A COMPENDIUM OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY

APPENDIX

Before I conclude, it seems highly necessary to enlarge a little on some particulars, which were before but slightly mentioned.

One of these is the HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, which was just mention­ed in the Fourth Chapter of the First Part. On this important head I now intend to speak particularly; chiefly on the plan of the pious and learned Dr. Peter Brown, late Bishop of Cork, in Ireland.

It is needful, first, to trace out the bounds and extent of human under­standing. These bounds being fixed, we are next to consider, how the mind dilates itself beyond them: how it supplies the want of direct ideas, by raising up secondary images in itself: insomuch that things, otherwise imperceptible, grow familiar and easy; and we meditate and discourse even on those beings, whereof we have not the least direct perception.

CHAPTER 1
SECTION I
OF THE IDEAS OF SENSATION

  Our senses are the only source of those ideas, upon which all our knowledge is founded. Without ideas of’ some sort or other, we could have no ‘knowledge ; and without our senses we could have no ideas. But these being once transmitted to the memory, the soul, which till then was still an unactive being, supplied with materials to work upon, begins to exert her operations.

Before we speak of the properties of ideas of sensation, it is proper to observe three things : 1. That it is not necessary to decide whether sensitive perception be performed, by an impression of the object upon the sense, or by an operation of the sense upon the object.  It is certain that either way of sensitive perception necessarily requires the presence of the object, and an immediate action, either of the organ upon this, or of this upon the organ : consequent upon which is a sort of representation of the object to the mind. This is the case of all external objects, which have left any representation of themselves with us by our senses: which representation being transmitted by the senses to the memory, is properly termed an IDEA.

If any one asks, what an idea is, let him look upon a tree, and then immediately shutting his eyes, try if he retains any resemblances of what he saw; and that is an idea. Thus is it is, that all the varieties of the visible creation is let in upon our minds through the senses, as  all parts of a delightful and spacious landscape are contracted and conveyed into a dark chamber, through an artificial eye in the wall , and so become conspicuous and distinguished in miniature.

Nor, 2. Is it material whether the ideas of sensible objects are true images of their real natures: or whether the objects be only occasions of producing these ideas, by virtue of an arbitrary law of God, such a thought in the soul should follow such a motion in the body. For whatever impression sensible objects occasion in us, this we call their idea; it being the only perception of them we are capable of, and the only way we now have of knowing them. And such a way it is, as answers all the ends of knowledge in this life, and lays a groundwork sufficient for all that knowledge which is necessary in order to another.

The third thing proper to be mentioned, is, that to prevent confusion, the word IDEA is, in all that follows, confined to the images we have of sensible objects, and the various alterations of them by the understanding. And taking the word in this sense, the mind has no idea of her own operations For these are originally within us themselves, and so are known by inward consciousness; not as outward things are, by any similitude of them, conveyed through the senses to memory.

CHAPTER 1
SECTION II
OF THE IDEA OF SPIRITS

When we observe such effects among material things, as we know cannot proceed from any inherent power in them, we necessa­rily infer, There are some other beings not material which have the power of producing those effects: though as these beings are imper­ceptible to our senses, we have no idea of them.

It has been said indeed, that we have as clear an idea of SPIRIT, as we have of BODY; and to prove this, it is said farther, that we conceive THINKING, as clearly as we do EXTENSION. But what if we did ? A pure spirit, if we speak strictly, does not THINK at all. Thinking is the property of an EMBODIED SPIRIT, as requiring the concurrence of material organs, and being accordingly ever performed more or less to advantage, as these are better or worse disposed. They are soon relaxed by the labour of thought and attention, and must be constantly wound up anew by rest and sleep. A distemper puts the whole machine out of frame, and turns our sober thinking into madness, And if the vessels of the brain are entirely obstructed, as in an app­plexy, we think not at all. How then can we imagine that a pure spirit THINKS? It KNOWS indeed ; but we cannot tell how: to be sure, not by playing upon a set of material springs, exquisitely wrought up into a curious contexture for that purpose.

It is because we have no idea of a spirit, that we are naturally led to express it by a negative; to call it an immaterial substance, or something that is not matter; something that is not any thing that we know; which forces us to conceive and express it in this imperfect manner.

Yet it has been affirmed farther, that we have as clear an idea of God himself, as we have of man; and that we are as ignorant of the essence of a man, as we are of the essence of God. Do we not then know, that it is essential to man to be finite? And have we not a distinct idea of Finiteness ? But who has any idea of Infinity, the essential attribute of God? ‘Tis plain, we have not; and therefore we express it by a negative, “Without bound.”

Properly speaking, we have no idea of God. We come to our knowledge of his very existence, not from any idea of him, but from our reasoning, upon the works of the visible creation. And hence, for want of a simple and direct idea, we form an indirect and very complex notion of him.

This we do in the best manner we can, by removing from him all the imperfections of the creatures, and attributing to him all their perfections, especially those of our own minds. Yet in truth, even these cannot be supposed to be in God, as they are in us. And therefore we are said to ascribe them to him only in the ABSTRACT’: saying, in other words, that they are of a different species Creator, from what they are in the creature. .

Accordingly, that there are incomprehensible perfection in answerable to knowledge and power in man, whereof these are only the faint, though true resemblances, is natural and easy to But the conceiving his power as an ability to change things infinitely his knowledge as only infinite thinking: the multiplying and enlarging our own perfections in number or degree only, to the utmost stretch of our capacity, and attributing them so enlarged to God, is than raising up an unwieldy idol of our own imagination, without any foundation’ in nature.

The sum is this. We have no idea of God, as he is in himself. for want of one, we frame the best conception we can, by putting together the perfections of the creatures, particularly those we observe in our selves, to stand for his perfections: not grossly inferring, That God is in effect, such an one as ourselves; but, concluding, that our greatest excellencies are the aptest representations of his incomprehensible perfections, I bough these infinitely transcend the most exalted of what are in any created beings, and are far above, out of the reach of alt human imagination. So true it is, that, though it may be justly affirmed, we can have no knowledge WITHOUT ideas, yet it is most unjust: and absurd to infer thence, that we can have no knowledge BEYOND them.

CHAPTER 1
SECTION III
THE PROPERTIES OF IDEAS OF SENSATIONS

  Since then the IDEAS OF SENSATION are the foundation, and rough materials, of all, even our most abstracted knowledge, (out of which every man raises a superstructure, according to the different turn of those organs, that are more immediately subservient to the operations of the understanding, and the different ways in which he employs those operations:) it will be convenient to say something concerning’ the properties of these ideas.

Their first property is, that they are ORIGINAL. ‘We receive them from our first coming into the world without any immediate concur­rence of the understanding, antecedently to any of its operations. The soul, till these are received, is wholly unactive, and cannot so much as form one thought. These ideas are, in respect of our subsequent notions, like the first particles of matter in respect of the things compounded of them. They run through infinite changes, as the mind works upon them; yet in themselves remain unchangeable. And as our compound notions are made out of these, so are they all ultimately resolvable into them.

Ideas of sensation are by this property distinguished.

1. From such ideas, as are supposed to be innate, and antecedent to the impression of any outward object.

That we have no such ideas, sufficiently appears even from hence, that we have no occasion for them. We have no occasion for innate ideas of sensible objects, because there is an obvious way of obtaining them by the senses. And as to our knowledge of spiritual things, as it cannot be accounted for by innate ideas, so it easily may be accounted for without them. The rise and whole extent of this know­ledge is easily accounted for, from the ideas we have of sensible objects, the necessary consequence we draw from, their existence, to the. existence of things not sensible, and from that manner of conceiving these, which we naturally fall into, by the help and mediation of such things. as are within our present sphere.

2. From such ideas as are supposed to be acquired by, and seated in the understanding, to be the ground-work of our knowledge of spiritual things, as others are of our knowledge of things material. Now if there were any such ideas, we must acquire them one of these ways: either,

First, by the presence of the object itself, and its immediate impres­sion on some faculty disposed to receive and retain the impression. But every one may be conscious, that immaterial objects were never so present to any faculty of his mind, as to imprint and leave upon it any just and real similitude and resemblance of themselves. Or,

Secondly, these ideas must proceed from the immediate power of God. That he can impregnate the mind with them, is certain. But bow is it proved, that he does ? If ever he does, it is by an extraordinary, supernatural act. Whereas, we are now speaking what our perceptions are, in the ordinary way of nature. Or,

Thirdly, the mind has a power of raising up to itself ideas of things. whereof, it can have no actual view, of objects which have no commu­nication with any of our faculties. But if it cannot form one idea of any material object, without the actual presence of it, much less can it frame ideas of immaterial objects, without their immediate presence.

Perhaps the power of raising up to itself ideas, without the pre­sence or impression of any object, is the privilege of the Divine mind, answerable to that of creation. But the power of our mind in the little world, is much the same with that of the whole man in the greater. It is as impossible for it to raise up to itself any new idea, independent of all sensation, as it is for a man to add one particle to the common mass of matter.

A second property of an idea of sensation is, that it is simple ; by” which I mean, that it is an appearance, which cannot be resolved more than one of the same kind.

Simple ideas are generally confined within too narrow a compass For not only those of sounds, smells, tastes, colours, and qualities, are simple, but the ideas of all single bodies. All strikes the sense at once, is to be accounted a simple idea. For you cannot divide the idea you have of any one body, into’ the idea of more bodies than one; though it may be subdivided into the ideas of the several parts of that body.

By this property, ideas of sensation are distinguished.

1. From the various alterations and combinations of them made by the mind. The mind cannot indeed destroy any of these ideas any more than it could create them. But it alters, enlarges or diminishes them; it separates and transposes them, and thus is furnished, with a new set of ideas from within, as well as with simple ones without.

2. From those notions, which the understanding forms out of simple, and complex ideas, considered together with the various operations of the understanding upon them. Such is the notion we form of most virtues and vices: each of which is apprehended by ideas of sensation, and the action of the mind upon them put together into one complex conception.

A third property of ideas of sensation is, that they are direct and immediate. These original, simple ideas, necessarily presuppose the presence of the object, arid its actual impression on the’ sense: whence follows a direct and immediate representation of it, without the intervention of any thing else. Thus we could not have had the idea of’ a tree, if the eye had not actually seen it; nor of a trumpet's sound, if some of the undulating air had not actually struck upon the ear.

By this property, ideas of sensation are distinguished

I From the ideas we have of those objects of the same kind, which we never actually perceived Thus, the Idea of a man we have been, is put for a man we never saw having no way of conceiving a rn-in that was never Wesent, but by substituting for him the idea of one that was.

2. From all conceptions of things, which are purely metaphorical There are two sorts of metaphor, human and divine.

Divine metaphor is the substituting our ideas of. sensation, which are direct and immediate with ‘the words belonging to them, for the things of heaven of which we have no direct idea, or immediate conception as when God’s knowledge is expressed by His BEING

In EVERY PLACE his power by a STRONG HAND

Divine and human metaphor agree ‘in this. That the words, figuratively transferred from one thing to another, do, not agree with the things to which they are transferred, in my part of their literal sense. So hands and eyes, when applied to God, are not spoke in any part of their literal signification : as neither is the word SMILING, when applied to the verdure of the field.

They differ in this, that in human metaphor, the things, for which the figurative words are substituted. may be as immediately and directly known, as the ideas placed in their stead. But in Divine metaphor, only the substituted ideas are direct and immediate. We have no direct or immediate conception of the things they are substi­tuted for.

3. From all conception of things, which are purely analogical. Divine analogy is the substituting words. that express our ideas for heavenly things, whereof we have no ideas. Thus far it agrees with metaphor; but here lies the essential difference. Metaphorical words are spoke of heavenly things, in no part of their proper sense: analogical, in some part of it, though not the whole. So the word HAND is spoken of God metaphorically: for he has no kind of any sort whatever. The word POWER IS spoken of’ him annologically for he has some sort of power, though of quite a different sort from ours.

The true nature of our present knowledge of divine things, is by the apostle very aptly described by our SEEING IN A GLASS DARKLY, or IN A MIRROR, IN AN OBSCURE REPRESENTATION. To shew the apti­tude and significancy of which expressions. I shall observe two things:

1. That a glass exhibits to us nothing of the substance of the thing represented in it: the similitude therein having no more of the essence of the thing itself, than a mere shadow. Yet we cannot say, but there is a real likeness of the substance in the airy form. There is such a proportion between them, that the idea of a Lice we never saw, but in a glass, is a just one, and may well be substituted for the face itself, of which it gives some real knowledge.

Thus as to those conceptions, which stand in our minds to represent spiritual things, though the things they stand for are of quite another sort, and though these substitutes are no more in respect of them, than a fleeting appearance in the glass is to the man represented by it: yet there may be such a proportion between them, as to make our conceptions of natural things just representations of things super­natural. So that the knowledge we have of them is true, and our reasonings upon them substantial. is long as they are kept within the due compass of those’ representations. For then it is, that men run into absurdity, concerning spiritual things, when not content with this analogical knowledge, they argue from things natural to the intrinsic nature of the supernatural, and suppose, that what is affirmed of these representations only, is literally true of the things they represent.

The second thing I would observe concerning this phrase is, That in all instances we use the same expressions, by which we express the things themselves, for their appearances in the glass. And in­deed justly: for though there is nothing of the real nature of the objects, in those appearances, yet, Seeing there is such a proportion between them, the same words aptly serve for both. So we say, We see a man in the glass, or the sun or moon in the water, ;vhen we see only an appearance. which has nothing of the real nature of a man, or the sun or moon. And there is such a proportion between the object and its appearance, as would give us some idea of it, though we had never seen it, hut in a glass, or in the water.

By what has been already said, analogy in general may be easily distinguished from metaphor: but because the distinction between this and divine analogy is of so great importance, I shall set the difference between these two in a clearer and opposite light.

Metaphor expresses an imaginary analogy, a real correspondence metaphor is no more than an allusion; analogy, a substitution of ideas and conceptions. The intention of’ metaphor, is only to ex­press more emphatically something known more exactly before : the intention of analogy, to inform us of something, which we could not have known without it. Metaphor uses ideas of sensation to express things, whereto they have no real resemblance; analogy substitute our notions and complex conceptions of things, with which they’ have a real correspondence. To conclude: Words applied metaphorically, are not understood in any part of their proper sense analogical words are understood in a part, though not the whole of their literal meaning.

CHAPTER II
SECTION I
OF THE PURE INTELLECT AND ITS OPERATIONS

  Having hitherto considered the ideas of sensation as the only materials the mind of man has to work upon, I come to treat of the mind itself, or the pure intellect. I do not mean by this the imma terial part of us, nor yet the most refined and exquisite parts of the body, which are immediately subservient to its nobler operations but both of these operating together in essential union.

Our present knowledge is gradually performed, by the concurrent motion of some bodily part within us; which is the cause of that weariness we feel, after long continued thinking. We should never be tired with this, if the pure spirit could reason independently of all material organs. But experience shows us, the case is otherwise:

we find it a labour to the brain, and feel ourselves as much wearied with intense thought, as with hard bodily labour: having premised this of them in general, I proceed to consider the particular opera­tions of the intellect, which presuppose sensation, and contain the whole process and utmost extent of human understanding.

The first of these is a simple view or survey of the ideas of sen­sation, just as they lie in the memory This the logicians have rightly termed SIMPLE APPREHENSION; but they generally confound it with pure sensation, whereas, it is easy to observe essential differences between them. I. In simple apprehension the mind is often active, in sensation always passive. 2. Simple apprehension presupposes sensation, and is always subsequent to it. ‘3. By sensa­tion the mind receives ideas; by simple apprehension she surveys those already received.

The second operation of the intellect on the ideas of sensation is JUDGMENT. This may be divided into several species; the most con­siderable of which are these that follow.

1. The SEPARATING our ideas from each other, and ranging them under distinct heads.

2. The COMPARING them with each other, and observing their agreements or disagreements.

3. The ENLARGING OF DiMINISHING them. So we can enlarge the idea we have of a tree, to any size, even to reach the clouds; or diminish it in our thoughts, till we reduce it to what it was in its first principle or seed.

4. The DIVIDING or COMPOUNDING them. So we divide any simple idea into its several parts, or compound the ideas of several houses, to make up that of a city. All these species of judging are peculiar to men, and not enjoyed by brutes in any degree.

Another act of the intellect, generally reduced to judgment, is ABSTRACTiON. This, some suppose to be performed, by drawing the mind off from all ideas of sensation, from all compositions of them, and from all complex notions, in order to form ideas of incorporeal beings. But it may be doubted, whether this be practicable in our present state.

The true abstraction seems to consist, not in forming ideas inde­pendent on sensation, but in substituting the only notions we have, which are natural, easy and familiar, to represent those supernatural things, of which, otherwise we can have no notion; in transferring our thoughts from the literal propriety of the words, by which we express them, to that analogical signification, whereby they are, as it were, spiritualized. This seems to be the only abstraction we are capable of, with regard to things spiritual. And this is so far from being independent on sensation, and the operations of intellect that we can no otherwise think or speak of such objects, than in these worldly and human symbols; and that if we abstract from these; we extract from all thought of heavenly beings, and can have neither names nor ideas for them.

What has been hitherto said of the operations of the intellect relate only to ideas of sensation. Therefore, it is proper to observe here that the same operations are likewise exercised upon all our alterations and compositions of them. When the memory is once furnished with those voluntary alterations and combinations of simple ideas, the mind has the same full power over them, as over the ground work of them, namely, that of simple apprehension, and of judgment in all its branches .And the same arbitrary sway it has over all the complex notions and conceptions, which are formed out of those simple or complex ideas considered together with the operations of the intellect upon them.

Before we close this head of judgment, it is worth while to take particular notice of that species of one of its branches, comparing which is distinct from all the rest, and is commonly called RELATION. This is that act of the mind, whereby it considers the dependence , of things on each other. I shall dwell on it no longer than is necessary to show the procedure of the understanding, in attaining knowledge,

First when we consider the relations of sensible objects to each other, as they are in their own nature, without any respect which they bear to our understanding, hence opens a spacious field of knowledge that of natural causes and effects, of the manner, wherein natural things act, upon, or. suffer from each other : in short, of their influence one another numberless ways: and this ‘is natural philosophy.

Secondly, from our ideas of sensation we infer the existence of those outward objects, that occasion them in us. And from the existence of these we infer a first cause of all things, eternal and necessarily existing. Hence again we have the knowledge of the relation he bears to us, as our Creator and our preserver. From these relations flow all the duties of piety; such as love,  reverence, praise, and prayer.

Again. When we consider the relation, we bear to our fellow creatures, of the same nature and degree in this world hence we come to be sensible of our obligations to justice and humanity.        And when we distinguish these by particular, nearer relations, such as parent or child, servant or master, hence we deduce all the duties necessary to the well-being of the whole kind, and of every individual.            

Lastly, when we consider the relation we bear to ourselves, the regard every man ought to have for his own happiness ; hence we may infer all those duties, that naturally, tend to promote the good either of our body or mind. And all comprehended under this second head, is properly natural religion. For the sanction of this, and to show the tendency of its precepts to our future happiness, the under­standing proceeds thus. From the unequal distribution of rewards, to those who observe them, and of punishments to those who trans­gress them in this life, so evidently inconsistent with the goodness and justice of an All-perfect Being we infer the necessity of future rewards and punishments, and consequently the immortality of human souls

CHAPTER II
SECTION II
OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE AND EVIDENCE

  It being a matter of the utmost consequence to the right procedure of the intellect, to state the several kinds of knowledge, as well as the degrees of it in each kind, which can admit of any, I shall observe that there are three kinds of knowledge, and as many kinds of evidence, on which they are built.

The first is that we have from our senses, which consists in an intellectual view of the ideas transmitted through them to the memory. This is a knowledge direct, immediate, and intuitive, and carries in it the highest certainty. Consequently, it admits of no proof from reason:

for all such proof has less of perspicuity and certainty, than that which it already contains in its own nature This is a knowledge which admits of no degrees of evidence : for all sensation is in itself equally certain, and the evidence of all the senses is equally clear, with respect to their proper objects. When the sensation is regular, and perfect, the assent of the intellect necessarily follows all at once; though in a manner quite different from demonstration, which extorts it by imme­diate proof. Not that it yields to the clearest demonstration, when the organ is rightly disposed, and exercised upon its proper object, at a just distance, and in a due medium. Against sensitive knowledge, rea­son can never interpose, unless there is a suspicion of failure in the act of sensation. Nor does it inquire then, whether the evidence of sense be true ; but whether it be truly the evidence of sense. So that to argue against the evidence of sense, is to oppose the evidence of reason, to what in its nature admits of no reasoning at all.

And highly necessary it was, that this evidence of sense should be so immediate, clear and undoubted, because it is the foundation of all knowledge, human and divine. If then the truth of this admitted of’ any doubt or were capable of any proof, we should wander about is endless skepticism, without the least certainty an any thing. For no proof for it could be more evident, than that which it was brought to prove, and would therefore itself require another proof; and on. with endless confusion.

A second kind of knowledge is that we have from self-consciousness We come to the knowledge of things without us, by the meditation of of their ideas ; but we are immediately conscious of what passes in our own minds, without the intervention of any idea. Thus we have a’ knowledge of all the faculties of our soul, very different from sensitive knowledge; though we have no degree of it antecedent to the exercise of those faculties upon the ideas of sensation : as we should have had no knowledge of our bodily motions, if the parts had not actually moved.

Though this kind of knowledge be more complex, it is equally ter­tam with that we have from sensation. The assent as necessarily’ fol­lows upon consciousness : indeed it falls in with it. The conscious ness itself is the very assent ; nor can they be distinguished even in thought. When this internal sensation is truly natural, we are never deceived in this article of knowledge. And this also is so clear and dis­tinct that it admits of no proof from reason.- So that neither can this, any more than the former, be called demonstration : since, like that, it is so immediate and intimate to us, that nothing can increase its evi­dence, And for a man to argue away any instances of this knowledge,’ or to deny their certainty, is no less absurd, than to contradict the clear perceptions of external sense. Only it is to be observed, that all here said of this knowledge, is said of the first, immediate, inter­nal perceptions; not of any farther observations, made upon them by the intellect, or of any deductions afterward drawn concerning them.

These two kinds of knowledge are immediate, and consequently a sort of intuition : entirely different from which is, —The third kind of knowledge, REASONING, which is mediate, and wholly acquired by deduction, by the exercise of that one operation of the mind, illation or consequence. This we may subdivide into different species, according to the different manner of the intellect’s’ procedure, in making its deductions.

The first species is science or demonstration, which appears clearest in the syllogistic form; by applying a common measure to two ex­tremes, which have an infallible connexion with it. So that the conclusion follows by an absolute certainty, and compels the assent And the knowledge is as infallible, as the direct, clear perception bf sensation, or consciousness.

The second species of it is moral certainty, the utmost degree of which is nearest to demonstration. This knowledge is acquired by proofs that have only an undoubted connexion with the two extremes. The force of this every plain understanding perceives; and it rarely requires the syllogistic form, unless for the confuting perverse oppo­sers. The arguments for it are deduced from all kinds of knowledge; but still the assent is free; and the will has a great share in promoting or hindering it. And hence it comes, that there is room for passion and prejudice of all sorts, to interpose and bias the intellect.

We ought not therefore to call the evidence of moral truths, by the name of demonstration. It is true, both mathematical and moral truths are founded on the strongest proof. Yet they admit not of the same sort of proof nor indeed are they capable of it.

Because it is so great a disadvantage both to natural and revealed religion, to have a moral certainty confounded with mathematical, I shall distinguish the different natures of them more fully, under two different propositions.

  From the very different, and even opposite nature of moral certainty, and that which is strictly mathematical, it must appear

1. That there is as little room for the latter in natural religions, as in revealed. To show this clearly, I have instanced in the’ fun­damental truth of both ; which, though founded upon the utmost moral evidence, so as to render a dissent from it inexcusable yet appears not to be strictly demonstrable. Indeed, were there one demonstrative argument for it, all others would be entirely needless.

2. That natural religion includes faith, founded on moral evidence. When, upon full proof to our understanding, we assent to this, There is a God, then the hearty concurrence of the will completes that assent into faith. Faith therefore, is altogether as necessary in natu­ral religion, as in revealed. For though we have a moral cer­tainty for the existence of a Deity, which so far is knowledge only ; yet still because the intrinsic nature of God is utterly incom­prehensible, and can be no immediate object of human understand­ing, men must give the assent of the intellect here, together with the consent of the will, to the truth of things, as mysterious as any in all revealed religion; anti which they are obliged to conceive by the same analogy, by which we conceive all the mysteries of chris­tianity.

3. That evangelical faith is no precarious or implicit assent, but founded on the utmost evidence we are capable of receiving, for, a. truth of that nature. To see this clearly, we must well distinguish two things:

First, The assent of the understanding to a proposition upon moral, evidence, which is thus far merely knowledge. Here we are, to fix our foot, and join issue with all ranks’ of unbelievers; the ground of whose condemnation will be, that they wilfully withheld their assent from the truths of revelation, when they had the same evidence, which would have fully convinced them in matters merely human.

Secondly, A consent of the will, following the assent of the intellect. The whole process of the mind in obtaining such a faith, as performed in this manner: 1. A proposition being offered us, the will consents to weigh the evidence for it. 2. The intellect weighs it, and if the moral evidence be full, assents to it. Thus it commences a point of knowledge, and on a second consent of the will, a point of faith.

But it is worth observing, that there can be no immediate assent to any thing inconceivable or incomprehensible. To explain this by a few instances. “ There is a God.” When, upon full evidence, we assent to this, what is intelligible in that proposition, is the immediate object of our knowledge. The incomprehensible nature and attributes of God, are only the remote and mediate objects of it,

Again. “ This is my beloved Son.” We assent to this, as a perfectly intelligible proposition, on full evidence that it was spoke from heaven; being assured, that Christ, not in any unintelligible manner, but according to the plain sense of the words, is as really and truly the Son of God, as one man is the son of another.

He who believes thus far. without any respect to what is incompre­hensible in that proposition, namely, the supernatural generation, and the ineffable manner of it, has an evangelical faith.

But what then, you will say, becomes of the mysteries of the gospel? They are all laid up safe, out of our reach, to be the immediate objects of our knowledge, when we come to see face to face.

From hence it appears, that Christian faith is not an implicit assent to things unintelligible and inconceivable : since nothing, that is incomprehensible, can come into any question between us and un­believers. We can have no controversy, but about what is perfectly understood, as far as it is so; and concerning the moral evidence, upon which propositions, as clear as any in ‘human language, are founded. Our controversies turn wholly upon what is clear. As to what is incomprehensible, in any proposition, it can be no immediate, direct object, either of knowledge or of faith.

The third species of knowledge, which we have from reason, is OPINION. This Plato well defines a medium between knowledge and ignorance. it is a sort of knowledge, loosely speaking, inferior to any of the foregoing, but approaching nearest to that founded on moral evidence. Only whereas moral certainty, in its highest degree, leaves but a bare POSSIBILITY of the thing’s being otherwise ; all opinion leaves room, more or less, for DOUBT, yea, for some fear of its being otherwise. But as for all the degrees between the highest moral cer­tainty on one hand, and the lowest probability on the other, these two sorts of knowledge run into each other, and are not easily to ‘be dis­tinguished.

This may be illustrated by a parallel, drawn from common mechan­ism. While you are offering the reasons, for and against any morally certain or probable proposition, imagine yourself throwing them into the scales, and weighing them in a balance. If the balance inclines not at all to either side, there is no sort of knowledge, but downright ignorance : the reasons on each side destroy each other, SO that the intellect cannot assent to either. And if there be any decision, it is the arbitrary imposition and precarious act of the will. If either from its natural weakness, or for want of improvement, the intellect cannot find out reasons, so that each scale preponderates in its turn, then it in a state of doubt. If one scale preponderates but a little, and continues at a stay, so that the difference is barely discernible, it is then’ only a conjecture. But if this preponderancy is very plain, though there is weight enough on the other side, to keep the scale still pru dent, then it is probability or opinion. When, lastly, the arguments are so strong that one of the scales weighs to the ground, then it is moral certainty, and there is no reasonable cause for any farther scrutiny. The proposition then concludes as surely, though ‘not so necessarily, as demonstration ; which admits of no weight whatever to be thrown into the opposite scale.

Of probability in general it may be observed,

1. That, while we are weighing a probable proposition, there are two latent causes of deceit; the one in the intellect itself, which holds the balance; for if a man is ignorant or weak, so as not to discern the proper reasons, he may be imposed upon by false weights: the other in the will, when, instead of plain reason, a man throws his pride, or passion, or prejudice, into the scales. And these will, by the invisible’ turn of a false balance, outweigh the strongest arguments.

2. That the higher degrees of probability, in matters of religion, demand our assent. So they do in all other things. here the. dif­ference is not great, between the opposite sides of a question, men ever close with the greatest appearance of truth, and that in all things’ of the greatest moment. Nay, the main conduct of human life is governed by the highest probability: so that, in many instances, it would be downright madness, not to be determined by it. Yet,

3. Mere probability is not a sufficient ground for religious faith. This must be built on certain knowledge, which opinion, properly speaking, is not. Indeed the word is vulgarly taken for any assent, whether formed on probability, or moral certainty. And so, it is commonly said, “a man is of such an opinion,” with regard to the very fundamentals of christianity. But-this loose way of speaking ought never to be used, seeing it has a tendency to betray unwary men, into a favourable judgment of such principles, as are destructive of all religion.

The fourth species of knowledge, which we have from reasoning, (if it be not rather a particular species of moral certainty) is an assent upon testimony: to make which truly knowledge, there must be a concurrence of our own reason in the following particulars:

1. Our own reason must judge ,of the subject matter of the infor­mation, whether it be made in intelligible words. For no man can be informed, of what he cannot understand : there can be no revela­tion to us, concerning the intrinsic nature of things, that are incom­prehensible to us. And accordingly, no part of the christian revela­tion, concerning God and things supernatural, reaches farther than their existence, and that lively analogy, under which they are repre­sented; which is as plain and obvious, and intelligible, as any thing in common life.

2. Our reason must convince us, that the matter of the informa­tion is possible. that it implies no contradiction. And if the informa­tion relates to things supernatural, this is a fundamental rule to induce no contradiction, but from what is plain and intelligible in every proposition. Whence it follows, that such absurdities and con­tradictions, as arise from a comparison of what is plain and intel­ligible, with what is incomprehensible, in respect of their intrinsic nature are all groundless and imaginary.

3. Our reason must judge concerning the ability and integrity of the informer. information or testimony may he divided into human, and ‘divine. To human testimony we assent only so far, as it appears agreeable to truth. Yet this assent is very extensive, and makes up the greatest part of human knowledge. It takes in all we have of the history of mankind, all the accounts of whatever we have not seen ourselves. And we acquiesce in all this, not as probable only, but as so much real knowledge; being an assent, which is founded on such evidence, as often amounts to a moral certainty.

As to Divine information or revelation, reason, knowing it to be Divine, is already convinced that it exceeds all human certainty. The only thing, therefore, which is to be convinced of here, is,

4. That the revelation is divine, or that the scripture is of Divine authority, in order to this, we may observe,

First, that, as God has made men the immediate instruments of all those revelations, so evangelical faith must be partly founded on human testimony. By men were both the Old and New Testament wrote; and if we consider them abstracted from their Divine autho­rity, they must be allowed to be of equal credibility, at least, with all other ancient writings. Though we should suppose them to,be upon the foot of mere human testimony, yet would our knowledge of them be, at least, of equal certainty, with that founded on any profane history. Now, if to this human, we add such Divine testimony, as cannot be pretended for any other writings in the world, as the miracles of Christ and his apostles: the concurrent completion of all the prophecies, from the beginning of the world, in him alone; the scrip­tures being the only book in the world, that gives us any account the whole series of God's dispensation towards wan, from the creation for four thousand years; the great exaltation of natural religion, visible in every part of it; and, lastly, the providential care so fest in every age, for transmitting down several books, writing at such great distances of time one from another, and all of them from us ; their being at this day so void of any material error, that in the infinite various readings, which have been carefully Collected, there cannot be found one contrariety in any’ fundamental point of faith -or practice : if these things, I say, are thoroughly considered, they: give the scriptures such a certainly, as no writing merely human can have, and are the greatest evidence for the truth of them which they are capable of receiving, with a continued, daily repetition of miracles. We may observe,

Secondly, that, as God has made men the immediate instrument of all his revelations, so he hath condescended to make use of hu­man language, as well as of our natural ideas and conceptions, for the’ clear and easy representation of things supernatural, and otherwise incomprehensible. indeed the intrinsic nature of heavenly things could not otherwise have been revealed to us; seeing we had nei­ther capacity to apprehend, nor language to express it. Or had ‘it been miraculously revealed to a particular man, yet it would’ ‘-not have been possible for him to utter it. This made it necessary to adapt all the divine revelations to our natural way of thinking and speaking. And accordingly we are not obliged to believe any doc­trine, which is not plain and intelligible. All in scripture, beyond this, is no immediate object of our faith, but belongs to another world: and we are at present to believe no more of it,. than’ that it is incomprehensible.

Nothing therefore is more absurd, than ,the objections of unbelievers against the Christian mysteries, as unintelligible; since Chris­tianity requires our assent to nothing, but what is plain and intelligible in every proposition. Let every man first have a full conviction, of the truth of each proposition in the gospel, as far only as it is plain and intelligible, and let him believe as far as he understands. Let him firmly believe, there is but one God, the object’ of any Divine worship whatever; and think and speak of him under that plain,, scriptural distinction, of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; leaving the incomprehensible nature of that union and distinction, to, the great Author of our faith himself. Let him believe Christ to be the only begotten Son of God, in the obvious import of these words, and leave the manner of that inconceivable generation to the veracity of God. Let him believe, that Christ did as truly make an atonement to God for us, as one man atones for another to a third person; ‘and leave, the unintelligible part of that Divine operation, for the subject of future praise and contemplation. Let men, I say, believe as far as they thus clearly understand, without perplexing themselves or others with what is incomprehensible; and them they fulfil the whole purpose of God in all his revelations.

By thus carefully distinguishing the several kinds of knowledge and evidence, what endless confusion may be prevented, in religious controversies! Most of these have arisen from supposing these heads of knowledge to differ in degree only, not in kind; and from con­founding the different kinds of evidence, peculiar to each of them; from men’s insisting upon the evidence proper to one kind of know­ledge, for that of another, which will not admit of it; from opposing to each other the different kinds of knowledge, which can never interfere or clash with each other; and lastly, from not distinguishing between a blind, implicit assent to the testimony of another, and that faith, which implies a full, rational conviction of the truth of what is believed.

  CHAPTER II
SECTION III
OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE BY REVELATION

  We have now brought the mind of man, by several steps, to the utmost knowledge it can reach by its own faculties. Whatever is beyond that contained under the foregoing heads, is communicated to it from heaven.

When we observe, 1. The more particular and full discoveries of those relations we had some knowledge of, by the light of nature ;* and, 2. Those relations we bear to God, and God to us, which are entirely new, and undiscoverable by the light of nature: this know­ledge includes the foundation and substance of all revealed religion.

As to the first. When to that general knowledge we have by the light of nature, of God, as the Creator of all things, it is revealed, that he “spoke them” into being, and created them “by his word ;“ that he made man in particular “out of the earth,” and breathed into him a principle of a higher kind; that he was created in innocence, and “in the image of God ;" and that from him all mankind descended.

Again. When to the general relation of his providence over us, it is more particularly revealed, That he “upholdeth all things by the word of his power ;“ that “in Him we live, move, and have our being ;“ that “not a sparrow falls to the ground without Him ;“ nay, that “the hairs of our head are all numbered ;“ and, lastly, when his relation to us, as a Judge, is rendered more full and express by these particulars, that “the eyes of the Lord are in every place beholding the evil and the good ;“ that “He shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good or evil. that “he hath appointed a day, in which He will judge the world; and that, in order to this universal judgment, there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and of the unjust.

*I believe all "the light of nature,” so called, to flow from preventing grace

Again. When it is revealed, that “there is but one God :" opposition to the multitude of heathen deities; that this God "is a Spirit,” that “ there is none good but He ;“ that “He only is wise," and his wisdom is infinite; that he is Almighty, bath all power, is “above all, the only Potentate, King of kings,” and “Lord of lords:" that "He is the Most High, the Lord of hosts,” who “ only hath immortality :“ these and such like equally express declarations, concerning the One God, are evident improvements of that which we have by the light of nature.               These expressions are all plain and intelligible, so that, when we use them we know what we say. But as to the following expression concerning the One God, That he is “God of himself, Root, Principle, and Original :“ that he is a “ Pure Act, simple, undivided, Self. existent, absolutely supreme ;“ together with the words, “Subordi­nate, co-ordinate,” and above all, his metaphysical "Substance and essence :“ these are not the language of revelation, especially when used to explain the Unity of God; but affected terms, invented by un to express their several sentiments of that Unit)

Can we sufficiently lament the mischief, which has been done, by. the rumbling of these, and such like sounding words, through whole volumes; to the confounding both the writer and the reader, and per­plexing that great article of our faith, the Trinity: which as it lies in the scripture, is, so far as we are to believe it, the plainest thing in the world? All this pompous affectation of being more knowing in the Christian mysteries, than the scriptures can make men, tends only to propagate absurd and inconsistent notions, which a plain, rational man would be ashamed of. Such as these,

That the Son of God was produced by an external act of the Father's power, but was not made or created

That there are Three Persons truly Divine; one of them the true God, the Second, truly God, the Third, no God at all.

That we may arid must pay divine worship to Two Gods, and divine honour to a Third Person, who is no God.

That by the term TRINITY we must mean, a Trinity of Two Gods, and a Divine Person, but no God.

These and many such positions are either expressly, or by plain consequence, contained in some of our modern systems of religion, and are set down here, not as they are a total subversion of the Christian faith, but as they are a bold and arbitrary imposition on the common sense and reason of mankind.

The relation we bear to God as our Creator, which was partly discovered by the light of nature, is made nearer yet, and more dear and engaging, by that entirely new distinction in the One God, revealed to us under the different characters of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and by the unspeakable blessings we derive from their several offices and operations.

This distinction, utterly incomprehensible in itself, could never have been known to men, but by revelation. Nor could we have con­ceived it in any degree, had it not been discovered to us, under the semblance of such relations, as are familiar among men : as that of a Father and a Son, and the Spirit of a man, which is in him. And, if we admit this distinction at all, we must hold it to be so really founded in the Divine Nature, that we cannot think or speak of it any other­wise, than as a personal distinction. For the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are, in respect of one another, thus distinguished through the’ whole language of revelation: and, in respect of mankind, they are ever distinguished by such different operations, as we distinguish human persons by. So that whatever is denoted by Father, Son, and Spirit, we must either flatly reject the scriptures, or else always speak and think of those Three, as we do of three human persons.

That Christ, the second person, had a being, before lie was born of a virgin, is so evident from revelation, that we can make no sense or coherence of scripture, without allowing it; and there can be no other purpose, in revealing all things concerning him, under the character of a son, and only begotten son, but to convince us, that he has all the natural, essential attributes of his Father, that, as a human son pos­sesses the entire human nature, so the Son of God possesses the entire divine nature.

That the Holy Spirit, who is in scripture distinguished from the Father and the Son, is a distinct person from both, is plain from the commission given the apostles to baptize, in the name of the Father. and the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. This form, if each of these be not a distinct person, sufficiently tends to confound mankind, If the Holy Ghost be not a distinct person, but only a tower of the Father, then the sense of it runs thus: “Go and baptize in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Father again.” Therefore to say the third person, here mentioned, is a mere name, and imports only the power of the Father, is not only charging God with laying a snare to deceive us, but denying his commission to be common sense.

That the Holy Spirit is God, is evident from revelation, which every where distinguishes him by this peculiar character of Holy. For abso­lute holiness is the peculiar attribute of the absolutely supreme God; and he being every where called “the Holy Spirit,” by way of excel­lency, and distinction from all created spirits, that epithet must imply an original intrinsic and essential holiness in him Especially, if we observe, that this is his constant distinguishing character not only where he is mentioned with relation to us, but also where he is named together with the Father and the Son. Insomuch, that He alone is expressly styled holy, wherever the three persons are’ expressly named together in scripture.

The word holy in those places cannot be added, in opposition to the Father and the Son; nor as exclusive of them; because they are both absolutely holy, as well as the Spirit: so that they naturally lead us into a belief, that his is the same holiness with that of the Father and the Son, namely, the intrinsic holiness of Jehovah, the most’ high the supreme God. To this if we add, that He is called, “The Spirit of Holiness, the Spirit of Glory, the Eternal Spirit,” and very often, the Spirit of God, as particularly at the baptism of Christ, where be was personally distinguished from the Father, even in a visible appearance. We must have our reason strangely amused by subtlety criticism, and be turned quite out of the plain way of thinking, before we can understand these revelations to mean any thing else, than that lie is God, equal with the Father.

The sum is this. Since both reason and revelation show, there is but one God, we can own and worship but one. And since that One God is set forth to us in scripture, under three distinct relations, and accordingly represented by distinct personal names, and characters, and operations, and offices; therefore we worship but one God, with this distinction of his own making, not of ours.

It is said, “Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and Him only shalt thou serve :“ by which all Divine worship is utterly cut off from the Son and Holy Ghost, unless they are one with the Lordour God. Again, it is written, “The Lord thy God is one Lord, whom we are to love with all our heart, mini, soul and strength.” But if so, all Divine love is cit off from the Son and Holy Ghost, unless they are that one Lord our God, who is a jealous God, and will by no means suffer any part of his worship to be paid to any other.

According to this plain and natural way of Thinking, as we are bap­tized by one anti the same solemn act of worship, “in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost:” so we ever after adore them, without any degrees or inequality of worship; which, indeed, as it is truly Divine, can admit of no degrees or inequality. Whereas, they who argue for an inequality in the divine Persons, and for an inferiority of nature in the Son and Holy Ghost to the Father, necessarily involve themselves and all their adherents in endless uncertainty and confusion. For they can never settle the different kinds and degrees of that lower Divine worship, “a contradiction in the very terms” which is to be pail to the Son and the Holy Ghost. They can never distinguish it with such exactness, that it shall neither be the worship due to the supreme God, nor that honour, which is to be paid to mere creatures, and varied according to their several dig­nities.

But to make it vet more clear, that the mind of man cannot, without absurdity, have any other conception of the Son and Holy Ghost, than as being one absolutely Supreme God with the Father, and one joint Object of all Christian worship ; let us collect the two seemingly inconsistent doctrines, into opposite propositions.

Now both these precepts are express scripture, and therefore equally objects of our faith; it being evident, that here is no con­tradiction in terms, and that the seeming contradiction is with regard to a unity and distinction, for the direct apprehension of which, there is no capacity in the mind of man. The wisdom of God has left it for us to believe them both, and to reconcile them according to the best of our understanding: not by taking upon us to show, how the Divine Nature is One, and how it is Three; but by solving the seeming opposition, in a way most obvious to a plain capacity; that is, by concluding, since there is but One God, who alone is to be worshipped, and since the Son and Holy Ghost are both called God in Scripture. and expressly commanded to be worshipped therefore they are One with the Most High God, though how they are One we cannot comprehend.

Thus has the Gospel revelation improved the knowledge of man kind, in these important points. And it has no less improvement Our knowledge, in the grand article of future rewards and punishments.

As to rewards. 1. Whereas, all that was before expected in the: other world, was sensual pleasure for the body, and pleasing con­templation for the soul. Now we learn the joys of heaven to be of a sort, whereof nature can give us no conception: we shall be as the angels of God in heaven.

2. The resurrection of the same body. is a point entirely new, of which Christ’s rising with the same body assures us. That this body will be CHANGED, is likewise entirely new ; that this change shall be effected in a moment; that the dead in Christ shall rise first; that their change shall be into the likeness of Christ’s glorious body: alt which particulars are beyond whatever could have been suggested, by the mere understanding of man.

Another instance of revelation, entirely new with respect to these rewards, is, that of living for ever in the immediate presence of God, the Fountain of All happiness. We are now informed, that we “shall see God as lie is. face to face, in whose presence is fulness of joy ;“ that we “shall be where he is,” shall “behold his glory,” and shall shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of our Father. This is a strain, no imagination, merely human, could ever reach or aspire to. We may add, that whatever the wisest heathens spoke of future rewards, was only from faint conjecture; whereas now we have the plain, and express, and repeated promise of God for, them.

As to future punishments, we learn from revelation alone,

1.  That they are both for soul and body, which are distinguished by “the worm that dieth not,” and “the fire that is not quenched.” And accordingly we are bid to “fear Him, who is able to destroy both body and soul in hell.”

2.  That the soul will be “punished with everlasting destruction, from the presence of the Lord.” That the chief of all misery, in another life, would be, exclusion from the sight of God, was never thought of by the wisest heathens, who placed all happiness in them­selves.

3.  That the body will be punished by fire, than which we have not any revelation more express and positive. And as it is an instance of the great goodness of God, that the joys of heaven are represented, figuratively, as exceeding the utmost of our conceptions; so it is an argument of his strict justice, that the pains of hell are more literally foretold.

4.  The eternity of these punishments is revealed, as plainly as words can express it. Not that the punishments denounced are mere arbitrary sanctions, like those annexed to human laws. But those denunciations are withal so many previous warnings of the in­evitable consequence. the natural tendency of sin to misery. So that an unrepenting sinner cannot be otherwise than miserable, in another life, by a necessity of nature: since there never can be any altera­tion of his condition, without such a change of the whole man, as would put the natural and settled order of creation out of course.

With respect to these rewards and punishments, we have these farther revelations: that the very “day is appointed by God, in which lie will judge the world in righteousness, by the man, whom He bath ordained ;“ that He hath committed all judgment to the Son; and that all mankind must come upon their trial at once. The glorious pomp and majesty of his appearance, the awful solemnity of the whole procedure, nay, the very words of the sentence, both on the just, and on the unjust, are discovered to us. It is farther revealed, that in this day of God, while He descendeth with ten thousand of his angels, “the heavens being on fire, shall be dissolv­ed, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat.” These are “the terrors of the Lord,” which are sufficient to make the stout hearted tremble, and are such motives to all holiness of heart, and holiness of conversation, as nothing but infidelity, or wilful want of consideration. can render ineffectual.

GENERAL REFLECTIONS

  Having now, as my leisure and abilities permitted, taken a sur­vey of the wisdom of God in the creation; before I conclude, it may not be improper to add something, in answer to those on the one hand, who imagine all inquiries of this kind to be vain, fruitless labour: and those on the other, who spend more time therein than is consistent either with religion or reason.

I do this chiefly in the words of that great ornament of his pro­fession, the lord chief justice Hale. He supposes the good steward giving in his account, at the last day, thus to speak. “Happy is he, who can adopt his words, in speaking to the Judge of all !"

1. I have not looked upon thy works inconsiderately, and passed them over as ordinary things. But I have studiously and diligently searched into them, as things of great eminence and wonder; and have esteemed it part of the duty, which the wise God of nature re­quires of the children of men, who, for that very end, exposed these his works to the view of his intelligent creatures, and gave us not only eyes to behold, but reason, in some measure, to understand them. Therefore I have strictly observed the frame of the world and its several parts, the motion, order, and divine economy of them I have searched into their quality, causes, and operations; and have discovered as great, if not greater matter of admiration therein, than in the beauty, which at first view, they presented to my sense.

2. And this observation did not rest in the bare perusal of the works themselves, or in the searching out, so fir as that could be. done, their immediate natural causes. But I traced their being, dependence, and government, unto Thee, the first cause of all. And by this tracing of things to their original, I was led to a demonstrative conviction, that there is a God, who is the great came, both of their being and motions : yea, that there is but one God; that He is most powerful, most wise, knowing all things, governing all things, sup­porting all things. Upon these convictions, I was strengthened in the belief of the holy word, which had so great a congruity with these truths.

3. And, upon these convictions. I did learn the more to honour, reverence, and admire Thee; and to worship, serve, and obey Thee; to walk humbly, and sincerely, and lawfully, before Thee as being present with me, and beholding me; to love and adore Thee, as the fountain of all being and good. When I looked upon ‘the glory and usefulness of the sun, I admired the God that made it, chalked out its motions, placed it in that due distance from the earth, for its use and conveniency. When I looked upon the stars, those huge and wonderful balls of light, placed at that immense distance from the inferior bodies, and one from another, their multitude and motion; ‘I admired the wisdom and power of that God, whose hand spans the heavens, and has fixed every thing in its place. Nay, when I looked upon the poor little herbs that arise out of the earth, and considered the secret spark of life, which is in every one of them, that attracts, increaseth. groweth, produces seed, preserves them and their kinds; the various virtues that are in them, for the food, medicine, and de­light, of the more perfect creatures ; my mind was sweetly carried up, to the adoration and praise of that God, whose wisdom, and power, and influence, and government, are seen in these footsteps of his goodness.

So that take all the wisest and ablest men, the most powerful and the most knowing, under heaven, they cannot all equal the wisdom and power, that are seen in a blade of grass. Nay, they cannot so much as trace out, or clearly and distinctly decypher, the great varieties in the production, growth and process of its short, yet won­derful continuance. Insomuch, that there is scarce any thing upon earth, be it ever so inconsiderable, but yields me inscriptions of the power and wisdom of its Maker written upon it.

4. In the contemplation of thy great works of the heavens, these goodly, beautiful and numerous bodies, so full of glory and light, I could not but. make that natural reflection, " Lord, what is man, that. thou art mindful of him, or the son of man, that thou regardest him?” it is true, man, considered in himself, is a creature full of wonder; but compared with these goodly creatures, he seems but an incon­siderable thing. I learned hereby, to be humbled to the dust, and to adore thy condescension, that thou art pleased from heaven, the dwelling-place of thy Majesty, to take care of such a worm as man, sinful man!

5. in the contemplating thy power and wisdom, in creating and governing the world, I have learned submission to thy will, as being the will of that most wise God, that by his wisdom, not only created at first, but still governs all things. I have learned to depend upon thy providence, who, though I am but a worm, in comparison of thy heavenly works, yet am an excellent creature in comparison of the ravens, and the herbs of the field. Yet, those he feeds, and these he clothes: and shall he not much more clothe and feed me? Thus I have, in some measure, improved the talents of thy works, to trace out thy Majesty and my own duty.

Now is it vain or fruitless labour, thus to survey the wonderful works of God? And yet it is certain, we may run to excess,, even in inquiries of this nature. We may spend far more time and pains therein, than is consistent either with religion or reason. Have we not a curious instance of this in the writings of a late eminent philoso­pher; at the same time, a divine by profession, and rector of a con­siderable parish. “ During the whole time,” says he, “that I have resided here, [have not been able by all my industry, to discover any more than fifty-three species (of butterflies!) in this neighbourhood. But, I verily believe, if God spares my life a few years longer, I shall be able to find several more !“ Was it not a pity, but his life should. have been spared fifty years for so excellent a purpose’?

To those who lean on this extreme, I would recommend a few more reflections, extracted from the same masterly writer.

1. My learning of natural causes and effects, and of arts and sci­ences, I have not esteemed to be the chief, or the best furniture of my mind: but have accounted them dross in comparison of the knowledge of Thee, and thy Christ, and him crucified. In acquiring them, I have always taken care, 1. That I might not too prodigally bestow my Lime upon them, to the prejudice of that time and pains, which were most profitably bestowed, on the acquiring of more excellent know­ledge, and the greater conceraments of my everlasting happiness.

2. I carried along with me, in all my studies of this kind, the great design of improving them, and the knowledge acquired by them, to the honour of thy name, and the greater discovery of thy wisdom, power and truth; and so translated my secular learning, into an improve­ment of divine knowledge. And had I not ever preserved that design in my acquirement of natural knowledge, I should have accounted all the time misspent which had been employed therein.. For I ever thought it unworthy of a man, who had an everlasting soul, to furnish it with such learning, as either would die with the body, and has become unuseful for his everlasting state, or that in the next moment after death, would be attained without labour.

3. My knowledge did not heighten my opinion of myself; for the more I knew, the more I knew my own ignorance. I was more and more convinced, that I was very ignorant, even in what I thought I knew. And I found an infinite latitude of things, which I did not know at all. Yea, the farther I waded into knowledge, the deeper still I found it. And it was with me just as it was with a child, that thinks, if he could but come to such a field, or climb to the top of such a hill, he should be able to touch the sky. But no sooner is he come thither, than he finds it as far off as it was before. Just so, while my mind was pursuing knowledge, I found the object still as far before me as it was, if not much farther; and could no more attain the full and exact knowledge of any one subject, than the hinder wheel of a cha­riot can overtake the former. Though I knew much, that others were ignorant of,  yet still I found there was much more, whereof! was ignorant, than what I knew, even in the compass of the most inconsiderable subject. And as my very knowledge taught me humi­lity, in the sense, of my own ignorance, so it taught me the narrowness of my understanding which could take in things only by little and little. It taught me, that thy wisdom was unsearchable, and past finding out,: yea, and that thy works though they are but finite in themselves, and necessarily short of the infinite wisdom that contrived them, are yet so wonderful, as fully to confirm the observation of the wise man, “No man can find out the work that thou makest, from the beginning to the end.” If a man were to spend his whole life, in the study of a poor fly, he will still leave much more undiscovered, than the most singular wit ever attained.

4 It taught me also, with the wise man, (when I looked back on what I had attained) to write vanity and vexation, upon all my secular knowledge and learning. That little I knew, was not att