JOHN WESLEY'S CONCEPT OF LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE

Leon O. Hynson, Ph. D.
Professor of Theology, Spring Arbor College

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper seeks to provide an analysis of the explicit and implicit arguments in John Wesley's discussion of conscience and the liberty which must be guaranteed to it. It proceeds, first, with an elucidation of Wesley's concept of conscience, how it is defined, and what are its major motifs. Second, it examines the writings of Wesley which specifically emphasize the concept of liberty of conscience. Finally, it applies the concept of liberty of conscience to the major functions of conscience, as Wesley spelled them out, in an interpretive discussion.

The position of the present writer, as elsewhere officially expressed, 1 is that the concern for liberty, civil and religious, is the central interpretive motif in Wesley's churchstate views. Dedication to liberty of conscience is certainly an integral facet of that central commitment. Liberty of conscience is not, however, applied solely to churchstate issues but for Wesley involves the theological, the social, the ethical, the cognitive, and the evangelical. Important to this discussion will be consideration of the boundaries or limiting principles in Wesley's use of the concept of liberty of conscience, and the way the principle operates within these bounds.

The concept and function of conscience was a significant personal and theological concern of Wesley. It is possible to generally define the pre and postAldersgate years in terms of the orientation of conscience. The preAldersgate years may be termed the years of the "anguished conscience, and the post- Aldersgate, the years of the "social conscience. " It is recognized that this is a broad generalization.

The powerful influence of an extensive "conscience literature"2 led Wesley to think deeply about conscience and to sensitize his own life. Thus, he became an exemplar of that religious man who maximizes the interior life. His own religious quest became an anguishladen venture, a veritable implosion of spiritual force.

II. CONSCIENCE PER SE

Wesley systematically spelled out his concept of conscience in his sermon on "Conscience. "3 Here he indicated his indebtedness to his grandfather, Samuel Annesley, for his views on conscience, and here, too, he reacted negatively to the concept of conscience which the Scottish philosopher Francis Hutches on had elucidated in his notion of the "moral sense. "

In the Notes Upon the New Testament ( 1755), Wesley' s understanding of conscience is also clearly delineated. The comments provide a spectrum of Wesleyan reflections on conscience.

Analysis of Wesley's writings indicates an authentic concern for a clear view of conscience. These writings show at least five major functions and/or aspects in Wesley's interpretation of conscience

A. Theologically Considered

Wesley interprets conscience and its origin in a theological framework. Against Hutches on, who argued that the moral sense is a natural endowment, Wesley argues that this is correct only in the sense that every man possesses the faculty of conscience. Conscience, however, "properly speaking, . . . is not natural, but a supernatural gift of God, above all his natural endowments. "4 The etiology of conscience, for Wesley, has a Christological referent, being equated in a vague sense with the light which enlightens every man, that is, Jesus Christ.

Wesley is ambiguous in his efforts to explain the origin of conscience. At one point he seems to be uncertain whether man "in a state of innocence" possessed the moral sense or conscience. At another time his theology of creation incorporates the position that liberty of conscience is grounded in God's creative gift. It would seem correct to say that Wesley believed in the presence of conscience in Adam's nature. Conscience is ordinarily de scribed by Wesley as "a branch of that supernatural gift of God which we usually style, preventing grace "5 Preventing grace (the negative aspect of prevenient grace) is a broader concept which includes the concept of conscience. Conscience is found in every man, awakening with the dawn of rationality.

B. Cognitively Considered

Conscience, for Wesley, includes the cognitive element. It is defined as "knowing with another," the conscience and God witnessing the same. Again, conscience is considered "the knowledge of two or more things together," that is, the knowledge of words or actions and their moral quality. The cognitive capacity of conscience may evidently be shaped by "the prejudices of education,"6 an idea Wesley does not spell out.

Conscience implies selfknowledge, a discernment of thoughts, words, and actions. It implies knowledge of the rule, the written word of God, which directs the Christian man in his life, and, finally, the knowledge that thoughts, words, and actions are conformable to that word. Conscience, Wesley insists, always has reference to God, His will and word. All consciousness of right and wrong is founded in the will and purpose of God.

In summary, Wesley sees several distinct elements in the knowledge capacity of conscience: discernment, understanding, judgment. "It is a kind of silent reasoning of the mind, whereby those things which are judged to be right are approved of with pleasure.... "7 Wesley intimates that knowledge received by the function of conscience is partial or incomplete. The Christian needs the operation of the Holy Spirit and the word of God in order to receive a clear "reading of himself. The unction of the Holy Spirit, and the Bible, are necessary complements of con science. The nonChristian seems able only to recognize "the general lines of good and evil."8

C. Ethically Considered

Closely related to the above is the ethical. Conscience discerns the moral quality of words, thoughts, and actions, distinguishing good from evil, and kindness from cruelty. Wesley here unites the theological and the ethical. Conscience is never simply natural, but is a branch of preventing grace; it makes moral judgments as a graced faculty.

Wesley disagreed with Francis Hutcheson at this point. Hutcheson saw conscience as a natural faculty, an essential capacity of man as a human being. Wesley, while uncertain about the temporal origin of conscience, was certain that the ethical function of conscience is operative under grace. There is clear evidence that Wesley misunderstood Hutcheson at certain points, but not apparently on this point. 9

D. Socially Considered

Wesley particularly structured his concept of conscience as sociallyoriented in his analysis of Hutcheson's Essay on the Passions.10 Hutcheson had described the "moral sense" and the ''public sense" as facets of the humanity common to man. Both of these senses are included in conscience. The public sense involves the sense of pain or pleasure one experiences upon seeing the misery or deliverance of a fellowcreature. Conscience informs every man that it is right todo unto others a she would that they do unto him. The moral sense affirms benevolence and condemns cruelty, whether performed by ourselves or others. Conscience, then, has a clear social reference. It informs concerning the quality of our actions toward others. It rewards benevolent behavior and punishes cruel or ungenerous action. It suffers with the suffering and rejoices with those who are freed from trouble.

Important as this maybe, Wesley is unprepared to admit that this "social conscience" means the power to act benevolently or generously, even though one possesses the power to discern the quality of actions. Hutcheson had a benign conception of man, affirming that most men are essentially benevolent. Wesley disagreed with Hutcheson's conception.

I know both from Scripture, reason and experience that his picture of man is not drawn from the life. It is not true that no man is capable of malice or delight in giving pain, much less that every man is virtuous, and remains so as long as he lives. . 11

Conscience provides sanctions for the structuring of a right relationship with others, but it does not provide the positive power which creates the benevolent spirit. This is given by the grace of God through faith, which expresses itself in love. It is that faith which works through love which is the dynamic of the Thou-directed life.

E. Evangelically Considered

Wesley, like the major reformers before him, saw one of the marks of the churchas the preaching of the pure word of God. Preaching that pure word was for him a question of conscience which impelled him to adopt field preaching and the use of lay preachers. His evangelical concern bade him heed at certain points the obligation to God above the conflicting restrictions of men.

Wesley's primary commitment, as a conscientious servant of Jesus Christ, was consistently evangelical and shaped his relationship to his own Church. He counselled loyalty to, not separation from, his Church, but always emphasized the priority of God's will over a merely human will, even the will of the hierarchy. This persuasion is seen early in his pastAldersgate development during his confrontation with Joseph Butler, Bishop of Bristol.12

His highly significant letter of 1761 to the Earl of Dartmouth contains a synopsis of most of the issues with which Wesley wrestled in conscience, including preaching of justification by faith, and gathering congregations or societies. Wesley asserted that laws enacted by the Church under the authority of the state could not supersede conscience.

If a dispensation of the gospel is committed to me, no church has power to enjoin me silence. Neither has the State; though it may abuse its pow er and enact laws whereby I suffer for preaching the gospel. 13

III. LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE

Wesley's understanding of conscience provides the basic foundation for an explication of his view of liberty of conscience. There are in Wesley's tracts, occasional writings and sermons, many indications of his dedication to liberty of conscience. He applied the claim of liberty of conscience both to religious belief and exercise and to the civil sphere. Religious liberty is grounded in the demands of conscience and in man's natural endowment.

No man or institution may intrude upon this intensely personal sphere of life. Liberty of conscience is "an indefeasible right; it is inseparable from humanity."14 It is most personal because conscience is the ultimate source of direction for each person who "must judge for himself because every man must give an account of himself to God."15 Since conscience indicates right and wrong, pointing out the character of actions and attitudes, to usurp the power of liberty of conscience is to deprive man of his right to personal judgment and to live as he knows he must before God. To deprive a man of liberty is to deny his humanity, and to contradict his nature.

In a historical analysis, Wesley points out the repressive measures in England, which denied the right of liberty of con science, creating adversity and suffering for hundreds of people, guilty of no crime. Property had been seized, even in England whose concern for the rights of property was universally recognized. Why the persecution? "Because they did not dare to worship God according to other men's consciences."16

Wesley, however, was not arguing that such conditions existed in his own era. He was fearful that the civil turmoil of his day, especially in the revolutionary fervor of the sixties and seventies, would bring back into English life the old intolerance characteristic of England before the Glorious Revolution.17 (He was persuaded that English liberties dated from the Revolution, that prerevolutionary England had often been arbitrary and intolerant. ) Therefore, he employed his writing skills to persuade Englishmen that they possessed an enviable, perhaps even maximal, degree of liberty, both civil and religious.

Wesley insisted that the English Civil War was fought because Charles Iencroached on liberty of conscience "not in one trifling instance only, but in a thousand instances of the highest importance."18

A. The Argument from Natural Law

For Wesley, liberty of conscience is an essential facet of humanity. It is inalienable from mankind, from the rational creation, a kind of natural instinct. "The love of liberty is, then, the glory of rational beings. . ., " the gift of the Creator, a right every man possesses, for the use of which he alone, finally, must answer to God.

The concept of natural law was a familiar idea in eighteenth-century England. Natural law arguments were employed to buttress English constitutional order, 19 to fight slavery, and to undergird religious liberty.

Wesley's concept of natural law is understood properly when interpreted theologically, that is, in the light of his theology of creation. Religious liberty or liberty of conscience (these concepts seem to be equated) is integral to human existence, inalienable, inseparable from man. However, this is the gift of God in creation. "The Creator gave him this right (liberty of con science) when he endowed him with understanding; and every man must judgefor himself, because every man mustgive an account of himself to God."20 Wesley's theology of creation interprets and qualifies the natural law theory.

Wesley used the argument of the superiority of natural over human law to support his attack on slavery and his belief in liberty of conscience. Human laws, he declared, cannot change the nature of things. 21

B. The Political Argument

Wesley also employed a political argument for liberty of conscience, appealing to the English system as the guarantor of religious freedom. To Wilberforce, he appealed for relief from the Act of Toleration, which did not give reforming movements like the Methodist societies the freedom to function: "Where then is English liberty? yea, of every rational creature, who, as such has a right to worship God according to his own conscience?"22 Every Englishman had the right of liberty of conscience given by the laws of the nation. 23

C. The Right of Private Judgment

Standing in the Protestant tradition, Wesley was dedicated to the right of private judgment. The rationale employed by proponents of private judgment is that every man must have liberty of conscience for every man is responsible to God and must judge what is God's will.

The annual conference wrestled with the issue of private judgment and what dependence each member should place on another's judgment. It was agreed in 1744 that in speculative matters, rational arguments must be employed to convince, but that in practical questions the integrity of conscience should prevail. In 1747, after reference to 1744, it was asked, "Can a Christian submit any farther than this to any man, or number of men, upon earth?" The answer was:

It is undeniably plain he cannot: either to pope, council, bishop or convocation. And this is the grand principle of every man's right to private judgment...on which Calvin, Luther, Melanchthon and all the ancient Reformers. . . proceeded: 'Every man must think for himself, since every man must give an account for himself to God.24

Wesley asserted the right of private judgment to resist Roman Catholic arguments that Scripture cannot be the sole rule of faith; at least not interpreted by private judgment, which has no place in religion.25 The Scriptures are of higher authority than the pope or Church of Rome, and liberty must be given to the conscience in interpretation. 26

Wesley recognized the cruciality of the private judgment argument, its potential distortion, and the inherent possibility of chaos if pressed beyond bounds. Wesley appealed for toleration showing that all Christians must follow the light they have received. In his societies he challenged those whose consciences appeared to conflict with his. He argued that they should indeed have liberty of conscience but not within the context of Methodism since he as leader must act according to his conscience.

The private judgment argument surely implies the tolerance of the judgments of other men since it recognizes that those judgments are made before God, accepting His prior claim upon the person involved.

Is there a relationship between the concept of liberty of conscience and that of the right of private judgment? Are they synonymous? Wesley seems to use private judgmentas at technical idea applied to specifically Christian judgments, while liberty of conscience, per se, has a general application. Evidently they are corollary ideas.

IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

What are the implications we may legitimately draw from this analysis of conscience and liberty of conscience? How does Wesley's principle of liberty of conscience operate within, or with respect to, the cognitive, ethical, or social functions of conscience ?

First, an implication emerges from the perception of con science as the moral sense. Conscience must be unfettered in its ethical function, remaining as open and unclouded by external restrictions as possible, whether social, ecclesiastical, or political. Liberty, Wesley insisted, is"essential to a moral agent."27

As a facet of the natural image of God, which includes understanding and will, the conscience is an integral part of the process of decision. To deny liberty of conscience means in effect to alter the decisions made by incorporating alien patterns in the act of decision. As Wesley taught, this means prevention of the exercise of man's humanity.

The same argument applies to the social orientation which is always present in the preceptions of conscience. Liberty of conscience here implies clear perception of the social import and impact of one's choices, acts, and attitudes, indicating the quality and consequences of such choices as they relate to society. An unfettered conscience is imperative in assisting the Christian toward appropriate social action or else distortion occurs leading to confusion and error. Crucial to this awareness of right and wrong, of benevolence or inhumanity, is the way conscience is informed by growth in knowledge.

This growth renders possible a maturation in the rational capacity, and, thereby, in the conscientious capacity. Con science, in other words, may be informed by new insights.

This leads us to the cognitive sphere. What does liberty of conscience mean for us in the sphere of knowing? Wesley pointed up three primary factors integral to the knowledge function of conscience, insisting that conscience implies all three. These three are related to the Christian life, for Wesley specifically asks, "What is conscience, in the Christian sense?"28 There is a knowledge capacity in the faculty of conscience, corrected and informed by the Holy Spirit, and spelled out in adequate particularity in the written word of God.

Conscience implies this complementarity of conscience, Spirit, and written word in the knowing process for the Christian. How, then, does the principle of liberty of conscience operate with respect to the knowledge discoverable through conscience, Spirit and word? It means liberty to hear and heed the voice of conscience; the freedom to study the word of Scripture which in forms conscience, to engage in the entire hermeneutical task so that Scripture may be opened; and to be taught by the Spirit of truth. In a word, it implies liberty to follow where conscience, word, and Spirit lead.

We must assert the necessity of openness to the Spirit, who corrects and clarifies the indications of conscience. Without the Spirit, writes Wesley, "Selflove. . . would disguise and wholly conceal him (man) from himself." The Spirit must also equip us to "judge of the rule whereby we are to walk."29, which is the word of Scripture.

We recognize the special responsibility which the Christian, and especially the Christian theologian, bears to know what Scripture includes, what it means, what it teaches, what are its vehicles of truth and what is the truth borne in these vehicles. Liberty of conscience is crucial to such examination, lest truth be obscured or hidden. Without the knowledge of the truth discovered by such free inquiry conscience is deprived of truthknowledge which it must possess to remain free.

The theologian's conscience must remain unfettered by alien influences, or the will of men in civil, social, or ecclesiastical spheres, which would still the insistent voice of conscience, Scripture, and the Holy Spirit, which calls the theologian to a quest for the knowledge that enlightens and informs the Christian conscience. Real liberty of conscience requires openness to truth- knowledge or our liberty becomes wrapped about with the binding grave clothes of ignorance.

Wesley suggests rather explicitly the necessity of such an open quest for truth in his discussion of heresy in the Christian church. Insisting that the Roman Catholic Church had fostered the notion that heresy is a perversion of fundamental doctrines, instead of the biblical view of heresy as division, Wesley charged that the Roman concept of heresy was formed in order to deny to Christians some basic rights. He declared:

Heresy is not, in all the Bible, taken for 'an error in fundamentals, ' or in anything else .... Therefore, both heresy and schism, in the modern sense of the words, are sins that the Scripture knows nothing of; but where invented merely to deprive mankind of the benefit of private judgment, and liberty of conscience. 30

Wesley's Advice to the People Called Methodists, written in 1745, contained the appeal for tolerance and liberty of con science in the search for that truthknowledge which comes through conscience, Scripture, and the Spirit:

Conform yourself to those modes of worship which you approve; yet love as brethren those who cannot conform.... Condemn no man for not thinking as you think: Let every one enjoy the full and free liberty of thinking for himself .... Abhor every approach, in any kind or degree, to the spirit of persecution. 31

What, however, is the limiting principle in the exercise of liberty of conscience in this search for knowledge? Is any restraint placed upon the theologian, the Christian? The answer seems to lie in the concept of accountability. Primarily, it is accountability to God. Liberty of conscience or private judgment can never mean irresponsibility or arbitrariness. It requires recognition of obligation toGod whose will is expressed in creation and redemption; it means social obligation; responsiveness to truth as Scripture reveals it; and the evangelical obligation to proclaim Jesus Christ as the Savior whose purpose is ultimately to bring man and creation back into union with Him who first sent it forth by His word and will.

This limiting principle is, it seems to me, as strong a restraint as ought to be imposed. It does not require uniformity of interpretation or conclusion, unless truth is conceived only as discoverable from a single vantage point, onedimensioned. If the truth of Scripture is larger than any particular ecclesiastical interpretation, then there is room for variant conclusions which in the day of Christ may be discovered to be valued, if partial, reflections of the light which shines in and from the face of Jesus Christ.

DOCUMENTATIONS

1. Leon O. Hynson, "Church and State in the Thought and Life of John Wesley, "unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1971.

2 My own term to describe the writings of Law, Taylor, aKempis, Seougal, Scupoli, Baxter, et al, which were intended to create a refined, sensitive conscience.

3. Wesley, Works, VII, 18694. 4. Ibid., VII, 18788.

5. Ibid., p. 189. 6. Ibid., p. 187. 7. Ibid.

8. Notes upon the New Testament, John 1:9.

9. Cf. Hynson, Ch. 4.

10. Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections With Illustrations on the Moral Sense, 3rd ed. (London: A. Ward, 1742. )

11. Wesley, Journal, V, 492_95. 12. Works, XIII, 501.

13. Wesley, Letters, IV, 147ff. 14. Works, XI, 37f.

15. Ibid., p. 37. 16. Ibid., p. 139. 17. Ibid., p. 138.

18. Ibid., p. 110.

19. David L. Keir, The Constitutional History of Modern Britain Since 1485, 9th ed. (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1969), p. 293.

20. Works, XI, 92, 37. 21. Ibid., pp. 70ff.

22. Letters, VIII, 231. 23. Letters, V, 22; VI, 228; VII, 15152.

24. Albert C. Outler, John Wesley (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 13644.

25. Journal, III, 172; Works, X, 85. 26. Works, X, 13340.

27. Ibid., VI, 66. 28. Ibid., VII, 189. 29. Ibid., VII, 18990

30. Notes Upon the New Testament, I. Cor. 11:18.

31. Works, VII, 357.