HERMENEUTICAL BASES FOR THEOLOGY:
HIGHER CRITICISM AND THE WESLEYAN INTERPRETER

by
George Lyons

The assigned title of this paper, "Hermeneutical Bases for Theology: Higher Criticism and the Wesleyan Interpreter," is in need of exegesis. First, even a casual survey of the literature on the subject of "hermeneutics" and "theology" makes it obvious that no generally agreed upon definitions of the terms may be assumed, nor is the relationship between them clarified much by the term "bases." Second, "higher criticism," a designation seldom used by its contemporary practitioners, unfortunately often carries the largely negative connotation of a destructive attack upon the authority of the Bible. And third, the reference to "the Wesleyan interpreter" suggests a non—existent uniformity among those who choose so to identify themselves, whether this uniformity is conceived in terms of presuppositions, methodology, or conclusions. There is no generally agreed upon or distinctively Wesleyan hermeneutic or attitude toward and application of the so—called "higher criticism." Equally competent and committed Wesleyans continue to differ in their judgment on these subjects. John Wesley's (1703—1791) words on a controversial subject of his day are apropos:

and not merely heat on the subject.1

What is the relationship between hermeneutics and theology? An answer calls for some historical orientation. Wesley does not use the term "hermeneutics," so far as I have been able to determine, but he does practice it. The practice of establishing principles, methods, and rules necessary for the interpretation of written texts dates from antiquity, although the term "hermeneutics" was first used in this traditional sense in the seventeenth century. The most important contributor was a younger contemporary of Wesley. Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768—1834), attempting to overcome the existing division of hermeneutics between the secular and the sacred, proposed instead the categories of general and special hermeneutics. "Following prior practice, Schleiermacher placed [hermeneutics] between grammatico-historical criticism on the one hand and exegesis on the other."2

These distinctions and definitions have been so widely and differently abandoned in contemporary practice that the meaning of the term "hermeneutics" has become increasingly ambiguous. Some continue to use "hermeneutics" to refer to the theory that guides "exegesis," and "exegesis" to refer to the practice of the "interpretation" of texts.3 Others use "exegesis" to refer to the descriptive task of determining the original meaning of a text as over against "hermeneutics" as the concern to expose the present meaning of a text, with "interpretation" comprehending both tasks.4 All such distinctions become somewhat artificial when it is recognized that the underlying ancient Greek terms, hermeneia and exegesis, and their Latin equivalents, interpretatio and expositio, were essentially synonymous.5 Furthermore, the profound interrelationship between the historical context of a text and its meaning increasingly have made the clear division of labor between historical criticism and interpretation inapplicable in practice. At the same time, the once fairly manageable set of rules for interpretation have today become a whole series of disciplines.6

Another development has been the so—called "New Hermeneutic," which differs from the traditional hermeneutics

The "New Hermeneutic," lends philosophical sophistication to the view that interpretation is inevitably subjective, as opposed to the traditional view that the meaning of a text is to be found in the objective intention of the text's author.8

In its traditional usage "hermeneutics" is to be understood as a subdivision within Biblical studies. Since the Bible is foundational in Protestantism, "hermeneutics" as explanation provides the raw material for theology. In the new usage, "hermeneutics" as understanding becomes "the overarching category which unifies the theological faculty, moving from Biblical exegesis via systematic theology to practical theology and homiletics." Thus "hermeneutics" is envisaged as "the basis of theology as a whole"9 or perhaps "theology itself is hermeneutic."10

In either usage hermeneutics and theology are intimately related. Although it is difficult to distinguish cause and effect, it appears that it was in part a hermeneutical shift, specifically the abandonment of allegorical exegesis, that gave birth to the Reformation. One wonders whether Martin Luther's (1483—1546) conflict with Rome forced him to reorient his hermeneutics or vice versa. In any case, the Reformers rejected the medieval ecclesiastical hermeneutic which presumed an unbroken continuity between Scripture and tradition and which was in turn supported by the prevailing exegetical mode, the so—called quadriga or the fourfold meaning of Scripture. Medieval art, in which Biblical stories are "presented in contemporary settings and dress, even with some contemporary personages appearing next to Biblical characters," dramatically illustrates the disregard for or unawareness of the historical distance separating the Bible from contemporary Christendom.11

Implicit in the Reformation insistence upon the principle of sola Scriptura and the rejection of the normative authority of tradition and of the fallen Church is the rise of historical consciousness. Hermeneutics in the sense of interpretation became necessary as a result of the recognition of the historical cleavage between then and now. The continuity between the two periods had to be discovered inductively by attentive listening to what Scripture said and not merely deduced from what Church tradition said, ingeniously read back into Scripture by means of allegorical interpretation. Whereas allegorical interpretation ignored the gap between "then" and "now" at the expense of history, Reformation hermeneutics' attempt to bridge the gap made the eventual emergence of historical criticism virtually inevitable. Wesley stands in this Reformation tradition of hermeneutics at the point in time when the foundations of "higher criticism" were being laid. An interesting bit of historical trivia—H. S. Reimarus (1723—1768), the father of modern life—of—Jesus research, was at Oxford briefly five years before Wesley came there.12

"Unless Biblical study is to be merely a game for antiquarians," we must, like Wesley, ask about the contemporary significance of the text.13 The object of hermeneutics as interpretation and exposition is to analyze

The most pressing problem of hermeneutics is less the determination of what its object ought to be than how it ought to be achieved.15

How does hermeneutics provide the basis for theology and practical living? But first, what is "theology"? In contemporary usage the term "theology" is no less ambiguous than "hermeneutics." God, the proper subject matter of "theology" as suggested by its etymology, is not a directly accessible and definable object of study.16 And yet, "it is a doubtful proceeding to use the concept 'theology' in such a wide sense that any talk of God and any religious statement whatever may be designated as theology."17 Such a definition fails to distinguish between theology and confession or testimony or mystical religious fantasy. "Theology" may at times be used to refer to the entire academic/professional discipline of religious studies, as in the distinction between the theology and biology departments in a college. The understanding of "theology" in Medieval Scholasticism, which employed Greek philosophy as the basis for its formal categories of thought, created a dilemma for the Reformers, who recognized these categories as insuperably alien, both formally and materially, to the Bible, newly recognized as the normative basis for Christian faith and practice.18 This eventually led to the emergence of a new discipline—Biblical theology.

The earliest Biblical theologies produced by Protestant Scholasticism were neither truly Biblical nor theology, but simply collections of proof texts juxtaposed indiscriminately under the headings of the various dogmas to which they were presumed to lend support, something like modern topical Bibles. In opposition to Lutheran orthodoxy the pietists called for a truly Biblical theology which was to be found inductively in the Bible and not to be influenced deductively by dogmatic and philosophical presuppositions. Johann Philipp Gabler (1753—1826), generally considered the father of modern Biblical theology, was a younger contemporary of Wesley. Gabler had as his ultimate concern the establishment of a Biblical foundation for a proper systematic, constructive, or dogmatic theology. "Biblical theology was freed from a predetermination by dogmatic theology but remained determined by it with regard to its purpose."19 Biblical theology was not an end in itself, but had the task of mediating between Biblical religion and dogmatic theology. Gabler's distinction between true and pure Biblical theology amounted to a recognition of the need to separate the particular, human, time—bound, and contingent aspects of Biblical theology in the broader sense from the narrower sense consisting only of the purified, unchanging, divine, and timeless concepts. Wesley shared a similar concern, but with a significant difference, as we shall see.

To some extent Wesley anticipates the insight of Adolf Schlatter (1852—1938) a century later. Schlatter recognized that theology and religion, which Gabler distinguished, were inseparable in the New Testament.20 Although Schlatter recognized the distinction between the descriptive task of New Testament theology and the prescriptive task of dogmatic theology, their relationship was one of neither dependence nor independence but of "dialectical interaction."21 Schlatter writes,

Hendrikus Boers correctly observes that " 'theology' is the fundamental reason for most New Testament research, . . . the hidden presupposition which determines it,"23 and the goal, if not the substance. of hermeneutics. Academic interest in the New Testament is due invariably to its part in the Scriptures of the believing community. "The question thus arises unavoidably as to what the New Testament means."24 One cannot be content with the purely antiquarian interest in what it meant originally. "If there were to be no expectation that these writings had something meaningful to say, there would be very little interest in them."25 And yet, even a casual inspection of the New Testament reveals that although it contains historical narratives, didactic and revelation speeches, pastoral letters, and an apocalyptic account, it contains "nothing that could in any real sense be called a theology. 26 The New Testament authors have certain theological convictions which emerge more in ethos, one's characteristic way of living, than in logos, theoretical abstractions. Thus a theology based on the New Testament must be practical. Paul's pastoral letters, even Romans, which comes closest to anything like theology in the New Testament, do not seem to be either products or presentations of a coherent theological system; they grow out of life and are concerned with Christian living. This is not to deny that Paul's occasional letters to his churches arise from profound theological convictions, some of which are at odds with those of his converts.

In considering the relationship between hermeneutics and theology, another question must be raised. To what extent does one's theological orientation determine his hermeneutic, influence his explanation of Scripture, and his understanding as such? This suggests the question addressed in Rudolf Bultmann's important essay, "Is Exegesis without Presuppositions Possible?"27 to which he answers unambiguously, yes and no. It is permissible to describe theology as based upon hermeneutics, whether as the explanation of the intention of Biblical texts in their continuing relevance or as the understanding apprehension of what comes to expression in the language of the Bible. It is also permissible to describe hermeneutics in its overarching sense as inevitably presupposing theological commitments.

John J. Kiwiet thus characterizes the Roman Catholic hermeneutic as ecclesiocentric, Luther's hermeneutic as Christocentric, Calvin's hermeneutic as theocentric, and Anabaptist hermeneutic as anthropocentricpneumatocentric.28 In this same sense, Carl Michalson characterizes Wesley's as a "hermeneutic of holiness."29 Mildred Bangs Wynkoop characterizes it as a "hermeneutic of love."30 I would suggest still another characterization—Wesley's hermeneutic is soteriocentric. He studied the Bible with one overriding question in mind: What is the way to heaven?31

Inevitably one's theology influences the questions he brings to the text. One may not legitimately import alien answers to the text and remain true to the Protestant acceptance of the supreme authority of Scripture. Rather one must approach the text without presuppositions in the sense of "dogmatic prejudices" or presuppositions as to the sense of "dogmatic prejudices" or presuppositions as to the results of exegesis.32 Wesley and Wesleyans properly insist that whatever is not found in Scripture is not to be made an article of faith.

There is a sense in which James I. Packer is correct that the relationship between theology and hermeneutics is reciprocal—"Every theology has its built—in hermeneutic, and every hermeneutic is implicitly a total theology."33 Packer, however, is not referring to the inevitable pre-understanding one brings to Scripture, but to a prior constraint on what Scripture may be taken to mean. He claims to follow Calvin in asserting that Biblical interpretation is for the sake of arriving at an adequate systematic theology, which in turn becomes a propaedeutic for Biblical interpretation. That is, systematic theology is the necessary preliminary instruction for Biblical study.34 Packer's fundamentalist argument that "in all our Biblical interpretation we should use the concept of inerrancy as a control . .,"35 is unacceptable for the same reasons that the historicist exclusion of the possibility of miracles by definition is likewise unacceptable.36 Even Bultmann insists that historical science as such "may not assert that . . . a faith [in divine intervention] is an illusion and that God has not acted in history."37 Let us turn now to the matter of "higher criticism."

The designation "higher criticism" was apparently first used by J. G. Eichhorn (1752—1827), another younger contemporary of Wesley, late in the eighteenth century. Eichhorn used the term "higher criticism" to designate the rational examination of the Bible with a view to answering questions about the date, authorship, place of origin, sources, integrity, the literary character of its various documents, etc.38 Thus "higher criticism" comprehends all the critical methodologies of contemporary Biblical interpretation, such as literary criticism, source criticism, Tendenz criticism, history of religions (i.e., Religionsgeschichte, or comparative religions), form criticism, tradition criticism, redaction criticism, rhetorical criticism, structuralism, etc.39 It employs the adjective "higher" to distinguish it from "lower," that is, textual, criticism. This was not intended to suggest that "lower criticism" is either inferior to or less complex than "higher criticism," but rather that it is foundational for it.40 For various reasons both expressions, higher and lower criticism, have fallen into disuse except among fundamentalists, who reject higher criticism, to be replaced by the designations "historical critical method" or simply "Biblical criticism."

The scope of the present paper does not permit a full description and assessment of the various methods constituting Biblical criticism. Suffice it to say that history has shown both the uncritical rejection and the uncritical acceptance of Biblical criticism to be inappropriate to its object, the Scriptures. Between these two extremes is the possibility of a critical openness to whatever the evidence requires.4l Historical critical method as a historical phenomenon "must be subject to the same scrutiny, criticism, and revision as any other part of history."42

"Biblical criticism is not, inherently and necessarily, hostile to evangelical faith," despite the practitioners who have employed it for negative and destructive purposes.43 The method itself cannot be blamed for the prejudices of some who use it.44 The problem is not in the application of criticism to Scripture but in the rationalistic prior constraints that some radical practitioners have imposed on their task. Even those on the conservative side of the spectrum are not without their own rationalistic prejudices. It appears that "there is an undefined point on the higher critical scale—varying from one evangelical community to another—beyond which, by virtue of some mystical consensus, critical inquiry may not go."45 Apparently, it is assumed that appeals to inspiration and/or inerrancy can settle historical and literary questions. But can they?

Numerous contemporary voices, including some prominent Biblical critics such as Brevard Childs, James Sanders, Peter Stuhlmacher, Walter Wink, Reginald Fuller, and Paul Minear, are now calling for a reformation of Biblical criticism to bring it into subservience to a hermeneutic which is appropriate to its object, the Bible as canonical Scripture.46 Gerhard Maier's "obituary" announcing The End of the Historical Critical Method, 47 however, appears to be premature. Even if we may be said to live in the post—critical period, this may not be taken as aid and comfort for those who are nostalgic for pre—critical naivete. As Wayne McCown recognizes, post-critical hermeneutics presumes the results of earlier historical critical research but goes beyond such criticism "to more constructive endeavors."48 This is what Wesleyans who have employed Biblical criticism have been doing all along. The fundamentalist position of those who claim to adhere to the historic position of the Church, that is, the position of the Church for the nearly eighteen centuries before the discovery of Biblical criticism, after this far—reaching hermeneutical revolution has taken place, is not really the same as that of those who lived earlier, before there existed a serious alternative other than scepticism.49 In the same way, Wesleyans cannot simply appropriate Wesley's hermeneutical method and assumptions and remain true to Wesley.

As a Wesleyan I have some serious reservations concerning the post-critical hermeneutical approach known as "canonical criticism."50 I for one am not prepared to accept the implications it has for "lower criticism" in New Testament studies. Wesleyans are inveterate "primitivists," and properly so. I am not prepared to ignore the fruit of earlier generations of textual critics as little more than historical trivia. Are those who welcome canonical criticism with open arms prepared to accept, for example, the last twelve verses of Mark—which are clearly part of the canonical text of the Gospel—despite all the difficulties this creates? Are they really prepared to recognize the texts of the post—Constantinian Church as of greater normative authority than those of the primitive authors and editors? My questions register my reservations. On the positive side, however, one value of canonical criticism is the modern application of the Reformation principle of Biblical interpretation, which Wesley followed—the analogy of faith. It is, according to Raymond E. Brown, the reminder that

Historical criticism serves as an essential reminder that we are separated from the original setting of Paul's letters, for example, temporally, geographically, politically, culturally, sociologically, situationally, and in other significant respects as well. "They cannot possibly be automatically, and without remainder, applicable to US in our situations."52 We are reading someone else's mail and must never forget it. Some object to critical studies of the Bible on the basis of the misunderstanding that, although the original readers cannot have had all the scholarly tools of the Biblical critics, they understood adequately and so should we. This argument fails to take seriously the "tacit dimension" in language,53 the fact that what Paul's readers knew automatically as children of the age and culture which they shared with Paul, we can know only imperfectly at best, and only through painstaking historical study. Paul J. Achtemeier argues that "critical studies have been made necessary by the sheer complexity of the phenomenon under investigation, and no amount of pious rhetoric or fiery attacks can change that fact."54 We are not untrue to our Wesleyan heritage when we acknowledge that the scholar is in a better position to understand what Scripture meant than is the simple, devout Christian. We are untrue to our tradition only if we are content as scholars to stop with academic description.

The Wesleyan Interpreter

Let us look more closely at the Wesleyan precedent as it relates to criticism and hermeneutics. The editor of Wesley's standard sermons, Edward H. Sugden, contends that "Wesley was a critic, both higher and lower, before those much misunderstood terms were invented."55 This correctly recognizes that although Wesley "wrote in pre—higher—critical times," he was not uncritical in his approach to Scripture, nor was he unconcerned with the questions subsequently addressed by higher criticism.56 Although his view of Scripture as the book of God allowed him to be "unhindered by any questions of date or authorship,"57 he does not ignore such questions even in his Explanatory Notes in which he deliberately sets aside critical questions to give plain truth for plain people. George Allen Turner is correct that "to classify Wesley as a 'critical' scholar represents a vain attempt to 'modernize' him."58 Few in England during the eighteenth century were in close touch with German scholarship where the pioneering work in higher and lower criticism was being done.59 If we admit that Wesley was not a modern Biblical critic, can he properly be made an advocate of Fundamentalism?

At times Wesley does sound like a Fundamentalist, for example, when he dismisses the possibility of errors of any kind in Scripture with the observation, if there is one error there might as well be a thousand. Yet Wesley insists that apart from a commitment to certain "fundamental doctrines," he is willing to think and let think and claims no assistance from the Spirit in his "private opinions."60 Furthermore, Wesley's list of "fundamentals" is hardly that of Fundamentalism. They include the deity of Christ, the atonement, justification by faith alone, original sin, the Trinity, and the work of the Holy Spirit. Turner writes that Wesley takes a mediating path between the Calvinists and the Friends, a balance between the formers' emphasis on the Spirit's illumination of the word and the latters' intuitive immediacy of the Spirit's witness to truth.61

Nevertheless, Wesley's Arminianism and his open attitude toward Johann Albrecht Bengel's (1687—1752) controversial text critical proposals clearly sets him apart from the reactionary rejections of Biblical scholarship characteristic of modern Fundamentalism.62 He wrote of his Explanatory Notes on the Old Testament: "It is not part of my design to save either learned or unlearned men from the trouble of thinking.... On the contrary, my intention is, to make them think, and to assist them in thinking.63 "Hermeneutical theory, like all other theory in the later part of the eighteenth century, obeyed the slogan: Dare to think."64 This Wesley did and encouraged his Methodists to do likewise.

Wesley also distances himself from a Fundamentalist approach to Scripture in the large place he assigns Christian experience. He writes in his Plain Account of Christian Perfection that if he were convinced that none had experienced the perfection in love he maintained to be witnessed to in Scripture, he would be convinced that his interpretation was mistaken and would be constrained to teach differently.65 Wesley writes, "Whereas it is objected that experience is not sufficient to prove a doctrine unsupported by Scripture: We answer, experience is sufficient to confirm a doctrine grounded on Scripture."66

It is in this context that Wesley's acceptance of the Reformation emphasis upon the "internal witness of the Holy Spirit" is to be understood. The Spirit does not free men from the hard work of study and thinking nor does He inspire correct objective interpretations of Scripture. Nor does the Spirit act in the capacity of some kind of heavenly imprimatur giving the divine nihil obstat that either Scripture or one's interpretation of it is free from error. Rather the Spirit subjectively validates the truth of Scripture in its spiritually transforming intent. As Paul M. Bassett argues, "The Spirit does not convince men of the authenticity of the Scripture. Rather, the Spirit applies 'and enables man to receive with faith the illuminating and saving meaning of God's revelation.' "67 Man comes to experience salvation, through personal, existential encounter with the Living Word, Jesus Christ, through the instrumentality of the written Word. One can correctly grasp the meaning of Scripture without being grasped by its intent. The Spirit's role in the hermeneutical process does not give license to ignorance or indolence on the part of the Spirit—filled; it is rather a call to ethical seriousness.

Wesley accepts the Reformation hermeneutical rule known as "the analogy of faith," by which Scripture is understood as its own interpreter. His object is not that of the Fundamentalist, to harmonize diversity, but to criticize non—Scriptural doctrines.68 Wesley considers the simple, historical literal meaning of Scripture the "firm foundation on which the spiritual meaning can be build."69 By "spiritual meaning" Wesley does not suggest that he adheres to a twofold meaning of Scripture, an abbreviation of the medieval fourfold meaning. He refers rather to the practical, edifying corollaries to be deduced from Scripture—an insistence upon the necessity of moving beyond what it once meant to what it now means.70 To carry out this edifying task, Wesley considered it advisable for every minister to be, in his words, a "critical master" of Greek and Hebrew.71 It is not clear precisely what Wesley meant by the term "critical;" it is clear that the knowledge of Scripture he expects of the professional clergy is both intensive and extensive. He raises the following questions for self—examination:

Wesley shares the concerns of Biblical criticism to set Scripture within its proper historical context and to bring reason to bear on revelation. He insists that, although "not absolutely necessary," it is "highly expedient" for one who "would thoroughly understand the Scriptures" to have a first hand "knowledge of profane history, likewise of ancient customs, of chronology and geography."73 The interpretive task makes it "equally expedient" to have a "some knowledge of the sciences also" such as logic, metaphysics, natural philosophy, and geometry.74 Wesley finds skill in the use of logic especially useful. "It is good for this at least," he says, ". . . to make people talk less; by showing them both what is, and what is not, to the point; and how extremely hard it is to prove anything."75 He is fully as aware as any sound modern critic that in most things one deals with probabilities not certainties. Wesley recommends a "knowledge of the Fathers" of the ancient Church, whom he considers "the most authentic commentators on Scripture"76 --a view shared by many modern advocates of canonical criticism. He also considers a knowledge of what we would call "psychology" and "sociology" to be essential to the task of applying Scripture individually to the needs of each hearer. He asks in self—examination: "Have I any knowledge of the world? Have I studied men, (as well as books) and observed their tempers, maxims, and manners?"77 Have I "an eminent share of prudence? that most uncommon thing which is usually called common sense?" And do I have "all the courtesy of a gentleman, joined with the correctness of a scholar"?78 Wesley's approach to Scripture, despite the scholarly tools he brings to the task, is not academic but intensely practical in its objective. In his 1756 "Address to the Clergy" he insists that the clergyman requires a thorough knowledge of the Scriptures, because they "teach us how to teach others," and most importantly how "to make a suitable application of all to the conscience of his hearers."79 For Wesley critical knowledge must lead to practical application.

Perhaps more important than whether or not Wesley used "higher criticism," thus authorizing Wesleyans to do so, is the recognition that he used the interpretive principles and methods generally accepted by his contemporaries, and was not reluctant to accept the fruits of new critical methods. Wesley's unqualified endorsement of Bengel is noteworthy in this regard especially in view of the controversy surrounding his text critical innovations. Furthermore, in Wesley's utilization of then contemporary exegetical methods, he was following, unwittingly perhaps, clear Biblical precedents. Several recent studies, perhaps most accessibly Richard N. Longenecker's Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period,80 illustrate the extent to which New Testament writers were conversant with, if not experts in, the methods of Biblical interpretation of their day. Few of us would assume that our acceptance of Biblical authority would entail an obligation to employ the Biblical writers' exegetical methods. I agree with Longenecker that this is neither necessary nor possible. Both the Wesleyan and Biblical exegetical methods establish a more important precedent. Unless we are content to live in a theological ghetto in which we address only ourselves, Wesleyan interpreters too must be willing to become familiar with the current methods, results, and practice of "higher criticism." Certainly we cannot uncritically swallow all its naturalistic and rationalistic assumptions, but neither can we ignore its more numerous values. If we expect to be taken as anything other than quacks and obscurantists in the world of serious Biblical scholarship we must be critical masters of "higher criticism, " but not for the sake of academic respectability alone. Edification in holy love must be a central objective.

Wesley shows a clear awareness of the gap that exists between his time and that of the primitive church.81 And yet he insists that Methodism ought to be "the old religion, the religion of the Bible, the religion of the primitive Church, the religion of the Church of England."82 Such "primitivism" led to the charge that he was an "enthusiast"—a charge he justifiably denies. Unlike the "enthusiasts" Wesley accepts as methodologically sound the need to distinguish between the aspects of the New Testament Christianity which uniquely applied to the earliest Christians of the Apostolic age and those which apply to Christians in all ages.83 But he insists that even if certain Biblical texts "primarily belong to the Christians of the apostolic age," that does not exclude them from belonging to all in a secondary sense.84

The gulf that exists between then and now has grown larger since Wesley's day as a result of both modern technology and a greater understanding of how truly "primitive" the primitive church was. The difficulty of the hermeneutical task of bridging that gulf must not detain us from placing this among our highest priorities as Wesleyan interpreters. I suspect that, if Wesley were to reappear on the contemporary scene, he would not be entirely happy with either his liberal Methodist sons and daughters, nor with his children of the conservative Holiness Movement. He would probably bump our heads together, insisting once again that critical thought and holiness of heart and life are not to be divorced.

Notes

1Wesley's remarks on predestination are recorded in Sermon 58, The Works of John Wesley, 14 v019. (Grand Rapids: Baker; reprint of the 1872 ed.), 6:226 (hereinafter cited as Wesley, Works).

2Richard N. Soulen, Handbook of Biblical Criticism (Atlanta: John Knox, 1976), p.73. See Milton S. Terry, Biblical Hermeneutics: A Treatise on the Interpretation of the Old and New Testaments, new ed. (New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1883), pp.17—21.

3See e.g., Walter C. Kaiser, Jr., Toward an Exegetical Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1981), p. 47.

4See e.g., David Stacey, Interpreting the Bible (New York: Seabury, 1977).

5See James M. Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth," The New Hermeneutic, ed. James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr., New Frontiers in Theology, No. 2 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 1—7; and Anthony C. Thiselton, "Explain, Interpret, Tell, Narrative," The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology, vo1. 1, ed. Colin Brown (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1975), pp. 573—84.

6See Richard L. Rohrbaugh, The Biblical Interpreter: An Agrarian Bible in an Industrial Age (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978), pp. 8—11.

7Soulen, p. 74.

8A position ably defended by E. D. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University, 1967). See also Soulen, p. 75.

9James M. Robinson, "Basic Shifts in German Theology," Interpretation 16 (1962):95—96.

10Idem, "Hermeneutic Since Barth," p. 67.

11Hendrikus Boers, What Is New Testament Theology? The Rise of Criticism and the Problem of a Theology of the New Testament, Guides to Biblical Scholarship, New Testament Series (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), p. 17.

l2See Charles H. Talbert, ed. Reimarus: Fragments, Life of Jesus Series (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970), "Introduction," pp. 1—43.

13Rohrbaugh, p. 13.

14James M. Robinson, "The Future of New Testament Theology," Religious Studies Review 2, 1 (1976):17.

15This problem is not restricted to the sterile scholarship of secular higher critics. See Robert Traina, "Inductive Bible Study Reexamined in the Light of Contemporary Hermeneutics: Part II: Applying the Truth," Interpreting God 's Word for Today: An Inquiry into Hermeneutics from a Biblical Theological Perspective, eds. Wayne McCown and James Earl Massey [hereinafter cited as Hermeneutics], pp. 85—109, esp. p. 106.

16Maurice Wiles, What Is Theology? (London: Oxford, 1976), pp. 1—6.

l7Gerhard Ebeling, Word and Faith, trans. J. W. Leitch (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1960), p. 93.

18Boers, pp. 16-22

19Ibid., p.37.

20Adolf Schlatter, "The Theology of the New Testament and Dogmatics," (1909) The Nature of New Testament Theology, trans. Robert Morgan (Naperville, IL: Allenson, 1973), pp. 161—66.

21Boers, p. 70; cf. p. 73.

22Schlatter, p. 122.

23Boers, p. 7; cf. also p. 87

24Ibid., p. 59.

25Ibid.

26Ibid., pp. 9—10.

27Rudolf Bultmann, "Is Exegesis without Presuppositions Possible?" Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann, trans. Schubert M. Ogden, Living Age Books, No. 29 (New York: Meridian, 1960), pp.288—96; and notes, pp. 315—15.

28John J. Kiwiet, "Hermeneutics in Historical Perspective," Southwestern Journal of Theology, 16 (1974):7—11.

29Carl Michalson, "The Hermeneutics of Holiness in Wesley, " Hermeneutics, pp. 31—52.

30Mildred Bangs Wynkoop, "A Hermeneutical Approach to John Wesley," Wesleyan Theological Journal 6 (Spring 1971):21; idem, A Theology of Love (Kansas City: Beacon Hill Press of Kansas City, 1972), p. 101. She is followed by Larry Shelton, "John Wesley's Approach to Scripture in Historical Perspective," Wesleyan Theological Journal 16 (Spring 1981):41.

31Wesley, Works, 5:3. See Shelton, pp. 39—40.

32Bultmann, p. 290.

33James I. Packer, "Preaching as Biblical Interpretation," Inerrancy and Common Sense, ed. Roger R. Nicole and J. Ramsey Michaels (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1980), p. 196.

34Ibid., p. 188.

35Ibid., p. 199.

36See Robert W. Lyon's ("Evangelicals and Critical Historical Method," Hermeneutics, pp. 141—54) critique of the presupposition defended by Bultmann (pp. 291—93).

37Bultmann, p. 292.

38W. Neil, "The Criticism and Theological Use of the Bible, 1700—1950," The Cambridge History of the Bible: The West from the Reformation to the Present Day, ed. S. L. Greenslade (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1963), pp. 270—73, George Eldon Ladd, The New Testament and Criticism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1967), pp. 37—38.

39Soulen, pp. 27—28.

40See Soulen, pp. 102; 26; 78; and similarly J. Barton Payne, "Higher Criticism and Biblical Inerrancy," Inerrancy, ed. Norman L. Geisler (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1979), p. 86.

41See Robert Traina, "Inductive Bible Study Reexamined in the Light of Contemporary Hermeneutics: Part I: Interpreting the Text," Hermeneutics, pp.74—79; John Culp, "The Impact of Modern Thought upon Biblical Interpretation," Hermeneutics, pp. 127—31; Lyon, pp. 135—64; Frank W. Spina, "Canonical Criticism: Childs Versus Sanders," Hermeneutics, p. 184.

42Lyon. pp. 142—43.

43Wayne McCown, "Toward a Wesleyan Hermeneutic," Hermeneutics, p. 9; cf. on the other side, Richard S. Taylor, Biblical Authority and Christian Faith (Kansas City: Beacon Hill Press of Kansas City,1980), pp.70—71, 89.

44Raymond E. Brown, The Critical Meaning of the Bible (New York: Paulist, 1981), p. 25.

45Harry R. Boer, Above the Battle? The Bible and Its Critics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), p. 42. Pragmatic philosopher Richard Rorty "suggests that truth is what our peers will let US get away with saying." Alvin Plantinga, "How to be an Anti—Realist," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 56 (1982):64.

46See the discussion in McCown, pp. 10—11.

47Gerhard Maier, The End of the Historical Critical Method, trans. Edwin W. Leverenz and Rudolph F. Norden (St. Louis: Concordia, 1977).

48McCown, p. 26 n. 39.

49So Neil, p. 310; and Brown, p. 26.

50See Spina, pp. 165—95

51Brown, p. 32.

52Victor Paul Furnish, The Moral Teaching of Paul (Nashville: Abingdon, 1979), pp. 15—16.

53See Perry B. Yoder, Toward Understanding the Bible (Newton, KS: Faith & Life, 1978), p. 31.

54Paul J. Achtemeier, The Inspiration of Scripture: Problems and Proposals, Biblical Perspectives on Current Issues (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1980), pp. 153—54; quote from p. 154.

55Edward H. Sugden, ed. The Standard Sermons of John Wesley (London: Epworth, 1935), 1:21.

56W. E. Sangster, The Path to Perfection. An Examination and Restatement of John Wesley 's Doctrine of Christian Perfection (New York: Abingdon—Cokesbury, 1943), p. 35. Cf. also George A. Turner, "John Wesley as an Interpreter of Scripture," Inspiration and Interpretation, ed. John F. Walvoord (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957), p. 161: "His view would now be described as pre—critical, as would the view of most eighteenth—century writers." See e.g., Wesley's comment on the so—called OT historical books, Joshua through Esther: "It seems the substance of the several histories was written under divine direction when the events had just happened, and long after put into the form wherein they stand now, perhaps all by the same hand." Explanatory Notes on the Old Testament, cited in Sugden, p. 22.

57Sangster, p. 36; cf. Turner, p. 160.

58Turner, p. 162 n. 11.

59Neil, p. 272; cf. 280: "In a strict sense higher criticism did not become a live issue in England until the second half of the nineteenth century...." Yet Hans W. Frei's suggestion should caution us from assuming too quickly that Wesley was entirely pre—critical, for he writes: "If historical periods may be said to have a single chronological and geographical starting point, modern theology began in England at the turn from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century. " Frei, The Eclipse o f Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New Haven Yale University, 1974), p. 51.

60Wesley, Works, 8:101.

6lTurner, pp. 157—58.

62Ibid, pp. 160 and 162.

63Wesley, Explanatory Notes on the Old Testament (1765),1:1x; cited in Turner, p. 172.

64Frei, p. 94.

65Wesley, Works, 11:366—446.

66Ibid, 5:132f.

67Paul M. Bassett, "A Study in the Theology of the Early Holiness Movement," Methodist History, 13 (May 1975) :81.

68See e.g., Wesley, Works, 10:490: "Have I a full and clear view of the analogy of faith, which is the clue to guide me through the whole?" 10:482: "Scripture interprets Scripture; one part fixing the sense of another." See Shelton, p. 42.

69Ibid, 10:482; cf. 10:491 and 493.

70Ibid, 10:483. On the literal and spiritual senses, see Frei, pp. 38—39, 55—56. On the influence of Bengel in this, see pp. 175—179. See also Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1964), pp. 216—17, 234, 243—44 (Spiritual exposition "makes the sacred pagas edifying"), [243], and 258.

71Wesley, Works, 10:491; cf. 10:483.

72Ibid, lQ:490—91.

73Ibid, 10:483; cf. 10:491

74Ibid, 10:483; cf. 10:491—92.

75Ibid, 10:492

76Ibid, 10:484; cf. 10:492.

77Ibid, 10:492.

78Ibid, 10:485

79Ibid, 10:482—83. See 10:490: "Have I, (1) Such a knowledge of Scripture, as becomes him who undertakes to explain it to others, that it may be a light in all their paths?" 10:491: "And have I learned to apply every part of the sacred writings, as the various states of my hearers require?"

80See Richard N. Longenecker, Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period /Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 1975).

81Wesley, Letters, II,206: "I apply no Scripture phrase either to myself or any other without carefully considering both the original meaning and the secondary sense, wherein (allowing for different times and circumstances) it may be applied to ordinary Christians." Cited in McCown, pp.8—9 and 25n.36.

82Wesley, Works, 7:423. In using Num. 23:23 as a text, Wesley writes, "We need not now inquire, in what sense this was applicable to the children of Israel. It may be of more use to consider in what sense the words are applicable to ourselves" (7:419—20).

83Ibid, 8:87ff.

84Ibid, 8:92.