The Methodist Quarterly Review
April, 1879
Art, VI.-METHODISM AND HERESY.
A certain ambiguity of Methodist law comes into view the moment we raise the question
suggested by these words, and instantly not two, but several, distinct opinions come to
the front, each having many followers and much argumentation on its side. The question is
just now a practical one, as there are two or three Methodist preachers under suspension
for heresy, and it is quite probable at the next General Conference there will he a great
legal battle over an appeal taken by one or more of these.
The constitution of the Methodist Episcopal Church secures for its ministers and
members the right of trial and appeal. The hook of Discipline has a section containing the
rules under which such trials must proceed. For the trial of ministers there are statutes
concerning immorality, heresy, inefficiency, etc. The statute concerning heresy (¶ 207)
was framed essentially as we have it now in the very earliest year of the Church. The
statute prescribes the Articles of Religion as the appeal and test of orthodoxy in cases
of trial for heresy. And there is no authority in any of these rules for trial, or
elsewhere in the Discipline, for apprehending and trying a preacher on charges of
erroneous doctrine except under the Articles of Religion. The law of the Methodist
Episcopal Church knows no heresy outside of the Articles of Religion. This is the thesis
which is sustained in this paper.
Before attempting a discussion of the several theories of the law of our Church, it
will be well to recall a few fundamental truths that bear upon the general subject. The
history of human society teaches that a supreme power of government should always be
exercised under well-defined principles and laws. It is an axiom in constitutional
government that no man can be trusted with undefined power. Hence arise the checks and
limitations of authority which are found in constitutions. Hence, also, arises the
division of governmental functions into the legislative, the executive, and the
judicial-where each has a limited supremacy, and acts as a check upon the others.
These principles are not less applicable, nor is their application less needed, in
ecclesiastical than in civil government. All history is illustrative of man's love of
power. And while the tyranny of civil rulers has proved the necessity for constitutional
checks, it is a well-known fact that the most iniquitous and mischievous abuses of power
that the world has known are to be found in ecclesiastical history. And the Church of Rome
is not the only illustration of this truth which Christendom furnishes.
For these reasons the great Protestant Churches of today are organized under
well-defined constitutional laws, whereby the rights of members are carefully guarded, and
the prerogatives and duties of rulers are clearly defined. It is quite certain that no
Church of our time will feel itself justified in its appeal for the patronage and
confidence of the general public whose form of government ignores these principles. Tested
by these principles, the Methodist Episcopal Church will not be found wanting. Her
government is not above law, but under law. By her constitutional law the fundamental
interests of her people are guarded against abuse of power, and her statute laws prescribe
not only their duties, but also their rights.
That there are anomalies and imperfections in the system is freely admitted by her best
friends more, perhaps, than is altogether creditable to us in this last quarter of the
eighteenth century; but these are passing away under the vis medicatrix of her own
intellectual and religious life.
In every form of Church organization there are four matters of fundamental import, all
of which ought to have the protection of constitutional law. These arc (1) the polity, (2)
the theology of its teachers, (3) the conditions of membership, and (4) the right of trial
and appeal for ministers and members. When these four interests are carefully guarded by
organic law it will be admitted that a Church possesses free and constitutional
government. The Restrictive Rules are the constitutional law of the Methodist Episcopal
Church. These rules are above the action of the General Conference, and can only be
altered by the concurrent vote of three fourths of all the members of the Annual
Conferences, and two thirds of the General Conference.
All of the aforementioned fundamental interests of a Church are protected by these
Restrictive Rules.
Rule I guards the theology of the teachers of the Church. Rule III guards its polity.
Role IV guards the conditions of membership. Rule ~ guards the right of trial and appeal
for ministers and members. It is obvious that any legislation or method of administration
which tends to nullify these constitutional guards is destructive of the system, and
unconstitutional.
Let us classify the opinions that are entertained in the Church on this subject. To
help clearness of thought let us first classify all opinions under two heads:-
I. The strict constructionists of the law, who hold that the articles of religion are
the only standard of doctrine by which a minister's orthodoxy may be judged.
II. The liberal constructionists, who, by a more liberal interpretation of the law,
conclude that other doctrines besides those defined in the Twenty-five Articles are
included in the authoritative confession of the Church.
The liberal constructionists may be subdivided as follows:-
1. Those who claim that the Bible is the standard, in addition to the Articles.
2. Those who claim that the so-called "standard authors," especially Wesley's
Sermons and Notes, are the ultimate appeal.
3. Those who hold that the consensus of doctrinal opinions held generally by the
Church, and interpreted by the court of triers, is the doctrinal standard and ultimate
appeal. Let us examine each of these views separately.
1. The argument for the Bible as the standard is that Art. V, on "The Sufficiency
of the Holy Scriptures for Salvation," indorses the Scriptures as the touch-stone of
orthodoxy, and, therefore, that every thing in the Bible may be imposed on the belief of
an accused party by a Church court.
But this is a stretch of interpretation which the judicial mind will riot readily
accept. Art. V is negative in its character, and is a statute of limitation. It confers no
power, but is simply and strictly a limitation of power :-
V. The Sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures for Salvation. The Holy Scriptures
contain all things necessary to salvation; so that whatsoever is riot read therein, nor
may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man that it should be believed as an
article of faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation.
In the Church of England, across the sea, it may ho presumed that the meaning of the
Article is understood. Many important trials for heresy have been held there in recent
years, and, so far as J can learn, this claim has never been made. It is certain it has
never been allowed. The intent of the Article was not to define the authority of the
Scriptures, though it does this in a quasi manner, but to condemn the Romish claim
for the authority of tradition.
2. The argument for the standard authors as the appeal may be given as follows:-
(1.) Art. V refers us to the Scriptures. As Methodists we have gone to the Scriptures,
and we find their teachings defined in our standard authors. The reply to this is the same
as that given above; namely, that Art. V does not open up all the Scriptures as the Creed
of the Church, but simply defines the relation of the Scriptures to any creed which the
Church may adopt.
(2.) A second argument is attempted from Restrictive Rule No. I, (Discipline, ¶ 70.)
"The General Conference shall not revoke, alter, or change our Articles of Religion,
nor establish any new standards or roles of doctrine contrary to our present existing and
established standards of doctrine." Is riot this, it is asked, an acknowledgment of
existing and established standards of doctrine? Most certainly it is the acknowledgment of
certain standards, but it does not impose those standards as a confession on the Church;
otherwise we should be bound to believe all that said standards contain; for example,
Wesley's views of the immortality of brutes, and baptismal regeneration.
Let us suppose that this rule authorizes the General Conference to add new articles of
faith, provided they be riot contrary to the standard authors; and let us raise the
question whether the rule forbids the General Conference from condemning certain views set
forth within those standards, as, for exam-pie, Wesley's immortality of brutes. It will be
admitted-it must be admitted-that there is nothing in the rule which debars the General
Conference from condemning Wesley's notion. But to admit this is, also, to admit that the
rule does not lift those standard authors to the rank of a confession. The Constitution of
the United States authorized the State of Ohio to make and execute laws, provided such
laws were not contrary to Federal laws. That was an acknowledgment of existing and
established Federal laws, but it did not authorize the State of Ohio to execute said
Federal laws. The Methodist Episcopal Church authorized (let us suppose) the General
Conference to make and impose doctrines, provided such doctrines be not contrary to
certain existing standards, but in doing so it did not elevate the standards to the rank
of a creed, or authorize the General Conference to enforce the belief of them in the
Church.
But, as a matter of fact, it has been accepted as Church law that this rule does riot
authorize the General Conference to make new doctrines, whether taken from the existing
standards, or elsewhere.
The last General Conference, in sanctioning the Report of the Bishops on Dr. Brunson's
proposition to add to the Articles of Religion, took the ground that it was not competent
for the General Conference to make additional articles of faith. Now, if the General
Conference is esteemed by the constitution of the Church from framing out of our standard
authors new articles, how can it be claimed that a committee of triers may go to those
authors and make them a law for any special case? Does the constitution give to a court a
law-making power which it withholds from the General Conference.
Let be quote from the very able report of the Bishops on Dr. Bruin’s paper, which
was read to the Conference by Bishop Foster. It bears directly on the question before us:-
The work of formulating theological troth into an authoritative declaration of' faith
is too delicate to be successfully achieved without the concurrence of many minds, after
patient study and laborious research. We also find that the question of the right of the
General Conference to act in the premises is involved. The first Restrictive Rule guards
the Articles of Religion in the following words: "The General Conference shall not
revoke, alter, or change; our Articles of Religion, nor establish any new standard or
rules of doctrine contrary to our present existing and established standards of
doctrine." It is sometimes claimed that while this restriction protects the existing
Articles from change, it does not prohibit the General Conference from adopting additional
articles, provided they are not contrary to the old ones. But this claim cannot be
admitted, since it is perfectly obvious that a stated number of Articles of Religion
containing definitive substance of doctrine, is different in contents from the same
Articles with others added containing substance of doctrine not found in the original
articles.... And even if it could be fairly deduced from the language of the law, it is
certain that those who ordained the delegated General Conference, and gave it all the
power it possesses, did not intend to clothe it with authority to make additions to the
articles of religion....To us it is evident that nothing so fundamental as an
authoritative declaration of faith should be taken into the organic law of the Church by
any questionable process, or by the exercise of any doubtful authority. . . We are
impressed that it is dangerous to exercise any powers which can be claimed only by
questionable inference. It is not well to put the language of the Constitution under
severe tension; nor is it wise to act upon an interpretation that pushes the instrument to
the verge of its possible meaning. The path of safety is in the conscientious adherence to
the organic law, construed in the interest of its own safeguards, mid in the avoidance of
extreme and doubtful interpretations. When we once began to act upon inferences a very
wide door is opened, which will not close at our bidding.- General Conference
Journal, 1876, p.207.
This, then, is our question: If the General Conference is not competent to make new
Articles of Faith, can a court of triers virtually make them by passing sentence under
authority of the standard authors? Precedents become laws, unless set aside by special
legislation. There is much in those authors we have never believed or professed to
believe. Are we left by the Constitution of the Church at the mercy of a committee of
triers, who shall interpret and enforce upon us said authors according to their personal
judgment? Forms of trial should not be converted into processes of legislation. A
fundamental principle of jurisprudence is stated in Sharswood's Blackstone (page 69) in
the following words: "Judges must not assume the characters of legislators. It is
their province jus dicere, and not jus dare." And yet the
strange doctrine has been put forth in this discussion, and will be put forth again, that
although the General Conference cannot go to Wesley's Notes and Sermons, or to the "
Doctrinal Tracts," and therefrom formulate Articles of Faith additional to the
Articles of Religion, yet a committee of triers can try an accused under the Notes,
Sermons, and '~ Doctrinal Tracts," and if they find his preaching contrary to any
doctrines contained therein, the committee can legally expel him from the Church. That is
to say, the committee can per form, by a back-door process, legislative functions which
the Constitution of the Church denies even to the General Conference. We will return to
this again.
(3.) A third argument for the authority of the standard authors is attempted from the
early practice of the Church. It is said that at the beginning Wesley's Sermons and Notes
were the test of orthodoxy. To which we answer, that it is true that prior to the
organization of the' Church, in 1784, "the Notes, Sermons, and Minutes of Mr.
Wesley" were, by special enactment, (Annual Minutes of 1781 and April, 1784,)
declared the standard of doctrine; but it is equally true that at the Christmas
Conference, in 1784, when the Church assumed an organic form, the Articles of Religion
were adopted, at the request of Mr. Wesley, as the authoritative doctrinal standard of the
Church, and ever since they have had a conspicuous and sacred place in the book of
Discipline ; and it is also true that from the time of their adoption there has been no
mention of Mr. Wesley's Notes and Sermons.
(4.) A fourth argument for the authority of the standard authors is attempted from the
necessity of the case. "The Articles it is said, are not sufficient for the Church's
needs; they do hot cover the ground. There is an absolute necessity that certain other
doctrines be included in the creed of the Church." Now, it is true that necessity
knows no law, but it is equally true that law knows no necessity. When the Vandal,
necessity, dons the ermine and takes the seat of the judge, the genius of law slips out
from the hall of justice. Is the Methodist Episcopal Church above law, or under law? Is it
a constitutionally organized body, in which the rights and privileges of its members are
sacredly guarded? Let us remember the lesson taught by the ages, that apart from law there
is safety neither for the individual, nor for the State, nor for the Church.
Before proceeding further let us remind the reader that the question before us is not
what ought to be the authoritative creed of the Church, but what is it? It is simply and
purely a legal question; and as such, apart from all personal judgments as to the wisdom
of the law, we are bound to deal with it. There are two principles which, by general
consent, determine the interpretation of oaths and professions of faith, namely, the plain
historical meaning of the words, and the animus imponentis, or the intention of the
party requiring the profession. The application of these principles to our ease requires
us to review certain parts of the history of the organization of our Church, and, also, of
the adoption of the Restrictive Rules.
It will be conceded on all hands that the Christmas Conference of 1781, which organized
the Church, was in perfect harmony with the wishes of Wesley in all that they did. It will
be conceded that the Articles of Religion were prepared by Wesley for the new Church, and
that they were adopted by the Conference of 1784 as an authoritative statement of their
doctrines. It will be conceded that a statute was enacted by the same Conference, (Bangs'
History, vol. i, p.211,) or very soon after, for the trial of heresy, and that the offense
of heresy was described ~ said statute as a breach of the Articles of the Church." It
will also be conceded that no other statute on this subject was enacted by the Christmas
Conference, or subsequently by any Conference during the whole history of the Church.
This, then, is our historical inquiry, Did Wesley and the Conference intend the
Articles of Religion to be the only authoritative creed of the Church under which a
minister should be tried? Certainly the prima facie is that they did so intend. Let
us look with some cal-c at these Articles, which Wesley prepared, and which the Church
adopted, and still preserves, as her rule of faith. It has become the fashion in certain
quarters to disparage our Articles of Religion. Their supposed deficiencies am pointed
out, and their anti-Romish character is dwelt upon, until many have lost all respect for
them as an expression of Christian doctrine. Despite these disparagements, we affirm our
conviction that they are the best statement of Christian doctrine, for the purposes of a
Church creed, that has ever been formulated.
The topics which they treat embrace the whole range of essential doctrine. They are
especially full and satisfactory on the doctrines of grace. And Hie language in which they
are couched is grave and judicious. The omissions and limitations of the Articles indicate
their wisdom hardly less than their contents. Scylla and Charybdis are alike avoided, and
the free, open channel of God's abounding grace is clearly pointed out. It was said, in
the Report of the Bishops to the last General Conference, that "the work of
formulating theological truth into an authoritative declaration of faith is too delicate
to be successfully achieved without the concurrence of many minds after patient study and
laborious research."
Judged by the test of this sentiment of our Bishops, no creed of Christendom equals
ours. It is not of mushroom growth. Most of the other Reformed confessions sprang from a
single mind, or from a single epoch. Ours is the work of centuries. In its form of
Thirty-rime Articles it was, like our English Bible, the work of the great sixteenth
century-that grandest century which England ever knew. The piety and learning of the old
Protestant martyrs are in it. And beyond the English theologians we can trace the German
Reformers; for at least six of our articles are from the hands of Luther, and Melanchthon,
and their friends.
After a history of two hundred years the original Thirty-nine Articles were committed
by Providence, for revision, to the hands of a man whose genius for Church government and
Gospel truth has never been surpassed. The reproach and contumely which Wesley accepted in
establishing the Methodist Episcopal Church, and the exceeding solicitude and carefulness
with which every step of the great work was taken, are matters of history. The founder of
our Church never reached so high an altitude as when, in establishing Episcopal Methodism
in America, he hook from him the traditions of ages, and stood forth free in God's eternal
truth, as when an eagle shakes from his wings the fogs and mists of the low valleys. With
prophetic vision lie saw a new world rising in grandeur beyond the ocean, and freed, as
lie declared, by God's providence, from the civil and ecclesiastical traditions of
antiquity.
From Wesley the Methodist Episcopal Church received her polity, her doctrines, and her
conditions of membership-those three essentials of a Church. Her doctrines are contained
in his revision of the Thirty-nine Articles of his own English Church; and a comparison of
the revised articles with the originals, as set forth in Stevens' history, (ii, 205,)
reveals the care and wisdom with which he accomplished the task. It may be well to recall,
briefly, the doctrines set forth in the Twenty-five Articles, in order to correct unjust
impressions of them. An analysis shows that they prescribe the following doctrines:-
I. Bible.-The authority of the Scriptures is defined, and the canonical books
are named.
II. Theology.-The doctrines of the Godhead in trinity, of the deity of Christ, and of
the Holy Ghost, are clearly and elaborately defined.
III. Christology.-The nature of Christ is set forth; also his crucifixion,
death, resurrection, and ascension. It is also declared that he is "the only Mediator
between God and man," and the future Judge of all mankind.
IV. The doctrines of grace.-Man's depravity and helplessness arc affirmed. Man's
dependence upon grace for his recovery. Atonement by "the oblation of Christ for the
sins of the whole world." Justification by faith only. The relation of works to faith
defined, and antinomianism condemned.
V. Ecclesiology.-The Church defined ; also a sacrament, and tire only two
sacraments, Baptism and the Lord's Supper, defined.
VI. Eschatology-The general judgment at the end of the world is declared. This
judgment shall be by Jesus Christ on his return from heaven "to judge all men at the
last day." The doctrine of purgatory, with all that is involved therein, is
condemned. Masses, or prayers for the dead, are condemned.
Thus it will be seen that this compendious creed contains all the essential doctrines
of Christian dogmatics. It sets forth tire great facts of revelation, and declares in
strong, clear language the foundation trusts of the Gospel. Theories in each department of
doctrine, which have been the bane of the long Confessions, are wisely avoided. It would
seem that we have here a creed not for an epoch or a century only, but for all time. That
Wesley intended these Twenty-five Articles to occupy the same place in the Methodist
Episcopal Church which the Thirty-nine Articles held in iris own Church, can-not be
denied. In iris certificate of ordination of Dr. Coke be gives, as Iris reason for
organizing the Methodist Episcopal Church, the fact that "the Methodists in America
desire to still adhere to the doctrine and discipline of the Church of England."-Tyerman's
Life, iii, 434.
The organizing Conference not only accepted the form of government and ordination from
Wesley, but also the Twenty five Articles were formally adopted as the Creed of tire
Church, and, if Bangs' History is correct, a form of trial was provided at once for a
breach of the Articles of the Church. The statute now in the Discipline concerning heresy
is essentially the same as when first adopted, and has never been changed. The Conference
also declared that. "during the life of Mr. Wesley we acknowledge ourselves his sons
in the Gospel, and ready in matters of Church government to obey his commands."
The testimony of Dr. Abel Stevens is explicit to the effect that Wesley intended the
Articles of Religion to be the only obligatory creed of the new Church. He writes :-
Wesley evidently designed the Articles to be the briefest and barest possible symbol of
expedient doctrines; and, as we shall hereafter see, not even a requisite condition of
Church member-ship, though a requisite functional qualification for the ministry. He
consigned his other tenets, however precious to him, to other means of conservation and
diffusion, for it was riot his opinion that the orthodoxy of a Church can best guarantee
its spiritual life, but that its spiritual life can best guarantee its orthodoxy.-Vol. ii,
page 209.
It will not be pretended that at the organization of the Church the "Doctrinal
Tracts" had any standing as an authoritative creed, for the first mention of them in
the Discipline is several years later. The "Doctrinal Tracts" were four in
number, and were on the following subjects: Predestination, Perseverance of the Saints,
Christian Perfection, and Baptism. (Emory on the Discipline, p.84.)
It is important in this discussion to observe carefully what pledges are made by a
preacher in coming into the Methodist Episcopal Church. And a distinction must be made
between conditions proposed by an Annual Conference for its own "satisfaction,"
and conditions proposed by the Church in its book of Discipline. These last alone form the
basis on which he can be expelled from the Church.
Nowhere in the curriculum for admission, or orders, is a candidate in our Church asked
if he believes in the doctrines taught in the standard authors. Such assent is neither
asked nor given. Nowhere in the Discipline is there any record of such authors, as to who
they are or what they teach. And when the question is asked, What are the
"standards" referred to ~ the phrase, "our present existing and established
standards of doctrine," the answers are vague and conflicting. One answers, The
original four volumes of Mr. Wesley's Sermons, and Notes on the New Testament; and the
reason given is, that these were prescribed by the Conferences of 1781 and April, 1784.
Another answers, "The Doctrinal Tracts;" and the reason for this is, that these
tracts were bound up with the Discipline from 1789-1812, (excepting 1796, when they were
omitted.) A third insists that Fletcher's " Checks" must be included, because
these had canonical esteem by the fathers, and were commended to the preachers in certain
early minutes. Bishop Baker, in his work on the Discipline, in order that nothing shall be
missing, says that "usage and general consent" puts Watson's Institutes among
the "established standards" of the Church.
Now, it is admitted that prior to the organization of the Methodist Episcopal Church,
in 1784, "the Notes and Sermons" are specified as the rule of doctrine, but they
are never thus mentioned, or, indeed, mentioned at all, subsequent to the Christmas
Conference of 1784. And there is not a particle of evidence that any Conference ever
acknowledged the "Doctrinal Tracts" as occupying the same standing as the
Articles of Religion. They were, indeed, printed in certain editions of the Discipline
prior to 1812, but so, also, were "the Psalms and Hymns" and "the Church
Service," while many books were enjoined by name to be carefully studied by the
preachers. Shall we try Methodist preachers for heresy out of "the Psalms and
Hymns," or by the teachings of "à Kempis," or "Primitive
Physic?"
The very vagueness of these standards is the condemnation of the view that such
voluminous writings have the authority of a creed. Who are these standard authors? Where
shall we find this index expurgatorius.' It is riot in the Discipline of to-day. It
has never been in the Discipline, nor has it ever been announced by any General Conference
since the Church was organized. But, on the contrary, there has been a specific statute
for heresy from the first, unchallenged and unchanged, and in that statute the Articles of
Religion are prescribed as the standard of authoritative doctrine. There is. allusion,
indeed, to "erroneous and strange doctrines" in the ordination of elders, but
according to the Discipline the Articles of Religion are the touch-stone of such erroneous
doctrines. The Discipline, like the Bible, must be permitted to explain itself.
The questions put by the Bishop to the candidate at the bar of the Conference touching
this matter, are: "Have you read the Form of Discipline?" "Are you willing
to conform to it? It is nowhere asked of a candidate whether he believes the teachings of
certain standard authors, or whether lie agrees with the consensus of Methodist
doctrine, or whether lie will conform to the traditions of the so-called "unwritten
law" of Methodism, or whether be will consent to take his theology from whatever
committee of triers may happen to be appointed on his case. He pledges himself, simply and
solely, to conform to the Form of Discipline. It is nowhere asked of him whether he agrees
with the sixty volumes prescribed for study and reading in the Conference Course, nor was
it the design of the General Conference that such questions should be asked by either
Committee or Annual Conference. The Conference examinations are not inquisitorial as to
belief, but as to knowledge, and while the Annual Conference has the power mid the right
to reject a candidate for admission on its sovereign judgment, ("if he give us
satisfaction," the law says,) yet it has not disciplinary warrant for demanding
agreement with the authors prescribed in the course of study. For the law under which
these examinations arc held, see Discipline," ¶ 145.
In 1808 the Restrictive Rules were adopted and the delegated General Conference was
authorized. Prior to that date the General Conference, being coin posed constructively of
all the traveling preachers, had absolute power over all doctrines and usage’s of the
Church. The fear of hasty legislation, and the desire " that the doctrine, form of
government, and general rules of the united societies in America be preserved sacred and
inviolable," (Preamble of Report of the Committee on Constitution-Bangs'
"History of the Methodist Episcopal Church," ii, p. 229,) were the motives which
led to the present constitution of the Church. The inspiration of the establishment of the
delegated Conference, with its limitations and powers, was to preserve in statu quo the
creed and polity of the Church as received from Mr. Wesley. The General Conference of 1808
did not intend to lift the standard authors to the rank of a creed, nor did it occur to
them that the words which they employed in Rule I would ever be tortured to such a
meaning. If further proof of this were needed we have it in the fact that they did not
enact a statute for heresy in harmony with this construction of Rule I, but were content
with the old statute which restricted heresy trials to the Articles of Religion.
The view here presented is also that of Dr. Nathan Bangs, in his "History of the
Methodist Episcopal Church," and, as Dr. Bangs was a member of the Conference of
1808, he is a competent witness. (Bangs' History, vol. ii, p. 233.) The teaching of Dr.
Stevens in his " History of the Methodist Episcopal Church " is also in harmony
with the thesis supported in this paper, to wit, that the law of the Methodist Episcopal
Church knows no heresy outside of the Articles of Religion. For Stevens' views on this
subject, see chap. V, vol. ii, of the "History of the Methodist Episcopal
Church."
But it will be said that the practice of the Church has been to go outside the Articles
of Religion in her trials for heresy. We reply, that if the practice is contrary to the
law, the sooner it is stopped the better. The advice is as good for a Conference as for a
preacher, ' Let us keep our rules, and not mend them." No practice can have authority
which is in violation of law, no matter how long it may have continued. It is an
acknowledged principle of jurisprudence that court decisions shall be set aside when it is
made plain that they are out of harmony with the statute. To set aside such decisions is
the very office of a court of appeals. Chancellor Kent on this has the following,
("Commentaries," vol. i, p.539:) "A solemn decision upon a point of law
arising in any given case becomes an authority in a like ease, . . . unless it can be
shown that the law was misunderstood or misapplied in that particular case." And it
is well-known that the Supreme Court of the United States reversed a decision of its own
on the currency question, during the War of the Rebellion. Hence if our Conferences have
been acting without law, or contrary to law, in their methods of heresy trials, the sooner
such lawlessness is exposed and ended the better. But though the Annual Conferences may
have been at fault in this matter, a careful search among the Journals of the General
Conference has led the writer to the conclusion that the General Conference has always
conformed its action to the law of the Discipline, and only entertained an action for
heresy which was brought under the Articles of Religion.
The Journals of the General Conference contain accounts of three appeals on questions
of heresy, namely, that of Joshua Randall, New England Conference, in 1828; L. D. Simonds,
California Conference, in 1868; and T. B. Taylor, Kansas Conference, in 1872; and the
offense in each case is disseminating views which are contrary to the "Articles of
Religion." Our examination of these Journals has led us to the conclusion that the
General Conference has never given its sanction to trial for heresy under other test of
orthodoxy than the Articles of Religion.
This leads us to the last theory of the liberal constructionists; namely, that the consensus
fidei, as interpreted by the court, is the law under which heresy trials must proceed,
and by which suspected opinions shall be judged. This theory has recently been advocated
in the editorial department of the National Repository." ("National
Repository," December, 1878.) Before passing to the examination of the argument, let
us first note the opinion of the writer as to the significance of Art. V. " The
attempt has been made," he says, "to make the Article on 'the sufficiency of the
Scriptures' cover every thing which may be proved out of the Scriptures; but that is quite
too great a stretch of interpretation." The argument of the "Repository"
may be summarized as follows: The Protestant Churches do not bold themselves strictly to
their confessions, but, nevertheless they agree in the main on a consensus of
faith. Written creeds are ambiguous, and "any written document is capable of some
latitude of interpretation." It is not the written creed, but the consensus, to
which appeal is actually made in any case of trial, though the authority of the confession
be acknowledged. "Administrators of discipline may be presumed to know what is, and
what is not, the accepted doctrine of their Churches, and as in all cases of trial the
triers are the judges of both the law and the facts, it is for them to decide any given
ease' by a proper reference to the accepted faith of the body." In the Methodist
Episcopal Church the Articles do not meet the needs of the Church, and "any doctrine
clearly within the consensus of the Church is protected by the common law of the
Church, without special legal enactment." "Whether or not this rule is a good
one," the writer adds at the close of the article, "will be tested by the higher
tribunal to which certain recent eases have been appealed."
That there is force in certain of these considerations, though obvious fallacies in
others, we are bound to confess. But there are grave objections to them. It will be found,
indeed, after careful thought, that they are not only fallacious, but that they are
subversive of those great principles of jurisprudence which are alike the defense of
liberty and the condition of progress. There is a heritage of legal principles which has
come to us chiefly from Rome, which is not less valuable than the heritage of literature
and art which has come from Greece, and is only second in value to the heritage of
revelation which was the gift of Israel to the human family. Let us recall a few
principles in law that may be said to have the character of axioms.
1. Triers must not sit as legislators. Their office is to interpret law, and not to
make law. Government has its three distinct departments-the legislative, the judicial, and
the executive. These must not be confounded.
2. Ex post facto laws are vicious, and in all free governments are
unconstitutional. An ex post facto law is one which renders an act
punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed. Such laws are
forbidden by the Constitution of the United States. If law may be applied to adjudge an
act which was committed before the law was made, there is an end of justice and private
rights.
3. The defense of liberty is in the keeping of law. If law be overridden, or be loosely
administered, liberty is jeoparded, and beneath the glove is the iron hand of tyranny.
"The discretion of the judge," said Gibbon, "is the first engine of
tyranny.
4. It is better to obey an unwise law, and amend it as soon as possible, than to ride
over it and thus destroy the safeguards of society. One of the wise sayings of General
Grant, when President, was: "The best way to lead to the repeal of an unwise law is
faithfully to execute it."
It is said in the "Repository" that creeds are ambiguous, and that "the
only way to maintain a uniform standard of religious belief" is to put the consensus
in the place of the written creed, and for its interpretation to trust to the wisdom
of the triers. It is riot easy to comprehend how such a statement could have been made by
its author. The written creeds ambiguous, therefore resort to that nebular
insubstantiality, called the consensus. This may be called an ecclesiastical
nebular hypothesis.
"The written creed is capable of latitude of interpretation," we are told,
"and there is a strange power in the human mind of reading into a form of words what
may be desired;" there fore go to the unwritten creed, as with its notes,
we may sup pose, of semper, ubigue et ab omnibus, it floats, like ether in
universal space, in the convictions of the Church. In the immortal words of the"
One-hoss Shay:" "Logic is logic. That’s all I say." But a more serious
objection to this scheme is that it transforms triers into law-makers. Take an
illustration. A brother is charged with disseminating pre-millenarianism. He has caught
the spirit of the prophetic conference. The triers have two tasks before them: to decide
whether consensus condemns pre-millenarianism, and whether the charge is sustained.
But consensus never uttered her voice before on this matter. They consult the
authorities, living and dead, and decide that pre-millenarianism is a heresy, and expel
the accused from the Church. What have they dope? Adjudicated under law I Not at all. They
have been a law unto themselves, and by the vicious process of ex post facto law
they have driven a brother from the Church. Now, if that verdict be not reversed by the
General Conference, (to which body there is no appeal from the Judicial Conferences save
on a question of law,) you have a precedent which henceforth becomes law in the Church.
It is denied to an Annual Conference to make laws and establish doctrines; it is denied
to the General Conference to add to the doctrines of the Church; but here is a back-door
process by which the Church's fundamental laws are overslaughed and a committee of triers
may foist new doctrines and obligations on the Church.
Take another example. An eminent pastor in the West was recently brought before his
Conference for certain opinions on inspiration. He, declared to the Conference that he
believed the Scriptures were written by inspired men, and were the only and sufficient
rule of & Christian's faith and practice. To the Article on the Scriptures he
subscribed with all his heart. But he is probed for his theory of inspiration, and
tells the Conference that he does not believe that inspiration carries with it absolute
infallibility on all subjects. The Conference is not satisfied, but for the present is
content to admonish and warn him. The next scene in the drama will be a trial for heresy.
The triers will decide, perhaps, that an infallible plenary inspiration, which extends to
the ipsissima verba, is the consensus of the Church, and the popular
pastor will be deposed from his ministry. In such a ease lie might answer, "Surely it
was riot in the bond. Your theory of inspiration was never imposed by the Church in any
form before.’ Here will be a new precedent and a new law, and, as was said before,
the fundamental guards>f the rights of the members of the Church are trampled on. Now,
remember, that the trial of appeals is no longer conducted by one last court, to wit, the
General Conference, as formerly, but by a board of triers, who have been elected by and
are members of three Conferences convenient to the accused, and it is easy to see that
diverse and conflicting decisions will be rendered on the same questions.
Take, for example, the case just referred to. Here in the latitude of New York that
pastor would probably not be condemned as a heretic for his theory of inspiration; while
in the latitude of Kentucky or Kansas his denial of plenary inspiration might lead to his
expulsion; but in the latitude of Georgia or Mississippi, where good orthodox black men
make the consensus, any brother who denied that the very words of the Bible were
chosen by the Holy Ghost would. probably have no chance for an hour. And. yet we are told
by the "Repository" that the only way to maintain a uniform standard of belief
is to put consensus, in the place of the written creed. It will be remembered that
there is no appeal from the decision of these far-separated Judicial Conferences, except
on questions of law. And let it be observed that this reasoning is hardly less applicable
to the theory of the authority of the standard authors, for those authors traverse the
whole realm of theology, not only the essentials, but matters of speculation. It
would be a nice thing, indeed, a very nice thing, if trouble-makers could always be
squelched by a majority vote. It would preserve the homogeneity of the body. But even the
trouble-maker has his rights under the law; and if for no other reason, then for this
reason, that if he have no rights, neither has his fellow.
It has been put forward 'that the common law of the Church makes the consensus the
standard of orthodoxy. This cannot be admitted. There is much loose talk about common law,
as though the term protected any proceedings, however irregular, provided such proceedings
had been running on for some time without protest. Common law exists only by
constitutional provision, as in England, and in certain courts in the United States.
Common law has no authority in Germany or in India; and it would be as appropriate to
apply the principles of the Roman law to our Church jurisprudence as those of the common
law. A Church has no common law, but is a voluntary organization under the statutes of its
book of Discipline. Besides, common is nearly, if not quite, as defined and positive as
statute law, and the judges have no more discretion in the one case than in the other. In
England the common law courts have been distinguished for a certain narrowness and
technicality of reasoning. So even in courts of equity the judge has little discretion.
There are established and recognized principles of equity which must rule in the courts.
Otherwise, as was once said by an eminent judge, the measure of justice would be what
happened to be the measure of the judge's foot. Ecclesiastical common law is a fiction.
The Methodist Episcopal Church is an incorporated body, recognized by the civil laws as
governed by a body of statutes which are contained in its hook of Discipline. Among other
statutes for the trial of ministers there is one on the subject of heresy :-
When a minister or preacher holds and disseminates, publicly or privately, doctrines
which are contrary to our Articles of Religion, let the same process be observed as in the
case of gross immorality; but if the minister or preacher so offending do solemnly engage
not to disseminate such erroneous doctrines, in public or in private, he shall be borne
with till his ease be laid before the next Annual Conference, which shall determine the
matter.-Discipline, ¶ 207.
Such is the law. It is specific and plain, and in this form it has been in the
Discipline from the infancy of the Church. According to this law the Articles of Religion
are the test of orthodoxy. The General Conference of 1848 laid it down as a principle of
trial procedure that "an Annual Conference can investigate the ease of a member only
by the rules for trial."-Sherman's History of the Discipline, p. 49.
The argument that the law is not sufficient and does not meet the needs of the Church,
and that, therefore, we must add to it by some fiction of common law, would not be beard
for a moment in a civil court. It is quite common to find in the civil courts that an
offense charged does not come within the law. Then the accused goes free. And Legislatures
are always patching up the criminal laws to meet such cases. If this fancy of common law
could have any standing in a Methodist court, the fact that there is a special statute for
the trial of heresy would set it aside as to that; for it is an axiom that a statute
always sets aside common law. If the Legislature has not pronounced, judges go back to
precedents and customs; but when the Legislature has uttered a law, the judge is estopped
from hunting up custom, and confines himself to explaining the will of the Legislature.
Pomeroy on Municipal Law (p.17) says: "Whenever the Legislature has spoken, in
general its voice is supreme; it overrides the declarations of preceding Legislatures and
the decisions of courts." And on page 20: "The badge of inferiority of common
law is that the Legislature may step in and sweep it all away, and when its potent voice
has once spoken the courts are powerless to resist; they can only expound the
statute."
The Church of England has essentially the same law for heresy as the Methodist
Episcopal Church. It has been decided there again and again that the hard words of the
symbols must be adhered to closely, and that consensus and the Bible, and even the
Scriptures quoted in the Book of Prayer, must be ruled out. In 1862 Dr. Wilson, one
of the authors of the notorious "Essays and Reviews," was tried for heresy on
the charge of restorationism. The highest ecclesiastical court of England acquitted him
because, under "the articles and formularies of the Church of England, restorationism
was an open question."
So, also, Dr. Rowland Williams was acquitted after a trial on a charge of teaching a
heretical theory of inspiration, because the articles did not define inspiration.
The law which Wesley gave to American Methodism was that under which he had preached,
and with which he was so well satisfied in England. "Not a single doctrine,"
says Stevens in his History, "does Methodism hold to-day that was not sanctioned by
the standards of the Anglican Establishment."
It is true that the Methodist Episcopal Church and the Anglican Church are not the
same, yet if in this matter their law is essentially the same, and if they are good
lawyers on the other side, it is plain that we have no right to go to consensus. So,
also, in the Presbyterian Church no consensus would be allowed for a moment. The
triers might read into or read out of the Confession as they pleased, but they must
profess to read the Confession ~d to judge by the Confession. Fancy Prof. Robertson Smith,
in his recent trial, submitting to be pronounced a heretic on the dictum of a
Synod's interpretation of consensus-orthodoxy! As a matter of fact he held the
Presbytery of Aberdeen, which tried him, strictly to the Confession; and Prof. Rainey and
other eminent leaders held the General Assembly strictly to the Confession. And had he
been deposed from his office under some elastic common law consensus, how quickly
would he have appealed to the civil tribunal for the redress of injury illegally done him!
The consensus doctrine is in direct conflict with two fundamental principles of
Methodist law, to wit, that the doctrines of the Church are fixed and cannot be revoked or
amended, and that every minister has the right of trial. (Restrictive Rules, Nos. I, V.)
The authority of consensus puts the doctrines in a state of flux. Nothing is
"established;" every tiling is fluent. Doctrines which were deemed roost vital
fifty years ago may fifty years hence be remanded to the moles and to the bats. And, then,
what is the worth of trial if an accused cannot anticipate the law under which lie shall
be tried, but must hear it for the first time from his judges. In such a case an accused
comes not to trial, but to judgment. Ita scriptum est is the decalogue of the
jurist; a maxim not simply of statute law, but also of common law. There must, therefore,
be written standards. The law must be in black and white, so that an accused may be able
to know what it is.
Now, in the Methodist Episcopal Church, what are those written standards? They are, say
some, the Notes and Sermons of Mr. Wesley, "the Doctrinal Tracts," and the
liturgies of the Discipline of 1808. Very well. Now, if those writings are the Confessions
of Faith in the Church, we must hold (1) that they are authoritative in all and everything
they teach, or (2) that they are to be interpreted by the Articles of Religion, and are
only of authority in elaboration of the articles, (which is the view of the writer,) or
(3) that they are to be interpreted and applied by the sovereign authority of the triers,
which is a return to the consensus doctrine. Here is a trilemma. The third member
of it has all the vices of consensus, for those writings traverse the whole realm
of theology, not only the essentials, but also the non-essential. How is an accused to
know what part of the sermons of Wesley the triers will enforce as obligatory? Is Wesley's
post-millenarianism an essential doctrine? Is Wesley's view of inspiration an essential,
or his view of the punishment of the wicked in the world to come? Just where we
want something fixed, a lex scripta, we find every thing is unfixed and ambiguous.
The first member of the trilemma is equally untenable, for the simple reason that no
Methodist preacher of to-day believes, or ever did believe, all that is taught in those
writings. Nor was there ever a time in the history of our Church when every thing
contained in them was believed.
This is the proof that they never had the authority of a creed, but that they were
directory and for instruction, rather than obligatory. Take, for example, the Treatise on
Baptism, which was one of the Doctrinal Tracts printed in the early Discipline. In the
most unequivocal language Mr. Wesley teaches in that tract the doctrine of Baptismal
Regeneration. (Wesley's Works, vol. vi, p. 14.) Surely the American preachers never
believed that vagary of Popery. We are thus shut up to the conclusion that the Articles of
Religion are the only test of orthodoxy.
A further argument for the Articles of Religion as the only test of orthodoxy is found
in the place which these Articles have had in the history of the Church. What does it mean
that they are so jealousy guarded by the first Restrictive Rule, and have a sanctum in
the organic law of the Church I What does it mean that neither the General Conference, nor
the constitutional two thirds and three fourths vote of the entire Church, can revoke,
alter, or amend them? What does it mean that both the Bishops and the last General
Conference declared that the supreme Conference itself was not competent to add to them?
And yet, forsooth, a Committee of Triers is competent to add to them, and to formulate
creeds ad infinitum, according to their understanding of so-called standard authors
or of the nebular hypothesis called consensus.
No legislative powers are half so dangerous to liberty as such latitude given to a
court. The principles involved in this discussion were thoroughly canvassed in the famous
debates on the Constitutional Law of the Church in the General Conference of 1868. The
questions before the Conference were the admission of Delegates from Mission Conferences
and Lay Delegation. There was a majority in the Conference for both measures, but the
organic law of the Church seemed to be in the way. Dr. M'Clintock was on the popular side,
and with his splendid eloquence made a terrible use of this very weapon of common law and
unwritten constitution. He was answered in a speech in all respects worthy of the debate
and of the cause, by the present editor of the "Repository," and the sub-stance
of the answer was that unwritten constitution has no standing in the presence of specific
statute.
Too much deference cannot be felt toward that august Power "whose home is the
bosom of God, and whose voice is the harmony of the world." All progress moves toward
written constitutions and statute laws as the defense against arbitrary power. Let us
recall the remark of Gibbon, that "the discretion of the judge is the first engine of
tyranny." The defense of liberty is the well-defined law.
The principles in this discussion are constantly in debate in Church government. In a
letter to Rev. F. D. Maurice, on the subscription to the Articles of the Church of
England, Rev. Charles Kingsley wrote as follows :-
As long as the Articles stand, and as long as they are interpreted by lawyers only, who
will ask sternly, "Is it in the bond?" and nothing else, I see hope for freedom
and safety. But as soon as any body of men, however venerable, have the power given to
them to dictate to me what I shall think and preach, I shall answer, My compact with the
Church of England is over. I swore to the Articles, and not to you.
John Wesley elbowed for himself room in the Church of England; and when consensus would
have hung him, he sternly appealed to the law and the testimony of England's statutes.
"I vary from the Church," he said, "but I will never leave her." He
bad not much respect for majority votes; and in making a Church he allowed room for
varying. And the Methodist Episcopal Church reflects his mind better than any other on
earth, as Bishop Simpson told Dean Stanley, at his recent reception in St. Paul's Church.
When we took our ordination vows, we pledged ourselves to the Book of Discipline; we
subscribed to certain doctrinal standards contained therein; but we did not subscribe to a
library of authors or to an undefined consensus of faith. Let us see to it that our
Church is in its form a Church of constitutional liberties, and in its spirit one which
leaves to the Lord of the conscience judgment upon those questions where unity was never
covenanted and can never be enforced.
[FOURTH SERIES, VOL. XXXI.-23]
Edited by Aaron Bynum, June 16, 1999.
Proofreading, HTML conversion, and other modifications by Brandon Boyd.
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