PAUL MERRITT BASSETT

Introduction:

This essay is written in the context of two tensions within the theology of the holiness movement1 that must be noted if the reader is to understand what is being presented. The first tension is created by the assumption of the holiness movement that it is thoroughly orthodox in its theology, that its doctrinal content flows well within the stream of the great channel cut by the consensus quinquae saecularis. The movement readily admits that raison d’etre is the propagation of the doctrine of Christian perfection in basic fidelity to the form promulgated by John Wesley. But this doctrine the movement insists, is an emphasis from within the great tradition and not some heterodox dogma attached to an otherwise mainline theology.

It would seem that we may grant the truth of the holiness movement’s claim to a site in the orthodox campground. When it is true to its own thinking, it is clearly a branch of Protestantism, with the latter’s historic concern for maintaining the principle of sola gratia, its insistence that the ultimate theological authority be Scripture, and its claim that priesthood belongs to all believers.

Where the tension arises is at the point of emphasizing the doctrine of Christian perfection. Can that particular doctrine be emphasized as the very reason-for-being of the movement, with all of its affiliates, without affecting the rest of the dogmatic framework of the greater tradition? To what degree does the emphasis skew the remainder of the doctrinal context if any?

Obviously, in practice, the emphasis on Christian perfection does cause distortion in the rest of the theological system. The sacraments, for instance, are of minor import in the thinking of many, if not most, holiness people, while "getting sanctified" is urged on every believer. In theory, according to the principal theologies of the movement, the imbalance is not so serious. Nonetheless, the perfectionist emphasis does effect the entire

system. Thus, a tension is created when, on the one hand, it is asserted that the movement is faithful to the great tradition but at the same time it is insisted upon that a particular doctrine, defined in a unique way, be placed

as the capstone of theological and practical concern-a doctrine that has not served in that way along the history of orthodox tradition.

Rubrics do tend to shape the content of what follows though their original purpose was simply to give clue to that content as a chapter heading would. So, when the rubric becomes a controlling factor, when "entire sanctification" becomes the guidance mechanism, the gyroscope (to change the figure) of the theological system, the question may fairly be raised whether Chalcedonian christology, to cite an example, remains authentically Chalcedonian christology. In a theological framework where sanctification is the systemic raison d’etre, will the christology borrowed from a system or framework in which christology is the systemic raison d ‘etre be changed in fundamental ways? Is such change inevitable? Assuming a carefully wrought inner logic to both systems, what of the danger of making an orthodox doctrine over into heterodoxy simply by connecting it to the borrowing system at points that vary from its original connection?

That is the first tension shaping this paper: the relationship of a doctrinal emphasis to the whole of Christian theology-the effect of a specialized definition of a particular doctrine viewed as systematically central on the traditional theological formulae to which it is connected. Can both be maintained in a living theological system? The second tension arises within the holiness movement itself. Two systematic theologies have shaped the formal statements of its doctrine over the past half-century, and these two are essentially different in methodology and in certain ranges of presupposition-this, in spite of their agreement on the doctrine of Christian perfection.

The first two generations of the holiness movement, from the beginning of Phoebe Palmer’s leadership of the Tuesday Meetings for the Promotion of Holiness (1839) to the end of the nineteenth century, were generally nourished on Methodist theology, especially the works of Richard Watson,2 Adam Clarke,3 and W. B. Pope,4 with Thomas Ralston’s Elements of Diuinity5 and (later) Amos Binney’s Theological Compend6 providing summaries of "the body of divinity" for thoughtful laypersons and minimally educated ministers. Toward the end of the nineteenth century and in 1905, respectively, two more substantial Methodist theologies appeared: John Miley’s Systemah’c Theology7 and Olin Curtis’s The Christian Faith.8 These were used by the emerging holiness denominations in the educating of their clergy, but with heavy supplementation in books on Christian perfection from within the holiness movement itself.9

However, uneasiness grew at two points: the desire of the holiness denominations (the Nazarenes in particular) for clear identity as churches in their own right and what was seen as an adulteration of the doctrine of Christian perfection or entire sanctification in the works of Miley and Cur-tis. The former point was certainly more formative than the latter in the request of the Church of the Nazarene, at its general assembly of 1919, of H. Orton Wiley, then president of Northwest Nazarene College, Nampa, and a close associate of P. F. Bresee, founder of the Church of the Nazarene, that he write a comprehensive systematic theology for the ministry of that denomination.

It was not Wiley, however, but Aaron Merritt Hills, professor of theology at Pasadena College and a very well-known preacher throughout the holiness movement, who was first to the press with a systematic theology. His Fundamental Christian Theology, a two-volume work, was published in 1931, and was the required theological work for ministers in the Nazarenes’ "Course of Study" until 1940.10

With Hills, whose influence was very great in holiness circles long before 1931, a theological influence quite different from traditional Wesleyanism was to be impressed upon the minds of the holiness people. Hills came to the Church of the Nazarene from Congregationalism. He had studied at Oberlin under Finney and Fairchild and at Yale Divinity School under Timothy Dwight, George Fisher and Samuel Harris. He himself tells us that until his pastoral career was well launched he had read nothing in Methodist theology. He was a convinced New School Calvinist bent on com-bating the older Calvinism represented by Charles Hodge.11 His deep and sincere commitment to Christian perfection comes by way of Charles G. Finney, not by way of Wesley. In fact, he rejects explicitly several fundamental Wesleyan doctrines, including the specifically critical concept of prevenient grace or "gracious ability."12

Methodologically, Hills places free agency at the center of his system with Christian perfection or entire sanctification being immediately ancillary to free will or free agency. These two doctrines, then, govern the development of the rest of his theology. We shall see later how these fundamentals-in-tandem affect the christology and ecclesiology of the

holiness movement. Suffice it here to say that in Hill’s work, both his systematic theology and his earlier writings, we have a thoroughly Calvinistic, though New School, theological method in apologia for a Wesleyan-Arminian religious movement. Hills would be chagrined, of course, to be counted among the "Calvinists" because it is they whom he meant to refute. But his target was Old School Calvinism, creating a problem with his definition of "Calvinist," and, further, whatever the problems of definition, as has been clearly shown elsewhere, his theological method was fundamentally that of his opponents.13

Much more Wesleyan in both content and method is the theology of H. Orton Wiley, the "official" theology of most of the denominations in the holiness movement since its publication in 1940 and 1941.14 Wiley himself came to the Church of the Nazarene at about the time Hills did, but as a much younger and inexperienced man. He had been reared in the United Brethren tradition, which had been influenced deeply by both Methodism (especially in its German- speaking form) and German Lutheran Pietism. He received this theological education at what is now called the Pacific School of Religion.

In saying that Wiley’s theology is much more Wesleyan in content and method than that of A. M. Hills, reference is made to two points. First is Wiley’s critique (albeit implicit, not explicit) of certain elements of Hills’ theology that move away from the Wesleyan theological tradition to that time, and second, Wiley’s obvious reliance upon Wesleyan sources, though it is obvious as well that he is aware of others.

Wiley differs methodologically from Miley at three critical points, and in each instance goes back to earlier Wesleyan sources for direction. First, Miley insists on the inductive method as the appropiate theological method. And it is the particular data that have the higher degree of certainty or reality or truth. Theological generalizations, for Miley, are constructs abstractions, and are therefore of limited value. They are not Atruth@ in themselves.l5 Wiley is much more Platonic. The task of theology is the discovery of truth and of the "structure of truth." So while we move from the particulars to the general, it is the generals, the generalizations or constructs, that have the greatest certainty, reality or truth.16 He relies heavily here on Pope’s theology, which, in turn, is clearly influenced by Watson’s.

Second, Miley, insisting on the scientific character of theology, points to its empirical character, along with its perfect right, as a science, to utilize discursive reason, and to the obligation to respond to the questions posed by a scientific age.17 Wiley assigns a scientific character to theology only insofar as it does systematize its facts and seeks the relationships between them, and insofar as its "spirit is that of open, unbiased search after truth."18 His is much more a theology built upon the questions raised by the Enlightenment than upon those raised by the scientific revolution of the mid-nineteenth century. The likes of Darwin, Spencer and Huxley are barely mentioned by Wiley, let alone the epoch-making scientists and mathematicians who were his contemporaries-Rutherford, Compton, Einstein, Planck and others (some even more noteworthy than those named). Positivism and Marxism are not recognized at all, except for a brief mention of the latter.

Instead, Wiley, almost bound by his sources, reflects their struggles and is thus seen to wrestle with their enemies when sometimes these enemies are long since gone.19

Wiley’s third difference with Miley, in which Wiley again goes back to a more nearly Wesleyan stance, is at the point of recognizing experience as a source for theology. Perhaps Miley’s rejection of experience in this authoritarian role has to do with what the term had come to mean by the time he was writing-something like "being human in general," with more specific reference to physiological connotations.20 At any rate, experience can only confirm doctrine, at best. Wiley, on the other hand, probably does not recognize as Miley had that the term "experience" had been equivocated. So he retains it as a source of authority in theology. By "experience" he means "evangelical experience," and he believes that any subjective or emotionalist tendency here is held in check by submission to the experience of the Church at large.21 In this way, experience is indeed a primary source of doctrine, of theology. But he means by "experience" something more nearly akin to Wesley’s than Miley’s definition. His debt to Pope in the section in which he considers this matter is quite apparent.

So, in addition to the New School style theology of A. M. Hills, the holiness movement also has the more traditionally Wesleyan theology of H. O. Wiley (traditional to the point of rejecting important aspects of newer Methodist theologies in favor of the traditional approaches). For a long time, the agreement of the two with respect to the centrality of the doctrine of Christian perfection tended to mask their profound differences in method as well as content. But a tension was there nonetheless, and it is one that has become increasingly clear and pressing as the pluralism of the holiness movement on so many other issues has crystallized. It is a tension between a rationalistic, rather scholastic approach to doctrine, in which the theology itself becomes part of the received faith, and a more open-ended, experientially grounded approach in which theology is the never static expression of basic theological and spiritual commitments.

This tension is becoming quite critical in these days, and it must be recognized and reckoned with by any who would understand the theology of the holiness movement. With these tensions in mind, then, we move on to the matter at hand-the interplay of Christology and ecclesiology in the thought of the holiness movement, with a special concern for the question "Does the believer’s Church, in the holiness movement, have a consistently related christology and ecclesiology?"

My colleague, Mildred Bangs Wynkoop, for whom I was a Johnny-come-lately pinch hitter at the conference at which this paper was originally read, had planned to present her paper there under the title "A Wesleyan Reconsiders ‘Jesus Christ our Lord.’ " That title would scare, or at least irritate, not a few of the holiness folk-probably even some holiness theologians -especially if "reconsider" means that there is a possibility that something old must be checked or corrected or that something new might be proposed.

This conservatism is not, it would seem, a result of fear that openness and reinvestigation would be or might be costly. Rather, it is consistent with the style of theologizing that Richard Niebuhr typed as "Christ against Culture." Here, any suggestion that Christian theology should, for whatever reason, enter conversation with "the world" or take into serious account secular intellectual concerns (or social concerns) in the actual formation of its own structures and systems is held in deepest suspicion. It is indeed recognized even by the most conservative that theology cannot totally ignore its cultural context, but any kind of readiness to come to terms with secular currents risks being quickly labeled "compromise." And that is simply a synonym for heresy in much of the holiness movement.

At the point of Christology, then, emphasis is placed upon the super- or trans-rational character of the doctrine (mere rationality being seen as a worldly demand, a characteristic of worldly reflection). So, for example, E. P. Ellyson, in the very first theology published by the holiness movement, says:

Hills makes much the same assumption-that especially at the point of understanding what he calls the "theanthropic" character of Christ, reason will fall short, though it must be exercised. Further, like Ellyson, Hills makes no room for experience in the construction of Christology except as he does refer to the fact that the doctrine of the "union of the two natures in the personal oneness of Christ is the Catholic doctrine. All the great divisions of the universal church have held this faith. It has come down to us from the Council of Chalcedon in an unbroken line."23 But even here there is no recognition of the fact that the church arrived at the formula of Chalcedon by way of reflection on its experience, its tradition, not by strictly exegetical means. In fact exegesis was creating an impasse.

This means, then, that for Hills, christology is set. There has been and can be no legitimate development of christology beyond Chalcedon. Ellyson will not even draw upon the creeds for christology. He attempts to remain strictly with Scripture. Even logical development is generally absent from Ellyson’s theologizing.

In Wiley, however, we find a very different way of developing a christology and we find a christology that i8 quite different in content from those of Hills and Ellyson. In the first place, Wiley very carefully points out the weakness of form-ing a christology on the basis of Scripture alone:

Behind this declaration of Wiley’s is his understanding of the authority and inspiration of Scripture, an understanding which we note only briefly here as critical to our understanding of his christology.

For Wiley, Scripture is part of what he calls, "the dual source of theology," by which term he means to include with Scripture "the spiritual illumination of the Church"-i.e., tradition or experience. And it is only the testimonium Spiritus sancti that brings them into harmony and maintains that harmony. Further, at the heart of that work of the Spirit is the Person of Christ.26 Here, christology touches the doctrine of Scripture authority and inspiration. For Wiley, Christ is the Revelation and he warns against making the Revelation and the written Word identical.27 However, this does not mean that Scripture is to be set aside in the least in the formation of christology. "The study of Christology is best approached through its presentation in the Holy Scriptures, where the great events in the life of Christ are viewed in the light of the theological significance which attaches to them."28

What does Wiley make of the great christological formulae? Are they for him, as they are for Hills, the final word of the Church on Christ’s person? In beginning his chapter on the Trinity, in which he also begins to develop his christology, Wiley has this to say:

He does not exclude from this declaration the development of christology, but, rather, explicitly makes it, too, part of that "humid air," that "expression of experience." In speaking of Arianism in particular, he says, "As the doctrine of the Trinity grew out of the doctrinal life of the Church and not out of philosophy, so it was its devotional consciousness and not its philosophy that rejected the Arian heresy."30

It is this openness to seeing doctrinal development as a consequence of experience that keeps Wiley from closing the theological books on christology at Chalcedon. He readily admits, at several points, that the Chalcedonian and Athanasian formulae are basic to orthodox christology.31 But he also notes development in the Middle Ages via both the "Schoolmen" and the Eastern Church (especially John of Damascus) and again in the reformers of the sixteenth century.32 He hints at some new developments even in contemporary times, though he is properly tentative about them and tends to emphasize their continuity with the old to such a degree that their newness is obscured.33 Finally, however, all must be held in abeyance:

Wiley quotes Pope:

Trinity and christology, then, are to be sung. They are both vehicles of worship and consequences of reflection. Obviously, this leaves the door ajar for continuing christological development. Wiley has no doubt that the line from Scripture to Chalcedon is both correct and essential and fundamental but he leaves it all quite open within these boundaries and nowhere suggests that the development of christology has culminated and ceased.

What of the presence of Christ, according to Hills and Wiley? How does Christ manifest Himself in His Church? Hills' understanding of the sacraments is what has been unfairly labeled Zwinglian. That is to say, the presence of Christ in the sacraments especially in the Lord's Supper, depends entirely upon the faith of the participant. Hills warns his readers away from any strong or literal understanding of the sacraments as "means of conveying to us the blessings of the Gospel. 36

In this way, he makes it clear that he prefers what he calls "The Socinian Notion" to what he calls "The Stronger Protestant View"-and for this latter, less preferred view, he quotes Samuel Wakefield, a Methodist who was one of Watson’s imitators and "American translators," to use Robert Chiles’ phrase.37 Here is Hills’ statement of the "Socinian Notion."

The Unitarians hold that the Sacraments are quite like other religious rites and ceremonies; their peculiarity chiefly consists in their emblematic character, representing as they do spiritual and invisible things, and are memorials of past events. They are chiefly an aid to pious sentiments, and a quickener of devotional feelings and holy emotions. They are also an appointed means of professing faith in Christ, and acknowledging Him before the world. There is very much truth in this view.38 Hills does speak of the possibility of receiving "a fresh sense of the presence of God" in His Eucharist, but this is totally dependent upon the communicant’s act of "reach[ing] out the hand of faith and tak[ing] the blessings, so beautifully symbolized, and so dearly bought by the efficacious blood shed on Calvary’s cross."39

Wiley sharply criticizes this view as escaping the errors of transubstantiation and "consubstantiation," but as "nevertheless fall[ing] short of the full truth."40 Its principal weaknesses are: (1) its failure to understand the purpose of the Eucharist, and (2) its failure to understand the meaning of the term "real." The "rationalistic" or Socinian" view, as Wiley calls it does not really grasp the sacramental character of the Eucharist i.e., its mystical (and not merely historical) connection with the original Lord’s Supper. "Perpetuity" is Wiley’s word for describing that bond-"The Perpetuity of the Lord’s Supper."41 The purpose of the Eucharist, then, is not only testimony (an outward and visible sign of an inward and visible grace), not merely a pledge of that grace, but it is as well a means of grace-we receive the pledged grace in receiving the spiritual presence of Christ in the bread and the wine.42 And it is this presence that is the real mystery.43 The "seal" is the confirmation that the pledge of grace is being fulfilled. The Holy Spirit is the "sealer" and this testimony is always to the person and work of Christ, so He re-presents to us the work of Christ, the very presence of Christ-not physically or corporeally, but spiritually. So, the Eucharist becomes not simply an awakener of faith or of "holy emotion" but a means, a vehicle, of grace.44

Thus, Wiley accepts with little amendment the "Reformed Doctrine" of the Lord’s Supper. The pledges of grace are "accompanied with an invisible gift of grace."45 And Christ is there spiritually present. Here, then, as at many critical points, the holiness movement has two legacies. Both affirm the presence of Christ in the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper but in very divergent ways. For Hills, the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is dependent upon the same element upon which it is dependent on any other occasion-the faith of the believer alone. The sacrament, then, is not a celebration of Christ’s special presence; in fact, it is not a celebration of His presence at all. It is a commemorative meal eaten principally to refresh our appreciation for what Christ has done for us. For Wiley, the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is dependent upon the promises of our Lord that attend its celebration. The faith of the participant is important, is crucial, to the appropriation of those promises and that presence. So, the Supper is the celebration of the special presence of Christ. It is a vehicle of grace.46

Here again, the holiness movement has two very different understand-ings and guidance systems. Hills simply has no section on the ethics of the Christian life in his Fundamental Christian Theology. He comes closer to an extended treatment in his Holiness and Power: For the Church and the Ministry,47 but only accidentally or incidentally. His only systematic consideration of the matter is in his chapter on "Conversion, or Regeneration" in the Fundamental Christian Theology.48 Here, there is scarcely a word about Jesus Christ. Even where one might expect something along the lines of imitatio Christi, there is only a short paragraph, void of reference to Christ’s work in us.

For Hills, the Holy Spirit is the agent and animator of the life of holiness, which is sufficiently orthodox in itself. But no care at all is taken either here in the section on regeneration or in the section on the Holy Spirit as a Person of the Trinity, to anchor the Christian life in the continuing presence of Jesus Christ, with the Spirit serving as Christ’s Spirit. The Spirit is seen as an independent being with an independent work. Hills is much more inclined to speak of the relationship of Spirit and Father than of that of Spirit and Son. So, while Hills is certainly within the boundaries of the great tradition in understanding the Holy Spirit to be the guide of the Christian’s life and the divine presence within that life, this failure consistently to relate Spirit and Son in these matters makes both his christology and his formal ethic quite problematic.

For Wiley, the systematic position of "Christian ethics or the Life of Holiness" lies between the discussion of Christian perfection or entire sanctification and the discussion of the doctrine of the church.50 It is formally included in the extended consideration of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. However, Wiley makes quite clear his conviction that the life of holiness is totally dependent upon the presence of Christ. To be sure, the Holy Spirit communicates this presence, but Wiley focuses upon the presence of the Son as "the positive element in Christian ethics."

In laying down the principles of ethics, Wiley turns to the doctrine of Christian perfection with its "dominant note" of "full devotion to God." "This devotement becomes a fundamental principle in Christian ethics. As such, it is exercised toward Christ in His divine-human nature as the mediatorial Person; and thus both as Creator and Redeemer."52

In order that Christ might give His people a new commandment, and a perfect law of liberty through which that commandment could be fulfilled, He himself received a new commandment and learned obedience by the things which He suffered. And having learned obedience, He presented Himself as at once the perfect lawgiver, and the perfect example of His own precepts. Here we find the unsearchable unity of His two natures in one personal Agent investing the subject of Christian ethics, as it does also, that of Christian dogmatics.53

Christ Himself, then, in His continuing presence, is both example and agent of Christian ethics. Apart from that example and that agency, there is no life of holiness, no ethical life in any uniquely Christian sense. So profoundly central is the presence of Christ (in "the unsearchable unity of His two natures") to this life of holiness that Wiley includes prayer and worship as necessary and concomitants of it-Christ being the mediator of prayer and the object of worship.54 He approvingly quotes Methodist Bishop McII vaine: "It is the necessary tendency of true worship to assimilate the worshipper into the likeness of the being worshipped."55

On its Methodistic side, then, the holiness movement has developed a deeply christocentric ethic which is utterly dependent upon Christ’s historic and continuing presence and upon His example. But side by side with this ethic is a pneumatological one in which Christ’s role is quite unclear. Rather, the emphasis is upon some sort of spiritual power.

How then do these two very different conceptions of the presence of Christ reflect themselves in the ecclesiology of the holiness movement? Does the movement have a unique doctrine of the Church? How consonant is that doctrine, if there be such, with the two christologies?

Hills places his ecclesiology within his discussion of soteriology, following a chapter combating the Calvinistic doctrine of the perseverance of the saints.56 Systematically, it actually is connected to his consideration of the doctrine of sanctification. His definition of the Church reads thus:

Following a very brief discussion of the term ekhlesia, Hills moves on to write concerning the duty of every true child of God to be part of the fellowship of the visible church, concerning church government, concerning ordination to ministry; concerning admission and expulsion, and concern-ing "the legitimate ends of church government."

What is obvious is Hill’s commitment to the basic notion of the believers’ church, though at the same time, he stoutly defends infant baptism, even offering refutation of those who oppose it.58 He argues that baptism admits infants into the Church59 but makes no attempt to harmonize the argument with either of his definitions of Church already cited.

Also to be noted is the almost complete absence of any attempt to relate christology to ecclesiology. The terms "body of Christ" and "Bride of Christ" are conspicuously absent, though he does speak (almost pro forma) of "members of His body" in the definition cited.

True, the Church emphasizes "public confession of Christ," and its unity lies in its "common faith in, and loving devotion to, their common Lord," with its aim being "to exalt Jesus as Lord of all."60 But why there should be a church for these purposes and how this church gains and retains these privileges and responsibilities are questions left untouched.

It seems that this ecclesiology, as theologically thin as it is, is indeed consonant with Hills’ christology, and with his understanding of Christ’s presence. He has constructed a theology in which there is no necessary relationship between the major sections at the point of christology. If anything, Hills’ theology is held together more by his pneumatology than by any other motif. And the holiness movement has reflected this sort of theology in its ecclesiology in many and profound ways. It prizes worship services in which there is "the freedom of the Spirit," it seeks leadership that is "Spirit-filled," it seeks "the guidance of the Spirit." All of these phrases are of course common coin in the Christian tradition, but the holiness movement has tended to utilize them and reflect upon them apart from any christological reference. Even the Lord’s Supper can be neglected without official or popular rebuke, but entire sanctification must not be neglected. And it must be put in pneumatological terms, as recent reaction to certain debates within the Wesleyan Theological Society has shown.61

Wiley's ecclesiology also reflects in a consistent way his own christology, including his understanding of Christ's presence.

Like Hills, Wiley insists that the Church is "the fellowship and communion of believers." Therefore, "a confession of faith in the Lord Jesus Christ becomes the one essential requirement for admission to the visible organization."63 Nevertheless, also like Hills, Wiley believes in baptizing children. However, he tends to remove that question from the question of admittance to the Church. He speaks of infant baptism as an application of the benefits of the Atonement to the child, benefits which must be "owned" by the child himself or herself at some determinate point in the future. He insists that baptism places the child "only" in the Abrahamic covenant (cf. Gal. 3; Rom. 4:11-12; Gen. 22:18; 17:10).64 In this way, the matter of inclusion in the church is aborted. And, in this way, the Church remains a believers’ church for Wiley. Moreover, it retains its christocentric character.

Wiley’s ecclesiology, then, is an extension of his christology. It is the ecclesiology which Wiley represents that lies behind most of the formal ecclesiological declarations of the holiness movement. But these are, for the most part, borrowed from early to mid-nineteenth century Methodism, and especially British Methodism as represented in the theologies of Watson and Pope. In practice, the movement has turned to the pneumatologically oriented ecclesiology represented by Hills-ian ecclesiology shaped by the exigencies of the camp meeting. This development may be the source of further, and fruitful, study, but is not central to our purpose here.

We can now respond to the question "Does the believers’ church, in the holiness movement, have a consistently related christology and ecclesiol-ogy?" The response is an unhappy one.

There are two basic christologies and two basic ecclesiologies operative the holiness movement, and they are quite different from, even antithetical to, one anther. A. M. Hills serves as reflector and propagator of these pairs, and for him christiology and ecclesiology barely touch one another. H. Orton Wiley serves as reflector and propagator of the other, and for him ecclesiology is a logical and theological extension of christiology.

At present, the tension between the two points of view is at last being articulated. But what lies in the future with respect to this important question is anybody=s guess.

1By AHoliness Movement" is meant that group of denominations and congregations in North America. (along with with their international missions) that affiliate with either Christian Holiness Association or the International Holiness Convention. The largest of these groups are the Salvation Army, Church of the Nazarene, The Wesleyan Church and the Free Methodist Church.

2Especially richard Watson, Theological Institutes, ed. J.M=Clintock, 2 vols. (New York: Nelson & Philips 1850).

3Adam Clarke, Christian Theology, ed. S. Dunn (New York: 1835).

4W. B. Pope, A Compendium of Christian Theology, 3 vols. (New York: Phillips & Hunt 1881).

5Thomas Ralston, Elements of Divinity (Nashville: Morton & Griswold, (Nashville: 1847).

6Amoe Binney, Theological Compend (Cincinnati: 1858).

7John Miley, Systematic Theology, (NewYork: Hunt & Eaton, 1892, 1894).

8Olin Curtis, The Christian Faith (New York: Methodist Book Concern,1905).

9Miley=s Systematic Theology, for instance, was required reading in the ACourse of Study for Klicensed Ministers@ in the Church of the Nazarene from 1911 to 1932, although from 1916 to 1932 it is listed with Ralston=s Elements of Divinity as an alternative. Curtis= The Christian Faith, while not on denominational list pertaining to ministerial education, was a standard text in theological studies at college level; from about 1911 to 1940 or later.

10Aaron Merritt Hills, Fundamental Christian Theology, 2 vols. (Pasadena:C. J. Kinne, 1931); hereinafter abbreviated FTC. For a more extended treatment of Hills= theology, especially as it compares with Wiley=s, sre this author=s AA Study in the Theology of the Early Holiness Movement,@ A.M.E. Zion Quarterly Review: Methodist History (News Bulletin), April 1975, pp. 61-84.

11FCT 1:5-6. Also cf. FCT 1:346.

12Cf. FCT 1:337-75. Hills= considered opinion is that the doctrine of "gracious ability," so prized by most Methodists, is not consistent Methodism, and he notes with satisfaction that John Miley rejects it (1:370). Even Hills' doctrine of sanctification owes more to Finney and to

Asa Mahan than to Wesley or the Wesleyans; this, in spite of Hills' sharp critique of Finney's development of the dogma (FCT 2:252-56; Holiness and Power: For the Church and the Ministry [Cincinnati: 1897], pp. 33-31). Cf. Bassett, "A Study in the Theology," pp. 69-71.

13Cf. note 10 above.

14H. Orton Wiley, Christian Theology, 3 vols. (Kansas City: Beacon Hill Press, 1940, 1941); hereinafter abbreviated CT. A one-volume abridgement was published by Wiley and Paul T. Culbertson under the title Introduction to Christian Theology (Kansas City: Beacon Hill Press, 1946); hereinafter abbreviated ICT.

15Miley, Systematic Theology, 1:47-54.

16CT 1:53-55; 60-62.

17Miley, Systematic Theology, 1:23-39.

18ICT, p. 25; cf. CT 1:60-62.

19Wiley's principal sources, except for John Miley himself, are by and large from the generation of his grandfather. W. B. Pope is cited most often in the CT (170 times), then come John Wesley (91 times), Miley (77 times), Richard Watson (73 times) and Samuel Wakefield (67 times). None of these are Wiley's contemporaries. Only Miley was alive among them when Wiley was born. On the "Wesleyanness" of Pope, see E. Dale Dunlap, "Methodist Theology in Great Britain in the Nineteenth Century," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Yale, 1956. Robert E. Chiles, Theological Transition in American Methodism: 1790-1935 (New York, Nashville: Abingdon 1965) says, "Pope stands out as one of the towering figures in all of Methodist theology who with remarkable fidelity recaptured the essence of Wesley's Theology" (p. 34, n. 21). Of Watson, Chiles writes, "Though he preserves the substance of Wesleyan theology, Watson compromises its spirit" (p. 49). Wakefield's A Complete System of Christian Theology (Cincinnati: Curts and Jennings, 1869) is among the "American translations" of Watson's Institutes (cf. Chiles, p. 54). Such are Wiley's credentials as a Wesleyan.

20Late nineteenth century devotional literature continually warns believers not to confuse states of grace with physical or emotional sensations. For an example of "experience" having become a bland term, cf. George A. Coe, What Is Christian Education? (New York: Scribner, 1929), pp. 43-46.

21CT 1:37-52. Hills simply lists experience among the false sources of doctrine (FCT 1:30), but his implicit definition of "experience" is akin to that of Miley. So, none of the three recognize the change in the term since Wesley's time. Wiley does not see that Miley and Hills work with a newer definition; Miley and Hills do not see that their definition is different from Wesley's. Wiley draws heavily upon Pope, of course. But in Pope's British context, the term retained its older meaning in theology while it did take on the newer connotations in common usage.

22Edgar P. Ellyson, Theological Compend (Chicago and Boston: 1908), pp. 37-38. This work was produced in 1905, but published in 1908 as part of the process in which the Holiness Churches of Christ in the southwest joined the Church of the Nazarene, thus creating a national denomination. Ellyson, then president of Texas Holiness University, originally a Friend,

actually wrote the work in reaction to systematic theology. 23FCT 2:25. (Cf. FCT 2:22-31).

24CT 2:170. Interestingly enough, Ellyson's brief chapter on christology, at the point of "proving" the divinity of Christ, follows precisely the order of topics (under slightly different titles) criticized by Wiley. Cf. Ellyson, Theological Compend, pp. 32-36.

25ICT p 27. Cf. also CT 1:34-37.

26CT 1:35-36.

27CT 1:36-37. Wiley does not deny that the Bible is "the revealed Word of God. " But it is not the Revelation. Its purpose, to Wiley, is instrumental.

28CT 2:146-47. Note Wiley's sensitivity to the fact that the Gospels are principally theological treatises, not mere biographies. This was not the usual conservative view at the time of writing. In fact, such a sentiment could attract fusillades from the Fundamentalists.

29CT 1:393-94.

30CT, 1:415. Cf. CT 1:400-04. Also note Wiley's observation that the doctrine of the Trinity has historically and biblically had "close connection with redemption, and not merely as an abstract metaphysical or theological conception" (CT, 1:394).

31E.g. CT 1:39-48. Entering this discussion, Wiley says, "Being the outgrowth of experience, such confessions represent a collective or corporate experience, corrected and tested by a wider group of believers. While not authoritative in the sense of a norm of doctrine, they are an outgrowth of the religious life which owes its origin to Jesus Christ through the Spirit,

and must therefore be regarded in a subsidiary sense as true sources of theology" (1:39). Also cf. CT 1:422 and 2:157. In this note and nn. 32 and 33, references to CT 1 are to Wiley's Trinitarian section, in which his christology is begun; references to CT 2 are to his more developed and

specific christology.

32CT 1:416-17. Also cf. CT 2:155-68.

33CT 1:422-38. Also cf. CT 2:167-68.

34Pope, Compendium, 1:286, quoted in Wiley, CT 1:438-39.

35CT 1:439.

36FCT 2:293.

37Cf. FCT 2:293; Chiles, Theological Transition, p. 54.

38FCT 2:293.

39FCT 2:293.

40CT 3:204-05.

41CT 3:205-08.

42CT 3:155.

43CT 3:169.

44CT 3:158-59.

45CT 3:169. The phrase is from Wiley's discussion of baptism, but is clearly applicable to his doctrine of the Eucharist.

46It is under these terms that some in the holiness movement have revived John Wesley's understanding of the Eucharist as a "converting ordinance." That is to say, an unbeliever, coming in confession and repentance, may in faith receive Christ as Saviour in partaking of the elements.

Wiley himself seems to have held this view but did not think it appropriate to propagate it in CT. He nowhere refers to Wesley in his discussion of the Supper. He does draw heavily upon Richard Watson.

47A. M. Hills, Holiness and Power: For the Church and the Ministry (Cincinnati: M. W. Knapp, 1897).

48FCT 2:197-213, esp. 211-13.

49FCT 2:212.

50CT 3:7-100.

51CT 3:10-11.

52CT 3:24.

53CT 3:25.

54CT 3:40-46.

55CT 3:45-46.

56FCT 2:282-95. Actually Hills speaks of the church itself only on pp. 282-92. The rest of the chapter is given over to a general statement on the sacraments.

57FCT 3:282.

58FCT 2:325-30.

59FCT 2:326-28.

60FCT 2:283.

61Cf. Wesleyan Theological Journal, vols. 13-15 (1978-1980), passim.

62CT 3:103.

63CT 3:124.

64CT 3:185-89.