The Methodist Quarterly Review
July, 1877

ART. 1.-POPE'S CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

A Compendium of Christian Theology, being Analytical Outlines of a Course of Theological Study; Biblical, Dogmatic, Historical. By W. B. POPE, D.D., Theological Tutor, Didsbury College, Manchester. London: Published for the Author at the Wesleyan Conference Office. 1875.

It is not strange that the skeptical and latitudinarian spirit of modern thought in questions of religion rises in opposition to systematic theology. Even with some thinkers holding evangelical affiliations there is a growing depreciation not only of systematic theology, which such decry, but of all doctrinal theology. Creeds are an evil, and doctrines should be dismissed from the pulpit. Opposition thus becomes broad and radical, and, as we believe, so far as prevalent, subversive of the very foundations of true religion.

No religion has ever existed without the materials for a creed. No one can ever take a high form as a religion of true spiritual power, except in the apprehension of great religious truths in the faith of its subjects. And these truths, properly formulated, are religious doctrines. Faith enters largely into all religious life, and must so enter. Its prominence in revealed religion is no arbitrary appointment, but springs from a necessity arising in our mental and moral constitution. And the grand sphere of our faith is a sphere of doctrines. Even the great facts which it embraces are full of doctrines; and without tile doctrines which they embody and bear to our faith, they would be void of their grandeur and practical religious force. [FOURTH SERIES VOL. XXIX.-25] Doctrines enter into the very faith and life of religion. And as well exclude the mind from all objective relations, and yet require of it all the varied activities of thought and feeling which such relations necessarily condition, as to require the faith and feeling of a true religious life in the exclusion of the doctrinal truths which in a like necessity condition them. And, historically, the periods of the highest, best religious life are the very periods characterized by the fullest, clearest doctrine. And the order of every religious reformation has been, first, a reformation of doctrine, and then, through faith in the better doctrine, a new and better religious experience and life. It must ever be so. Such is the chronological order because it is the logical order.

But it is objected that, at the very least, the systemization of doctrines is valueless. It is true that, in the logical order, the formulation of the doctrines severally must precede their construction in a system. Hence, it is alleged that systemizing adds nothing, and is, therefore, useless. But, if nothing is thereby added to the doctrines severally, neither is any thing taken from them, nor are they in any way changed or damaged. And this objection has no special pertinence to systematic theology, and really arises from opposition to doctrines. And if we have doctrines in religion which admit of scientific construction, there can be no valid objection to their systemization.

It is further objected that doctrinal theology, and especially systematic theology, engenders bigotry. It may do so, but does not either necessarily or by natural tendency. Theologists have been earnest in maintenance of their creeds; and properly so, because in their deepest convictions such creeds contain vital truths. Bigotry may enter into this support. So it may and does enter into the advocacy of mere negative creeds, the special aim of which is the subversion of the cardinal doctrines of Christian theology. There is often the bigotry of negation and destruction. And the self-styled liberalist is not rarely the most intensely illiberal. And as it respects bigotry or the spirit of a true liberality, orthodoxy has no concessions to make to latitudinarianism. And in ah affirmative or vindicatory view there is exceeding much to justify the scientific construction of Christian doctrines.

The mind by its own constitution tends to this work-indeed requires it. We cannot be satisfied without it. As by a law of the mind we are impelled to inquire into the qualities of things, so by a law equally impellent we inquire into their relations and accordance. This result is inevitable in all profounder study; and such relations and accordance are as veritable and profitable subjects of study as the things themselves separately viewed. All scientific and philosophic history is in proof of this mental tendency and need. Scholarly minds have diligently studied facts as they arise in all the departments of investigation, but they cannot rest in them merely as individual or isolated, however numerous and interesting in themselves. A law of their mind has impelled them to classify these facts, and to generalize them in the laws which harmonize and unite them. Thus we have the sciences and the philosophies.

Shall we, then, in the grander field of theology, bar the highway of advancement, and when the mind would achieve the sublimest results in the generalization and harmony of religious truth, violently thrust it back upon the merest elements? This would be unnatural, and deeply damaging to all the best interests of theological study. No one denies the grandeur or benefit of the results of systemization in the sciences usually so called. And without rising to these results by the Only method of reaching them, we must have remained in the merest elements of truth. In suck a state we should have a race in juvenility instead of the noblest manhood. Nor must we deny to theology a method which in other departments has achieved such results. For it is only as in a like method we study its doctrines in their relations, and systemize them in a grand scientific whole, that we can ever rise to the clearer view and profounder comprehension of divine truth.

As pertinent to these views, and as setting forth the benefits of a systematic study and treatment of theology, we quote from the work under review:-

It is of great importance that the student should imbue his mind at the outset with a sense of the possibility and the advantage of a well-articulated system. In the organic unity of Christian truth every doctrine has its place in some cycle of doctrines, while all the lesser Systems revolve around one common center; and it is one of the fruits of theological study to enable the student to locate every topic at once Bat not only so. There are rich and profound harmonies among these truths; and every doctrine having its proper place, has also its relations to almost every other: the quick ascertainment ,0f these relations is another fruit. Putting the two together, the aim of this study should be to discover all the affinities and connections of the truths of the Christian system.-Pp. 17, 18.

As the scientific discussion and systemization of theology is of great value in aiding us to a clearer and more comprehensive view of the doctrines. wrought into the system, and as the truths so apprehended are at once conservative and promotive of the best interests of religion, we, therefore, heartily welcome this new contribution of Dr. Pope, and we so welcome it for some special reasons.

Dr. Pope is a member of the British Wesleyan Conference, and has a covetable home reputation for intellectual ability, learning, and scholarly industry. He has been for years theological tutor in the Didsbury College, and has special preeminence as a theologian. And, as delegate from his own conference to our late General Conference, his address evinced a mind of a high scientific and philosophic order, deeply evangelical in tone, and richly fraught with religious truth. These facts are full of promise, and give rise to an expectation of a valuable work in theology. Nor does the work itself disappoint this expectation.

And we have here a system of Christian theology from an Arminian stand-point. Of such we have comparatively few. The great majority of works on systematic theology, especially those of an evangelical life, are from a Calvinistic position; and it is to be regretted that Methodism has had to. wait so long for an additional work both Arminian and evangelical in its life. Mr. Wesley was a voluminous writer, as were some of his co-laborers, and we have bad many competent writers since; but for a hundred years and more of our history no one except Mr. Watson attempted a systematic theology. Certain monographs and mere outlines are no exceptions. Nor are some larger works, either being founded upon "Watson's Institutes," or lacking comprehension. That we have produced only one such work in so long and successful a career is a singular fact, as well as one to be regretted. And the preaching and habits of thought of many of our leading ministers have been eminently doctrinal. Perhaps the common acceptance of the "Institutes" of Mr. Watson as thoroughly sound in doctrine, and as of such superior ability that no one might hope to achieve even an equal success, has been a chief cause of this fact. Nor would we utter words in depreciation of the "Institutes." They have rendered most valuable service and will continue to do so. Yet the amount of quotation which they contain is to their detriment. Had Mr. Watson relied more upon his own superior abilities he would have given more unity and symmetry to his work, and also a higher scientific character. It is deficient in the higher excellences of theological style. And, probably, there is no leading Methodist mind that would not prefer a far higher mental philosophy than that which underlies the "Institutes." But granting all the superiority ever claimed for them, it is not well that one mind should furnish the systematic theology of a great Church for so many years. Besides, the rapid strides and new positions of science and philosophy, new forms of skeptical criticism and objection, and modified views of opposing schools of theology, all call for a re-establishment of the doctrines which we hold as vital. We, therefore, welcome the work of Dr. Pope as an additional contribution to the systematic theology of Arminian Methodism. And we are, also, glad to know that other works are in advanced preparation.

We also welcome this work as an intrinsically valuable one. Being professedly in the form of outlines, and compassing in one octavo volume a rather broad treatment of the topics of theology, most of the discussions are necessarily brief Yet the need of elaboration is largely superseded by thoroughness of analysis, exactness of method and definitive statement, terseness, and clearness of style.

We do not propose a general review of the work before us, a thing wholly impracticable indeed within the necessary limits of this paper. After a brief notice of the more prominent points, we may consider more fully the discussion of some of the cardinal doctrines of Christian theology.

The main divisions of the work embrace the great topics somewhat common to systems of theology of the higher order, and are given under the following headings: I. Divine Rule of Faith. II. God. III. God and the Creature. IV. Sin. V. The Mediatorial Ministry. VI. The Administration of Redemption. VII. Eschatology.

The Scriptures are fully and correctly recognized as the rule and authoritative standard of the Christian faith. Yet, in entire consistency with this position, the author fully accepts the cardinal principles of natural theology, and for this he has the full warrant of the Scriptures themselves. They clearly recognize a light of nature in the frame-work of the heavens and the earth as revealing a God, and a moral reason in man as revealing and enforcing the will of God. Still, for clearness, fullness, and authority, the Scriptures infinitely transcend all the revelations of nature, and are by all pre-eminence the divine rule of faith. This rule is discussed under three divisions: Revelation, Inspiration, Canon.

Revelation is thus defined :-

1. Revelation, taken in its broadest meaning, includes every manifestation of God to the perception of man: whether in the constitution of the human mind, in the frame-work of nature, or in the processes of providential government. It embraces the whole compass of the divine disclosures, whether in act or word, whether by immediate contact of the eternal Spirit with the human soul, or by mediating instrumentalities.

2. Revelation, in the stricter, deeper, fuller sense, is the unfolding of the eternal counsel of God in Christ for the restoration of man to fellowship with himself; and, as such, it is perfected in the Christian Scriptures in the final testimony of Jesus.-P. 24.

In the first definition revelation is far broader than the Scripture. Hence, it does not define or distinctively characterize them as a revelation. The second, as it seems to us, has a like deficiency. It is rather a statement of the great and crowning truth given us in Revelation, than a definitive characterization of the Scriptures as a revelation. Yet if their alleged claims are valid, there is, and there must he, some specific fact thoroughly differentiating them from all the revelations of nature on questions of religion, and distinctively defining them as a divine revelation. This fact we find in a supernatural agency. Revelation is truth supernaturally given. And it is the divine agency working in a supernatural mode which constitutes the truth so given a revelation. And the Scriptures are a divine revelation so far, and only so far, as they have their origin in such an agency. Nor is this position affected by any question respecting the mode, or differences of mode, in which this agency may have worked. Whether the truth be written by the finger of God as the Decalogue, or given in dream or vision, or in verbal dictation, or in the substance of it, while the mind of the recipient determines the manner of expression, we still have a supernatural agency which constitutes the truth so given a divine revelation. It hence follows that such revelation is not necessarily limited to the Scriptures. Nor do we believe that it is. Doubtless many a devout heathen has been helped by a special divine agency to higher religious truth than otherwise he would have obtained. And such have in some measure been made prophets to others. But the Scriptures, given by the highest supernatural agency, and containing the highest religious truth, and withal verified and accredited by the divine testimony, are in all pre-eminence the divine revelation, and the authoritative rule of faith.

On the credentials of the Christian faith the author discusses briefly, but with clearness and force, the evidences which verify the divine original of the Scriptures. He gives special prominence to the following topics : I. Christianity is a full and satisfying response to an expectation of mankind, and especially to its own preparatory disclosures. 2. The divine agency and authority as manifested in miracles, prophecy, inspiration. 3. The character of Christ. 4. The influence of Christianity. 5. The presence of the Holy Ghost. Under the third heading he says:--

The person of Christ, the author of Christianity, is its highest crudential This is true of our Lord's character generally ; but for our present purpose it will be sufficient to regard him as the founder of his own religion, and to mark the perfect consistency with which he supports his claim to be the divine-human revealer. The strength of this argument will be found to be only increased by the theories adopted to resist it. There is no rational way of accounting for the person and work of Christ but that which accepts the divine origin of Christianity.-P. 84.

The argument so grounded and constructed is valid and most conclusive. In its more specific and effective form it belongs rather to the modern treatment of apologetics. It is the resistless response of the Church to the desperate onslaughts of skepticism. Christianity is not to be overthrown with a jest or a sneer, as infidelity has well learned. It is a great fact in history. The Gospels we have, and Christianity we have; and the Christ of the Gospels and of Christianity must be accounted for. The divine origin of Christianity renders a rational account. On no other ground can such an account be rendered. Yet this is the dire necessity of a multiform rationalism. And it is true enough that the strength of this argument is only increased by the theories adopted to resist it. The mythical theory of Strauss and the legendary theory of Renan are in forceful illustration. Ullman's " Sinlessness of Jesus" renders the chief service in this argument. Bushnell's. " Character of Jesus," Young's " Christ in History," "Ecce Homo," "Ecce Dens," and many other works, follow in tile same line, presenting the argument, however, in new phases, and contributing to its invincible strength.

Inspiration, another cardinal fact as concerned in the "Rule of Faith," has a brief but clear and valuable discussion. The author treats the subject under several heads-Scripture testimony, historical development, dogmatic results. He clearly favors what is called the dynamical theory, as obviating the difficulties of the mechanical theory, and yet as securing a valid doctrine of plenary inspiration. And as the question of inspiration is one of great importance, we quote with the greater fullness his more definitive statements :-

The specific agency of the Holy Ghost in the creation and construction of the Holy Scripture.-P. 60. Dogmatic theology has a clear account to give of inspiration. The Scriptures, fairly compared and interpreted, declare it to be that specific influence of the Holy Ghost on the minds of certain men which qualified them to communicate, from age to age, an infallible record of divine truth concerning the redeeming will of God.-P. 75. But the Spirit used his instruments as men. They were not passive in the writing of Scripture, though in some cases they were passive in receiving revelation. They wrote, sometimes after long intervals, what they had received, and always according to the characteristics of their individual genius, style of thought, and diction. But their faculties. were raised, invigorated, and strengthened to their highest pitch. What has been termed the DYNAMICAL Theory, namely, that the influence of inspiration acted upon and through the faculties of the inspired person, is known to be true by all the phenomena of the several books. From the record of the most transcendent vision down to the simplest private letter, the writer in Scripture is true to himself-P. 77. The inspiration of the holy Ghost makes Holy Scripture the absolute and final authority, all-sufficient as the supreme standard of faith, directory of morals, and charter of privileges to the Christian Church.-F. 79.

These views we accept as judicious and true, and, for the present, in full accord with the position of the best minds of the Church-minds thoroughly evangelical in their religious faith, and thoroughly loyal to revealed religion. Words arc the vehicle of truth. But the same truth may be conveyed with a variation of words. A message may be given to several persons to be delivered to several parties. Each delivers it in his own manner. But with all the differences of style and words, each gives the message truly. Yet the theory here maintained consistently admits a higher law in inspiration. God still holds his messenger in his own hand, and under such control as to secure a right expression of the truth. But this does not involve a mechanical determination of. the words. And if there be an original necessity for a verbal inspiration in order to a right expression of divine truth, there must be a like necessity for such a measure of it in all translation and reading of the Scriptures. Words do not mechanically determine their own meaning or the understanding of them in the mind of either translator or reader. But clearly there is no such dominating agency of the Holy Spirit. Or, if there ever be such, it is not the common law. And we get all requisite inspiration in a divine agency, acting not upon the mind as a purely passive instrument, but in it as in the use of its own faculties. The truth so given is divine truth, and of the highest possible authority.

Under the second heading, the author treats the questions concerning the existence and notion of God. Here he enters more directly the sphere of natural theology. The discussion, as in other parts, is brief, but in the method of a well-wrought analysis and generalization. "The being of a God is at once an innate idea and a demonstrable truth."

Such are the ground-facts of the author's theism. In alleging the idea of a God to be innate be clearly accepts the higher intentional philosophy of the best metaphysical thinkers. And this is the common ground of the highest, best theism. Of course it is not meant that this idea, as innate, has a necessary active form as a conviction of truth in every human mind. It is very doubtful if such is the fact. What is meant is, that under proper conditions of mental and moral development, the idea of a God springs up spontaneously from the very constitution of the mind. Hence, even if there be heathen in so low a slate as to be void of this idea, it is a fact in no contraction to the truth alleged-not any more than ignorance of the same heathen of the equivalence of two and three to five disproves its intuitional character. And as men may by prejudice or skeptical speculation so overrule their own mental powers as to deny the most certain cognitions, so, in like manner, they may eliminate the idea of God as a conviction of truth. But this does not disprove the fact that naturally it is a spontaneous product of the mind. Hence, the universality, not absolute but practical universality, of the idea. Its deep perversions, so widely revealed in human history, arise from the prejudice and corruption of men, as explained by St. Paul in Romans i, 21-23. But with all this perversion the deeper study of ethnic religious finds almost every-where an underlying theism previously unknown or denied.

In the statement of the author the being of a God is not only an innate idea, but also a demonstrable truth. Demonstrable can here be used only in a popular or qualified sense. Such a truth is not, in the stricter terminology of logic, a demonstrable one. As an innate idea or an intuition of the reason, it has its certainty in itself. But as maintained by the logical reason, the evidences alleged are not strictly of a demonstrative character. This fact, however, rather concerns their logical quality than their conclusiveness. And thus we get the true and the full ground of Theism within the sphere of natural theology. The being of a God is a truth addressing itself to the intuitive reason, and also a truth provable by the logical reason. Nor is there any reason to surrender the argumentation so long familiar to natural theology. Vigorous and persistent efforts have been made to discredit it, to break down its logical validity, and to wrest it from the service of our theistic faith; but it still firmly holds its place, and will continue so to hold it.

There is little room for originality in the method of this argument, or in the classification of the evidences with which it proceeds. The argument is mainly, if not wholly, inductive, or a' posteriori. The author properly makes little account of the argument ontological, or a' priori. Even admitting its logical validity, it is too abstruse for any common service to Theism. And most who use it carry it over into the inductive method before reaching their conclusion. But the arguments usually designated as the cosmological, the teleological, and the moral, are thoroughly valid in the a' posteriori method, and most conclusive in the logical result.

The subject discussed under the fourth general heading is Sin. It is treated in four divisions: origin of sin in the universe and on earth; nature of sin; sin and redemption; original sin. We have no particular occasion to review any part of this discussion unless it be the fourth-original sin. It is, however, but just to say that the whole discussion is conducted with great carefulness and marked ability. It is very coin-pact, and contains a great deal for the space occupied.

The question of original sin is one of very broad theological relations. This is clear enough to any one comprehending the subject, or familiar with the history of doctrinal theology. Nor has it usually received that thorough analysis and discriminative statement which its importance requires, and which is essential to its scientific treatment. The term original sin, though long in the use of theology, is objectionable, specially on account of its ambiguity and diversity of application in dogmatic use. Though freely admitted into Arminian theology, yet in the synthesis of facts which it usually symbolizes it more properly belongs to Calvinistic theology. But here it is indifferently used for several doctrines as a whole, or for any one of them, and often without any discriminative application. This tends to confusion; and the term is more confusing and misleading when so used by us, or even when used at all, except in the most definitive sense. Nor should it be any offense to say that our leading writers have not wholly escaped the fault of the Calvinistic. If Dr. Pope cannot be fully excepted, yet he is certainly one of the most careful in his discriminations.

Let us turn from the symbol to the subject which it represents. As above stated, the formula original sin as used in theology, represents several facts or doctrines. Analyzing it in the light of its doctrinal history in Calvinism, we find these facts: 1. The depravity of human nature; 2. The guilt of the race from a participation in the sin of Adam as the ground of the just infliction of depravity as a punishment; 3. The intrinsic sinfulness of our native depravity, or that it is strictly of the nature of sin, having the desert of damnation. These leading facts, so often blended and treated as a whole, require separation, and to be treated severally. Only thus can we hold our own doctrine of sin in proper discrimination from that of Calvinism. For there is a difference between the two, especially as the latter is taken in the full sense of its usual formula. And unless we properly maintain that distinction we shall find ourselves embarrassed at other points of difference between the two systems.

In another analysis the several facts involved in the whole question of original sin are: 1. The depravity of human nature; 2. The origin of depravity in the sin of Adam; 3. The law of its derivation; 4. The question of its punitive demerit. These are really four distinct questions; and however intimately related, yet the intrinsic character of each is independent of any such relation.

The depravity of human nature. The author fully maintains this truth, and according to the best standards of Wesleyan Arminianism. As a truth clearly revealed in Scripture, broadly recorded in human history, deeply realized in human experience, and thoroughly underlying the whole economy of grace, it stands as a truth firmly established. No Pelagian dialectics can set its proofs aside. In its subjective form it lies below all experience, and is the state of a nature rather than a nature itself, and the state not of any particular faculty, but of the moral nature broadly. As realized in human experience and revealed in human history, it is readily and properly characterized in its tendency or inclination to evil. And this is in fall accord with the most orthodox symbols, and also with the common utterance of divines.

Now this depravity, existing as a fact, is not determined or affected in its specific quality by any question respecting its origin. Whether derived from Adam or not; or whether, if from him and his sin, by a law of retributive justice on the ground of a guilty participation in his sin, or by a law of genetic transmission, it is precisely the same in itself. A valid doctrine of depravity, therefore, and as valid and thorough in all that pertains to itself as any that Calvinism maintains, is not at all dependent upon the high assumption of Calvinism respecting the participation of the race in the sin of Adam, and the retributive character of depravity as the universal punishment of a universal sin.

The origin of depravity in Adam and in his sin is clearly the doctrine of Scripture. It is traced back to him, and, in a profound sense, to his sin and fall. Such is the scriptural account of the origin of depravity; and as a universal evil, such is the only rational account. But this fact of its origin does not of itself determine the law of its transmission. Especially does it not determine the transmission to be by a law of retributive justice in the universal punishment of a universal guilt.

This brings us to the third question in the broader subject of original sin: What is the law of the derivation of depravity? This question has a broad place in the polemics of theology. There are two leading answers: one, the law of retributive justice; the other, the law of genetic transmission.

The former is pre-eminently the answer of Calvinism. The race is held to be guilty, not only in depravity, and because of it, but also before it, and as the just ground of it. Hence, depravity is distinctly declared to be a punishment. No other view, it is maintained, can accord with the divine character. But if inflicted as a punishment, the subjects of it must have been previously guilty as in desert of such penal infliction. So far all are agreed.

Whence this guilt upon all the race? From a participation in the sin of Adam. So Calvinists are mainly agreed to answer. What is the ground of this participation? In the answer to this question they are wide apart. Mainly they form two schools: one maintaining this participation on the ground of a real oneness with Adam; the other, on the ground of a representative oneness with him. According to the former, especially in its higher realism, the very sinful act of Adam is the sinful act of every individual of the race. According to the latter, the guilt of the act is imputed to each as represented by him. It is the error and confusion of Calvinistic theology that this participation in the sin of Adam is often based upon both grounds. This is utterly unscientific. The two grounds are different and opposite, and reciprocally exclusive. If one is guilty of Adam's sin because of any natural relation to him as progenitor or any real oneness with him, then is he not guilty by imputation on the ground of a representative oneness, for this would make him doubly guilty. And reversely the same consequence follows.

Dr. Pope seems really t() maintain the guilt of the race on account of the sin of Adam, though not so formally explaining the ground of this guilt, nor so distinctly asserting the penal character of depravity. And be is careful to guard his doctrine against the higher assumptions and implications of Calvinism.

The effect of the fall upon the posterity of Adam is described in Scripture as the universal diffusion of death as a condemnation, and of a bias of human nature toward evil. The scriptural doctrine finds its expression in the theological term original sin: the hereditary sin and hereditary sinfulness of mankind derived from Adam, its natural bead and representative, but derived from him as he was under a constitution of redeeming grace and in connection with the second Adam, the spiritual head of mankind-P. 221.

This passage may suffice for the author's views, though others might he added. It contains nearly all the questions of original sin, yet makes special the one we are here con-side ring. And it seems clearly to set forth a guilty participation of the race in the sin of Adam. Thus the effect of the Call is the universal diffusion of death as a condemnation; that is, as a universal penalty upon a race accounted universally guilty. And the formula original sin, accepted as expressing the doctrine of Scripture, he explains as meaning "the hereditary sin and hereditary sinfulness of mankind derived from Adam,"

The two terms, "hereditary sin" and "hereditary sinful-ness," are clearly discriminated, the latter signifying the sinful depravity in which we are born, and the former, called elsewhere " hereditary guilt," a sin which precedes and conditions the penal infliction of this sinful depravity. This primary sin is alleged to be "derived from Adam as natural head and representative." But here we have the two grounds of this universal hereditary guilt, involving the same unscientific account of it noticed before. Yet the representative headship has special prominence with Dr. Pope, as with our authors generally. By divine appointment Adam was constituted the representative of all the race in the primitive probation, and involved all in the penal consequences of his sin. Hence, the state of the race is held to be justly a state of death, and death, as elsewhere explained, in its threefold form as physical, spiritual, eternal. But this is maintained of the race only in its relation to the first Adam, and as wholly apart from the second Adam. In these views Dr. Pope is in, at least, seeming accord with some of our leading theological writers, though we think it would be easy to show that both he and they are out of logical accord with themselves.

It must be apparent to any scientific theologian that the doctrine of hereditary guilt as the ground of a penalty inflicted depravity at least seemingly clashes with cardinal doctrines of Arminianism, and the very doctrines which differentiate it from Calvinism. Nor do we forget that this is held to be only a part of the whole case; that there is a second Adam under the economy of whose redemption we are all born. So Dr. Pope and others in accord with him hold. Every one of us denies that any soul is or could be doomed to perdition for the sin of Adam. Indeed, no Arminian can admit this. But thus it is proposed, through an incoming economy of redemption, to save our theodicy. Do we really save it? Or is such a saving requisite? For if God can so impute the sin of Adam to any one of the race as to constitute in him a desert of the penalty of death in its threefold form, as physical, spiritual, eternal, there can be no injustice in its infliction. And while the economy of redemption may give us a view of the divine love which otherwise we should not have, theodicy needs no such vindication. The race might have been propagated in its sole relation to the first Adam under the law of sin and death, and whether dying in adult age or in infancy, under the inevitable doom of endless perdition, and however it might affect our views of the divine goodness, the divine justice would stand clear of all impeachment.

There are many other difficulties of this doctrine which we do not pause even to suggest. But in view of what has been said, it should be no offense to suggest a probability that the doctrine itself has been stated too strongly. Besides, we thus leave Calvinism in full possession of sufficient ground for its peculiar doctrines of sovereign election and limited atonement. For God wrongs no man by delivering him over to his just desert. And while in such an election and redemption he would show special favor to some, the others would not be wronged. But neither truth nor Scripture requires any such concession. Nor is the doctrine at all requisite, as we have before Been, to the most valid and thorough doctrine of human depravity. This is the same in itself whatever the law of its derivation. And, indeed, when we get all the qualifications and limitations by Dr. Pope and others in accord with him, we have really no doctrine of this hereditary guilt left. The imputation of Adams sin is virtually denied. It is not really admitted that we ever become guilty of his sin. The sum of the teaching is, that we suffer the penal consequences of his sin-penal to him, but consequences of his sin and punishment to us by virtue of our relation to him. This does not deny that the result to us is in the order and provision of the divine law, but that it is to us as accounted guilty of Adam's sin. Such, as we understand it, is the whole truth as explained by Mr. Watson in his "Institutes," (II, 53, 54.) in an illustration taken from Dr. Watts. This we fully accept. It is a doctrine in full accord with the general course of Providence; and it neither clashes with cardinal doctrines of Wesleyan Arminianism, nor yields any ground to the peculiar doctrines of Calvinism.

Is depravity sin proper? This is the final question. And it is not one the answer to which is determined by any theory respecting the origin of depravity or the law of its derivation, unless it be that the maintenance of its strictly penal character denies its strictly sinful character. Surely it would require the sharpest dialectics to prove that any thing strictly a punishment can have in itself the desert of punishment. But let the question stand in full discrimination. The depravity of the race is one question; the law of the derivation of depravity is another. Whether depravity has in itself the demerit of sin proper is still another.

Dr. Pope, as all our authors, maintains a real difference between original and actual sin, and that the former does not constitute us guilty in the full and exact sense of the latter. But this question solely concerns their sameness in point of legal quality or demerit. That in this, depravity is strictly of the nature of sin, Calvinism fully maintains. With this Dr. Pope seems quite in accord, unless we accept certain qualifications and limitations as to the contrary. In sketching the history of the doctrine of" original sin," he says that "Methodism accepts the Article of the English Church"-that is, the Ninth Article, which he quotes in full. He could scarcely have named a stronger statement of the deep demerit of depravity considered simply as a native moral state and before all and any actual sin. It is strong enough for Augustine, or Calvin, or the Synod of Dort. And we must except to the part bearing directly on this question. Dr. Pope may speak for him-self and for his own Church if so it be, but he may not speak for the Methodist Episcopal Church. We have the same article, but only in part, and with the omission of every phrase and word which expresses this doctrine. So it has stood in our Discipline since 1792. Why this elimination if such is the doctrine of our Church? [We here give so much of the original article as concerns this question, and italicize the words emitted from our own article, that the significance of the change may be the more clearly seen: Original sin standeth not in the following of Adam, (as the Pelagians do vainly talk,) but is the fault end corruption of the nature of every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil; and, therefore, in every person born into the world it deserveth God's wrath and damnation. The omission last noted was made by Mr. Wesley as he prepared the articles and sent them over by Bishop Coke for the American Methodists, then to be organized into a Church the first noted was made by the Christmas Conference so organizing the Church. And this article, with the others, was not passively accepted from Mr. Wesley by the General Conference, but formally adopted by it. Since my paper was written I have read a paper by Dr. Bledsoe, in his "Southern Review," fully discussing the doctrinal significance of the change which I have noted in this article of our faith. Re especially maintains that Mr. Wesley, in his later life, modified his earlier views on original sin. This modification, however, did not touch the question or truth of our native depravity in any element or fact essentially belonging to it, but only the separate and distinctively Calvinistic question of our intrinsic desert of ' God's wrath and damnation," solely on account of that native depravity.]

But here we have in Dr. Pope, as in our other theological writers, such limitations and qualifications as in regard to the imputation of Adam’s sin. And it is denied that any soul is or can be delivered over to perdition except for actual [FOURTH SERIES, VOL. XXIX.-26]

sin. But according to this Ninth Article, this may justly be done. Yea, the infant, with its yet undeveloped congenital depravity, may be so doomed in tile just and penal wrath of God. No Arminian can consistently admit such a possibility even on the footing of divine justice. But this implies no question or doubt respecting the native depravity of the race. It is still a truth, and with all its characteristic facts. It is a state of moral alienation from God, a dominating inclination to evil and an inability to good, intrinsically involving us in moral ruin and misery, and out of all which there is no deliverance except through the economy of redemption.

Under the fifth general heading, Mediatorial Ministry, the author discusses the atonement. On the fact of an atonement he is thoroughly true to the Scriptures. The mediation of Christ, wrought out in his incarnation, sufferings, death, and intercession, is the true and sole ground of a sinner's forgiveness and salvation. This is the truth of the Scriptures and stands firmly, and will ever so stand against all the exegesis and dialectics of a multiform Socinianism. But so far we have only the fact of an atonement. When we further inquire into the necessity for the mediation of Christ, and how it meets that necessity and avails to forgiveness and salvation, our questions lead on to a theory or doctrine of the atonement. Here it is that divines equally evangelical divide. We find a summation of the author's views in the passage following :-

The errors of historical theology have all sprung from failure to connect the three leading ideas: the atonement in God as a necessity in the Divine attributes ; the reconciliation on earth, as vindicating to the universe the rectoral justice of God; and the exhibition of the redemption to man, as moving upon his con-science, will, and heart. Here unite what are sometimes called the SUBSTITUTIONAL, THE GOVERNMENTAL, AND THE MORAL INFLUENCE theories.-P. 412.

We have here three elements in the one atonement-a blending of three theories in the one doctrine. If the synthesis is correct each element should be a part of the atonement, and tile three should be in exact scientific accord.

But the third element, that of moral influence, does not strictly belong to the atonement. Instead of being the whole doctrine, as Socinianism maintains, it is really no part of it. It is no part of the provisional ground of forgiveness as in relation to God, and has its sole function in its relation to a purely conditional fact in us as recipients of saving grace. Hence this moral influence is no part of the atonement proper, but arises from it as a manifestation of the character of God. And the atonement itself is none the less complete though its moral influence be persistently and finally resisted. And, according to the author's own classification of facts, it belongs rather to the administration of redemption than to redemption itself.

The other two terms should, in the author's use of them, designate two distinct and yet agreeing elements of the atonement, and so agreeing as to constitute the one doctrine. In theological terminology satisfaction is a more distinctive term than substitution, yet neither fully discriminates a theory from the governmental theory, because this, in a proper exposition and statement of it, fully admits both substitution and satisfaction. Hence, we must find the fundamental principles of these two theories of atonement in their deeper distinction in order to determine the question of their scientific accordance in the one doctrine.

Substitution or, more properly, satisfaction, as a term expressive of a theory of atonement, is the satisfaction of a purely retributive divine justice-a justice that in itself and for its own sake, and irrespective of all the interests of public justice, must have penal satisfaction. Just penalty is absolutely irremissible. This is the determining principle of the theory. Hence, the only releasement for an actual sinner is in an equal or equivalent punishment of a substitute. And this same principle determines the substitutional sufferings of Christ to have been in the mode of a substitutional punishment.

This is the Anselmic atonement, and largely the Calvinistic doctrine. And other doctrines of Calvinism are in full scientific accord with it. Special election, limited atonement, and a sovereignly achieved salvation of all the redeemed, belong to it and it to them. And historically these doctrines go together as logically they belong together.

The governmental theory has its essential distinction from this theory, and is out of scientific accord with it. But we here speak of this theory, not so much in its usual statement, as in such statement as it will truthfully admit and as its full truth requires.

It equally admits the intrinsic demerit of sin and a retributive divine justice; but it denies the absolute necessity of punishment for the satisfaction of a purely retributive divine justice. It denies the possibility of such satisfaction by substitutional punishment. While it holds the demerit of sin to be the ground of punishment, it holds the end of punishment to be the interest of government. It, therefore, holds the remissibility of penalty on the ground of such provision, but only on such as will equally secure the interests of the government as its actual infliction. Such is the rectoral atonement. And it follows that while the atoning sufferings of Christ are substitutional, they are not penally so; that while they so far take the place of penalty that it may be remitted in entire Consistency with the function of divine justice in the interests of government, they do not take its place as the equivalent punishment of sin.

This theory also holds to a satisfaction of divine justice, but a satisfaction in accord with itself. It denies the possibility of a satisfaction of divine justice in its sole regard to the demerit of sin by substitutional punishment. Unless sin in its intrinsic demerit can be put upon the substitute it cannot be punished in him. But who now so bold as to maintain such a possible transference of sin? Dr. Pope, we are sure, is very far from it. But divine justice finds satisfaction in the infliction of penalty upon sin in the interests of moral government,. So it finds satisfaction in the substitutional sufferings of Christ as equally securing these same interests while the penalty of sin is remitted.

And this theory grounds the atonement in the profoundest necessity. In its objective relation this necessity arises out of the interests of moral government; in its divine relation it is grounded in the very nature of God. As he is God, holy, just, and good, he cannot disregard the interests of his moral government. Penalty is the means of their conservation. Penalty, therefore, be must inflict, or find some substitutional provision which will equally conserve them, while penalty is remitted. Such provision we have in the substitutional sufferings of Christ. Only these are sufficient. Hence this theory responds in the sense of the profoundest necessity of atonement to the great question of Anselm, Cur Deus Homo?

This is really the Arminian or, more properly, the Grotian atonement. And we are a little surprised to find Dr. Pope conceding (p.412) that it has somewhat the character of acceptilation-a thing with which Calvinism charges it as a most serious objection. It is utterly excluded by tile deepest logic of the theory. Yet it is but fair to say that some unguarded and illogical statements of it give some coloring to the con cession, and even to the objection. And we allege, and with space could make good the allegation, that the acceptilatio of Duns Scotus has far more affinity for the Anselmic atonement than for the Grotian.

And these two theories cannot be scientifically wrought into the one doctrine of atonement. Hence, so far as Dr. Pope assumes this, we are out of accord with him. But really lie does not accept the theory of satisfaction. While some of his expressions seem to admit its deeper principles, others exclude them. And in his treatment of that part of soteriology which follows atonement, and which he very judiciously formulates as the administration of redemption, (head VI,) his principles, as those of every Arminian, exclude the theory of satisfaction in the high Calvinistic sense of it, and require the principles which really constitute the rectoral atonement.

We must not extend this paper, hence we pass the two remaining divisions of this work with their high commendation to students of theology. And so we commend the whole work. We wish that it could be accessible to the theological reader at a lower price.

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