THE EMBOURGEOISEMENT OF THE FREE
METHODIST ETHOS(1)
by
Robert Walter Wall
From its first publication in 1860, the Discipline
(D) of the Free Methodist Church(FM) has documented a codified history of the
denomination. Each subsequent edition of the D, generally published immediately following
a quadrennial General Conference, includes a variety of theological and ethical,
constitutional and denominational changes effected by vote at that particular General
Conference. In this way, the D performs a critical governing role in the church by
transmitting its constitutive creeds and by providing its constituents with a normative
and current self-definition.
The purpose of this study is to provide a diachronic
analysis of a specific element within the D: the code of rules which guides the church's
internal and external conduct, that which is reflective, if not formative of the church's
ethos. Although such a study could well benefit from a comparison with other
denominational disciplines, especially those from sister traditions and with longer
histories than the FM D, our study will deal only with that D and its particular rules for
Christian conduct. On that basis we will attempt to provide a modest commentary on FM's social
history. Our assumption is that such codes establish symbolic boundaries, between
covenanters and between church and society, which distinguish the ethos of a FM society
within the larger social order. In this sense, then, our diachronic study will attempt at
the very least to document how those boundaries have been redrawn. Of course, the more
difficult task is to construct sociological typologies which explain why a particular
community's moral boundaries are redrawn in a particular manner at a particular moment of
its history.
Before introducing a sociological construct appropriate
to this study, we want to insist on the metaethical importance of the D as a
theological document. It was Ernst Troeltsch who first traced the formative importance
of theological concepts on the ways in which a religious group related to a larger
society. Because moral codes are framed by a particular theologic, the moral boundaries
which they establish around and within a religious community are rendered coherent by the
theological convictions of that community. (Troeltsch, 1931) The function of the D is to
"wrap" its various codes in a way which gives them ecclesial and societal
meaning.
The importance of this point was made clear again to me
at our most recent General Conference, held on the Seattle Pacific University campus this
summer. Not a few delegations expressed concern about the church's reputation for and
experience with legalism. No one will deny that legalism is "bad news" for a
people of "good news." However, the focus of their concern was the code: perhaps
the church should delete the code in order to end its legalism. Beyond its superficial
analysis of the problem, the proposed solution actually betrays the theological consensus
which founded FM. Sharply put, those who advance such a solution fail to understand the
D's code of Christian conduct in its normative theological context.
In this regard, let me make two brief observations to
establish a theological context to make meaning of the D's code of Christian conduct.
First, a macroscopic observation. All of the sections which make up the D, whether
theological and ethical or practical and political, are prefaced by a historical summary
of FM roots. The summary has expanded and its rhetoric softened over the years, itself, an
intriguing topic for analysis. Yet, from its first edition, in 1860, to the current one,
the D has contained an apologetic argot.2 The critical memory of the point of origin,
transmitted in the introduction to the D, narrates the expulsion of several ministers and
members from the Methodist Episcopal Church Genesee Annual Conference, for seeking to
reform a denomination which failed to adhere to the "basic principles of Methodism,
especially to the doctrine and experience of entire sanctification." From its
beginning, then, FM has been defined by a prophetic impulse, a reactionary and deviant
tendency which views itself as tradition-bearer and reformer of the larger group gone
astray.
Moral and theological codes are very important to such
movements for a constitutive reason: they provide religious boundaries which distinguish
the remnant from the rest of Israel. They help define and reorder the "true"
tradition so that those who are true to the faith will be kept within the prescribed
borders. In this way, the code performs a conservative role: the identity of the community
is properly formed so as to inform the next generation.
Now, to a more microscopic observation about the
moral code which confirms the larger point. The D is structured in an intentioned way.
Reform is given form in order to perpetuate the movement's raison d'être.
Discrete parts are intentionally fitted together into a coherent whole so that D reflects
in its very Gattung the movement's theologic and moral calculus. To understand the
intent of the code of Christian conduct, then, requires us to understand the significance
of its location in a specific place within a specific part of the whole D.3
Accordingly, it is critical to locate the roles for
Christian conduct in their normative context. Consistently with the past, this code is
currently found in the second section, sandwiched between two other codes, which together
constitute the normative definition of the "Christian Life." On the one hand
stands a code of theological convictions which describes 'Christian experience" while
on the other hand stands a code which stipulates the practices of a "Christian
community." These three ingredients of the "Christian Life" are logically
and deliberately related to each other by this sequence. In this light, we may understand
the "Christian Life" to consist of a particular religious experience of God's
salvation, which is evidenced by a particular moral vision; this, in turn, leads to the
formation of a particular religious community of those who bear the behavioral marks of a
common religious experience. This particular structure indicates the importance of the
moral code as that which bears testimony to a religious experience, which experience
itself provides evidence of saving faith; it is also a particular morality which functions
as the test of community.
More importantly, the D's formulas for Christian living
are centered by the very doctrine which gives the tradition its theological
distinctiveness: entire sanctification. What FM sought to protect at its beginning is a
particular teaching of God's salvation by which good works are the testimony of present
salvation and the condition of final salvation. In sum, justifying grace, conditioned by
faith, brings one into covenant with God; and sanctifying grace, conditioned by
faithfulness, keeps one in covenant with God. The fruit of true repentance, which the code
describes (not prescribes), documents the experience of sanctifying grace. In this way,
the D's codification of good works keeps the idea of sanctification from abstraction; the
code retains the doctrine as a concrete experience, decisive to the community's unique
identity within and contribution to the church catholic In this sense, the code provides
explanatory power for the holiness tradition, not to bring it to collapse under the awful
weight of judgmentalism and legalism, but to impel it to assert that God's grace which
justifies the believing community also sanctifies it to bear witness to God's transforming
love in the world.
A caveat: At least at an informal, oral level, the
discussion about rules now taking place within FM threatens to shift its formative
theological paradigm from one which is centered by sanctification to one which is centered
by justification. From the perspective of justification, codes of Christian conduct may be
viewed as preventing people from getting into a right relationship with God. Yet, FM
belongs to a theological trajectory which has always been more concerned about staying in
a loving relationship with God and with neighbor than with getting in. An ethics of
sanctification is vitally concerned about how the believer continues to respond to God's
grace in the world.
While we would certainly recognize the dangers inherent
in the latter theological orientation, we also recognize its vital importance within the
church catholic. Thus, to change the place of the code within the D, as some FM would do,
or to alter it without proper attention to the description of Christian experience which
precedes it and the description of Christian community which follows it, is to erode or
even erase the religious heritage which the founding fathers and mothers of FM sought to
preserve. (Wall 1987a, 57-60).
II
Our next task is to construct a sociological typology in
fundamental continuity with the D's theological calculus.4 Only then do we possess an
intellectual construct with the explanatory power to analyze the D's code of Christian
conduct. In doing so, we are less concerned with organizational patterns than with the
religious orientation of the organization's relationship to the surrounding social order.
In this regard, our work will proceed from two assumptions. First, the orthodoxy of
sanctification will necessarily result in a particular kind of orthopraxy. It will be our
second assumption that the D's rules establish those symbolic boundaries which measure the
community's adherence to its stipulated orthodoxy.
The notions of consecration and sanctification are
closely related in the D's definition of Christian experience, thereby forging the
foundation of a sectarian orientation toward self as well as toward society. In fact,
according to the D, it is of the very essence of the Christian Life that God's sanctifying
grace will be evidenced by self-denial and by social dissent, the two basic types of
sectarian orientation. Self-denial provides personal evidence of sanctification,
whereas social dissent provides public evidence of the same redemptive reality. We
are not surprised, therefore, that the D codifies boundaries which tend to separate the
Christian community as a uniquely moral society from the worldiness of the surrounding
social order.
At least in terms of the moral boundaries drawn to guide
personal conduct, members of the FM community share the same spirit of renunciation which
belongs to those communions whose piety is organized by the orthodoxy of sanctification (e
g, Anabaptists, Quakers, Pentecostalists). There is considerable intolerance among these
groups for those vices and amusements which are thought to challenge the principle of
self-denial and its corollary, self-control. Thus, for Wesleyans, the central moral issue
is not the idolatry of "good works," as it is within Reformed circles who follow
a theology organized by the teaching of justification by faith alone. Logically, as these
circles see it, to elevate the imperative of good works contradicts the primacy of faith
in God's justifying grace. Within Wesleyan communions, however, the orthodoxy of
sanctification demands faithfulness alone, and rejection of the idolatry of self
Selfishness is the contradiction of obedience which effects God's sanctifying grace.
In sum, the typology of self renunciation
characterizes at least the personal dimension of a sectarian sociological construct in the
FM D. The D's rules document the believer's consecration and measure the extent to
which God's sanctifying grace has empowered the believer for witness and service. Whatever
is worldly threatens to contaminate the self. From a sociological perspective these
codified lines are inherently critical to the identity of those who belong to a Christian
community which exists in contrast to the mores of the social order. Only in
contraposition can the individual believer find unique legitimacy as a witness to God.
A sectarian orientation toward society constitutes an
expression of social dissent as well. Historically, sectarian movements have emerged among
those who champion the classes which are marginalized by society's power structures and
privileged elites. Such socio-religious movements can be subdivided into two, seemingly
opposite, kinds of hostile responses toward the society's institutions and their power
structures: disengagement from or disinterest in them (e.g., the "passive"
hostility of Amish, Mennonites), or engagement against them (e.g., Sojourners Community,
liberation theology). FM, a community founded out of class protest and formed by a spirit
of abolition, clearly belongs to the second group. Because of its early history, the
definition of the Christian community's relationship with the surrounding society was
actively negative and confrontive. Especially at the point of origin, the D envisions this
type of sectarian orientation. Thus, while the spirit of personal renunciation forms the
community's moral boundaries of personal existence another spirit, one of abolition,
forms its moral boundaries of public existence.
The typologies of renunciation and abolition, in that
they reflect a common theological program, are mutually coherent. A concern for
self-denial in the personal sphere is roughly equivalent to a concern for those who are
denied their selfhood in the public sphere. In fact, the freedom to make a choice of
self-denial, the essential evidence of sanctifying grace, requires that a person be free
to do so. Thus, abolition becomes the necessary condition of renunciation, which in turn
is the necessary condition of final justification.
Social constructions must also include developmental
typologies as well. Moral boundaries change because the orientations of religious groups
to society change. Such changes are bound to occur since no religious group can resist the
basic tension between the morality of the group, which is formed by religious authorities,
and the morality of the culture, which is formed by secular authorities. Typically, the
dialectic between a sectarian religious orientation and a secular world, especially during
the twentieth century, will produce a movement toward a denominational orientation, i.e.,
an orientation less at odds with societal norms and values.
Several possible variables may modify this type of
development. For instance, the extent of the social engagement of a particular group will
determine the extent of its social accommodation. In matters of the personal morality
formed by the spirit of renunciation, the D reflects a greater resistance to the
accommodation of popular definitions of right and wrong. In the case of the community's
public witness, however, where its abolitionist spirit once excited a vital engagement
against society that changed it, the D suggests greater accommodation with society as the
spirit of abolition has become less intense and urgent over the years. Indeed, public
dissent in any case is difficult to maintain in the face of conflict with other social
entities, religious and secular, who dislike and distrust sectarian intolerance and claims
of unique legitimacy.
To the extent that such changes are found in the D's
definition of Christian conduct, we are able to discern the extent to which FM has
compromised its sectarian moral vision for a denominational one. Our sense is that its
current definition of the personal morality is considerably more sectarian than its social
witness, whose vision of class protest has been eroded by embour geoisement.
III
We are now prepared to describe the changes in the D's
code of Christian conduct with this question in mind: has FM maintained moral boundaries
consistent with the orthodoxy of entire (esp. inner) sanctification and the sectarian
vision it shapes? For the purposes of this discussion, we have divided the rules according
to the two typologies introduced above: renunciation, which sets the internal boundaries,
and abolition, which establishes the external boundaries. (While we would suggest a third
typology to define the terms of the community's relationship with God, we will not treat
it as a discrete category in this study but as integrated with the other two.)
The Spirit of Renunciation
The two characteristics of the spirit of renunciation,
which are consistently stipulated by the D, are simplicity and temperance. We will treat
only these two although we may assume that other specified expectations regarding ethical
behavior were shaped by the OT Decalogue and the NT vice lists, or by the familiar
prohibitions of the conservative Protestant subculture, which promoted a kind of
"moral asceticism" consistent with the D's codified "spirit of
renunciation." In this regard, we note in passing that in 1979 the D added a rule
regarding homosexuality (D 1979, par. 330) and another regarding pornography
in 1985 (D 1985, par. 335). Certainly, neither is at odds with a conservative ethos.
Especially the statement about pornography, which describes its corrosive, inward
effects, follows the D's deeper "theologic": that Christian conduct results from
inward transformation. Accordingly, pornography's threat is to the inner self. However,
neither rule reflects the historic interest interest of FM in self-denial, which is drawn
along socioeconomic lines rather than from an interest in drafting codes of sexual vice.
Our own hunch is that these recent additions reflect FM rapprochement with the evangelical
mainstream, which has always been more inclined to codify sexual mores than FM has been.
(Hunter 1987, 60)
An earlier and more complex illustration of this same
point is the rule on public schools. It was added in 1960 to prohibit certain
worldly amusements, specifically dancing, even though it was already waning as one of
fundamentalism's most important symbolic moral boundaries. (D 1960, par.85.1) Curiously,
this category has since become the dumping grounds for other fundamentalist interests,
such as the teaching of evolution, added in 1979 (D 1979, par. 337), and the polemics of
parental responsibility over public schools, which was added in 1974. (D 1974, par. 336)
It was in 1974, that participation in school dances was demoted and absorbed into the
general classification of assignments and activities which conflicted with the mores of
denomination. While it could be argued that these prohibitions are consistent with the D's
historic concern for personal modesty, which is an evidence of inner sanctification,
clearly the moral boundaries have been redrawn to conform to moral interests of the wider
conservative constituency.
There are other indicators, however, which suggest that
FM is struggling to maintain its historic commitment to simplicity. For example, in 1985 a
rule prohibiting gambling was added. (D 1985, par. 336.1) This prohibition is no
doubt a response to the growing popularity of lotteries and betting in the general
society; but the lines are drawn in ways appropriate to the D definition of Christian
conduct. Accordingly, the evil of gambling is its exploitation of the poor. Even more
critically, gambling indicates the greed of the materialistic social order and contradicts
faith in the regnant God. The result is an idolatry of self which ruins honest work and
leads to tragic addiction evidence of the lack of self-denial and so of sanctifying grace.
This same concern for the idolatry of self is reflected
in the new statement on false worship, also added in 1985. (D 1985, par.320) To
worship God is to abstain from the worship of "things, pleasures, and self."
That is, the spirit of renunciation forms the attitude which in turn promotes worship of
God, which is the very prerequisite of sanctification.
A slight change in the rule regarding stewardship of
possessions is significant. On the one hand, the rule reflects the transformation, if
not the erosion. of the historic FM view on simplicity. The original statement concerning
private property prohibits "the laying up of treasure on earth." (D 1860, sec.
2.[4]) This Biblical formula, understood within the code, could imply that the middle
class value of private ownership should be opposed. Of course, some FM of earlier
generations applied it in this way. Especially important, however, is the rhetoric of
personal rights used in the 1974 and 1979 editions: "The Scriptures teach the right
and responsibility of private ownership." (D 1974, par.33)~ This statement in effect
repudiates the spirit of renunciation: a code cannot transmit a definition of conduct
centered by the imperative of self denial and speak of personal rights at the same time.
While in our view, this rule qualifies the historic commitment to economic simplicity, the
1985 substitution of "privilege" for "right" represents an important
attempt to recover the original moral vision of the FM (D 1985, par. 336)
The close relationship between self denial and self
control in the D's definition of simplicity is indicated from the beginning by its call
for "diligence and frugality." (D 1860, sec. 2.[5]) In a sense, the addition in
1985 of the rule governing discipline of the body attempts to clarify these two as
interdependent. What is striking about the rule is that it draws borders around the body
not in terms of the classic spiritual disciplines, but in terms of "the pleasures of
this world." (D 1985, par.335.3) Self-denial is not defined in theocentric ways, but
by an inner-world asceticism in line with the fundamentalism of an earlier generation.
Yet, it makes more sense here than in the orthopraxy of Reformed fundamentalism. Here,
self-control gives witness to the Spirit's presence, who empowers a disciplined life of
simple service to others.
Our sense is, then, that in most matters related to a
simplified lifestyle, the D's imperative of self-denial has been retained and clarified.
Although certain moral boundaries have been redrawn in accord with FM's growing alliance
with conservative Protestantism, they are resignified in ways different from Reformed
Protestantism and consistent with the Wesleyan orthodoxy of entire sanctification. Having
said this, it would also seem that other symbols from an earlier period, especially when
adapted to the middle class values of private ownership, have been redrawn under pressure
of embourgeoisement.
The most important traditional symbol of the spirit of
renunciation is temperance. The first FM expansion of the Wesleyan rule prohibiting
"spirituous liquors" was instituted in 1882. What is striking about its
formulation are the two statements which bracket it in the code. On the one hand, the
prologue reads as follows: "A spirit of self-denial is indispensable to the Christian
character." (D 1882, sec 7.53) That is, to abstain from "spirituous
liquors" is to provide the necessary evidence of selflessness, the byproduct of inner
sanctification. And yet, on the other hand, the conclusion reads as follows: "We are
bound to do all we can to prohibit by law this nefarious traffic" (D 1882, sec 7.5)~
That is, "temperance" is not only a yardstick by which the believer's spiritual
maturity is measured; it has become the rule by which the society's moral boundaries are
legislated as well. The concluding social mandate, reflecting the influence of the
Temperance Movement within the church, is earlier justified by this claim: "A large
proportion of the crime and pauperism of the country is caused by strong drink." (D
1882, sec 7.53) There is a sense in which this socioeconomic justification stems from the
church's identification with the poorer classes, whose wellbeing is most ravaged by
alcohol abuse. Renunciation of "strong drink" constitutes proper evidence of
personal and public fitness. Indeed, temperance (really, total abstinence) has come to
symbolize within FM the interplay between spiritual and social forms of holiness.
The rule on temperance remains unchanged until 1974 (D
1974, par. 331), when its symbolic power is significantly weakened in three ways. (1)
Appeal to specific Biblical teaching replaces appeal to self-denial, the fruit of inner
sanctification, as the grounds of the rule's legitimacy. Here is yet more evidence of FM's
rapprochement with mainstream North American evangelicalism, with its paradigm merging
pre-millennialist piety and Princetonian (i.e., Reformed) theology (Dayton 1976, 121141;
Wall 1987b). (2) The rule draws moral boundaries only for the individual, even speaking of
alcoholic beverages as "self-destructive." The historic concern for society's
poor has been largely abandoned, except as drug abuse intrudes upon middle class values in
causing "crime, accidental death, broken homes, and job loss" as studies from
"experts" have shown itself a middle class evidence. (3) Finally, the
traditional concern for "strong drink" has been collapsed into more recent
concerns regarding drugs and tobacco, again, moral boundaries which separate Christian
from worldly conduct for most conservative Protestants. Yet, as FM joins the mainstream,
the distinctive symbol, temperance, is weakened as a particular feature of its orthopraxy.
There is a sense in which the 1985 revision of the rule
attempts to recover, if also to reinterpret, FM's historic stance. This it does through a
prophetic midrash on Mark 12:3031 (D 1985, par.335.2): to love our neighbor now means to
abstain from alcoholic beverages. In that "alcohol . . . is damaging to individual,
families, and society . . . to abstain from alcoholic beverages is "to make a united
social witness to the freedom Christ gives." Upon closer reading, the "social
witness" is to a rather middle class neighborhood. The class awareness of the first
FM statement on Temperance has been softened.
Moreover, the effort seems all the more meager when
compared to the expansion of the motif of individualism, already introduced in the 1974 D.
Now, the statement is introduced not by an appeal to self-denial but to "personal
development"which includes psychological, physical, and financial as well as
spiritual values, according to the revised rule.6 While these modifications seem to
suggest that there is little shift in attitudes about drinking alcohol, they also suggest
that the historic symbolic significance of the rule for FM has been substantially
undermined.
The Spirit of Abolition
Nowhere is the abolitionist Tendenz more
faithfully fixed and preserved than in the statement on human rights, added to the
code in 1964. (D 1964 par.85.5) When conservative Christianity had distanced itself from
the civil rights movement of the early 60's as being politically liberal, FM took the
remarkable action of affirming the equal worth of all persons and pledged "a
determined effort to eliminate the unchristian practice of racial discrimination and
injustice." Even though its further expansion in 1974 shifted the source of authority
from tradition (i.e., "The Free Methodist Church pledges a determined effort
....") to Scripture (D 1974, par. 326), it did nothing to soften the rule's
abolitionist spirit. At last here the critical social feature of FM's founding vision is
maintained.
In other spheres, however, the nature of social dissent
is modified under the pressures of encroaching embourgeoisement. For example, at
the point of origin, dress codes established the symbolic boundaries between the Christian
community and the socioeconomic mainstream. The community's identification with the
underclass is made clear by discouraging "superfluity of apparel" (D 1860, sec.
1)style of apparel being a symbol even in the ancient world of power (or lack of it) and
social status. The erosion of the symbolic purpose of this rule began in 1947 with the
deletion of the reading from Wesley's sermon on dress (D 1947, par.73)no doubt because it
had since become a perfunctory ritual if even performed. However, without the Wesley
sermon the tradition had lost its proper context for understanding the rule, justifying
the legalistic use of the rule while emptying it of its symbolic power.
This peril is realized by 1964, when the code adds the
footnote which reinterprets dress as a cultural custom, which can "change from age to
age." (D 1964, par.82) Dress has now completely lost its power as a symbol of dissent
against the middle class value of "superfluity," functioning only as an evidence
of one's social "propriety." Not surprisingly, then, the rule is eliminated from
the code in 1974, and replaced by the statement on simplicity of life (D
1974, par.332)a veritable paean to American middle class virtue, which assumes that a
"purchased and furnished home" is selected in accord with the principle of
simplicity. It is intriguing that the Biblical citations used to justify the stipulated
principle are taken from a NT paraenesis of "good Christian citizenship" which
bids believers to avoid conflict with the ruling elites of the social order in order to
participate more fully in the securities and comforts of the middle class.7
The tensions within the sociopolitical realm are
different. The rules governing citizenship and militarism stem from the
original prohibition against "fighting . . . and returning evil for evil, or railing
for railing." (D 1860, sec 2.[4]) A sectarian, even pacifistic, sentiment is
envisioned by this rule. In 1935, when fascism in Europe was beginning to rekindle
American fears of another world war, the code expanded its rule against fighting by
relating it specifically to militarism and war. The statement lays down a boundary
remarkably similar to that of the Peace Churches: militarism and war are "contrary to
the spirit of the NT and the teaching of Jesus Christ"; they are "utterly
indefensible . . . from humanitarian principles" and it is the "profound
conviction that none of our people should be required to enter military training or bear
arms"except in the case of "national peril."
In 1947, following the very war that the 1935 code
feared, the code is expanded again to define the exception clause, "national
peril," in this way: It is the church and not the state which defines national
perilin that it is the conference secretary who both receives and records the names of
conscientious objectors. (D 1947, par.73a.2) In this way, the believer could claim
"conscientious objector" status under the aegis of the church in agreement with
national law. At the very least, this particular commentary continues the spirit of the
founding prohibition against serving as a military combatant.
In 1974, the statement is transformed in such a
confusing way that we must conclude that the tradition itself is in jeopardy. (D 1974,
par. 335) Perhaps it is most intelligible only as a conservative response to the
"liberal" protest of the Vietnam period. The moral borders of the Christian
community are now redefined by the orthodoxy of "the sovereign authority of
government" and the orthopraxy of "good citizenship" and national
"duty." (D 1974, par. 335.1) Thus, the person's conscience no longer functions
as the community's symbol of public dissent; it is now defined as an internal element of
the moral apparatus of a good citizen.
The traditional teaching against militarism is retained
but severely modified by this new teaching about civil religion. The resultant revision
rejects "military aggression" "as an instrument of national policy and
strategy," and instructs the church to call for its abolition "as a means to the
settlement of international disputes." (D 1974, par.335.2) The security of the
sovereign nation now centers the church's response to war and peace; the church is now
understood as an institution of the political order and custodian of its myth of national
security.
The movement of the sociopolitical boundaries toward the
cultural main stream is also indicated by the statement on Christian citizenship,
first added in 1969 (D 1969, par. 84~ and expanded to its present form in 1974 (D 1974,
par. 327). The 1974 revision is important for two reasons: (1) the rhetoric employed is
individualistic rather than communal; and (2) the definition of society is positive and
participatory rather than adversarial. Now the believer is admonished in a church's moral
code to exercise "his right to vote." Again, Biblical citations are taken from
the institutional paraenesis of the NT, which envisions a sociology of consolidation
rather than conflict with the social context. In this sense, the code stipulates behaviors
for those interested in joining the sociopolitical mainstream rather than for those
engaging in protest from the margins.
Finally, we turn to the borders defining FM's
relationship to other "philanthropic" groups, or secret societies. The
socio-religious tension in the founding vision was typical of sectarian movements: FM
conceived itself to be uniquely legitimate as the carrier if not also caretaker of a
uniquely important orthodoxy in a pluralistic world. Institutionalized secrecy symbolized
evil and guile; whereas the evidence of sanctification is institutionalized grace.
Moreover, disclosure of the religious intentions of a philanthropic association is
necessary to knowing whether an alliance is even possible. In this sense, sectarian
intolerance defines the limits of a pluralizing tolerance.
Three revisions in the development of this tradition are
important to consider. The first, in 1915, expands the code to include teaching on labor
unions (D 1915, par. 73)at the time a revolutionary entity in American life. Any
association with unionism, understood here as a philanthropic rather than an
anti-Christian movement, had to meet two conditions: (1) the abolitionist spirit inclined
the church to stand on the side of the working classes; only those unions which sought
their betterment without discrimination or coercion were therefore acceptable. (2) The
abolitionist spirit was also sectarian and inclined the church to oppose any union which
used secret oaths to give itself unique legitimacy over the church. The statement is
sociologically significant because it sought to define the church in the workplace in a
way which reflected its tensions and the church's accommodations to it. The labor union
was viewed as legitimate to the extent that it shared the church's spirit of abolition.
Unions were simply not uniquely legitimate in se.
The second revision, made in 1951 (D 1951, par. 83.3),
added an interesting endnote to its rule on secret societies and eliminated the clause on
labor unions. Since unions were given national legitimacy by the Taft-Hartley bill in
1947, the church thought it appropriate to give clear expression to their status in the
1951 D, only to have the egalitarian core of its rule stripped away in the 1974 revision.
In any case, the "endnote" added in 1951 allowed insurance policies to be
retained from competing societies if they were contracted before one had joined the
Christian community. Here practical tolerance won out over sectarian intolerance. In fact,
the 1099 of invested dollars or of the security of insurance, which this expansion now
contradicted, was once the very sort of evidence demanded for entrance into the Christian
community.
The final revision, made in 1974 (D 1974, par. 334), is
again characterized by a shift away from the corporate character of the community toward a
code for personal morality. Accordingly, the principle of "individual rights"
(par. 334.1) and the hierarchy of "employer-employee" (par. 334.3) now interpret
the workplace. Ironically, such a commentary is justified by appeal to the slave-master
legislation of NT code (par. 334.3, 5). The abolitionist Tendenz against such
hierarchies has now been turned upside down!
More importantly in my view, there is a shift in the
definition of secrecy. The concern is now about institutional loyalty and allegiance.
Secrecy has come to symbolize a false religion with the potential of confusing an immature
believer. In a sense, this revision suggests a retreat back to parochialism and away from
the founding understanding that institutionalized secrecy made cooperation difficult.
IV
In concluding this study, let me make two brief and
pointed observations, framed by the acute observations made by Max Weber two generations
ago. (Weber, 1922) The D reflects the growing bifurcation of private and public worlds
within FM. Especially during the last generation, the symbolic boundaries which order
private lives are reified while those symbols of public protest against socioeconomic
injustice are redrawn in ways which undermine the abolitionist vision of the founding
fathers and mothers. Such a bifurcation is evidence of embourgeoisementi.e., the
movement of a prophetic community, which stood on society's margins with its poor and
powerless, toward society's mainstream. This movement demands at least public conformity
to the political and economic agendas of its middle class. In this sense, FM has become
the very kind of denomination against which it once reacted and which it sought to revive.
Across Wesleyanism, however, there are prophetic voices,
empowered by the charisma of revival, trying to be heard: Timothy Smith and Donald Dayton,
Paul Bassett and Randy Maddox, and the roll call continues to include newer voices within
this Society. These are those who contend that the vision which founded FM is profoundly
redemptive and Biblical; its erosion, whether because of social pressure or religious
alliance, is bad news and not good news for God's people.
Weber reminded us that religious movements like FM are
dynamic processes, like life itself. Wesleyan movements typically are energized by class
protest and are therefore threatened by the forms and forces of embourgeoisement,
only to be reformed again by the renewal of an abolitionist spirit. Wesleyan movements are
centered as well by notions of personal holiness, typically codified and threatened by
legalism and individualism. Because Christian ethics is really theological ethics and
behavior follows from and is made coherent by beliefs, my own hunch is that any reform of
the tradition will take us back to the orthodoxy of God's sanctifying grace, which we must
continue to teach with even greater clarity and conviction. Then, within these theological
boundaries, we might be better able to transmit to our children the vision of self-denial
and abolition as the hard but requisite responses of Christian community to its various
private and public worlds.
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bellah, Robert N.
1967 "Civil Religion in America." Daedalus 96:121.
Berger, Peter
1967 The Sacred Canopy. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
Dayton, Donald W.
1976 Discovering An Evangelical Heritage. New York: Harper & Row.
Greeley, Andrew.
1972 The Denominational Society. Glenview, II.: Scott. Foresman.
Hunter, James D.
1987 Evangelicalism: The Coming Generation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lasch, Christopher
1978 The Culture of Narcissism. New York: Norton.
Livermore, Paul
1989 "The Formative Document of a Denomination Aborning: The Discipline of the Free
Methodist Church (1860)." Pp. 175195 in Religious Writings and Religious Systems,
vol. 2. Ed. by J. Neusner, E. Previchs and A. Levine BSR2; Atlanta: Scholars Press.
Marston, Leslie R.
1960 From Age to Age: A Living Witness. Winona Lake Ind.: Light and Life Press.
McGuire, Meredith B.
1987 Religion: The Social Context. Second Edition. Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth.
Robertson, Roland
1970 The Sociological Interpretation of Religion. New York: Schocken.
Smith, Timothy L.
1957 Revivalism and Social Reform. (1976) Gloucester, Ma.: Peter Smith.
Troeltsch, Ernst
1931 The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches. Vols. 12. (1960) New York:
HarDer & Row.
Wall, Robert W.
1987a "Law and Gospel, Church and Canon." Wesleyan Theological Journal
22:3870.
1987b "Evangelicalism." Seattle Pacific University Review 6:4455.
Weber, Max.
1922 The Society of Religion. (1963) Boston: Beacon.
NOTES
1On this topic, I have benefited enormously from the
insight and suggestions of my colleagues and friends, Martin Abbott of Seattle Pacific
University and Donald W. Dayton of Northern Baptist Theological Seminary. I hope that this
paper reflects in some measure their kind benefactions toward me.
2For this point see Paul Livermore's critical rhetorical
study, "The Formative Document of a Denomination Aborning The Discipline of the Free
Methodist Church (1860)," in Religious Writings and religious Systems, vol. 2
(BSR2; J. Neusner, E. Previchs and A. Levine, eds.; Atlanta Scholars Press, 1989), 17779.
I am profoundly grateful to Professor Livermore, not only for this splendid essay but for
several conversations we had while I was preparing this paper.
3By way of analogy, Peter Zaas has challenged the
consensus which holds that the Pauline vice catalogues are preformed constructions and
incidental to Paul's epistolary purposes; "Catalogues and Context: I Corinthians 5
and 6," NTS 34 (1988), pp. 62229. Zaas shows that Paul and not "tradition"
constructs lists of vices and virtues to make theological points which address his
audiences' needs.
4Sociological typologies are intellectual constructs; we
do not expect to find in society what we find in the mind. Therefore, the proper role of a
"sociological typology" in a study such as this one is to explain rather than to
describe a social movement or institution.
5This Tendenz is best reflected in the massive
1974 revision of the Codea revision prompted as much by political exigencies surrounding
the Free Methodist Church's then-proposed merger with the Wesleyan Church as with its
growing infatuation with mainstream evangelicalism.
6The language of "therapy" which enters the
Code in 1974 betrays a middle class understanding of authority, with its emphasis on
"individual wholeness." Cf. C. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism (New
York: Norton, 1978), pp. 18286
7Cf Martin Dibelius and Hans Conzelmann, The Pastoral
Epistles ("Hermeneia"; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), pp. 3941.
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at Northwest Nazarene University
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