THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY IN
19TH CENTURY AMERICAN WESLEYANISM
1850-1900
by
Sam Powell
Introduction
They do not like to think about it. It is a part, but not a part of their thought. The doctrine of the trinity among 19th century American Wesleyans is like a vulgar joke in polite company. Or a pointed question posed to a politician. An issue of importance, which needs to be addressed. But of course it's a purely positive notion and cannot be understood at all. It is the Christian's antique: to be admired, but not used.
Why do they have this attitude? Why does the doctrine of the trinity have such modest use among the Wesleyans' theological weaponry? We all know the average answers: these were a preaching folk, their message a simple one of full salvation, designed for a simple, unlettered audience; the heart of Wesleyanism is the heart strangely warmed-speculation i9 not fitting for piety; the Wesleyans were Protestants: they know only the accommodated God. To these we routinely add: the controversy with the Calvinists stamped the character of 19th century Wesleyanism, so that all their time and energy was consumed in fighting for free will and gracious ability.
Is there a true answer? Such an answer would include all the reasons given above, but would have to go beyond them, for many in the l9th century were content to hide their trinitarian talent in the ground lest its value be lost through commerce. The doctrine of the trinity at this time was not a popular doctrine if one means by this a doctrine which enters deeply into the systems of theologians. (And of course we are speaking of the immanent trinity: persons, nature, relations of origin and the like.) Calvinists, Methodists, and many others all had little use for the speculative development of this doctrine. But the historian of Wesleyanism wants to know why in particular the Wesleyans made so little use of the doctrine. What was the force which united all the various influences and conditions into that optimistic uncertainty which characterized the Wesleyans?
The debate with the Calvinists over will. This is the issue but not because this debate consumed all their energies and talents. And not because this controversy shows that the genius of Wesleyanism is existential, rather than speculative. The debate with the Calvinists was decisive because the defense of free will established the conceptual parameters of Wesleyanism, parameters which excluded a priori a fruitful understanding of the trinity. (Perhaps not a priori: but it would have taken theological genius, or theological sleight of hand, to accomplish such an understanding with the conceptual tools at hand. Practically a priori. Conditioned a priori.) The debate did this by forcing the Wesleyans to declare personality to be the highest level of being in the universe, and this presupposed a community of personal beings, one of whom was infinite. So the Wesleyans took as their ultimate principle for the defense of freedom the personality of God.
But if God is a person (or the Person), how can God be three persons? To this the Wesleyans found an answer in the creeds, and Richard Watson had already shown them that for such topics the best method was scriptural exposition. So the Wesleyan theologian, although occasionally critical of the Nicene formulation, concluded his thoughts on the matter by allowing that, after all, the creeds stated the best possible solution, given the limitations of human thought. And beside that, scripture gives us the fact of the trinity. Our task is to believe it, and defend it as best as possible.
The contemporary Wesleyan will dutifully and sympathtically acknowledge that the 19th century fathers did well with a difficult situation. But we cannot remain satisfied with their solution, because it is not a solution. A doctrine which is absolute in the strict sense can never be an important doctrine. And it was not for the Wesleyans of the last century. It was a defensive weapon used to beat off the infidel whenever they dared show their faces. It was an educational degree from an inferior school: it said something, but not much, and more than anything its worth was merely to proclaim that the owner was ignorant of the degree's low value.
What is needed is a doctrine of the trinity which will operate in the theological system in the same way that any mechanical part works in a machine. In other words, what is needed is a truly systematic theology. The body of this essay is divided into two sections, an exposition of the doctrine of the trinity as held by 19th century Wesleyans, and an attempt to show why the Wesleyan doctrine of the trinity was so barren. The essay concludes with exhortation to Wesleyan theologians on the issue of the trinity.
The theologians whose views are discussed are mostly those who contributed articles to the Methodist Quarterly Review. In addition, John Miley has been chosen because he summarizes 90 well Wesleyan theology. Everything spoken on the topic before him is present in his Systematic Theology in a clear and consistent way. Daniel Whedon is also included, not because he had anything significant to say about the trinity, but because his writings on the freedom of the will show so well that the conflict over the personality of God was not fought with the pantheists or atheists, but with the Calvinists. Whedon's works illustrate the truth that the dominance of the category of personality effectively precluded a fruitful understanding of the trinity.
Why these and not others? For one reason, there is an amazing paucity of works devoted to the study of the trinity in this period. But even if there had been many, the result would have been the same. There is little difference between Mattison's A Scriptural Defense of the Doctrine of the Trinity (1850) and Miley's treatment in 1892. So the choice of authors and even their historical order is not crucial for understanding the Wesleyan doctrine.
Exposition
Theological Method
To understand the Wesleyans' approach to the trinity, it is necessary to grasp first their concept of method, for it was their pursuit of scientific rigor which allowed them to have a doctrine of the trinity at all.
The attitude of all the theologians was all the same: as with every science, there is a body of relevant facts which before study are unorganized. The task of the scientist or theologian is to organize the facts in a way which will be both inclusive and harmonious. For example, William Nast, writing in 1860, states that his purpose in the essay is to "harmonize with the Godhead of our Lord Jesus Christ his true humanity."1 Nast, who by this time had been a Methodist preacher for 25 year was hardly a theological rustic: he had attended Tubingen and taken classes with F. C. Baur, and by the time he emigrated to America was quite a sceptic. Becoming a Methodist changed his thinking on more than one issue. D. W. Clark, 1843 graduate of Wesley University and soon to be bishop in the M. E. Church, also writing in 1851, is even more explicit: the teachings of Christ are not in the Bible "given in the scientific forms of dogmatic theology."2
Miley's Systematic Theology contains the most thorough treatment of the topic among the Wesleyans. He states that any proper definition of science will embody a sense of certitude which grounds the science. Further, there must be a "generalization in some principle or law which interprets the facts" covered by the science.3 Two facts which ground the possibility of theology as a science are the existence of God and the religious nature of humanity.4
Having established that theology has a claim to be a science, Miley considers faith. "Faith is not a blind acceptance of any alleged fact or principle, but its acceptance on rational grounds." Thus faith follows on evidence. The existence of enigmas among the evidence is no more a problem for theology than for any other science. The facts may not be completely understandable, but they must be accepted as long as they come from a source deemed authoritative. So it is not irrational to believe in the trinity since its source has a demonstrable certitude of truth.5
In summary, the method of theology first consists in an organization of the relevant facts, then in showing their systematic inter-connections. Whether the doctrine can then be further understood depends on the nature of the doctrine. Some are amenable to the power of reason; others are purely a matter of revelation.
Reason and Revelation
The typical Wesleyan view of the relationship between reason and revelation in theology is Thomistic: there are truths which are revealed, yet which reason can also attain, and there are truths which can only be known by finite minds through revelation.
On this topic Miley states that the error of rationalism is to think that human reason is the sole judge of truth, so that every doctrine depends for its acceptance on rational comprehension. Actually, reason functions in theology as that faculty which organizes the various truths given in revelation, and in grasping the rational certitude of theology. While reason does not encompass revelation, still revelation does not contradict reason. Many doctrines cannot be understood, but can be accepted as true because they have their origin in scripture, which can be rationally shown to be true.6
Having shown the reasonableness of religious truth, Miley proceeds to draw the lines of demarcation between truths known by natural reason and those not. The existence of God can clearly be known apart from revelation. "The idea of a divine existence is a necessary intuition of the mind. By a necessary intuition we mean one that springs immediately from the constitution of the mind."7 Further, "Our intuitions give objective truth. This may be denied, but only with the implication of agnosticism or utter skepticism."8
The knowledge of the trinity, however, is another matter for all of these Wesleyans. For example D. W. Clark states that the believer asserts the trinity because of scripture, even though the fact of God's plurality cannot be explained in relation to other facts of revelation. The trinity is not settled by "logical inductions, by metaphysical distinctions, nor yet by scientific demonstrations."9 W. P. Odell wrote in 1896, "Undoubtedly a philosophy of the trinity is impossible. The idea transcends human powers of comprehension.... Here is a great mystery, which ... cannot be pictured to the imagination.l0 In even stronger terms, G. P. Disosway wrote,
Christ's Sonship is a sublime and incomprehensible mystery, a divine secret. To dive into it men may pretend to learning and knowledge, but betray their presumption and ignorance. The pious and humble will not search after things too difficult and too high for human comprehension."
Miley is in complete accord. "In the doctrine of the trinity there are questions of fact, and also a question of harmony in the facts.... We do not think it open to full explication in human thought. It is not wise to attempt more than is attainable."l2 At the close of the section on the trinity Miley says, "We may still learn the unwisdom of attempting a philosophy of the trinity.... The incomprehensibility of the doctrine is only one of many incomprehensibilities in God."13
So not every doctrine is directly reasonable in the sense that it is discoverable by reason, but every truly Biblical doctrine will be reasonable in
the sense that belief in it is warranted. Reason rightly used will never conflict with doctrine truly stated. For example, Odell, having just explained the transcendence of the doctrine and its incomprehensibility, goes on to say that this does not mean that the doctrine is either self-contradictory or even unbelievable." William Nast takes it as his task to discover whether the hypostatic union implies a contradiction, and takes as a methodological principle the rule that an inability to explain something does not of necessity imply a contradiction.15 As usual, Miley follows suit. "Were the constituent facts of the doctrine in contradictory opposition, it would be incredible.... The facts as posited by Trinitarians are not contradictory."16
The Understanding of Faith
Having disarmed the claim that the doctrine involves a contradiction the theologians go on to give their various understandings of the truth. Clark takes a fairly radical position by criticizing the traditional creeds of the church. "We are not calling into question the Trinity.... Our inquiry relates only to the form of the statement . . . to the symbol that has been adopted to express it."" He goes on to say that although the truth itself is incomprehensible, the doctrinal (scientific) form used by the early councils, being a creation of rational minds, must be subject to rational scrutiny and criticism, and that the traditional symbols are vague, defective, and open to serious challenges. In fact, as Clark understands the case, the critiques of Unitarianism, Schleiermacher, and Bushnell are based on the inadequacies of the creeds, not of the doctrine itself.18 Clark allows that it is difficult to conceive of the union of two natures, but argues that a solution may be deferred until it is discovered how in a single human person a soul and body are united. In effect, Clark is arguing for a negative analogy: since the human person is incomprehensible, the God-man concept cannot be accused of incredibility.19 Thus the task at hand is to solve problems linked to the doctrine, such as how Christ could assume human nature without assuming a sinful nature, and why God, who is so great, should condescend to become incarnate in a creature so small.20 Having accomplished this goal, "all then we have to do is to set forth the simple scriptural fact of Christ's divinity, assured that this fact must in some way be harmonious with" the divine unity. The interpretive key is to accept the authority of revelation, and to keep in mind that God even as revealed is incomprehensible-a fortiori God must be even more so unrevealed.21
Apart from his considered rejection of the traditional symbols of the trinity (and his rejection of the notion of eternal generation), it is clear that there is little attempt at understanding the doctrine in Clark. For him the
understanding of faith in this case means simply ascertaining what the scriptural doctrine is, then solving the problems which arise from it. In other words, the duty is to show that the doctrine is not contradictory-all further, positive understanding is eschewed.
Another writer at this time, James Strong, attempts to go farther than Clark, but actually remains within the latter's bounds. Strong tries to show that the notion of sonship in God does not involve the notion of inferiority in order to uphold the equality of the persons. He argues that by analogy with human generation, there is no essential inferiority tied to ontological derivation, since even in human generation there is an equality or sameness of natures.22 He considers that the only sort of inferiority connected with generation is two-fold: the anteriority of the father (implying superiority over the minor), and the fact that the generation lay with the father's will, the child having no consent. However, since both scripture and the creeds testify that the divine persons are all eternal, any notion of anteriority is excluded.23 Further, the divine generation is not according to will, but by the nature of God, i.e. by necessity. The Son is not generated by the will of the Father. Rather, both have their existence from the nature of divinity. For these reasons, and also because of the equality of divine properties, the elements of inferiority attached to derivation are not essential, but accidental.24
Strong next considers whether any real meaning can be given to the term person as applied to the divine. After stating the usual proviso that the divine nature is far beyond human comprehension, Strong gives a definition of person very similar to the classical descriptions: "A certain mutual relation essentially subsisting in the Godhead: and 'persons' are those SUBSTANTIVE FORMS of Deity thus distinguished."25 Although Strong shows more theological sophistication than Clark, it still seems that he is mainly content merely to demonstrate that the doctrine is not contradictory. He does argue analogically from human generation, but he does so only to prove that inferiority does not necessarily connect itself with derivation. Virtually no positive understanding of the trinity is gained through this maneuver.
William Nast represents an interesting case, for he appears to hold different views on the subject. He first notes that although the doctrine of the hypostatic union is difficult, it is unique to God's design to reconcile opposites, e.g. grace and liberty. He then repeats the familiar axiom that the divine reality is beyond human comprehension and, regarding the incarnation, plainly says that "there is nothing analogous by which it could be explained; it is an object of faith. The philosophy of the fact we must leave to God." Although he is not here speaking specifically of the trinity, the case is the same, for the unrevealed divine nature is incomprehensible.26
With this introduction, one might suppose that a simple statement of the scriptural texts would be all which could be hoped for. On the contrary, Nast argues that it is against the fundamental principles of evangelical Protestantism to assume that the church has once and for all times decided "the terms concerning the mode of the two-fold nature." This would mean that all searching after truth would be useless. Rather, "Although we can never fathom this mystery . . . it is nevertheless our sacred duty to learn to understand so much of it as the Scriptures enable us to hnow.27
He goes on to say that a failure of comprehension may be due either to the transcendence of the doctrine to human understanding, or to the fact that the scriptures have not yet been thoroughly understood-the essential definition may not yet have been located.28 Thus what he denies on the one hand, the understanding of faith through the use of analogy (and how else is the faith to be understood?) he allows on the other hand-but only in the mode of harmonization. "The proper conception of the God-man" is gained by harmonizing the divine and human natures.29 In practice, this means that, regarding the kenosis of the divine nature in the incarnation, "Only so much of his divine self-consciousness as was necessary for his mediatorial office" was shed by the Son.30 Again it seems that the only understanding allowed is that involved in the resolution of conflicts inherent in the statement of the doctrine in the Bible.
Although it might be argued that all theology operates in this manner, still it must be allowed that Christianity has often sought to positively understand by means of systematic, reasonable categories. The search for understanding would likely have been undertaken anyway, as evidenced by the work of St. Thomas. The adoption of Aristotelian categories as an interpretive structure was not primarily for the defense of faith against heretics, but rather because of the intrinsic superiority (in Thomas' opinion) of the Aristotelian conceptual system for the understanding of faith.
The Wesleyans stand in the theological tradition of Calvin, who likewise relied on scripture and its harmonization, but whereas Calvin is completely at home in the classical language, and uses it to advantage, the Wesleyans seem embarrassed by the need to defend the trinity conceptually, and have a tendency to neglect the power of the Nicene terminology. Tendencies and embarrassments are difficult to measure, and in fact Miley's theology contains a greater percentage of space devoted to the trinity than Calvin's Institutes, but the impression is still given of a reticence about the doctrine. Perhaps it is the case that sustained reflection on theology and creative understanding can occur only in the absence of noteworthy critique. Yet in this same period (and the preceding fifty years) the Wesleyans were carrying on a highly creative polemic against the Calvinists (both traditional-Edwardians and New School) on the issue of free will; criticism in this case did not hinder, but caused to flourish, theological speculation. By comparison with doctrines such as free agency and the governmental theory of the atonement, the treatments of the trinity appear to be merely delaying actions, designed to hold territory rather than advance the church's mission.
The only article in the Methodist Quarterly Review in this period to concern itself primarily with the trinity was written in 1894 and occupies six pages. While it is not different in method from the other articles studied, the author does include reflection on the nature of personality which is of aid in interpreting the thinking of Wesleyans on the trinity.
Edwin Sherwood begins his essay by noting that the trinity is a product of revelation not reason, and that its mystery does not lie in either contradiction or in the distinction between being and person, for this latter is clear. The mystery lies in two areas incomprehensible for human thought, namely the distinction between personality and person in God, and the existence in God of persons without individuated beings.31 He notes that it is not enough to say that the divine persons are personal within the divine unity, for this yields an impersonal unity and a personal plurality. What is demanded is also a personal unity.32 He therefore concludes that the best formulation of the divine reality is to say that one personal substance (not one person) exists in three persons. This can be the case, for unlike humans, where every person is a personality, in God personality is broader than person. That is, in God individuation of the persons is not complete as it is in humans.33 This lack of analogy with humans is no bar to credibility, for there is nothing about person and personality which necessarily implies that each person is an individuated being, or that person is essentially co-extensive with personality. Human experience may give only the accidents of the case, and since it cannot be proved that the human mode of personality is the rule, belief in the trinity is not incredible.34
Before an interpretation of the Wesleyan view of the trylity is given, it will be well to examine Odell's opinions. Actually, he mentions only briefly one thing which distinguishes him from the other theologians, and apparently nobody ever developed his idea, but his thought is this: it seems that a plurality is implied by God's moral nature, since "one cannot love without an object of affection.... There must have been eternally present an object of regard" as the object of divine love.35 This is, of course, the argument of Richard of St. Victor, and is used by him to demonstrate not only the second person, but also the third person. Odell, unfortunately, does not expand his views, nor did anyone else. This remark, practically an aside, apparently did not commend itself to Wesleyan theologians.
The Problem
Why is this? Why were Wesleyan theologians so loathe to use analogies and philosophies to gain understanding of the trinity? Throughout the paper several reasons have been postulated, and all of them contain some truth. But another reason may lie in the issue with which Sherwood struggled, namely, how do the persons of the trinity stand to the personality of God? What Sherwood wants to say is that the operations of the trinity ad extra are according to essence, that is, that all the persons act in a unified way. However, by posing the question in the way he did, Sherwood has virtually asked how a divine person (implying personal) can be fully personal. That is, the central concept of God for Sherwood (and for most Wesleyans of this period) was that of person/personality. The problem arose when three persons/personalities were posited. Sherwood's answer is to speak of partially individuated persons after the manner of Richard Watson, but, apart from the question whether this signifies anything intelligible, it can be claimed that the adoption of personality as the chief concept for God was a strategic error (at least as regards the trinity), because the notion of personality, as understood by the Wesleyans, was not capable of bearing a strong trinitarian interpretation.
This can be clearly seen in Miley. The force of the proofs for God's existence is that they demonstrate the personality of God, especially the teleological and moral/anthropological arguments. The teleological shows God's intellect and sensitivity to ends, while the moral shows God's own moral nature.36 In his critique of anti-theistic agnosticism, Miley devotes much space to make the point that the Absolute described by philosophy cannot be the personal God, although in fact, the personal God is the only real absolute.37 At one point Miley states that "if God is not a personal being, the result must be either atheism-or pantheism."38 A little farther he says that "Personality is the most determinate conception of God . . . the only conception of God which immediately gives his attributes."39
Explanation
In 1864, Daniel Whedon, editor of the Methodist Quarterly Review fixed his biggest theological guns on the Calvinists, and launched a frontal assault on their stronghold in The Freedom of the Will as a Basis of Human Responsibility and Divine Government. In it he presented the Arminian position and the points of criticism against the necessitarian argument. Why did Whedon engage the Calvinists? From the writing of a 438 page tome we must infer that he had been considering his strategy for some time, and the eagerness with which he lunges at the enemy speaks for a certain zealousness.
The preliminary clashes which occasioned The Freedom of the Will constitute a veritable trench warfare between Whedon and B. N. Martin. The latter in 1859 wrote a lengthy essay in The New Englander40 in which he argued that Nathaniel Taylor had introduced an improvement into the thinking of New England theology by emphasizing the notion of God's moral government. Among other benefits, Taylor's suggestion overturned the dictum that sin was a necessary component to the best of all possible universes. As an aside, he noted that this axiom was not unique to Calvinist divines, but could for example be found also in Wesley. Of an essay of some 60 pages, the remarks on Wesley occupy several paragraphs."
In November 1860, Whedon, in the Synopsis of the Quarterlies section of MQR, took note of the article and allowed that it showed much ability. However, Whedon observed, Martin had attempted to maintain Taylor's originality by misstating Wesley's views. First, the passage quoted from Wesley was irrelevant. Second, the issue was not the reality of sin itself, but rather of the possibility of sin, free will. 42 The enemy's maneuvers having been checked, Whedon returned to the business of editing.
The real battle, however, had just begun. Within a few months the shooting broke out afresh as Martin wrote a "Reply to the Methodist Quarterly Review. " Far from being a defeated foe, Martin mustered his weapons to claim that not only had he not misrepresented Wesley (here he quoted from sermons numbers 68 and 69 in the Emory edition), 43 but that
All that is most obnoxious in the extreme Calvinistic view of this subject is surpassed and outdone by the boundless extravagance of both the Romish and the Wesleyan theology. 41
Whedon closed ranks and readied his ordnance for a fight. He immediately wrote a reply to the upstart in which he repeated his charge that Martin's purpose was "to exalt Dr. Taylor at the expense of Mr. Wesley." He also rejected the claim of Martin that for Wesley "sin is the necessary means of the highest good of the universe." 45 Whedon had several arguments to contest Martin's claims, and of course his task was made more difficult given the nature of Wesley's theologizing. But whereas Wesley himself was relatively light artillery, Whedon had considerably larger guns which he now brought into use. While Wesley had no opinion as to the necessity of Adam's sin "to the best possible system for our own race," Fletcher was quite emphatic. After a few remarks about the Manichean character of the Calvinist God, the issue turned to whether the fact of sin involved divine permission in order to bring about a greater good, or involved the necessity of sin for the highest good (implying divine causation and hence culpability). Fletcher of course opted for the former, arguing that God could bring about the best without any individual's sin.46 Whedon admits that for Wesley God has the power to prevent sin, but not without destroying freedom.
It was a fundamental principle of Mr. Wesley's theodicy, expounded by him passim, as our extended extract above shows that it was Fletcher's, that it is impossible for even omnipotence arbitrarily to control free agency."
Martin had begun by making a specific point about Wesley himself. Whedon had escalated the conflict to include the entire Wesleyan tradition, especially Fletcher.
Martin tried one more time to get Whedon to capitulate. In his second reply, he covers again the old ground and notes that the issue at stake in the original Wesleyan-Calvinist debate (namely the one in which Wesley himself participated) was not free will 90 much as free grace. 48
Whedon blasted back a reply, but for the most part reiterated his earlier contentions, except that he stressed in this reply the role of Fletcher as the "authorized expounder of Wesley's Theology." 49
The debate as such ended with Whedon's second reply. However, in early 1862 Bibliotheca Sacra announced a series of essays on different theological perspectives, to be written by experts within those perspectives. In the July 1862 edition of MQR Whedon announced that he would write the article on the Doctrines of Methodism. 50 The article appeared in the April 1862 volume, and was basically expository in character, as opposed to polemic. There was no mention of the clash with Martin, but the topics discussed were almost exclusively those dealing with the Calvinist-Arminian controversy.
It must have been around this time that Whedon was writing The Freedom of the Will, and it is reasonable to suppose that at least part of the reason why he wrote the book was to declare conclusively that Wesleyans stood, and had always stood, for free agency and moral government.
In this book he notes that, contrary to the position assumed by Calvinists, "All atheists, Pantheists, Materialists, and professed Fatalists are necessitarians." 51 Further,
The doctrine that one principle of causation or fixed invariable sequence rules all things, material or mental, and all events of Will or of physics, is central with the d'Holbachian Atheism and Edwardean Calvinism.... The doctrine that there is no soul and no [free] Will . . . that there is no God who does not come under the same inflexible inalternative law of matter, levels the whole into one system of fatalistic materialism. 52
The moral consciousness demands freedom, immortality, and God as a Person. Only a personal God could be the sort of God demanded by this consciousness. 53
Whedon argues that a god which wills of necessity "is thus an infinite substance, with no power but to be passively moved as external causation acts up on him." 54 If this is so, then what God has actually created is the measure of His power: "God and not-God are fixed correlatives: absolute counterparts of each other." 55 The point is obviously that Whedon finds that Calvinist God to be such a God, and hence to be no God at all, since this would conflict with moral government and hence with the moral consciousness.
Unlike the Calvinists' God, who cannot deviate from perfection and who thus has no claim to morality, the Arminian God is "an infinitely free, excellent, meritorious Person," and so can be conceived as either good or bad morally. Further, Whedon notes almost parenthetically that "the Infinite of the Pantheist is all comprehending, of evil and good alike. Nay, Calvinism itself has never yet been able to extricate itself from the charge of placing the intentional primordial authorship of evil in God." 56 The point for Whedon is that naturalistic systems have difficulty accounting for a good God. So as far as Calvinism links God with responsibility for sin, there is evil in God and Calvinism is a naturalistic or pantheistic system.
Whedon's last word on the subject is that "the necessary CONDITION to the possible existence of a true Divine Government is the Volitional FREEDOM, both of the infinite and the finite Person." 57 His argument is that the Calvinist God is more like a pantheist absolute principle than the Christian God. The former has a monopoly on causation, and is itself inwardly determined. The latter exercises moral government, and shares both freedom and causation with creation. The Arminian God is truly a person, and has moral qualities.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the personality of God, a concept which played so important a role for Miley and others, did not conceptually arise from conflicts with pantheists or natural science, but rather from the debate with the Calvinists. As the Wesleyans saw the problem, the Calvinist God just could not be a personal God. The affirmation of moral consciousness implied an acceptance of freedom, and this in turn required a God who limited Himself, who allowed a measure of causality to creation, and who was not internally necessitated: an infinite person.
The point of all this for the doctrine of the trinity is that the concept of the personality of God assumed such an integral place in the Wesleyans' thinking that it became the central theological category. I contend that the polemic situation was so decisive for Wesleyanism that they were conceptually unable to make use of the trinity in a systematic way. Not only were they trying to construct theology by means of philosophical tools, but the tools themselves were faulty.
Clearly personality was an important notion for Miley, and thus undoubtedly for most Wesleyan thinkers. Personality in general for Miley includes essentially rational intellect, sensibility, and will.58 Miley gives little elaboration of sensation as an essential element of personality, and he could have, if he wanted to, subsumed it under intellect, at least in God, for the divine intellect may be supposed to have an intuitive knowledge of even concrete facts. At any rate, the inclusion of sensibility in personality disrupts the classically held psychology of intellect and will, with the result that a trinity of procession from the divine essence as an act of understanding (as in St. Thomas), namely Word/concept and Love/will, is impossible.
But Miley appears not even to want to proceed analogically. In the section on the trinity he states that previous attempts to reason analogically about the trinity are misguided, and specifically cites the psychological analogy. "Intellect, sensibility, and will unite in the personality of mind. True: but no ground remains for any personal distinctions either in the mind or in the powers which constitute its personality." 59 Yet, working along similar lines, theologians such as Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas did discover personal distinctions among the powers, namely, distinctions of origin and procession. A likely explanation for this feature of Miley's thought is that "person" is for him so bound up with personality that to think analogically would be to either divide the substance by assigning each person to a faculty to create a virtual tri-theism, with each person being a completely individual personality. This is the problem which concerns Sherwood. The battle to demonstrate the personality of God had been fought for so long that the personality of God (intellect, sensibility, will) became more important than the trinity of God, especially since the latter could not be interpreted within the personality of God.
This can be seen if Miley's concept of the image of God is examined. For Miley, the image of God in which humanity was created is primarily a holy personality. "Personality is the central truth of man's original likeness to God." 60 Whereas Augustine had argued from humanity's psychological composition as the image to the trinity, Miley argues from it to God's personality and does not mention the trinity. While this is consistent with what he had previously said concerning analogy and personality, it does show that his primary concern is not to understand the trinity, even in a rudimentary way, but rather to show that there is an analogy between the human soul and the unity of God.
Conclusion
I have argued that the Wesleyans' controversy with the Calvinists so stamped their thinking that they were unable to deal conceptually with the doctrine of the trinity. There were many components which conspired to render the Wesleyans incapable of thinking in a trinitarian way, but the factor which united these components into a historical force was the debate over free will. The Wesleyans were poorly served by the polemic, at least concerning the doctrine of the trinity. Instead of constructing their theology along trinitarian lines, they first proved the personality of God, then attempted to locate within God three personalities. Given this, it is no wonder that the dominant trend was simply to state the facts of the doctrine and to defend it against charges of contradiction.
There remains only the task of stating the implications of the essay for the contemporary construction of Wesleyan theology. I argue that Christian theology must be trinitarian from the foundation. Wesleyan theology in particular has erred in relying on two lines of defense: the doctrine of the trinity as a revealed truth, and the claims of theism as rationally grounded. The thinking has always been that if the first line were breached, at least the second line would hold, being grounded on the sure rock of rationality.
This attitude has left us like Thetis standing on the beach watching Peleus setting sail: unable to believe what is happening before her eyes. So we in theology have watched in disbelief as the ship of philosophy has sailed for other seas. In brief, philosophy and reason are no longer able or willing to do the job we ask of them. Spoiling the Egyptians is one thing, but we have traditionally reversed the roles between Israelite and Egyptian: under Pharaoh the people of God did the hard work: Wesleyans want Pharaoh to do the hard intellectual work under the guise of spoiling the Egyptians.
In summary, the theology of l9th century Wesleyanism cannot be reconciled with the truth that the God encountered in Jesus Christ is not just any God to whom the notion of trinity has been connected as an adjunct. The God of Christ is always the trinity.
Notes
1"The Divine Human Person of Christ," Methodist Quarterly Review
42(1860):441. [Hereafter MQR]
2"The Incarnation,"MQR 33(1851):116.
3Systematic Theology, 2 vols., (New York: Hunt & Eaton, 1892), 1:22.
4Ibid., 1:26-29.
5Ibid., 1:37-38.
6Ibid., 1:43-47.
7Ibid., 1:68.
8Ibid., 1:71.
9Clark, MQR 33:133.
10"The Christian Conception of God." MQR 78(1896):731.
11"The Apostles' Creed," MQR 41(1860):484.
12Miley, 1:223.
13Ibid., 1:231.
14Odell, MQR 78:731.
15Nast, MQR 42:442.
16Miley, 1:271.
17Clark, MQR 33:122.
18Ibid., p. 123.
19Ibid., p. 130.
20Ibid., p. 131.
21Ibid., pp. 133-134-
22"The Doctrine of the Logos in the Introduction to John's Gospel," MQR 33(1851):543-544.
23Ibid., p. 544.
24Ibid., p. 545.
25Ibid., p. 547.
26Nast, MQR 42:443.
27Ibid., p. 445.
28Ibid., pp. 445-446.
29Ibid., p. 443.
30Ibid., p. 457.
31"The Mystery of the Trinity," MQR 76(1894):584.
32Ibid., p. 585.
33Ibid-, pp. 586-587.
34Ibid., pp. 588-589.
350dell, MQR 78:732-
36Miley, 1:109.
37Ibid-, pp. 148-149-
38Ibid., p. 173.
39Ibid., p. 177.
40"Dr. Taylor on Moral Government," New Englander 17(Nov. 1859):903-967.
41"Ibid., p. 948.
42MQR 42(Jan., 1860):146.
43New Englander 18(May, 1860):477.
44Ibid-, p. 479.
45"Wesleyanism and Taylorism - Reply to the New Englander," MQR 42 (Oct., 1860):657.
46Ibid., pp. 660-661-
47Ibid., p. 665.
48"Theology of Wesley - Reply to the Methodist Quarterly Review," New Englander 19 (July, 1861): 640.
49Wesleyanism and Taylorism-Second Reply to the New Englander," MQR 44(Jan., 1862): 143.
50Bibiotheca Sacra 19(1862):241-273. For the announcement see MQR 44(1862):336-337 and 506.
51D. D. Whedon, Freedom of the Will (New York: Carlton & Lanahan, 1864), p. 108.
52Ibid., p. 109,
53Ibid., p. 110.
54Ibid-, p. 312.
55Ibid.
56Ibid., pp. 315-316.
57Ibid., p. 436.
58Miley, 1:169.
59Ibid., p. 269.
60Ibid., p. 407.
Edited by Brian Seidel
