The Methodist Quarterly Review
January, 1852

ART. 1.-FAITH AND SCIENCE-COMTE'S POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY.

Cours de Philosophie Positive. Par M. Auguste Comte, Ancien Eleve de l’Ecole Polytechnique; Repetiteur d’Analyse Transcendentale, et de Mecanique Rationnelle a la dite Ecole. Paris: Bachelier. 1830-1842. 6 tomes, 8vo.

TWELVE long years elapsed during the slow publication of the successive volumes of M. Comte's Cours de Philosophie Positive, and nearly ten more have passed away since it was submitted in its complete form to the tribunal of public opinion. The writings of Mr. Lewes, M. Littre, and M. Pinel, and also those of Prof. Whewell and Mr. Mill, forbid our supposing that M. Comte's views have been wholly without influence; yet, during the whole period of these twenty-one years, in which this system of Positive Philosophy has attained its legal majority, it has been but twice noticed, as far as we are aware, in the periodical criticism of Europe, [Sir David Brewster, in the Edinburgh Review, July, 1838, No. clxxvi, art. i; and Prof. Emile Saisset in the Revue des deux Mondes. This "strange silence" is noticed by M. Comte himself-Tome vi, Preface, p. xxi.] and never in that of America ; [Since this was written an excellent article on the subject has appeared in a contemporary journal.] and even the name of its illustrious author would have remained a nomen ignotun to the large majority of the literary world, but for a cursory and unsatisfactory critique upon the work in Mr. Morell's Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century, and a less meagre but scarcely more adequate examination of his doctrines in Mr. Blakey's History of the Philosophy of Mind. From these scanty sources, but especially from Mr. Morell's very limited and borrowed criticism, have been derived the few passing observations upon M. Comte's philosophy, which have been occasionally hazarded in the ephemeral publications of the day. The comparatively recent [FOURTH SERIES, VOL. IV.-1] production of the political and social doctrine to which the speculative system of Positivism serves as a propaedeutic, has recalled our attention to that elaborate scheme which constitutes its basis. We would have enlarged our rubric and our text by the addition of the "Republique Occidentale," but the fallacies of the latter can be duly appreciated only after a candid estimate of the merits and defects of the great preliminary work. Moreover, we are not disposed to increase the magnitude and diversity of a subject already too ample and complex, by connecting with its examination an inquiry into another topic which more appropriately demands independent treatment, and may receive it at our hands on some future occasion. We shall find it necessary to trim down even the contents of the volumes which form our text into manageable size and shape, by the exclusion of almost everything which is not immediately connected with M. Comte's philosophic method; and while yielding to this necessity, we cannot be guilty of the inconsistency of augmenting the range of view on another side, by bringing within the sweep of our horizon another work which can well await a separate consideration. We are anxious, pro virili parte, to atone for the neglect with which M. Comte's labours have been hitherto visited, and to present a sufficient and impartial estimate of that philosophic system, which forms in itself a complete and symmetrical method, and one which is assimilated so closely in many respects to the intellectual instincts and appetites of the day, that its secret influence will be almost exactly proportionate to the degree of public disregard with which it may be visited. In that struggle between religion and science, between philosophy and faith, which has already commenced, and which must play so important a part in the intellectual history of the remainder of the century, a large, ingenious, and learned party must recognise Comte as their apostle, and the Positive Philosophy as their creed; nor can the votaries of the Christian faith be prepared to resist the rising deluge of error, unless they have first patiently weighed and dispassionately appreciated the current forms of metaphysical or speculative delusion-and Positivism among the rest. For these reasons, late though it may appear to be, we propose at this time to exhibit the doctrines of M. Comte, to examine their validity, to acknowledge their occasional and limited truth, and, so far as we may be able to do so, to expose their fallacies, and refute the principles from which we conceive that their errors proceed.

In the solitary review of the work, which has hitherto appeared in the English journals, only the first two volumes were considered by Sir David Brewster. In these the philosophy of Comte was, barely indicated, but by no means developed; and what was important [1*] or original even in the fragment reviewed, was unappreciated or misunderstood in the feeble essay of the reviewer. We can scarcely conceive anything more unfortunately inapposite and irrelevant to the intellectual characteristics of the author reviewed, than the smooth, elegant, and plausible remarks with which Sir David commences his criticism. Yet, notwithstanding his limited comprehension, or, total misapprehension, of the scope and nature of the treatise of M. Comte, he commends it as "a work of profound science, marked with great acuteness of reasoning, and conspicuous for the highest attributes of intellectual power." Equally strong and flattering is the testimony to its merits offered by the few other writers in England who have spoken of it. Morell admits "the admiration excited by the author's brilliant scientific genius." [Morell's knowledge of Comte seems to have been taken at second-hand from the essays of Brewster and Saisset.] Blakey's eulogy is to the like effect. Mill, who is so largely indebted to it for much that is most valuable in his own celebrated treatise on logic, frankly acknowledges his indebtedness, and constantly bestows upon Comte cordial and generous commendation. "Within a few years," says he, "three writers, profoundly versed in physical science, and not unaccustomed to carry their speculations into higher regions of knowledge, have made attempts of unequal, but all of, very great merit, towards the creation of a philosophy of induction: Sir John Herschel, in his Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy; Mr. Whewell, in his History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences; and, greatest of all, M. Auguste Comte, in his Cours de Philosophie Positive, a work which only requires to be better known to place its author in the first class of European thinkers." [Mill's Logic, b. iii, ch. i. See also his estimate more explicitly recorded b. iii, ch. y, ch. xxiv; b. vi, ch. x.] Prof. Whewell, in the works to which Mr. Mill refers, has paid the Positive Philosophy of M. Comte the very significant compliment of borrowing from it to a vast extent, without making any acknowledgment whatever. These works of Dr. Whewell's were evidently suggested to him by Sir John Herschel's Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy. [The germs of these works may be found in a review of Sir John Herschel's Discourse, evidently written by Prof. Whewell, in the London Quarterly Review for July, 1831.] The leading idea in the plan of the history is due partly to Victor Cousin, and partly to Comte ; [This fact, with respect to Victor Cousin, appears sufficiently established in the Southern Quarterly Review for July, 1842.] and the larger portion of the philosophy which has any appearance of novelty or depth may be traced to the more or less distinct intimations of Kant and Comte. [We do not mean to accuse Whewell of downright plagiarism, though this charge might be justified by some incidents in Ms literary career, but only of such indebtedness as ought to have been acknowledged. His appropriations reappear as identical arguments and conclusions, as modified doctrines, or as contradictory views, all, however, evidently suggested by the writers menioned above.] Yet his very great obligations to these authors are nowhere acknowledged further than by a rare and reluctant reference to their writings. [If we remember correctly, there are two references to Comte in Mr. Whewell's History of the Inductive Sciences.] Mr. Mill proclaims liberally, and in strong terms, the aid which he derived in the composition of his system of logic from the above-mentioned works of Dr. Whewell; but, with the exception of a few happily invented technical phrases, all the assistance which was obtained from those sources might have been more efficiently obtained from the Cours de Philosophic Positive, either by the direct adoption or the suggested refutation of the conclusions of M. Comte.

When such high encomiums have been bestowed upon the elaborate treatise of M. Comte by the concurrent testimony of the few distinguished writers who have studied its contents and availed themselves of its results, it may appear singular that it has never, in the course of the nine years which have elapsed since its completion, been brought to the test of full and intelligent criticism in Europe or America. This may in some measure be accounted for by the immense range of varied erudition exhibited in it. which seems to require an analogous, though not necessarily equivalent, polumaqia, in any one who should undertake to give a complete analysis or refutation of its conclusions. Moreover, the originality and abstruseness of many of the speculations, which rest on the vast scaffolding of the author's acquired knowledge, can only be apprehended in their full significance, and weighed in a just balance, by a mind more untrammelled by ordinary prejudices, and less wedded to received formulas, than can be readily found in the present day. In addition to all this, the boldness, the novelty, the exhaustless variety, the copiousness, the logical coherence, and the remarkable extent of the work, combine to render a thorough examination and appreciation of its doctrines eminently difficult. It may appear paradoxical to mention its rigid logical connexion among the obstacles tending to prevent an earlier criticism of the work; but the perfect harmony and mutual dependence of all its parts necessitate the clear apprehension of the system as a whole, before any satisfactory judgment on it can be rendered. ["Sans doute in nature de ce cours ne saurait etre completement appreciee, de maniere a pouvoir s'en former une opinion definitive, que lorsque les diverses parties en auront ete successivement developpees." -Comte, Cours de Phil. Pos., tome i, p. l. The composition of a work so extensive and so closely articulated as, Comte's is a remarkable anomaly in this age, and justifies his own remark: "A une epoque de divagation intellectuelle, et de versatilite politique, toute longue perseverance dans une direction rigoureusement invariable, peut, sans doute, etre justement signalee' au public, comme une solide garantie de leur (les nouveaux principes) consistance, et meme de leur opportunite ," &c.-Tome vi, p. iv.] And the difficulty, as well as rarity, of such apprehension may be easily estimated by any one who has noted the singular incapacity of the contemporaneous generation for enlarged and connected speculation, [The contracted and limited horizon with which men of science bound their views in our day is constantly noted and reprehended by Comte. Cours de Phil. Pos., tome i, p. 29; vi, pp. xxii, 15, 23, 289-292, 340, 643, 675.] and who is aware of the deficiency of modern thinkers and writers in everything appertaining to strict logical investigation and extended logical investigation. Every one who has studied the works of Leibnitz must have observed how utterly ridiculous and anomalous his peculiar doctrines appear, when severed from that grand but fallacious scheme of which they constitute such essential details. [The mutual interdependence of the doctrines of Leibnitz is traced with some ability by Morell, Crit. Hist. Phil., &c.; and better in Brucker's able summary, Hut. Crit. Phil., tome V, pp. 397-446 ; but can be fully appreciated only from the direct study of the works of Leibnitz himself.] Eminently plausible when considered in their native setting and harmonious correlation, they excite only a smile when exhibited in naked isolation. In the same way, to understand the separate dogmas of Comte, we must contemplate them in their symmetrical correspondence with, and dependence on, that vast redintegration and expansion of the whole body of the sciences, which he has so ably endeavoured to constitute. But in order to do this effectually, we must wander through the maze of all known or conjectural science, and digest the immense mass of important doctrine which is thickly spread over the five thousand pages of the Cours de Philosophie Positive. If we judge from the long silence of the critics, this is task almost beyond the capacity of human performance-it is certainly not achieved by Prof. Saisset is one which, if satisfactorily executed, would require, according to the mode of its accomplishment, either nearly equal or else greater genius and learning than have been displayed by M. Comte in the construction of this mighty monument of intellectual power. It is not always, but it certainly is sometimes true, that the correction of speculative errors and aberrations requires greater abilities and attainments than their creation. We have no hesitation in declaring that such will be the case whenever M. Comte's system of philosophy may meet with a full, adequate, and dispassionate refutation, coextensive with the range of the heresy, equally comprehensive in its general principles, and equally complete in its details.

We have perhaps already given an ample excuse to exonerate the periodical criticism of Europe and America from any very harsh censure for its long neglect of M. Comte; and we have assuredly said enough to manifest our full sense of our own inefficiency for the adequate performance of the task. But while the bow of Ulysses stands idle in the hall, and the twenty years of hopeless wandering and anxious expectation have been consumed before the master's band has been extended to draw it, we may perhaps be pardoned if; as no Ulysses appears, we adapt the bow to our strength and endeavour to wield it, without laying claim to any permanent acquisition of it; for, until the bow be bent and the arrow sped to the mark, it will be the source of evils innumerable to men, instead of defending them against the calamities which it might be potent to avert.

PollouV gar tode toxn aristhaV kekadhsei

qumou kai yuchV.

We shall not attempt to review the whole ground over which the labours of M. Comte extend-a task for which we candidly confess our own incompetency, and which, even if not beyond our ability, would be precluded by the necessary limits of this article. Neglecting for the time his skilful elaboration of a new classification of the sciences, [Of this Mr. Mill speaks in these terms: "M. Comte, whose view of the philosophy of classification, in the third volume of his great work, is the most complete with which I am acquainted," &c.-Logic, b. iv, ch. vii.] and the valuable strictures on the several departments of human knowledge with which he has enriched his work, we will confine our attention to the examination of that system of Positive Philosophy, of which he so loftily and constantly claims to be the founder, ["Le Fondateur d' une nouvelle philosophie." -Cours & Phil. Pos., tome vi, pref., p. vi. "Fondateur d' une nouvelle philosophie generale, a la fois historique et dogmatique."-Tome vi, p. xxviii, cf. p.288, and numerous other passages.] and whose definite establishment he boldly proclaims in his Republique Occidetale. In thus separating the leading element from the rest of these important labours, and concentrating our regards upon it, we deem that we shall be rendering better service to our readers than we should have done, had either ability or inclination permitted us to enter upon that full examination of the complete work which we recognise as beyond our strength; for thus we should only have dissipated the force of our remarks over an infinite multiplicity and diversity of details. M. Comte's contributions to the philosophy of the inductive sciences have been already in part appropriated by Dr. Whewell, and, in some measure, criticised and appreciated by Mr. Mill. His systematic classification of the sciences, or, as he terms it himself, "la vraie hierarchie encyclopedique," "cette hierarchic fondamentale des sciences positives," [Comte, Cours de Phil Pos., tome vi, preface, p. vii; tome i, p.98.] can be more profitably estimated in connexion with the elaborate but somewhat grotesque scheme of M. Ampere, [Essai de Philosophie: on Exposition Analytique d' une Classification Naturelle de toutes les connaissances humaines. Par Andre' Marie Ampere. 2 vols., 8vo Paris: l838-1843.] who has been largely, but perhaps unconsciously, aided by his predecessor; and his criticisms on the separate sciences may be judiciously referred, on his own principles, [Comte, Cours de Phil. Pos., lecon lvii.] to the special examination of the cultivators of the several sciences respectively. His Philosophy of History, which is eminently ingenious, and in many respects profound, and which has been unjustly neglected by Ferrari, [Ferrari, Essai sur le Principe et les Limites de la Philosophic de I' Histoire. Paris: 1843.] may occasionally furnish us with some necessary illustrations, but cannot be permitted to break the unity of our aims; while his creation of Social Philosophy, so loudly and so rightfully claimed by him as exclusively his own, is well entitled, by its extent and importance, to an independent discussion, without which its merits and its defects cannot be fairly tested. By this division of labour alone is there any prospect of the formation of a just estimate of the value and the results of M. Comte's labours; and in this way, what might be beyond the separate ability of one to accomplish, may be separately achieved by the distinct but concurring exertions of many. We have divided our strand from the cord as appropriate to the time, the occasion, and our own ability; we have taken for our text what may seem the least part of M. Comte's work, but it is the leaven which leaveneth the whole lump; and if we refute his philosophy.. his errors are crushed in the germ. We shall therefore limit our view almost exclusively to the nature, value, and tendencies of M. Comte's system of Positive Philosophy. We shall, however, remember, and our readers should remember also, that M. Comte's intellectual rank is to be judged by no such partial criterion, but from the aggregate of his labours, and from the extent, compactness, profundity, and universality of his researches. Perhaps, when all that he has done is taken into sober consideration, it may be thought that he stands next to Bacon among modern philosophers-proximus, sed longo intervallo. He is superior to the sage of Verulam in every-thing but sobriety of judgment, poetic richness of imagination, and that first and loftiest of all gifts of genius, justice of conception. But whatever may be thought of him in comparison with the founder of modern science-and he himself pretends to no equality-he is certainly entitled to rank with, if not above, Hobbes, Descartes, and Leibnitz-perhaps we might add Kant.

Before entering, however, upon the analysis of the Positive Philosophy, some previous notice of the author, of his motives in writing this work, of the circumstances under which it was composed, and of its general character, may be acceptable to our readers, particularly as both the book and the author are so little known among us. A few brief remarks upon these topics are all that we can venture to indulge in before entering upon the character and tendencies of the Positive Philosophy.

M. Comte states, in his personal preface to the sixth volume of his work, that he was sprung from a Catholic and royalist family in the south of France, and brought up in the midst of royalist and Catholic influences. He appears.. nevertheless, to have thrown himself at a very early age into the current of revolutionary feeling. From his birth and education he may have imbibed that bitter detestation of the name and fame of Napoleon which is so frequently and so singularly exemplified in his works. Educated at the Polytechnic School, he was early initiated into that mathematical and scientific discipline which he makes the basis, and we might almost say the sum, of nil valuable learning. Regarding the instruction obtained at this celebrated institute as incomplete and insufficient, he prepared himself for his already contemplated renovation of sciences and societies, by sedulous application to the more recondite study of the phenomena of social existence and the phases of humanity in past ages. He was thus led to the discovery in 1812, at the age of twenty-four, of what he calls "the true encyclopaedical hierarchy of the sciences," and of the complete harmony and mutual interdependence of his intellectual and political speculations. But not content with the mere repetition and extension of the accredited doctrines handed down by others, nor even with the vague fancies of possible regeneration which floated dimly before his eyes, be plunged boldly into the vortex of those wilder speculations which were broached obscurely in his youth, and he appears to have been one of the first, as he certainly was the most distinguished, of the acolytes of Saint-Simon. In that scanty band of enthusiasts and fanatics, whose reveries were barely redeemed from insanity by the high and solemn, though impracticable, nature of their aims, he seems to have rendered himself equally notorious by his talents and by his cold and sweeping infidelity. So fixed, so calm, so cold, indeed, was this infidelity, that it was rebuked even by Saint-Simon on his death-bed. From the ranks of the Saint-Simonians, however, M. Comte with-drew after a short period of service; and he now looks back with repentance, regret, and no slight scorn, to his former connexion with the singular founder of that singular sect. [See what he say" of his Saint-Simonian fever. Cours de Phil. Pos., tome vi, pp vii,viii.] But, notwithstanding this secession, and the bitterness which it has left behind, he has carried him into the wider sphere of his own original speculations, the same feelings, the same objects, and frequently the same doctrines in were entertained by the grotesque and erratic hierarch whose ministry be had abjured. Certain it is that the impress of Saint-Simon is often to be detected in the most characteristic positions of the Philosophie Positive. It was while yet numbered among the Saint-Simonians that M. Comte gave the first distinct intimations of that colossal scheme which he has since accomplished. He had been destined for the great work of the renovation of the sciences and the regeneration of society by Saint-Simon himself; he had been by him designated as a fitting Elisha on whom the mantle of Elijah should descend; and he laid the foundation-stone of the contemplated edifice by the publication of his Systeme de Politique Positive in 1822. Perhaps dissatisfied with the mysticism which encircled the hard and practical, though fantastic, realities of Saint-Simonism; perhaps unwilling to remain trammelled by adherence to a system which, notwithstanding its tendencies to libertinism, was yet reluctant to renounce wholly the recognition of a Deity, or the necessity of religion ; [This seems to have been the principal cause of the schism. Cours de Phil. Pos., tome vi, p. ix, Note.] M. Comte withdrew from the communion of that sect, which was ready to honour him as the anointed successor to their founder, and boldly undertook the construction of an independent system for himself.

He had scarcely, however, entered upon the oral exposition of those new doctrines which are embodied in his Cours de Philosophic Positive, when his labours were interrupted by an attack of mental derangement, which he has characterized as "une crise cerebrale," and attributed to the combined influence of great distress and excessive labour. When medicine and science despaired of a cure, nature was left to her own unrestricted energies; and, indeed, by judicious nursing "the inherent strength of his constitution triumphed over his disease, and even over the doctor's prescriptions." [Cours de Phil Pos., tome vi, p. x, note.] M. Comte, after his recovery, immediately resumed the thread of his speculations, and concluded, in 1829, the oral elaboration of his views, which bad been broken off by his mental alienation three years before. He boasts that this terrible episode in his career in no respect affected the perfect continuity of his intellectual development; but those who are disposed to criticise his philosophy harshly, may suspect that some traces of insanity may yet be detected in some of thc extravagant propositions of the Positive Philosophy, and especially in its sweeping and impassive atheism.

M. Comte informs us that he has, during his whole life, been wholly dependent on his own exertions for support; that he was entirely without private fortune at the commencement of his career; that from the age of eighteen he has been teaching mathematics from six to eight hours a day ; [In singular contradiction to Comte's own declarations, Morell says: "Up to the year 1816 he was a teacher in the Polytechnic School at Paris."- Crit. Hist. Phil. XIX. Century, p.354.] that it was not until 1832 that he was admitted into the faculty of the Polytechnic School, and then only as a tutor of the lowest grade; that at the age of forty-five, when he completed the publication of the Cours de Philosophie Positive, his means were still uncertain and limited; and that he was without any assured provision for his old age, though he expresses an entire confidence in the generous support of his countrymen, and appeals, for the estimation of his labours, from the neglect and injustice of his compeers, to the bar of the public opinion of France and Europe. Of the weight to be attached to his criminations of the Polytechnic School, of the Institute, of the Government, and of the mathematicians of France,-though, in regard to the last, they have been repeated by Hoene Wrouski, -we cannot and need not judge ; [Tome vi, pp. xxxxiv. After the revolution of February, however, M. Comte retracted his language with respect to M. Arago, whom he had termed "fidele organe spontane' des passions et des aberrations propres a in classe qu'il domine aujourd'hui si deplorablement." -Tome vi, p. xvi, note. The retraction is repeated in the preface to the Republique Occidentale, pp. xi, xii] but we cannot refrain from expressing our admiration of the high sentiments which are conveyed, and the lofty spirit of philosophic independence which is breathed by the language of his appeal. [Cours de Phil. Pos., tome vi, pp. xxxi-xxxiv.]

Another appeal to the "Occidental Public," which is appended as a post-scriptum to the "Republique Occidentale," enables us to bring down M. Comte's personal history to the middle of the year 1848. It reveals a more melancholy condition than its predecessor. He says that his persecutions have extended even beyond his previous apprehensions. In the July of 1844 he was summarily ejected from his office in the Polytechnic School by the machinations and injustice of his scientific enemies. lie has had to return to the occupation of private instruction, and "commenced his second half-century by resuming for life the humble and laborious profession which' seemed appropriate only to his more youthful years."*[Republique Occidentale, p.398.]

Notwithstanding the noble appeal of M. Comte to the public opinion of Europe, his labours remain to this day unappreciated. By indiscriminate admiration; by a few others they may have been reprobated with undistinguishing acrimony; and by Mr. Mill, as far as they ran parallel with his own studies, they have been cordially appreciated but no suitable response has been given to the manly appeal of their author Yet, when we examine his work, it is difficult to determine whether we ought to admire most the constant industry and the unswerving perseverance of twenty years devoted to its composition, or the genius, profundity, boldness, originality, and learning displayed on every page. These characteristics are entitled to our earnest approbation, whether M. Comte's conclusions be considered accurate or not Indeed, no more memorable instance has fallen under our cognizance of patient, continued, and logical investigation, and of unflinching perseverance in defiance of all obstacles, than is displayed in the volumes under review. In spite of his constant and common-place avocations; of the difficulties and trials of his private life; of the jealousy or animosity of men distinguished equally by their talents, their reputation, and their influence; of the interruptions of sickness, the seductions of deceptive theories, and the scantiness of leisure hours-in spite of all these things, and, worse than all, of the grinding oppression of poverty, M. Comte has pressed steadily onwards, from his youth to the turn of mature life, towards the final accomplishment of his early meditated designs, and has ultimately succeeded in completing the immense elaboration of his vast system in the Cours de Philosophie Positive. Considering this, however, as merely the necessary introduction to more immediately practical labours, he closes his long work with the promise and the delineation of those ulterior speculations, for which all that he has already accomplished is regarded merely as the indispensable preparation. It would be difficult, if not impossible, in the present age to find a parallel for the immense learning and labour of the Cours de Philosophie Positive; it would be questionable whether in any age an analogous case could be discovered, in which such labours had been contemplated by their author as merely the scaffolding for higher and more important constructions, designed and to be erected by himself. These are considerations which entitle M. Comte to our admiration, wholly irrespective of the error or the truth of his conclusions, or of the beneficial or pernicious tendency of his writings.

One of the most remarkable peculiarities connected with the composition of this work, is the singularly brief time in which its different parts were written. In the midst of all other engagements and distractions, these five thousand pages were composed in twenty-two months of actual labour, as appears from the data communicated by M. Comte in the general table of contents appended to the sixth volume. The publication, owing to a variety of delays, was pro-longed through the tedious term of twelve years; but the treatise was written by scraps at different times, which in the aggregate amount to only the above-mentioned period of twenty-two months. It is true that long previous meditation had already developed in his 'mind the connected scheme of the Positive Philosophy, and his pub-lie lectures had in a great measure settled the form and systematized the order of its exposition; still, when we consider the. range, the variety, and the learning of the work, the extreme rapidity of its composition must be regarded as not the least remarkable of its characteristics. It adds to our admiration also, that, though this hasty execution has occasioned prolixity and needless repetition, it has in no wise impaired the strict logical concatenation, the close interdependence, or the symmetry of its respective parts.

Before concluding this rapid notice of the critical merits of M. Comte, we must commend the perspicuity and translucent clearness of his style, the quaint but vigorous originality of his expressions, and the happy grace of his forcible mode of argumentation. His literary excellences are by no means inferior either to his philosophical profundity or his scientific attainments.

The motives which inspired the composition of this great philosophical system may be in some measure inferred from our previous remarks; but they are so closely connected with the satisfaction of the wants, and with the realization of the most active appetencies of the age-and, furthermore, they shed so much light upon the character of the system itself; that if we had the space, we would scarcely deem it irrelevant to accord to them a wore extended examination here. Moreover, we regard the feeling which prompted M. Comte's vast exertions, guided his investigations, and determined his utterance, as being that feeling which it is most important to awaken in the minds of the passing generation; for, whatever may be our estimate of the method or of the results of the Positive Philosophy, there is no room for doubting the urgent necessity for a general intellectual regeneration, though we would have it irradiated by a very different spirit from that which breathes through the creed of M. Comte. Nevertheless, the full and clear-sighted recognition of such a necessity has furnished the main-spring of his labours, and the desire of suitably supplying the want has given birth to his great treatise. He says of himself:-

"When I had barely attained the age of fourteen, I had already, of my own accord, run over all the essential degrees of the revolutionary spirit, and experienced the fundamental necessity of a universal regeneration, at once political and philosophical, under active energy of that salutary crisis, whose principal phase had preceded my birth."

M. Comte may, perhaps, have deceived himself in tracing to so a period the origin of his particular philosophy, from the desire to assimilate his own intellectual development to that of Lord Bacon, whom he regards, most erroneously, as the apostle of Positivism ; ["Les deux eternels legislateurs primitifs de la philosophic positive, Bacon et Descartes."- Cours de Phil. Pos., tome vi, p. 455; V, pp. 695, 756, 784, 886.] but the anxiety to prepare the way, and, if possible, to determine the form for this second instauration of the sciences has undoubtedly been the actuating of his philosophical life. Our estimate of the results and aims of his philosophy will accordingly depend to no slight extent upon our agreement or disagreement with his conclusions in regard to the social, political, and intellectual condition of modern civilization.

For ourselves, we have no hesitation in declaring that we assent most cordially to nearly all of M. Comte’s strictures on the present age. With him we recognise its total want of consistent principles. and the. entire absence of anything like logical or philosophical sequence in its schemes, its practices, and its reasonings. We perceive most clearly the universal spirit of resistance to all authority, resulting in anarchy intellectual, political, social, and religious; the substitution of false and petty aims in life for the noble sentiments of right and duty; the degradation of all science into the mere instrument of pecuniary advancement, and the concomitant decline of science itself. Like him, we admit and lament the mammonization of all the springs, processes, and results of human action, whether collective or individual; and we regard these evils as being pre-eminently the characteristics of this self-glorifying, self-stultifying age of intellect. To these things, as not very remote causes, we trace the social and political calamities and revolutions which have illustrated the history of the recent years; and we can conceive of no remedy for the present condition of the European world, and possibly for the impending fate of America, which does not commence with a complete reformation and reorganization of our philosophy. Thus our opinions are in perfect unison with those of M. Comte as to the task which is proposed to the present generation, and the nature of the medium in which it is to be accomplished; and, however widely we may differ from him in our choice of the modes of procedure to be adopted, and dissent from the fundamental principles of the required philosophy proposed by him, we acknowledge the valuable services which he has rendered by precisely stating the conditions of the problem, and offer the cordial tribute of our admiration to the singular genius, learning, and sagacity with which they have been settled, proved, and illustrated.

A vague and latent feeling of these pernicious characteristics of the times, with their dependent consequences, led to the premature, fantastic, and irrational reveries of Saint- Simon, Fourier, and Owen. But, however chimerical we may deem their views, and how-ever delusive or demoralizing we may consider their projects, these writers are entitled to our conscientious regard for the promptitude with which they detected the obscure nature of the disease, the boldness with which they attempted to expose it, and the faithful diligence with which they endeavoured to discover and apply a remedy; for these growing evils were then imminent, and they are still impending fatally over the human race-more fatally for the recent explosion in Europe-and they demand a prompt, a clear, and a sufficient solution.

It was the common recognition of the same phenomena and the same necessities, which led M. Comte to associate himself with Saint-Simon: they were inspired with the same hopes, and actuated by the same spirit. They both saw the urgency of a complete intellectual regeneration, which might revivify every department of human speculation and practice, and might effectually reorganize the various systems of social co-ordination. M. Saint-Simon was an enthusiast, a fanatic, and the constant dupe of his own vanity: he was uneducated, and his mind was undisciplined, and consequently his refuge and his creed was mysticism. M. Comte is more learned, more sober, more practical, and more profound; but both aimed at the same end, and hoped for its achievement by analogous means. If the one degraded and the other denied religion, they both did so under the delusion that Christianity was effete or false, and proved to be so by the utter decay of its influence over the lives and actions of men, and by its apparent inefficacy to 'remedy those social disorders which they did not perceive had sprung from infidelity of heart, and from practical disregard of its precepts and solemn ordinances.

Out of the ranks of the Saint-Simonians, as in them, M. Comte still kept the same high objects in view. He thought, he studied, he lectured, he taught, and he wrote, to call the attention of mankind to their condition and their wants; to awaken them to the recognition of the necessity of an instant and thorough intellectual regeneration; to urge them to the laborious accomplishment of the great task; and to offer them what seemed to himself a sufficient, and the only sufficient for their labours, and remedy for their distempers. Whether, in this estimate, he has not deceived himself, we shall hereafter inquire: but it is to the constant stimulus of such views and feelings that we owe the composition of the Cours de Philosophie Positive; and we freely acknowledge our deep gratitude for the gift. We shall censure as strongly as any one the fallacies and sophistries of its infidelity, and the errors which we deem its author to have committed; but, on the whole, we regard it as the great and most valuable legacy which the first half of the nineteenth century has bequeathed to posterity. M. Comte recognises, illustrates, and probes, with a delicate and faithful hand, the nature and sources of universal distemperature of the times, which threatens to convert the human family into a pandemonium upon earth, and to render all human achievement, all human civilization, and all human science, the instruments of the most complete and wide-spreading debasement of society. He points out the gross intellectual aberrations into which this enlightened age has fallen; the deep-seated intellectual anarchy and licentiousness which prevail, to the discomfiture of science, philosophy, and social organization: to these sources he traces the revolutionary character of the day, the wants and miseries of the masses, and the advancing disintegration of all intellectual systems. But, not content with merely calling attention to the existence of evil-a mission which Carlyle has performed with the ignorance, but also with the frenzied inspiration of a priestess of Delphi or Dodona-he endeavours to characterize its nature and discover its origin; and unsatisfied even with this, he suggests remedies, and offers what he deems a panacea in a new method of science, a new instauration of learning, a new philosophy without a creed, and a concomitant and accordant reorganization of society. Such is the purpose of the Cours de Philosophie Positive.

Referring the social difficulties and disorders of the times to the unsoundness of our intellectual principles, to the vague and fluctuating nature of all our speculations about men and states, and to the logical fallacies involved in all our scientific processes, M. Comte deems it necessary to constitute the general science of societies (Sociology) before proceeding to examine questions of politics proper, or of political economy. But, in order duly to create this social science, he examines the grounds and truth of all other human sciences, regarding them as the necessary preliminaries to the examination of the phenomena of social existence. These propaedeutic studies, each of which has its own independent value, can, however, be neither criticised nor examined, except in their mutual relations and interdependence; nor can they be reformed or corrected without a constant reference to some fixed scientific method. Hence the necessity of commencing these labours by a formal classification of the sciences; and hence also the necessity of making such classification dependent upon a clearly defined method. This method must of course be determined by the nature of the faculties of the human mind, by the degree of certainty conceived to appertain to human knowledge, and by the character which belongs to all human reasoning. All methods agree in seeking their determination from these. sources, and the diversities by which they may be separated from each' other thus spring entirely from the different modes in which these problems are interpreted by different minds.

Under the influence of these considerations. M. Comte determines the character, conditions, and limitations of human knowledge, and the method of scientific inquiry to be pursued in accordance with such restrictions, which method lie terms the Positive Philosophy. He then proceeds, by the application and development of this method, to build up the several sciences in regular order and due sequence, raising them stage by. stage above each other in beautiful and harmonious co-ordination, thus constructing his new classification of the sciences, or Hierarchic des Sciences Positives. As he advances, he points out the peculiarities, the excellences, and the defects of the several science-he determines what conclusions arc solid, what doubtful, and what fallacious-develops the positive method concurrently with his criticism-and thus passes through all the subordinate and interdependent degrees to those biological studies which, though. not cultivated philosophically as yet, nevertheless form the indispensable link of transition to the study of the actions of masses of men, the doctrine of communities, or what he has named Social or Sociological science.

This orderly and logical mode of procedure suggests to us the course to be adopted in our examination of M. Comte's system of philosophy. Leaving out of view the application of his doctrines to the separate sciences, and neglecting his scheme of classification, as not specially belonging to the present inquiry, we shall first consider briefly his views of the nature and limitations of human knowledge then proceed to an examination of his Method; next investigate the character and efficiency of the Positive Philosophy; and conclude with an estimate of the validity, the tendencies, and the defects of this recent counterpart to the Instauratio Magna of Lord Bacon. Throughout this examination, we shall find at every step new cause for admiration, in the work, though we may ultimately conclude that the views therein set forth are imperfect, impracticable, or fallacious; and may find that the writer has overlooked many of the most vital phenomena and most important characteristics of human life and knowledge; and may even discover that the new method, as understood by its promulgator, involves such fallacies and inconsistencies as defeat its satisfactory application to the solution of the social and intellectual difficulties of the present age. Such is the mode of procedure which we shall adopt, in order to afford a critical and impartial estimate of the Positive Philosophy of M. Comte.

In a former essay we discussed the general question of the certainty and limitations of human knowledge, [April, 1851. Art. I, Philosophy and Faith.] and indicated the position assumed by the Positive Philosophy in regard to this fundamental point. On the present occasion, accordingly, we need only repeat briefly what we then exhibited more fully, and notice the fatal and all-pervading errors which have sprung from fallacious views on this subject.

The human mind, according to the doctrine of M. Comte, recognises the impossibility of attaining to absolute knowledge, renounces all inquiry into the origin and destination of the universe and into the intimate causes of phenomena, and seeks only to discover, by a happy combination of reasoning and observation, the laws of their action; that is to say, their uniform relations of succession and resemblance. The explanation of facts, thus reduced to precise terms, becomes thenceforward the established connexion between the diverse particular phenomena and certain general facts, whose numbers diminish with the progress of science. [Cours de Phil. Pos., lecon i, tome i, pp. 4, 5.] The statement of these general facts, in scientific language constitutes what is habitually understood by the laws of nature.

We deem M. Comte, as we said on the previous occasion, to have taken a correct view of the nature of strict science, in considering its laws as merely the theoretical colligation of phenomena, and as possessing no demonstrative truth beyond their correspondence with the facts obtained by observation, and their conformity with the consequences developed by accurate reasoning therefrom; but he errs in ignoring and cashiering everything which [FOURTH SERIES, VOL. IV.-2.] does not fall within the range of strict scientific demonstration. The limitation proposed by M. Comte only distinguishes scientific from unscientific knowledge; it explodes neither the existence nor the practical utility, under certain conditions, of the latter. All science, indeed, in its earlier 'ages had belonged to this same category of vague, undefined, unsystematized knowledge; and if the rule of the Positive Philosophy is of universal application, the existence of the grain of truth in former speculation, which has fructified into our modern science, is, denied by the same negation which in our time affects to repudiate everything but that small portion of human knowledge which admits of scientific co-ordination. Every round in the long ladder of human progress by which our present advancement has been attained, would be thus proved to have been utterly rotten and nugatory, and unavailing even for those purposes which it had subserved. Yet, despite of this, we would continue to claim as valid the position to which we had ultimately arrived by their assistance. M. Comte asserts, and most justly, that the only true method of philosophical exposition must be principally historical,. [Cours de Phil. Pos., lecon lviii, tome vi, p. 658.] and must explain, absorb, and harmonize all the previous stages of progress; but certainly the leading dogma of Positivism in regard to the conditions of human knowledge is strangely at variance with this doctrine of an historical mode of philosophy. Nevertheless, this inconsistency is by no means the sole or the principal objection to the application of M. Comte's theory to the extent contemplated by him. Its great fallacy is, that it excludes from even practical validity that great portion of human knowledge and opinion which, though not systematized into science, furnishes the sufficient and only attainable rules of our ordinary life and action, continues to supply; as it has hitherto supplied, the material for the further advancement of science itself, and affords a substitute for scientific direction in anticipation of the time when the development of science enables it to furnish more satisfactory and demonstrative prescriptions. Our life and intellect are submitted to the harmonious guidance of a self-expanding, self-expounding science, and an undefined arbiter, half-reason, half-instinct, which supplies the deficiencies of the former. This unsystematized reason is the sole guide of the untutored ages of humanity. With the advance of civilization it concedes daily more and more of its once exclusive authority to the hands of its younger, but more showy and disciplined sister; but it never entirely resigns the reins of human conduct, nor can discord be introduced between the two, or a usurped and exclusive jurisdiction conferred upon the puisne' sovereign, without endangering the foundations [2*] of all reason, and introducing fatal schisms and inconsistencies into our whole reasoning and practice.

The ostentatious profundity of modern times, which derides as superstition all that admits not of explication by the formalism of its scientific processes, has narrowed and cramped the range of the human intellect, and palsied the play of human feeling. It has cut 'us off from all recognition of those vague impulses, those mystical aspirations, those prophetic instincts, and hallowed fancies, which, 'yielding not to the trammels of science, are sublimated by the alembic or eliminated by the calculus, but which nevertheless are calculus, to sanctify and adorn our daily life and conversation, and to shed the brilliancy of a heavenly origin around the cold formalities of the world. All that is essential to redeem science from its hard and impassive narrowness-to counteract its dangerous seductions-lies beyond its horizon. Every appeal to the imagination, the affections, and the nobler principles of our being, is drawn from springs deeper than the finite plummet of human intellect has ever sounded There can be no sympathetic comprehension of the wide universe in which we are placed, no quickening recognition of our manifold relations to it, unless we breathe a more empyrean air than that which can be compressed by the force-pump of scientific demonstration. Nay, we must travel beyond the sphere of human systems, before we can discover those eternal founts of light, which are requisite for the irradiation, the enlargement, and the elevation of science itself. How unwise then, how unworthy of our boasted intelligence, to dwarf the undefined world of human apprehension to the straitened compass of scientific truths!

We are no advocates for the wild and feverish delusions of theoretic fantasy; no rebels against the wholesome restrictions of sober reason; no architects of unsubstantial systems framed by reasoning a' priori. All that we maintain is, that a broad line of distinction-wide as the chasm which separates Dives and Lazarus-exists, and should be recognised, between scientific conclusions and unscientific knowledge. We agree most entirely and cordially with M. Comte in our estimate of the character of the former, but we are unwilling with him to blind ourselves to the existence and importance of the. latter.. We would cheerfully render unto Caesar the things that be Caesar's; but we think that the most essential part of the tribute remains unpaid until we render unto God the things which are God's, without attempting to absolve the human intellect from its highest and noblest functions.

It would not be difficult to show that M. Comte's position, so far as it is true-that is to say, when confined to the characterization of scientific knowledge bad been in some degree anticipated by Lord Bacon himself, and indicated by him in a remarkable passage of his works, which probably suggested to our author the designation of the Positive Philosophy. ["ut doctrinam quandam positivam, et tanquam fide experimentali." **Fab. Cupid., Bacon's works, vol. xi, p.99, ed. Montagu. The whole passage is cited Meth. Qu. Rev., vol. xxxiii, p.198.] His great predecessor has, however, with his wonted comprehensive grasp of intellect, recognised also that distinction between knowledge capable of systematization and knowledge incapable of it, on which we have insisted; though he has left his views undeveloped. Perhaps we might go back three centuries in time, and find M. Comte's theory obscurely intimated in the great precursor and namesake of the sage of Verulam :-" Tota philosophae intentio non est nisi rerum natures et proprietates evolvere." [Opus Majus, ps. ii, c. viii, p.21, ed. Venet.] If by "the nature of things," Roger Bacon contemplated only their phenomenal nature, this passage might have formed a suitable motto to the Cours de Philosophic Positive. And that such was his intention might perhaps he safely inferred from other remarks contained in the Opus Majus, especially from that profound observation in which he anticipates the wisdom of Lord Bacon already referred to:-

"Sed tamen omne id super quod potest intellectus noster, ut intelligat et sciat, oportet quod sit indignum respectu eorum, ad que in principio credenda sua debilitate obligetur, sicut sunt divinae veritates et multa secreta naturae et artis complentis naturam, de quibus nulla ratio humana dari potest in principo; sed Oportet quod per experientiam illuminationis interioris a Deo recipiat intellectum, viz., in sacris veritatibus gratiae et gloriae, et per experientiam sensibilem in arcanis naturae et artis expergefactus inveniat rationem.": [Opus Majus, ps. i, c. x, p. 11.]

But whether it be true or not that the position of Comte was indistinctly perceived by friar Bacon, under its due limitations, there can no doubt that he has supplied a valid criticism on its exclusive application:-

"Non est homini gloriandum de sapientia, nec debet aliquis magnificare et extollere quae scit. Pauca enim sunt et vilia respectu eorum, quae non intelligit sed credit, et longe pauciora respectu eorum quae ignorat." [Opus Majus, ps. i, c. x, p. 11.]

We do not mean to strip M. Comte of his laurels. He looks up to Lord Bacon as the prophet, and almost as the founder of the Positive Philosophy; and whatever may have been the views of either Bacon on this subject, they certainly never designed them to be accepted in the sense in which they have been expounded by Comte, nor did they anticipate him in the elaboration of an entire scheme of philosophy on this basis. Moreover, Lord Bacon, with his "natura naturans," his "latens schematismus," and such technical phrases of an antiquated metaphysical system, was far from attaining the perspicuity, the accuracy, and the precision with which this great doctrine has been enunciated by M. Comte, whose sole error consists in rendering it exclusive.

But besides the general objections, which have been just stated, there are others, springing immediately from this erroneous estimate of the nature and limitations of human knowledge, which peculiarly infect the whole scheme of the Positive Philosophy. Such, for example, is the entire negation of logic and metaphysics; such is also the absolute repudiation of all religious belief, and the substitution of the adoration of a typical humanity for all forms of divine worship.' These errors flow legitimately and necessarily from the fundamental fallacy which we have noticed: the latter will be more appropriately treated when we come to speak of the tendencies of M. Comte's system; the former we will discuss in connexion with the positive method, which we proceed at once to consider.

If science (as indeed is true) be necessarily founded upon observation and induction, and if all reliable knowledge (which, however, is not true) be that which admits of a scientific character, then all knowledge which does not possess the characteristics specified by M. Comte as essential to its validity, must be utterly unworthy of the recognition of a disciplined philosopher, and may accordingly be cashiered by him as altogether nugatory. Such an undigested body of knowledge may indeed have formed the avenue along which the human mind has advanced to the apprehension' of positive truth; it may have been the sole and indispensable support of previous ages of ignorance; but its mission is wholly ended on the appearance of the new dispensation. We may, indeed, assign to it an historical and factitious value, as indicating the line of march and the stages of advancement by which the world has arrived at its present purified intelligence; we may regard it with interest and respect as the chrysalis in which the vital germ of our present glorious science lay buried until the appointed time of its manifestation: but independently of these considerations, and considerations which spring from these, it can have no claim upon our veneration, as it has none upon our credence. In characterizing the gradual progress of human intelligence, as in estimating the value of contemporary philosophy, and determining the method to be pursued,. the simple thread to guide us through the labyrinth will be found in the relation which different systems bear to the fundamental principle of the Positive Philosophy. As this aspires only to the discovery of phenomenal laws, and proceeds entirely by sensible observation and reasoning therefrom; so that doctrine which derives its facts from an unquestioning belief in the evidence of sense and feeling, draws its certitude from an unreasoning conviction, and builds its conclusions by deduction from loosely assumed premises, is most widely antagonistic to it, and belongs to the early ages of humanity, and the ruder periods of human reason. Midway between these opposing systems is a method which cautiously examines into the premises which it receives, curiously detects and exposes the weak points of the system of faith, and then diligently attempts to close up the wounds which it has made, by instituting a theoretic reconstruction of the whole fabric of human life and knowledge, which is supposed to be valid if it does not offend against any of the theories which have been established as the abracadabra of the creed. This manner of reasoning is the intermediate link between the other two, and furnishes the means of transition from the blind credulity of the one to the equally blind scepticism of the other. The three systems, when arranged in their logical and chronological order, have been designated by M. Comte the theological, the metaphysical or critical, and the positive methods. The first maintains a belief in supernatural agency, seeks into the hidden nature of being, and endeavours to discover efficient and final causes; the second is only a modification of the first, and consists in substituting ideal entities for the supernatural agencies of its predecessor; and the third is such as we have already described it. [Cours de Phil. Pos., lecon i, tome 1, pp. 2, 3.]

In the above remarks we have attempted to exhibit the chain of reasoning by which M. Comte appears to have been led to the specification and adoption of the positive method. It will be observed, that the application of the names or epithets to the three successive systems is a piece of philosophical legerdemain, designed to excite prejudices for an ulterior purpose; and that the links of the deduction are by no means free from flaw; while the whole chain is dependent upon an hypothetical premiss which we 'have shown to be fallacious.

But further: although the reasonings of the human mind may be justly distinguished into these three classes, the distinction is valid only in regard to its progress in particular and often fragmentary branches of inquiry. In the individual intellect, as' in the history of humanity, all three modes exist concurrently together, and are concurrently applied to different subjects, or different. members of the same subject. We do not drive the sciences abreast-.such an idea is admissible only in the magnificent hyperbole of Fontenelle ; ["Pareil en quelque sort aux anciens qui avaient l'adresse de mener jusqu'a huit chevaux atteles de front, il mena de front toutes les sciences."-Fontenelle Eloge de Leibnitz. Leibn. Oeuvres, vol. ii, p.1.] but the sciences themselves, and their different subdivisions, always exhibit diverse degrees o' advancement, and a coexistent subordination to all of these methods. It is true, indeed, that the employment of the one or the other may so far preponderate as to give a prevailing tinge to the procedure of a system, the philosophy of a period, or, the reasonings of a man. Still, such prevalence by no means indicates the exclusion of the other modes; nor is it in contravention of their validity within their own appropriate range. In the darkest infancy of civilization, so far as history or tradition can inform us, some rude arts were possessed, and consequently there must have been some exercise of positive reasoning. In the enlightenment of modern times, some entities and some supernatural powers are still recognised, although M. Comte and M. Strauss would explode them by the establishment of their own foregone conclusions M Comte perceives that the contemporary character of different sciences is analogous to the historical development of a particular one-that all three modes of philosophy coexist in the different conditions of distinct bodies of contemporary learning, as they have succeeded each other in the evolution of a special department of knowledge. Indeed, much of the positive method, and the whole "Hierarchie fondamentale des Sciences Positives," spring from this basis Yet, apprehending this truth, he fails to see how fatally it is at variance with the supposition of the exclusive validity of any one method The truth is, that the various modes do not succeed each other in their systematic integrity: such succession reveals merely the course pursued in the attainment of each separate acquisition. The tendency of the human intellect is undoubtedly to render scientific all the conquests of reason which can be coordinated under general laws; that is to say, to bring all its information under the category of positive philosophy. In its advances towards this goal, it passes through the two other previous stages; and so far the positions of Comte are correct. The positive method is correct and exclusive so far as it is applicable, but it is not of universal application; for much of our knowledge still remains in the transition state, and may never pass beyond it, though the domain of this intermediate system must shrink up with the progress of science. But that large portion of human knowledge or conviction which, as friar Bacon says, we believe but do not understand, may continue in the unresolved nebulous form of its primitive condition, and may admit of but partial conversion into either of the other states, although one has attempted to absorb and transmute it, and the other to supplant or deny it. Supposing that the scientific progress of man was complete as complete as human faculties and a finite intelligence would permit-all knowledge would not even then be scientific or positive, but much would still remain in that vague and indistinct state,, out of which all our science had been tediously evolved. Even then we should not be justified in abusing the authority of science to abjure that whole body of knowledge, without which science itself could never have been. In such an event, the intermediate philosophy might relapse into its earlier condition in part, and in the main become blended into science, and so vanish; but then, as now, our life would be regulated and illumined by the two great lights of heaven-the sun of faith to rule by day over our earthly duties and heavenward aspirations, and the moon of science to rule by night over the darkness of human reason and human achievement.

It is a vain effort to endeavour to reduce all knowledge to a single precise and unvarying form. As it is in its nature relative, both in its subjective and objective' respects, both with respect to the mind which knows and the thing which is known, it must of consequence vary in a manner corresponding with the different relations which subsist between both. Hence our convictions are founded upon different kinds and degrees of evidence, which must produce a characteristic difference in the nature of the conviction itself The principle of belief may be the same, but the certainty exists under a difference of form. The ancients, and the earlier philosophers of modern times, in their recognition of distinct species of intellectual apprehension, were wiser in the vagueness and uncertainty of their language, than the great reasoners of our own day in that attempted perspicuity which is attainable only by the sacrifice of some of the most important forms of truth. Valid objections may, indeed, be raised to the various modes in which it has been proposed to distribute human knowledge into its species. With the scholiast David, we may admit five powers or faculties of knowledge-perception, conjecture, opinion, understanding, and pure reason [pollois anabaqmois kecrhtai tiVVVVVs ina gnw thn filosofian qelei gar ginwskein tas penet gnwstikas duunameis eisi de autai aisqhsis, farntasia, doxa,m dinanoia, kai nous. David Prolegomena Philosophiae, ap. Schol. Aristot., p. 14, b. 30.] or, with Olympiodorus [David, ibid., b. 38.] we may prefer a novenary, or with Aristotle, [Eth. Nicomach, lib. vi, c. iii, p. 1189.] a septenary, or with Spinoza, [De la Reforme de ’Entendement. Oeuvres, ed. Saisset, vol. ii, pp. 280, 281.] a quaternary, or with Hobbes, [Ap. Morell, Crit. Hist. Phil., &c., p. 73.] a binary division of knowledge: but whichever mode we adopt, we cannot, unless blinded by the partiality of system, fail to recognise that no single form will embrace all the specific characteristics of knowledge. To attempt, then, to restrict the sphere of human belief, and to limit the anile of valid knowledge merely to that which has attained, or is capable attaining, a scientific or positive form, is the fallacy of mistake a part for the whole, and is equally erroneous as to suppose some truths must be received by faith and are incapable of demonstration, that therefore all must be so. Both errors spring from the same defective view: the former is the error of M. Comte; the latter, that of the narrow-minded theology which generates an hostility between science and religion, by utterly denying the independent validity of scientific reasoning, and has led, as a consequence of the same fundamental sophism, to Comte's utter negation of religion itself, and his repetition of the assumption of his adversaries, that science and religion are incompatible with each other.

May it be permitted us here to remark in all humility, and without pretending to except ourselves from the censure, that these errors, and nearly all others connected with the abstruse questions regarding the foundations and characteristics of knowledge, arise from the almost hopeless incapacity of the human mind to contemplate m their coexistence and interdependence the complex multiplicity of natural phenomena, whence men are driven to seek for a delusive simplicity by a necessary exclusion of those data which refuse to be systematized, and to forget in the pride of their own labours that such exclusion has prevented the results obtained from being anything more than a partial representation and explication of the facts, and thus to mistake their imperfect systems for a complete, all-comprehending exposition. This is the great danger of scientific systems-a danger which justifies, if it did not suggest, Lord Bacon's reprehension of systematic science.

Having shown, by these general considerations, the invalidity of the exclusive claims of the Positive Philosophy, as a complete system or method of universal application, we proceed to examine more closely the characteristics of the Positive Method itself. The development of each individual mind being analogous to the progressive development of humanity, or the human mind in its totality,-a doctrine borrowed from Hegel, and true under certain limitations,-and the logical construction of science corresponding with its chronological improvement, a correct philosophy must rest upon a wide induction from the phenomena of human progress. Those stages, then, through which the intellect of humanity has passed, may be regarded as the landmarks for determining the facts, and, consequently, the positive laws of philosophic advancement; and the goal towards which this progress tends, will exhibit the essential condition of a valid philosophy. In this manner M. Comte is led to the institution of the Historical Method of Philosophy, as it has been 'well termed by Mr. Mill; and from this method springs, by an easy and legitimate descent, that beautiful and admirable classification of the sciences, which even Mr. Morell acknowledges to be "unquestionably a masterpiece of scientific thinking, as simple as it is comprehensive."[Crit. Hist. Phil., &c., p.356.]

But the question next arises, What are the stages of historical progress? or under what general and characteristic heads may the successive conditions of the human mind, in its onward march, be appropriately classified? They are, according to M. Comte, those already discussed, and termed by him the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. The whole of the fifth and nearly half of the sixth volume of the Cours de Philosophie Positive are devoted to the proof of the justice of this division, which is there endeavoured to be deduced from an examination of the whole stream of human story. With this Philosophy of History, admirable as it is in many respects, singularly acute, ingenious, and sagacious as it nearly always is, we shall not concern ourselves in the present essay, as it would require too much space, and too seriously interrupt the continuity of our exposition of the system. But in the classification which it is intended to support, there is so much truth mixed up with a fatal leaven of error, that, even at the risk of some delay, we must stop to estimate its value. We might object that the terms employed are metaphysical in their application; that they extend to a whole period that which is but partially characteristic of it; that they are indistinct, uncertain, and inapposite; and that they rather convey such meaning, and just so much, as the loose imaginations or the prejudices of the reader may be disposed to attribute to them, than any determinate idea. But, though much might be appropriately said upon these points, we are not disposed to avail ourselves of any arguments having the semblance of a quibble in the discussion of so important and vital a feature of the Positive Philosophy, or in the confutation of an author fir whose sincerity and profundity we entertain so high an admiration as we feel for M. Comte's. We shall, therefore, endeavour to estimate the value of the ideas rather than of the terms; to show in what respect they are vague and shadowy, even as conceived by the great founder of the system; and to detect the germ of subsequent and consequential fallacies in this very obscurity.

M. Comte says, [Cours de Phil. Pos., tome i, p. 11. ] that the attraction of an unlimited empire over the external world, considered as designed for man's use, and linked to his existence by intimate and continual ties; that the chimerical hopes and exaggerated ideas of the importance of man, which are incident to the earliest ages of society, give birth to theology and the theological character of all knowledge or speculation in those ages. We would deny the existence of the causes alleged, and the connexion between the assumed causes and the supposed effects. M. Comte has represented the retrospective judgment of the philosopher looking back from the vantage ground of modern science, on the primitive condition of society, rather than the feelings of the society itself he has learned the destiny from the event, and attribution the same knowledge as an anticipation present to those who commenced its fulfillment. The history of the early ages of humanity, and the early condition of societies, represents them as possessed by sentiments utterly at variance with these views. A crushing, despondent subjection to the unseen powers of nature; an unquestioning belief in a supernatural decree; an indisposition to look into the future, and a reckless contentment with the present; a belief in the almost hopeless inutility of human effort, and the absolute dependence of man on supernatural authority; a humiliating sense of individual insignificance-such are the characteristics of the earliest centuries of humanity of which tradition or history gives us an account We can readily conceive how such feelings as these might generate a blind, unreasoning theology, with which they would certainly be in harmony, but we cannot, in the slightest degree, comprehend how the theological character of early times could arise out of the causes supposed by M. Comte. We admit this theological character, though we think it requires to be guarded with precision; but we think it is due to the simplicity of the rude and uninformed mind, susceptible to all the terrors and impressions of the natural world, and the unstilled murmurs of the mystic voice within, still unweaned from its divine original, which gives birth to the religious character of these times. it is the vague, undefined mystery of confused feelings, struggling to realize and embody itself in the world without, which gives rise to that low type of religion which M. Comte not inappropriately terms fetichism; for, in such ages, man humbles himself before the god whose presence he beholds in the cloud, the sunshine, or the shower, and whose anger he hears in the thunder and the tempest. The great secret, however, is that then the mind of man, and his wild untutored nature, yield themselves facile to his instinctive impulses, which have not yet learned to analyze themselves, or to clothe themselves in the barren precision of metaphysical expressions. Under these circumstances, all the relations of life, all the phenomena of nature, are sup-posed to be under the immediate governance or agency of super-natural powers. The human mind has not yet claimed its due participation in the changes which take place around it; and every action, even the simplest, becomes connected more or less with religious observances. Religion - a blind superstition, in great measure it may be, but hardly a theology-religion thus engrosses all of human life, claiming not merely what is its due, but what awaits the development of the human mind to become legitimately dependent upon other control. When this period arrives, religion is only relieved of the superintendence of a domain which did not rightfully belong to her,-not exiled from her own: her eternal rights remain unimpaired, though some temporary usurpations she may abandon.

It will thus be observed, that what M. Comte terms the theological state, or the theological period, is that in which an unreasoning superstition absorbs the whole domain of human intelligence, and perceives the imminent agency of the divinity in every phenomenon of nature. That there is such a condition, both in the progress of society and in the development of the human mind, is indisputable; but the abuse of the religious feeling is not religion, and a blind superstition is not theology, no matter how closely or how frequently it may appear to be connected with it. Let us add here also, en parenthese, that theology presupposes metaphysics, [So recognised apparently by Aristotle and the ancients. Arist. Metaph., v.i, p.1026, a. 24, and Schol. Alex. Aphrod. Ad loc.]as it is the union of religion and metaphysics, the systematization of religious creeds and doctrines by metaphysical reasoning. The important truth contained in M. Comte's view is, that the faith which is essential to religion exists in excess in that particular state or era, and is equally characteristic of all belief; and that an immediate divine agency is then employed to explain everything, even those things which in more enlightened ages are justly referred to the operation of natural laws. The vital fallacies consist in confounding religion with its aberrations; in failing to perceive that religion, in a narrower or wider sense, is characteristic of all ages, and cannot therefore be assumed as the specific difference of one; and in supposing that its restriction within due limits is a virtual demonstration of its absolute falsehood and inefficacies.

We may make nearly the same observations in regard to M. Comte's conception of the metaphysical era, for the fallacies involved are similar. The cultivation of the reasoning faculties of man soon brings him to the recognition of intermediate links of causation; and the difficulty of grappling with the shadowy forms of undefined causes, induces him to give a name and an independent existence to these causes. Thus arises the doctrine of entities, and the whole framework of the Realistic philosophy. The habit of mind producing these results, when it pursues its logical evolution to extremes, undermines the foundations on which religious belief is supported, by hypostatizing all things, and reducing all entities, even the being of God, to the mere creations of the human intellect. Thus it constitutes the transition stage to the entire negation of all religion. But observe, that these entities do not necessarily appertain to metaphysics, but are characteristic of only one form of metaphysical philosophy-Realism. It is true, that it is with great difficulty that the passage from Realism to Conceptualism or Nominalism is effected. It is equally true, though we need not dwell upon it here, that these other forms of ontology lead, in like manner, to scepticism when developed to their ultimate consequences. But the point to be noted is, that the characteristics which M. Comte assigns generally metaphysics are incident to merely one form of it, and cannot therefore be assumed as the properties of the science itself. It must be further remembered, that before religion is systematized into theology, it must be moulded into that form by union with metaphysics; and it might be shown, though we may not have the time to do it on the present occasion, that even science must be fallacious unless it rests upon a correct basis of metaphysics, and recognises its dependence thereon, so that even in the Positive state the concurrent existence of metaphysics is required.

We might again repeat nearly the same observations in passing to the consideration of the Positive state; but as the Positive Philosophy is the subject of this essay, their repetition is unnecessary, and we may safely leave them to be more particularly gathered from our general criticism, which must be deferred to the next issue of this journal.

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