A COVENANT CONCEPT OF ATONEMENT
by
R. Larry Shelton
A key concern of evangelical theology in general, and of Wesleyan—Arminian
theology in particular, is the need of sinful humanity for restoration to fellowship with
God. This need for salvation is addressed by the atoning work of Jesus Christ. Although
some of the theological and Biblical metaphors for atonement reflect cultural, legal or
governmental concepts, the foundational understanding must be essentially interpersonal.
The issues of sin and salvation are profoundly interpersonal in nature. It is a personal
humanity which stands in need of reconciliation with a personal God. In Scripture, the
central paradigm of this saving relationship with God is the covenant motif. In both its
cultic and interpersonal elements, the covenant metaphor serves as the basic hermeneutical
reference point for the doctrine of salvation in the Biblical narrative.
In developing a theology of atonement, the entire canonical witness of Scripture must
be considered. Such a methodology must consider the theological witness of the entire
canon rather than to present a truncated focus which emphasizes only certain thematic
emphases such as the juristic or penal metaphors, or which relies on word studies alone.
Parenthetically, because of the covenant context of the atonement, even the juridical
metaphors occur in contexts where the relational emphasis has been previously established.
While such a canonical procedure cannot be carried out with completeness in the space
available here, it is possible to stress the Covenant relationship between God and His
people while minimizing the assertion of theological constructs which are external to the
canonical text or which are occasional rather than universal paradigms for atonement.
It is clear that the Biblical canon presents God consistently as a personal Being who
interacts personally with those beings created in His image. In the Old Testament, He is
seen initiating a series of events leading to the salvation of His chosen people.
Likewise, in the New Testament, "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto
himself" (2 Cor. 5:19, KJV), and thus in Christ God reveals His personhood in
historical and experiential ways. Thus, while salvation history presents a rich and
diverse description of God's saving activity, the primary and continual theme of the
covenant relationship underlies the canonical treatment of atonement.
I. The Covenant Context of Atonement
The Old Testament sacrificial system which was used in part to accomplish atonement
between Israel and God found its expression in the context of the covenant. Indeed, as a
result of the covenant, the sacrificial cultus was established by divine initiative in
order that a humanity which was estranged from God might have a way of removing the
barrier caused by sin. Although Israel tended to understand the sacrificial cultus as an ex
opere operato action performed for its own sake, the basic character of Old Testament
religion was interpersonal. Israel was united with Yahweh only in the context of
interpersonal, covenantal faith, not by blind trust in the promises of the covenant or by
faithful performance of the prescribed legal or sacrificial ritual. Therefore, in order to
explicate a theology of atonement, it is first necessary to establish the meaning of the
covenant context in which the atonement occurs.
Although the etymology of berith is not thoroughly clear and its usage is
controversial, as seen by the discussions of Weinfeld, Barr, Kutsch, and others, the
frequency of its usage indicates its importance in Old Testament theology.1
Davidson notes that the term berith occurs nearly 300 times in the Old Testament in
addition to many allusions to the concept of covenant.2
The etymology of the term is inconclusive for establishing the semantical usage of berith.
A variety of diverse and sometimes conflicting meanings emerge from an etymological
analysis. Meanings as different as "bind" and "cut or cleave" are
found.3 A semantical analysis of berith is more fruitful
for an understanding of its Biblical usage. As James Barr has shown, berith is an
opaque word which has little relationship to its etymology in actual usage. It functions
quite idiomatically. For example, it is not pluralized in Old Testament usage in spite of
the number of covenants attached to persons, times and places. Such a singular usage of
the term, Barr insists, reflects a restricted range of meaning which is determined not by
the larger etymology but by the specific semantical application of the concept.
Furthermore, berith is virtually lacking in synonyms, and it is used in very
limited contexts.4 All in all, however, the concept of covenant
reflects a relationship which is interpersonal rather than an objective, impersonal
statement of law.5 It provides a particularly apt metaphor for
the relationship between God and Israel. The Mosaic Covenant in Exodus 19—24 and the
covenant in Joshua 24 are examples. Particularly at Sinai, the covenant metaphor is used
to describe a divinely initiated agreement which is ratified by Israel's response (Ex.
24:4—8), and conditioned upon Israel's obedience. Only if certain stipulations are
followed is there a guarantee of a continuance of fellowship between Israel and God.
Israel will enjoy the benefits of the covenant promises only if she obeys the demands
articulated by God at Sinai. Indeed, the conditionality of covenantal fellowship with God
is explicitly stated in Leviticus 18:24—28; Deuteronomy 4:25—26; Jeremiah
4:1—2; and Ezekiel 33:23—29.
At Sinai, God gave expression to the relationship between Himself and Israel which had
begun with Abraham. His offer to make a covenant with Israel was an act of grace, for
Abraham had not merited the promise, "In thee shall all the families of the earth be
blessed" (Gen. 12:3, KJV). Yet there were obligations. Eichrodt says:
With the Sinai covenant, God was to continue His assistance and faithfulness while
Israel's behavior was subjected to specific standards. God thus forbade that which
abolished the relationship created in the covenant with His elect nation. Every breach of
this Law was a personal offense against this God whose concern and love had been so
explicitly expressed.8 As long as Israel was obedient to the
Decalogue and observed the standards of the sacrificial system, God would continue to
assist and deliver her. Because of this specifically defined relationship, the fear of
arbitrariness in God was excluded from Israel, and in this atmosphere of covenant security
Israel found its strength.9
This communion with God was mediated through the rite of sacrifice. In this context of
sacral communion, the rite of blood—covenanting brought God and Israel together in a
mutual union. This did not reflect, however the pagan concept of magical power residing in
the sacrificial victim. Instead, the covenant sacrifice resulted in a personal and moral
commitment to God and a personal union with Him which gave Israel life and strength.10 While pagan rituals had to be continually repeated in order to
maintain the cycle of nature or appease their gods, in the Israelite covenant, the
sacrifice was not repeated in order to maintain a magical nature cycle, but to commemorate
the establishment of the relationship and to express faithfulness to it.11
Thus, the relationship between God and Israel took the shape of an interpersonal
covenant relationship which became the basis of Israel's history. When this covenant was
transgressed, Israel was alienated from God and the covenant sanctions became operative.
Only through repentance could Israel be forgiven and restored to covenantal fellowship.12
In the New Testament, the frequency of explicit references to the covenant is
diminished. The word diatheke is used some thirty times in the sense of
"covenant." In Galatians 3:16, Paul relates the covenant of Abraham to Christ,
and the Letter to the Hebrews also compares the new covenant in Christ to the old under
the Law (Heb. 7:1—22 and ch. 8). Thus, while the New Testament retains the idea of a
covenant relationship to God, this is a new covenant which functions through the agency of
Christ rather than through the sacrificial cultus. The universal invitation of Christ's
covenant establishes a covenant relationship with all who will accept it. In making
explicit this covenant which was implicit in Creation, God profoundly demonstrates that He
is indeed Lord of all creation. In the Eucharist, a lasting and personal relationship
between Christ and the Church is expressed in a new and creative way. The Last Supper is
understood to anticipate Jesus' death as the historical event upon which the new covenant
relationship with God is to be based. The "new commandment" (John 13:34) of love
becomes the stipulated condition which binds Jesus and the Church. The Eucharist as the
anticipation, then, and the remembrance, now, of the Cross becomes the most profound
expression of the covenant relationship.13
The cup of faith takes the place of the oath in confirming the new covenant
relationship. As Mendenhall says, "Since the relationship to Christ is both the
content and the obligation . . . of the covenant, all the detailed prescriptions of Jewish
law are both unnecessary and (for Paul) inimical to Christianity."14 In place of these prescriptions, the Church bases its covenant
faith on God's work in Christ (2 Cor. 5:19); Rom. 3:25ff, etc.), the abolition of the
curse of the Law through the Cross, and the rejection of the covenant relationship because
of sin. Christ's person and work are God's offer and the Eucharist and life of faith are
the Church's response. Thus, the OT and NT covenants have continuity and yet
distinctiveness, as Mendenhall notes:
and yet the Sinai covenant of the OT and the NT covenant in Christ's blood are one:
each created a people of God out of those who were no people, demanded the complete
self—surrender to God as a joyful response to the love of God which preceded. The
simple stipulations of the Decalogue were summed up in the yet simpler obligation of love
at Jesus' command—but this is no command; it is rather the very nature of the
relationship between God and the community.15
The need for atonement, then, is directly tied to the nature of the covenant. Because
of disobedience to the covenant stipulations, in short, because of sin, both Israel and
the Church, indeed all humanity (Rom. 1:18—3:20), finds itself in desperate need for
a means of restoration to God's fellowship. As the basis of reconciliation, the atonement
provides the means by which this can occur.
Furthermore, since all sin is essentially relational, the overcoming of the curse of
sin must involve personal and relational means. The sacrifice, for example, is an endeavor
to remove the barrier created by sin between God and the person. It is important to
remember that in the OT, it was God Himself who initiated and established the sacrificial
system for the purpose of Israel's making atonement of sin. However, the sacrificial
cultus is limited to sins of inadvertence. Intentional sins are not covered and some may
not be atoned for at all (I Sam. 3:14; Isa. 47:11). For those sins covered by sacrifice,
the person who has violated the covenant obligations must avoid God's wrath by a proper
use of the cultus. What occurs in the process of avoiding wrath is the essence of
atonement, or kipper.
Much controversy surrounds the meaning of kipper. The term can mean "make
expiation," "wipe away," "forgive," "appease," or
"propitiate," as well as a number of other nuances. The debate over kipper
relates primarily to whether atonement means "expiation,"
"propitiation," or both. "Propitiation" suggests that God, who is
angered by sin, requires that something be done to appease that anger before forgiveness
can be offered the sinner. "Expiation" focuses on the removal of the sin which
incurred God's wrath, and this is usually done through sacrifice.16
While he has probably overstated his case, C. H. Dodd has argued that kipper is most
accurately rendered "expiate," since God is not an irascible deity whose anger
must be appeased by sacrifices and bribes so that His reluctance to forgive may be
overcome. Dodd notes that the Biblical writers portray God as the One who initiates
forgiveness rather than as a capricious and vindictive deity who must be bribed back into
a good mood by sacrificial gifts. Thus, expiation better represents the nature of the
sacrifice which removes or annuls the sin so that God can forgive with integrity because
the cause of His anger has been removed.17 The strength of this
argument is that it denies that God's reluctance to forgive is a hindrance to
reconciliation. Its weakness lies in its unwillingness to admit that there is divine wrath
and hence a propitiatory element, although not pagan appeasement, in the Biblical usage of
kipper. For example, propitiation is certainly the intended usage in Numbers 25:1—13.
Here God's anger was being executed against those who had worshipped Baal—peor.
However, His wrath ceased when the guilty couple was slain by Phinehas the priest.18
Others, such as Leon Morris, object to the expiatory interpretation of atonement
because it gives inadequate consideration to the moral nature of God whose anger at sin is
based on His holiness and integrity. Morris does not see God's wrath as impersonal
retribution, for God has provided means for averting His wrath. However, he strongly
stresses the propitiatory means of satisfying God. These propitiatory ways of purging sin
include destroying the offending city (Deut. 13:15—17), putting away heathen wives
(Ezra 10:14), and repentance (Jonah 3 7, 10).19 Interestingly, the
last two examples he gives seem certainly to involve expiation, which is reconciliation by
removing the cause of God's wrath Other OT examples of expiation include intercession
(Ex.32:30), offering incense (Num.16:47), and possibly an offering of money (Ex. 30:16).
Indeed, neither propitiation nor expiation can exclusively convey the entire range of
atonement ideas, and etymological means alone will not settle the debate.
The important issue, then, is how God's wrath against sin can be averted. Ultimately,
in both the OT and NT atonement is achieved by some means of expiation which results in
propitiation. Sacrifice, or some other means such as prayer, expiates sin and removes the
cause of wrath. This removal of sin and the corresponding repentance and obedience of the
person results in the propitiation of God. He is propitiated because His intention was to
maintain the covenant fellowship in the first place. Whatever makes possible the
restoration of that fellowship appeases Him, whether it be sacrifice, prayer, or the
destruction of the guilty party.
Repentance in itself may serve to expiate sin and propitiate God. Milgrom shows that
repentance can have an expiatory function. While sacrificial atonement is useful only for
involuntary wrongdoing, a deliberate sinner may mitigate his offense by confessing it and
repenting. Through remorse and confession, the penitent reduces his intentional sin to an
inadvertent one and thus makes it eligible for sacrificial expiation.20
This may well have been what Moses was trying to accomplish for the people by praying for
their forgiveness for sins not covered by the sacrificial system (Ex. 32:30). In any case,
God's forgiveness at all levels was conditioned upon the repentance of the sinner and this
involved a contrite confession of sin (Lev. 5:5). The sacrificial acts were not effective
unless they were accompanied by true repentance.21 Not only must
atonement involve something which changes God's attitude toward the sinner (propitiation)
but something must also change the sinner's attitude toward sin (expiation). Thus, the
personal repentance of the sinner resulted in the personal forgiveness of God and the
restoration of the relationship of covenant love between God and the penitent.
It is clear, then, that in the OT the expiation of the sacrificial atonement was not a
mechanistic removal of sin apart from forgiveness for sin. God's forgiveness was
conditioned upon the sinner's repentance (Lev. 5:5).22 Only when the
breach caused by unconfessed and unforgiven sin was healed could the relationship with God
be restored. Since sin had broken the relationship, it could not remain operative in the
sinner's life if the covenant fellowship was to be restored.23
Through the sacrificial cultus, the penitent expressed his penitence and submission to the
will of God. By conformity to the ritual prescribed by God's grace, the sinner acted in
such a way as to show his personal surrender to God and because this obedient action
indicated repentance and confession for the sin, the broken covenant fellowship was
restored. Obedience to the Law thus expressed love for God who had established the
covenant community. Since this kind of covenant love was the essence of fellowship with
God, the covenant relationship was normalized and the purpose of the covenant order was
restored.24 Entrance into the covenant was by faith in God and
obedience to His Law as sealed by circumcision (Gen. 17:11, 12). Maintenance of the
covenant was thus contingent upon faith and moral obedience to its stipulations, including
repentance for sin through its sacrificial provisions.25
II. Christ's Atonement in the Covenant Context
In the NT, the atonement of Christ functions to initiate and maintain God's new
covenant with all humanity. While Christ's death may seem analogous to the OT sacrifices,
it is not entirely so. Not only His death, but His life are revelations of God's love
which work to reconcile an alienated humanity back to Himself (John 3:16; Rom. 5:8; 8:32).
Christ's sacrifice of death and resurrection delivers humanity from sin and establishes a
new covenant with God.26 The OT sacrifices are limited in
usefulness to atone for the involuntary sins of those living under a previously
established covenant. Christ's Incarnation is efficacious for all sin and for all people,
regardless of their previous covenant affiliation with God. His death is sacrificial, but
not identical with the definition and function of the OT system. Also, it should be noted
that since the OT sacrifices incorporated more than the sin offering, but worship and
praise as well, the sacrifice of Christ is certainly not limited to any penal or judicial
function.
Indeed, diatheke in the NT expresses primarily the idea of forgiveness in
connection with the work of Christ. Because of Christ a relationship between God and man
has become possible in a way previously impossible. What the Law could not do in
overcoming sin, God has done in Christ (Rom. 8:3—4). The writer of Hebrews speaks of
a "better covenant" (Heb. 7:22; 8:6). Paul compares the old covenant with a
schoolmaster whose purpose was to lead Israel to Christ, while the new covenant is
spiritual and based on faith (Gal. 3). Morris says, "Each time the New Testament
refers to the new covenant as having been prophesied it links an explicit reference to
forgiveness of sin with the new covenant."27
While it is clear that Christ establishes this new covenant as a context in which
forgiveness and reconciliation may occur, it is less clear how what Christ does can cancel
the effects of sin and reconcile humanity to God. A number of metaphors are used to convey
pictorially the means of atonement.28 These metaphors include the
ideas of sacrifice, ransom, redemption, reconciliation, justification, adoption, and
regeneration. The common element in these concepts is the concern to release the sinner
from the wrathful consequences of sin and restore the penitent to fellowship with God
through forgiveness. In interpreting these metaphors it is important to remember that all
of them must be understood against the background of the covenant with its personal and
relational implications. Scholars such as Leon Morris tend to stress the irrevocable
nature and authoritative disposition of the covenant. This tendency may reflect a Reformed
predestinarian bias more accurately than it reflects the evidence. As noted earlier, Barr
and others caution against any facile attempt to render "covenant" as a
unilateral sort of obligation.29 Furthermore, the dispensationalists
notwithstanding, the Abrahamic covenant is at least implicitly conditional and the Mosaic
covenant is explicitly conditional and stresses Israel's responsibility. Note Exodus 19:5:
Both Jeremiah and Ezekiel stressed the conditionality of the covenant promises (Jer.
4:1—2; Ezek. 33:23—29). In the NT, Paul certainly sees the covenant promises as
conditioned upon obedience. After recounting Israel's being "broken off" from
the olive tree because of their unbelief (Rom. 11:17—20), he declares that only if
they do not continue in their unbelief will they again be grafted in (Rom. 11:23). The
community of the covenant are those who believe in Christ as "children of the
promise" (Rom. 9:8).30
The sacrificial metaphors in particular should receive attention from
Wesleyan—Arminians. Since the atoning work of Christ is frequently described with
sacrificial terminology, it is tempting to understand terms such as "cross,"
"blood," "sacrifice," "lamb" as referring exclusively to
Christ as a sin offering. Furthermore, the sacrificial victim in the sin offering is
sometimes understood as having a vicarious penalty inflicted upon it. In fact, it is not
clearly established that the sacrificial victim in the OT absorbed the penalty deserved by
the sinner. Instead, the victim reflected the repentance of the one who offered the
sacrifice. Also, when Christ is spoken of as a "paschal lamb" by Paul (I Cor.
5:7) and the "Lamb of God" by John (John 1:29, 36), he is understood to be a
sacrifice but not a sin offering. The paschal lamb of Passover indicates celebration over
deliverance from bondage.
Furthermore, the significance of "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the
world" (Rev. 13:8), is that the atonement of Christ is not just the single act of the
cross, but is the "righteousness of God," the eternal, saving character of God
Himself. The death of Christ is the "eternal, suffering love of God for man,"31 which may not indicate His absorption of His own penalty as much
as it indicates the extent to which He will go to restore a covenant which He did not
break and to deliver helpless humanity from bondage which it brought upon itself.
These sacrificial metaphors imply that Christ's incarnation was a sacrifice to God
which fully achieved what the OT ritual did only in figure and, in constant necessity of
repetition. Also, it must be remembered that the sacrifice in the OT was effective in
restoring the covenant relationship only when it was accompanied by the faith and
obedience of the one on whose behalf it was offered. The wrath of God was averted by the
obedient performance of a ritual made available by grace.
As a sacrifice, Christ also functioned as a representative of all sinners. In His
baptism at the hands of the Baptist, He identifies with Israel and the whole of humanity
in giving Himself to God. Cullmann says in this regard:
. . . Jesus is baptized in view of his death, which effects forgiveness of sins for all
men. For this reason Jesus must unite himself in solidarity with his whole people, and go
down himself to Jordan, that "all righteousness might be fulfilled."32
Christ thus becomes the ultimate statement of humanity's repentance and confession of
faith. His atonement is vicarious not simply in that He became a sacrifice so that we
would not have to be sacrifices, but it is vicarious in that by His life, death and
resurrection He modeled to us how we were to be "living sacrifices" (Romans
12:1—2). It is only as our repentance and obedience are complete so that we are
united with Christ in the sacrifice of His total life (Rom. 6:1—10) that sin is
expiated and God is propitiated. In the OT, the sacrificial ritual whereby repentance was
to be expressed was prescribed by God. In the NT, the proper sacrificial attitude is
exemplified by Christ's life and death. Instead of a sacrificial ritual we have a
sacrificial example. This example does not simply inspire the sinner to moral renewal, but
requires that the sinner also express repentance for sin and personal surrender to God by
identifying in faith with the dying and rising experience of Christ (Rom. 6:1—10).
Thus, by obedient union by faith in the events of Christ's sacrificial life and death, the
believer is enabled to conform to the covenant expectations. This is justification since
the believer is now brought into a relationship of righteousness in the covenant union.33
Thus, a sacrificial understanding of the atonement in the context of the covenant
relationship emphasizes the need for participatory involvement in the "fellowship of
his sufferings." Christ's work benefits me only as I experience it in
faith—union with Him. When the objective work of Christ in atonement is divorced from
the subjective need for the appropriation of his work by faith, the vicarious implications
of Christ's dying "for many" (Mark 10:45) give way to a substitutionary emphasis
in which Christ's work becomes an external and transactional satisfaction of penalty which
tends to separate the believer from responsibility for moral and spiritual growth.34 This kind of monergism is avoided with the Wesleyan—Arminian
emphasis which stresses both the objective work of Christ before God and the subjective
work of Christ in the believer which leads him/her to an appropriate faith response.
By placing himself among humanity as a part of it, Christ as the perfect expression of
humanity in obedience to God, took the place of our weakness and rebellion and
accomplished a reconciliation with God for us. God "made him who knew no sin to be
sin on our behalf, that we might become the righteousness of God in Him" (2 Cor.
5:21, NASV). The fact that He "bore our sins in his body on the cross" (1 Peter
2:24 NASV), gives us an example of what obedience to God really is. Peter has said in 1
Peter 2:18—23, that what finds favor with God is obedience to Him in the face of
unjust suffering:
Servants, be submissive to your masters with all respect, not only to those who are
good and gentle, but also to those who are unreasonable. For this finds favor, if for the
sake of conscience toward God a man bears up under sorrows when suffering unjustly. For
what credit is there if, when you sin and are harshly treated, you endure it with
patience? But if when you do what is right and suffer for it you patiently endure it, this
finds favor with God. For you have been called for this purpose, since Christ also
suffered for you, leaving you an example (emphasis mine) for you to follow in His steps,
who committed no sin, nor was any deceit found in His mouth, and while being reviled, He
did not revile in return; while suffering, He uttered no threats, but kept entrusting
Himself to Him who judges righteously; and He Himself bore our sins in His body on the
cross, that we might die to sin and live to righteousness; for by his wounds you were
healed (NIV).
In the OT, the prescriptions of covenant expectations were made clear so that the
believer would have measurable standards by which his behavior was judged. In the NT,
Christ is the incarnation, the example, of covenant expectations. Ritual obedience to the
Law could not make the believer like Christ. Only union with Him in faith could make the
believer righteous. In this new covenant, the believer is asked to be his/her own
sacrifice by a faith—union with the perfect expression of covenant obedience, the
sacrifice of Christ's life, death and resurrection. Christ is not only a sin offering
which expresses our repentance, He is the entire covenant who also expresses our
thanksgiving and worship and pattern for covenant life. Christ as our sacrifice expresses
a repentance so perfect and complete that it expiates the effects of sin for all those who
in faith allow Christ to be the expression of their repentance. Because Christ speaks for
us and perfectly expresses our repentance and obedience, God's wrath against us is
propitiated and we are restored to covenant fellowship. Christ, therefore, as our
hilasterion, establishes us in righteous relationship to God "that we might become
the righteousness of God in Him" (2 Cor. 5:21). Thus, Christ breaks the barrier
between humanity and God (Eph. 2:14) not just by changing the attitude of God, but by
expressing a change in humanity as well. Reconciliation occurs not because God's justice
is satisfied by retributive punishment but by a correction of humanity's covenant
relationship to God and thus removing the cause for God's wrath.
The kind of obedience God desires is the kind Christ showed when He obeyed to the point
of death. Thus, Peter makes clear that he understands what Christ did in His life and
death to be the perfect example of obedience, in order that by identifying with His
example of perfect obedience, we might "die to sin and live to righteousness"
also in a relationship of acceptable covenant obedience. The writer of Hebrews expresses a
similar emphasis in calling Christ the "pioneer of our salvation" (Heb. 2:10;
12:2).35 The prevalence of atonement theories derived primarily from
cultural and political settings, such as the penal substitution theory, has tended to
obscure the covenant emphasis of the believer as a "living sacrifice" following
Christ's example by faith—union with Him. In particular, the penal theory has been
compatible with theories of limited atonement. John Wesley's reaction to such doctrines is
clear. Because such objective theories relate atonement to eternal decrees resulting in a
determinism which gives the sinner no opportunity for a faith response, they reflect a
love "as makes the blood run cold," says Wesley.36 Unless
grace is free for all, there is really no gospel to proclaim. Because of its Biblical
predominance and relational emphasis which expresses expectations to which a penitent may
respond, the covenant understanding of atonement avoids the difficulties of other
theories.
III. A Brief Survey of Atonement Theories
In addition to the Biblical metaphors for atonement, other theological metaphors have
been set forth throughout the history of doctrine, primarily since the eleventh century.
The Church has never endorsed any of these theories as tests of faith, although some of
them have enjoyed wide acceptance. While these theories have been useful within their
cultural contexts, the very fact that they have arisen out of specific cultural/historical
settings has tended to limit the universality of their relevance. Theological creativity
in expressing the Gospel in relevant cultural terms is to be encouraged, but the freezing
of some of these theories into creedal and dogmatic forms tends to diminish their
effectiveness when the cultural and historical milieu changes.
For example, the satisfaction theory advanced by St. Anselm in the eleventh century
reflects the understanding of honor and satisfaction which was found in the Code of
Chivalry when "knighthood was in flower." Anselm saw the atonement as a
restoration of God's offended honor by the meritorious and supererogatory obedience
offered by Christ on behalf of humanity. The obedience of Christ's life had merit to make
amends for the infinite dishonor brought upon God's name by sinful humanity.37 However, once the idea of the treasury of merits was discounted by
Protestantism, the relevance of Anselm's theory was minimized and its influence went the
way of chivalry.
Another theory which has had wide influence is the penal substitution theory developed
by the Reformers. This concept which has its roots in Anselm's theory develops the idea
that Christ absorbs the penalty of God's curse upon sin in the place of the sinner. Again,
the historical context provides a framework for a new metaphor for the atonement. The
indulgence controversies had raised the issue of merits, and Martin Luther struggled to
demonstrate the sole sufficiency of Christ for salvation apart from merit attached to the
lives of saints or the efforts of the believer. This Augustinian view of sin as depravity
led him, as well as Calvin, to place salvation beyond the level of human participation.
Also, through the period of feudalism, Teutonic political theory had come to view justice
in terms of abstract law rather than in terms of personal honor as in the age of chivalry.
Justice was accomplished not by restoration of personal relationships, but by satisfying
the penalties required by law. In this context of retributive justice, the satisfaction of
the legal penalty of death for sin was the only option for understanding atonement. Thus,
passages like 2 Cor. 5:21, "He made him who knew no sin to be sin on our
behalf," were understood not in the covenant context of sacrifice as an expression of
repentance and obedience, but in the legal sense of penal substitution. Such verses were
interpreted without reference to the covenant understanding of sacrifice. The result was a
very rigid and objective view of atonement which reinterpreted the sacrificial metaphor as
a propitiatory offering, and which overlooked the fact that the most serious kinds of sins
had no means of sacrificial expiation. Forgiveness was based on God's forgiving grace in
response to repentance and obedience.
Calvin saw the problem in part, but scarcely improved the situation. His strange
doctrine of imputation led him to say that God's wrath does not really rest on Christ, but
God treats Him as if He were angry. Thus, Christ does not bear God's anger, but merely
something exactly like it! This negates any practical understanding of sanctification
because the believer is not really righteous, but by a moral fiction is treated as if he
were.38
Later Protestant Scholasticism continued to interpret the work of Christ as a penal
substitution, and viewed justice as exclusively retributive and transactional. The
personal faith relationship essential to a Biblical covenant tended to be replaced by a
Lutheran sacramentalism and a predestinarian Calvinism which understood covenant as a
unilateral, deterministic, and juristic set of divine decrees. The result was a loss of
the covenant/interpersonal understanding of the Biblical covenant concept of salvation.
In the face of the increasingly effective attack on the penal theory by the Socinians,
Hugo Grotius altered the penal theory by defining justice as a need for orderly government
in a moral universe, rather than as the need for God to administer retributive penalties
upon the offending parties. For Grotius, Christ's suffering is penal, but voluntary, and
the example of Christ's passion deters sinners from continuing in a path which disrupts
moral order.
The Arminian and Wesleyan theologians tended to follow Grotius' governmental theory
with some changes. Curcellaeus emphasized he idea of sacrifice rather than satisfaction of
wrath through punishment, thus describing the priestly work of Christ as propitiatory, but
not penal. Curcellaeus says:
Christ did not therefore . . . make satisfaction by suffering all the punishments which
we had deserved for our sins. For, firstly, that does not pertain to the nature of a
sacrifice, and has nothing in common with it. For sacrifices are not payments of debts, as
is evident from those of the law. The beasts which were slain for sinners did not pay the
penalties which they had deserved, nor was their blood a sufficient ransom for the souls
of men. But they were simply offerings by which men sought to turn God to compassion, and
to obtain from Him remission of sins.39
Wesley was less creative in adapting the governmental concept. He saw the necessity of
a moral government of the universe being consistent with the character of God. However, he
also seemed to reflect Anselm's idea that since sin is a violation of God's honor, it
deserves infinite punishment. His Notes on the New Testament also show that he understood
Christ's death as a punishment due to us because of our sins.40
However, his understanding of the atonement differed substantially from the Calvinistic
penal views. He saw Christ's work as universal in extent and conditional upon faith.
Furthermore, he did not systematically develop an atonement theory. He was concerned with
the practical and evangelistic applications of the doctrine. In a letter to Mary Bishop,
7th February, 1778, he said:
Our reason is here quickly bewildered. If we attempt to expatiate in this field, we
'find no end, in wandering mazes lost.' But the question is (the only question with me; I
regard nothing else), What saith the Scripture?41
His thrust in his sermon, "Salvation By Faith," emphasizes that the faith
through which we are saved "acknowledges the necessity and merit of His death, and
the power of His resurrection . . . a recumbency upon Him as our atonement and our life,
as given for us, and living in us. . ."42 His emphasis on the
believer's response of faith and the life of sanctification and the universal nature of
Christ's work are greatly dissimilar from any consistent form of a penal substitution
theory as developed by Reformed and Lutheran theology.43 His
understanding of the atonement, then, was syncretistic and functional and certainly leaves
room for further analysis of this concept by those who follow in his spirit.
Wesley's followers generally developed some form of the governmental theory of
atonement. Richard Watson developed a modified governmental theory which emphasized that
God's government is based on His ethical character, not just on abstract concepts of moral
rectitude. He emphasized the penal character of Christ's death because he understood the
sacrificial system to be a context in which the penalty of law—breaking could be
executed. He understood the execution of a penalty to be the only means by which expiation
for sin could be attained. He said that the holiness of God is so intense and inflexible
and His justice so absolute that a penalty for sin must be enacted, or else the law must
be repealed and God's veracity rendered unworthy. He rejected the notion that repentance
on the part of the offender placed him in a new relationship with God. Repentance must be
accompanied by an atonement which makes forgiveness right as well as merciful. Repentance
must be connected with a satisfaction which propitiates, or appeases, the wrath of God. He
says:
His understanding of sacrifice, then, grows out of judicial theory rather than being
inductively derived from the covenant context. As Milgrom (note #20) has shown, repentance
can have an expiatory function. Furthermore, Leviticus 5 shows that the efficacy of the
sin offering lies not in any penal implication of the death of the animal, but in the
repentant confession and sacrificial offering from the sinner and the subsequent atonement
made for his sin by the priest. The sinner, if poor, could even use flour as a sin
offering (Lev. 5:1—10). It is difficult to see how an offering of flour can be
construed as a penal substitute for the sinner. Also, it is difficult to see God's
holiness interpreted, as Watson insists, as intense and inflexible justice in narratives
such as Hosea and Jonah. In Jonah, it was certainly repentance which brought God's
forgiveness:
But both man and beast must be covered with sackcloth; and let men call on God
earnestly that each may turn from his wicked way. . . . When God saw their deeds, that
they turned from their wicked way, then God relented concerning the calamity . . . and He
did not do it (Jonah 3:8—10, NASV).
God's forgiveness is based on compassion (Jonah 4:11), not on abstract concepts of
inflexible cosmic justice, if one includes the whole canon. Of course, there is punishment
for sin, but there is also pardon, as Jesus indicates in the Parable of the Prodigal Son
(Luke 15:11—32).
The English Methodist William Burt Pope was also drawn to the governmental theory, but
like Watson, tended to relate Christ's vicarious work to the concept of penalty. While
rejecting Anselm's idea of a quid pro quo satisfaction which led to a view of limited
atonement in Calvin, he does not seem to see that if Christ suffered the penalty which God
had pronounced on sin, then divine justice would be satisfied even for those who do not
repent. This would result in universalism, a legacy which Arminianism has not totally
escaped. Pope thus sees Christ's death as a sacrifice which takes the place of a penalty
and renounces the commutative penal idea of Christ's death as exact and mutual
compensation for sin. He thus rejects the consequences of his penal view, by showing that
as a substitute for judicial penalty, Christ's work was counted sufficient as an
atonement, although not the precise equivalent of the penalty due to sin.45
John Miley, the nineteenth century American Methodist, attempts to show that the
personal character of God does not require penal satisfaction in order to maintain His
integrity. He fully accepts the atoning nature of Christ's sufferings, but rejects the
idea that they are penally retributive. His governmental emphasis stresses that the
atonement is provisory in that it renders sinners salvable, but does not of necessity save
them. What Christ does makes possible God's actual forgiveness which does not rest on
Christ as the substitute for penalty, but on faith in God as the proper context for moral
government. Penal substitution results in the absolute removal of all further need for
justice, thus there can be no conditioned penal substitution as some governmentalists
attempt to show. God's integrity does require that sin be punished, but Miley says:
To exaggerate it into a necessity for satisfaction in the punishment of Christ as
substitute in penalty, is to pervert Scripture exegesis, and equally to pervert all
theology and philosophy in the case. . . . God may and does wish that He may save. . . .
And real as the divine displeasure is against sin and against sinners, atonement is made,
not in its satisfaction, but in fulfillment of the rectoral office of justice.46
Thus, Miley sees the death of Christ as a declaration of God's honor and justice, and
this, he says, is the only consistent soteriology for Wesleyan—Arminianism.
More recently, H. Orton Wiley has cautioned against failing to distinguish between the
fact of the atonement and theories about it. He warns against stating the idea of Christ's
substitution as a penalty for sin in such a way as to make Christ a sinner or to make the
atonement merely a commercial transaction. However, like Wesley, Wiley seems to vacillate
between describing Christ's sacrificial work as a "representation of the pure life
which the sinner should have" and that "His sufferings were penal inflictions
for our sins."47 He understands "propitiation" to mean
that "the substitute endures the punishment which otherwise would fall upon the
guilty themselves," while saying on the same page, "It is on this basis of
representation that the idea of substitution must be considered."48
Furthermore, while affirming a penal understanding of the cross, Wiley clearly rejects the
"penal satisfaction theory" as a Calvinistic theory. The danger of this theory,
he says, is that our sin is only imputed to Christ, according to this view, and therefore
only an external transfer of merits results while the internal union of the believer with
Christ is not clearly expressed. The penal substitutionary theory also leads either to
universalism or unconditional selection, because, on the one hand, the nature of a penal
atonement cancels all punitive claims against the elect, thereby predestining them to
salvation. On the other hand, if Christ's penal death was for all, then all will
universally be saved.49
Wiley seeks a middle ground in describing Christ's sufferings as "a provisory
substitute for penalty in the interest of moral government."50
He sees the atonement grounded in a governmental necessity which makes it impossible for
God to dispense with the sanctions of His immutable laws. Since God cannot set aside the
execution of the penalty, He must either inflict His retributive justice on the sinner or
provide a substitute. Thus, God "makes prominent the sacrifice of Christ as a
substitute for penalty."51
It seems obvious that if Wiley and other governmentalists see Christ's sacrifice as
only a substitute for penalty, they cannot consistently describe His work as penal in any
clear way. It appears that while the governmental theory rejects the penal substitution
and unconditional election of Calvinism, it has not totally separated itself from the
liabilities of a penal understanding of the atonement. A covenant understanding of the
meaning of sacrifice allows a more consistent understanding of Christ's vicarious work
than the governmental tension between penalty and a provisory substitute for penalty.
Penalty is not an appropriate category for describing the sacrificial work of Christ. That
is why a clear distinction between the Calvinist penal views and the governmental penal
views cannot satisfactorily be made.
While space does not permit an exhaustive survey of theories, another prominent view of
atonement which has its roots in ancient orthodox tradition is the dramatic, or classic,
theory of Gustaf Aulen. Modifying the Latin ransom motif, he sees Christ in cosmic combat
with the powers of darkness. Aulen sees the atonement not as a legal transaction or
juristic sentence, as in the Latin and Swiss/German traditions, nor does he see Christ
merely as an inspiring example of love, as in the Abelardian/Eastern Orthodox traditions.
Instead, Christ is the cosmic champion who overcomes the evil forces which hold humanity
in bondage. Through his work we may sing, " In all this we are more than conquerors.
. . ." (Rom. 8:37, KJV).52
IV. Concluding Observations
While some of the theological models for the atonement give very useful insights into
various aspects of God's magnificent work of redemption in Christ, some of them insert
concepts which are alien to the Biblical realities which they are attempting to explain.
The cultural baggage of some of these theories may reflect the characteristics of certain
historical periods and worldviews more substantially than they reflect the Biblical
message of redemption.
While the penal substitution and governmental models, in particular, have been very
influential in Wesleyan theology, these theories must be evaluated for contemporary
usefulness. One must question not only the accuracy with which they reflect the Biblical
reality of atonement, but how relevant they are to be a culture which is reluctant to
understand justice as punishment or morality in terms of a world governmental system which
is corrupt, fragmented, and often an expression of systemic evil.
It seems that an appropriate theological methodology for Wesleyans would involve
openness to truth, creative approaches to the proclamation of the gospel, a
contextualizing of Biblical realities, and an inductive attitude which resists the
intrusion of alien categories into Biblical revelation. A fresh examination of the
usefulness of the Biblical covenant model may well reveal a satisfactory context for
describing God's work in terms which are culturally relevant. The Biblical concept of
covenant describes an interpersonal relationship and the Biblical metaphors for salvation,
such as husband—wife and father—son, are profoundly personal. This understanding
of the reconciling love of a personal God appeals strongly to an alienated society which
sees no future but despair.
Christ's sacrificial act of submissive obedience to God in the face of the sin of
self—righteous humanity is the supreme historical revelation of God's
self—giving love. As a vicarious expression of penitence for all humanity who will
participate in Christ's life and death by faith, Christ enables a grieving God to believe
in us again. The love which goes to such lengths to win back a "crooked and perverse
generation" creates hope anew for a world which is lacking in integrity, trust, and
community.
Furthermore, the covenant model, since it is Biblical, provides a balance which
prevents an overemphasis on either mere sentimentality or on the rigid deterministic
categories which obscure both the seeking love of God and the reality of His actual work
in the believer. The participation of the believer by faith in the work of sacrifice
retains both the subjective and objective, the expiatory and the propitiatory emphases.
Such a model should be seen both as compatible with Wesleyan—Arminianism and as
critical of it at points where the Wesleyan—Arminian tradition has not fully divested
itself of the vestigial remnants of alien epistemological systems. A critical review of
models which attempt to describe the atonement in ways which direct attention away from
the distinctives of free will, experiential salvation, the sufficiency of Christ, and the
personal relationship to God by the Holy Spirit thus reveals a divergence from the
covenant context for salvation in God's redemptive history.
Notes
1The discussion grows out of the thesis that the concept of
covenant does not reflect the traditional connotation of pact or mutual agreement, but
rather an obligation imposed upon one party by another. Primary contributions to this
discussion are: Ernst Kutsch, Verheissung und Gesetz (Beiheft zur Zeitschrift fur die
alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, 131; Berlin New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1973); M.
Weinfeld, "Berit—Covenant vs. Obligation," Biblica, 56(1975) pp.
120—128; James Barr, "Some Semantic Notes on the Covenant," Beitrage zur
alttestamentlichen Theologie: Festschrift fur Walther Zimmerli zum 70, Begurtstag, ed.
by H. Donner, R. Hanhart, and R. Smend (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1977), pp.
23—38.
2A. B. Davidson, "Covenant," A Dictionary of the Bible,
Vol. 1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1898), p. 509; G. E. Mendenhall,
"Covenant," The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, Vol. 1 (Nashville:
Abingdon,1962), p. 715.
3Francis Brown, S. R. Driver, and C. A. Briggs, Hebrew and
English Lexicon of the Old Testament (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 136; Mendenhall,
Ibid.; J. A. Thompson, "Covenant," International Standard Bible Encyclopedia,
Vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Co., 1979), p. 790. Davidson, op. cit., p. 509.
4James Barr, op. cit., pp. 23—36.
5Mendenhall, op. cit.; also see G. E. Mendenhall, Law and
Covenant in Israel and the Ancient Near East (Pittsburgh: The Biblical Colloquium, 1955).
6Dwight Van Winkle, "Christianity and Zionism,"
unpublished faculty research, Seattle Pacific University, 1983, pp. 4—9.
Thompson, op. cit., pp.792—793; for further development of the personal aspects of
the covenant relationship and the personal elements in the problem of sin, see the chapter
by the author on "Initial Salvation," in A Contemporary Wesleyan Theology, 2
vols. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing Co., 1983).
7Walther Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, 2 vols.
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961), p. 2:228.
8Ibid., p. 1:75.
9Ibid., p. 1:38.
10Ibid., pp. 1:154, 157.
11Ibid., pp. 1:43, 44.
12Thompson, op. cit., pp. 792—793; for further
development of the personal elements of the covenant relationship and the personal
elements in the problem of sin, see the chapter by the author: R. L. Shelton,
"Soteriology: The Redemptive Grace of God in Christ," A Contemporary Wesleyan
Theology.
13Mendenhall, op. cit., pp. 722—723; Thompson, op.
cit., p. 792; D. F. Estes, "Covenant (NT)," ISBE, Vol. I, ed. by G. W. Bromiley
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1979), pp. 793.
14Mendenhall, Ibid., p. 723.
15Ibid.
16John E. Hartley, "Expiate; Expiation," International
Standard Bible Encyclopedia, Vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1982),
pp. 246—247; C. L. Mitton, "Atonement," The Interpreter's Dictionary of the
Bible (Nashville: Abingdon, 1962), p. 310.
17C. H. Dodd, The Bible and the Greeks (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1935), pp. 88—93.
18Hartley, op. cit. p. 247.
19Leon Morris, The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross (Grand
Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1965), p. 153.
20J. Milgrom, "The Priestly Doctrine of Repentance,"
Revue Biblique, 82(1975), pp. 198—199.
21H. H. Rowley, The Meaning of Sacrifice in the Old Testament
(Manchester: John Rylands Library, 1950), p. 87.
22J. Barton Payne, The Theology of the Older Testament (Grand
Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1962), p. 298.
23Shelton, op. cit., pp. 15—17.
24Eichrodt, op. cit., pp. 2:445; 1:256.
25Shelton, op. cit., p. 22.
26Vincent Taylor, The Atonement in New Testament Teaching
(London: The Epworth Press, 1963), pp. 51—52; 170.
27Morris, op. cit., p. 103 (see pp. 90—109).
28Mitton, op. cit., p. 312.
29See note #1.
30Van Winkle, op. cit., pp. 8—10.
31Mitton, op. cit., p. 312.
32Oscar Cullmann, Baptism in the New Testament (Chicago: Henry
Regnery Co., 1950), p. 18.
33For a more thorough development of the concept of
justification, see R. L. Shelton, "Justification in the Pauline Corpus," An
Inquiry Into Biblical Soteriology, Vol. 1 in Wesleyan Theological Perspectives (Anderson,
Ind.: Warner Press, 1980).
34George Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament (Grand Rapids:
Wm. B. Eerdmans Co., 1974), p. 428.
35On the issue of salvation in Hebrews, see Wayne McCown,
"Such A Great Salvation," An Inquiry into Biblical Soteriology, ed. by John
Hartley and Larry Shelton (Anderson, Ind.: Warner Press, 1980).
36John Wesley, "Predestination Calmly Considered," The
Works of John Wesley, 3rd edition, 14 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1978),
10:229.
37Anselm of Canterbury, Why God Became Man, Library of
Christian Classics, Vo1. X, ed. & trans. by Eugene Fairweather (Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1956), pp. 179—181.
38L. W. Grensted, A Short History of the Doctrine of the Atonement
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, reprinted 1962), pp. 210—219; see also the
discussion of these theories in Shelton, "Initial Salvation. . .," op. cit., pp.
54—66.
39Cited by Grensted, Ibid., p. 300; Grensted quotes from
Curcellaeus Institutes, V, 19.15.
40John Wesley, Explanatory Notes upon the New Testament (London:
The Epworth Press, reprinted 19663, pp. 837 (Heb.9:8) and 879 (1 Pet.2:24).
41John Wesley, Wesley's Works, Letters, Vo1. XIII, (Grand
Rapids: Baker Book House), p. 34.
42John Wesley, "Salvation By Faith," Forty—Four
Sermons (London: Epworth Press, 1944), p. 3.
43A. S. Wood attempts to show that Wesley held a penal
substitutionary view while not setting the atonement inside a legal framework" in
which God is made subject to an eternal, unalterable order of justice." Such a
position is inherently contradictory by definition. The penal theory is based on an
unalterable order of justice. Wesley's view is syncretistic and more governmental than
penal. See A. S. Wood, The Burning Heart (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.,
1967), pp. 237f. See also, William R. Cannon, The Theology of John Wesley (Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1956), pp. 209—211; and Albert Outler, John Wesley (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1964), pp. 273, 276, 287—288.
44Richard Watson, Theological Institutes, 2 vols. (New York:
Carlton Phillips, 1856), p. II, 139; see also pp. II, 87—102;113;149—151.
45William Burt Pope, A Compendium of Christian Theology, 2
vols. (London: Wesleyan Conference Office, 1880), pp. 2:265, 313, 314; see the discussion
in Shelton, "Initial Salvation," op. cit., pp. 63—64.
46John Miley, Systematic Theology, 2 vols. (New York: Eaton and
Mains, 1984), p. 2:186; see pp. 123, 168. Miley also quotes Raymond and others for
support; see Miner Raymond, Systematic Theology, 2 vols. (New York: Phillips and Hunt,
1880), pp. 2:257—258.
47H. Orton Wiley Christian Theology, 3 vols. (Kansas City: Beacon
Hill Press, 1952), pp. 2:221, 225.
48Ibid, p. 226.
49Ibid, pp. 245—249.
50Ibid, p. 258.
51Ibid, p. 275.
52Gustaf Aulen, The Faith of the Christian Church
(Philadelphia: The Muhlenberg Press, 1948), p. 228.
|
