley’s
extraction of Ditton was published along with the one of King’s, Origin of Evil in
the Arminian Magazine. It was concerned with two things:
(1) Ditton wished to deny that there were two gods, one good and the
other evil, in order to account for evil; and, (2) account for the presence of evil by
attributing it to the willful deviation from God’s "eternal rules and measures
of fitness."
Leading up to the point where Wesley started his extraction, Ditton
argued that one cannot hold to a materialist’s view of creation and freewill at the
same time.92 For Ditton, a denial of a mechanical explanation of the universe
which is bound tightly to the rule of cause-and-effect had to be established before one
could affirm free-will, in order to exonerate God of evil. As long as there was a view of
creation being strictly cause-and-effect there could be no free-will. Once this point is
established, free-will can account for the presence of evil in the world. In Wesley’s
extraction of Ditton we read:
Farther, it no way derogated from any one perfection of an Infinite
Being to endow other beings which he made with such a power as we call liberty; that is,
to furnish them with such capacities, dispositions, and principles of action that it
should be possible for them either to observe or to deviate from those eternal rules and
measures of fitness and agreeableness with respect to certain things and circumstances
which were so conformable to the infinite rectitude of his own will, and which infinite
reason must necessarily discover. Now evil is a deviation from those measures of
eternal, unerring order and reason—not to choose what is worthy to be chosen, and is
accordingly chose by such a will as the divine. And to bring this about no more is
necessary than the exerting certain acts of that power we call free will. By which power
we are enabled to choose or refuse, and to determine ourselves to action accordingly.
Therefore, without having recourse to any ill principle, we may fairly account for the
origin of evil from the possibility of a various use of our liberty, even as that capacity
or possibility itself is ultimately founded on the defectibility and finiteness of a
created nature.93
Here evil is defined not in the Augustinian sense of being the absence
of good, but as deviation from the perfect good, or by not choosing good. The defect was
not material, but in the will. To say otherwise (as King had), Wesley thought, made God
the author of evil.94
This position was further reinforced by one of Wesley’s later
sermons, "The End of Christ’s Coming" (1781), part of which already has
been referred to above. Says Wesley:
And God created man, not only in his natural, but likewise in
his own moral image. He created him not only in knowledge, but also in
righteousness, and true holiness. As his understanding was without blemish, perfect in its
kind, so were all his affections But it cannot be doubted he might mistake evil for good.
He was not infallible; therefore not impeccable. And this unravels the whole difficulty of
the grand question, unde malum? "How came evil into the world?" It
came from ‘"Lucifer, son of the morning": it was "the work of the
devil." "For the devil," saith the Apostle, "sinneth from the
beginning";95 that is, was the first sinner in the universe; the author of
sin; the first being who by the abuse of his liberty introduced evil into the creation.
"He, of the first, If not the first archangel,"96 was tempted to
think too highly of himself. He freely yielded to the temptation, and gave way first to
pride, then to self-will.97
The defectibility of the created nature was precisely located in the
fallibility and imperfection of both the angelic and human wills. Their wills were not
impeccable. The defect was not in the manner of creation, but in the will, which was
located in the soul, an immaterial substance. All this seems to indicate that, for Wesley,
the defect in creation was moral, not aesthetic; immaterial, not material. From here,
Wesley attempted to unravel the entire question of the origin of evil.
From the abuse of free-will the different types of evil can be
explained. In the sermon prepared by Wesley during the "Unde malum?" correspondence
with is father, Wesley wrote:
It has indeed been well observed, that all evil is either natural,
moral, or penal; that natural evil or pain is no evil at all if it be overbalanced with
following pleasure; that moral evil, or sin, cannot possibly befall anyone unless those
who willingly embrace, who choose it; and that penal evil, or punishment, cannot possibly
befall any unless they likewise choose it by choosing sin. This entirely cuts off all
imputation on the justice or goodness of God, since it can never be proved that it is
contrary to either of these to give his creatures [the] liberty of embracing either good
or evil, to put happiness and misery in their own hands, to leave them the choice of
life and death.98
From this quotation it is clear that Wesley held to a traditional
division of natural, moral, and penal evil. Moral and penal evil was thought completely
contingent upon free-will. That he also thought natural evil was also is somewhat
obscured. But he did believe that somehow the material world was affected by this defect
of the will in the immaterial world. For example, he demonstrated how even natural evil is
the consequence of Adam’s choice of evil, saying that after Adam’s sin,
man made himself incapable of transmitting those blessings, that
communication was necessarily cut off. The intercourse between God and the inferior
creatures being stopped, those blessings could no longer flow in upon them. And then it
was that "the creature," every creature, "was subject to vanity," to
sorrow, to pain of every kind, to all manner of evils. "Not" indeed
"willingly": not by its own choice, not by any act or deed of its own; "but
by reason of him that subjected it"; by the wise permission of God, determining to
draw eternal good out of this temporary evil. But in what respects was "the
creature," every creature, then "made to subject to vanity?" . . . The
very foundations of their nature are out of course, are turned upside down.99
The chain of being was made dysfunctional by Adam’s sin. Adam had
not suffered as the result of a defective creation. Creation had suffered as the result of
a defective Adam. The human defect was located precisely in the
Wesley seems to have held to a mythological explanation of evil, which
locates the origin of evil in a primordial rebellion of creatures (Satan, Lucifer, et al.)
against their Creator. A more modern version of this view is put forth by N. P. Williams
in Ideas of the Fall and Original Sin (1924). King’s presentation of the
Augustinian view is more of a metaphysical one which ascribes moral evil to the nature of
finite existence. A modem representative of this view is F. R. Tennant.100
3. An Implication
There is one significant implication from all this. Because Wesley held
to a moral definition of evil, he was able to deny the concept of the "sinful
body." To Wesley, some may say,
"But surely we cannot be saved from sin while we dwell in a sinful
body." A "sinful body"? I pray, observe how deeply ambiguous, how
equivocal, this expression is! But there is not authority for it in Scripture: the word
"sinful body" is never found there. And as it is totally unscriptural, so it is
palpably absurd. For no body, or matter of any kind be sinful: spirits alone
are capable of sin. . . . Only the soul can be the seat of sin. 101
There was what appeared to be a disjunction between the body and the
soul, where sin and even the origin of evil was concerned. Only the soul, which was the
source of volition and free-will, could be ultimately responsible for sin since evil and
sin were defined as choosing not to do God’s will. The body was morally neutral in
Wesley’s view. To say otherwise would have jeopardized Incarnation theology. When
Christ became flesh, or a whole person, he "united himself to our miserable nature,
with all its innocent infirmities."102 To speak of infirmities was the way
in which Wesley discussed the moral neutrality of the body, all of which was the
consequence of his aesthetic view of creation and moral account of the origins of evil.
Only by maintaining the moral neutrality of the body, and a moral definition of evil,
could Wesley argue for the possibility of entire sanctification in this lifetime.
How Wesley answered the question "Unde ma/urn?" determined
much of what followed in his understanding of salvation. How one explains and defines evil
has important theological consequences for the remainder of one’s theological system.
What this also indicates is that Wesley saw practical consequences in what some wrongly
consider insignificant theological trivia.
Abbreviations
AM Wesley, John, Arminian Magazine (1778-97).
ANF Roberts, Alexander, and James Donaldson, eds, The Ante-Nicene Fathers, 10
vols. Edinburgh: T&T Clark/Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1989.
BEW Bicentennial Edition of Wesley’s Works. Nashville: Abingdon Press/Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1975- .
ENNT Wesley, John, Explanatory Notes upon the New Testament. London: 1755.
ENOT Wesley, John, Explanatory Notes upon the Old Testament. Bristol:
1765).
Essay Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), Peter Nidditch, ed.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.
]WJ The Journal of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M., [. ..] enlarged from Original
Manuscripts, 8 vols, Nehemiah Curnock, ed. London: Epworth Press, 1909-16.
JWL The Letters of the Rev. John Wesley, 8 vols, John Telford, ed. London: Epworth
Press, 1931.
NP Wesley, John, A Survey of the Wisdom of God in the Creation: or a Compendium
of Natural Philosophy, 3rd ed. 5 vols. London: J. Fry, 1777.
NPNF1 Schaff, Philip, A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of
the Christian Church, first series, 14 vols. Edinburgh T&T Clark/Grand Rapids: Wm.
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1988.
PWHS Proceedings of the Wesley Historical Society.
Works The Works of the Rev. John Wesley, Thomas Jackson, ed., 3rd ed. 14 vols. Grand
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1979.
WTJ Wesleyan Theological Journal.
Notes
1This was the annual lecture of the Wesley Fellowship, Great
Britain, and was read 12 September 1992 in Birmingham, England. Some alterations have been
made to the conclusion. Apart from this, it appears as published by the Wesley Fellowship
as Occasional Paper No. 7.
2Lactantius, "A Treatise on the Anger of God," xiii (ANF
7:271).
3A.g., Antony Flew, God and Philosophy (London: Hutchinson
Press, 1966), 48. Also see John Mackje, "Evil and Omnipotence," in The
Philosophy of Religion, ed. Basil Mitchell (London: Oxford University Press, 1971),
92-3; and Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 1974).
4The etymology of "theodicy" is derived from the Greek
word for God, "theos," and justice, "dikei." The word appears to have
been coined by Leibniz "in 1697 in a letter to Magliabechi . . . as the title of an
intended work" (John Merz, Leibniz, London: William Blackwood & Sons,
1884, 101, in John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, London: Macmillan Co. Ltd,
1966, 6 ð.).
5See BEW, 25:240-2 (Dec. 19, 1729), 25:258 (Dec. 11,
1730), 25:264-7 (Jan. 15, 1731); also see AM 3(1780):604-6, 607-11; BEW,
"The Promise of Understanding" (1730), 4:285; BEW. "The End of
Christ’s Coming" (1781), 2:476. A close inspection of Wesley’s
"Sermon Register" reveals twenty-seven instances of preaching from this text (1
John 3:8) between 1742 to 1789, leading Outler to conclude, "This confirms the
impression of Wesley’s serious preoccupation, both early and late, with the problem
of evil, and especially moral evil (BEW, 2:47 1).
6E.g., BEW, 25:240-2 (Dec. 19, 1729); BEW, 2:476,
"The End of Christ’s Coming" (1781); AM 3(1780):604-6.
7A slight misquote from Milton, Paradise Lost, 1.26, found
on the title page of "Predestination Calmly Considered" (1752), which was
later republished in AM 2(1779), 505 ff, 553 ff, 609 ff. The quote also appeared
in "The Great Assize" (1758), BEW, 1:365; "God’s Approbation of
His Works" (1782), BEW, 11:399; "On the Fall of Man" (1782), BEW,
II:401; "The Promise of Understanding" (1730), BEW, IV:282-3; JWL
VI: 137, (1775).
8"On Mourning for the Dead" (1727), BEW, 4:239; cf. Augustine,
"Enchiridion" (42 1-23), XI, XXVII (NPNF1, 3:240, 246).
9See Richard Brantley, Locke, Wesley, and the Method of
English Romanticism (Gainesville, Florida: University Presses of Florida, 1984). For a
critique of Wesley’s aesthetic theme in creation see Joseph Barker, "A Review of
Wesley’s Notions Respecting the Primeval State of Man and the Universe" (London:
1848), 22.
10See "The Imperfection of Human Knowledge" (1784), BEW,
2:568-86.
11A.g., "The Repentance of Believers" (1767), BEW, 1:344-5;
"Upon Our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, IV" (1748), 1:538; "Original,
Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law" (1750), BEW, 2:12-3; ‘In the
Fall of Man" (1782), 2:411; "God’s Love to Fallen Man" (1782), 2:424;
"The General Deliverance" (1781), 2:449; "A Call to Backsliders"
(1778), BEW, 3:211; "The Promise of Understanding" (1730), BEW, 4:285-6.
12A.g., "Upon Our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, VI"
(1748), BEW, 1:589; "On Divine Providence" (1786), BEW, 2:540-1;
"On the Omnipresence of God" (1788), BEW, 4:44; "The Unity of the
Divine Being" (1789), 4:62; "Public Diversions Denounced’ (1732), 4:320-1;
"Thoughts Upon God’s Sovereignty" (1777), Works, 10:361-3.
13"The Unity of the Divine Being" (1789), BEW, 4:62.
14This went through several editions, being expanded with
virtually each edition: (1763)2 vols., 1st edn; (1770)3 vols., 2nd edn; (1777)5 vols., 3rd
edn.
15"God’s Approbation of His Works" (1782), BEW,
2:388.
16"God’s Approbation of His Works" (1782), BEW,
2:390-1.
17"God’s Approbation of His Works" (1782), BEW.
2:396-97.
18"The Wisdom of God’s Counsels" (1784), BEW,
2:552.
19See BEW, 2:397 note 43, part of which says, "The
‘vain king’ was Alphonso X, ‘El Sabio’ (1221-84)," and his ironic
aphorism survives in many different versions. Cf. John Norris, "Sermon Preached
Before the University of Oxford, Mar. 29, 1685," p. 2, where mention is made of
"that arrogant and peevish mathematician who charged the architect with want of skill
in the mechanism of the world" saying he could have done better."
20"God’s Approbation of the His Works" (1782), BEW,
2:397-8.
21Cf. Bruce Reichenbach, Evil and a Good God (New York:
Fordham University Press, 1982), 121.
22NP (1777), 5:225-6.
23"The ‘proof-text’ here is Plato’s
Thaeatetus,
153C, where Plato cites Homer’s Iliad, viii. 19, as a proof-text for the
phrase [. . .] ‘the golden chain,’" see Outler BEW, 396 ð. 40.
24"God’s Approbation of His Works" (1782), BEW,
2:396-97. Cf. Locke, Essay, III. vi. 12, where he does not insist upon the
necessity of plenitude, saying its existence is only probable.
25NP (1777), 4:57 ff.
26NP (1777), 4:58-9; cf. Locke, Essay, III 6.12.
27NP (1777), 4:60.
28"Of Evil Angels" (1783), BEW, 3:16.
29For Wesley’s sound rebuke of Buffon’s Natural
History, see "Remarks on The Count De Buffon’s ‘Natural History",
AM,
7(1782); in Works, 13:448-55.
30Loíejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 183-4.
31"The General Deliverance" (1781), BEW, 2:442.
32Loíejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 189-95. An opinion
also held by Locke (Essay, III.vi.12); Addison (Spectator, no. 621, Nov. 17,
1714); Bolingbroke (Fragments in Works (1809), VIII.44, 186; and Pope (Essay
on Man).
33ENOT, 3 vols (1st vol. 1765). The exact date of
publication is disputed because of its being published in weekly installments. This was
not a work by Wesley, but an extraction of Matthew Henry’s Exposition, and
Poole’s Annotations.
34Contemplation de la Nature, 2nd ed. (1769), 1:23-24, 84, in
Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 194-5.
35I.x.25, cf. I.xxxix.98.
36BEW, 1:252; 2:473, 503,535, 536, 577, 578; 3:86.
See 4:587.
37See BEW, 2:503 note 20.
38See, NP (1777), 5:3, 114.
39Milton, Paradise Lost, 1.291 (see PWHS, 5:116).
40JWJ, 4:354; cf. Aquinas, ST, Pt. I, Q. 47, Art. 3.
41Cf. William Broome, "The forty-third Chapter of
Ecclesiasticus Paraphrased,’" and Collection of Moral and Sacred Poems (1744),
11.99, BEW, 3:463 note 50.
42An unanswerable argument.
43"What is Man?" (1787), BEW, 3:462-3. But cf. NP (1777),
5:114-6.
44For an interesting poetic comparison between angels and men see
Charles’ hymn, "A Dialogue of ANGELS and MEN" in, Hymns and Sacred
Poems, 3rd edn (1756).
45NP (1777), 4:110. This was a part of his extraction of
Bonnet.
46"Of Good Angels"" (1783), BEW, 3:6.
47"Oð the Discoveries of Faith" (1788), BEW, 4:31.
48An Extract from Milton’s Paradise Lost (1763), 2nd
ed. (1791). See Oscar Sherwin, "Milton for the Masses: John Wesley’s Edition of Paradise
Lost," Modern Language Quarterly, 12(1951):267-85; Samuel Rogal, "The Role
of Paradise Lost in Works by John and Charles Wesley," Milton Quarterly 13(1979):1
14-19.
49"Remarks on Mr. H. ‘s account of the Gentoo
Religion in Hindostan" in Lloyd’s Evening Post, Nov. 30, 1774; and Works,
13:403-8.
50Carris Fletcher, Milton’s Rabbinical Readings (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1930), 255.
51BEW, 3:3.
52"What is Man?" (1788), BEW, 3:458.
53"Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law"
(1750), BEW, 2:6.
54"The Unity of the Divine Being" (1789), BEW, 4:63.
Cf. JWL. 6:2 14 (April 17, 1776), where he talks about paradise, and how "the
soul will not be encumbered with flesh and blood; but probably it will have some sort of
ethereal vehicle, even before God clothes us 'with our nobler house of empyrean
light.'"
55"Of Good Angels" (1783), BEW 3:6. Cf. his
comment on Psalm 104:4 in ENOT; cf. Aquinas, ST. Pt. I, Q. 50-51 on angels.
56"Of Good Angels" (1783), BEW 3:6-8; "On
Guardian Angels" (1726), BEW 4:228-9, 233.
57"Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law"
(1750), BEW 2:7.
58"Upon Our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, VI"
(1748), BEW 1:583-4.
59"Of Good Angels" (1783), BEW 3:6.
60"Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law"
(1750), BEW 2:6.
61The "Apostle" was Isaiah, in Isaiah 14:12.
62Milton, Paradise Lost, V:659-60.
63"The End of Christ’s Coming" (1781), BEW 2:476.
64Isaiah 14:12.
65Milton, Paradise Lost, V:659-61. Notice how Wesley
quotes Scripture and Milton side by side in such a way that only the scholars of the Bible
or Milton could tell them apart.
66Cf. Isaiah 14:13.
67A phrase used by Polycarp, "The Epistles of
Polycarp," VII (ANF, 1:34).
68Isaiah 14.14.
69"The Deceitfulness of the Human Heart" (1790), BEW
4:152, 154.
70"The End of Christ’s Coming" (1781), BEW 2:476.
71"Of Evil Angels" (1783), BEW 3:16-29.
72"The End of Christ’s Coming" (1781), BEW 2:476.
73See comments of Leibniz on King’s work in "Observations on the Book
Concerning ‘The Origin of Evil,’ in the "Appendices" of Theodicy (Huggard,
405-42).
74King, Essay on the Origin of Evil, 9-15.
75King, Essay on the Origin of Evil, 150-55.
76King. Essay on the Origin of Evil, 356; cf. 340.
77King, Essay on the Origin of Evil, 369.
78Jenyns, Free Inquiry, 102.
79Jenyns, Free Inquiry, 25.
80Jenyns, Free Inquiry, 15.
81Jenyns, Free Enquiry, 110.
82AAW, 25:258.
83BAW, 25:264-67, which appeared in AM 3(1780):607-1 1.
84AAW, 25:264.
85AAW, 25:266.
86"God’s Approbation of His Works" (1782), BEW,
2:399. Note Wesley’s footnote as enhanced by Outler.
87Perhaps this is an obscure reference to the fact that Jenyns
was the elected MP for Cambridge (1742 and served until 1780).
88"God’s Love to Fallen Man" (1782), BEW, 2:434.
Cf. "God’s Approbation of the His Works" (1782), BEW, 2:397-8 as
referred to in note 81 above.
89"God’s Love to Fallen Man" (1782), BEW, 2:434.
Cf. "God’s Approbation of the His Works" (1782), BEW, 2:397-8.
90See "On the Fall of Man" (1782), BEW, 2:411
and note 60. This thought connects Wesley with the "felix culpa" tradition,
which renders the entire controversy with Calvinists meaningless. If the fall resulted in
the redemption, does it then matter whether or not God is responsible for the fall?
91AAW, 25:240-2 (Dec. 19, 1729); cf. AM, 3(1780):
604-6. Ditton was responding to the materialism of Hobbes.
92Ditton, Discourse, 474, 490 (the emphasis is his).
93BAW, 25:241-2 (Dec. 19, 1729); cf. Ditton, Discourse, 424-7
(the emphasis is mine).
94A position also held by Browne, Winnett, Peter Browne,
Provost, Bishop, Metaphysician (London: SPCK, 1974), 30-49.
95The "Apostle" was Isaiah, in Isaiah 14:12.
96Milton, Paradise Lost, V:659-60.
97"The End of Christ’s Coming" (1781), BEW,
2:475-6. Cf. the view of 4 Clement of Alexandria, "The Stromata," 1:17.
98"The Promise of Understanding" (1730), BEW, 4:285.
99"The General Deliverance" (1781), BEW, 2:442-3.
100A similar contrast is made between King and Browne by Winnett,
Peter Browne (1974), 35-6.
101"On Perfection" (1784), BEW, 3:79-80.
102ENNT, (1755), John 1:14.
Edited by Michael Mattei for the
Wesley Center for Applied Theology
at Northwest Nazarene University
© Copyright 2000 by the Wesley Center for Applied Theology
Text may be freely used for personal or scholarly purposes, provided the notice below the
horizontal line is left intact. Any use of this material for commercial purposes of any
kind is strictly forbidden without the express permission of the Wesley Center at
Northwest Nazarene University, Nampa, ID 83686. Contact the webmaster for permission or to
report errors.
|
