CONSERVATIVE WESLEYAN THEOLOGY
AND THE CHALLENGE OF SECULAR HUMANISM

Paul Merritt Basset

Nazarene Theological Seminary

The temper of this article is basically pastoral. The theme arises out of the conviction that very little is being done by the consecrative Wesleyan "camp" in the way of critical and creative response to what is perhaps the best entrenched, most tenaciously held system of philosophicaltheological notions in North Americaalthough it is not always adhered to consciously, nor is it held at any high level of sophistication by many.

The system is secular humanism. And the increasingly large numbers of people who go through introductory courses in liberal arts programs in all sorts of secular or secularizing colleges and universities, in addition to the growing number of our children who are taught by such persons, seem to demand that conservative Wesleyan theology launch a strong, balanced, well- learned, energetic offensive. This is not to suggest abandonment of the ancient struggle with various forms of Calvinist belief nor the pervasive results of nineteentwenties style liberalism. But it is to suggest the necessity for a sharp response to the fact that a more virile opponent has entered upon the field, an opponent it is folly to ignore.

The thesis of this paper is that by reason of its proper methodology and the structure of its bases, conservative Wesleyan theology is well equipped both to appropriate from, and to offer unique and basic correctives to, contemporary secular humanism at a level and in a manner not possible to other major Christian theologies. Obviously, this thesis is too ambitious for a short article. Hopefully, its spirit is sufficiently heuristic to pry open doors to much more profound and extended consideration.

The necessary first step in the discussion of the thesis is that of definition.

The term "conservative Wesleyan theology" confronts the scholar with terminological morass. But this is not the creation of some befuddlement with respect to the major tenets of the theology of John Wesley. On these reputable scholars agree. Rather, serious difficulties arise at the point of attempts to make Wesley's thought contemporary and at the point of understanding his intentions in matters of emphasis and balance.

The "holiness movement" has not generally felt that the fact that Wesley's theology is historically conditioned effects materially its validity across historical contexts. Further, this movement is convinced that Wesley's doctrine of entire sanctification is the very tap root of his thought, the formative factor and dynamic of all else, and that this was Wesley's intention. From these bases, it presses its claim to be identified as conservative Wesleyan theology.

In this paper, then, "conservative Wesleyan theology" refers to that particular constellation of concepts, attitudes, and presuppositions which clusters around John Wesley's conviction that there is an experience of grace subsequent to regeneration, instantaneously receivable, which renders the believer capable of acting and being in complete conformity to the Great Commandment.

The term "secular humanism" conjures with fecundity. Definitions range from a militant faith in man which is meant to displace faith in God, to a faith in God which intends to open the door to faith in man. For the purposes of this paper, the term "humanism" is qualified by the adjective "secular" and will signify that attitude toward man and things human which calls on humankind to be selfreliant, to anchor its axiology in man himself, and to pledge allegiance to the scientific method as the surest guide to the discovery of human good and truth.

The clearest statement of this sort of humanism is the Humanist Manifesto, which was drawn up in 1933, by a group of distinguished Americans. While the selfassurance of the Manifesto now seems almost quaint, the mindset and working assumptions that produced it are far from dormant or effete. Emotionally, the attitude of this type of humanism has been chastened. But the intellectual fertility of the "movement" is demonstrated quite clearly in the force and great popularity of such thinkers as Enrich From, who entitled his magnum opus, Man for Himself.

What are the working assumptions from which these definitions of conservative Wesleyan theology and secular humanism have arisen?

There has been precious little deliberate attention given to methodology in Wesleyan theologies and among Wesleyan theologians; this is especially true among the conservative Wesleyans. Thus the task of citing the working assumptions of theologians within the holiness movement is difficult. Further, it would appear that since the beginning of the ModernistFundamentalist controversy, there has been a shift in such conservative Wesleyan theological method as is obvious. Probably it is as one result of this shift that conservative Wesleyan theology has been pushed onto a siding with reference to any strong response at the theologicalphilosophical level.

It would seem that the FundamentalistModernist controversy trapped Wesleyan theology, allowing its emotional ties with the aims of Fundamentalism to saddle it with a Fundamentalist doctrine of the Scripture that is

quite out of place in Wesleyanism; for, contrary to the tenor, temper, and intention of Wesley and the earlier Wesleyan theologians, who could not systematically separate the doctrines of biblical authority and inspiration from Christology, our contemporary "Wesleyan" understandings of inspiration and authority may all too often be stated and argued without the slightest reference to the One who is the Word. Fundamentalism is capable of producing and absorbing the doctrine of inspirationauthority that it has because, true to Calvinist systematics, Christology plays a secondary role. To be sure, the Fundamentalist believes that Christ is the only savior. But, according to Fundamentalism, He is the only savior not because of who He is, in himself, but He is only savior by divine appointment. He is a sort of divine accessory after the fact.

Wesley would have understood well Luther's hermeneutical principle: Christus rex scripturae. In fact, this is the de facto methodological governor in both the Explanatory Notes Upon the New Testament and the much less It known Explanatory Notes Upon the Old Testament. The authority of Scripture, for Wesley, arises primarily from the fact that the writers have made a full explication and presentation of the Living Word in soteriological terms. It does not arise primarily from the fact that the writers were inspired. Exegesis, proper exegesis, according to Wesley, begins with Him. Aside from Him, aside from our experience of Him, there is no valid exegesis of Scripture.

Originally, Wesleyan theologies were based upon the experienced authority of Scripture. This is not to say that the authority of every particular precept was perceived to arise only from some personal experience of its authority, though this would indeed be seen as the ultimate desideratum. Rather, it is to say that by way of a graciously given experience which was set in motion by a true hearing of the Word and attested to and explicated by the Word, we came to know the authority of Scripture. Thus, this authority is not propositional only, nor informational only. It relates itself to experience and manifests itself in experience. Further, this experience expands and seeks in the Word both food for growth and channel markers for the expression of that growth. And this growth and guidance simply reinforce the experienced authority of the written Word. Thus, the Scripture becomes authoritative dynamically, not impositionally.

It is true, of course, that Wesley seems on many occasions to sound as if he believed the authority of Scripture to be impositional. And, as Sangster has put it, the Bible sometimes becomes "an arsenal of prooftexts" for Wesley. But it seems wise to recall the very practical aspect of Wesley's confidence in the workings of prevenient grace. When Wesley refers to Scripture as authority, he is attempting to awaken conscience and consciousness of that authority which the Word already has by way of the speaking of the Spirit.

It is most important to emphasize the fact that the ultimate authority is that of the Living Word by way of the written Word. Such passages as II Timothy seem not so much to be prooftexts or demands upon our faith as testimonies as to what happens once we have accepted positively the original gracious claim of the Living Word, heard by way of the preaching of the written Word. Just as there are ever so slight rumblings among holiness scholars concerning the necessity for avoiding pneumatological language which would detract from the essential Christocentricity of the doctrine and experience of entire sanctification, so it would also seem genuinely Wesleyan to avoid pneumatological language in delineating a doctrine of Scripture in a way that would detract from the understanding that we have only one revelation Jesus Christ. Scripture, far from being independent of Him, has nothing to say if it is not of Him.

Hopefully, this has not been simply so much schussing. What we are attempting to show here is that the methodological linchpin for both conservative Wesleyan theology and secular humanism is the authority of experience. It is precisely this fact that places Wesleyanism in a position to say something to secular humanism at a level impossible of achievement to the other major Christian traditions.

Basic to secular humanism is an utter confidence in the empirical method as the way to such truth as there is. Behind this confidence is the even more significant assumption that man is perceiving, and is capable of perceiving truly, a real world. This, in turn, places upon the human intellect the heavy burden of the integration of perceptions and guidance in their utilization. The axiological principles by means of which the intellect does its work arise out of experience.

For the secular humanist, human experience is experience of the natural order. His understanding of the universe is totally naturalistic. Enduring good is attained in this impersonal order by the intelligent control of the natural processes, or, where these cannot be controlled, by careful adjustment to them. Because the secular humanist accepts both the scientific method and the findings of science as proof incontrovertible of the validity of these working assumptions, ideas of God, revelation, and the supernatural in general have no standing in the business of valueconstruction. Religion is simply the integration of personality around that principle which seems best to organize experience in the impersonal natural order. This principle is in no way metaphysical, but is rather selected from experience. And, of course, this means that the principle is not essentially fixed, nor is it final. The uni verse is in no way taking account of human good or ill, and for this reason it is impossible to believe in terms of the fixed and the final.

Implicit in all of this abides a pragmatism of the sort that says that whatever fulfills human purposes, satisfies human desires, and develops human life is true and good, with fulfillment being understood in naturalistic terms.

Having taken considerable space with definitions and working assumptions, we must now suggest some of the areas of challenge between conservative Wesleyan theology and the secular humanistic bent of our culture. Three will be noted here, but not exhaustively, since their function in this case is heuristic.

First is the challenge laid down by humanism that Christianity is exclusivist and inclined to deny positive value to any but its own concerns and notions. The source of this criticism, within the framework of humanist thought, is the conviction that religion is simply the integration of the personality around whatever principle seems best to organize the empirical data, experience in and of the natural order. To the secular humanist, the empirical data present proofpositive that there are many forms of personality integration that "work".

The conservative Wesleyan might respond to this criticism by pointing to the fact that Christian exclusivism is the result of experience. Those early Christians who declared there is no other way were speaking from the depths of their own pilgrimages. They had tried other waysnow they had found The Way, or, better, The Way had found them. And, The Way seeks, said they, for all men. The fact that others, nonChristians, also claim to have found the way in no way proves that Christianity is wrong in its claims.

There is compelling, but not definitive or conclusive, evidence for an utter satisfaction in Christianity. And it is here, at an apparent point of weak ness, that Christianity steals some humanist thunder. The humanist would point to the claims of the adherents of other religions that they, too, are satisfied (some of them being former Christians). Here, then would appear to be proofpositive of the relativity of Christianity. But the Christian may respond by saying that there is at least some evidence that one aspect of the fundamental experiential data in this satisfaction is the understanding that Christianity is the only way for all men. While this proves nothing, it does point to a fundamental problem with the humanist's acceptance of empirical evidence as the only admissible evidence. However, there is a much more telling response open to the conservative Wesleyan here. He maymustconcur that there is no conclusive empirical evidence of the absoluteness of Christianity. But he may also work with the humanist insistence upon the freedom of the human being to choose his faith. He may answer that Christianity is, after all, a true faith in that the freedom of neither himself nor the humanist is going to be erased by some absolutely undeniable material evidences of the truth of that faith. On the other hand, the Christian might point out, the secular humanist really wants a faith that empirically is indubitable, and thus, according to the humanist's own standards of what must be believed, takes away his freedom.

The Wesleyan may say even more at this point than other classes of conservative Christians. The Wesleyan insists that religion is indeed the integration of personality around whatever principle seems best to organize experience in and of the natural order.

In contradiction to Calvinism, Wesleyanism firmly maintains that one of the free aspects of free grace is the fact that the exclusivism of Christianity is a matter of the very CreatorSustainerJudge of the universe revealing the One Way to all men in a salvific way. In contradistinction to Lutheranism, Wesleyanism, with its optimism of grace in the experience of entire sanctification, offers a genuine integration of personality. Lutheranism's strong note of justification by grace is gratefully heard, but its preoccupationmaybe obsessionwith sin as a way of magnifying grace leaves a rather pessimistic chord lingering in the believer's ear.

When secular humanism speaks of integration of personality around a principle, and a flexible principle at that, "integration" can only mean either a rather forced systematizing that must go beyond what the empirical evidence allows (such evidence presents no system) and thus contradict a basic humanist doctrine, or a sort of aimless, but constant, searching"searching" itself becoming the principle.

Wesleyanism is free to say that the secular humanist is quite correct in his assertion that there is no fixed principle to tie to, and thus no doctrinal formulation that is a sine qua non. Wesleyanism may fault the Calvinist's sovereignty of God, the Lutheran's sola gratia, and the Roman Catholic's ecclesia mater et magister as dogmas necessary to salvation, though he may hold them otherwise. Wesleyanism insists that there is a center from which all else should radiate and around which our personalities may be integrated and that is, of course, Christ Jesus. This meets the humanist's observation that axiology must have its roots in human experiencethat value must take its rise from humankind. (Surprisingly, the New Testament indicates that it will be Christ as man who will judge us!) But far from opening the door to a multitude of relative axiologies, the Wesleyan insists that Christ reveals in space we know and time we know precisely what the humanist is afternot merely an example of integration, but a truly human source of value. And He is empirically compelling in that the Church calls herself his and claims to live only because He lives.

Thus, the source of value for the Christian is truly human in that it is the incarnate Word. But the Christian is not a relativist in the crassest sense, for the incarnate Word dwells in any and all who will receive Him. The Christian ethic is a matter of responding in experience to the inward presence of the incarnate Word. Christianity avoids the relativism that arises from a purely individualist ethic by insisting that each individual play his role within the context of the community of believers, which community is itself called the body of Christ. This is to say that the Church itself is in some way the extention or continuation of the Incarnation. It cannot be thought of in totally individualistic terms. Again, Wesleyan thought allows for a completely human axiology. But that axiology is human in the way that Christ was human: its final reference is divinedivine love, which has man for an object.

Another issue over which secular humanism throws down the gauntlet is that of the tendency of conservative Christianity to assert the moral worminess of man. Various humanist authors have indeed recognized that not all Christians so assert. But these humanists also recognize that the normative Christian understanding of the morality of the natural man is very low.

The source of the humanist objection here is not necessarily a high estimate of man on their part. The humanist who argues from a high anthropology, so to speak, is actually being inconsistent with his own insistence that such value generalizations are to be avoided. The empirical evidence is much too ambiguous. The humanist objection to the assertion of man's horrible warp is based primarily upon the understanding that man is the only source of value and the understanding that the empirical evidence has some genuinely good things to say about man.

Conservative Wesleyan theology may respond in three directions here. First, it must assert the working of prevenient grace in a sinful world. By this grace, good is willed and good is done, even by sinful men. Unfortunately, our culture is so soaked with an implicit Freudianism with respect to human motivation that we are almost totally incapable of believing that there are any unmixed motives. And even more unfortunately, there is a tendency in consenative theological circles to utilize this notionespecially at the point of the attempt to convince the audience under evangelization of its sin and guilt in spite of its exterior respectability.

Conservative Wesleyan theology need not deny some truth to the Freudian understanding. Rather, it simply affirms that whatever may be the percentage of mixed motives at work in man, genuine good is sometimes willed and done. And, what is more, grace offers "singleness of heart"it holds out the possibility that by sanctification doublemindedness may be banished.

This ending of the divisiveness in the human soul is, of course, a desire of our culture. But our culture sees it only as an ideal, reachable, if it be reachable, only by human effort. (Ironically, the assumption of mixed motivation continues so that the ideal is reachable but only under the influence of mixed motives!) Here, conservative Wesleyan theology insists that not only is the singleness of heart attainable, but the irony of the humanist's problem is shortcircuited by the willing grace of God, who out of his sole motive of love, grants singleness of heart as a gift.

Responding more directly to the humanist concern with Christianity's low view of man, conservative Wesleyan theology might agree that the empirical evidence will allow neither a high nor a low view of man as a generalization. This neither affirms nor denies that there is good in man. What it does do is force a decision on the part of every man about himself as he reads his own evidence about himself. Here, conservative Wesleyan theology, with its strong doctrine of prevenient graceincluding the clear word about the work of the Holy Spirit in convictingmay be confident that every man will be spoken to, and that even the good wrought by sinful men will not finally be mistaken by them as being salutary.

Further, conservative Wesleyan theology must insist that the sinfulness of man is a genuine tragedy. It admits that there is sufficient evidence available indicating what man can and should be to make what he is, by comparison, a story that cries out for the entrance of some cosmic and loving redeemer.

In this way, conservative Wesleyan theology may avoid the pitfalls and sloughs into which both Calvinism and Lutheranism fall when they proclaim a position that denies the empirical evidence or explain that such good as there appears to be is really evilimpregnated. On the other hand, neither does Wesleyanism lionize man, as does humanism, by assigning to him the role of Source of Values in such a way that it burdens him with a load that all of the empirical evidence says he cannot really bear.

A third area of contention between humanism and conservative Wesleyan thought is the ethical absolutism of Christianity. The source of the humanist complaint is the conviction that we are in need of continual adaptation in a universe that really takes no thought for human values. Humanism is quite sharp in its rebuke of the Christian insistence that there are fixed moral values. To be sure, humanist writers recognize the divergencies among various authors claiming to be Christian. But the secular humanist usually insists that it is the chain of Paul, Augustine, maybe Thomas, Luther, and Calvin, that really constitutes the norm. And here, humanism is quick to point to the inconsistencies along the chain and within the thought of each living link.

Unfortunately, conservative Christianity has responded poorly here, asserting an ethical absolutism and then denying or explaining away the ambiguities, anomalies, and casuistries that seem so obvious to the "outsider". It would seem that conservative Wesleyanism, if it could return to its roots in the experienced authority of Scripture. can speak to secular humanism on its own grounds here as the other rnajor traditions cannot.

First of all, conservative Wesleyan thought already has at hand the dogged Christocentricity of its founder. Dr. Ray Dunmng, in his work on Wesley's ethics, has shown tne utter necessity for recollecting this Christo centricity in any serinous discssion of Chistian behavior from the Wesleyan perspective. Christian behavior, according truly Wesleyan parameters, must be a response to the love of Christ, not a way to Christ. Thus, the absolutism of the Christian's ethic is not an absolutism imposed by legal Sat, but an absolute giving over of the Christian to responding to the love of God in Christ. It is thus an absolutism in terms of the dynamics of being, not merely an absolutism of assigned duties. Because of this, what is right may change (aside, of course, from the great biblical channel markers which tell people who want to know how to respondbecause they are already engracedhow it may be done). The yearning to do right and to satisfy that yearning by a constant seeking of the will of the Living Word is changeless, except that it deepens constantly.

Under these rubrics, the conservative Wesleyan may say that he neither seeks ethical adaptation for its own sake, nor does he avoid it. He is convinced of the shifting of worldly ethical stimuli, so to speak, as the struggle between Satan's chaos and God's design continues in a fallen world. He also warns the humanist that sheer pragmatism is woefully inadequate, for the adjustment at any particular point may be adjustment and a sense of accomplishment with respect to precisely the wrong element in the stimuli. Or it may be a very shortsighted adjustment. The universe does indeed seem at times to run on indifferent to any human values, the Wesleyan will insist. And at his best, he will not exercise that sort of casuistry or "silverliningism" that cheerily assumes that eventually the moral books will be balanced. He will say to the humanist that the really genuine and adequate ethical adaptation goes deeper than response to empirical assessments. After all, it is empirically verifiable how fickle the natural order is, and how impossible are such assessments on any broad scale, either chronologically or societally. True adaptation lies in the discovery of the real order of the universewhich, says the Wesleyan, is not a "what" but a "Who", and a Who who cares enough to submit to the natural order and die, that He might transform it by a resurrection. The final answer that the universe can give to human purpose, so says the empirical evidence, is death. And aside from some idealism or altruism, that is as far as the humanist can go, consistent with his epistemological principles. But, says the Wesleyan, that answer becomes a mere prelude to the passing of the entire exam. And because of this, all worldly standards, of whatever sort, are brought to judgment. Allegiance to them as ends is declared unconstitutional, a new and living Way having been established. Thus, the humanist's own hope is not at all demolished, it is fulfilled.

We have tried to show where lie some possibilities for creative response on the part of conservative Wesleyan thought to the dominant philosophical tone of our time, secular humanism. Obviously, responses confined to words and the exchange of ideas are quite deficient. Producing the words must be liveslives that say in every way possible: True life has but one focus, the love of God, neighbor, and self. There is really no other absolute: not country, not creed, not system, not Church, not modus vivendi. In fact, I refuse to absolutize what I've done. I shan't argue as if it were absolutely good. In an imperfect world, it is impossible to argue thus. But there is an absolutism in my commitment. I've bet my life on one thing (on one person, really). And I've done that not because I bet first, but because I'm responding to a sum mons to do so from the One who already knows the Winner of the race.

Of course, we did not cover the gamut of Wesleyan thought. Humanism is not a sufficient target to warrant the firing of all of our cannonry. There is, therefore, imbalance here and there. This fact must be recognized, especially by the man who tends to boil all things down to one manageable issue. But we hope we have shown how at least some issues may be met creatively.

Withal, we would never assert that Wesleyanism is simply a better team in the same league with humanism. The difference is between a legitimate and an illegitimate way to "play life's game." But there are points at which we can at least understand each other's game plan. And underlying it all is the conviction that so valid and so capable is conservative Wesleyan theology at its best that we may exercise an old axiom fearlessly in a new way"The best defense is a good offense."