HISTORY AND HERMENEUTICS:
A PANNENBERGIAN PERSPECTIVE

by

Laurence Wood

What is the relation of history and hermeneutics? This has been a question of much debate in contemporary theology. It is well known that the theological giants of this century-Barth, Bultmann, and Tillich-believed that critical history raised serious problems for Christian faith. In order to protect the purity of faith from the onslaughts of critical history, revelation was identified exclusively with the Word of God. Not history but language was thus the primary locus of revelation. In this way the truth of faith could not be put at the mercy of the critical historian.

In Bultmann's kerygmatic theology and Barth's theology of the Word of God, the primary locus of revelation was centered in the Word, thus putting revelation outside the possibility of critical inquiry. Though Barth added historical elements to his dogmatics, revelation itself did not come under the general category of verifiable truth. Thus, revelation was seen as the self-authenticating Word of God. Ebeling and Fuchs have modified Bultmann's "demythologizing" into the understanding of the linguisticality of reality, i.e., language is not a secondary objectification, but the reality of revelation itself coming into verbal expression. Revelation thus occurs through and in words, for words let reality be. This experience of faith is called a language event. However, this language event preeminently exemplified and grounded theologically in the historical Jesus is not an assertion that can be objectively analyzed, but rather, it is a communication between persons as an encounter, an "apprisal."'

In contrast to this neo-orthodox understanding of revelation as encounter through word, Wolfhart Pannenberg (the now well-known professor of Munich) radically redefines revelation in terms of history as the comprehensive whole of reality. Here the emphasis is not upon linguisticality, but upon the historicality Geschichtlichkeit) of all reality.2 Critical history is thus not a problem for Pannenberg. Rather, it is the solution to the problem of the negative alliance set up between faith and history by the neo-orthodox champions of the Word of God theology. Of course, he has radically overhauled critical history as it had come to be practiced. He specifically rejected its positivistic presuppositions and its absolutizing of the principle of analogy which precluded the possibility of any absolutely unique event occurring in history. His positive attitude toward critical history has been like a breath of fresh air. I would like to focus my address on his use of the historical method in doing theology.

The central motif of his theology is-theological knowledge is critical historical knowledge. The knowledge of revelation is not a supra-historical knowledge as though revelatory events occurred in a historical vacuum. The knowledge (i.e., insight)3 which faith presupposes is a knowledge of history which is accessible to human comprehension. To set the knowledge of revelation over against natural knowledge "is in danger of distorting the historical revelation into a gnostic knowledge of secrets."4 Pannenberg is thus projecting a theology of reason in which it is asserted that God has made Himself known within the context of our natural processes of thought. In thus emphasizing a theology of reason, Pannenberg dislikes the category of a supernatural order of knowledge as opposed to a natural order an exaggerated manner, his polemic is: "THE HISTORICAL REVELATION IS OPEN TO ANYONE WHO HAS EYES TO SEE."6 Pannenberg further polemicizes a strong methodically-objective approach in this way:

Nothing must mute the fact that all truth lies right before the eyes, and that its appropriation is a natural consequence of the facts. There is no need for any additional perfection of man as though he could not focus on the "supernatural" truth with his normal equipment for knowing. The event, which Paul witnessed, took place totally within the realm of that which is humanly visible. In particular, the Holy Spirit is not an additional condition without which the event of Christ could not be known as revelation.7

This means a knowledge of revelation is a knowledge of history, i.e., what factually happened in the space-time spectrum. What cannot be ascertained in the biblical traditions by means of the historical-critical method cannot be true for Christian faith. This means what is theologically true cannot be historically false.8 But, it is also saying that only those theological truths which can be sufficiently verified according to a critical reconstruction of the biblical traditions are to be considered valid.9 In this way, Pannenberg intends to overcome the trend in theology which locates revelation in the moment of faith's experience rather than in a reasoned knowledge of what is transient and concrete. Thus, "Christian faith must not be equated with a merely subjective conviction that would allegedly compensate for the uncertainty of our historical knowledge about Jesus."10 This would only make faith indistinguishable from superstition. Pannenberg thus sees the task of the theologian to be one of critically assessing the truth-claim of Christian faith.

For much too long a time faith has been misunderstood to be subjectivity's fortress into which Christianity could retreat from the attacks of scientific knowledge. Such a retreat into pious subjectivity can only lead to destroying any consciousness of the truth of the Christian faith.11

This leads Pannenberg to say: "Faith can breathe freely only when it can be certain, even in the field of scientific research, that its foundation is true."12 For example, the historical character of the resurrection of Jesus (without which Pannenberg argues that there can be no Christology cannot be ruled out a priori. It cannot be deprived of its historical past-ness and then be reinterpreted existentially. If there is any present significance to the resurrection kerygma, then the kerygma must be taken seriously when it reports an event that happened in the past. Thus, Pannenberg points out that faith in its claim to absolute certainty must reckon with the probabilities of historical knowledge. In other words, there can be no absolute dualism of the subjective certainty of truth and the objectivity of knowledge (i.e., insight). That is, one must not speak of the resurrection kerygma solely in terms of its existential relevance without also a critical assessment of its historical factuality, even as in philosophy Hegel (whose categories are decisive in Pannenberg's theology of history) has argued that one cannot divorce appearance and reality as though what appears is relevant while the question of its reality is irrelevant. Such a dualism, Pannenberg would argue, is not any less unacceptable to philosophy than a dualism of faith and a historical knowledge of facts is to theology.

In arguing for the corporeality of Jesus' resurrection (which is the central event in his theology of universal history), Pannenberg pursues a closely reasoned argument which includes: (1) Delineating the Old Testament and Jewish eschatological expectation of the general resurrection of the dead, (2) a historical-critical analysis of the resurrection traditions, (3) a careful exegesis of the resurrection texts, (4) a philosophical reflection on the possibility of Jesus' resurrection, and (5) anthropological considerations concerning man's hope for life beyond death.13

There are, however, two especially significant factors Pannenberg considers in establishing the resurrection as a historical event. First, there is the language of the Old Testament and the Jewish eschatological expectation in which Jesus' resurrection was expressed. This prior expectation of the general resurrection of the dead presupposes that the Jewish community possessed a distinctive thought-pattern in which the resurrection as an expression of an imperishable life was clearly distinguished from this worldly-transitory experience of life. Hence the encounters with the risen Lord were expressed in already-existing thought-patterns, such as "resurrection from the dead," "rising from sleep," etc. (Isa. 26:19; Dan. 12:2; 1 Thess. 4:13ff.; 1 Cor. 11:30; 15:6, 20, 513.

The historical occurrence of Jesus' resurrection thus did not need to be interpreted for His-contemporaries, but its interpretation was inherent in the event itself because the disciples already had a prior conception of the resurrection from the dead. Consequently, the resurrection of Jesus is described not as a mere resuscitation of the dead to a temporal life, but the transformation of an old body into a "spiritual body" (l Cor. 15:35-56). This is to say, the early Christian community knew the difference between "the intended reality and the mode in which it is expressed in language."14 Without intending to negate the facticity of the resurrection of Jesus, Pannenberg thus designates it as ,a "metaphor" insofar as its linguistic expression is concerned. This means that the event happened in space-time, though the language itself is analogical because it speaks of reality beyond man's present experience. Further, the term, "resurrection of the dead," is an "absolute metaphor," for it is "the sole expression for a definite subject matter, and is neither interchangeable with other images."15

In addition to the Old Testament apocalypticism, Pannenberg delineates the significance of Jewish apocalypticism in attempting to set forth an apologetic for showing how it was possible for the disciples to confess the reality of the resurrection. He wants to show that this confession was not an arbitrary or mythological interpretation, but a valid historical statement based on what factually happened. The disciples were reporting what they had seen and not confessing what they merely believed. This is to say, in arguing for a theology of reason, Pannenberg intends to show that what the disciples reported did not require a supernatural enlightenment. Instead, the resurrection event can be seen for what it factually was by anyone as a natural (and not a supernatural) appropriation of the facts.

Whether or not Jewish apocalypticism can serve the apologetic purpose Pannenberg wishes is debatable. In fact, the Pannenbergian group, especially Rolf Rendtorff, Ulrich Wilkens, and Pannenberg in Revelation as History, is criticized for its interpretation of Jewish apocalyptic theology in establishing a theology of universal history. In appealing to Dietrich Rossler, Gesetz und Geschichte (Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Erziehungsvereins, 1960,'6 they argue that God's self-revelation took place in past decisive events, such as the Exodus and the Conquest, but with the exilic and postexilic prophets the idea of revelation was shifted to a future perspective, and finally in Jewish apocalyptic theology revelation was expected to take place at the end of history.17 Over against this, it has been asserted that Jewish apocalypticism comes from astrological determinism and ontological dualism, derived from Persia and Babylon. It is further contended that the apocalypticists were not concerned with history as the sphere of God's revelatory activity, but with the eschaton when this present evil world would be done away with.18

However, Pannenberg’s appeal to Jewish apocalyptic theology in the present context is to point out that the conception of the resurection of the dead was not immediately formulated with Jesus' own resurrection. But that in fact there already had existed a prior conception of the resurrection. Thus, Pannenberg's apologetic use of the prior conception of the resurrection from the dead is to point out that the disciples knew how to express the reality of Jesus' resurrection (though it was necessary to recast this prior conception in the light of what actually happened), and thus they were not resorting to mythological conceptions as such.

The second factor to be considered in establishing the resurrection as a historical event is the authenticity of the Pauline account of the appearances of the risen Lord to certain members of the Christian community (1 Cor. 15:1-11). In contrast to the Gospels' accounts of the appearances of Jesus which Pannenberg (in his highly rationalistic methodical approach to the study of Scripture) thinks "have such a strongly legendary character that one can scarcely find a historical kernel of their own in them,"19 he finds strong historical evidence of such appearances in Paul. Pannenberg writes:

It is this context of apocalyptic tradition and the appearances of Jesus as reported by Paul that Pannenberg considers decisively significant for ascertaining the resurrection as a historical event. However, the question arises whether Pannenberg has in fact "proved" the resurrection itself, or proved that Paul and those to whom he appeals as witnesses, whose testimony could be checked by Paul’s contemporaries, merely said that Jesus was raised on the basis of their having remembered certain appearances of the risen Lord. Whether or not the mere fact that it can be proved that Paul said Jesus was raised from the dead constitutes a "historical demonstration" of the resurrection itself is problematic. If one understands history in Collingwood's sense, then Pannenberg's proof is not a historical demonstration of the resurrection. For Collingwood, what is merely remembered does not qualify as scientific history. Paul's statement of the resurrection is based on the "memory" of those who witnessed the appearances of the risen Lord, but there was no present concrete evidence that Paul could appeal to, excepting of course the empty tomb which Paul does not ever mention.

Collingwood, whose epistemology of history Pannenberg in general remembered certain appear follows,21 defines scientific historical knowledge in terms of what can be conclusively known comparab1e to the certainty that one can attain in mathematics. It leaves "nothing to caprice," and allows "no alternative conclusion, but proved its point as conclusively as a demonstration in mathematic8."22 However, Collingwood does not define all reality as history.23 In this respect, a biography is not defined as historical knowledge insofar as it relies on memory and not concrete evidence. To be sure, Collingwood does not deny that a biography is genuine knowledge, but it is not historical knowledge inasmuch as there is no immediate appeal to tangible evidence but only an appeal to one's memory.21 Precisely what historical knowledge is for can be seen when he writes:

Thus, scientific historical knowledge is imaginatively re-enacting the past on the basis of what is currently given as concrete evidence.

On the other hand, whenever it is asserted that historical conclusions represent degrees of probability, then Collingwood says that one is resorting to scissors-and-paste history, which relies on memory and authority of others.26 However, Collingwood affirms that we may accept as true some things even though we cannot appeal to the grounds upon which they are based. But this "information" is not scientific historical knowledge, even though it may be said that such is real knowledge and not mere belief.27

Thus, when Pannenberg states that the resurrection of Jesus has "good says that one is resort historical foundation" on the basis of those who saw the appearances of the risen Lord and that faith has its point of departure "on an event which we can know historically only with probability,"28 then he is not providing a scientific historical demonstration of the corporeality of the resurrection, but rather he is only historically demonstrating that Paul and the early Christian community "said" that Jesus was raised on the basis of their memory of His having appeared to them. If this is to be called a historical demonstration, then clearly in Collingwood's terms this is a scissors-and-paste history, based on the memory and authority of those who reported the appearances.

It is because theology has to do with degrees of probabilities in regard to history that causes the real rub for faith. This is why Kierkegaard and subsequent neo-orthodox theology refused to put faith at the mercy of historical research. For Kierkegaard, faith has its point of reference in history, but its sole condition is found in God Himself. That is, faith is solely the work of God. Though Pannenberg clearly distinguishes between the certainty of faith and the certainty of historical knowledge and shows that they lie on different 1evels.29 nevertheless, his exclusively critical-historical is at best problematic from an apologetic standpoint. For the scriptures are primarily kerygmatic in intention and only secondarily can be appealed to as "historical sources," though this is not to reject in principle Pannenberg’s goal of historically vindicating the knowledge of revelation which is logically prior to faith. Thus, insofar as Jesus' resurrection is concerned, perhaps it would be more correct to say the resurrection as a historical event can be shown to be genuine knowledge and not mere belief, though it does not qualify as a historically verifiable "scientific" knowledge merely from the standpoint of the Pauline kerygma. According to Collingwood's epistemology, Paul's re-enactment of the resurrection event would have to elicit the support of public concrete evidence (such as the empty tomb) and not merely the memory of witnesses before it could qualify as scientific knowledge.

To be sure, Pannenberg appeals to the tradition of the empty tomb and sees in this tradition a valid historical account.30 Consequently, in theory Pannenberg can assume that the resurrection event can be historically demonstrated (even according to Collingwood's idea of "scientific" history), inasmuch as there is not only the tradition of the appearances of the risen Lord but also the tradition of the empty tomb as well. This is to say, "scientific" historical knowledge based on what is public concrete evidence (and not mere memory) can be claimed for the resurrection event itself, if in fact the tradition of the empty tomb is authentic. But on the other hand, when Pannenberg argues that (1) the Jewish apocalyptic expectation (which provided the language for expressing what is meant by the resurrection) and (2) the Pauline kerygma constitute in themselves a historical demonstration,31 it is debatable. Only if the tradition of the empty tomb can be supported (which Pannenberg argues in favor of) can the resurrection in theory be called a "scientific" historical demonstration.

However, to restrict the term "historical knowledge" to Collingwood's definition is more confusing than instructive for the Christian believer whose faith has to do with historical events. Furthermore, the question arises whether or not Collingwood's so-called "scientific" history is more a subjective assertion rather than an objective possibility. To be sure, history should be "wholly a reasoned knowledge of what is transient and concrete."32 But is it really possible to assert that "scientific" history proves "its point as conclusively as a demonstration in mathematics"?33 This is to say, can historical knowledge ever advance beyond the concept of probability?

In contrast to Collingwood's epistemology and from a more "practical" (rather than "scientific") perspective, the believer can speak of the resurrection as a historical event on the basis of Jesus' appearance to the disciples and can refer to this knowledge as historical knowledge inasmuch as the appearance was an occurrence that happened in space and time. At the same time it is to be acknowledged in accordance with Collingwood's epistemology that there can be no "scientific" historical verifiability of the resurrection (if indeed there be such history at all!) merely from the standpoint of the Pauline kerygma, especially since Paul (1 Cor. 15:1-11) only appeals to the memory of those who witnessed the appearances of the resurrected Lord. One might further suggest that in the light of what Paul says of the reality of Jesus' resurrection that to disbelieve that Jesus was raised from the dead reflects a particular Weltanschauung rather than what Paul's resurrection kerygma actually affirms on the basis of eye-witness testimony, whose testimony could be checked.

Pannenberg's emphasis in this regard has been to point out that the knowledge upon which faith has its point of departure is objective. It is his quest for the objectivity of knowledge that so characteristically differentiates the Kantian presupposition that reason can cognize no valid theological content which rather must be referred to faith as a subjective postulation. Pannenberg’s ontology is in fact a clear rejection of the Kantian dualistic definition of reality. In thus respect, he cannot accept a dualistic epistemology in which history is dichotomized into the sacred and the profane. There are not two kinds of historical reality, for God works in the ordinary world of profane history. Thus Pannenberg criticizes Richard Rothe for making the distinction between the manifestation of God in the external events of history and the inspiration of the biblical witnesses whose interpretation is essential to a correct understanding of those revelatory events. Likewise he criticizes Paul Althaus for holding to the view that the meaning of Jesus' history as revelation is only accessible to faith.34 Pannenberg writes:

Pannenberg rightly insists upon the primordial unity of fact and meaning, event and interpretation. Every event imposes its own meaning to each inquirer. To be sure, not every event possesses equal clarity, but its clarity will be disclosed in proportion to the knowledge of its "context of occurrence and tradition in which it took place and through which it is connected with the present and its historical interest."3h Here it can be seen that Pannenberg is not resorting to a simplistic epistemology in which the mind passively receives reality. Rather, one must critically evaluate events in the light of their contexts.

This context of tradition extends from the present moment of each particular inquirer into the past event. One must not simply inquire into the past as though it were a dead past. The historian is no cemetery caretaker.37 This reciprocal relationship of past and present means that our present thought-world is not to be sacrificed to a previous world view, but at the same time our own world view is not to be considered inflexible or absolute. Pannenberg is not embracing an absolute relativism of historical knowledge, but rather he is pointing out that any one event has its inherent meaning only as it is seen in the context of universal history. Obviously truth in any absolute sense of the word cannot be rationally comprehended by finite man, but this does not minimize the fact that the greater a knowledge of the tradition-historical context of any event, the greater one’s understanding of the event will be.

Pannenberg is careful to guard against permitting one's own subjective interpretation to be injected into an event of the past. Though an event must be interpreted in the context of universal history, this does not mean one can inject whatever interpretation he likes into the event. "If we are to take these facts seriously, nothing ought to be inserted so as to allow them to be seen in a way different from what would naturally emerge."38

That one does not see the events correctly does not mean that they are beyond human reason to know. It could be that one does not have sufficient historical data to see the meaning of an event. At any rate, insofar as the meaning of the Christ event is concerned, that certain men do not see Jesus as the revelation of God does not indicate this unique event is above reason to know. "If the problem is not thought of in this way, then the Christian truth is made into a truth for the in-group, and the church becomes a gnostic community."39

It can be seen that Pannenberg distinguishes between faith and knowledge in a comparable way to the Reformers' distinction of notitia, assensus, and fiducia.40 Faith is trust in Jesus and His message. It is this fiducial faith that creates fellowship with God. But this faith is not blind gullibility. It is based on knowledge, i.e., insight (notitia plus assensus). Faith has its frame of reference in historical events which can be sufficiently verified thus satisfying the demands of our critical rationality, while the experience of faith itself, on the other hand, has its sole condition in the free grace of God. This means faith is logically preceded by knowledge and thus presupposes its basis is true. But the condition for faith is the work of God. To be sure, this knowledge of faith's basis may not be psychologically antecedent to faith, i.e., faith may not have a scientific knowledge of its basis, but it at least must presuppose that this basis is true.

It would thus not be accurate in the strict sense of the word to say that Pannenberg is trying to prove faith. Pannenberg is quite willing to subsume knowledge under the category of faith in the Reformer's terminology. Faith, in this respect, includes notitia, assensus, and fiducia. But even here notitia and assensus logically precede fiducia.41 Pannenberg further points out the relationship of faith and knowledge when he writes: "One cannot really know of God 's revelation in Jesus Christ without believing. But faith does not take the place of knowledge."42 Thus faith has its sole condition in the work of God and is not the accomplishment of man, though at the same time Pannenberg contends that the knowledge which faith presupposes must be open to critical historical research. Thus it is trust in Jesus which creates fellowship with God and not theoretical knowledge.

Kierkegaard, in dichotomizing faith and history, had said that any attempt to substantiate faith through proving its historical basis was a sign that one did not believe. The greater the historical uncertainty the greater the passion of faith. By contrast, Pannenberg says the refusal to examine the historical basis of faith is a sign one has not truly believed. The unexamined faith which deliberately refuses to know its bases is indistinguishable from a works righteousness which accomplishes self-redemption through self-deception.

To be sure, the certainty of faith lies on a different level from the probability of historical knowledge. In this respect, faith is a gift of God, but critical history is not necessarily the work of the devil.

This emphasis upon history as the locus of revelation which is open to rational inquiry stands in radical contrast to all forms of dialectical theology. Pannenberg readily admits that this exclusively historical approach puts faith at the mercy of historical research. In this respect, one must reckon with the possibility that the knowledge upon which faith is based could be shown to be false in the light of future research. To be sure, Pannenberg does not take this possibility to be a probability: "I see no occasion for apprehension that such a position of research should emerge in the foreseeable future. But in principle it cannot be excluded."44

Since the only means of ascertaining the revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth is through the historical method (i.e., the historian must investigate what the facts are behind the kerygma),45 Pannenberg cannot subscribe to any form of an authoritative "Word of God" theology which would have the effect of merely suppressing critical rationality and compelling belief. Until the Enlightenment, the Bible had been more or less identified as the Word of God, which was conceived as supernaturally inspired. In neo-orthodoxy, revelation was no longer identified with the Bible, but with the Word of God as kerygmatic proclamation (Bultmann) or as Jesus Christ who is the source of the preached and the written word (Barth).46 Pannenberg says this shift from the orthodox concept of revelation nevertheless left intact the idea of authoritarianism. "But for men who live in the sphere in which the Enlightenment has become effective, authoritarian claims are no longer acceptable."47 Pannenberg in this way is seeking to point out the inadequacy of all authoritarian theologies which in essence would exempt the truth-claim of Christian faith from critical rationality. He thus says: "It was for this reason that I finally turned away from the 'theology of the Word of God' in its different present-day forms."43

To be sure, Pannenberg admits that authoritarianism is a characteristic feature of both the Old and New Testaments, that the prophets conceived of their message as the authoritative Word of God and that the apostles (especially Paul) identified their message as the authoritative Word of God. Such authoritarianism is characteristic of episcopal and papal claims, as well as the Reformers' sola scriptura However, Pannenberg sees in the Enlightenment's demand for individual freedom over against all forms of authority the mature result of Christian faith itself.49 Pannenberg thus wants to separate the authentic (in the sense of being verifiable) biblical experiences of God from the authoritarian claims of the Bible itself. In this respect, Pannenberg speaks of the dissolution of the Protestant Scripture principle. What is normative for valid theological statements is not the biblical texts themselves, but the historically veribiable events which the texts reports.50

Thus, what Pannenberg calls for is a "depositivization" of the "pre- modern Christian tradition."51 This depositivization would render useless the idea of demythologizing, especially in the light of the fact that Pannenberg thinks demythologizing in Bultmann did not completely abandon the outmoded authoritarianism of the church tradition.52 Thus, his basic disagreement with the theology of the Word of God is its suppression of rational inquiry into revelation:

He thus says that "thinking which has appropriated the questions of the Enlightenment can no longer be content with asserted authorities." Rather, modern man "must ask about the adequacy of the claims of authority." Otherwise, if authoritarian claims compel belief then faith will "deteriorate into the 'work' of an illusory redemption of oneself." This would mean that "the believer who thinks that he can give the answer to the trial of gnawing doubt through the act of faith itself is already on the road to such a self-deceptive works-righteousness."54 In thus rejecting any authoritarian feature insofar as the idea of revelation is concerned, Pannenberg is trying to guard theology against the charge of illusion in Feuerbach's or Freud's sense.55

Pannenberg, however, makes it quite clear that he is not intending to lessen the ministry of the Holy Spirit in the life of the believer. In reply to John Cobb's criticism that Pannenberg draws "attention away from the question of God's immediate dealings with individuals,"56 Pannenberg says: "Far be it from me to contest the immediacy of contingent divine activity in individuals." 57 Cobb's criticism is prompted by Pannenberg's insistence that a direct self-manifestation (not a direct self-revelation) of God, 58 i.e., God directly manifesting Himself to someone in the form of a verbal communication, is not truly revelation for us, except as it can be "confirmed" to be true on the basis of its traditio-historical context. This is to say, a direct self-manifestation of God which takes the form of "prophetic inspiration" does not have "an autonomous status as revelation,"59 so far as it relates to our critical consciousness today.

In effect, it would thus certainly appear, despite his denial, that Pannenberg has minimized the prophetic word which is so characteristic of the Old Testament. He clearly rejects the idea of any inspired word even if it should be the Old Testament prophets. Only as the prophetic word conveys what has happened in the past and from this announces provisionally what will happen in the future does it have any theological validity today. Thus Pannenberg clearly suggests that he will not allow for the validity of any divinely inspired communication to the prophets, for words are the vehicles which convey selves are not to be seen as revelation.

To be sure, Pannenberg correctly points out that a direct experience of God as well as all consciousness "is itself mediated through the previous history of individuals within their environment, as well as through their relation to the future toward which their anxieties and hopes are directed."60 And of course, his emphasis upon the inseparable relationship of historical experience and language is intended to be directed against the Barthian theology of the Word of God which says quite plainly that revelation is not concerned directly with the question of historical understanding. But, if the Barthian theology placed one-sided emphasis upon the "word" as the medium of revelation, it is clear that Pannenberg has one-sidedly emphasized historical events as the medium of revelation.

Further, if Pannenberg so strongly insists that the revelatory events are open for anyone who has eyes to see that the interpretation of these events is self-evident to historical reason, why is there no general consensus of opinion concerning the revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth? Pannenber’s answer is found in Paul's statement that "the god of this world has blinded the minds of the unbelievers" (2 Cor. 4:4)61 If this is so, then historical reason can hardly qualify as the sole means of ascertaining the proper interpretation of revelatory events. Instead, one must rely also upon the Holy Spirit "who will guide you into all the truth" (John 16:13). This is not to introduce the Holy Spirit as a "stop-gap" for ignorance, but a fundamental biblical recognition that man's powers of reason also come under the curse of the Fall.

This related question must also be put to Pannenberg. IF he does not discount the direct influence of the Holy Spirit upon the believer, why must it be asserted that only through the historical method can God’s revelation in history be established. To be sure, revelation must show itself to man's critical rationality as being valid. But if God's Spirit is really operative in the life of the believer, then cannot "contemporary Christian experience" l 7 be a decisive factor? If God really acted in the past events to make Himself known, can He not likewise confirm His past activity in our "contemporary Christian experience"? Is this not the significance of the Reformers' teaching concerning the testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum, that one is brought to fiducial faith through the inward motion of the Holy Spirit, who likewise guarantees the certainty of what is the basis of faith? John Calvin put it this way:

Does he not in effect allow for at least the partial legitimation of the knowledge of revelation through the testimonium Spiritus Sancti interum when he says that one can have fellowship with Jesus without regard to his theological and historical knowledge? Thus if one can say that the Holy Spirit imparts the inward certainty of the truth of revelation, is not Pannenberg's heavy reliance upon the historical method a one-sided neglect of the cognitive aspect of faith?

To be sure, Pannenberg deserves the credit for pointing out so cogently that the biblical texts must be treated as historical sources if faith is not to be made suspect. He has thus impressively shown in his major book, Jesus-God and Man, that the believer's subjective certainty of God's revelation can be seen to be objectively true. But in thus stressing the exclusively historical method for getting at the actual course of revelatory events, has he not depreciated the theological intention of the biblical texts? This devaluation of the theological intention of the biblical texts is especially seen in his negative judgment concerning the passion narratives. To be sure, Pannenberg's desire for the rational purity of faith accounts for this devaluation, and thus much of the theological interpretation of the gospel writers looks too much like a subjective and arbitrary projection into the actual course of events of Jesus' life.

Is this presupposition valid? Are many of the theological interpretations of the gospel evangelists arbitrary and mythological? This question reveals the basic flaw of his theological method. All theological knowledge is not historically controllable knowledge. What is needed in theological reflection is a balance between revelation as word and revelation as history. Pannenberg has rightly insisted on this point as well, especially in his stress upon the ontological unity of events and meaning. But ,many events biblical history are not historically demonstrable, even though they are brought into conjunction with other events which are verifiable in principle. Furthermore, some events would not have been revelatory unless they had been accompanied by the inspired word of God, as for example when God's word preceded and followed the Exodus event in order that Moses might understand what the event meant (Exodus 14).

I agree with Pannenberg that the primary locus of revelation resides in historical events in which the work of God is grounded. And I agree that critical history can be an important aid to faith. But the knowability of revelation and its reliability resides first and foremost in the witness of the Spirit of Christ poured out upon the Church at Pentecost.

In this respect, the confirmation of the truth of God's Word through the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit refers both to the Spirit's testimony in the experience of each believer and also in the experience of the Church as a corporate community. In other words, the confirmation of divine truth occurs personally and corporately. That is, the testimony of the Spirit occurs within the experience of the Church and within the experience of the individual believer. Hence Wesley's stress upon experience and tradition as sources for doing theology are closely connected with the doctrine of the internal testimonies of the Spirit. This corporate and public emphasis upon the doctrine of the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit thus avoids an arbitrary subjectivism.

Otherwise if the experience of faith is not a way of knowing, then Martin Kaehler's question raised toward the end of the last century is all the more relevant: "How can Jesus Christ be the authentic object of the faith of all Christians if the questions what and who he really was can be established only by ingenious investigation and if it is solely the scholarship of our time which proves itself equal to this task?"64

Practically, Pannenberg says faith is mediated to the believer without regard to his comprehension of critical history. Yet, he altogether disallows at the theoretical level any connection whatever between what the scholar does in establishing the nature of truth on the one hand and what he confesses as a practicing believer on the other hand. But if faith is informed by critical history, as Pannenberg maintains, surely critical history must itself also be brought under the discipline of faith.

Pannenberg thus does not fully succeed in integrating faith and history. In his method for doing theology, critical history is an aid to faith, but faith is not an aid to critical history.

It seems to me that the proper relationship between history and hermeneutics does not lie wholly with Pannenberg or with Karl Barth. A mediating synthesis which is so much needed in theology today would maintain the interdependency history and hermeneutics while giving priority to the Word of God which is nonetheless informed by critical history. I believe such a synthesis would reflect the spirit of Wesley's theological method-the primacy of scripture supported by reason, experience and tradition.

Notes

1. Gerhard Ebeling, Word and Faith, trans. J. W. Leitch (London: SCM Press Ltd.,1960), pp.318,326,331; Ernst Fuchs, "The New Testament and Hermeneutical Problem," The New Hermeneutic, ed. James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. )New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 116-19, 124-25.

2. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology as History, ed. James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb. Jr. (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 242.

3. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Revelation as History, trans. David Granskeu and Edward Quinn (London: Sheed and Ward, 1969), p. 198.

4. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 135.

5. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, trans. G. H. Kehm (London SCM Press, 1970), 1:13.

6. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 135.

7. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 136. It is this premise that God's revelation is self-evident to historical reason that has justly occasioned the criticism that in effect Pannenberg does not sufficiently clarify "the transition from historical fact to faith" (Helmut G. Garder and W. Taylor Stevenson, "The Continuity of History and Faith in the Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg: Toward an Erotics of History," The Journal of Religion, LI, no. 1 [January 1971], 51). Cf. L. Steiger, "Revelation-History and Theological Reason: A Critique of the Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg," trans. J. C. Weber, History and Hermeneutic, ed. Robert W. Funk (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 126.

8. Karl E. Braaten, History and Hermeneutics (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1966), p. 92.

9. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1968), pp. 99, 109; Basic Questions in Theology, 1:38-39, 50, 198-99.

10. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 131.

11. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 131.

12. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 131.

13. Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, pp. 53-114.

14. Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, p. 75.

15. Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, p. 187.

l6. Cf. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 62.

17. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, pp. 47-48, 59-66, 111-12, 128; Basic Questions in Theology, 1:20-21.

18. Cf. Robert North, "Pannenberg's Historicizing Exegesis," The Heythrop Journal, II, No. 4, 377-400; H. D. Betz, "The Concept of Apocalyptic in the Theology of the Pannenberg Group," Journal for Theology and the Church, 6 (1969): 192-207; William R. Murdock, "History and Revelation in Jewish Apocalypticism," Interpretation, 21 (1967): 167-87. It should be pointed out that Pannenberg has acknowledged that his idea of the Jewish apocalyptic theology of history must be revised (Basic Questions in Theology, 1:xviii).

19. Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, p. 89.

20. Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, p. 91.

21. Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, 1:70-72, 78-80.

22. Robin G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: University Press, 1962), p. 262.

23. Collingwood, The Idea of History, pp. 210, 302.

24. Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 304.

25. Collingwood, The Idea of History, pp. 252-53.

26. Collingwood, The Idea of History, pp. 257-63.

27. Collingwood, The Idea of History, pp. 256-57.

28. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 273.

29. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 273.

30. Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, pp. 99-106.

31. Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, p. 98.

32. Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 234.

33. Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 262.

34. Pannenberg, Theology as History, pp. 125-216.

35. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 126.

36. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 127.

37. Pannenberg, "Hermeneutics and Universal History," History and Hermeneutic, p. 126.

38. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 137.

39. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 137.

40. Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, 2:30ff.

41. Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, 2:30.

42. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 128.

43. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 269.

44. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 274.

45. Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, p. 99; Basic Questions in Theology, 1:139, 160, 195-98.

46. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 226.

47. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 226.

48. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 227. It is not altogether justifiable for Pannenberg to charge that Barth's theology of the Word of God is merely subscribing to an uncritical acceptance of authority. Barth (as well as Bultmann) is just as concerned with the truth-claim of Christian faith as Pannenberg is. Instead of suggesting that Barth equates faith with blind gullibility, it would be more accurate to say that Barth locates the validation of Christian faith in God's authentication of, His Word in Holy Scripture (i.e., testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum), whereas Pannenberg thinks the historical-critical method is entirely adequate for such purposes. J9Pannenberg, Theology as History, pp. 227-28.

49. Pannenberg, Theology as History, pp. 227-228

50. Pannenberg, "La signification de l'eschatologie pour la comprehension de l'apostolicite et de la catholicite de l'Eglise " Istina, 12 (1969):163. Cf. Basic Questions in Theology, 1:4, 6, 7, 12; Theology as History, p. 228.

51. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 228.

52. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 228.

53. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 229.

54. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 270.

55. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 239.

56. Cobb, "Past, Present, and Future," in Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 209.

57. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 238.

58. A direct self-revelation would be the full disclosure of God's essence, whereas a direct self-manifestation involves only the appearance of God without any reference to a disclosure of His essence. Cf. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 9.

59. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 238.

60. Pannenberg, Theology as History, p. 238.

61. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 136.

62. Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, pp. 99, 109.

63. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1879), 1:72.

64. Martin Kaehler, The So-Called Historical Jesus and the Historic, Biblical Christ, trans. Carl Braaten (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1964), p. 102.