THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY: A WESLEYAN VIEW

WALTER H. JOHNSON, Th.D.
(Chairman, Department of Philosophy, Seattle Pacific College)

The history of thought reveals recurrent expressions of the desire for objectivity. Various words have been used to express this continuing hope. The word empiricism has been a verbal symbol for what has also been called the "concrete facts" of experience. When materialism was the dominating philosophy, it seemed assured that man had achieved the hard facts upon which all tenable truths could be based. As early as Aristotle, Platonic idealisms and subjectivisms were rejected in favor of more scientific or empirical methods in the search for truth. Later observations, however, revealed that the apparent objective method resulted in a congealed position known as Aristotelianism. This interesting fact in the history of thought--shown in the tendency of man to begin with a hypothesis based upon an empirical or object approach to truth, followed by the congealing of these inductive facts into a system of absolutism--has repeatedly characterized man's search for the "concrete facts" of truth.

The "idols" of Francis Bacon picture the difficulty with which we face this problem. Bacon sought for the "expurgation of the intellect," to achieve a mind free from human frailties and subjective tendencies that obscure a true empirical approach to truth. Experience, however, since Bacon, has shown that the mere naming the "idols" of the tendency of man to be human in his interpretation of truth has not eliminated the subjective factor.

The interesting illustration given by Sir Arthur Eddington called "Eddington's elephant" suggests that man in his desire for scientific objectivity has actually found, instead, abstractions and subjective interpretations. The elephant, according to Eddington's parable, instead of being a live animal on the side of a hill, has been turned by science into a two-ton mass on an angle with a friction element created by grass. The final result suggested by Eddington is that science instead of achieving the concrete facts has actually turned a life situation into an abstraction that presents a limited concept of truth.

Even Life magazine has recently given editorial consideration to this problem under the heading, A Discipline That Needs Some:

It's a pity no scholar has ever thought to do his doctorate on the number of creative minds that have been driven clear out of the academic world by the stultifying demands of 'scientific method' misapplied. Certainly in the social sciences, the tyranny of methodology and sheer jargon has long since got out of hand . . .

The quest is for a way to disentangle the true disciplines of scholarship from the whole materialistic and behavioristic approaches to existence--twin blights that have debased so much of 20th Century thought and ethics. (1)

This quest has profound significance not only for the various academic disciplines but for western civilization itself. One expression has been the materialistic Marxist dogma that has influenced so many minds and masses in all contemporary civilizations.

Our suggestion is not that empirical truth is invalid, but that empirical truth "misapplied" is a limited aspect or facet of total truth.

One barrier to pure objectivity has been the economic influence of affluence. More philosophical and theological positions have changed because of potential book sales and salary increases than from pure reason.

Plato was one of the first, in The Republic, to note the difficulty of man's achieving the purely objective point of view. After the very thorough training suggested for the philosopher-rulers, Plato at the conclusion of The Republic suggests that even the "Ph.D." graduates in the field of Platonic idealism would need protection from the temptation of property and things. A system of guidance for these leaders of The Republic was suggested which would protect them from themselves, from their subjective natures, which Plato called the "psychological problem."

As Plato observes, "justice would be simple if men were simple." The communal state suggested by Plato for his philosopher-rulers is really an admission of their continuing humanity and the possible influence of economic factors on their decision making even after extended, intensive training in the school of ideas. Furthermore, they were forbidden the having of wives because of the possible influence of wives on the decisions of the philosophers. The aggressive, prodding wife who drives her husband to seek greater economic and political power is, evidently, not a recent invention.

Sociologists have pointed out the influence of affluence upon the decision making of men. Their studies indicate that religious groups are profoundly influenced by the growth of affluence within the community of the denomination. That which we cannot afford is usually considered worldly. When we have sufficient to buy the things heretofore condemned, we no longer consider such things "worldly."

The simple basic economic factors have often influenced the so-called "objective judgments" of scholars. The failure of the scholar to meet and to combat the Nazi movement in Germany, the Fascist movement in Italy, and the Communist take-over in Russia is one of the many occasions of academic incompetence. Only a few religionists and intellectuals were able to withstand the combination of economic, social, and power pressures brought to bear in Nazi Germany, and, of course, with Dietrich Bonhoeffer, some of these men died rather than succumb to the intellectual and economic dominant forces at the time.

Such failures by the academic community have caused many to question the absoluteness of traditional, scientific, authoritarianism. Some go so far as to suggest that the use of the word "inductive" should no longer characterize the study of science. Brown and Stuermann take this position.

Scientific activity takes on, for many, the characteristics of a religion. "Scientifically tested," "endorsed by men of science," and "established by scientific research" are typical of phrases used frequently and insistently by commercial and political propagandists, by businessmen and clergymen and by housewives and students. Such expressions can, of course, be used properly and wisely. On the other hand, they are often used to persuade, to confirm prestige on some idea or product, to pick an unwise objective. Even more tragic is the perverse use of the name of science to try to make some contemporary view point--in politics, economics, religion, etc.--appear to be a superior or final truth .. ."" A misconception that must be described for proper understanding of scientific processes is that they are "inductive" or "empirical" while non-scientific disciplines are "deductive" or "theoretical." This bifurcation reflects a failure to recognize the dominant role that deduction and theory plays in even the most elementary scientific studies The contention that induction is the basic method of thought or procedure in science cannot be adopted without qualification, if it can be accepted at all. Whether there is such a thing as pure induction, starting with the particular and reasoning to a general rule, is highly questionable," "The principle mechanics of thought or inference in the scientific process is deduction. (2)

Many of us would not care to equate the scientific process with deduction. However, it is significant to observe the strong reaction against empirical dogmatism among such recent scholars. The suggestion that the "scientific method" and "science" have become status symbols by which not only products but ideas have been sold should be given serious thought. The human tendency to allow affluence to influence judgments should be watched carefully to ascertain whether the often quoted adage is true that "man can stand anything but prosperity."

Roadblocks in the quest for objectivity have appeared in various forms. In the recent past the philosophy of religious empiricism was seen in the writings of Schleiermacher, an advanced and devotional form of anti-intellectualism. Religious mystics have always contended that their direct apprehension and intuitive cognition of the will of God gave valuable insights. Strong views in this direction were advanced by what has often been called religious liberalism. The values of this movement, however, were limited by the lack of definitiveness. Devotion without definitiveness led to the extreme of anti-intellectualism. Basic concerns for truth values voiced by many were stilled with the suggestion that adequate emphasis upon pietistic religious experience of God excluded the necessity for guide-lines of truth.

The latest university student power rebellions have been in part against the entrenched orthodoxies of a scientism which the young feel has dehumanized them. Strangely enough they have a semantics which had previously become almost symbolic of the past and traditionalism. They are against the "Establishment". They are "Disestablishmentarians".

Perhaps the most violent anti-intellectual revolt against the "objective facts" of the scientific method has been the dynamic contemporary movement of existentialism. The "I-It" of Martin Buber symbolizes the world of objects and scientism against which existialism finds itself in opposition. The "I-Thou" of innerexistential confrontation rejects any system that would violate its individual freedom and subjective awareness of truth.

The philosophy of Paul Tillich emphasizes "ultimate concern" and these ultimate concerns cannot be comprehended within the limited truth-judgments of the scientific method. It is imperative that we go beyond the test tube and laboratory to truly comprehend "life", contends the existentialist.

A fascinating lingering question concerning this movement which needs discussion is whether both atheistic and theistic existentialists express their true underlying assumptions, or adopt a Kantian superhistorical semantics to escape discussion of fundamental dichotomies created by their irrevocable acceptance of empirical dogma?

It is a strange phenomenon of our time that the great intellectual institutions have been caught in such violent upheavals of anti-intellectualism. The existentialist verbally contends that the extreme use of the scientific method, which in many cases excluded personal involvement in the search for truth, violated man's respect for himself and subjugated his personal integrity of experience to the cold impersonal domination of the machine, the microscope, and the laboratory. Existentialism is shouting that "all life is a meeting" as suggested by Martin Buber. Life is more than body. Truth is more than hormone secretions. Respect for individual choice must never be obscured by the determinism of mechanistic science.

The extremes of this revolt, of course, contain the seeds of its own destruction. Already we see brief articles suggesting the re-investigation of the place of reason in the pursuit of truth. It is no doubt safe to anticipate the not too distant swing of the pendulum in favor of a rationalism which has been thoroughly discredited by the anti-intellectualisms of many intellectual institutions today.

Thoughtful men in both science and metaphysics have been greatly disappointed at the extremes provoked by obscurantisms on both sides of the dialogue in quest for objectivity. Religionists, philosophers, and scientists have all in turn contributed to the confusion and disaster of this quarrel. Alfred North Whitehead, in The Function of Reason, observes,

Obscurantism is the inertial resistance of the practical Reason, with its millions of years behind it, to the interference with its fixed methods arising from recent habits of speculation. This obscurantism is rooted in human nature more deeply than any particular subject of interest. It is just as strong among the men of science as among the men of the clergy, and among professional men and business men as among other classes. Obscurantism is the refusal to speculate freely on the limitations of traditional methods. It is more than that: if is the negation of the importance of some speculation, the insistence on incidental dangers. A few generations ago the clergy, or to speak more accurately, large sections of the clergy were standing examples of obscurantism. Today their place has been taken by scientists--the obscurantists of any generation are in the main constituted by the greater part of the practitioners of the dominant methodology. Today scientific methods are dominant, and scientists are the obscurantists. (3)

This seems to strike at the basic root of our human dilemma in the quest for objectivity. As Aristotle found the "objective facts" and congealed them into one of the most dogmatic systems of all human history, men have always erected ivory towers of obscurantism from which they have voiced ex-cathedra statements of "final judgments" or "concrete facts". It is so difficult for us human beings to become self-conscious enough to make proper evaluations of our own inherent subjectivity. After all, we are first of all men, then scientists, poets, philosophers, and religionists.

There is a truth in Martin Buber's emphasis that all thinkers walk a 'narrow bridge" of scholarly investigation. We all operate intellectually from a precarious position. As Emerson suggested "man had his choice between truth and repose, he cannot have both." There is indeed, as Buber suggest, a holy insecurity" in intellectual honesty.

The basic question, then, of our discussion is, with all the precariousness that surrounds our venture, is it important that we continue the quest for objectivity? Most of us who attempt to be relevant to our age would agree that the quest for objectivity must not be discontinued. We have viewed with considerable interest the gradual erosion of the so-called "concrete facts" of empiricism. Scientific observations by Heisenberg, Lobochevsky, and contemporary physicists would seem to indicate the willingness of mathematicians and physical scientists to admit the limitations of earlier congealed positions. Scientists and philosophers of science have turned from the dogmatism of original positivism to logical positivism. They have traditionally understood observation in terms of inspection by a microscope. The microscope is still one of the basic investigative tools and the values derived from it continue, but the scientist has broadened his perspective of truth. Logical positivism in some situations has developed into phenomenology in which scholars not only question the absoluteness of the scientific facts but question the possibility of finding meaning at all in material and philosophical inquiries The dialogue has continued in the schools of linguistic analysis so that it has become difficult for many to hold any concept having fundamental meaning that can be understood and communicated to others.

We have also noted the violent and at times emotional reaction of existentialism against the systematization of truth presented by what is now considered classical materialism of the scientific world.

Our problem of relevance in the context of contemporary thought is a difficult one. Shall we join the reactionary movements that repudiate honest intellectual disciplines that have pursued objective truth? Most of us share the hope of the intellectual that it might be possible to achieve some degree of objectivity in the pursuit of truth. In fact, the evangelical' may yet be one of the strongest supporters of a mature science which is probing its way in a climate of subjectivism and non-cognitivism.

The problem becomes one of the basic methods in approaching objectivity. It would seem that the earlier advocates of extreme objectivity attempted to build a cyst around the private world of objective truth. It was their point of view, spoken or implied, that those who did not accept the basic frame of reference from which they concluded the "only tenable facts," were incapable of objectivity.

A more productive approach would suggest that we are all products of environmental and training circumstances that have led to certain basic beliefs in philosophy, science or religion. We have observed the dangers inherent in insisting that our own individual perspective is the only possible route to objectivity. The declaration of one's position as the only objective position simply compounds the difficulty of achieving objectivity. It creates a doctrinaire dogmatism which is as absolutistic as the clerical dogmatism it originally opposed. With Alfred North Whitehead we observe that the dominant power structure of any particular age controls the obscurantism of that age. If White-head is right that scientism is the obscurantism of our age, and it would seem to recommend careful observation of any "decrees" issued by this prevailing power structure.

Klausner and Kuntz, in their recent book Philosophy: The Study of Alternative Beliefs, (4) suggest in the title and in the book that philosophical assumptions are actually beliefs, that a basic philosophical frame of reference is arrived at by what may be called a leap of faith. To be sure, logic and reason contribute to the formation of assumptions, but in all areas of life that seem to really matter to man--in metaphysics, in politics, as well as in religion--belief goes beyond pure logic and pure reason. The simple admission of this fact, that we are human beings and conditioned by factors of training and background, would seem to be the best beginning in the search for objectivity, because if we can admit our humanity, we can perhaps more honestly guard against the emotional extremes and intellectual vagaries which the history of thought has shown us to have.

In our quest for Objectivity, therefore, we suggest at least three observations for our consideration of contemporary assumptions. First, we should give respectful consideration to a viewpoint no matter how extreme it may seem to us at first. If we expect respectful treatment from others. It is imperative that we reciprocate by giving fair presentation of developing viewpoints whether or not our immediate reaction is positive or negative. Secondly, it would seem helpful intelligently to qualify any written or spoken philosophical or doctrinal position. This suggests the honest proving of beliefs to ascertain the facets of truth that are really congruous with an intellectually honest position. Finally, it would seem important to attempt to relate the new concept to the total of past, present and future thought and life. Many have, to be very specific, given fair, honest and intelligent investigation and qualifications of Hugh Hefner's Playboy philosophy, but the final concern is the question of relevance (5) In the light of the history of thought and action, does Hefner give constructive suggestions or simply confound our confusion? In an age inflamed by fiction, the entertainment world and the communication media, is Hefner's contribution a creative, constructive one, or does it add to the difficulties of those who would attempt to give guidance to youth who are already inclined to experiment with the Commandments?

Is one truly relevant who cleverly ascertains the trends of the statistical majority of an age and joins heartily in support of the views that will give him the vote and sales for his magazine or book? To be relevant, one must objectively consider the next step in this dialogue. What will Neo-Hefnerism present? Hefner has already been under a considerable amount of pressure for his own level of "puritanism" which excludes the ethics of the homosexual.

The quest for objectivity, then, must continue, but must not be based on an exclusive philosophy of dogmatic empirical science, but must begin with the humility of human admission that social, intellectual, and religious influences have contributed to our present judgments. Scientists, religionists, philosophers and other disciplines can contribute together in this honest, respectful quest for objective truth.

(1) Life, September 24, 1965, p.4.

(2) Brown and Stuermann, Elementary Modern Logic (New York: Ronald Press, 1965), pp.214-215.

(3) Alfred North Whitehead, The Function of Reason (Boston: Beacon Hill Press, 1929), pp.43-44.

(4) Klausner and Kuntz, Philosophy: The Study of Alternative Beliefs (New York: Macmillan Press, 1961).

(5) John Robinson, Honest to God (London: SCN Press Limited, 1963).

Edited by Nick Nettles