CHRISTIAN HOLINESS AND THE PROBLEM OF SYSTEMIC EVIL

by
Albert L. Truesdale

This paper is an invitation to theologians within the Holiness tradition to give serious and sustained attention to the theological and ethical implications that derive from the modern social—solidaristic view of the self. Specifically, what are its implications for the Holiness tradition's doctrines of sin and salvation?

There are six parts to the paper. The first defines the solidaristic model of the self. The second traces the emergence of this view in post—Kantian thought. The third looks at this view as it is represented in twentieth century philosophy, sociology, psychology and theology. The fourth part gives some current examples of systemic evil. The fifth investigates the relationship between the structures of society and Paul's understanding of "principalities and powers." And the sixth asks about the availability of resources in John Wesley which can help us respond to this modern understanding of the personal.

The view of human existence with which I wish to deal uses no universally accepted nomenclature to identify itself. It may be called the solidaristic, individual—social, or dynamic apprehension of the self. In any event, the language designates a view of human life that has a fair degree of consistency among its many proponents. In contrast to the traditional atomistic point of view which saw the self as either a pure subject for whom the world is object (e.g. Descartes and Rousseau), or as an act of consciousness whose objective is theoretical and egocentric complete self—consciousness (e.g. Fichte)1 its successor sees self—consciousness (the personal) as the result of a process of interchange with other persons and participation in (as well as creation of) diverse social structures. In place of the self viewed fundamentally as subject it offers a view of the self as agent. It rejects the egocentrism and idealism (i.e. the I whose essence is thinking, the dualism of mind and matter) inherited from Descartes. In place of the primacy of the self—as—thinking substance, it places the primacy of the self—as—acting agent, an action out of which self—consciousness arises.

Hence, this model understands self—consciousness as essentially joined to social and physical reality. It insists that the self exists only in dynamic relationship with the other.

As represented in Descartes and the social atomism which flourished in France and England in 18th century Enlightenment thought the older view of human existence posited a static, atomic individuality not essentially dependent upon the social whole.2 For Rousseau, for example, the individual is prior to society.

The more dynamic view does not assume the existence of the self as "naturally endowed" with reason and self—consciousness which is then free to act upon the world which is its distinct object. Rather it understands self—consciousness as the actualization of unique human capacities essentially dependent on social participation for their realization. But if this concept of the self rejects atomistic individualism it also rules out all forms of social determinism.

The modern dynamic understanding of the personal closely parallels the concept of the open system employed by the life sciences. As opposed to the view which reduces the organism to isolated organs or systems, the open system conceives of highly interacting, complex, and overlapping elements, related to each other contextually.3

According to Karl Heim this change in our understanding of the self is part of a larger shift in our understanding of reality. To the static world—picture characteristic of Newtonian physics, we now see opposed a dynamic conception of the world—"reality lived no longer as Being but as act."4 The process philosophies of people such as Whitehead and Hartshorne are the most extensive and consistent philosophical statements of this shift.

II. The Emergence of the Dynamic Model

The rise of the solidaristic concept of self—consciousness in post Cartesian philosophy can be traced directly to Hegel, if not to Schelling and Fichte before him. It is dimly anticipated in Kant. There is debate as to how much Fichte contributed to the emergence of this view. George Herbert Mead believed that he contributed significantly.5 But Karl Marx 6 and Jean Hyppolite 7 are certain that he did not. Hyppolite says that whereas Schelling affirmed nature as being a certain expression of the I, Fichte "reduced nature merely to the opposition needed for the I to pose itself."8

George Mead held that for all three (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) the self arises in the social experience. But the self carries within it the very unity that makes society possible, which makes the world as a more or less ordered whole possible. The self organizes the world and in doing so realizes itself.9

Personality, Schelling maintained, is not something given from the start, it must be won. The free human spirit must give birth to human personality.10 In the society about him—in social relations and in history—the individual finds the ideas which he or she (the 'artist') is trying to bring to consciousness. He discovers in the "landscape" of the world the unity and organization which belong to himself. Nevertheless Schelling's 'philosophy of identity' too closely identifies the object of knowledge with the self that knows.

For Hegel the "I" of self—consciousness must not be thought of as a substance which is antecedently there—from which the activities spring—but as a subject which constitutes itself in its activities. Individuality is itself only realized as a part of a concrete whole of individuals; its life is drawn from common life in and with others. In The Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel says that individuality in its immediate essence must be actively affirmed through a process of actualization which amounts to achieving the purpose which we may recognize as potential in essential individuality. What we may call the special capacity, talent, or character of the individual qua potentiality is achieved as actual through intense interaction with moral others, and with culture.11 The objective social order is realized in and through individuals.

Hence, he rejects the idea of the self as an atom which regards itself as central and all other selves as extrinsic. Such a fragmented view of the personal, torn crom its social basis, sees the self "as a cosmos in which the other fragments are mirrored as distorted reflections of itself."12 Rejecting the contractualism of Hobbes and Locke who start with abstract individualism Hegel insisted that genuine individuality is the realization of activity and not the presupposition of society. For Hegel the "truly individual is revealed in the systematic character into which things enter." For example, the family is more of an individual than its members, and the community is more of an individual than the family.13 Hook insists that for Hegel the institutions, customs and laws of the community are the " source, substance and repository of all that the individual creates. It owes little to him, he owes everything to it."14

But there are numerous instances in The Phenomenology of Spirit where the reciprocal creativity of self and world seem much more balanced than Hegel is given credit for. For example, he says that while spirit is the basis and starting point for the action of all and every one (it is their goal), it is also a product "wrought and created by the action of each and all and constituting their unity . . . and identity of meaning."15

For Ludwig Feuerbach man's being is contained only in community, in the unity of person with person. But this unity is built upon a real difference between I and thou, the self and the legitimate other. "The ego, " he says, "attains to consciousness of the world through consciousness of the thou."16 Martin Buber says that Feuerbach "introduced the discovery of the Thou and thereby inaugurated the revolution against the lone Cartesian res cogitans. " In my opinion Buber is incorrect when he gives this honor to Feuerbach.17

According to Karl Marx, Hegel correctly saw that man "creates himself in a lengthy process of which the motive force is human praxis, the actual practice of men living in society."18 But Marx's analysis of social activity is based not on metaphysical assumptions, but on historical and sociological "fact." His is an investigation of the social conditions under which consciousness is discovered. Bourgeois society, Marx said, treats its members as if they were impenetrable atoms. It views the individual as "an absolutely complete and blessed creature, independent and free from any need."19 But the individual's daily experience compels him to admit the error of atomism and recognize his manifold interrelationships with others.20 "The principle of division of labor," Hook says, "links together the social status and opportunities of men in such a way that the latter can no longer intelligently regard themselves as independent."21 This is especially true in the commodity system of capitalism where the wealth of one class means the poverty of another, and a bankruptcy here means distress there.

Consciousness arises in social relationships and is directly shaped by those relationships. Although of a different dimension, society is just as real as any of its members. And although it does not exist apart from the individuals who constitute it, it cannot be reduced to them. "It is," Hook says, "an order out of which individuals arise and acquire their very individuality."22

Consciousness, for Marx, is social before it is individual, ". . . man first sees and recognizes himself in other men. Peter only establishes his own identity as a man by first comparing himself with Paul as being of like kind," and vice versa 23 Marx spelled out the psychological, ethical, and social consequences for the individual that stem from economic interdependence within society.

In the late 19th, and 20th centuries the solidaristic view of human existence reaches maturity and gains wide—spread acceptance in psychology, social psychology, philosophy and theology. Let us observe how this model is developed in representatives of each of these fields.

1. Psychology. Let us first look to Karl Jung's psychology of the self. Not only do we encounter in his thought an intense reciprocity between self and world, but an exploration of the factors that condition the explicit self—making process. Through his concept of "the collective unconscious" Jung showed that we begin our pilgrimage to selfhood millions of years before our birth. We possess certain genetic predispositions of size, height, and inherited possibilities of psychic functioning which characterize us as human and predispose us to distinctively human mental processes. We are endowed with racially collective possibilities which are actualized in life. But they are subject to many environmental factors, undetermined human interactions, and to social and cultural influences.24

The primordial images and patterns which make up the collective unconscious recapitulate the evolution of mankind and the common human situations of all people. They reveal the innate potential of human development. When they become operative these archetypes cease to be merely potential or latent and become effectively realized in the individual and society.25

The archetypal self constantly prompts the ego (the "I", which directs, abstracts, and adapts) toward its common humanity and toward the fulfillment of its innate potential, a fulfillment achieved in manifold social relationships. "The self is expressed in culture and culture is an avenue to the self. Culture shapes personality, and personality culture." In this way the ongoing process of self—transcendence occurs. As a result of its interaction with social forms, sometimes the self is enlarged and enriched, sometimes it is diminished and impoverished.26 In either case this is the route to individuality and potentially greater integrity.

2. Social Psychology. One of the most important contributions to the solidaristic understanding of human existence to come from sociology was made by social psychologist and philosopher George Herbert Mead (d. 1931) who taught at the University of Chicago from 1894—1931. Mead rejected the idea that individuals endowed with mind and self—consciousness could exist prior to and outside society. Minds and selves emerge only in the process of social interaction and communication; they do not antedate society. Through our unique capacity for language, the emergence of the self and social interaction are made possible. The self, he says,

For Mead, therefore, the self is a process, an achievement and not an entity.28

Another very important contribution to the solidaristic understanding of the self was made by social psychologist Harry Stack Sullivan, who was himself strongly influenced by George Herbert Mead (among others). For Sullivan "personality" is an illusion if conceived apart from the interpersonal events in which it arises and manifests itself. "Personality only manifests itself when the person is behaving in relation to one or more other individuals," even when the other person is a folk hero (e.g. Paul Bunyan) or a fictional character such as Anna Karenina. Personality is a "dynamic center of various processes which occur in a series of interpersonal [exchanges]."29

3. Philosophy. The influence of Martin Buber on both philosophy and theology in the 20th century is incalculable and much of his influence has to do precisely with the subject we are considering. Buber's rejection of atomistic individualism is succinctly stated in Between Man and Man. He says ". . . an individualistic anthropology . . . which is substantially concerned only with the relation of the human person to himself . . . cannot lead to a knowledge of man's being."30

According to Buber the human spirit, primarily understood, is not something that is but something that happens. Through the power of the word—through the images of language—the spirit of the child steps forth—is born.31 In the word, chaos is subdued to form.

The time of atomic individualism is over, he says. Now we know that the meeting of man with himself takes place not as Descartes described, but

Another 20th century philosopher who has given extensive consideration to the form of the personal and who has shown the failure of Cartesian and Contracturalist atomism is John MacMurray. In his 1954 Gifford Lectures MacMurray follows paths similar to those walked by Buber. We know existence, he says, by participating in existence.

MacMurray criticized the atomism of a psychology which understands itself as a science of mind. Rather, psychology must think of itself as a science of human behavior. Atomism appears in philosophy when the self is primarily conceived as the subject in experience. The error in both psychology and philosophy can be corrected by conceiving of the self not theoretically as subject, but practically, as agent. ". . . human behavior is comprehensible only in terms of a dynamic social reference; the isolated, purely individual self is a fiction." The personal exists only in dynamic relationship with the Other.34

4. Theology. When we turn to Christian theology in the 20^th century at least three figures stand out as principal representatives of the dynamic—solidaristic understanding of the self: Walter Rauschenbusch, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Paul Tillich.

To Walter Rauschenbusch must be chiefly credited the application to theology and ethics of the relationship between the individual and the social structures in which he or she lives. With prophetic clarity Rauschenbusch saw how an atomistic view of the self restricts the range of the gospel in the world. Certainly not one to diminish the importance of personal conversion, 35 he saw that the gospel of the Kingdom is incomplete if it does not speak to the social structures through which individuality is expressed. Rauschenbusch lamented the church's lack of a "scientific comprehension of social development."36

He pled with the church to adopt a vision of redemption that actually addresses the truth of human existence.

Atomistic individualism and the corresponding concepts of salvation built upon it miss the fact that "sin is lodged in social and institutions"38 just as surely as it is in the individual. Not only of what he had learned from a "scientific comprehension of social development,"39 but also because of what he had observed in the urban social structures of New York City, Rauschenbusch perceived that ". . . original sin is partly social. It runs down the generations not only by biological propagation but also by social assimilation. "40 (For this view he expressed indebtedness to Schleiermacher and Ritschl.)41

The social institutions that emerge in a society assume a life of their own (he calls them "composite personalities")42 which is not immediately under the control of the individual. Many of these structures are to some extent socially beneficial. But most, if not all, "assume an authority in sin."43 Such structures become "social idealizations of evil."44

To adequately understand individual existence the role played by "composite personalities" must be faced.

Rauschenbusch correctly saw that no vision of redemption can be complete or truly Christian which fails to give to sin the scope and seriousness due it. Lose the social—corporate pole of sinfulness and our doctrines of sin and salvation "will be mainly concerned with the transient acts and vices of individuals."46 Although Reinhold Niebuhr's expectations for social redemption were much more restrained than those expressed by Rauschenbusch, he certainly inherited the latter's understanding of the relationship between the individual and social structures. With equal tenacity he attacked the atomistic individualism of "Bourgeois democracy" which misunderstands the social substance of human existence. The liberal illusion that communities remain primarily the instruments of atomic individuals who are forced to create some kind of minimal order for their common life 47 bore the full brunt of his repeated attacks.

No one has seen more clearly than he that individual consciousness and awareness are rooted in social experience and that they find their ultimate meaning in relation to the community. The individual, Niebuhr said,

Niebuhr did not share Rauschenbusch's optimism that the whole social order could be Christianized. He recognized that social groups do not have, personal centers, or centers of consciousness, as do individuals. Consequently, the imperatives of a sensitive conscience cannot be directly addressed to social institutions. Whereas restraint of the egoistic impulse may be checked at the individual level by the ideal of unselfishness it cannot be so checked at the level of group relations. There is an intransigence in the evil of social institutions which is not directly governable by individual good will.49

A morality of pure disinterestedness [pure love] is impossible. "There is not enough imagination in any social group to render it amenable to the influence of pure love. Nor is there a possibility of persuading any social group to make a venture in pure love."50

The selfishness of social groups can at times be checked by competing groups, and although a spirit of love may preserve a degree of sensitivity to "the common weaknesses and common aspirations which bind men together above the areas of social conflict,"51 Social selfishness is inevitable. Niebuhr realized that there always exists the possibility for individual acts of unselfishness.

In spite of the limitations imposed by the selfishness of social groups, he admonishes us to pursue the "valuable illusion" that the collective life of humankind can achieve perfect justice. But it is an "illusion that must be controlled by reason."52

In the theology of Paul Tillich the Self—World character of the personal plays a fundamental role. According to Tillich human existence stands out of the potential provided by God. The actualization of potential life—of the self—occurs within the two complementary polarities of Self and World (a structure or unity of manifoldness).53 These polarities are analogically characteristic of all existence, analogically because only in humanity is there the actual potential for selfhood and the intentional creation (through language) of complex political, religious, moral, and aesthetic structures of meaning.

In his ontology and subsequent anthropology Tillich carefully safeguards the importance of the individual so that it is not lost in the collective, and he carefully safeguards the social basis of self realization so that the old atomistic individualism cannot resurface. There is a conscious effort to harmonize existentialism and idealism. He always strives to balance the subjective and the objective poles of existence and ontology.

For Tillich the possibility of self—consciousness is bound up with the possibility of world—consciousness. A person can be a self because he or she can have a world. We come to know ourselves as having a world to which we belong. In every experience there is something that has and something that is had, and the two are one.54

Never simply bound to an environment, we can transcend and shape it according to universal norms and ideas.55 The self both creates and is created by the structures in which it comes to expression. Through the world the self encounters itself and without a world self would be an empty form. World provides the content—psychic as well as bodily.56

Therefore there is no self—consciousness without world consciousness and no world—consciousness apart from self—consciousness. If we lose either side of the polarity then both vanish.57

Tillich clearly realized that this polar view of human existence was the result of an identifiable process in post—Cartesian philosophy.

The social structures in which we participate evidence both blessings and curses. They either facilitate the fulfillment of the individual's moral, cultural and religious capacities, or they retard or block them. In most cases the social structures of which we are a part represent a mixture of both blessings and curses.

In many instances the "benefits" which a structure offers to one group are gained at the expense of denying these benefits to another group. In such instances the self of the person who reaps these costly benefits is so closely identified with the structure and invests so much in its maintenance, that he or she is either unwilling or unable to identify its evil and is consequently unable to recognize the evil in himself. As Niebuhr clearly showed, forfeiture of social benefits gained through injustice to others is seldom done willingly.

In some instances a social structure can only be described as demonic i.e. the "life giving strength" which it provides to one group is inseparably joined to its power to deny life to another group. A social structure's exploitation of one national, racial, economic or sexual group may be seen as necessary to generate "meaning" for another group.

All of us participate in structures that promise life to us at the expense of others. We are born into such structures and we daily contribute to their continuation by feeding on their benefits and by encouraging their survival. We identify their existence with our own; any threat to them becomes a threat to us.

The dimensions of the gospel are such for Tillich that the New Reality which appears in the Christ must seek the transformation of both the self and the world. According to him the New Reality that appears in Christ envisions the transformation of all three functions of life: religion, culture and morality, of both the self and its world.58

The corporate view of the self as expressed in the twentieth century is more consistent with the Biblical understanding of corporate life than is eighteenth century atomism.

Let us now give attention to some contemporary illustrations of the relationship between the individual and sinful social structures. Hopefully these illustrations will demonstrate the inadequacy of atomism and will show just how deeply involved you and I are in structures which daily generate alienation and exploitation of both victim and offender.

1. Racism. A common misconception about racism is that it can be reduced to prejudice against a person of another race. But, says Robert Blauner this error misses the systemic character of racial oppression. Although individual prejudice is certainly a part of it, racism in the United States is structural, and reaches into every dimension of American life. The processes that maintain domination over blacks by whites are built into the major social structures. Through procedures that have become conventional and for which there is little immediate need of prejudice as a motivating force, systemic racism excludes or restricts full participation in American society by blacks.

Virulent prejudice, Blauner says, is not necessary to maintain a racist social structure. Often the people of good will and tolerance who identify racism with prejudice exempt themselves from responsibility and involvement. In fact, often such people of good will "help maintain the racism of American society and in some cases even profit from it."59

The logic of racism denies to blacks access to the resources for human fulfillment that exist within a society. This happens in ways of which most whites are ignorant. But its results are felt directly by its immediate victims.

The fallout from institutional racism that benefits whites and which in turn fortifies these institutions is at least five—fold: more steady employment for whites, higher wages, more lucrative occupations, greater investment in education, and the monopoly over the labor unions.61

The deliberate nature of racism is not to be minimized. Racist oppression of blacks in the ghetto or predominant black neighborhoods does not result from "blind" economic or market forces. Instead, it results from deliberate policies applied by real estate companies, is "supported by powerful segments of federal and local government and, unfortunately, is buttressed by majority sentiments in the white population."62

2. Exploitation of the world's resources by first world countries. A second example of systemic evil to which most of us make significant contributions and from which we daily reap appreciative dividends is the "free enterprise" system of production and distribution. A large part of the world is excluded from this system, and to a large extent our standard of living is predicated upon their continued exclusion. Probably most North Americans are unaware of the extent to which their "American way of life" is dependent on the exploitation of third and fourth world peoples.

Most of us are willing members of the 34% of the world's population that consumes 87% of the world's GNP each year, while the poor two thirds of the world's population is left to divide the remaining 13%. While less than 6% of the world's population lives in the United States we regularly demand 33% of the world's annual consumption of minerals and energy.63 I am a part of a society which consumes almost five times as much grain per person as do the people of the developing countries.64 I am a part of the American eating pattern which, when the amount of grain we feed cattle is calculated, places a feeding burden on world resources not of two hundred and twenty million people but 1.6 billion people.65 I seem not to mind that it takes seven pounds of grain to produce one pound of edible beef. And I am an active part of a society which, in exchanging approximately 3 million metric tons of cereal protein for 4 million metric tons of other proteins which are all superior in nutrients, perpetuates the "protein drain" from the third world.66

Can I ignore the fact that my desire for cosmetically attractive fresh produce, much of which comes from third world countries, often demands large plantations which only the economic elite can own? Can I ignore the fact that the large plantations help suppress movements for land redistribution and other democratic social reforms in third world countries? Such redistribution could lead to a higher standard of living for the dispossessed peoples who must now work for minimum wages to produce my affordable coffee, bananas, pineapples, tomatoes, and carnations?67

My lifestyle, and perhaps yours as well, makes it possible for almost half the cultivated land of Central America and the Caribbean countries (invariably the best) to be used to produce coffee, bananas, cocoa, sugar and beef, while as many as 80% of its children are undernourished.68

At the heart of the problem of poverty and hunger in the world are economic and political systems which ignore, mistreat and exploit people. Often maintenance of these systems is essential to my self—world structure. A threat to them appears as a threat to me. As a result I engage in all sorts of rationalizations and ignorance to insulate myself against criticism of the ideologies which I have inherited and which I sanctify through active participation.

3. Sexism. Space does not allow an adequate discussion of the intricate network of laws, customs, and language which constitute the systemic evil of sexism. The social institutions which deny full human dignity to women are no less intransigent than racism. Cessation of participation in, and surrender of the "benefits" derived from sexism threaten the identity of many men. Apparently, being "Christian" is no guarantee against this fear. Think of how religion is used to shore up the foundations of sexism. Who among us can wink at the sin which allows men to share sexist spoils grasped at the expense of women who are denied opportunities to fulfill their God—given abilities?

4. We can only mention ecclesiastical structures which encourage and institutionalize the will to power and which often generate petty carnal kingdoms in the name of The Kingdom. Such kingdoms grind under foot the gospel's investment in a new humanity.

Systemic or structural evil is normally so much a part of our self identity that it is difficult to either recognize or admit it. It is so subtle, says Ron Sider, that "one can be ensnared and hardly realize it."69 For the Christian, moral and religious atomism offers a ready escape from this admission.

But can any of us actually justify our claim to faith and ignore the extent to which we "have profited from systemic injustice—sometimes only half knowing, sometimes only half caring, and always half hoping not to know"?70 Sin in Scripture, Steven C. Mott adds, "includes participating in injustices of the social life or failing to correct them."71

It would be incorrect to say that the New Testament speaks of structural evil in the sense that I have been using the phrase. But there are good reasons to believe that at least in the writings of Paul the concepts of cosmos, and the principalities and powers, indicate an objective social reality which can function for good or for evil. Steven C. Mott, working from a theme presented earlier by Allan Galloway in the Cosmic Christ,72 says that these concepts indicate a mystery of evil which appears in our social life.73 Galloway had argued that for Paul the demonic principalities and powers

Later, G. B. Caird wrote in agreement with Galloway that

Writing after Caird, Markus Barth, in his study of the Epistle to the Ephesians, carefully examines what Paul means by "principalities and powers." He concludes that "Paul means the world of axioms and principalities, of politics and religion, of economics and society, of morals and biology, of history and culture."76

They all agree that the principalities and powers "indicate that evil has a social and political character beyond [the] isolated actions of individuals. "77

As striking as the array of the principalities and powers are, far more awesome is the range of Paul's claims about Christ's intentions for them. According to G. H. C. Macgregor Paul's language of cosmic redemption as found in Ephesians, Philippians and Colossians "signifies the redemption of man's whole environment as distinguished from the redemption of his inward state." Paul's gospel and his teachings about the principalities and powers are designed to combat a dualism which thinks of redemption simply in terms of escape from the world. Paul extends the scope of redemption to the whole cosmos.78

Following the lead of Alan Richardson who maintains that "the death of Christ reconciled to God the hostile, fallen powers and set free from bondage . . . the world powers,"79 Jung Young Lee argues that Paul's words in II Corinthians 5:19, "God was in Christ reconciling the cosmos to himself," means not only the world of humankind, but the universe as well, including stoicheia (Galatians 4:3; 5:9; Colossians 2:8, 20) and cosmokratoras (Ephesians 6:12), alternative expressions meaning "the elemental spirits " or "the world rulers, " and signifying the "cosmic powers which are 'weak and beggarly elements.'"80 Lee agrees with Barth. According to Paul, "By the great mercy of God the cosmic powers shall return to their original functions as instruments of God's fellowship with his creation."81

Caird suggests that Paul developed his hope of cosmic reconciliation (Corinthians, Ephesians, Colossians) as a complement to his earlier (Galatians) insistence on their (the powers) defeat. "The powers could be reconciled to God only when they had been deprived of their evil potentiality and made subject to Cbrist."82

We conclude that while the New Testament does not view systemic evil in the same way as did Rauschenbusch, Niebuhr and Tillich, in the Pauline corpus there is more than ample justification for a view of sin and salvation which involves both the individual and the structures of society in which we live. Steven C. Mott correctly insists that our theology and ethics must come to terms with the social material to which the Biblical language of principalities and powers points.83

Is it possible to do theology and ethics within the framework of the solidaristic—dynamic understanding of the self and still identify as a Wesleyan theologian or ethicist? Are we faced with the harsh alternative of either Wesley or modern thought about the self and its world? Or is there sufficient ground in Wesley's own thought to accommodate a thorough consideration of the self—world structure of life? I believe that the latter is the case.

I would like to suggest that in Wesley's thought there are four essential factors that can help prepare us for the work ahead.

1. First we need to give careful consideration to the implications of Wesley's view of salvation as being cosmic in scope. That the atoning work of Christ reaches to the whole creation is essential for Wesley's understanding of salvation. That the Christian gospel intends the redemption of the social order was not just theory with him, it was indistinguishable from the gospel he preached and his entire mode of conduct. In fact, it may be argued that Wesley believed that calling for the social structures to become Christian was simply a matter of calling on England to live up to what it had already verbally committed itself.

Essential to the scope of salvation as envisioned by Wesley is his understanding of prevenient grace. We need to spell out its implications not only for the self, but for the social and physical material out of which our worlds arise. The category of prevenient grace, which has as its telos evangelical transformation, establishes a continuity between grace and nature. The religious category of prevenient grace converts directly into an ontological category in which God is the immediate ground of being not only for the individual person but for the physical world and all social institutions to which he is related. The telos of prevenient grace must bear directly not only on the self but also on the world in which the self is expressed.

Consequently, to be consistent with Wesley's vision of redemption, our soteriology and hamartiology must fully locate the individual in his or her world and must not make claims that can succeed only in an atomistic framework. The optimism of grace must not live in league with a truncated view of the personal.

2. This leads to the second aspect of Wesley's theology that can help us. For Wesley there is no holiness but social holiness. Wesley used this phrase to counter the religious atomism of the mystics. But it is applicable not only to the koinonia of the church but to the social dimensions of the gospel as well. God raised up the Methodists, he says, "to spread scriptural religion throughout the land," and "to leaven the whole nation with that 'faith that worketh by love.'"84 Atomism in religious experience and in moral awareness was clearly anathema to him. Even the poorest Methodist was expected to bring to each class meeting some food gift for distribution to the needy. Genuine discipleship, he believed, reaches toward the transformation of other people and of the social institutions in which they live. His discussion of the evils of smuggling, for example, which robbed the king and every honest citizen, shows his awareness of the intricate and extensive reaches of evil institutions.85 He denounced the heavy drain on the corn resources for distillery purposes which caused a scarcity of corn for the poor, and moral distress in the land.

Wesley wanted his doctrine of Christian perfection to be viewed primarily as perfect love towards God and man. Not the neighbor in the abstract but the neighbor caught in the complexities—as either oppressor or victim—of eighteenth century industrialized England. Perfect love, for Wesley, contained a compelling moral dimension. Witness his efforts to rid Britain of slavery, smuggling, widespread poverty, and to bring about prison reform. Social holiness in Wesley reached out not only to the individual but to his social environment as well.

3. The third area in Wesley's thought which holds promise for us is his anthropology. For this insight we are indebted to the recent contribution made by Theodore Runyon in his essay, "Wesley and the Theologies of Liberation."86

Runyon notes that when Luther and Calvin removed salvation from the realm of dependence on human action and placed it in the realm of divine promise and faithfulness they paid a stiff and (for Wesley) unacceptable price: the shift in the location of essential humanity.

According to Luther and Calvin the Christian's true being is to be found in God, in his election, or in his forensic declaration of our justification through Christ, rather than in our existence in the world. "The result is [a] split . . . between the transcendent realm in which our salvation is actually occurring, and this world, which is in effect bracketed out of salvation history."87 Runyon appeals to Reformed theologian Otto Weber to support this assessment. Weber calls this "split" a non—Biblical distinction in which the "person" is separated from his or her "works."88

The contrast drawn by Runyon between Wesley on the one hand, and Luther and Calvin on the other is striking. Without in any way detracting from the Protestant insistence that salvation is by grace through faith alone, the locus, exercise, and model of salvation changes remarkably. For Wesley the locus of redemption is the world. The assurance of divine love must be exercised in the service of renewing the world and the race. The model for this is God's own being as seen in his work, "which takes the form not of divine fiat in the councils of heaven but of the creative intervention of divine love, intent to restore a lost creation."89

For Wesley, according to Runyon, the self is a dynamic rather than a static reality. It is an achievement, an activity, a project. It is a work which is always directed toward some purpose, either toward the service of God and the world, or the service of self in pride, vanity or gain.90

For Wesley, Runyon maintains, essential humanity is a potentiality (in Christ) to be realized in the world through grace. It cannot be achieved in isolation from the world in which God is active. The renewal of the race, for Wesley, is the telos of redemption and the faith which works by love expresses in action this vision of cosmic renewal. Becoming in reality what one is essentially (or potentially) is inseparable from this process of transformation, the project—in— process—of—achievement.91

The relation between Christ and the structures of this world is one of a Transformer to the transformed.92 The Christian as agent of transformation also undergoes transformation in the process of achieving the project of transformation. "This is Wesley's model of synergism—human partnership with the divine."93

If Runyon's assessment of Wesley is correct, then its implications for theology in the Holiness Movement are staggering indeed. Simply, rather than being a true expression of faith and redemption, all forms of religious and moral atomism which insist on viewing either sin or salvation apart from the social structures in which our redemption occurs disclose in fact a failure of faith. All that we say about sin and salvation must show an awareness of life in its complexity. This seems to be a consistent extension of Wesley's anthropology.

4. The fourth aspect of Wesley's thought to which we should look for help lies in what we may call his distinction between the "already" and the "not yet" of perfect love.

Before we examine this distinction we should take note of a criticism of Wesley's concept of sin that has been made by numerous interpreters. People such as Robert Chiles,94 R. Newton Flew, Paul Hoon 95 and John L. Peters have pointed to ambiguities in Wesley's view of sin which make a consistent statement of his position difficult, if not impossible. Some of the criticism is unjustified, as when Lindstrom interprets Wesley as saying that only the "fully sanctified do not deliberately transgress the law of love."96 In numerous instances Wesley maintains that the regenerate person does not deliberately transgress the will of God but is instead set free from "an earthly, sensual . . . mind" and filled with "the mind that was in Christ."97 But Wesley is not always consistent on this point. Sometimes he seems to attribute "voluntary transgressions" to the regenerate.98

The central part of the criticism seems to be aimed at Wesley's sharp distinction between sin as a "voluntary transgression of a known law" and "sin as an involuntary transgression of a divine law, known or unknown." The former he clearly labeled sin "properly so called," and the latter he termed sin "improperly so called."99 R. Newton Flew charges that Wesley's stress on the "conscious and deliberate intention of the agent is "the most formidable defect in his doctrine of the ideal."100 He and others maintain that sin "improperly so called" is too "active" to be dealt with adequately under the rubric of "involuntary sin." Lindstrom attributes this rigid distinction to a narrow individualistic line in Wesley's thought which cannot be easily reconciled with his broader realization that the entirely sanctified person stands in need of forgiveness and atonement.101

Keeping this criticism in mind, let us turn to the distinction between the "already" and the "not yet" of perfect love. While in one sense a sanctified person fulfills the law of love (i.e. his or her whole disposition, thoughts and actions have their source in love) in another important sense he or she does not. Through inevitable human defects, even the sanctified person will make many mistakes which "will frequently occasion something wrong, both in our temper, and words, and actions."102

The entirely sanctified are intensely aware not only of their "own ignorance" but also of their "littleness of grace, coming short of the full mind that was in Christ, and walking legs accurately than they might have done after their divine Pattern.''103

Though not burdened with guilt and not in need of forgiveness for 'willful' transgressions, the entirely sanctified nevertheless stand in the need of the atonement. The most perfect have continued need of the merits of Christ and need to pray "forgive us our trespasses." Remarkably, Wesley says that the sanctified need "Christ as their Priest, their Atonement their Advocate with the Father" because of "their coming short of the law of Love" even as their every blessing depends on Christ's death and intercession. Christian perfection, he says is not freedom from all sin because "sin is the transgression of the law" and the perfect transgress the very law they are under. Those who are made perfect in Christ "need the atonement of Christ; and he is the atonement of nothing but sin."104 The sanctified do not need the atonement of Christ in order to restore the favor of God, "but to continue it.''105

For Wesley, Lindstrom says, even the most sanctified Christian must live on the basis of forgiveness.106 For on the one hand the work of entire sanctification is a divine gift, a divine work wrought by God and to be accepted by faith. On the other hand there is a gradual work of transformation that issues from a day—to—day relationship with Christ and this transformation continues throughout life.107 In light of all this one can understand Lindstrom's quarrel with Wesley.

I would like to suggest that even when we admit the ambiguity in Wesley's distinction between "sin properly so called" and "sin improperly so called," and even if we agree that the strictly passive character of "involuntary" inadequately accounts for the full meaning of "coming short of the law of love," it still may be the case that Wesley has at least indicated a way whereby as Wesleyans we can deal candidly with the reality of systemic evil. In fact, Paul M. Bassett says that Wesley's insistence that the Anglican Liturgy, steeped in the recognition of racial evil, be used by the Methodists, and the importance he attached to the Lord's prayer make explicit his recognition of our participation in systemic evil, a participation for which confession and atonement are imperative.

May it not be the case that the time has come for us to restate the "not yet" of perfect love in contemporary language (not limited to the rigid distinction between "voluntary" and "involuntary") which takes unflinching account of our involvement in systemic evil even as the moral import of the doctrine commits us to an implacable struggle for systemic evil's elimination?

Do we not fall victim to a failure of theological nerve if the "not yet" is stated only in passive terms which trivialize both the pervasiveness of evil and the grace of God? In the interest of theological credibility and devotional fidelity, are we not now forced to rethink the meaning of simul justus et peccator within a Wesleyan framework? And finally, are we not now faced with the need to give what is for the Holiness tradition unaccustomed consideration to the corporate aspect of original sin?

Notes

1John MacMurray, The Self as Agent (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1953), p. 12.

2Sidney Hook, From Hegel to Marx (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1978), p. 42.

3Frank M. Bockus, "The Archetypical Self: Theological Values in Jung's Psychology, The Dialogue Between Theology and Psychology, Ed. Peter Homans (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 228.

4Karl Heim, God Transcendent, trans. Edward Dickie (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1936), p. 184.

5George Herbert Mead, Thought in the 19th Century, pp. 123ff.

6Hook, op.cit., p. 44, from Capital, English Translation, I, 61 (Hook does not tell us which English Translation).

7Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. 234.

8Ibid

9Mead, op.cit., pp. 124ff.

10Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 7, Part 1 (New York: Image Books, 1965), p. 165.

11G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind Trans. J. B. Bailey (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1967), pp. 420, 421. Bailey traces Hegel's line of thought to Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744—1803) who, though partially within the framework of the Enlightenment, was already on the way toward Romantic thought. Translator's introduction, p. xxviii.

12Hook, op.cit., p. 42.

13Hook, Ibid.

14Hook, Ibid.

15Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, p. 458; see also pp. 423, 459. Hegel is far more empirical than his existentialist interpreters give him credit for being.

16Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (First published 1841) (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1957), p. 83. See also pp. 82, 158. See also Hook. pp. 236, 252, 258, 259.

17Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. by Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1947), p. 148.

18Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, iii.

19Karl Marx, Die Heilige Familie 1902, II 227.

20Hook, op. cit., p. 46.

21Ibid., p. 45.

22Ibid

23Karl Marx, Capital, as quoted by Hook, p. 44. Compare Hook, p. 303. See also Marx's discussion of the Four Alienations in the "First Manuscript," Karl Marx: Early Writings, Trans. T. B. Bottomore (New York: McGraw—Hill Book Company, 1964), pp. 69—134. See especially pp. 129—134 ". . . the relation of man to himself is first realized, objectified, through his relation to other men" (p. 130).

24Carl Jung, "On the Nature of the Psyche," The Basic Writings of Carl Jung, ed. Violet Staub De Laszlo (New York: The Modern Library, 1959), pp. 80ff.

25Carl Jung, "Two Essays on Analytical Psychology," The Collected Works, Vol. 7, 1953, p. 108. Bockus notes that Jung "never analyzed the stages of human development as extensively as have contemporary thinkers [e.g. Erik H. Erikson]. He did, however attempt to identify the various aspects of self—development and the critical issues in the life history, and there is considerable similarity between Jung's understanding of the dynamics of the self—realization tendency and some of the prevalent contemporary theories of human development" (Bockus, op.cit., p. 227).

26Bockus, op.cit.. p. 236.

27George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 140.

28Mead, Movements of Thought. . ., p. 372

29Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Personality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1970), p. 140.

30Buber, op.cit., p. 199.

31Ibid, p. 193.

32Ibid., pp. 202—203. Karl Heim clearly perceived and stated the understanding of the self as described by Buber. To the static, atomistic world view Heim opposed "a dynamic conception of the world—reality lived no longer as Being but as Act" Karl Heim, God Transcendent (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1936), p. 184.

33John MacMurray, Persons in Relation (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 17. The Gifford lectures were entitled "The Form of the Personal" and were published in two volumes.

34John MacMurray, The Self as Agent (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1953), p. 38.

35Walter Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922), pp. 95ff. For twelve years Rauschenbusch pastored among the working people on the west side of New York City.

36Walter Rauschenbusch, Christianity and the Social Crisis (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920), p. 194.

37Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel, p. 5.

38Ibid., p. 60.

39Rauschenbusch was dependent in part on Josiah Royce who emphasized the reality of superpersonal forces in human life. Royce was influenced by Wundt's Volkerpsychologie.

40Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel, p. 61.

41Ibid, pp. 92—94.

42A Theology for. . ., p. 75

43Ibid, p. 62

44Ibid, p. 78.

45Ibid, p. 81.

46Ibid., p. 90.

47Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1944), p. 53.

48Ibid, p. 50.

49Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1932), p. 257.

50Ibid, p. 272.

51Ibid

52Ibid, p. 277.

53Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), I:170.

54Ibid, p. 169. He prefers "self" over "ego" because he believes that it is much more comprehensive, i.e., that it includes the subconscious "basis" of the self—conscious ego as well as self—consciousness.

55Ibid, p. 170.

56The distinction made here by Tillich is very similar if not identical to Hegel's discussion of content in the Phenomenology of Spirit as it relates to the individual and the emergence of Spirit through his interaction with culture.

57Tillich, p. 171.

58Ibid, III:157.

59Robert Blauner, Racial Oppression in America (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972), pp. 9, 10.

60Ibid, p. 33. Here Blauner quotes from Michael Reich, "The Economics of Racism," Upstart 1 (1971), pp. 55, 56.

61Ibid, p. 25.

62Ibid, pp. 32, 33.

63Ronald J. Sider, Rich Christians in an Age of Hunger: A Biblical Study (Downers Grove, IL. InterVarsity Press, 1977), p. 18.

64Ibid, p. 42.

65Ibid, p. 152

66Ibid, p. 156

67Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins, World Hunger: Ten Myths (1979), p. 28.

68Ibid, p. 32.

69Sider, op.cit., p. 136.

70Sider, p. 166.

71Steven C. Mott, "Biblical Faith and the Reality of Social Evil," Christian Scholars Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1980, p. 236.

72Allan D. Galloway, The Cosmic Christ (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1951).

73Mott, op.cit., pp. 231, 232.

74Ibid., p. 28.

75Markus Barth, The Broken wan: (London: The Judson Press,1959), p. 83. Barth notes that Paul does not say that all "rule, authorities, powers and dominions" are evil or that they serve the evil one. But all of them do exert an influence over the world. "Their rule is felt as coming from somewhere above us. . . . They seem to form a whole empire, and defy easy control, else there would have been no need of the resurrection of Christ to put them under his feet."

76Ibid., pp. 81, 82.

77Mott, op.cit.. p. 226.

78G. H. C. Macgregor, "Principalities and Powers: The Cosmic Background of St. Paul's Thought," New Testament Studies, Vol. 1, 1954—55, p. 26.

79Alan Richardson, An Introduction to the Theology of the New Testament (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1959), p. 213.

80Jung Young Lee, "Interpreting the Demonic Powers in Pauline Thought," Nouum Testamentum Vol. 12; No. 1, 1970, pp. 60—61.

81Ibid, p. 66.

82Caird, op.cit., p. 83.

83Mott, op.cit., p. 232.

84John Wesley, "On God's Vineyard," The Works of John Wesley, Vol. VII, p. 208.

85John Wesley, "A Word to a Smuggler," Works, Vol. 11, p. 175.

86Theodore Runyon, Ed., Sanctification and Liberation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1981).

87Ibid, p. 27.

88Ibid.

89Ibid, p. 29.

90Ibid.

91Ibid.

92H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1951) pp. 218ff.

93Runyon, op. cit., p. 28.

94Robert E. Chiles, Theological Transition in American Methodism, 1790—1935 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1965), p. 122ff.

95See Chiles, Paul W. Hoon, "The Soteriology of John Wesley," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Edinburgh, 1936, pp. 303ff.

96Harald Lindstrom, Wesley and Sanctification (Stockholm: Nya bokforlags Aktiebolaget, 1946), p. 148.

97Wesley, "On God's Vineyard," Works, VII, p. 205. See also "The Marks of the New Birth," and "The Great Privilege of Those Who Are Born of God," Works, V; "Salvation by Faith," Works, V, Part II, paragraph 6.

98Wesley, "A Plain Account of Christian Perfection, Works, X, p. 396.

99Ibid.

100R. Newton Flew, The Idea of Perfection in Christian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 333.

101Lindstrom, op.cit., p. 97.

102Wesley, "A Farther Account of Christian Perfection," Works, XI, pp. 417 ff.

103Lindstrom, p. 147. Lindstrom is quoting from Letters, V, Letter XV, September 1762, p. 189.

104Wesley, "A Farther Account," pp. 417, 418.

105Ibid, p. 418.

106Lindstrom, op.cit., p. 152.

107Colin Williams, John Wesley 's Theology Today (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960), p. 186.