A DIALOG WITH THE PROCESS THEOLOGY OF JOHN B. COBB, JR.

by John Culp

The purpose of this paper is to stimulate further the ongoing dialog in Wesleyan-Holiness circles with the Process theology of John B. Cobb, Jr. In order to do that, this paper will primarily be concerned with the ways in which Cobb's thought can be helpful to Wesleyans. A paper addressed to Process theologians would focus on the contributions which Wesleyan thought can make to the development of Process theology. The approach will be to examine Cobb's major concerns and underlying view of reality rather than specific doctrines because the specific doctrines are derived from his vision of reality. This paper is not primarily concerned with providing a critique of Cobb's thought because of the necessity for Wesleyans to move beyond the traditional critiques to which Cobb has already responded. Only an accurate interpretation of Cobb can make pertinent criticisms of his position. This paper deals with Cobb's major concerns so that the dialog between Wesleyan theology and Process theology will not be terminated due to misunderstandings of Cobb's position. Cobb's Vision of Reality and Natural Theology

John B. Cobb's concept of "vision of reality" makes his theological intentions apparent. Failure to understand his purpose can lead to a misunderstanding of his theological efforts. The concept of "vision of reality" ties together the two major themes in his thought. These have been identified by David Griffin as Christian existence and Christian natural theology.1 Without connecting these themes, Cobb can be read as either a philosophical theologian attempting a task which has been in disrepute for sometime, i.e. a natural theology, or as a theologian of experience with little concern for the philosophical underpinnings of his position. In addition, ignorance of Cobb's concept of "vision of reality" makes it difficult to understand how his position is an attempt to maintain Christian distinctives.

Cobb understands a vision of reality to be a pre-conscious way of viewing all of reality which influences not only what we do but also how we think.2 However, conscious reflection upon a vision of reality is possible and necessary. Without a conscious examination of how this vision is expressed in belief, the vision of reality may be changed or lost.3 At the same time conscious examination makes rational support and modification of a vision of reality possible. Without a conscious examination of our vision of reality, it will become fragmented and ineffective because of the acceptance of features from competing visions.4 Modification of beliefs which express and support visions of reality often occur in times of stress when past formulations become inadequate. Christian thought is presently experiencing such a time of stress according to Cobb.

Cobb recognizes that the modern consciousness is dominated by a vision of reality expressed in scientific thought which has rejected such basic features of the Christian tradition as the reality of God and His direction of the world. However, Cobb is convinced that the Christian vision, or a vision influenced by Christian thought, remains a viable option.5 Not only is it a viable option, but Cobb finds that revision of the dominant vision is necessary. As evidence of this need for revision, he cites the shifts in modern scientific theory which challenge the deterministic and materialistic assumptions of past scientific theory.6

Cobb is called a post-Enlightenment thinker because he has no desire to respond to the challenges from the vision of reality expressed in the modern consciousness by the mere reassertion of traditional orthodox positions. He is not simply a modern thinker, however, because he remains convinced of the validity of the Christian vision in spite of its minority status.7 As a post-modern thinker, his purpose is to demonstrate the viability of Christian thought through a reformulation of its concepts in a way which will remain true to the Christian vision of reality.

The first step in demonstrating the viability of a Christian view is the development of a metaphysics, or natural theology, which is compatible with and influenced by the Christian perspective.8 The development of such a metaphysic will enable Christian thought to respond to the challenge of the scientific vision. A Christian metaphysic makes it possible to show the validity of the Christian vision by meeting the demand for an interpretive scheme which provides a better explanatory model than the present scientific one.

Cobb finds that the thought of Whitehead comes closer to meeting the demands of the present situation for an adequate metaphysics which is compatible with Christian thought than any other system of thought. His Living Options in Protestant Theology is a defense of the adequacy of Whitehead's thought and its compatibility with the Christian vision. He then goes on in A Christian Natural Theology to utilize Whitehead's metaphysics, especially as influenced by Hartshorne, to respond to the modern scientific consciousness.

Cobb's efforts to defend the Christian vision of reality by reformulating the conscious expressions of that vision are distinguished by the notions of God as creator, the historicity of reality, and the mutuality of the God/world relation. Cobb is convinced that Christian thought is the result of the vision of reality which views the world as God's creation.9 This means, for Cobb, that all of existence depends upon God. This does not result in the traditional concept of creation from nothing because of the absolutistic implications of that doctrine. If the world depends completely upon God for its existence, self-determination is impossible. Cobb's position is that nothing comes into existence apart from God's involvement with its becoming even though He does not totally determine its being.10 It is in the sense that nothing exists without God's action that Cobb can accept the traditional doctrine of creation from nothing. If nothing exists without God, then God can be said to create from nothing. This position still avoids making God a limited God because there is no power or reality which competes with His creative activity. God is not a totally determining power though because each event draws from the past in its self-determined response to God's presentation of possible arrangements of the past. The philosophical basis for this concept is Whitehead's analysis that every event is a response to the past. God provides the possibilities, the past provides the resources, and the event itself makes the response. This means that the past is vital to what becomes in contrast to the traditional doctrine of absolute non-existence prior to creation. Nothing, however, could occur without God's action of presenting possibilities. God is the creator because He is crucial to the world's existence.

The second characteristic of Cobb's thought is his notion of historicity. Cobb speaks to the modern situation through his complete acceptance of the modern notion of the historicity of all reality. Whitehead's metaphysics is helpful at this point also because it recognizes the historical nature of reality in its very refusal to be substantialistic. Whitehead purposely used the term "actual occasion" as the description of the basic unit of reality. The term "occasion" was used because it most adequately conveyed the presence of becoming at the center of reality.11 An occasion becomes; it does not endure. An occasion draws upon the past and influences the future, but does not continue to exist through a series of changes over a lengthy time span.

Cobb's acceptance of the historical nature of reality is so thoroughgoing that he not only denies the validity of statements about the essence of Christianity similar to those made by the 19th-century theologians, but also denies the possibility that theology can ever attain a final statement.12 Because every theological statement is conditioned by its historical situation, it is limited and not final. Any attempt to formulate a principle or concept of a non-historical essence is doomed to failure because it is relative to that period in the history of thought which sought to overcome historicity. This is always the case because every event is an appropriation of influences from the past and thus always related to the past.

Cobb does not think that his position leads to the loss of every standard of evaluation. The standards for evaluation participate in the historical process rather than being some type of an a-historical essence. The possibility of evaluat-on comes from the inheritance of an event from the past. Because an event inherits from the past, it is possible to compare it with the past events. In other words, compatibility with past values can be evaluated on the basis of the continuity between the events. New events can be evaluated regarding their acceptability as valid developments of past events. The criteria are themselves developing and relative but still make evaluation possible. The criteria are not imposed upon events or statements to determine their validity but grow out of the events. Therefore, the function of theological statements in a new context is more important than simply what their verbal form is.

Christianity itself then cannot be the final statement about the nature of God and His relationship to the world. Christianity is final, for Cobb though, in the sense that it is the most adequate expression of God and His relationship to the world at the present time. Christianity is also final in the sense that any future conceptuality which would be more adequate would inherit from Christianity and develop its unique insights.13 This recognition of the historical nature of all theological statements leads to a humility in Cobb's theological efforts. This is attractive at a time when theology often attempts to demonstrate its validity by unconditional assertions about the validity of certain theological tenets.

Cobb's acceptance of historicity influences his concept of God as well as his understanding of the relativity of all theological statements. For Cobb, God is non-temporal, He is not limited to one moment in time. This does not mean that God can be described as eternal in the traditional sense of being separate from development. Cobb holds that God is both non-temporal and becoming. God is becoming, or living, because He includes the events of the world in His very nature. There are two natures of God according to Whitehead.14 The primordial nature is the non-temporal and unchanging. The consequent nature depends upon the events of the world. It is always becoming because new events are always taking place. Neither of these natures of God can be adequately understood in separation from the other. Cobb emphasizes this because he thinks Whitehead is somewhat inconsistent at this point.15 Thus for Cobb, God Himself in His basic nature is becoming as well as being.

The third distinctive feature of Cobb's theology is his understanding of God's relationship to the world. For him, God and the world are mutually related. The traditional understandings of God's relationship to the world have limited themselves to talking about the world's dependence upon God. They are very careful to point out that God does not depend upon the world. There may be an acknowledgement that God works His will through human agents at times, but this is in no way necessary nor does it indicate any dependence of God's being upon the world. Cobb's process theology finds that this is an inadequate response to historicity because it isolates God from history. Isolating God from history would eventually make the incarnation and God's action in the world meaningless concepts. A more adequate response is to recognize that God's relationship to the world is a mutual relation. God depends upon the world, and the world depends upon God. This mutual relation between God and the world further expresses the relativity of God. It also is based upon Whitehead's concept of God's primordial and consequent natures. As has been mentioned, the primordial aspect of God is the permanent aspect of God and presents a goal to each occasion. This goal is crucial for the becoming event. On the other hand, the consequent aspect of God is the aspect of God which is ever growing and developing because of its inclusion of the events of the world. The events of the world do influence who God is. This influence does not merely cause an adjustment of God's purpose but even a modification of His very being. Cobb refuses to separate the primordial and consequent aspects of God. The permanence of God is always related to His inclusion of new events. The primordial nature responds to the consequent nature through the presentation of new possibilities to new events. Thus God is who He is because of what He does in relation to the world, not because of what He is in separation or isolation from what happens in the world.

God is the creator because He created the world. As creator He continues to act creatively in the world. Unless God's relation to the world is a mutual relation, this continuing creative action is impossible. God's constancy is His creativity which continually goes beyond our expectations. His constancy cannot be derived from a concept of substantialistic immutability. Cobb's Vision of Reality and Christian Existence

Since a vision of reality strongly influences the pattern of living, conscious expressions of that vision will influence an individual's pattern of living. This is the second major theme in Cobb's thought. Cobb develops this theme in his book, The Structure of Christian Existence. There he describes the contrast between the Christian structure of existence and other structures. This examination of patterns of living recognizes the values of pluralism but concludes that the Christian structure of existence can justly claim finality because it includes and fulfills the other structures. But since the Christian structure of existence is not permanent, Cobb is open to reformulations suggested by other religions.16

The Buddhist structure of existence points toward a possible modification which could lessen the tension in Christianity between personal identity and responsibility, or love, for others. If personal identity is defined in substantialistic conceptualities, it is impossible to fulfill the command to love others as ourselves. Cobb is convinced that much of our guilt over the failure to fulfill this command is false guilt because our conceptualities make its fulfillment impossible. As long as a substantialistic definition of self as that which endures through all changes is maintained, love of the other is never the same as love of self because the self must be first if it is to love the other. A concept of the self as an event which exists in connection with others overcomes the difficulties of the traditional view without sacrificing the concept of personal responsibility.17 Possible Contributions to Wesleyan-Holiness Thought

The process theology of John B. Cobb, Jr. has a number of significant contributions to make to contemporary Wesleyan-Holiness thought. Cobb's theology reflects his heritage in the Methodist tradition. This common heritage greatly facilitates dialog. The first contribution which Cobb's theology offers is an awareness of the importance of metaphysics for theology. This is especially important for the Wesleyan movement since the movement is based upon the insights of someone who is traditionally described as not being a theologian, or at least not a systematic theologian. Wesley's unsystematic approach requires refinement and development, not glorification. Wesley's theology contains some startling insights along with some serious tensions. His utilization of the Arminian thought of his time, without accepting its rationalism devoid of experience, does provide a pattern; but that pattern must be filled out if contemporary Wesleyans are to minister to the modern world. The best response to the challenges of opposing metaphysical positions is a conscious evaluation of one's own metaphysical assumptions.

Such an examination will prove fruitful to the Wesleyan-Holiness movement by enabling it to attain a higher degree of internal consistency. For example, Arminius and Wesley provided conceptualities which make it possible to acknowledge God's knowledge of the future without going on to say that God determines the future. Arminius initiated this by distinguishing between God's knowledge of the past and future events and saying that God knows the past as actual and the future as possible.18 Many lay people are unaware of this type of distinction and find that their theology is frequently closer to the Calvinistic position than to the Arminian. This becomes significant not because of some desire for academic purity but because of the implications this shift has for the concept of human responsibility. Any similarly inconsistent development of Wesley will make it difficult to maintain his major insights because of the confusion arising out of the tension. One of the areas of Cobb's thought which Wesleyan thinkers need to examine carefully for insights is the understanding of God's relationship to human existence. Wesleyans cannot adequately respond to a culture seeking freedom, defined as the absence of restraints, without moving beyond a concept of God which supports the view that God acts only as a restraint upon human freedom. Refusing to move beyond such a concept is to fail, because it fails to recognize the biblical basis for defining freedom as the removal of restraint. Until Wesleyans move beyond the implicit rejection of this concept of freedom, they cannot consistently maintain for their culture the concept of human responsibility. A creative response to our culture requires an awareness of the metaphysical assumptions which we make and a concern for their consistency.

A conscious awareness of metaphysics is also necessary in order for Wesleyan theology to gain a hearing among the many contemporary theological and religious options. Although a denial of the modern consciousness may function temporarily as a basis for religious activity, eventually it is self-destructive because it is acceptable only to the limited few who already share its perspective. If Wesleyan theology is to be more than a theological curiosity piece, it must come to grips with modern thought. This is done most adequately by being aware of our own metaphysical assumptions and those of our competition. This awareness makes discussion, comparison and conversion possible among competing options. Without an awareness of any common history and shared metaphysical assumptions, it will be impossible for Wesleyan theologians to gain a hearing among contemporary thinkers whether they are professional philosophers or laymen in a community. Further, without an awareness of metaphysical assumptions, it will be impossible to ascertain the crucial distinctions between Wesleyan theology and the contemporary consciousness. Finally, if there is no awareness of the metaphysical issues, it will be impossible to present an adequate and persuasive alternative.

Beyond the emphasis upon a conscious metaphysical basis for theology, John Cobb's thought expresses a metaphysic which can be very helpful for Wesleyans. Cobb has based his theology on the metaphysical position of Whitehead because he found it to be the most compatible with the Christian message. The basis for this evaluation is Whitehead's unequivocal affirmation of God's actuality and effectiveness, his concept of God as creative, his acceptance of the significance of religion, and his emphasis upon human responsibility.19 There are a number of ways in which this metaphysics can be helpful to Wesleyan theology. One aid is Cobb's conception of the basic importance of experience and especially human experience in understanding the world. This conception recognizes the importance of human experience without falling into a subjectivism which leads eventually to solipsism. Whitehead and Cobb both find it necessary to begin with human experience but also recognize that human experience is not the only feature of reality. Human experience is related to non-human existence. The structure of all reality can be seen in human experience but human experience does not exhaust reality. Whitehead attempted to move beyond Descartes with what he called his principle of reformed subjectivity. This principle holds that knowledge of the world begins with human experience but that this knowledge can be generalized to speak of more than human existence. This is possible because human existence is not an exception to the categories which describe reality. Human events have both a physical and mental aspect as do all other types of entities. This means that an isolated subjectivity never exists. It never exists because each person is related to his own past and to the past of the entire world.20

Cobb can also contribute a metaphysical basis for the Wesleyan assertions about human freedom and responsibility through his explanation of how self-determination is a basic feature of reality. Cobb utilizes Whitehead's analysis of an event to do this. For Whitehead, an event is a process composed of past influences organized according to the selfdetermined response of an event to a possibility presented by God. God presents a range of possible responses to the past, and each event determines for itself which of those possibilities it will actualize. At the center of every event is this self-determination. The event itself is what ultimately decides what an event will become. That is why an event is both unique and responsible at the same time. Cobb has developed the idea that God is active in the world through persuasive power in order to explain how God can be active in the world without any loss of human freedom. God does not act as an external force determining the response of an event to the past. Instead, God presents possibilities and attempts to draw the event to fulfill the best possibility.21 This type of an understanding answers such questions as "did Jesus have the capability of sinning?" and "how can I be free to serve God if He has a plan for my life?" It is not necessary to adopt the Whiteheadian terminology, but the thoroughgoing acceptance of human freedom is necessary if human responsibility is to be an effective concept. Wesleyans must recognize that every event and, at the larger level, every person is capable of self-determination to some degree. Cobb makes it possible to describe how this freedom is a part of the very nature of reality.

In the more specialized aspect of the Wesleyan concept of entire sanctification, Cobb's thought can provide a model for relating the crisis and progressive aspects of the experience of entire sanctification. Working with Cobb's understanding of events as the basic nature of reality leads to a view of entire sanctification in which the moment of decision, the second crisis, is carried out and developed by succeeding events. The emotional intensity of the crisis of entire sanctification varies greatly. The continuing influence of that decision indicates more clearly than the emotional intensity the Significance of the event. The crisis event opens a range of possibilities which open up more significant possibilities for the succeeding events. Without the crisis experience in which the person decides to realize fully the possibilities which God provides, there is no ongoing experience of the greater possibilities. Likewise, without the continuing development of the influence of the crisis, the crisis event would have no meaning. The process is initiated in the event, and the event is continued through the process of the following events. Neither exists apart from the other, and there can be no debate about the greater importance of one or the other. Recognizing the dependence of the present upon the past and the continuation of the past through the present is the key.

Many theologians have challenged the suitability of calling Cobb's theology a Christian theology. The most frequent charge against Cobb's thought is that there is no possibility of avoiding complete relativism. The central issue is the degree to which the data for theological reflection are conditioned by their own situation and the situation of the interpreter. If the Biblical writers completely reflect their time, the limitations of their time may make them unreliable. If the interpreters of the biblical materials are completely limited by their perspective, there can be no final theological statement. One of Cobb's students, David Griffin, thinks that the criteria of coherence and consistency may be non-relativistic criteria within Cobb's theology which could be the basis for non-relative judgments about the validity of a biblical expression or biblical interpretation. However, he acknowledges that Cobb at times speaks as though these criteria are themselves relative.22

Cobb intends to do justice to the modern concept of historical reality. This leads him to refuse to exclude relativity from any aspect of his thought. As seen above, in so far as God is related to the world, God Himself is relative and developing. For Cobb, relativism cannot realistically be avoided. Rather than attempting to find some escape from relativism or some way to limit its scope, theology must accept it and examine what it means. Cobb responds to the charge of relativism by developing five theses and their implications.23 These express his reinterpretation of what relativism means for theology. Cobb's understanding of relativism does not find that belief becomes impossible or meaningless. In fact, the concept of relativism itself is limited to the modern consciousness. Because a belief may have to be modified in the future does not mean it is wrong or inadequate for the present. A specific situation may demand belief and action which is the expression of belief.24 Because a different situation requires a different belief and action does not make the first belief wrong.

Cobb finds that the concept of relativity is actually an expression of biblical faith which holds to the radical finitude of all created existence. Because of this finitude, absolute certainty is not available. Existential certainty is possible, but that is available through faith and not through abstract propositions even if they are about God or from God.25 This means that Christianity is relativized and that there are no fixed guidelines for determining what is a positive or negative, true or false, development of Christianity. To attempt to define criteria or a necessary expression of Christianity is a failure to take Christianity seriously and tries to establish human autonomy over God. Such an attempt is never adequate because it misunderstands the nature of both Christianity and reality.

Cobb describes the identity and continuity of Christianity in historical categories. The identity of Christianity is found in the priority which it gives to the history which has Jesus as its center. Its continuity is established by the constant re-encounter with Jesus and the earliest witnesses to His meaning for the church.26 This continuity is possible because of the historical relationships among the events which took place between Jesus and the present. The validity of the identification of a movement as Christian cannot be established simply upon the basis of historical inheritance, however. The re encounter with Jesus and the biblical materials must presently be taking place.27 If the vital influence of the events of Jesus is not maintained, a movement cannot be accurately described as Christian. This position still leaves open the possibility of radical modifications in the expression of Christianity.

Cobb's position on historical relativity does not deny the distinctively Wesleyan theological principle of human liberty. In fact, the acceptance of Cobb's position on historical relativity as the expression of human liberty has been demonstrated in the present theological context by some persons within the Wesleyan-Holiness movement. The debates about speaking in tongues and Spirit-baptism terminology illustrate this. I have heard the justification for extra-biblical positions being made by leaders of two Wesleyan-Holiness denominations. In each case, the basis for these extrabiblical positions was historical considerations. The argument against speaking in tongues was that a different situation from Paul's required a different response than the response Paul made. In the case of the phrase "Spirit baptism," the justification for the validity of terminology which lacked a specific biblical basis was the historical development of the doctrine.

Another type of objection to the theology of John B. Cobb, Jr. is one which has been raised about process types of theology for some time. In one form or another, it is the concern that the process concept of God is too limited to be a Christian concept. Ely first raised this question about the religious adequacy of a process concept of God.28 Black theologians have said that the process notion does not describe a God who is powerful enough to be trusted for the correction of social oppression.29 Langdon Gilkey, in spite of his appropriation of many process concepts, is convinced that the process concept is not a Christian one because its God cannot defeat evil.30

In spite of Cobb's defense of the cruciality of God as creator of all, this does not mean creation from nothing as was mentioned earlier. The denial of creation from nothing would seem to leave room for the existence of opposing powers which would limit God. The central issue is God's reliability. Can God be depended upon to provide salvation from the world, oppression, or evil? The existence of other powers cannot be tolerated if it means that God is limited by other powers because then God cannot be relied upon. Cobb's concept of creation accepts the presence of non-divine realities and the self-determination of individual events. That means that God cannot act independently of the responses of created reality. God's ability to act is limited. This limitation is not due to an opposing power, however. The limit is a logical one. If God acts independently of the responses of created reality, the freedom of creation becomes at best meaningless and at worst impossible. It is a logical impossibility to speak of God as the sole determining power and also to talk about human freedom. The desire to speak of God's power is a desire for security. That desire is a legitimate desire, but it is not best fulfilled by limiting God to providing security through the use of overwhelming power. The problem with that solution is that it both makes security meaningless because there is no threat and limits God to human conceptualities about His possible responses to evil. God cannot be limited by our expectations. Cobb's concept of God is that He is the source of continual and actual novelty. God breaks through our traditions and expectations by presenting us with opportunities never before possible of being realized. Instead of describing Cobb's concept of God as involving a limited God, it might be more accurate to describe his position as one in which God is not threatened by the creation of human freedom even if there is no limitation on that freedom.

That this is a logical limitation rather than an actual limitation of God is made evident because this understanding does not lead to a total frustration of God's purpose. Cobb's concept of God is that His persuasive power is pervasive. The rejection of God's purpose by one event does not destroy God's overall purpose. It does destroy God's purpose for that event and limit His purpose for other events so that rebellion is real and serious. Rebellion does not mean, though, that God cannot be at work in other events. The self-determination of every event does make it possible that at some time every event could rebel and destroy God's creation. But that still would not be the total defeat of a creative God.31 Other events would have preceded that rebellion and new ones would follow it.

There are a number of other specific points at which Cobb's thought is in tension with traditional doctrines such as life after death. In these cases, Cobb basically works from the Whiteheadian metaphysic in an attempt to reformulate the Christian position in a way which will express its crucial insight in modern conceptualities. These cases are expressions of his basic understanding and do not require detailed treatment. Possible Wesleyan Contributions to Cobb

Finally, it seems to me that this dialog does not have to be one-sided. Apart from any criticism of Cobb's theology, I suspect that Wesleyan Holiness theology could make a vital positive contribution to Cobb's efforts. I think that Wesleyan-Holiness theology could contribute to Cobb's attempts to define historical continuity. The Wesleyan-Holiness movement could easily serve as a study case in the attempt to formulate more precisely what historical continuity is. The Wesleyan tradition has never been as restricted to creedal formulations as other traditions. And yet, it has retained an identity through a number of transitions. This identity has been closely tied to Scripture and traditional theological expressions without being limited to past interpretations of the Bible or traditional theological expressions. Careful historical study of the Holiness movement, which is aware of Cobb's attempts to define historical continuity in a way which avoids being a definition by essence, might be able to contribute significantly to Cobb's efforts.

In conclusion, a reflective awareness of the nature of our own tradition will be the best way for contemporary Wesleyan theology to make its contribution to the broader efforts of contemporary thought. I think that this has been demonstrated by Timothy Smith's and Don Dayton's contributions to historical theology due to their awareness of their tradition. I find Cobb's thought to be uniquely helpful in my attempts as a Wesleyan to minister to the modern mind. This is because Cobb provides us with a sympathetic basis from which to examine consciously our own theology. Notes

1David Ray Griffin and Thomas T. J. Altizer, eds., John Cobb 's Theology in Process (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,1977), p.6 (hereafter cited as JCTP).

2John B. Cobb, Jr., God and the World (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), p. 136 (hereafter cited as GW).

3GW, 123-24.

4GW, 136-38.

5GW, 138; John B. Cobb, Jr., A Christian Natural Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,1965), pp. 13-15 (hereafter cited as CNT).

6GW, 70-71;JCTP, 14.

7GW, 123; CNT, 13.

8CNT, 11-12, 15.

9GW, 120.

10CNT, 203-14, 226.

11Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: MacMillan Company, 1929), p. 323 (hereafter cited as PR).

12JCTP, 165-66.

13John B. Cobb, Jr. The Structure of Christian Existence (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967), pp. 143-44 (hereafter cited as SCE).

14PR, 523-24.

15CNT, 178.

16SCE, 149-50;JCTP, 170.

17John B. Cobb, Jr. "Can a Christian Be a Buddhist Too?" lecture at Garrett-Evangelical Seminary, April 26, 1979.

18James Arminius, "Disputation XVII: On the Understanding of God," in The Writings of James Arrninius, Vol. II trans. By James Nichols (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1956), pp. 36-39. See especially theses X, XI, and XII.

19ClVT, 173-75.

20CNT, 44-45; PR, 238f, 288.

21GW 90-92

22JCTP 19-20.

23JCTP, 165-66.

24JCTP, 166

25JCTP, 167

26JCTP, 187

27JCTP, 187.

28Stephen Ely, The Religious Availability of Whitehead 's God (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1942).

29J. Deotis Roberts, Private Comments at School of Theology at Claremont, Spring 1978.

30Langdon Gilkey, "God: Eternal Source of Newness," in Living With Change, Experience, Faith, ed. by Francis Eigo (Villanova, Pennsylvania: Villanova University Press, 1976), 151-66.

31JCTP, 189.