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JOHN WESLEY—MENTOR OR GURU?

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This, the tenth anniversary of the Wesleyan Theological Society, becomes a convenient place to pause in our ongoing to check on our compass, our direction, our purpose, and our progress in the light of our purpose.

As a Wesleyan Theological Society we must renew our own self-understanding. We are engaged in a big thing—how big we may not fully realize. It has not always been the “in thing” to be much concerned about John Wesley. It is becoming so today. One of the reasons it has become intellectually respectable is that this age has found it necessary to reach for a solution to its massive problems, and it has found a possible aid in Wesley.

For all his diminutive, patrician size and manner, Wesley was BIG and there are growing numbers of religious and humanitarian, concerned people who see that bigness. We were seeing it all along, of course, and calling ourselves by his name but being Wesleyan does not necessarily make one as big as the prototype. Perhaps, by examining him and ourselves more carefully and honestly we may find the incentive to become bigger in ways that matter, in order to more adequately meet a day not greatly different from the day in which he served. But that process requires a view of the whole man Wesley was, not merely to select parts of him. And the talk tonight is all about that—under the strange title “John Wesley, Mentor or Guru?”

Self-studies begin in reviewing stated purposes. The WTS purpose is outlined in two major propositions in the Constitution.

1. “To encourage an exchange of ideas among Wesleyan/Arminian scholars and other persons interested in this area,” and

2. “To stimulate scholarship among younger theologians and pastors.” When the elements in this “purpose” are extracted and examined, a proper and suitable tool for self-study emerges. Among the many implications the following are pertinent for our review tonight.

1. The goal of the society is “an exchange of ideas,” which among scholars must be expected to result in wholesome differences of opinion shared creatively in lively dialogue. There would be no purpose in simply repeating “ideas” already held in common. Uncriticized ideas can hide unsuspected flaws. Controversy is the furnace in which ideas are purified and polished into greater usefulness.

2. This exchange is “encouraged.” It is important and demanded by the very nature of scholarship.
3. The goal is “scholarship,” and scholarship imposes its own high demands. It cannot be chained. It demands freedom as well as honesty and integrity and love of truth.

4. It is not clear who is invited to this interchange, whether the “other interested persons” are other than Wesleyan/Arminian scholars or other than scholars. I presume both are encouraged. And that is good.

5. “Younger scholars and pastors” are to be stimulated to scholarship. This is intended, no doubt, to prevent the “institutional dry rot” from undermining the life of the society. Fresh blood transfusions at regular intervals are essential to intellectual and spiritual health.

6. The major area of interest is “Wesleyan/Arminian.” This presupposes that Wesley and Arminius are important enough to become the center of attention and that there is enough untapped resource in them to warrant further digging. We will continue to search for Wesleyan and Arminian riches in Wesley and Arminius themselves, not neglecting disturbing areas of their thought, or dismissing Arminius as merely the father of “free will”—a travesty on his real contribution to the Church.

7. The society name, “Theological,” indicates that it is theological work that is to go on. It is recognized that theology is not finished. Creative opportunities and demands lie before us, leading to solutions to the ever new problems confronting the Church in the world.

8. The society is just that—a “Society,” not a church, or denomination, or sect, or social action group, or evangelistic movement. It is a working fellowship with a specific mandate. This fellowship can be wide, challenging, virile, and meaningful. It stands on the growing edge of Wesleyanism, reaching outward and upward toward a greater measure of competency and relevance.

9. Finally, the unexpressed but strongly implied assumption is that all this is worth the time and energy of scholars—that it matters.

This constitutes a profile of our task and suggests marching orders in the doing of it. With this understanding of our purpose and privilege and obligation, we can begin to do the thing required of us.

The Wesleyan Heritage

Wesleyans, traditionally, are not Wesleyan in the same sense that Calvinists rely on Calvin, or Lutherans on Luther. None of these men entertained any ambition to have a religious movement called by their names. All three were far too aware of the meaning of the Church to countenance such ideas. To them Christ was the Head of the Church, and the “marks” of the Church were truly catholic (not Romish): one, holy, apostolic, universal. The interpretation of these marks differed somewhat, of course. But their theologies were Church theologies, not sectarianisms. The errors they sought to correct were the pretensions of any human organization to usurp the headship of Christ over the Church.

Luther and Calvin had a specific history-bound task to perform—that of
defining their reforming movements before the somewhat hostile governments under which they existed. The question had to be answered clearly, “Is your revolt against civil authority, or against the authority of Rome?” And the people who wished to be Christian, not merely Roman, needed theological and ethical guidance which was provided in a masterful way by Luther and Calvin and the other Reformers. But the very demand for sharp definition eventually transformed the defining documents and creeds into divisive instruments that soon hardened into cold scholasticisms which created and perpetuated wide and often bitter divisions.

Wesley’s task was quite different. He felt he did not depart from the foundations laid by the Reformers. What he did do was to unlock the scholastic doors to allow the vibrant “Word of God” to illuminate and vitalize the cold, correct Reformation theologies. The “man of one Book,” as he called himself, added a dimension to theology that had never been an integral aspect of it before.

The Bible had always been used to support Christian doctrine. Taking the cue, perhaps from Arminius, Wesley used the Scriptures to criticize and give content to doctrine. To the four classical marks of the Church, Wesley more or less consciously added a fifth. The four marks had fenced off the Church into a sort of static, status-oriented, exclusivist entity. Wesley opened that closed door by showing that the Church has, also, a mission. It exists to live the life of love-Christian love-in the world; to become, in Christ’s stead, reconcilers. This changes the meaning of the Church in ways that we are but slowly recognizing.

Our definitive label, Wesleyan, is both a mark of identification and an obligation to engage in self-criticism relative to the accuracy of the claim. To be Wesleyan requires that one knows what Wesley taught in its totality and full-orbed unity. Selected bits and pieces taken out of context cannot be truly or honestly Wesleyan. This does not mean a slavish, wooden bondage to every detail of Wesley’s very fluid and investigative and growing thought but rather a full appreciation of the fact that his thinking was fluid, investigative, and growing and that he clearly distinguished between the substance (basic, biblical, and unchanging truth) and the circumstance (man’s opinions about these truths and his appropriation of them) within theological conversation.

Wesley’s real contribution lay within the substance of faith, the conviction derived from years of study that the heart of the Christian religion was “perfect love.” “There is nothing higher in religion,” he said. “If you look for anything more than love you look wide of the mark, you are getting out of the royal way.” This vital relationship between man and God and man and his fellows (religion and ethics) is the principle which interprets every detail of Wesley’s thought.

Love as the compass towards Wesley’s thought could “locate” us. By it two questions are raised which we wish to press: Is Wesley our mentor or our guru? and, How can the Wesleyan Theological Society meet the challenge imposed on it by its own Wesleyan claim? In other words, are we playing games or living for things that really matter?
Mentors and Gurus

John Wesley as a catalyst in the contemporary religious world will be considered under two categories; similar in function but quite different in character: Wesley as mentor or guru. Some liberties are taken with the meaning of these terms, suggested however by common usage.

A mentor is a guide and critic. His task is to introduce his charge to sources of information; to prevent the student from drifting into unfruitful, erroneous byways; and to encourage him to exploit his own potential as he learns to master his field. A mentor is satisfied when his student outpaces him.

The guru is a master. He is the “prima donna” who is to be followed, obeyed, believed, imitated, honored. Innovation is not the prerogative of the follower. He sets aside personal initiative. The guru is a little god.

The mentor taps resources of creativity and personal fulfillment in his student. He is a transformer, opening doors to freedom. The guru seeks to make men into his own image. He is a conformist leading to the illusion of freedom.

Wesley as Mentor

Wesleyans have used Wesley in both ways. To some he is mentor. Those around him were encouraged to dig from the same mine he found so inexhaustible, the Bible and everything in life and literature that cast light on the meaning of religion. Ignorance and distaste for the study called forth his acorn. The vitality of intellect and spirituality to which he led men produced a worthy line of theologians stretching from the New Room in Bristol in Wesley’s day to Europe and America today. A truly Wesleyan Wesleyanism is dynamic and vital and alert to contemporary issues, creative and free.

Wesley as Guru

But others have understood Wesley as guru, the authority, the master. He is put on a plane one step below St. Paul and at least one step above Augustine, and who knows how many steps above Calvin!

But by a twist of logic—or “psycho-logic”—it becomes necessary, always, for “authoritative interpreters” to explain such a master. These interpreters become canons of orthodoxy, as the Catholic church claims to be of Christianity. Protestant scholasticism fell into the same pattern. Interpreters are elevated to the status of secondary gurus and find it hazardous maintaining this status. Some Wesleyanisms follow gurus; but who can say, authoritatively, that any interpreter, in the eighteenth, nineteenth, or twentieth century is the canon of Wesleyanism and superior to other Wesleyanisms? Their decisions are necessarily subjective.

Wesley was deeply and consciously indebted to history, but history did not throttle him. He caught the torch from those before him and flung it out for others to carry. The flame has been spread far and wide: to Asbury, Roberts, Barclay, Albright, Morrison, Steele, Mahan, Inskip, Finney, Bresee,
Rees, to name a few. These are fellow laborers—with Christ—not heads of the Church.

Parochial and history-bound scholasticisms which become the norms of Wesleyan orthodoxy can lose the flexibility, the vitality and dynamic, and personal and social impact of the man whose name is borrowed. Great care must be taken lest, in our zeal to put a protective shield against verbal deviation and the erosion of parochial and denominational identity, a crippling scholasticism results which erodes the very truth which is most treasured. History points to the danger of isms becoming ingrown, self-infected, and sterile. Christian mission is prostituted into definition-forming rather than hearing the gospel call to the work of reconciliation and barrier-smashing, so that men can see and find the Lord Jesus Christ.

Wesley was not imprisoned by his own well-articulated theology. He was released from his own strictures by it. President Woodrow Wilson, in *An Address Delivered at Wesleyan University on the Occasion of the Wesley Bicentennial*, under the title “John Wesley’s Place in History,” said of him with profound appreciation:

> The Church was dead and Wesley awakened it. The poor were neglected and Wesley sought them out. The Gospel was shrunk into formulas and Wesley flung it fresh upon the air once more in the speech of common man. And men’s spirits responded, leaped at the message, and were made whole as they comprehended it. It was the voice of the centuries-longing heard from the mouth of this one man . . . the master of men, a leader who left his hearers wiser than he found them in the practical means of salvation.²

> Wesley entered every kind of human society with grace and dignity. Social unrest found him often among angry crowds. Heavy fists raised to strike the little man would drop tenderly, we are told, to stroke his hair when he looked full into the face of hostile men with clear, fearless, honest, loving eyes.³ Some men feared him as a revolutionary, but “a sort of revolution did follow him after all. . . . He almost unwittingly left a church behind him.”

**Wesleyan “Holiness”**

Moving in closer to the nub of our self-examination, and to our retooling, we must look at another key term in our vocabulary—holiness.

We implicitly and explicitly equate Wesleyanism and holiness. So well has this identification been made that those who admire Wesley but who do not find our understanding of holiness convincing refrain from calling themselves Wesleyan lest the label “holiness” be attached also to them. Wesleyan, along with the term *Arminian*, for inadequate reasons, is considered a liability. But Wesley was not handicapped by the term holiness. He made it an asset, though he did not escape persecution because of it.

But when Wesley is considered a guru, the tendency is to rigidify his theological position into formularies rather than into theology / life orientations flowing outward into the world. Formulas are necessary for clear thought, but necessarily logically restrictive. Life, however, is always greater than logic. Life and love are not *irrational*, or had better not be, but they
cannot be bound into the forms of logic and they do break out of the limitations of formularies. Theology, including Wesleyan theology, is in some measure parochial, insofar as it expresses the beliefs of segments of total Christendom. Parochialism by its very nature identifies one group against another and can create judgmental “disfellowships” which divide rather than define. John Wesley’s own solution (for he was a man of amazing Christian tolerance) lay in the transcendent theme, holiness as perfect love, which closes all parochial gaps.

When Wesleyanism becomes merely a formula, however precise, and the formula is equated with “holiness,” as it so often is, holiness, the central theme of the gospel, takes on a cold, rigid, forbidding image which never, somehow, gets into the nooks and crannies of the world’s life where it can do its reconciling, antiseptic, and healing work.

**Christian Holiness**

Wesley as mentor leads us into a biblical and vital concept of holiness. Holiness is not Wesley’s invention or property, nor is it ours. We do not do well to claim it as ours. It is a Christian doctrine. It is a Church truth. Only in an accommodated sense is it proper to designate any segment of the Church as “holiness.”

For any group, organized or informal, to call itself “holiness” imposes great responsibility. Negatively, great care needs to be exercised (1) lest holiness become implicitly or explicitly merely parochial, hence divisive; and (2) lest the impression be left that a judgment has been made regarding one’s own higher spirituality and, by contrast, the defective holiness of others.

Positively, equally great care needs to be taken that (1) holiness is understood in its full-orbed biblical meaning—”Christian”—not merely a limited meaning; and (2) that the demonstration of that many-splendored word include the beauty of Christian love—Christian ethics. Theology that does not issue in Christian behavior characterized by love is not Christian holiness (note Paul’s shocking word, “If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his”—Romans 8:9).

It is significant, we believe, that in the earlier days of the holiness movement the work of the Spirit of God brought people of all denominational affiliations into the “Movement” and prevented the formation of a church. Holiness was the vitalizing spiritual energy which renewed the churches through spiritually renewed people. There was a “holy” reluctance to pull folk away from denominations to form a new church.

It may be significant, moreover, that in this day’s spiritual reawakening, the Holy Spirit’s activity spans every human organization, as if to say, “I do not belong to any church, but to the Church, and I am where anyone is who is ‘in Christ.’” The work of the Holy Spirit crosses all humanly divisive lines. This does not mean that denominations forfeit the Spirit, but that God’s Spirit cannot be restricted in His work by any human fences. Where He is, holiness is going on.
When Wesleyanism is derived from Wesley as spiritual and theological mentor it is possible to wear the designation “holiness” with grace and humility and truth and winsomeness.

Summary

Among the things which being truly Wesleyan means are the following:

1. To be captured by the Word of God. To be Wesleyan is to be committed to the gospel, which will not be bound by any man’s interpretation of it but which stands in perpetual judgment over men’s interpretation.

2. To be a churchman, not sectarian in spirit. Denominations are not in themselves wrong, but the gospel Wesley leads us to transcends divisions and establishes oneness with all “the larger Body of Christ.”

3. To be Christ-centered rather than creed-bound. Wesley made Christ the meaning of holiness—the very heart of holiness. Theology took a seat lower than his Lord. It became a very important servant, not a substitute for the Lord.

4. To identify holiness as love. He called it “perfect love” but explained carefully and at great length that “perfect” meant unalloyed, not unimprovable, love. In characterizing holiness as love, enormous ethical shock waves crash through formal theology and raise great tidal waves of personal and social revolution. Love is essentially relational and dynamic—what spiritual really is.

5. To live “on the boundary” between the solid past and the growing edge of the world coming to be—to live fully and eagerly in the vitality of the Spirit’s presence. The freedom of the Spirit is not always, or only, emotional hilarity, shouting, weeping, unconventionalities in public worship. Freedom may well be courage in battle, a life of quiet dedication to Christ in unrewarded service, the prophetic voice in a hostile wilderness without self-defensiveness, anguished hours—and years—in the scholar’s study thrashing out answers to human problems too complex for shallow and pious platitudes. Freedom of the Spirit is the power to withstand impossible pressures in life and remain true and gracious and forgiving. It is meeting misunderstanding and rejection without bitterness. It is to love where self-vindication was once the spoiler. Wesley showed us this in his own life.

6. To be profoundly involved with social concerns. Perfection of love includes “following the Lord of the Church in the open ways where men are found,” says Leon Hynson in “The Social Concerns of Wesley,” “where abrasive encounter calls forth Christian commitment and concern.” Hynson quotes Carl Michaelson’s insightful comment to the effect that Wesley’s doctrine of “Christian Holiness removes the distraction of idolatry, thus liberating a man to assume responsibility for the world.” So strongly did John Wesley feel that the social dimension was absolutely essential to Christian holiness that he said to fail in this respect was not merely neglect or simple failure but rebellion.

If, indeed, holiness can be a well-defined title standing for the full biblical (gospel) meaning of that grand truth rather than a value judgment regarding our own orthodoxy and spirituality, the term can become the asset
that it was to John Wesley. If Wesley is understood as a mentor leading us past himself to the
Word of God and through it to the Lord Jesus Christ, we can see our task ahead more clearly.

How Can the Wesleyan Theological Society Meet the Challenge
Which Calling Itself Wesleyan Imposes?

We are left with one final word. What is our mandate in the light of (1) our purpose as a
Society? and (2) our existence in this world?

1. Our mandate is to “do theology.” Theology looks backward to roots, but also forward
toward service. Theology should be the vanguard of the marching army, showing the way,
setting the pace, leading into the real issues, guarding against expending strength on side
issues—wasting manpower and ammunition on battles already fought. Theology belongs up in
front leading the way, not dragging along behind justifying what is done or condemning it.

2. Theologians need to come to terms with archaic theological vocabularies once vital to
common understanding but now obscure. They must bring into today’s language the meanings so
long locked up in technical terms. The terms are not sacred or an assurance of orthodoxy—the
meanings are.

3. It is the task of theologians to bring Christian light to bear on problems modern man
faces which never have been faced before. This will require that the theologian learn what the
problems are, so that a simplistic dogma is not plastered over a sore more complex than meets
the eye. Christian answers are not easy and simple; else why do we have a Bible wrestling for
1,500 years to bring truth to mankind?

4. Theologians in the holiness tradition have the obligation to expose Wesleyan
parochialisms to each other in order to close the gaps in the ranks. Heat will be generated by
“perfect love” discussions, but the heat can fuse the isms into a dynamic spiritual unity-in-
diversity—a “knitting together,” as Paul said.

5. Holiness theologians should communicate with and commend to “the larger Body of
Christ,” of which we are a part, an understanding of what holiness theology and life really is.

6. Holiness theologians ought to be as courageous and humble as other religious bodies
who open themselves to the criticism and evaluation of “outsiders” in order to establish a ground
for serious dialogue. Without this “airing” process the danger of becoming ingrown, infertile,
and powerless exists. Slaying the enemy behind the safety of our closed doors does nothing
toward entering the arena of today’s need.

7. We need to take our faith out into the riptides of contemporary life and thinking—into
the scholarly societies whose task it is to engage in biblical exegesis, historical research,
thological exploration, and ethical and social problems. Are we willing to do the
homework necessary to be confronted with scholarship and build the respect of those
who have done their homework? Biblical holiness does not need to be defended and protected
and coddled but put into the rough-and-tumble of life. The Holy Spirit does not
need a safe place to do His work. He is eminently capable of caring for himself, and He operates
most effectively when opposition is the hottest and the holiness theologian is the most
intellectually prepared. Wesley taught us this, too.

8. One of the most urgent needs is to engage in cross-disciplinary interchange. How does
holiness look to a psychologist and a psychiatrist and a medical doctor? How can holiness be
meaningful to a social scientist, an anthropologist, an educator, a politician? How can a Christian
cope with the impersonality of the computer culture—the depersonalizing, technological way of
modern life? What about holiness in a world where the state has been given the responsibility for
the poor and needy; where drugs solve the problems of depression, aggression, and crime; where
health problems are yielding to science and the future is predicted with mechanical assurance?
Holiness, if it is relevant, must demonstrate that relevance where the real problems lie.

9. Holiness theologians must establish true biblical and psychological and theological
foundations for the ethical life. Ethical demands without a firm foundation are mere moralisms.
And this is going to take some very real biblical study.

10. Bishop Paul Ellis expressed a very Wesleyan concern to the Christian Holiness
Association executive committee: “Mr. Wesley placed primary emphasis upon Christ’s
definition of the ultimate demands of Christian discipleship in terms of love. . . . It seems to me
to be significant that, at a time in history when society seems as corrupt as in the day of Wesley,
there comes from several sources a new call to a biblical definition of Christian love and the
evangelical Christian’s responsibility to social concern and action. The relational concept
suggested by the word love is right on target for any discussion which moves toward the
purpose of opening up Christian holiness and love as realities which concern the entire Church of
Jesus Christ in the world. . . . The theological position which we take as teachers of holiness
must be moved from the areas of debate about the definition of terms into the home, the
community, the marketplace, and the personal life of the individual—in other words, the area of
dynamic action and creative relationships.”

11. And, then, Wesleyan Theological Society theologians need to write, WRITE,
WRITE—not just tracts and devotional literature—but solid theology, worth reading—not just
rewriting the old words but breaking out into fresh, vibrant, anointed, biblical, deeply meaningful
theology—and to pay the price for the scholarship needed to do this.

The Final Word

It is not mere negativism to recognize the fact that the holiness movement has virtually
lost its voice in the religious scene today—by default. The resource is present. The vision of
possibility is coming clearer. The will to respond is a part of the dedication to God which
Wesleyanism proclaims. Our work is not done. We have no excuse for thrashing old straw. The
call is imperious. Our answer is, “Lord, here am I; send me.”
REFERENCE NOTES


3. Ibid., p. 29.

4. Ibid., p. 30.


6. Ibid., p. 39, fn.


There are two methods of speaking with which Paul is concerned throughout 1 Corinthians 14. One method is “speaking in tongues” or glossolalia, the other is “speaking prophetically” or Propheteteialalia. It is necessary to examine carefully these two types of speech before attempting an interpretation of the chapter.

It is a thesis of this paper that a proper understanding of the terms prophēteuō and lalein glōssais will pave the way for an interpretation of 1 Corinthians 14 which fits harmoniously into the general structure of the entire Corinthian Epistle, which does no violence to the language of the Greek text, and which provides a possible reason for what appear to be contradictions in the argument of Paul concerning “gifts.”

Propheteteialalia

It can be shown that the term prophēteuō and its cognate nominal forms are used to depict description and definition far more than prediction. It is also clear that Paul’s use of this root in 1 Corinthians refers, not to prediction and those who can predict, but to describers and apologists. Thus when Paul enjoined the Corinthians to seek the pneumatika, especially the ability to “prophesy” (14:1), it was not because he believed it was possible for every member of the congregation to predict the future, but because he thought that everyone could proclaim the gospel and so produce learning and comfort or exhortation (14:3). Accordingly, it is more proper to translate Greek prophēteub by English proclaim or preach than by prophesy or predict. The importance of such a translation will be seen below.

Glossolalia

No phrase has received more attention in recent New Testament scholarship than the expression lalein glōssais or lalein glōssé. For purposes of translation, the simple English phrase “to speak in (a) tongue(s)” may be accepted as accurate, if uninspired. And let it be noted that although the
adjective “unknown” does not appear in the Greek text, it is not at all out of place in the context of the chapter.

Paul’s use of the phrase *Lalein glōssais* here in 1 Corinthians 14 must be sharply distinguished from Luke’s use of the same phrase in Acts 2. For Luke tells his readers that he is describing the speaking in various languages or dialects (Acts 2:6, 8), which the presence of a multilingual audience made necessary; but Paul explains that *glossolalia* in Corinth involved the utterance of *mystēria* which “no one understands” (14:2). [Scripture quotations throughout are the author’s personal translations.] The reason why no one can understand such utterance is that “the person who speaks in a tongue is does not speak to people” (*ho gar lalōn glōsse ouk anthrōpois lalei*). Thus it is clear that Paul wanted to make a distinction between understandable *propheiteialalia* and nonunderstandable *glossolalia*. Other points distinguish the one type of speech from the other, but the main difference between the two is understandability.

**Toward an Interpretation of 1 Corinthians 14**

An examination of the seven paragraphs which comprise 1 Corinthians 14 reveals that six of them specifically mention both of the types of speech defined above, *propheiteialalia* and *glossolalia*.4

In paragraph one (14:1-5), Paul gives the following definitions of the two types of speech which he was considering. *Glossolalia* is nonunderstandable, mysterious, self-edifying, and inferior to preaching. *Propheiteialalia* is especially desirable, understandable, upbuilding, encouraging, consoling, edifying, and superior to *glossolalia*.

But even while he is busy writing such definitions, Paul makes the unusual statement: “I want all of you to speak in tongues” (14:5a). Given the definition which Paul had just listed for *glossolalia*, is it at all strange that he quickly adds a condition? “But even more [I want you] to prophesy” (14:5b). Indeed, in the light of the way in which the apostle himself defined the two types of speech, one might well wonder how far Paul’s own “tongue” was from his cheek when he told his Corinthian readers that he wanted them to do something which he calls nonunderstandable, mysterious, self-edifying, and inferior.

Paragraph two (14:6-12) contains the Pauline assertion that *glossolalia* is of no benefit unless it is either apocalyptic, gnostic, prophetic, or didactic (14:6). In other words, Paul apparently felt that benefit could come only from that type of speaking which produced visions, knowledge, gospel proclamation, or teaching. It is noteworthy that in the preceding paragraph Paul had specifically labeled *glossolalia* as none of the above.

Paul begins paragraph three (14:13-19) by stating that the person who speaks in a tongue (*ho lalōn glōssē*) should pray for the ability to “interpret” (14:13). This is not, as commonly supposed, a Pauline assertion that *glossolalia* is acceptable if someone, anyone, “interprets.” Rather, Paul’s idea is that the glossolalist himself should become an interpreter of his *glossolalia*.

The Greek verb *diermēneuō* may mean either to “translate,” to “explain,” or to “interpret.”5 It is also used often to convey the idea of making
something understandable or clear. \(^6\) Now it is obvious, according to Pail’s previous statements, that the moment glossolalia becomes understandable, it ceases to be glossolalia by definition, for glossolalia is something which “no one understands” \((14:2)\). In other words, Paul, by telling his reader; to exchange their ability at glossolalia for powers of interpretation, has very clearly told them to choose that other way of speaking, the way which produces understandability. \(^7\)

Once again in this paragraph, as in paragraph one, Paul makes a statement which the context simply will not allow to be taken in a straightforward manner. “I thank God. I speak in tongues more than all of you” \((14:18)\). Some have contended that Paul means by this assertion that he speaks more languages than any Corinthian Christian. \(^8\) But such a contention requires one to define Pauline glossolalia as something different from Corinthian glossolalia, which is manifestly nonunderstandable, as shown above.

It is not unlikely that Paul here makes a statement which is so absurd in the context which he has just created that no reader could mistake his meaning. Phrased as a question, one might ask: Can it be believed by serious-minded interpreters that the pragmatic Paul would actually be thankful to God for the ability to do something which he has so vigorously deprecated? Perhaps a Pauline answer should be given: \(Μή \ γενόιτο!\) Rather, Paul preferred 5 mentally stimulating, instructive words to 10,000 glossolalia words \((14:19)\).

Thus while it is true that Paul made two statements like “I want all of you to speak in tongues” and “I speak in tongues more than all of you,” it is equally true that Jesus told certain would-be disciples that they should “hate” their families as well as their own lives \((Luke 14:26)\). It is the contention of the author that one should no more argue that Paul spoke in tongues and encouraged others to do so than he should argue that Jesus hated His own family and His own life and wanted His disciples to follow that example. In both cases, the context drastically alters the meaning of apparently straightforward statements. \(^9\)

Paragraph four \((14:20-25)\) involves two seemingly unrelated ideas. first, there is Paul’s citation of Isa. 28:11 \((14:21)\). Then there is the discussion of what glossolalia and propheticialalia respectively do in the ministry of the Church \((14:22-25)\).

Paul’s quotation of Isaiah may be included in this place because he wanted to explain an Old Testament passage which the Corinthians misunderstood and misapplied to their own situation. \(^10\) But whatever Paul’s reason for including the quotation in this passage, modern interpreters can understand the Isaianic passage with little difficulty. Isaiah was telling his nation of God’s method in teaching them lessons about sin and pride. To use John Bright’s very appropriate words, “If they will not hear the lesson spelled out in plain Hebrew, then God will be forced to teach it to them in Assyrian!” \(^11\) Far from qualifying as glossolalia, this babbling which sounds like a child’s silly prattle is the Assyrian language falling on ears accustomed to understandable Hebrew. \(sαυ lασαυ sαυ lασαυ qαυ lαqαυ qαυ lαqαυ\) \((Isa. 28:10)\). This is an example of what Paul had stated earlier in the chap-
ter: “There are doubtless many different languages in the world, and none is without meaning; but if I do not know the meaning of the language, I shall be a foreigner to the speaker and the speaker a foreigner to me” (14:10-11). Accordingly, this quotation of the prophet could not properly be used by the glossolalist to support his babbling. “The strange tongues were indicative of God’s displeasure and judgment, not of His pleasure and blessing.”

Verse 22 of the fourth paragraph contains a statement which many modern interpreters have failed to understand properly. “Glossolalia is a sign not for believers but for unbelievers, while propheteialalia is not for unbelievers but for believers.” This statement must be understood as a straw man which Paul sets up for the purpose of knocking it down. Evidently it had been the contention of the Corinthians that they practiced glossolalia in order to bring unbelievers to conversion. But Paul’s own opinion on the matter was exactly the opposite. Outsiders or unbelievers who hear glossolalia will certainly say, “You are crazy” (14:23). By contrast, an outsider or unbeliever who hears propheteialalia will be “convicted by everyone, called to account [for his unbelief] by everyone, the secrets of his heart will be revealed, and so, falling on his face, he will worship God and declare that God is certainly among you” (14:24-25).

Once again, the context of the chapter warns against citation of any one statement standing alone. It is entirely incorrect to assert on the basis of verse 22 that glossolalia affects unbelievers and propheteialalia affects believers, for it was precisely this error that Paul’s illustrations sought to correct in the thinking of the Corinthians. The modern interpreter can safely assume that Paul accurately described the fruits produced by both types of speech. While glossolalia produces accusations of insanity, propheteialalia produces conviction and conversion.

Paragraph five (14:26-33a) has often been explained in terms of restrictions which Paul placed upon glossolalia. It is interesting to note the following facts about the differences which Paul saw between glossolalia and propheteialalia. First, he warned that no more than two or three people should speak in tongues. By contrast, he assured his readers that all of them should proclaim the gospel in understandable speech (14:27, 31). Second, he repeated his admonition to the would-be glossolalist that an interpreter, the glossolalist himself, is necessary for his gift, an interpreter whose presence means that glossolalia loses its most essential characteristic of non-understandability (14:27c). By contrast, he specified the propheteialalist as one whose work would be properly balanced by the other people who were also preaching the gospel along with him. There would be no confusion in such a situation and no interpreter was necessary (14:32-33a).

Paragraph six (14:33b-36) is the only paragraph in the chapter which does not set glossolalia and propheteialalia in contrast to each other. But paragraph seven (14:37-40) contains some extremely interesting information. After having asserted the authority of his opinions in no uncertain terms (14:37-38), Paul drew two conclusions from this chapter on “speaking.”

Verse 39 is his first conclusion. But, unfortunately, there has been widespread agreement about the proper way to translate the Greek text of
the verse. Without fail, translators have assumed a version very similar to the Revised Standard Version: 

16 “So, my brethren, earnestly desire to prophesy, and do not forbid speaking in tongues.”

There are several problems which such a translation does not solve. First, there is the seemingly unrecognized fact that the Greek text does not contain a simple, uninterrupted phrase such as *lalein glōssais*. Rather, there is a complete grammatical unit which appears between the two words so naturally spoken and written close together. The entire phrase is *to lalein mē kōluete glōssais*. Thus a normally simple phrase, *lalein glōssais*, is broken by a negative particle and an imperative.

Second, there is the matter of the meaning of the Greek verb *kōluō*. Translators have steadfastly assumed that it means “to forbid” in this verse. But *kōluō* does not always mean “forbid” and it is not always so translated elsewhere in the New Testament. Of the many passages which could be cited in this regard, perhaps Acts 11:17 furnishes the clearest example of another meaning which the word may carry: “If then God gave the same gift to them [the Gentiles] as he gave to us when we believed in the Lord Jesus Christ, who was I that I could *kōlusai* God?” Now Peter, the speaker in this verse, certainly was not capable of “forbidding” God to offer salvation to the Gentiles, but he could have hindered or impeded God’s efforts by refusing to cooperate. This verse thus shows that *kōluō* does not always mean “forbid.” And since it does not always carry that meaning, it is fair to question whether that is its meaning in 1 Cor. 14:39.

Third, translators have failed to acknowledge the nominal quality of the articular infinitive *to lalein*. It is noteworthy that of the 16 times where the phrase *lalein glōssais / glōssē* occurs in the New Testament, only here is the articular infinitive attested. This would seem to argue strongly in favor of reading substantively. More important is the fact that the counterpart of *to lalein* in the first half of the verse is *to prophetēuein*. Both infinitives are direct objects, each of the main verb in the clause, and both should be read as substantives. However, the substantival character of the infinitive does not depend upon the absence or presence of the article in *koinē* Greek. As A. T. Robertson notes, “One naturally feels that the articular inf. is more substantival than the anarthrous . . . but that is not correct. The subject-inf. occurs freely both with and without the article in the N.T.” Thus the substantival quality of *lalein* in this passage is assured, regardless of one’s text-critical judgment concerning the article. Given the substantival quality of *to lalein*, and given the fact that *lalein* elsewhere in the chapter refers explicitly to *prophetēalalia*, it is certainly not incongruous to argue that *to lalein* in verse 39 refers, not to *glossolalia*, but to *prophetēalalia*.

Given these three objections to the traditional or standard translation of the verse, it does not seem improper to suggest the following version for consideration: “So, my brothers, earnestly desire *prophetēalalia*, and do not *impede prophetēalalia* with *glossolalia*.” Add to the three objections stated above the obvious fact that no one at Corinth was trying to forbid *glossolalia* and it should be clear that this translation of the text would make verse 39...
a fitting first conclusion to everything else which Paul had argued throughout the chapter.

There are two types of speech. They differ in understandability. They differ in purpose. They differ in what they produce in unbelievers. They differ in the benefits which they bring to their adherents. One is confusion and insanity; the other is peace and conversion to God. One is restricted and restrictive; the other is unlimited and expansive.

Accordingly, when Paul drew a second conclusion from the debate over the ways in which one should speak, he believed it was enough to say this: “Everything should be done properly and in an orderly fashion” (14:40). Can his Corinthian readers have had any doubts about which type of speaking would contribute to such propriety and order? Certainly they should not have misunderstood the thrust of Paul’s plea to them. It would have been highly improper to allow glossolalia to impede or hinder propheteialalia.

REFERENCE NOTES

1. I wish to thank my four responders—Professors Finley (Nazarene Theological Seminary), Thompson (Marion College), McNeil (Asbury College), and Burgess (Bethel College)—for their criticism of my paper at the annual meeting of the Wesleyan Theological Society, November 1, 1974. Some of the help which I received from them will be apparent from the citation of their comments in several notes below.

2. Cf. Titus 1:12 for a classic example in New Testament literature. Another indication of this idea is the appellation “prophetic” which is given to such historical books as Joshua, Judges, Samuel, and Kings in the Hebrew Bible. The Semitic terms which lie behind the Greek ones (Akkadian nabû, Hebrew nabi”) indicate the same idea. See in this regard W. F. Albright, Archaeology and the Religion of Israel (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., Anchor Books, 5th ed., 1959), p. 23, and the references there. Albright has argued that a nabi” was “one who is called [by God]” in a “transforming experience, as a result of which he was under special commission from Yahweh to preach to his people.” See also the important article by Herbert B. Huffmon, “Prophecy in the Mari Letters,” Biblical Archaeologist 31, no. 4 (Dec., 1968): 101-24.

3. See especially 1 Cor. 13:9, where Paul has described “prophecy” as ek merous, i.e., “imperfect” or “partial.” Other verses which are important in this connection include 1 Cor. 14:24-25, where Paul argues that “prophecy” or proclamation produces conviction, confession, and conversion of the unbeliever.

4. Dividing with the Revised Standard Version. Note that paragraph six (14: 33b-36) mentions only “speaking” (lalein) without distinguishing either glossolalia or propheteialalia.


6. See particularly Luke 24:27, where Jesus explains or interprets the Hebrew Scriptures to the disciples.

7. In this regard, Professor McNeil asked whether one could distinguish between “interpreted” glossolalia and propheteialalia. I would argue as follows: For Paul, any kind of speaking should be understandable to be of value in the church. Propheteialalia aims at understandability as part of its raison d’être. Glossolalia, however, has to be “interpreted” to be understood, at which time it ceases by definition to be glossolalia. If the end product, understandability, may finally be achieved by either process, one wonders why the Corinthians would not choose the direct and straightforward method of propheteialalia from the beginning. Again, it should be remembered that
the glossolalist and the interpreter are to be the same person, so the understandability is achieved by one person going a longer, two-step route. Paul’s point seems to be that during the glossolalia stage of this process much misunderstanding of the message of the gospel will result. That is why Paul prefers the direct route of propheteialalia.


9. Dr. Finley brought to my attention an event in the career of Micaiah ben Imlah which bears out the practice in Semitic literature of saying precisely the opposite of what is meant. Micaiah, famed for his negative oracles and hated by King Ahaz because “he never prophesies good” (1 Kings 22:8), said the opposite of what he meant to Ahaz in an attempt to highlight the ridiculous nature of the battle planned jointly by Ahaz and Jehoshaphat (see 1 Kings 22:15). I would like to add two examples from the Book of Job. Job’s wife told him to “bless” (sic!) God and die, barekh lohim va’mut (Job 2:9), although what she really meant was that he should curse God for his misfortune. That Job did not lack the ability to utter curses about his fate may be seen in Job 3:2-26. Later in the book, Job “compliments” his friends with these words: “Indeed you are the people and with you wisdom will die” (Job 12:2). But his rebuttal of virtually everything they said shows how little confidence he actually had in their wisdom.

10. Professor McNeil made the following observation in reference to this part of my paper: “Do you not first need to establish what the apparent spiritual state of the Corinthian readers is (cf. 1:2, 5, 10; 3:1, 3; 6:11; 14:20; e.g.) before you can identify them with the ‘unbelievers’ (or anyone else) of Isa. 28:10-11?” This question does not apply to my argument concerning the Corinthians. I am not identifying the Corinthians with anyone in Isaiah’s day, but am arguing that the reason for Paul’s citation of the Isaianic passage must be to show his readers that the prophet’s words describing the strange sounds of the Assyrian language cannot apply to their glossolalia utterances.


13. Indeed, glossolalia might be said to affect unbelievers, but adversely.


15. Dr. Thompson stated his opinion that this paragraph should have been discussed more fully. I did not give it much space because, as I have stated, it does not offer any information about the contrasting nature of glossolalia and propheteialalia.

16. Blaney, Wesleyan Theological Journal 8:58, does offer a different suggestion, but his idea, obtained from the writer of this paper in a private conversation, is more a paraphrase than a translation. Be it noted here that the author has discussed this particular verse with and received assistance from Rev. Sherrill Munn and Professor Robert D. Branson.

17. Among the English versions which translate similarly are: Wiclif (1380), Tyndale (1525), Cranmer (1539), The Great Bible (1539), Geneva Bible (1560), Bishops’ Bible (1568), Authorized Version (1611), Revised Version (1881), Revised Standard Version (1946) and New American Standard Bible (1960). In addition, Segond’s La Sainte Bible (1963); El Nuevo Testamento, published by Gideons International (n.d.); and Luther’s Die Bibel translate similarly in French, Spanish, and German respectively.
18. Professor McNeil noted that *laleō* and *glōssa* appear together 16 times in the New Testament (excluding Mark 16:17). Twelve times the phrase is used by Paul, 10 in 1 Corinthians 14. Of some importance is his comment that the two words are separated “in four other instances (Acts 2:4, 11; 1 Cor. 13:1; 14:27) by adjectives, pronouns, and/or nouns, but in no other instance by so weighty a unit as the verb.” McNeil concludes from this information that “the separation [in 1 Cor. 14:39] may or may not be significant. Context will have to be the final authority, and much hinges on the interpretation of earlier portions of the chapter.” Dr. Thompson also felt that I was “too bothered” by this interruption of the phrase. In response to their criticism, I call attention to the problems which some ancient scribes had with the phrase, particularly the fact that several manuscripts (D* G ii\d, e, g syr\h, pal K 88 104 181, etc.) moved *mē kōlute* from its position between *lalein* and *glōssais*, apparently because their copyists, too, were bothered by the interruption. The strength of the present reading is based upon two early uncial s (Sinaiticus and Alexandrinus) and, omitting to, the second-century Chester Beatty Papyrus. It was my friend Professor Hal Cauthron who advised me to investigate the manuscript evidence on this verse in support of my contention that *mē kōlute* occupies an unusual position.

19. Dr. Thompson called to my attention the numerous places where the RSV has rendered *kōluō* other than “forbid,” notably Heb. 7:23.

20. For this translation of *kōluō*, though not of the entire phrase, see *Expositor’s Greek Testament*, 2:917.

21. Professor McNeil called this fact to my attention.

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HOLINESS AND UNITY

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There are two affirmations about the Christian Church on which almost all Christians would be agreed: (1) God’s Church is one, and (2) His Church is holy. To question these statements would be to contradict the expressed wishes of our Lord in John 17, to disregard the churchly metaphors of the Apostle Paul, and to ignore declarations about the Church by most of the other New Testament writers. So when any follower of Christ announces that he believes in the unity and sanctity of the Church he creates little excitement, evokes almost no argument, and finds few challengers. We all accept these ideals and even the most ardent non-creedalist can heartily avow, “I believe in the one, holy, catholic Church.”

Once the affirmations are made, however, there comes the added task of elaborating their meaning. Here the complications and difficulties begin—and go on and on and on. The problem is perhaps best identified and simplified in the reported conversation between two sectarians in which one concedingly said to the other, “After all, when we get down to basics, each of us is earnestly striving to do the will of the Lord, you in your way and I in His.” The result, as we all know, is a severely fractured “body of Christ,” a blemished “bride” with spots and wrinkles and other such things, and multiple “buildings” made with human hands.

We need not elaborate the sadly divided state of Christendom. We are all too well aware of the hundreds of sects and denominations; of parties, camps, wings, factions, isms, and ites that cluster under separate labels and banners. We also recognize the fact that most Christians are neither repentant nor apologetic about these distinctions. Indeed they are not only willing but proud to wear a name tag that separates them from other Christians and, in effect, says, “Thank God, I’m not as others are!”

Yet, in the context of such universal acceptance of the ideal of Christian unity, there is a certain discomfiture about this separateness. This is not a recent development. Uneasiness about division in the Church goes all the way back to the first century. Much of the development of creeds and structures in the primitive and medieval periods of Christian history were specifically aimed at solving the problem of disunity.

The sixteenth-century Reformers, likewise, were not unmindful of the
charge that in separating from the Roman church they were guilty of schism. In order to live with
their own consciences, both Luther and Calvin were compelled to develop their own internal
rationale for separating from Catholicism. Luther eased his mind by declaring that the papal
institution was apostate and had actually ceased to be the Church as early as the eighth century,
so in departing from it he reasoned that he was not really dividing the Church. Calvin utilized the
ancient Augustinian argument against the Donatists, who objected to sinners in the Church: the
Invisible Church, he affirmed, is holy—and one; the Visible Church is imperfect—and divided.

By these and similar intellectual devices the existence of a divided Church was
rationalized and the denominational system became the developmental pattern for Protestantism.
Although the “established” churches made a noble effort during the latter part of the sixteenth
and through the seventeenth centuries to curb “enthusiasm” and enforce conformity, they were
unable to prevent the rise of independent movements and “sectaries.” During the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries proliferation accelerated, especially in America, and the already sundered
“body of Christ” exploded into hundreds of fragments. The dawn of the twentieth century saw
Christian rivalry accentuated, competition and proselytism rampant, and very few prophets to
raise a voice against the scandal of division.

Then the mood began to change. The nineteenth century had also seen some great
developments on the positive side. Most Protestant churches had shown unprecedented growth
and expansion—numerically, geographically, and programmatically. Missionary activity, though
often competitive in the mood of the time, had extended Christian outposts to every continent
and to remote islands in every sea. New program emphases, such as youth work, Sunday schools,
and social service, began to appear in almost all the churches.

Although these programs often were used as new weapons in the denominational warfare,
a different dimension of encounter emerged. Divided Christians who would hardly speak to each
other in their own communities found themselves sharing ideas with each other at Sunday school
conventions and working alongside each other in the city slums or on some far-off mission field.
So as a result of backlash from missionary outreach and the byproducts of other grand ventures
there were many Christian leaders who began to raise serious questions about the values of
vicious and wasteful competition. Shortly after the turn of the century suggestions were being
made from many quarters regarding possibilities for dialogue and cooperation across
denominational lines. Consequently, after centuries of division and conflict, a great number of
Christians in our time have come to the point of evidencing great concern about the divided
condition of the Church and are trying to do something about it.

The change in ecclesiastical climate is nothing short of phenomenal. Within this
twentieth century more attention has been directed toward healing the breaches in Christendom
than in any other period since the major disruption of institutional unity in the sixteenth century.
Great world conferences have been held, interdenominational organizations have been
constituted, ecumenical commissions have been created, hundreds of books have been published, numerous periodicals dealing entirely with ecumenicity have appeared, and Vatican Council II has brought Roman Catholics as well as Protestants and Orthodox into the arena of ecumenical discussion and activity.

Seminaries, originally founded to provide a distinctive denominationally oriented ministry, are now cooperating and “clustering” with whatever other schools they can, Protestant and Catholic, in order to provide a broadly ecumenical education for future leaders of the Church. Many denominational mergers have been successfully effected, and most religious bodies have created a department or commission whose specific assignment is to seek ways to promote Christian unity. To cite all contemporary activities which relate to seeking a solution to the problem of a divided Christendom would be very difficult, but if such were possible it would only accentuate the very apparent irenic climate among many of the presently constituted segments of the Church.

Now comes the question of where the proponents of holiness have stood—and are standing—in the midst of all this denominational competition and ecumenicity. Using a basically historical framework for analysis with concomitant theological and practical implications dealt with in context, there are six generalizations which may be posited in regard to this issue. To avoid any accusation of bias, three of them point toward separateness and three point toward unity. All of them relate the holiness emphasis as derived from Wesleyan theology to the problem of Christian disunity.

(1) Holiness as a doctrinal emphasis has tended to be a divisive issue.

Certainly there is nothing, inherent in the doctrine of holiness which would lead to separateness or division among Christians. On the theoretical face of it, quite the opposite would be true. Such terms as perfect love, Christian perfection, sanctification, etc., suggest anything but dissension and disunity. The fact of the matter is, as any student of the holiness movement knows well, holiness has been the occasion for a considerable amount of bitter debate and many severed relationships. The “saints” not only have fought their adversaries; they also have battled each other. Even in an era when harsh polemics were in style, they often exhibited a pungent vocabulary of notable causticity and graphic castigation. Their deep commitment to the doctrine and their intense fervor in propagating it made holiness people not only strong protagonists but also formidable adversaries.

The most specific manifestation of divisiveness fostered by the holiness emphasis was in the separation of factions and the formation of new denominations. Although few groups would admit to intentional divisiveness, the fact remains that almost without exception the holiness bodies came into being through schismatic action on the part of those who were vigorously upholding the doctrine in the face of opposition in the parent body. The general procedure is well illustrated in the Declaration of Principles adopted by the General Holiness Assembly of 1885:

Professors of holiness should not voluntarily surrender their Church privileges for trivial causes. But, if an oppressive hand be
laid upon them in any case by Church authority, solely for professing holiness, or for being identified with the cause of Holiness, depriving them of the privileges of Christian communion, they should then adjust themselves to circumstances, as may be required in order to have the continued enjoyment of the ordinances of our holy religion.¹

Such separations, of course, were always the result of the “hard core of resistance” in the parent group rather than any lack of wisdom or charitableness on the part of the sanctified rebels. William M. Greathouse well describes the oft repeated process:

Increasingly, the people who had espoused the doctrine, which was never meant to be a “theological provincialism,” found themselves unwelcome in their parent denominations. With agapeic hesitancy, but with New Testament poignancy, they formed small denominations.²

In reviewing the formation of this multitude of independent churches in the wake of the holiness revival, Timothy L. Smith, in an excellent chapter entitled “The Church Question, 1880-1900,” analyzes the complex of factors which produced this circumstance. He notes first that the holiness emphasis found adherents among people from a wide variety of backgrounds, both religiously and culturally, so the movement itself was far from being homogeneous in character. Very early there emerged a basic cleavage between the rural and urban wings of the awakening, the former being more emotional and rigid in defining standards and the latter being more intellectual and flexible.

Smith then isolates four factors which individually and collectively contributed to the fragmentizing and sectizing of the holiness emphasis in America:

(1) the persistent opposition of ecclesiastical officials to independent holiness associations and publishing agencies; (2) the recurrent outbursts of fanaticism among persons who were members of the associations but not of the churches; (3) the outbreak in the 1890’s of strenuous attacks upon the doctrine of sanctification itself; and (4) the increasing activity of urban holiness preachers in city mission and social work.³

The story of the formation of these many holiness denominations is sufficiently well known that it need not be detailed here. One writer has estimated that as many as 100 separate groups were brought into existence by the divisive activity of the proponents of holiness.’ Even though it might be difficult to document this figure, there is really no denying that holiness preaching and teaching has contributed significantly to the divided state of the Christian Church.

(2) The holiness movement has been from its beginning and continues to be interdenominational in both theory and practice.

It is not difficult to document the fact that the central leaders of the holiness movement never intended that the proponents of this doctrine should be confined to a single denomination. Although most of these leaders were Methodists, their vision of the field for the promotion of this work was
as broad as the Christian faith itself. The official “call” to that first organizational camp meeting in Vineland, N.J., in 1867 makes the interdenominational emphasis doubly clear. Rev. Alfred Cookman phrased it well:

We affectionately invite all, irrespective of denominational ties, interested in the subject of the higher Christian life, to come together and spend a week in God’s great temple of nature. . . . Come, brothers and sisters of the various denominations, and let us, in this forest-meeting, as in other meetings for the promotion of holiness, furnish an illustration of evangelical union, and make common supplication for the descent of the Spirit upon ourselves, the church, the nation, and the world.⁵

The response at the meeting itself was a vindication of the inclusiveness of the call. In reporting this 10-day encampment in the Guide to Holiness, Rev. G. Hughes lifts up some of the highlights of the first national holiness camp meeting. Among other observations he notes the following:

Another striking feature of the meeting was the fact that so many Christian denominations were represented. Presbyterians, Baptists, Episcopalians, Lutherans, Friends, and Methodists were all dwelling together in sweetest harmony. Never was there a more beautiful illustration of the Psalmist’s declaration, - “Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity!” One Presbyterian minister had come from Illinois to receive the baptism of fire; and he did receive it. A Baptist minister from Philadelphia came for the holy anointing, and the Spirit of power came upon him. He went to the Baptist church in Vineland on Sabbath morning, and preached to them on the text, “And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly,” and held up to them distinctly the privilege of full salvation in the blood of the Lamb.⁶

All the later developments of holiness associations—whether local, regional, or national—have stressed and continue to emphasize the interdenominational character of the movement. The focus of attention has been on promotion of the doctrine and practice of holiness and not on other affiliations which a person might have. Wide and diverse participation in all the associations was eagerly sought after because this broadened the potential field for promotion. Although holiness as a doctrine has been developed and advanced most specifically by those in the Arminian-Wesleyan tradition, it never has been regarded by its proponents as private property of the Methodists. The teaching has been presented as biblical and Christian and available to all, regardless of their denomination.

(3) Holiness groups have tended to be aloof from general ecumenical activity.

The massive ecumenical bustle of the twentieth century referred to earlier has developed largely without either the encouragement or the assistance of holiness-oriented leadership. Currently no avowedly holiness body in the United States is a full member of the World Council of Churches. One, the Salvation Army, has held membership but is not listed on the 1974 roster. The British Salvation Army, however, does participate in the World Council. The National Council of Churches lists no holiness churches in its member-
ship, but five Arminian groups and one Canadian body with holiness orientation have been approved for participation in selected units of the Council’s programmatic activity. The degree and extent of participation would vary widely from group to group and from time to time.

The ecumenical picture of holiness denominations involved with the National Association of Evangelicals is considerably different. Here a high degree of participation is clearly evident. Of the 12 member bodies of the Christian Holiness Association, 7 of them are also members of NAE; and of the 6 organizations listed as “cooperating” with the CHA, 2 are members of the NAE. The sum total adds up to the fact that one-half of these holiness groups are affiliated with NAE. It is notable, however, that some of the larger bodies—such as the Church of the Nazarene, the Salvation Army, and the Church of God (Anderson)—are among the other half who do not cooperate. To these must be added a significant number of holiness groups which do not even have a relationship with the CHA.

If one were to attempt to analyze the reasons for this basically non-ecumenical stance he would find it difficult to formulate any overall generalizations. From our review thus far, however, at least one factor is historically evident. Almost without exception the holiness groups were born out of conflict with the very denominations which make up the main-line ecumenical organizations, thus creating an inherent, though often unconscious, reluctance to lock arms with one’s former adversaries. Beyond this, there are the usual evangelical objections to cooperating with groups more “liberal” in theology and more “leftist” in politics. Pronouncements on social issues and involvement in protest activism have not been highly regarded by holiness people as proper procedures for proclamation, albeit there is an evident heightening social concern among all Evangelicals.

These theological and social issues would not apply, of course, to noncooperation through the NAE. Here the reasons for aloofness would be less accusative and probably less specific. For some it is simply, “We have plenty to do and we’re making it well on our own.” For others there are problems of attitude and spirit. Still others see all “conciliarism” as an abortive approach to true Christian unity, so do not join any organization for this purpose.

Putting it all together, one must conclude that holiness people have not been highly enthusiastic about the promotion of unity through entering into associational relationships with a broad spectrum of other Christians throughout the nation or around the world.

(4) Holiness has been promoted largely through cooperative “associational” measures and also has been the basis for some significant denominational mergers.

Donald W. Dayton has observed that, “although denominations within the holiness movement consistently ignore the conciliar movements on the national and international level, they are fiercely ecumenical within their own circle.” The tendencies toward divisiveness and aloofness mentioned earlier have not subverted an even stronger inclination to devise ways to identify with and establish vehicles of cooperation with others of like mind and spirit.
Holiness people have never been loners. From the “class meetings” of the Wesleys to the “Tuesday meetings” of the Palmers to the “camp meetings” of modern times, togetherness has been integral to the holiness emphasis. This togetherness has never been incidental or casual; it has been deliberate and planned. From the earliest days of the movement the proponents of this doctrine have joined together in transdenominational associations, assemblies, and bands. These structures were conceived as completely non-ecclesiastical. Their function was solely for the promotion of holiness, and no participant’s denominational affiliation or loyalty was challenged. The prevailing attitude on this point is well expressed in a resolution passed by the 1901 General Holiness Assembly held in Chicago:

To more effectively promote the spread of holiness, and unify our work, we recommend the organization of bands, and county, and state associations, with a uniformity of constitution and by-laws. That this Assembly, composed of members from at least twenty different evangelical churches, declare that these bands and associations are in no sense churches, were never intended to be churches, and are not to take the place of churches, but are simply a union of people for the promotion and conservation of holiness.9

At various times throughout the history of the movement there have been those who have sought to unify the whole effort through some central coordinating agency. S. B. Shaw of Lansing, Mich., for example, had a dream of forming a national holiness union and was one of the promoters of the assemblies held in Chicago first in 1885 and again in 1901. He hoped that these assemblies would eventuate in just such a union, but it never developed that way. The association approach yielded to the forces generated by the formation of separate denominations. Before the 1901 meeting, Shaw himself had led a group of followers in the formation of the Primitive Holiness Mission.

The association idea did not die with the sectizing of holiness, however, but it was forced to take a different focus. Since many participants were no longer members of the parent churches, they were not free to promote holiness inside those walls, so more attention was given to the development of the new denominations and less attention to the associations. Many of the local and regional organizations dropped out of existence entirely, and the National Holiness Association itself went through some very lean years. Recent developments reflect new vigor, and the change in name to Christian Holiness Association opens the way to broaden both purpose and function.

The strength of the cooperative impulse in holiness people is reflected in the fact that hardly was the fragmenting process under way until the merging process began. Here again, the details are many and impressive, but they have been reviewed adequately elsewhere.10 It is sufficient here to note that, from the bringing together of five groups to form the Church of the Nazarene in 1895 to the recent mergers which have produced the Missionary church and the Wesleyan church, there has been evidenced a continuing urge to bring strength and unity to the cause of promoting holiness. Even now conversations are in process to further unify and enhance this witness.
(5) Holiness leaders generally have tended to give only marginal attention to the matter of Christian unity, have steadfastly defended the denomination system, and have disclaimed “come-outism.”

The fact that holiness people have been strongly associational does not mean they have been concerned about Christian unity. Their cooperation has been focused on a specific purpose—the promotion of holiness—and has not been directed toward the overcoming of division and the unification of the Church. One might go even further and state that the central emphasis on personal holiness has so occupied the thought of leaders of the movement that little attention has been given even to articulating a doctrine of the Church, and much less to formulating concepts of the unity of the Church. This is not to say that a concern for the nature of the Church and its unity is entirely absent, for some significant formulations have been made. But one can examine a whole section of books on holiness in a seminary library and find very few of them which include any treatment of the “ecclesial” implications of the doctrine.

The deep concern on the part of early leaders of the movement that the holiness emphasis not be confined to a single religious group put them in the position of condoning—and seeking to work within—all existing groups. A holiness preacher was not just a holiness preacher; he was a Methodist, Baptist, or Presbyterian preacher who preached holiness. As the associations were formed, there were usually specific stipulations that participants were to be “members in good standing” of some Christian denomination.

Even after the fragmentation process began, there was still this strong attachment to the importance of denominational affiliation. In the “call” to the 1901 Chicago Assembly it is stated: “Persons will be enrolled as members who bring certificates from some branch of the evangelical Church, or from organizations which maintain a fraternal spirit and attitude toward the Church.” In the “Salutation” this principle is explicated further in regard to persons who, because of their fidelity to the cause of holiness, may have been expelled from their church:

They should be regarded with charity, treated with tenderness and consideration, and not disfellowshipped by the holiness brethren or branded with epithets of an unpleasant and reproachful character. Our advice to such would be in all cases to seek affiliation as early as possible with some organized body of Christian people who believe in and are committed to the holiness work.

In order to avoid a position which seemed to put a blessing on division in the Church, one writer finds comfort in drawing a distinction between “denomination” and “sect.” The sect, says Joseph H. Smith, is a “child of carnality” while the denomination is sometimes a “child of providence.” He regarded the latter as necessary to meet the diversities of “localities, languages, governmental restrictions, ancestral heritages, etc.,” incident to the worldwide propagation of Christianity. “As there were twelve tribes, but one Israel, so the body has various members, but one life within all; and different ‘branches’ of the church may all yet be as of one Vine.” At other points
Smith utilizes Calvin’s “visible-invisible” rationale for denominational divisions in the Church.\(^{15}\)

In spite of widespread accusations to the contrary, holiness leaders, almost with one voice, denounced “come-outism.” Even the come-outers denounced it, except they put the onus on the other parties and accused them of “crush-outism.”\(^{18}\) Regardless of the rhetoric, it is evident that the proponents of holiness had high regard for existing denominations, were reluctant to withdraw from them unless circumstances became intolerable, and in forming new denominations they simply took advantage of the system and did little to try to change its nature.\(^{17}\)

(6) Some holiness leaders have regarded sectism as “sin,” have looked to “perfect love” as the only escape from division in the Church, and have envisioned Christian unity as a visible fellowship of all the “saints.”

In his introduction to the report of the 1901 General Holiness Assembly, S. B. Shaw observes that “many hearts have been greatly burdened and have been crying to God for union among all of God’s children, especially among all those that believe in holiness of heart as possible through faith in the cleansing blood of Christ and by the baptism of the Holy Ghost.”\(^{18}\) Earlier (1896) holiness evangelist L. L. Pickett had declared, “Remember, when you people are lamenting the lack of unity among the people of God, that the remedy is to be found in sanctification. It is the doctrine of oneness among the children of God.”\(^{19}\)

At various other times and by a number of other people the suggestion has been made that the practical application of the sanctifying experience should have the effect of removing the barriers which divide Christians from each other. One of the earliest such expositions which has come to this writer’s attention is a letter to the Guide to Holiness in 1867 from Southern Methodist Bishop John Wilkins. He raises the question as to whether “the element of ‘Perfect Love’ is of sufficient power in the various branches of Methodism to leaven the animus of the whole denomination with such Christly love as that we shall hear no longer of that bitter hate between Northern and Southern Methodism.” He goes ahead to state that he does not feel that the time is ripe for reuniting the two churches, but there is need, he says, “to remove the fretting friction.” He continues by affirming, “There is enough of ‘Perfect Love’ in both branches to accomplish the desired result.”\(^{20}\) Admittedly, there is considerable difference between bringing peace to Methodism and healing the breaches in all Christendom, but the suggested remedy could well apply in both cases, for the malady is the same.

Other expressions suggesting holiness as the hope for unity have appeared from time to time in the literature of the movement, but the most articulate exponent of sanctification as the remedy for division was Daniel S. Warner, an Ohio preacher of the (Winebrennerian) Churches of God. He was led to accept the holiness teaching and experience around 1877 and became an ardent promoter of the doctrine. In 1878 he was expelled from his denomination for noncooperation and failure to abide by admonitions given him by the eldership regarding his activities as a traveling evangelist. He was accused of creating agitation in particular congregations by his vigorous preach-
ing of holiness. Shortly after his expulsion he entered the following note in his diary:

The Lord showed me that holiness could never prosper upon sectarian soil encumbered by human creeds and party names, and he gave me a new commission to join holiness and all truth together and build up the apostolic church of the living God. Praise his name! I will obey him.\(^{21}\)

During the following several months Warner’s thoughts concerning the relationship between holiness and unity began to take shape. He launched into the preparation of a manuscript which was published in 1880 by the Evangelical United Mennonite Publishing Society under the title of Bible Proofs of the Second Work of Grace. In order to adequately understand his views, a rather extended series of quotations from this work will be noted.

To begin with, he clearly regards all divisions in the Church as sinful:

Oft the enlightened Christian’s conscience inquires whether it is right for the Church to be divided thus, into a plurality of sects or denominations, with their respective human creeds and party names. In the light of truth, we are compelled to answer, No. And for the simple reason that these parties are not of Divine origin. Christ is the source of all true union among His disciples, and all divisions between them and the world; while the Devil is the instigation of all divisions in the Church, and all union between it and the world.\(^ {22}\)

Again:

It is a solemn fact that adherence in different denominations is the Devil’s wedge, whereby the unity of the Spirit, so perfectly procured in the grace of perfect love, is again destroyed. Party names, party creeds, and party spirits, almost of necessity go together; and the natural return of this spirit, because of membership in a fragmentary Church, takes more souls off of God’s altar than everything else together.\(^ {23}\)

This party feeling which he describes as “very sin” not only destroys brotherly love among Christians; it also hinders the work of evangelization. “The division of the Church into parties not only destroys the power and holiness thereof, but is the greatest impediment to the conversion of the world to God.”\(^ {24}\) He mourns this dire result of division among Christians:

O, the thousands of souls, that are being lost to all eternity through the selfish, wicked and carnal spirit of our churchism! God is dishonored, yea, robbed of the purchase of His Son’s death, and infidelity stalks abroad; the result of a divided house.\(^ {25}\)

Warner does not believe that an invisible spiritual unity is adequate:

Can it be said of professors of holiness that they have “one heart” and “one mind,” while some have a mind to be Presbyterian, others Baptists, others United Brethren, and others have a mind to adhere to the several different sects of Methodism? Have they “one heart and one way,” when they rise from the solemn altar in the holiness meeting and go, each one in his own way, to the synagogue of his own sect?\(^ {26}\)

For Warner, neither the problem nor its solution is of a corporate nature:
I would lay the responsibility of this enormous evil just where God places it, and all other sin. We will not be judged by sects, states, nor even by neighborhoods and towns, but “every one shall give an account of himself to God.”

A revival of holiness in a community is the result of personal consecration and faith; and its relapse will be in proportion to the number of individuals that remove the sacrifice from the altar. There is no such thing as thorough holiness, except as wrought by the Sanctifier in individual hearts; and if, as has been said, and as I verily believe, thorough and widespread holiness destroys denominations—burns up sectarian distinctions—it must do it in your heart, as an individual.27

To accomplish this desired end—to destroy denominationalism and achieve Christian unity—requires action on the part of sanctified persons. Though Warner denied the charge of “come-outism,” affirming that urging people to come out of one sect into another was furtherest from his thought, he nevertheless left little doubt regarding what he felt a sanctified Christian should do:

If you are a true, intelligent Bible Christian, a holy, God fearing man, you must cast off every human yoke, withdraw fellowship from, and renounce every schismatic and humanly constituted party in the professed body of Christ. Instead of belonging to “some branch,” you will simply belong to Christ, and be a branch yourself in Him, the “true vine.” Instead of remaining identified with any sect,—i.e., cut-off party, “directly or indirectly the results of sin”—you will claim membership in, and fellowship with the “one and indivisible Church, that God has on earth, and which is made up of all, and singularly who are born of the Spirit.” On this broad and divinely established platform, and here only, can you stand clear of the sin of sectarianism and the blood of immortal souls that perish through its pernicious influence.28

In Warner’s mind the views which he expressed were not to be identified with the “no-churchism” propounded by John P. Brooks and others in the holiness movement. He declared:

I am not advocating the no-church theory, that we hear of in the west, but the one holy Church of the Bible, not bound together by rigid articles of faith, but perfectly united in love, under the primitive glory of the Sanctifier, “continuing steadfastly in the Apostles’ doctrine and fellowship,” and taking captive the world for Jesus.29

In summarizing his views Warner lists five points:

From what has been said, and the uniform teaching of the Bible, the following facts are very evident:

1. The division of the Church into sects is one of Satan’s most effectual, if not the very greatest means of destroying human souls.

2. Its enormous sin must be answered for by individual adherents to, and supporters of sects.

3. The only remedy for this dreadful plague, is thorough sanctification, and this is only wrought by a personal, individual contact with the blood of Christ through faith.
4. The union required by the Word of God is both a spiritual and visible union.

5. The divisions of the Church are caused by elements that are foreign to it as a Divinely constituted body, by deposits of the enemy, which exist in the hearts and practices of individual members, involving their responsibility and requiring their personal purgation. 30

And finally, he affirms his conviction that neither holiness nor unity can progress unless they do it together:

   It is, indeed, my honest conviction that the great holiness reform can not go forward with the sweeping power and permanent triumph that God designs it should, until the Gospel be so preached, and consecration become so thorough, that the blood of Christ may reach, and wash away every vestige of denominational distinction, and “perfect into one”—yea, one indeed and in truth—all the sanctified. 31

Even though Warner held these convictions strongly, he did not take any hasty action. In the summer of 1880 he played a very active role in the Jacksonville, Ill., holiness assembly, making one of the presentations and serving on a committee. The following year at Terre Haute, Ind., however, he withdrew from the association because the assembly refused to remove what he called the “sect endorsing clause” from their bylaws. He felt that the requirement that a participant in the association must be a member of some church was approval of the sinful system. In October of that same year he withdrew from the Northern Indiana Eldership of the Church of God (a small holiness group with which he had affiliated three years earlier) and took his stand “with Christ alone.” From this action—and similar steps taken shortly thereafter in Michigan and Ohio—a nondenominational holiness movement emerged which is known as the Church of God (Anderson, Ind.).

So—there have been and still are those who hold the view that true holiness destroys division and produces genuine Christian unity.

* * *

Now that these six historically oriented generalizations have been posited, it is appropriate that six concluding propositions be stated regarding the relationship between holiness and unity.

(1) Believers in holiness must not be too ready to accept easy answers in rationalizing division in the Church. Even “liberal” Christians pray God’s forgiveness for participating in the sin of division.

(2) A passionate concern for personal sanctification should not subvert an equally great concern for the doctrine of the Church. It is well to keep in mind that the Apostle Paul uses the word sanctify in regard to both persons and the Church.

(3) In the light of Christ’s prayer for the Church (John 17), the concepts of “spiritual unity” and “invisible oneness” are inadequate and inconsistent with the apparent implications of “perfect love.”

(4) Associationalism and conciliarism are abortive approaches to Christian unity in that they only mitigate the evils of division and do not remove it.
(5) Nondenominationalism is an inadequate concept for the full realization of Christian unity in that it expresses primarily a negative rather than a positive character to the Church.

(6) This time in Christian history seems to be an especially propitious one for all proponents of holiness to dedicate themselves to giving major attention to the relational implications of this doctrine to the end that, under the leadership of the Holy Spirit, we may be able to lead the way toward unification of the whole Church so that, indeed, the world may believe.

REFERENCE NOTES

4. Vinson Synan, *The Holiness-Pentecostal Movement in the United States* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1971), p. 37. He later observes (p. 53): “A measure of the intensity of the conflict over sanctification is the fact that twenty-three holiness denominations began in the relatively short period of seven years between 1893 and 1900.” The process of schism did not end with the nineteenth century, however. Donald W. Dayton, in *The American Holiness Movement, A Bibliographical Introduction* (Wilmore, Ky.: B. L. Fisher Library, 1971), p. 52, notes that very recent times have seen the formation of a number of new small holiness denominations. Included in these would be the Allegheny Methodist connection, The Bible Missionary church (originally Nazarene), the Wesleyan Holiness Association (originally Bible Missionary church), the United Holiness church, and the Evangelical Wesleyan church (both originally Free Methodist).
13. Ibid., p. 34.
15. Ibid., p. 245.

17. Timothy L. Smith (*Called unto Holiness*, p. 29) refers to *The Divine Church*, by John P. Brooks, as the textbook for “come-outism.”


OLD TESTAMENT BASES
OF THE WESLEYAN MESSAGE

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In addition to the standard theological treatises of our movement which have sought to
delineate the Old Testament bases of the Wesleyan message, at least one major treatment\(^1\) and
numerous shorter articles have appeared in recent years surveying the biblical and, specifically,
the Old Testament foundations of Wesleyan thought.\(^2\) The dim prospects of going far beyond
these treatments in still another cursory presentation of the Old Testament bases of the Wesleyan
message invite concentration on some fundamental aspects of this biblical base.

Furthermore, Mildred Wynkoop’s creative attempt to present the Wesleyan distinctives
and, at the same time, to confront realistically the pitfalls inherent in substantialistic theological
categories, demands thoughtful reconsideration of the biblical bases for these distinctives.\(^3\)
Within this context this paper seeks to reexamine some aspects of the idea of the holy in the Old
Testament.

I. The Holy: Separation as Relationship

1. *The holy as separation.* Separation is obviously a fundamental aspect of the Old
Testament concept of the holy. This is a widely recognized fact and appears clearly, for instance,
in the discussion of Dr. George A. Turner in *The Vision Which Transforms*, where reference is
made to von Baudissin and to Snaith, who with modification accepted and popularized von
Baudissin’s extensive study.\(^4\) Whether or not the semitic root Q-D-SH was originally a religious
or secular term, the Old Testament preserves isolated examples of the verb *qadash* (all D or H
stems) used without religious connotation in the sense of “isolating,” “separating,” “preparing,”
or “designating” someone or something. Note, for example, Josh. 20:7: *wayyaqdishu ‘et-GN . . .
// natenu ‘et-GN. “And they designated GN . . . // they established GN,” in response to God’s command (Josh. 20:2),\(^5\) “Establish for yourselves [*tenu lakem]*
cities of refuge.” Or again, note Jer. 12:3: “Single them [the wicked] out [*hattiqem]*
like sheep for slaughter; separate them [*wehaqdishe*] for the day of slaying” (*httq //
hqdsh*).\(^6\) Of course such “secular” use of the word is certainly not
characteristic of the Old Testament. But the meaning of separation is forcibly underscored in these occurrences.

2. *Separation as relationship.* Characteristically in the Old Testament holy describes someone or something in a defined relationship. Someone or thing has been separated from the profane or the unclean to specific relationship with God. To be thus holy is to be directly God’s own, or to be set specifically to His service, or to be set for entry into His presence, or a combination of these.

The key expression again and again is “holy to Yahweh,” i.e., “with respect to Yahweh,” or “in relation to Yahweh.” The situation is essentially the same whether it is a day, a tent, an altar, a house, a field, a man, or whatever. The ritual of washing, clothing, anointing, installing, and atoning (e.g., Exod. 29:1-21), or selected ones of these, all made the process of separation from the profane and unclean unto the Lord unmistakably clear.

Even in cultic settings, however, this hallowing was far from a purely mechanical process. Moses was instructed to consecrate Aaron and his sons to be priests specifically of Yahweh (e.g., Exod. 40:13; *weqiddashta*; cf. Exod. 29:1). At the same time Yahweh himself said He would set them apart (Lev. 22:9, 16; ‘*ani yahweh megaddesham*). And finally the priests are said to have consecrated themselves (*hitqaddesh*; Exod. 19:22; cf. later, 1 Chron. 15:12; 2 Chron. 5:11). Even in this cultic consecration the wills of three parties interacted freely in the process of setting the priests apart to be God’s, to function in His service, and to approach His presence. The result of that personal interaction was that the priest, along with his clothes, and all articles participating in this specific relation to Yahweh, were holy (Exod. 29:21), or more specifically, “a holy thing with respect to Yahweh” (cf. Ezra 8:28). A similar interaction between men and God appears in the consecrating of objects; for example, the Tabernacle and the altar. Compare Exod. 29:44 and Exod. 30: (25-)29.

3. *Cleansing as relationship.* What is described relationally on the one hand as holy (separate) or on the other as profane/common (*khol*) is described ritually as clean or unclean (*thr/tm*). Thus, in these contexts clean and unclean do not substantially describe the condition of the person or thing, but characterize it with respect to its relationship to the divine. To be clean in this sense is to be holy—set in relation to God; to be unclean is to be unholy—out of and unfit for relation to the divine. In either case, the point is proper or improper relation to God.

And so, one reads in the description of Hezekiah’s reforms that those in the congregation who had not sanctified themselves (*lo’ hitqaddesh*) were unclean (*lo’ tahor*). Sacrifice was offered to consecrate every unclean one to Yahweh (2 Chron. 30:17). Similarly, hallowing the Temple was rendering it clean (2 Chron. 29:5, 15; cf. 29:17, 19). So with the altar; Aaron will sprinkle blood upon it and “cleanse it and hallow it [*wetiharo weqiddesho*] from the uncleanness of the Israelites” (Lev. 16:19). That the relational and the cultic are two sides of the same situation is seen from the blending of terms in Ezek. 22:26: “They rendered common [*khol*] my sacred offerings; between the consecrated and the common they did not make a separation, and between the
unclean and the clean they did not make a difference.”

In this connection a comparison of the Akkadian cognates to Hebrew Q-D-SH is instructive. Recent Akkadian lexicography is more inclined than one would know from Snaith’s discussion to recognize both purity (usually ritual purity) and consecration as prominent meanings of the Q-D-SH words in the East Semitic Mesopotamian languages. These words are usually found in a cultic setting (incidentally, a pig is lo qashid, “not clean”), and so are quite parallel to the Hebrew association of clean and consecrated. But it is not always so. A cleansed container for drinking water is also quddushu. That is, Akkadiah Q-D-SH can carry the meaning of being substantially clean.

At this point the Old Testament makes a careful lexical distinction not found in the Akkadian texts, even though there is a parallel conceptual association of the clean and the consecrated in Akkadian and Hebrew. The cycle of Q-D-SH words in Hebrew is not used in the Old Testament to refer to persons or objects as clean. This “clean/unclean” terminology is used to describe the ritual enactment of the consecration denoted by Q-D-SH. And, in spite of the close association of the two ideas, the vocabulary is kept carefully separate. Notice at this point that the Hebrew Q-D-SH words are not used to describe a person or object as substantially clean, i.e., as not-dirty. This is not qadosh, but tahor, as in pure gold (zahab tahor; Exod. 25:11). Even when the two terms, consecrated and cleansed appear together to describe pagan worship, they are not confused. One may conclude from these observations that when clean is associated with holy it too is a relational term, not concrete.

Further related light on the character of the holy and the clean is shed from a consideration of a set of similar but apparently contrasting biblical statements. Two samples will form the basis of this discussion. Regarding the consecrated altar, Exod. 29:37 states: “Whatever touches the altar shall become holy” (yiqdash, RSV); so also Exod. 30:25-29; Lev. 6:11, 20, etc. And, regarding the dead remains of proscribed creatures, it is said in Lev. 11:24: “Anyone who touches their remains shall be unclean” (yitma’); similarly Lev. 11:26-27, 31, 36, 39, etc.

A typical scholarly judgment upon Exod. 29:37 and similar Old Testament statements is S. R. Driver’s: “We have here . . . a survival of primitive ideas of ‘holiness.’ Holiness . . . is a contagious quality: thus the altar or the incense is holy, and whatever touches it becomes holy.” Essentially the same view with implications for Wesleyan theology appears when such a text is used as an illustration of the “impertability of God’s holiness.” That is, God’s holiness is something communicable.

The general biblical background and the theological motivation for the insistence that holiness is communicable are certainly beyond question. One must not be saddled with the old imputation heresy that we, by God’s grace, and seen through Christ, are reckoned righteous and holy, without regard to our actual righteousness or lack of it. And on the other hand, one must not fall in the Pelagian trap. One does wish to insist that a believer in any age has been considered holy by God because he was in some sense actually holy—not
of himself, but by the grace of God actually holy. But imputation and impartation are both inadequate concepts when, as is frequently the case, holiness, and with it sin, are conceived in substantial terms. A more careful analysis of the contrasting texts noted above is necessary.

In view of a number of contexts which illumine Exod. 29:37, the text should probably be translated, “Anyone who touches it [the altar] must be holy” (emphasis in any biblical quotation herein is added). It states the *prerequisite* for surviving contact with the altar, not the *result* of that contact.¹¹ (Compare the simple imperfects in the Decalogue commands.) Such a translation is at least admissible in all the Old Testament occurrences of this statement. As a matter of fact, an unconsecrated person who touched any sacred thing did not become holy—he became dead! So it was at the mount (Exod. 19:12), at the eating of offered flesh (Lev. 7:19-21), in the transporting of the Tabernacle (Num. 4:15), and with the priests who must be consecrated to draw near to God without disaster (Exod. 19:22).

This consistent and clear pattern must provide the context in which some other less clear passages are approached. The bronze censers of Dathan and Abiram (Num. 17:1-3; English, 16:36-38) are not evidence to the contrary. The censers had not become holy by mere contact with the altar, but, as the Word says, they had actually been offered (“brought near” is a technical expression meaning “offered”) and so were holy (Num. 17:3; English, 16:38). Jesus’ comment that the Temple sanctifies the gold of it and the altar the gift on it was not intended as a pronouncement on the communicability of holiness (Matt. 23:19). Even in the Temple, gifts on the altar had been placed there as an offering dedicated to God, and thus they were holy. So it is no doubt in Isa. 6:6-7. In view of the preceding discussion and biblical revelation in general (including Isaiah 1-2), one may be justified in understanding a far more profound healing of Isaiah’s relation with the Holy One than is encompassed in the mechanics of having his lips touched by a coal.

Once in scripture this question is plainly put to the priests (Hag. 2:1213, RSV):

“‘If one carries holy flesh in the skirt of his garment, and touches with his skirt bread, or pottage, or wine, or oil, or any kind of food, does it become holy?’” The priests answered, “No.” Then said Haggai, “If one who is unclean . . . touches any of these, does it become unclean?” The priests answered, “It does become unclean.”

These answers support the contention that even in the Old Testament holiness is by no means a thing, a substance to be communicated, but rather is an actual description of someone or something in proper relation to God.¹² That men and objects are holy in the Old Testament solely by virtue of their relation to God is of course a fact oft repeated in our literature.¹³ The point of this entire discussion of “The Holy: Separation as Relationship” has been to undergird the proposition that not only is this so, but that relationship (and with men, personal relationship) is the fundamental category in which all other aspects of the holy must be conceived if one is to be consistently biblical.
II. The Holy: Relationship Defined by God and His Covenant

As is well known, the concept of the holy as separation and, from man’s viewpoint, as relation to the divine, was not confined to ancient Israel. Two things make this abundantly clear: the extrabiblical (especially West-) Semitic occurrences of the Q-D-SH words which parallel the biblical usage, and the famous Old Testament references to sacred “prostitutes” in Israel (e.g., Deut. 23:18; 1 Kings 22:47, English 22:46; 2 Kings 23:7). So then, it was not basically Israel’s concept of the holy which distinguished her from her neighbors, but rather the incomparable Yahweh, who revealed himself to her. He, in His person and in His covenant, defined the holy for her.14

Outside of the fact that so much of the significant information about the holy in the Old Testament appears in the setting of the Sinaitic covenant, several interlocking biblical statements link holiness in Israel to the covenant. To these we now turn.

1. To be holy is to be uniquely God’s. Deut. 7:6, in a covenant setting (see 7:9-13), evokes covenant terminology in explicitly stating: “A holy people you are to Yahweh your God. Yahweh your God chose you in order that you might be to Him a special people from among all the peoples who are on the face of the earth.” So also Exod. 19:5-6: “And you shall keep my covenant and shall be to me a special possession from among all peoples. . . . And you shall be to me . . . a holy nation!” Note the connection: covenant, special possession, and holy (see also Lev. 20:26; 22:31-33; 25:55-26:2, 13; Isa. 62:12).

We are now primarily interested in holiness as it relates to the people, but the same association of holiness and divine possession is found elsewhere. Yahweh’s feast days are holy because they are His (Lev. 23:2-4); the firstborn must be consecrated, because they belong to Yahweh (Exod. 13:2). He set them apart for himself (higdashti li, Num. 3:13; 8:17). This correlation is strikingly demonstrated in the fact that one cannot consecrate what is already God’s (Lev. 27:26), nor can one sell what is holy, i.e., what no longer belongs to him (Ezek. 48:14). As Moses said to Korah, “God will make known who is His, even who is the holy one [between us]” (Num. 16:5). To be holy is to be God’s, effected by consecration and defined by covenant.

Furthermore, as part of that covenant, God pledged himself to be Israel’s God. Not only were they His, but He was theirs. “You shall be holy with respect to your God. I am Yahweh your God who brought you out from the land of Egypt in order to become your God” (Num. 15:40-41). The people are called to consecrate themselves for this very reason (Lev. 11:43-45). So it is also that God dwells among those who belong to Him and to whom He belongs (Exod. 25:8). “I will make a covenant of peace with them,” God says through Ezekiel, “. . . and I will set my sanctuary [miqdash] in their midst forever, and my dwelling shall be with them. I will be their God, and they will be my people” (Ezek. 37:26-27). Compare Ezek. 11:16! The nations would thus know that Yahweh was again setting His people apart (Ezek. 37:28).

Perhaps God’s giving of himself uniquely to His people casts light on the Old Testament’s view of God’s own holiness as in some sense separation. The statements about God’s holiness which include more than the flat assertion
that He is holy are declarations by and large of God’s incomparability, His essential separation from creaturely finitude (1 Sam. 2:2; Isa. 40:25; 54:5). He is incomparable in might (1 Sam. 6:20), in character (Ps. 99:2-5; Isa. 5:15-16; 55:6-9), in complete distinction from humanity (Hos. 11:9). That is, God is “wholly other” with respect to us.\(^\text{15}\)

It is also possible that God’s separation unto His people was considered part of His holiness. It did form the rationale for their own consecration to Him and was solidly linked to the covenant events. “For I am Yahweh who brought you up out of the land of Egypt in order to become your God; so you shall be holy, for I am holy” (Lev. 11:45). Thus, both God’s transcendence and His immanence are expressed in His holiness.

2. Not only does the covenant define the holy as uniquely God’s, but it also specifies that separation to God excludes all rival relationships and associations. This is emphatically reiterated in the constant repetition of Yahweh’s own name in strong contrast to all other divine names: “I Yahweh sanctify you.” “You shall consecrate yourselves, and you shall be holy, for I Yahweh am your God” (Lev. 20:7). And in this case, “consecrate yourselves” means precisely to repudiate offerings to Moloch and seeking “familiar” spirits, because not they but Yahweh is their God (Lev. 20:3, 6).

That is why the possessive pronouns are so prominent on Yahweh’s feasts (moaday) and sabbaths (shabbotay) and statutes (khuqqotay) and commands (mitswotay)—they are His in contrast to those of other gods. Israel was to keep Yahweh’s command in expressed contrast to walking in the ways of her neighbors (Lev. 20:22-23; cf. 20:26). The prospect of a rival covenant with another god was even anticipated and forbidden (Exod. 23:32). The keeping of Yahweh’s sabbaths was continually to be a sign of their devotion to Him as opposed to another (Exod. 31:13, 16). No wonder, then, that relationships which rivaled the people’s consecration to God were both a breach of the covenant (Lev. 25:55-26:2, 14-15; cf. Ezek. 23:39) and a profanation of the holy—of God’s holy name (Lev. 22:32; Ezek. 20:30; 43:7-8; cf. Isa. 17:78) and God’s holy place (Lev. 20:3-4; Ezek. 5:11; Mal. 2:11).

This undivided covenant loyalty to Yahweh is addressed in precise juridical language in several significant texts. Note, for example, Hos. 13: 4: “I am Yahweh your God, since the land of Egypt [i.e., ever since the Exodus and covenant encounter], and you know no god but me; and there is no deliverer beside me.” The point was not that Israel was unaware of other gods.

In texts of this sort, Hebrew yada, “to know,” is a technical legal term, the Hebrew reflex of well-known Hittite and Semitic covenant terms. “To know” and “not to know,” as legal, covenant terms, mean “(not) to acknowledge, recognize (authority, claims),” especially as set forth in a treaty (covenant).\(^\text{16}\) So also in Amos, after a reference to the Exodus prelude to covenant, God himself says, “Only you I knew from all the families of the earth. Therefore I am visiting upon you all your iniquities” (Amos 3:2). That is, on the basis of acknowledged covenant stipulations, I am holding you responsible.

Such a wholehearted focus on Yahweh to the exclusion of rival relation-
ships is envisioned as a lasting part of the true Israel’s covenant relationship with God. As Jeremiah wrote:

Lo, the days are coming, says the Lord, when I will make with the house of Israel and the house of Judah a new covenant. . . . I will put my law within them, and upon their heart I will write it. And I will become their God, and they will become my people. And no one will again instruct his neighbor or his brother saying, “Know Yahweh,” for they will all know me (Jer. 31:31-34; cf. 24:7).

They will, of their own will, freely acknowledge and keep the claims of My covenant, excluding all rivals.

3. The covenant further defines the holy as a relationship in which the will of God is done. Here holiness and righteousness are wed. Even in the Old Testament, understanding holiness as proper relation to God in no way renders the holy void of moral and ethical content. The two may be logically distinguished. But in practice they are inseparable. For in the Old Testament, as in the New, God’s works and relationships with men are a unit, a whole relationship which cannot be compartmentalized.17

It is significant that in a context stressing obedience to the covenant it is said that God’s people will become a “kingdom of priests,” i.e., a people subject to the divine rule of Yahweh, and a “holy nation” (Exod. 19:5-6; cf. Deut. 28:9). So the people as God’s sanctuary (holy place, miqdash) are also His royal realm (mamshelet; Ps. 114:2; cf. Isa. 63:18).

In view of this, the attempt to distinguish between ritual holiness and so-called ethical or moral holiness is anachronistic. It is a false distinction made from the viewpoint of a later era and misses an extremely important point of the covenant’s definition of the holy in the Old Testament. That point is that a holy man is in a relationship with God where God’s will, defined in the covenant, is done consistently. Even though the Decalogue was singled out for special consideration (as in Deuteronomy 5; cf. Mark 10:19-20), that was by no means the extent of the “moral” law. The constant mingling of the ceremonial and, from our perspective, the more ethical/moral law should teach us this (e.g., Leviticus 19-20). And all of it was kept if an Israelite wished to remain in proper relation to God. All of the law, not just the so-called “ethical” law, was God’s will, and hence a matter of personal and corporate conscience.18

There is not sufficient space here to review the numerous texts and contexts which link holiness with righteousness and justice and truth. Two things must be said, however. First, this conjunction of the holy and the righteous did not await the rise of the prophetic conscience in Israel. Rather, the prophetic concept of the holy was defined by the prior covenant. Even among Israel’s neighbors as close as Byblos, one may find righteousness, justice, and holiness clearly linked as early as the mid-tenth century B.C., 200 years before Amos and Hosea.20

Second, it is obvious that not only was Israel’s concept of the holy as separation a well-known part of her religious environment, but so was her concept of the holy as a correlate of righteousness. The inevitable conclusion of this, a point whose significance can scarcely be overemphasized, is that one
is totally dependent upon the covenant and, ultimately, upon the person of Yahweh himself to give content to the holy. Apart from Him one has no sure notion of *holy* or *righteous*, for all the world used these terms with profoundly differing meanings. No wonder, then, that in the New Testament the canons of the holy are the person of Christ, the image of God, and the Word of God (the new covenant with its new law), not as a mystical force, but as a defining revelation of the holy.

4. The covenant defines *the holy as in a relationship resulting from mutual choice*. This emphasizes and extends the notion that, with men, both the cultic and the so-called ethical aspects of the holy are moral. They involve personal choices, free responses to the Word of God, and issue in positive or negative effects upon men’s relationship with God.

The Book of Deuteronomy includes a blend of cultic, civil, and so-called ethical law reminiscent of Leviticus. Yet one of its major concerns is to record God’s attempt through Moses to elicit a positive response from the people to the covenant, to lead them to become in reality His holy people. This process of mutual response leading to a relation in which the people would be holy and would belong to Yahweh, where Yahweh would be their God, and His will would be done consistently, is summarized beautifully in Deut. 26:18-19. The RSV here is disappointing when it translates, “And the Lord has declared this day concerning you that you are a people for his own possession,” etc. The causative form, *he'emirka*, can be more adequately rendered than “has declared concerning you.” One might better translate, “And Yahweh has caused you/led you to promise today to become His special people, [causing you] to keep His commands . . . in order that you might become a holy people with respect to Yahweh your God.” In Deuteronomy 14, the relationship is given warmth and dynamic by the statement, “You are sons” (Deut. 14:1-2), again in a covenant setting with loyalty overtones. Compare Josh. 24:14-19.

Yahweh’s side of the relationship is just as plainly put in Deuteronomy 7. Yahweh has related himself to Israel by His own gracious choice, because of His love and faithfulness (Deut. 7:1-8).

**III. Summary**

*Holy* in the Old Testament is a term of defined relationship, with very few exceptions signifying separation from the profane and unclean unto the divine. Where this involves men, both the holy and the clean are best understood in categories of personal relationship rather than substantialistic or concrete categories. Further, this relationship is defined by the person of God and His covenant. As a result, to be holy is to be uniquely God’s, to repudiate relationships rivaling God. To be holy is to be in a relationship where by God’s grace His will is done, a dynamic relationship resulting from and continuing by mutual consent and deliberate choice.

**REFERENCE NOTES**


Relevant entries in this volume’s predecessor, *Insights into Holiness* (Kansas City, Mo.: Beacon Hill Press, 1962), also compiled by Kenneth Geiger, were more deliberately systematic than biblical in approach.


5. See also Zech. 1:7; Jer. 6:4; Joel 4:9; Mic. 3:5; cf. Jer. 22:7; 51:27-28.

6. Old Testament references are to the Masoretic text of the Hebrew Bible. Translations are the author’s unless otherwise marked.


10. For example, James F. Gregory, “The Holiness of God,” *Further Insights*, p. 34.


13. For example, Dennis F. Kinlaw and W. Ralph Thompson, *Further Insights*, pp. 44 and 108 respectively.

Is *berit-qodesh* in Dan. 11:28, 30 (“a covenant of holiness”) a “covenant defining a holy relationship with God”?

15. It may well be that God’s holiness as related to His glory and majesty should be understood thus as an aspect of His separation, His incomparability, rather than as a part of the actual meaning of the word holy. Cf. Exod. 15:11. See George A. Turner, *The Vision Which Transforms*, pp. 15-17. Compare God’s claims through Ezekiel that He would hallow His name and make it again distinctive and praiseworthy among the nations, by the strong deliverance and restoration of His people (Ezek. 20:41; 22:23; 28:25; 36:23; 38:23; 39:7, 27).


18. See John Bright’s comments, *The Authority of the Old Testament* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967), pp. 53-55. In this writer’s opinion, this “ethical” nature of the entire law is not taken sufficiently into account in treatments which emphasize the development of *qadosh* from separation to a personal moral quality; e.g., Walther Eichrodt, *Theology*, 1:137.


WESLEY’S EPISTEMOLOGY

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To ask what John Wesley’s epistemology is may seem ostentatious. Were not his concerns practical? Did he not say he was a man of one Book—*homo unius libri*? Did he not say he wanted to know one thing—the way to heaven?\(^1\) Such isolated excerpts from his writings make any talk about his epistemological theory immediately suspect. The popular image of Wesley is that he was an evangelist who preached a theology of experience rather than a systematic theologian with metaphysical interests.

I do not wish to try to refute this image altogether, but I do think it ought to be adjusted to include the fact that Wesley did speak to metaphysical issues. And I especially think his concept of experience should be carefully defined.

A look at some of the titles of Wesley’s writings show his metaphysical interests—”A Compendium of Logic,” “The Case of Reason Impartially Considered,” “The Imperfection of Human Knowledge,” “Remarks upon Mr. Locke’s ‘Essay on Human Understanding,’” “An Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion,” “Thoughts upon Necessity,” “Thoughts upon Taste,” and “Of the Gradual Improvement of Natural Philosophy.” In his journals, there are many references to his having read most of the significant philosophers of his day—Voltaire, Locke, Malebranche, D’Alembert, Montesquieu, Hume, Reid.\(^2\)

That Wesley valued the study of metaphysics is indicated in his diary of March 4, Wednesday, 1747: “This week I read over with some young men a Compendium of Rhetoric, and a System of Ethics. I see not, why a man of tolerable understanding may not learn in six months’ time more of solid philosophy than is commonly learned at Oxford in four (perhaps seven) years.”\(^3\) (Incidentally, if this evaluation of the status of philosophical studies at Oxford seems a bit harsh, it should be remembered that Wesley had taught logic at Oxford and would be in a position to know.)\(^4\)

What I propose to do is to extract from Wesley’s writings four things that are fundamental to his epistemology—tradition, the senses, reason, and faith. This of course can be done only in a sketchy fashion within the space allotted. One word of caution. I do not mean to suggest Wesley articulated an epistemological theory as such. Nor should it be implied from my presentation that his critical remarks upon the various philosophical issues were intended for philosophical scholars.
I. Tradition

That Wesley treated the historical tradition of the Church (especially the ante-Nicene fathers) with high respect is well known. My remarks thus will not focus upon his actual use of the written tradition, but upon the problem of historical knowledge.

Wesley was living in “the age of philosophy par excellence,” “the age of criticism.” Traditional was looked upon with skepticism; it no longer was authoritative. Everything was subjected to critical analysis. Truth had to be established at the bar of reason, not on the authority of any written tradition. Ernst Cassirer points out that it was “the eighteenth century which raised the central philosophical problem” of historical knowledge. So Wesley was living in the age that ushered in what has come to be called “the rise of the modern historical consciousness.”

The rise of this philosophical critique of historical knowledge stems from Cartesian philosophy. Descartes with his methodological skepticism had set up the criterion of self-certainty as the basis for all knowledge. Whatever was not clearly self-evident to reason was considered an inferior kind of knowledge. Thus, Descartes deprecated historical knowledge since it could only provide one with opinion.

This historical skepticism was passed on to the eighteenth-century English deists of Wesley’s time by way of Spinoza (1632-77), the father of modern biblical criticism. Spinoza with his pantheistic concept of God as pure being wanted to show that the Bible could not serve as the basis of a metaphysical theology. Since pure being is the source of absolute truth, this means finite being exists in a state of becoming and is thus relative. The philosopher must then transcend the temporal, finite level of being.

Spinoza believed the philosopher could do this since he has built within the structure of his reason the idea of ultimate reality. This rationalistic presupposition that man can know absolute truth through the sheer exercise of thought alone could have only negative implications for the biblical claim to absolute validity, for its truth is contingent upon historically conditioned events.

Cassirer has pointed out that Spinoza’s writings are the most unlikely place one would expect to find the rise of modern biblical criticism. Nevertheless, his critical analysis of the Bible stems from his intention to show that nothing historical could serve as the basis for absolute certainty, thus exposing the weakness of a historical revelation.

The deists of Wesley’s day were influenced by this historical agnosticism of Spinoza. They were further influenced by Locke’s empiricism in which Locke attempted to give a rational proof for God’s existence cosmetologically. Thus, the deists looked upon the Bible with its historically conditioned truths as inferior to the absolute certainty of truth attainable through reason.

I have found no direct indication that Wesley was acquainted with Spinoza, though it is almost certain he was (at least through his reading of the deists and such Cartesian rationalists as Malebranche).

It is at least evident that Wesley was well versed in the philosophical problem of historical knowledge. This is seen in his 79-page letter to the Rev.
Dr. Conyers Middleton, who had written in typical deistic fashion an essay entitled “A Free Inquiry.”17 Middleton says the veracity of any historical document “depends on the joint credibility of the facts, and of the witnesses who attest them.” He further says that “if the facts be incredible, no testimony can alter the nature of things.”18

While Wesley subscribes to these premises, he disagrees with Middleton’s thesis that “the credibility of witnesses depends on a variety of principles wholly concealed from us.”19 This smacked too much of an epistemological subjectivism which undercut the reliability of the biblical witness. Wesley agrees that “the credibility of facts lies open to the trial of our reason and senses,” but he also insists that there is a rational basis for accepting the credibility of a witness.”

This tension between the “credibility of the facts” and the “credibility of the witnesses” is a fundamental problem of the eighteenth-century mind. David Hume insisted that, no matter how honest and reliable a witness may be, nothing can alter the fact that miracles never happened.21 Hume’s denial of miracles occasioned Wesley’s comment against “David Hume’s insolent book.”22

It was Ephraim Lessing (1729-81) who gave the classical theological formulation of this problem of faith and history, which was later picked up by Kierkegaard23 and passed on to Barth,24 Tillich,25 and Bultmann.26 Lessing writes: “We all believe that an Alexander lived who in a short time conquered almost all Asia. But who, on the basis of this belief, would risk anything of great, permanent worth, the loss of which would be irreparable?” He answers by saying: “Certainly not I.” for “it might still be possible that the story was founded on a mere poem of Choerilus.”27 He concludes: “Accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason.”28 It is this divorce between reason and history which “is the ugly, broad ditch which I cannot get across, however often and however earnestly I have tried to make the leap.”29

It is this attitude of a distrust in the historical that Wesley is addressing himself to in his letter to Middleton. Middleton believes God’s existence can be established rationally on cosmological grounds and thus has priority over the historical witness of the Holy Scriptures. Though Wesley had an appreciation for traditional evidences for theism,30 his answer to this is a resounding NO.

To deprecate the historical on the grounds that there are no sure principles one can use to establish the integrity of a witness is to undermine faith. Wesley deplored this historical skepticism. If there are no objective principles by which one can judge the reliability of a witness, “then it is plain, all the history of the Bible is utterly precarious and uncertain; then I may indeed presume, but cannot certainly know, that Jesus of Nazareth ever was born; much less that he healed the sick, and raised either Lazarus or himself from the dead.”31

The implications of this historical skepticism extend further to the study of history in general.

If this be as you assert . . . then farewell the credit of all history.
Sir, this is not the cant of zealots; You must not escape so: It is plain, sober reason. If the credibility of witnesses, of all witnesses, (for you make no distinction,) depends, as you peremptorily affirm, on a variety of principles wholly concealed from us, and, consequently, though it may be presumed in many cases, yet can be certainly known in none; then it is plain, all history, sacred or profane, is utterly precarious and uncertain. Then I may indeed presume, but I cannot certainly know, that Julius Caesar was killed in the Senate-house. . . . Now, let any man of common understanding judge, whether this objection has any sense in it, or no.  

It is thus apparent Wesley would have been no Kierkegaardian historical skeptic. He would not have subscribed to the idea of a nonhistorical moment of revelation which somehow eludes the historian. To be sure, Wesley did not believe the truths of the Bible could be sustained apart from faith, for it is faith that enables one to “judge truly” and “reason justly.” One who has thus entered this deeper experience of faith can see with his “reason” that faith’s historical point of departure is solidly established.

II. The Senses

A second aspect of Wesley’s epistemology is sense experience. The metaphysical shaping of Wesley’s concept of experience comes mainly from Locke, who rejected Cartesian rationalism with its emphasis upon innate ideas and a priori knowledge:

Wesley was well versed in this debate between empiricism and rationalism. He likewise rejected the notion of innate ideas: “For many ages it has been allowed by sensible men, Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuit prius in sensu: That is, ‘There is nothing in the understanding which was not first perceived by some of the senses.’ All the knowledge which we naturally have is originally derived from our sense.”

The presupposition of this realism is that there is an ontological distinction between what is “out there” and my idea of it. However, Locke insisted that our knowledge is restricted to ideas which in no way tell us what reality is itself. This means our ideas are reduced to sense data and do not extend to reality itself.

Wesley in the name of “common sense” rejected this idea of a wedge between our experience and reality. This metaphysical agnosticism—that there is an unknowable material substance (an “I-know-not-what”) behind our experience—was no more acceptable to Wesley than the historical agnosticism of the deists. For Wesley, experience merges with reality without their ontological distinction being thereby dissolved. Truth is more than a formulation of ideas, but rather it is an active involvement of the whole person in reality itself.

III. Reason

Reason is a third aspect of Wesley’s epistemology. He defines reason as an intellectual activity rather than a faculty of innate ideas. In this respect,
Wesley was in accord with the eighteenth-century mind. Whereas the great metaphysical systems of the seventeenth century—Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz—saw reason to be the realm of eternal truths held in common by the human and the divine mind, the eighteenth-century thinkers looked upon reason as an intellectual activity.

Wesley cautioned against two extremes—overvaluing and undervaluing the role of reason for faith. The rejection of reason leads to a blind enthusiasm in which one will mistake his own imagination for the truth of God. Wesley says:

Never more declaim in that wild, loose, ranting manner, against this precious gift of God. Acknowledge “the candle of the Lord,” which he hath fixed in our souls for excellent purposes. You see how many admirable ends it answers, were it only in the things of this life: Of what unspeakable use is even a moderate share of reason in all our worldly employments, from the lowest and meanest offices of life, through all the intermediate branches of business; till we ascend to those that are of the highest importance and the greatest difficulty! When therefore you despise or depreciate reason, you must not imagine you are doing God service: Least of all, are you promoting the cause of God when you are endeavouring to exclude reason out of religion. . . . You see it directs us in every point both of faith and practice.

Wesley further says that reason “duly performed, is the highest exercise of our understanding.” He further speaks out against the sincere but misguided attitude that thinks the study of the Bible alone is of importance. He calls this “rank enthusiasm.” Preaching is more than a mere repetition of Bible verses. “If you need no book but the Bible, you are got above St. Paul.” He thus counsels his preachers who have “no taste of reading” to either “contract a taste for it by use,” or to leave the ministry and “return to your trade.” He further advises learning to read metaphysics “with ease and pleasure, as well as profit.” The Cartesian rationalist, Malebranche, and the empiricist, Locke, are recommended as giving one a good introduction to metaphysics.

On the other hand, there is the extreme of rationalism which prejudices men against the “oracles” of the Holy Scriptures. In his own way, Wesley called for a “Critique of Pure Reason.” He sought for a happy medium between these two extremes. He believed Locke in particular was moving in the right direction, though he fell short of the ideal of relating reason to faith. Thus Wesley says, “I would gladly endeavour in some degree to supply this grand defect” of Locke’s.

He gives to reason a twofold function. It is a reliable guide to the everyday affairs of life, and it “can do exceeding much, both with regard to the foundation of it [faith], and the superstructure.” Of the second aspect of reason’s function, Wesley writes:

The foundation of true religion stands upon the oracles of God. It is built upon the Prophets and Apostles, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone. Now, of what excellent use is reason, if we would either understand ourselves, or explain to others, those
living oracles! And how is it possible without it to understand the essential truths contained there? a beautiful summary of which we have in that which is called the Apostles’ Creed. Is it not reason (assisted by the Holy Ghost) which enables us to understand what the Holy Scriptures declare concerning the being and attributes of God?—concerning his eternity and immensity; his power, wisdom, and holiness?50

IV. Faith

The key to Wesley’s epistemology is faith. Here is where all the great metaphysical problems are resolved. The philosophers are perplexed by such problems as: What is reality? Can reality be known? Is reality merely matter or merely mind? Is matter intelligible to the mind? If so, how can two realities so different interact? What is the self? Where is it located? Is the self activated by freedom or necessity? Is nature governed by cause and effect? If so, what happens to the concept of God? Further, doesn’t the Newtonian law of gravitation make God an irrelevant notion, since He is no longer metaphysically needed to account for motion?

Wesley dealt with each of these questions. For him, there is no doubt that matter is real and that it is intelligible to the mind. He makes no apology for this commonsense view of reality.51 How body and mind interact, whether through the pineal glands52 as Descartes believed or not, is in the final analysis beyond our comprehension: “After all our researches, we can only say, ‘I am fearfully and wonderfully made!’”53

That the self, the world, and God have existence is a matter of speculation in philosophy. It may be that the untutored mind may have difficulty in answering the “finely woven schemes”54 of the philosophers with their perplexing questions which militate against a commonsense view of the world, the self, and freedom. But the “man of common understanding” intuitively knows that unless his commonsense view is tenable we “must necessarily sink into universal scepticism.”55 As it is well known, it is just this skepticism Hume logically drew from Locke’s metaphysical agnosticism.

But Wesley did not have to rely on common sense alone to support his belief in the reality of the self, the world, and God, for these realities are made known in faith. “In particular, faith is an evidence to me of the existence of that unseen thing, my own soul. Without this I should be in utter uncertainty concerning it.”56 Indeed Wesley concludes that, apart from faith, knowledge is an uncertainty.

The short of the matter is this: Those who will not believe anything but what they can comprehend, must not believe that there is a sun in the firmament; that there is light shining around them; that there is air, though it encompasses them on every side; that there is an earth, though they stand upon it. They must not believe that they have a soul; no, nor that they have a body.57

So far as the scientific laws of cause and effect and gravitation are concerned, they are only “vulgar [common] expressions”,58 i.e., they are scientific descriptions and not philosophical explanations.59

Likewise, the Incarnation is no more of a metaphysical problem than is
physical motion or the interaction of body and mind. How the “Word was made flesh” defies human comprehension, but such a rational demand is not made upon the believer. Wesley writes: “As to the manner how he was made flesh, wherein the mystery lies, I know nothing about it; I believe nothing about it: It is no more the object of my faith, than it is of my understanding.”

Thus, it is in faith that the great metaphysical problems are resolved—they all have their explanation in the reality of God. Wesley points out that “this circumstance [that God exists] the Doctor [Hume] had forgot.” But so have “almost the whole tribe of modern philosophers. They do not at all take God into their account; they can do their whole business without him. But in truth this their wisdom is their folly; for no system, either of morality or philosophy, can be complete, unless God be kept in view, from the very beginning to the end.”

It can thus be seen that, for Wesley, faith is a way of knowing. He draws the distinction between faith in general and justifying faith, which corresponds to the Reformers’ distinction between faith as insight (notitia) and faith as trust (fiducia).

To say that faith is a way of knowing is to say that “faith is sight.” As the senses are the guide to the truth of things physical, so faith gives us insight into the invisible world. God thus does not leave man enclosed within the natural world of sense experience: “He hath appointed faith to supply the defect of sense; to take us up where the sense sets us down, and help us over the great gulf.”

This does not mean, however, the truths of faith are found by looking inward to one’s religious consciousness. This is the fallacy of mysticism: “the not being guided by the written word.” In “the Mystic writers,” Wesley says, “you will find as many religions as books; and for this plain reason, each of them makes his own experience the standard of religion.”

The truths which faith sees are contained in the written Word of God. Even as the senses have as the basis of their knowledge the physical world, so faith has as the basis of its knowledge the Bible. This means faith does not create its own knowledge. Nor does faith look “inward” to any religious consciousness to discover what is valid doctrine; nor does one have recourse to a set of innate ideas about God. Rather, faith is a way of coming to see the things of God in the Holy Scriptures. Likewise, the senses do not create their knowledge, but are directed “outward” to see the things in the world of nature. (Philosophically, this realism is fundamentally opposed to the transcendental idealism of Kant.)

Thus, Wesley insists that “experience is sufficient to confirm a doctrine which is grounded on Scripture”; but on the other hand, “experience is not sufficient to prove a doctrine which is not founded on Scripture.”

As already noted, reason’s activity is to interpret the “given” of biblical revelation. Reason, however, can no more “pick and choose” from the “given” of the Bible what it considers authentic truth than it can arbitrarily select from the material furnished to it by the senses concerning the world of nature. The truths of faith are derived thus from the Scriptures, which are
inspired of God, which for Wesley means that “all Scripture is infallibly true.”

Wesley’s “Critique of Reason” brings one thus to see that reason’s task is to interpret reality as it is encountered directly through the senses or faith. That reason’s task is to interpret explains why Wesley says that the study of logic is of next importance to the study of the Bible. Wesley is not being a “scholastic” when he says this. In this respect, he criticizes the scholastics for their “vain speculations” and especially praises Francis Bacon for reinstating the inductive method.” He knows that the profundity of divine truth and the wealth of human experience cannot be squeezed into any logical system. He needs no philosophy to support his theology—whether it be Locke’s or Aristotle’s. He gladly uses from them what enhances understanding, but the truths of God’s Word must be expressed, in the final analysis, biblically both in content and in terminology.

That Wesley stressed a practical theology of experience instead of a systematic theology of doctrine is said to have prepared the way for the experience-oriented theology of Schleiermacher, implying that Wesley was some kind of John-the-Baptist forerunner. I think this judgment to be wrong, for Schleiermacher’s concept of experience is different from Wesley’s.

Schleiermacher’s theology of experience is an attempt to get around the theological agnosticism of Kant’s transcendental idealism in which reality is dichotomized into noumena and phenomena. Man, according to Kant, can never know the noumenal realities of the self, the world, or God; rather, man’s knowledge is restricted to sense experience alone. While recognizing the validity of the ideas of the self, the world, and God, Kant says we cannot know their realities. Man thus is the arbiter of what he does know, and for Kant that means truth is subjective knowledge, not an objective knowledge of what really is.

In order to get around this metaphysical agnosticism, Schleiermacher set up another knowing capacity in man which he called the das Gefüh! That is, all theological assertions are derived from one’s religious consciousness. This pantheistic idea of experience in which the individual himself participates existentially in the being of God has nothing in common with Wesley’s concept of experience.

For Wesley, subjective experience is an experience of something which comes to one from “the outside” and not something derived subjectively from “the inside” (as in transcendental idealism). This postulate of an antecedent reality which is intelligible to the mind is fundamental to Wesley’s world view. Otherwise, if Locke’s metaphysical agnosticism or Hume’s skepticism is valid, then Wesley said one will be forced to admit God is the “Father of lies” who has deceived man into believing as true something that is false.

In accord with Wesley’s commonsense world view, one can say, for example, that my experience of this paper is possible because this piece of paper imposes its own reality upon me and its reality is not contingent upon my mere perception of it. To be sure, my experience of this paper is subjective; it is I who experience it. But I experience it because its reality
imposes itself upon me from “the outside.” Thus, my subjective experience is at the same time a knowledge of objective reality.

Likewise, the believer’s experience of God is subjective, not because God is the depth of his being in a pantheistic sense. That is, though he experiences God, it is not because existentially he participates in the being of God; nor is it because of any innate idea. Rather, his experience of God is subjective because in the very depth of his being he is encountered by One who is other than he, One who is other than the world. In this way, the believer’s experience of God is possible because God comes to him from “the outside.”

It can be seen, then, that Wesley’s idea of experience is objective in that reality (whether the world or God) is intelligible to the mind because God as Creator has so constituted man that he can know the truth of what is. It is this postulate of an antecedent reality which is intelligible to the mind that is denied by Kant’s transcendental idealism.

It is this man-centered experience of Schleiermacher (and Ritschlian theology which presupposes the Kantian model of truth) that provoked the NO! of Barth in which he could see only the destruction of Protestant theology. The early Barth, in order to preserve the transcendence of God, overreacted to his liberal background and spoke of God as “wholly other.” Kant’s epistemology lurks in the background to Barth’s Epistle to the Romans, in which God is thought of as “permanently transcending time.” This accords with Kant’s deistic idea, but Barth was not satisfied with anything less than the self-revelation of God, which is not possible within Kant’s epistemology.

Thus, Barth utilized the Kierkegaardian concept of the nonhistorical moment which breaks into the world without becoming a part of world history; this was Barth’s way out of the Kantian agnosticism. Historical revelation was nonetheless jeopardized by this existentialist narrowing down of truth. Barth realized this, and thus retracted his position in Romans. But in my judgment, Barth never got away from the joint influences of Kant and Kierkegaard with their emphasis upon God’s “infinite qualitative” distance from man. The result is that Barth never freed himself from a skeptical attitude toward historical knowledge.

I have digressed at this point to indicate that our Wesleyan evangelical heritage should, it seems to me, extend back to the Reformers by way of Wesley, not neoorthodoxy. Barth had to retrace his way back to the Reformers by trying to free himself from the clutches of German idealism with its anthropocentric concept of experience. In so doing, in my judgment, he fell into some unhealthy emphases, though this is not to indicate a lack of appreciation for his most impressive Church Dogmatics.

Conclusion

One concluding observation. Corresponding to its confidence in reason, the eighteenth-century mind believed in the perfectibility of man. This can be seen in Locke’s utilitarian ethic in which he defined the greatest good as happiness which is obeying the will of God as seen in natural law.
Wesley did not share this ethical optimism of moral philosophy: “Have we any true knowledge of what is good? That is not the result of our natural understanding.” Wesely complains that the philosophers “look upon it [reason] as the all-sufficient director of all the children of men; able, by its native light, to guide them into all truth, and lead them into all virtue.” For Wesley, truth is to be had, not according to our natural understanding, but in faith.

Herein lies the epistemological significance of Wesley’s doctrine of Christian perfection, which he defines as “casting down everything that exalts itself against the knowledge of God” and “bringing into captivity every thought” in obedience to Christ. While the philosophers believed in the perfectibility of man based on a life of reason, Wesley believed in a perfection of love available to any man who comes into the experience of faith.

For Wesley, man’s greatest good is thus to be realized in the knowledge of God. Since knowledge is total involvement with reality, this means that to know God is to love God. It can be seen, then, that Wesley’s quest for knowledge—to know the way to heaven—is an ethical quest for holiness, for truth is experienced through the believer’s participation in divine love. It is this theistic concept of truth and love that provides the answer to a metaphysical agnosticism concerning the ideas of the self, the world, and God.

REFERENCE NOTES

3. Ibid., 2:48.
4. Ibid., 10:353.
6. Ibid., p. 197.
8. Cassirer, Philosophy of Enlightenment, p. 201.
9. Ibid.
11. Cassirer, Philosophy of Enlightenment, p. 185.
13. Cassirer, Philosophy of Enlightenment, p. 185.
15. Cassirer, Philosophy of Enlightenment, pp. 172f.
17. Ibid., 10:1-79.
18. Ibid., p. 3.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 53.
29. Ibid., p. 55.
30. Works, 10:76.
31. Ibid., 10:3.
32. Ibid., 10:65.
33. Ibid., 8:13.
34. Ibid., 6:339; 8:13; 13:445; *et passim*.
35. Ibid., 7:231.
38. Ibid., 13:462.
40. Works, 6:351.
41. Ibid., 6:359-60.
42. Ibid., 6:360.
43. Ibid., 8:315
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., 10:492.
46. Ibid., 12:262.
47. Ibid., 6:351.
48. Ibid., 6:352.
49. Ibid., 6:354.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., 6:343, 202-3.
52. Ibid., 13:497
53. Ibid., 13:495.
54. Ibid., 10:463.
55. Ibid., 10:472; *et passim*.
56. Ibid., 7:232.
57. Ibid., 6:204.
58. Ibid., 6:427.
60. Ibid., 6:204.
61. Ibid., 10:473.
62. Ibid., 8:48.
63. Ibid., 13:20.
64. Ibid., 7:232.
65. Ibid., 14:277.
66. Ibid., 13:25.
67. Ibid., 13:487.
68. Ibid., 5:129, 133.
69. Ibid., 5:193.
70. Ibid., 10:483.
71. Ibid., 13:483.
72. Ibid., 5:1-6.


75. This is why Kant calls his philosophy a “transcendental idealism,” since man can only know that something lies at the basis of his experience, but he cannot know what that something is. If man knew what that something is that lies at the basis of his experience, then he would have a transcendent knowledge of reality, not a transcendental idea of reality. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, with an introduction by Lewis White Black (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), pp. 41, 60f.

76. Tillich, Perspectives . . . , p. 111.
77. Ibid.
78. Works, 10:471.
83. Barth, Church Dogmatics, 1:2, 50; cf. also Church Dogmatics, 1:i, ix-x.
85. Works, 8:106.
86. Ibid., 6:351.
87. Ibid., 8:22.
88. Ibid., 8:47.
SEMANTICS AND HOLINESS:
A Study in Holiness-Texts’ Functions

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My topic involves our language statements which deal with the subject of Christian holiness. By “our language statements” I refer both to the New Testament writers and our Wesleyan holiness emphasis. To treat this subject from the perspective of semantics is but to use another methodological approach to our perennial task of interpreting the biblical text.

Holiness is both a subject and an experience, and with respect to both of these the New Testament tradition has a lot to say. Semantics helps us to see how the saying was done, the focus being upon the forms and logic of the language system used and how these functioned to express and provide meaning.

We are familiar with the syntactical approach to biblical interpretation, an approach in which we use grammars and lexicons as our tools to dig out meanings. The science of semantics offers an additional approach and another useful set of tools by which to interpret the texts.

Christian holiness is an experience of depth and ultimacy. The New Testament writers have used a dynamic religious language system in writing about their own experience of holiness; and the statements, expressions, and prescriptions used in their language system vividly reflect the experiential stance, thought-categories, and intentions of these writers with reference to that experience. When the sentence units within their language system are analyzed in terms of functions to be served, then the basic meanings within what they wrote tend to become quite clear.

Semantics has to do with this concern for clarity and understood meaning. The interrogation of sentence forms and the isolation and interpretation of sentence functions help us to discern meaning. This paper is based upon that method of approach in interpreting the function of New Testament holiness-texts.

I

The science of semantics is of a comparatively recent origin, but sufficient growth and development have occurred to make it a mature and valuable member within the family of sciences. Simply put, the science of seman-
tics deals with the logic of language and explores the conditions under which language statements become meaningful. The work of semantics is language analysis, the exploration and classifying of sentence forms and functions, and testing the empirical basis for what is said and meant.\(^1\)

There are many determinants at work in the use of a language: assumptions, attitudes, culture, experiences, perceptions, etc. When these determinants are considered for what they are, it is possible to see the way that they influence what is said, and to see as well how they condition what is meant. The use of “religious language” is also deeply influenced and conditioned by many determinants, the foremost being the religious situation or experience within which the speaking person is based or to which he stands related.

The new concern among philosophers about language analysis called the attention of the world to the “meaning” and “significance” of all language uses. The new emphasis was upon a more precise “placing” of words and phrases to insure a more precise function toward clear meanings. “Religious language” has also been explored and examined against the new criteria. Many philosophers (logical positivists and others) who tested religious language for its limits and functions differed in their final assessments of its validity and value, but the encounter has not been without value to the Church.\(^2\)

Some philosophers who were more congenial to the Christian faith recognized in the new philosophical concern an important tool by which to render theological statements more precise; they also saw its value for studying the logic at work within the unique religious statements within the Bible. At the present time there are many studies available which deal with religious language as a specialized category, and essential treatments have been offered of the assumptions, terminology, logic, locus, essence, functions, and truthfulness (empirical placing) of such a language system.\(^3\) This new and prolonged look into the nature and function of religious language has been shared by a sizable number of investigators, including ethnologists, anthropologists, linguists, theologians, historians of religion, and even sociologists.”

II

I have referred to the dynamic religious language system of the New Testament writers, and I somewhat passingly categorized their treatment of Christian holiness under three functionheadings: “statements,” “expressions,” and “prescriptions.” It is in order now to treat these designations in more detail because this is crucial to the purpose of the paper.

Semanticists have pointed out that in uttering a sentence in our everyday use of language we do one or more of four things: (1) We make a *statement*—analytical terminology for asserting or affirming some fact; (2) We make an *expression*, an utterance in which emotion and impulse play a considerable role; (3) We speak *prescriptives*, directing that something should be done; (4) We utter *performatives*, saying something that creates a new state of affairs, like making a promise. (The very speaking of the promise is the
act of creating the new situation, which is to say that a performative is a spoken action.) Meaning is intended through the use of any and all of these ways of speaking; performatives, however, are of a more critical nature since they have to do with speech-action in which meaning, emotion, and effect all go along hand in hand.\(^5\)

These categories of sentence-function provide us with an interesting measure for testing the function level of New Testament holiness-texts.\(^6\) Although I am drawing upon these descriptive categories from the current perspective of semantics, it should be mentioned, however, that the study of sentences by function-level and intention is not a new effort at all. Aristotle categorized sentences in this way long, long ago in his *Poetics*,\(^7\) although he outlined five categories rather than four. However ancient the categorizing might be, there is an evident history of its influence upon later cultures.\(^8\) With the current help we have for utilizing language theories and refining language uses, we have a meaningful tool for our research into the intended meanings of the New Testament message. We also possess a relevant method to help us pass on those meanings in our preaching, teaching, and theological work.

III

I am impressed by the number and functional forcefulness of the many New Testament holiness-texts. In terms of sentence-functions, the “statements” and “prescriptives” are the most plentiful. This is characteristic not only of the holiness-texts but of other teaching and hortatory themes, particularly in the Epistles, since these materials were addressed to evoke within readers a reaction-response of faith and commitment. The holiness-texts are being highlighted here, however, since the whole issue of the kerygma and the experience of salvation are toward righteousness and the fulfillment of the will of God in the holiness of obedient love.

It is instructive to watch the massive dependence of the writers upon the function of prescriptives in aiding this end; their usage of the imperative keeps us mindful of how the imperative and the indicative relate in the holiness experience.\(^9\) There are many implications to be seen in this epistolary constant for developing a theological ethic of holiness, as well as for a constructive psychology of Christian experience of holiness.\(^10\)

As a basic illustration of how plentiful the “statements” and “prescriptives” are within holiness-texts, consider the following instances drawn only from sentences using words based on the root *HAG*.” Observe the sentence-functions with care.

1. Beginning with the 27 appearances of *hagiazō* (meaning: to sanctify, consecrate, make holy), 4 are not applicable to our concern here (Matt. 6:9; 23:17, 19; Luke 11:2); 9 are *statements* (1 Cor. 6:11; 7:14; Eph. 5:26; 1 Tim. 4:5; 2 Tim. 2:21; Heb. 2:11; 9:13; 10:14; 13:12); 4 are *expressions* (John 17:17; Rom. 15:16; 1 Cor. 1:2; 1 Thess. 5:23); 6 are of a mixed character, showing either a double function as *statement-expression* (John 10:36; 17:19; Acts 20:32; Heb. 10:10, 29), or *statement-prescription* (Acts 26:18); while 2 are
plainly prescriptive (1 Pet. 3:15; Rev. 22:11).

2. Continuing with the 10 textual appearances of hagiasmos (meaning: holiness, consecration, sanctification), 3 uses are in statements (Rom. 6:22; 1 Cor. 1:30; 1 Thess. 4:7); 2 are expressions (2 Thess. 2:13; 1 Pet. 1:2); 1 is of a mixed character, showing a statement-expression function (1 Tim. 2:15); while 4 of the texts are clearly prescriptive (Rom. 6:19; 1 Thess. 4:3, 4; Heb. 12:14).

3. There are only two instances where the word hagiotēs (meaning: holiness) appears, and both instances are of a mixed character showing a blend of statement-expression functions (2 Cor. 1:12; Heb. 12:10).

4. There are three texts in which hagiōsunē (meaning: holiness) appears. One is a statement (Rom. 1:4), 12 one is an expression (1 Thess. 3:13), and one is prescriptive (2 Cor. 7:1).

5. Hagneia (meaning: purity) appears in two places, and is used both times to denote a virtue. Both uses are prescriptive (1 Tim. 4:12; 5:2).

6. Hagnizō (meaning: to purify) is found in seven places: four instances of use are not applicable here because they reflect a purely cultic matter (see John 11:55; Acts 21:24, 26; 24:18); one use is clearly prescriptive (Jas. 4:8); while two uses are of a mixed character, showing an expression-prescriptive function (1 Pet. 1:22; 1 John 3:3).

7. Eight holiness-texts use the word hagnos (meaning: pure, holy).” One of those texts is a statement (Jas. 3:17); one is of mixed function, statement-expression (2 Cor. 11:2); one is a clear expression (2 Cor. 7:11); and the other five uses are all prescriptive (Phil. 4:8; 1 Tim. 5:22; Titus 2:5; 1 Pet. 3:2; 1 John 3:3).

8. Only two texts employ hagnotēs (meaning: purity, sincerity), and in both cases we are dealing with expressions (2 Cor. 6:6; 11:3 [a doubtful reading]).

I do not intend to list here the many instances where the word hagios (meaning: holy) appears, since there would be hundreds of texts for which to account and to analyze. This would not better serve the point which the given listings already show, namely, that the New Testament treatment of Christian holiness involves statements, expressions, and prescriptives that clearly organize our view about the life of man in the will of God, and they evoke a deep realization of call and demand within us. The New Testament statements about holiness make clear assertions and sponsor a claim that challenges. The New Testament expressions about holiness show great excitement about a life to which the witnesses were committed as real, valuable, engaging, and conclusive. The New Testament prescriptives about holiness are unsparing in stress and demand, using imperatives with high warrant, strict realism, and decisive intent. Writing from the locus of a confirmed faith, and using language appropriate to the experience—as well as the understanding of their audience—the New Testament witnesses are seen to report, confess, exalt, proclaim, prescribe, invite, and challenge. The statements are often clearly doctrinal, the expressions convictional, and the prescriptives reflect both. In reading the holiness-texts from such a perspective one gains a new “feel” for the life that is being shared there.
In speaking of “feel,” there is one holiness-text with a functional force and “prescriptive power” which almost guarantee it for us by the way that text excites and expands the consciousness. I refer to Paul’s prescriptive sentence in Eph. 5:18: “And do not get drunk with wine, for that is debauchery; but be filled with the Spirit.” [Scripture quotations are in some instances the author’s personal translations.] The thrust of the picture is immediate. It opens up a conspicuously contagious psychology for the reader, inviting him to be “influenced” by God. Paul’s use here of the imperative passive—plerousthe en Pneumati—makes his words injunctive and prescriptive, but the sentence-function also makes a promise.

Paul’s choice of language opens a new situation for the reader. His prescriptive challenges an old pattern and illuminates the reader’s new possibilities. There is a deep treasure of meaning in what Paul has said, and the sentence he used creates a “feel” for that meaning. His imperative is more than a demand; it is an opening for the reader into the will of God.

Historians and commentators have reminded us that in the early period of Church history life in the Spirit was understood as initiation into enlightenment and enthusiasm. The early Christians viewed life in the Spirit as entrance into a higher range of abilities and enablements, as movement into a new sphere of relations by which certain natural limitations, felt helplessness, and the sense of incompleteness could be overcome.

Rom. 8:26 certainly reflects this view. Although Paul’s statement there that “the Spirit helps us in our weakness” only mentions prayer as an illustrative instance, we all “sense” that his stated fact about the ready help of the Spirit applies to a wider range of human needs. When scriptural reference is being made to persons “full of” or “filled with the Spirit” the contexts usually show some action being accomplished by those persons which could not have been done otherwise.

The materials in Luke-Acts are especially illustrative of this. There we are shown men and women being helped in their astheneia, and they are thus able to utter prophetic speech (thereby interpreting some event or predicting one) or to give a public witness (thereby creating or handling some religious situation). The Luke-Acts materials abound with the descriptive phrase “full of,” or “filled with the Spirit” (Luke 1:15, 41, 67; 4:1; and Acts 2:4; 4:8, 31; 6:3; 7:55; 9:17; 11:24; and 13:9); and in each instance of use the phrase is linked with a context where someone has been fitted by God for handling some task, speaking some needed word, or doing some strategic deed, and the whole notion is that of readiness to act by the help of God. According to Luke’s somewhat strict usage, being “filled with the Spirit” is a discernment-disclosure expression. It is explanatory and descriptive. It tells how some person was aided to make some action take place.

Paul also used the expression, but he widened the framework within which it was first understood and made it into a prescriptive: “Be filled with the Spirit.” Luke wrote to report about events and how they occurred; thus his statements and expressions. Paul wrote to shape an event, to make something occur; thus his prescriptives and performatives. Understood in this
way, both the adjectival use by Luke and the imperative use by Paul of the description “filled” can be viewed in a way that frees us from any notion of quantity in connection with the meaning of the term.

Paul’s prescriptive word “Be filled with the Spirit” functions as a challenge to hold a conscious relationship with God. He is encouraging the believer to receive the rich help offered by the Spirit. The point of the prescriptive is practical holiness, the enhancement of experience, the fulfillment of ethical demands, and being readied for service in the arena of human need. There is small wonder, then, that Paul could risk being misunderstood when he confessed his prayer that all the Ephesian members would be “filled with all the fulness of God” (3:19), using a problematic expression with which later generations of believers and scholars still wrestle.15

There is some evidence that the question was raised in the Early Church about the extent or degree to which one could be “full of the Spirit.” The question is implied in John 3:34, which states: “For he whom God has sent utters the words of God, for it is not by measure that he gives the Spirit.” Scholarly opinion is still divided over whether this is a saying of Jesus, or whether it is the summarized reflection of the Evangelist regarding Jesus,16 but the point of the statement is clear: There was no limitation of the Spirit in the life of Jesus.

Perhaps the question about degrees of Spirit-relatedness was influenced by a current rabbinic teaching that the Holy Spirit was given sparingly even to the prophets, that He only “rested” on them—and in measured fashion.17 The New Testament writers do not give this question any direct treatment, but their descriptive phrase “filled with the Spirit” does witness to an understood relation with the Spirit. Using such a description they confessed and affirmed that there is indeed a dynamic relationship between the believer and the Spirit.

Appealing again to the Gospel of John, we find there some sayings from Jesus which promise that the Holy Spirit will give the believer enlightenment (14:25; 16:13-15) and sense of divine presence (14:16-17; 16:7-11). The theology in these sayings is the same as that reflected in Luke-Acts, as we have seen. Both Luke and John describe the work of the Spirit in the life of the believer as that of enlightenment, enablement, and a shared sense of divine presence.

In our time another question has been raised in the Church: whether the “filling” of the believer by the Spirit can be perceived by the believer as a felt experience. The way this question is answered usually marks the boundary between churches of the holiness tradition which are “Pentecostal” by description and those of that same tradition which are not. That boundary between the churches is mainly psycho-theological because there are very few substantial theological differences between them to block unity. The Arminian-Wesleyan tradition is the religious milieu in which both groups are rooted. The separate paths they follow are conditioned mainly by a difference of view regarding the nature, form, content, and outworking of “enthusiasm”—God-within by His Spirit.18
While the world of our day continues to wrestle with the question about the existence or absence of God, the Church of our day is in a state of unrest as many believers stand puzzled over questions about the presence and manifestations of God. All of us know that there is an intensive search on among churchmen for “peak experience,” that there is a widespread longing within the Church to experience that which motivates to optimism, joy, and depth belief. It is really a quest for “the touch of God,”19 and to know that touch in a felt way. Charles R. Meyer has explained.

By peak experience we would mean that which is particularly striking and significant. It is the type of experience that we cannot easily forget because it is so unusual or different. Peak experiences are those which bring about notable changes in behavior, changes that are profound and lasting. From a peak experience a person might well develop a whole new outlook on life, a different or more meaningful philosophy.20

Our Wesleyan holiness tradition, following the witness of the New Testament, has always associated “the touch of God” with the working presence of the Holy Spirit. This interpretation is biblical and this emphasis is still needed.

The whole thrust of the New Testament witness is toward “peak experiences”—as man needs them and as God wills them. The fact is that Christian living is the result of the peak experience of conversion, and it is sustained and deepened when holiness, “the vision which transforms,”21 is given freedom to fulfill itself on every level of decision and realized intent. The fact is that those who let the vision fulfill itself do learn more and more about the presence of God, because through His Spirit within them God is realized as “manifested Presence.”

This is the explanation behind the fruit of the Spirit in Christian holiness (see Gal. 5:22-23). Nor should it be overlooked that a felt experience is implied in connection with the realization of certain fruit: “joy” and “peace,” for example, not to mention “self-control.” These are by no means unrelated to our realized emotional states; they are certainly perceivable effects for which the “filling Presence” is responsible. Full commitment can have an “overflow” effect. Conscious yielding of inner consent to God can occasion passionate joy. A will reinforced by the Spirit to live out the demands of the imperatives will learn the glory of the indicative and enjoy what R. R. Neibuhr called “the intimacy of believing.”22 Openness to the Spirit releases one’s moral energy and forbids that “bottled-up” self-containment that results in sin. Commitment centers the self, focuses identity, and gives a sense of being engaged. There are times when the believer might perceive a “filling” on the level of feeling. If so, then it is but the participatory work of the Holy Spirit to either ready or renew the believer. Even the body can share in some of His manifest effects.

The expression “filled with,” widely used by Luke, is found in more contexts than those which link it with the Holy Spirit. Some verses describe persons filled with wisdom (Luke 2:40), or filled with wrath (4:28), or filled with awe (5:26); or fury (6:11); wonder (Acts 3:10), grace and power
(Acts 6:8), deceit and villainy (Acts 13:10), or joy (Acts 13:52). In most of these instances we can recognize affective states of which the person is aware while being influenced by them. The person experiences himself as struck, stirred, and shaped by the state. Being “filled with the Spirit” can also be an affective realization. Paul must have been aware of this wider possibility within his functional directive. Perhaps this is why he gave it along with the prohibition against being drunk!

The New Testament is filled with a language that holds power to effect a situation of “discernment-commitment,” to use Ian T. Ramsey’s phrase. For believers, the holiness-texts found there are especially crucial to this end. Those texts present an organized view by which Christian experience is to be ordered, measured, and fulfilled. Those holiness-texts show us an all-important “vision which transforms,” and call us to an interaction with God through statements that are often “logically odd,” always morally gripping, admittedly unique, and with power to unmask.

I agree with Wayne E. Oates that “the Hebrew and Greek languages are at their bases structured, psychological points of view to those who look close enough.” That is so; and as for the New Testament writers, their Greek usage became the vehicle for a dynamic witness concerning life in the Spirit. The syntactical approach is still basic for research study of their message. A semantical approach to the study of that witness both deepens the level of our reach and assures the gaining of results.

REFERENCE NOTES


5. On these categorical descriptions, see Anders Jeffner, The Study of Religious Language, esp. pp. 11-12, 68-104. See also J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, ed. J. O. Urmson (New York: Oxford University Press, Galaxy Book, 1965); John
6. By “holiness-texts” I refer to sentence units that utilize one or more of the words based upon the root HAG, and in addition occur in a context significantly related to the holiness concern (behavior, codes, experience, etc.).


10. As both W. Curry Mavis, The Psychology of Christian Experience (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan Publishing House, 1963), and Mildred Bangs Wynkoop, A Theology of Love: The Dynamic of Wesleyanism (Kansas City, Mo.: Beacon Hill Press of Kansas City, 1972), have certainly seen and explored, with Wesleyan emphases as their province of consideration.


14. Ernst Kaesemann sees here a use of the oratio infusa motif by Paul. The technical concerns to be met in interpreting this verse are many indeed. See his Perspectives on Paul (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1969), esp. pp. 127-37. ET from the German by Margaret Kohl.


17. So Rabbi Acha (c. 320), in comments on Leviticus (Midrash Rabbah): “The Holy Spirit, who rests on the prophets, rests [on them] only by weight (= by mea-

18. I use this term *enthusiasm* despite the extreme disrepute in which some hold it. On the varied history it has had as a word, see Susie I. Tucker, *Enthusiasm: A Study in Semantic Change* (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1972).


20. Ibid., p. 63.


24. Ibid., p. 106.

A distinguishing mark of biblical religion is the rejection of idols. All images and symbols of Deity are forbidden by the second commandment for the evident reason that symbols too often become substitutes for the thing symbolized. Scripture teaches us that the created order does in fact bear some evidence of divine origination and that the attributes of the Creator are reflected in His work. It was characteristic of pagan religion to allow its vision and hence its worship to terminate upon the reflection, the symbol; and it was the task of Hebrew faith to reject the symbol in order that the ultimate reality, God, might again be seen.

There is an intriguing parallel between ancient pagan religion and modern philosophy at this point of symbols or images. The religious symbolism of the ancients is strikingly similar to the conceptual symbolism of post-Cartesian epistemology. It was Descartes who introduced into modern philosophy the view that we do not have direct knowledge of the world. The only direct, immediate knowledge which we have is knowledge of "ideas" which represent the world.

John Locke adopted Descartes' notion, popularized it, and passed it on to Berkeley and Hume, and through Hume to Kant. Locke held that the direct objects of our perceptions are always and only ideas. These ideas are caused by real existences lying outside the mind—existences, however, which we do not apprehend directly, but only indirectly. The implicit acceptance of the doctrine of ideas by these heavyweights of modern epistemology has been extremely consequential. It has led, as Mortimer Adler points out,

to all the riddles and perplexities of later empiricism concerning the subjective and the objective, concerning our knowledge of the external world, concerning the logical construction of "objects" that we cannot directly apprehend from the sense-data that we do directly apprehend, concerning the referential meaning of any words that do not have directly apprehended items, such as sense-data; and so on.1

Although Locke and Hume as well as Kant maintained that a real world exists independent of human cognition, it is difficult to understand how such confidence was warranted by their epistemology. As Adler again states:

How regarding the private ideas in my own mind as both its directly apprehended objects and also as representations of things
that cannot be directly apprehended enables me to have knowledge of or even a rational belief in an independent world of real existences is a mystery that has remained unsolved.\(^2\)

The evident problem is that the theory of ideas itself provides no criteria for evaluating the ability of ideas to represent a reality distinct from them. As Abraham Heschel says: “In order to prove the validity of symbols in general and in order to judge the adequacy of particular symbols, we must be in possession of a knowledge of the symbolized object that is independent of all symbols.”\(^3\)

It is precisely this latter knowledge which the theory of ideas excludes.

The legitimate consequences of such a position are clear. Genuine knowledge of the outer world is excluded. In Heschel’s words, “Objects possessing attributes, causes that work, are all mythical.”\(^4\) Neither can there be knowledge of such aspects of the inner world as personal identity, free will, etc. The question of the status of religious knowledge comes also to mind. Heschel’s answer is perceptive:

We must, of course, give up the hope ever to attain a valid concept of the supernatural in an objective sense, yet since for practical reasons it is useful to cherish the idea of God, let us retain that idea and claim that while our knowledge of God is not objectively true, it is still symbolically true.\(^5\)

The “idolatrous” character of the doctrine of ideas thus becomes manifest.

Conceptual symbolism, like its ancient religious counterpart, has not gone unchallenged. The modern Moses who arose to reject this epistemic idolatry was the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. The intention and the result of Reid’s work was to provide philosophical justification for the view that our knowledge of reality is direct, not indirect; immediate, not mediate; presentative, rather than representative. Reid maintained that we have immediate awareness of the world as it is and of ourselves as we are and that there is no sufficient reason for thinking otherwise.

While it is not our purpose in this paper either to justify or to refute the doctrine of ideas, it will be helpful to give an example of the sort of argument Reid utilized to establish his position. Reid held that there are certain beliefs which we do and must hold as (practical) human beings, which are held by men universally and are consequently reflected in our behavior and in the structure of all languages, and the denial of which leads to absurdity. One such belief is the conviction that our wills are free. Others include

our belief in the existence of a material world; our belief that those we converse with are living and intelligent beings; our belief that those things did really happen, which we distinctly remember; and our belief that we continue the same identical persons.\(^6\)

Concerning freedom of the will, Reid says:

This natural conviction of our acting freely which is acknowledged by many who hold the doctrine of necessity, ought to throw the whole burden of proof upon that side; for, by this, the side of liberty has what lawyers call a jus quaesitum, or a right of ancient possession, which ought to stand good till it be overturned. If it
cannot be proved that we always act from necessity, there is no need to produce arguments on the other side to convince us that we are free agents.  

Reid’s point is that our convictions concerning human freedom, personal identity, the material world, etc., are convictions which common sense teaches us are in no need of independent justification. To deny them is to deny common sense. Unless more convincing arguments are adduced to the contrary, such convictions stand as self-evident, hence self-justified.  

Another parallel between ancient religious thought and modern philosophical movements is worthy of note. Biblical religion is distinguished from all other major religions except those which it has influenced by its view of God as transcendent and free. Elsewhere the divine is found within the processes of nature and is subject to the fatalism inherent in nature’s inexorable laws. What is true of the gods is true also of man. Man emerges from the natural order and, like the gods, is determined by its laws. In biblical thought, however, man, who is made in God’s image, has a measure of distinctness from nature as well as a limited though real freedom of will. In comparative religion the ideas of idolatry, naturalism, and determinism are generally associated, as are the ideas of supranaturalism, human freedom, and the rejection of idolatry.  

Modern philosophy has tended to reflect these groupings of ideas. Nonrealistic epistemologies have generally led to naturalistic metaphysics and to denial of free will. When freedom is maintained in such a context, it is usually found to be a type which may be “reconciled with determinism.” Commonsense realism, on the other hand, has generally if not exclusively been associated with supranaturalism and with a clear doctrine of freedom. In America the followers of Reid and Dugald Stewart, many Methodists among them, argued that acceptance of the doctrines of epistemological realism and of freedom leads logically to theism, while denial of either leads to atheism. Thus, there was a spate of books by the academic orthodoxy on mental philosophy, on the freedom of the will, and on natural theology.  

It is not the purpose of this paper to demonstrate the relation of implication between the ideas of idolatry (religious or conceptual), naturalism, and determinism or between realism, freedom, and theism. It is our purpose to use this schema as an explanatory hypothesis for understanding the character of the relation between epistemology and theology in two major eras of American Methodist history: the era of academic orthodoxy and the era of modern personalism. Our intention is not to reach final conclusions but to open up new avenues of potentially fruitful investigation in an area which has been largely ignored.  

In spite of John Wesley’s profound respect for reason, the Methodist movement never attempted any consistent or thoroughgoing work in philosophy during the days of his leadership. This fact may be attributed to two things primarily. The first is that Wesley received his academic foundations and began his ministry during the period of John Locke’s greatest influence in British universities. Although Wesley paid his respects to Locke, there were fundamental incompatibilities between the implications of Locke’s
epistemology and Wesley’s understanding of the Scriptures. The second is that Wesley’s primary calling was to give leadership and direction to the evangelical revival, not to do detailed work in philosophy. Thus, while Wesley gave some critical attention to Locke, he wrote comparatively little in the field of philosophy. A tendency to neglect philosophy characterized Methodism during the entire Wesleyan period in England as well as the Asburian period in America. It is not clear that British Methodism has ever diverged significantly from this nonphilosophical orientation.

However, it should be made clear that there was in Wesley and other early Methodists a commonsense approach to theological matters which bore an affinity to Reid’s philosophical method. Leland Scott states in this connection that

the very claim of the Scottish philosophy to be one of “common sense,” thus non-abstract, dealing in evident realities apart from speculative metaphysics or scholastic divinity, served to attract the Methodist theologians to it. They found such a method congenial to their own interests and concerns. Indeed, the appeal to “common sense” (viz. common consent, the obviously reasonable, etc.) was characteristic of the evangelical theologies in the period of Wesley and Edwards, and their immediate successors, and this, of course, was prior to the specification of such an approach in a philosophical school.\textsuperscript{11}

Although Wesley read Reid’s first book, \textit{Inquiry into the Human Mind}, in 1774 with mixed feelings of delight and disappointment,\textsuperscript{12} it was in American Methodism that the mature works of Reid were most heartily appreciated.

Three years before Francis Asbury arrived on American soil bearing the message of the evangelical revival, John Witherspoon came with the philosophy of the Scottish renaissance, commonsense realism. Witherspoon utilized the same conceptual artillery with which he had combatted Lord Kames’s empiricism in Scotland to effectively rid Princeton of its prevailing idealism. By the turn of the century Witherspoon and others had made Reid’s philosophy a major influence in American intellectual life.

It was not long before the name of Reid began to appear in Methodist literature. Asa Shinn, a self-educated itinerant preacher who wrote the only theodicy in American Methodism’s first hundred years,\textsuperscript{13} was the first to see the intrinsic compatibility between Arminian theology and Scottish philosophy, but he was far from the last. In his \textit{Essay on the Plan of Salvation}, Shinn wrote: “It affords me unspeakable pleasure to find I can screen myself under the authority of a Reid, a Beatty, and a Campbell, among philosophers; and . . . of a Baxter, a Wesley, a Fletcher . . . among divines.”\textsuperscript{14} Scott rightly points out that “these words of Asa Shinn, published in 1813, were to prove methodologically prophetic of this early-nineteenth-century American Methodism.”\textsuperscript{15}

The intellectual treatment of the Wesleyan message by American Methodists was from the beginning characterized by a philosophical preference for Reid over Locke. Nathan Bangs, the first major polemicist, historian, and theological editor,” was a diligent student of theology and of mental
philosophy. In his youth he mastered his favorite author, John Locke. During his pastorate in New York City he mastered Berkeley and Hume as well as Reid, Beatty, and Stewart. Of these studies, Bangs’s biographer writes: “Reid’s ‘Essays on the Intellectual Faculties and Active Powers’ were especially his delight; he made an ample synopsis of them in his commonplace book, and considered them the best solution of the chief problems of the science which had yet been given to the world.”

Bangs continued to respect Locke, but he judged that Reid had detected the errors in Locke’s epistemology and had rescued philosophy from the “barefaced Atheism” to which these errors had led in Hume’s theory of successive impressions. In his influential letters on the “Importance of Study to a Minister of the Gospel,” Bangs urged that “Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual and Active Powers of Man ought to grace the library of every Christian minister.”

American liberal arts education is as indebted to Scotland for original inspiration and example as our university system is to the German idea. Thus it is not surprising to find in Methodism’s first college president a critical appreciation for Scottish philosophy. Wilbur Fisk maintained that understanding the analytic elements of both mental and moral philosophy is crucial for the detection of theological error and serves to confirm and clarify scriptural truth. Fisk admired Upham but was critical of the latter’s Mental Philosophy (1827-28) because Upham made the will the passive creature of the motives. However, as Scott points out, “Fisk spoke more enthusiastically of Upham’s later Treatise on the Will, wherein there is a shift from a Lockeian to a Reidian psychology, involving the stress on the distinction between the desire and the will.”

At the time of his unexpected death in 1839, Fisk “planned three new books, one on Mental Philosophy, one on Moral Philosophy, and one on the Philosophy of Theology.” Fisk’s influence and ideas lived on, however, in the person of his younger colleague at Wesleyan, Methodism’s most determinative theologian of the nineteenth century, Daniel Whedon.

During three critical decades of American thought, 1856-84, Daniel Whedon edited Methodism’s foremost theological journal (the Methodist Quarterly Review). Scott informs us that somewhat early in his academic life, Whedon came under the dominant influence of the new critique of Lockeian modes of philosophical thought—such a critique as was found not only in the writings of Stewart and Reid, but also in those of Jouffroy and Cousin.

Whedon held, as had Fisk and Bangs, that Lockeian epistemology leads logically to determinism and atheism, while commonsense realism supports free will and theism. The determinative influence of Reidian categories is evident in Whedon’s most important work, Freedom of the Will as a Basis of Human Responsibility (1864), a book which he was originally encouraged to write by Wilbur Fisk.

The philosophical orientation of Shinn, Bangs, Fisk, and Whedon is characteristic of American Methodism during the major portion of the last
century. As Scott points out, for example:

Evidence of decisive influence from the studies of men such as Reid, Cousin, Tappan, Mahan, Bledsoe, et al., may be discerned (at least indirectly) in such American Methodist writings as Ralston’s *Elements of Divinity* (1847), Wakefield’s *Complete System of Christian Theology* (1858), and Comfort’s *Source of Power, or the Philosophy of Moral Agency* (1858).  

Bishop Randolph F. Foster, whose “theological writings spanned fifty of the most intellectually decisive years in the history of American Christianity,” was a thoroughgoing, commonsense realist. Similar examples could be multiplied. It is interesting to note that American dissatisfaction with Watson’s widely endorsed theology focused on his commitment to Lockeian epistemology. Rising demands for a systematic theology to replace Watson’s identified the revision of his theory of knowledge as a chief concern. When such works did appear, chiefly those by Miner Raymond (1877) and John Miley (1892, 1894), they were characterized, in Scott’s words, by “full acceptance . . . of an epistemology of intuitional realism.” Thus, it was in democratic America that the philosophy of the “democratic intellect” was most highly respected and enthusiastically embraced by the exponents of a democratic gospel.

For most of the nineteenth century Scottish commonsense philosophy provided an intellectual context in which evangelical Christianity in general and Arminian theology in particular flourished. During these years philosophy was looked upon as the handmaid of biblical revelation. Philosophy and theology, particularly Methodist theology, agreed at the points of God’s supranatural existence and man’s freedom. In Whedon’s words, “Free-will in Wesleyan Arminian theology is like theism in Christianity, both philosophy and theology the same.” Within Methodism Wesleyan doctrine was maintained in basic unity as well as intellectually defended and zealously propagated.

Although there is some overlap, the modern period in Methodist theology may be conveniently dated from the 1876 appointment of Bordon Parker Bowne to a chair in philosophy at Boston University. It was during the last quarter of the nineteenth century that such movements as pragmatism, idealism, evolutionism, liberalism, and the higher criticism of the Bible emerged triumphant in the American academic mind. Probably no single individual was more influential in laying the intellectual foundations for and propagating the message of Protestant liberalism than Bowne. More specifically, Bowne’s personal idealism inaugurated “a new era in the history of Methodist theology.”

For our purpose it will be sufficient to notice that Boston personalism constituted a philosophical shift in the direction of epistemic “idolatry,” naturalism, and determinism, and that it led to a consequent abandonment of Methodism’s Wesleyan theological heritage. Such assertions may well raise some eyebrows and undoubtedly would have been rejected by Bowne himself as ridiculous. Was he not the great champion of voluntarism, the ardent foe of naturalism, and the architect of a genuine and sophisticated
epistemic realism? Bowne’s devotion to the theology of Wesley is less obvious, though he did profess continuing faith in historic Christianity.  

Bowne gained thorough acquaintance with Scottish realism during a seven-year stay at the home of Bishop Randolph Foster. Bowne always felt that Foster’s commonsense epistemology was inadequate and that it prevented Foster from achieving any satisfactory metaphysics.” In place of realism, Bowne developed the epistemology of personal idealism, well summarized by Charles Bertram Pyle as follows:

He reduces nature on the human side to idea; on the side of causality to Infinite thought and deed. . . . Bowne makes the object our own percept, its meaning our own construction. The object is a mental product, from the human standpoint, Infinite thought and deed from the standpoint of God. The object does not exist apart from mind. Its stimulus may exist apart from your mind or mine but not apart from all mind. The material world is perceived through the senses and has no existence as a material world except to human minds.

It is clear from this statement that we do not see beyond our own perceptions, because the world has in fact no existence apart from our perception of it. Bowne seeks to avoid the implicit solipsism of Kant by his Berkeleian contention that it is God who gives objective rational order to “the world,” and he differs from absolute idealism primarily in his interpreting the world as divine deed as well as divine thought. His epistemic idolatry is nevertheless manifest irrespective of these modifications.

Although Bowne contended, and with some justification, that he was neither a materialist nor a pantheist, it is not so clear that he was not a naturalist. His personalism made no provision for ontological discontinuity between God and the world. His view of the immanence of God was such that it “removes the antagonism of divine and natural and helps us to see the naturalness of the divine and the divineness of the natural.”

Let us see how these things are so. Bowne maintained that his view of God as personal distinguished his theory from both pantheism and materialism. God is neither the substance of the world nor is the world a mere emanation from the being of God. The relation between God and the world must be conceived differently. God is the cause of the world. The relation between them is a volitional one. Yet as the world’s cause God is radically immanent. Does He in any way transcend the world? Not in the sense that He is outside of or discontinuous with the world, but only in the sense that the world depends upon Him. In any other sense, says Bowne, the word transcend is without meaning.

It is interesting to note that Bowne’s pupil, A. C. Knudson, relates Bowne’s rejection of realism to his denial of orthodox biblical supranaturalism. He says of Bowne’s theory that

it rejected the crude realism commonly assumed by earlier Protestant theologians, and thus eliminated the traditional sharp antithesis between the natural and the supernatural. . . . If the popular distinction between the natural and the supernatural was to be
retained, it was necessary to restrict the distinction to the phenomenal order and to reinterpret the words natural and supernatural.43

Bowne’s move toward determinism is more difficult to identify. Personalism had at its very heart the assertion of rational freedom of the will interpreted in terms of contrary or alternative choice. One wonders, however, whether Bowne’s reduction of all causation in the universe to volitional causation must not require some modification of his doctrine of freedom. Close examination reveals that Bowne does in fact view “freedom” and “determinism” as basically compatible. These have been viewed as incompatible, he contends, only because they have been discussed in the abstract rather than the concrete.

Concrete problems can never be safely considered in the abstract. Many a proposition may seem self-evident when abstractly taken, which looks very different, when put into concrete form. And many ideas are mutually contradictory when abstractly compared, which harmonize admirably when concretely realized. This is especially the case with the doctrine of freedom. The difficulties in it have largely arisen from an abstract consideration, which puts asunder things that belong together.44

The apparent incompatibility between freedom and determinism when they are related abstractly dissolves, says Bowne, when we consider them concretely.

If we consult the dictionary only, we may easily persuade ourselves that fixity and freedom are incompatible; but if we consult experience, we shall find that we cannot dispense with either. . . . Freedom and necessity are contradictory only as formal ideas, and are not mutually exclusive as determinations of being. . . . Reality, then, shows these formally opposite ideas united in actual existence, and reflection shows that both are necessary to rational existence.45

In the light of such terminological revision we may begin to see how it was possible for Bowne to claim that Calvinists do not deny freedom, as Daniel Whedon asserted that they did.46

Operating from the vantage point of what we have termed “epistemic idolatry,” Bordon Parker Bowne thus came to view the traditional Christian distinction between the natural and the supranatural as arbitrary and misleading47 and that between freedom and determinism as abstract and false to experience. The consequent relation between personalism and orthodox Christianity is epitomized in Curtis Jones’s statement that “there seems to be a ravelling out of distinctively Christian theological concepts when the attempt is made to recast them in personalist categories.”48

The case is similar with respect to Wesleyan Arminianism. Whereas Scottish realism had provided a context in which Wesleyan theology could express itself and develop, personal idealism tended to supplant traditional Methodist doctrine. Bowne’s influence at this point is poignantly stated in Chiles’s remark concerning A System of Christian Doctrine, by Henry C. Sheldon, Bowne’s colleague at Boston. Says Chiles, “Though Sheldon frequently refers to Bowne in this work, he does not mention John Wesley.”49
REFERENCE NOTES

2. Ibid., p. 42.
4. Ibid., p. 128.
5. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 620.
8. Keith Lehrer, “Can We Know That We Have Free Will by Introspection?” *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 57 (March, 1960).
10. We use the term supranaturalism rather than supernaturalism here because the prefix super may be interpreted to mean merely “more than,” while supra emphasizes God’s essential distinctness from the world.
15. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
25. Whedon claimed to have learned more of his theology from Fisk than from “the living utterances of any other man.” See Scott, “Methodist Theology,” unpublished dissertation, p. 75.
26. Ibid., p. 189.
27. See, for example, Whedon’s *Public Addresses, Collegiate and Popular* (Boston: John P. Jewett, 1852), pp. 78-80; *Statements: Theological and Critical* (New

29. Ibid., p. 75.
30. Ibid., p. 170.
31. Ibid., p. 664.
41. Pyle, Bowne’s Philosophy, p. 96.
44. Bowne, Personalism, p. 199.
45. Bowne, Theism, pp. 196-98.
46. See Whedon’s review of Bowne’s Studies in Theism in Methodist Quarterly Review 61 (October, 1879): 775-78.
47. See also in this connection Scott, “Methodist Theology,” unpublished dissertation, p. 493.
49. Ibid., fn. 53, p. 67.
HOLINESS AND CONTEMPORARY EMPHASES ON COMMUNICATION
(Towards a Contemporary Expression of the Experience of Holiness in the Life of the Christian Believer)

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This paper is presented as the result of an assignment in which several suggestions and concerns were expressed, as follows:

1. Since the paper will be the finale to a well-packed agenda of scholarly papers and discussions, try to combine some thought-provoking concepts with a spirit of challenge. Do not just preach, but get some preachment into the paper.

2. Feel free to regard the subject as the jumping-off point for a narrower delimitation of your own choosing in the spirit of the overarching theme: Communicating the Wesleyan Message.

3. If possible, develop the presentation in the light of any significance ensuing from the July 16-25, 1974, International Congress on World Evangelization, which convened in Lausanne, Switzerland. The Congress in its acronym form came to be known as ICOWE and more familiarly as “Lausanne ‘74.”

The suggestions, as you can well see, represented quite a diversity and some spread in content and context. The movement of the paper will therefore be from the third suggestion back through to the first one.

I

To present a broad report on “Lausanne ‘74” with an adequate treatment of both the historical and contemporary perspectives is another subject and not necessarily germane to the development of the theme. However, certain aspects of ICOWE have something to say to us. Were we to be studying the processes of forms of communication, reports on the workshop presentations involving audiovisual methodologies, and verbal forms of preaching (e.g., expository preaching), there would be much of significance in the ICOWE program—even though such workshops represented “how to” concepts rather than scientific analyzing of communication. These presentations were of significance particularly to the Third World participants. We are not, however, entering here into the details of communication expertise.

The question that really arises is, Did “Lausanne ‘74” have anything to say to the concepts of the experience and life of holiness and to the communi-
cation of the same? In the larger sense, the Congress was not aimed strictly at theological areas having to do with crisis and process (growth) in the Christian life. The theme of the Congress, “Let the Earth Hear His Voice,” homed in on the emphasis of the word evangelization in the title, ICOWE. Evangelization in the sense of action rather than evangelism as the essence of concept was the thematic core of the Congress’s title.

This did not preclude theological discussions and workshops which dealt more specifically with questions of revelation, inspiration, the salvatory framework of calling men to repentance, discipling believers, church growth, human or social concerns, and the mandatory implications of the gospel to go into all the world. Such considerations and especially the discussions on the salvatory plan of God and its relationship to judgment and eternal damnation took note of modern theologizing and movements embodying a new universalism and syncretism in the current theological arena.

Again, in view of the mandatory implications of Christ’s Great Commission, attention was paid to recent calls for a moratorium on the sending of missionaries, calls coming from “Singapore 1973” and the current June gathering of the All-Africa Conference of Churches, June, 1974, in Lusaka, Zambia. Emphasized also was the need for an appropriate balance between concern for the “souls of men” and the “bodies of men” in evangelization programs. However, none of the position papers or Congress workshops had to do specifically with issues involved in the deeper life of the Christian or questions of sanctification and holiness.

This is not to say that “Lausanne ‘74” was without any concern for the spiritual quality of the believer. Congress participants cannot soon forget the Sunday morning message of Gottfried Osei-Mensah, a Baptist pastor in Nairobi, Kenya, in which his verbalizing of the need for the Spirit-filled life was so consonant with much of the manner of speaking one hears in Wesleyan circles today on the same subject. Others as well in short devotional and reportorial testimonies gave evidence of concern for the deeper dimensions of Spirit-filled and -directed living. But in most of these presentations, there was no evident attempt to interpret or promote a view of holiness or sanctification in the terms of one of the major theological schools of the day.

Thus to this participant at “Lausanne ‘74” the question of modes of contemporary communication of the holiness message from a Wesleyan perspective goes beyond ICOWE and its theme. What we mean is this: Hopefully as a result of ICOWE, a great wave of evangelism, evangelization, and church growth will take place in all sectors of the evangelical world. It is true that some of us were disappointed with the sparsity of participation at “Lausanne ‘74” by general leaders of the holiness movements and churches. We are grateful for the quality, if not quantity, of those who were there.

In a sense, though, how many did or did not participate is beside the Point. Cross-fertilization in the spirit of evangelism is the order of the day, and we are convinced that as and when an evangelistic explosion takes place, it will affect the holiness movement profoundly with numbers as well. Therefore, we may be faced with an unprecedented challenge to expound the
doctrine and experience of biblical holiness which will speak to the spiritual walk and needs of an enlarged community of the faith both within our own borders and in the larger evangelical ecumenicity where we associate with others. That to me is what “Lausanne ‘74” (ICOWE) has to say to us here today.

II

From this point, then, we progress in the consideration of the assigned subject, “Holiness and Contemporary Emphases on Communication,” to the second suggestion above, that of delimitation of our field of inquiry.

An appropriate negative statement is in order. Development of the theme will not be an attempt to approach analytically the science of communication as such or to study the various techniques of communication being employed fruitfully today. We are aware of several of these techniques which go beyond the bounds of monological preaching. The possibilities of dialogical sermons, speaking with such appropriate audiovisual tools as the overhead projector, getting concepts across by role playing in the sermonic or address section—these are but selected forms of various contemporary developments in communication with which we have had varying degrees of experience. Yet in it all one feels that the monological sermonic form is still a most potent way of communicating what we hope to get through to our audiences.

Therefore this will be one of those arbitrary points of narrowing the parameters of the subject. Contemporary emphases are taken to mean not so much “modes of expression in communication” as “concepts of expression in communication.” A subtitle is thus stated, “Towards a Contemporary Expression of the Experience of Holiness in the Life of the Believer.” The axiomatic understanding is that this will be approached from a Wesleyan perspective.

It is precisely at this point that we are still doing battle with our terms. To those of us with fairly long memories, our contemporaneity is but a reflection of some of the verbal joustings of the yesteryears. We have, for example, our perplexities in our ability to communicate just what we mean by holiness, entire sanctification, perfect love, Christian perfection, and other allied terms. We define the terms, exegete the passages, phrases, and words in the Greek New Testament from which they are derived, and still run into the question of what is actually being heard by the hearer. One is reminded of the problem of communication expressed in a proverbial statement: “If what you heard me say is what you think you heard me say, then what you heard me say is not what I said.”

Thus with our usage of the terms stated above, the listeners so often apparently hear us say, “I have absolute holiness; I am so entirely sanctified I cannot sin anymore and thus enjoy now and forever on a static plane sinless perfection; I never exhibit any human signs of personality embodying temper, expression of moods, etc.”

Now, of course, we did not say that. A past generation wrestled with the same problem in their way. Some of us can remember preachers who in
speaking of Christian perfection started their messages with such disclaimers as: “I am not speaking of absolute perfection, angelic perfection, glorified perfection.” But despite the disclaimers, that is precisely the way the receptors too often heard them. And all too often one fears that is the way the receptors are hearing us today.¹

On the one hand we must be very careful that we have sound theological constructs or propositions which elucidate the faith by which we stand. One of the theological dangers of the day is an existential mood which plays up emotional experience to the derogation of propositional truth. Thus we need to be well founded in what we understand the biblical teaching and systematic construction to be on such terms as entire sanctification, the baptism/filling of the Holy Spirit, the fillings/anointings of the Holy Spirit, holiness, inbred sin, the crucifixion of the old man, putting off the old man and putting on the new. In the discipling and teaching of the Church, adequate attention must be given to these areas, lest we find that our preaching and teaching of a most important portion of biblical truth is atrophying.

However, could it be that in an evangelistic communication of the message of holiness and its concomitants as an experience for the Christian believer, we have too often put the cart before the horse? For example, reflection on much of the preaching on holiness, the Spirit-filled life, the experience of entire sanctification seems to reveal a doctrinal delineation and then an invitation to seek an experience based on the systematic theology involved.

It is there that the hearer may form concepts presumably out of line with what was intended. The person then seeks for an emotional/existential relationship with Jesus Christ through the Holy Spirit quite possibly out of line with the emotional/spiritual norm for which the Scriptures call in daily living. A once-for-all emotionally explosive and static experience becomes the ardently desired achievement rather than a firm faith in a biblical experience resulting in a daily relational life with Christ. And this happens because the receptor of the preachment thinks that is what he is called on to seek. As a result he either lives a defeated, frustrated life, anemic in ecclesiastical and spiritual relationships, or he follows a type of ministry of another theological school which at least does not cause him to feel such emotional dissonance.

All too often he is quite prepared to believe that he must live with an emotional complex that will be a “habitation of dragons”; that he sins in thought, word, and deed every day; and that, regardless of his sinning, he is eternally secure in his positional sonship with Jesus Christ. He may bifurcate scripture to do this, but that is of no consequence to him. He now feels at peace with himself, not realizing that “peace with God’s demands” is more important.²

What then can be done to present in a contemporary mode an expression of the Wesleyan message and interpretation of being filled with the Spirit (Eph. 5:18), entirely sanctified (1 Thess. 5:23, NASB), and following after that holiness “without which no man shall see the Lord” (Heb. 12:14)? This brings us to the first suggestion at the beginning of this paper as the third
III

To a major extent many of the observations above have been autobiographical. I have no question as to the Sunday night in a little white church in western Oklahoma when I passed from death to life and became a newborn teen-ager in Christ Jesus. I also know the Sunday evening the next week when, in response to what I had heard preached and taught, I sought the filling of the Holy Spirit. I know the results of my faith then, the type of emotional experience I had, and I have no question of the quality of the sanctifying experience of the Spirit of God at that point.

But I was one of the group who found that Mondays were not always emotional highs, that 4 years later I still had to wrestle through God’s plan for my social life, that 13 years later I would still face the sharp implications of God’s will for me to go to Africa when I wanted to stay in the college administrative position where I was, that at different times since then I have had to wonder how and why God was moving in His providences in my life. And in that period I faced the sharp dilemma of what the “death of the old man” and “no more carnal strivings within” meant in the context of such wrestlings and moods.

I faced the question of personal honesty in what I preached as an interpreter of the Word. Where once I preached sermons which I strove to fashion after the theological constructs which I had been taught and which I still believe, I began to see others seeking for a static plateau. That was not my life; I did not see it in the Scriptures, nor did I see it happening in the greatest of holiness saints with whom I associated.

At that point the essence of the message and essence of holiness and entire sanctification came through in the words of Jesus, “As my father hath sent me, even so send I you” (John 20:21); or in the parallel words of the Apostle Paul, “Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus” (Phil. 2:5). As the disciple learns what is meant by the Father sending the Son, he will see what the Lord Jesus Christ demands of him.

The words in Mark 10:45, “For even the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give [to sacrifice] His life a ransom for many” (NASB), illustrates effectively the manner of the Father sending the Son. Three things stand out in the verse in alliterative detail: surrender, service, sacrifice.

In the word surrender lies the history of redemption and return to holiness. Against the background of prophetic utterances concerning the fall of the son of the morning (cf. Ezekiel 26-28 and Isaiah 10-14) and the apocalyptic phrase of the Lamb slain for those written from the foundation of the world (Rev. 13:8), one can see the creation of man with the power of choice between good and evil, holiness and depravity. Created man did not create evil as opposite to good by his choice; he was seduced by the evil one who in his fall had so created the actuality of evil. In the fall of man and the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world, we see the principle of sur-
render. The Logos, the Second Person of the Trinity, subordinates himself to the Father.

If created man falls and sins, he not only will lose his holiness; he also will come under the judgement of a holy God—totally lost. The word of the Second Person of the Trinity in surrender comes at that point, “If he falls, I will surrender myself to be sent by the Father at His bidding.” The Father says, “I will send My only begotten Son in the fullness of time, that whoever believes on Him shall have everlasting life” (John 3:16). And the Holy Spirit says, “I will be the Divine Agent, the Paraclete, the Vicar to be sent by the Father and the Son to perform the accomplishment of this redemptive act and bring man back to his estate of holiness” (John 14:26; 15:26; 16:13). In the fullness of time it was so.

There is a dual aspect to what follows. The Son became flesh (John 1:1), and the Holy Spirit descended on Him at His baptism (Matt. 3:16). This is the mystery of the holiness of God unfolding itself in the Incarnation act. There can be no such thing as a vacuum in the experiential fact of the holiness of God. Thus when the Son emptied himself, took off the cloak of His deity glory (see Phil. 2:5-10), He in essence was saying what He finally articulated in the Garden of Gethsemane: “Not my will, but thine, be done”; or what He taught His disciples to pray, “Thy will be done.”

But the very essence of praying such a prayer meant that the seal of God had to be on the act of total consecrative surrender, and this seal was the visitation of the descending Dove—the Holy Spirit (Matt. 3:16). The holiness of God in Christ in surrender meant the act of submission to God—no rebellion—resulting in the filling, the anointing of the Holy Spirit on Him as He went out into the steps of service and the life and death of sacrifice.

The beauty of it is that the Lord says to His disciples, “So send I you.” The ministry that gets our people to surrender totally to God and His will, whenever and wherever known, can lead us to urge them to believe that the Holy Spirit seals that avowal with His filling presence. In the light of that kind of experience personally, we find it hard to understand the penchant of some for a continuing dragon of rebellion against the will of God as part of their daily living except to believe that that is the major evidence of carnality and “the old man” within. And to that point we affirm there is cleansing and deliverance of that “old man” within.

When it came to the expressions of moods and personality, two facts stood out in the Scriptures. First, Paul’s words concerning the mind of Christ in Phil. 2:5-10 clearly identified that mind as (1) being posited in a distinct personality and (2) a complete submission to God’s will so as to be nothing. Thus (3) Christ was lifted up high and above all, under all, and in all, so that at His name every knee should bow. Since this mind is enjoined on the believer, it says that the life so sanctified is identified as being one of (1) continuing distinct human personality, (2) total submission to God as to be nothing in one’s own eyes, so that (3) Christ becomes everything. While points (2) and (3) fit our traditional mold of holiness preaching, it has been amazing how a number of people have responded so positively to the thought: Even though entirely sanctified, I can still be a person, still very much “me.”
When one realizes that truth, it brings so many facets of his daily reactions and moods into perspective in the life of holiness.

The second fact has to do with the risen Jesus’ words to His disciples in Acts 1:8 on the urgency for power. That urgency can be understood only against the backdrop of the disciples to whom it was spoken: Power to Peter never again to be a coward or to overcome running ahead of the Lord; power to James and John to get rid of their temper as “Boanerges . . . The sons of thunder”; power to James to die a martyr’s death; to John to outlive his peers and, exiled, be “in the Spirit on the Lord’s day”; power to Nathanael to get rid of race or place prejudice; power to Matthew not to be overcome with the publican’s materialism again; power to Philip to be able to lead men to Christ without having first to find an Andrew; power to Matthias not to be overcome by any temptation of vexation at being a second rather than first choice; power to Simon, the Zealot, to keep his church-state relations in proper scriptural perspective and his political priorities straight; power to Thomas never again to doubt or to demand emotional, existential evidence.

How one sees the foibles and the temptations of Christian brothers and sisters in those men, in ourselves! It helps us to realize that the message of the power of the Spirit-filled life is one of cleansing of the traits that would make for rebellion against God, and one of power over those human personal-isms that could trip us up. It also helps us to realize that so many of our traits are useful to the Holy Spirit and usable by Him in empowering us through such to live out the sanctified life.

Here then can be the contemporary message for this hour. Read Wesley and you read of a man who preached in this vein for his day. God grant that we may be faithful to our day.

REFERENCE NOTES
1. All one has to do is to teach a course on the theology of the Wesleyan movement in a seminary partially Calvinistic in theological stance to discover the different wavelengths of hearing of the spoken word and the caricatures of concepts arising concerning holiness and entire sanctification as held by the holiness movement. This has been the writer’s experience.

2. To a certain degree this type of problem and the ultimate result is seen in H. A. Ironside’s Holiness, the False and the True (New York: Loizeaux Bros., n.d.). The Wesleyan reader of the book suspects that Dr. Ironside sought for a caricature he conceptualized of holiness as a static, second, definite work of grace rather than a crisis of the will resulting in a relational experience which the Scriptures both demand and promise for seeking believers.

3. In actuality, evil was created by the fall of Satan (cf. Luke 10:17-20 and see again, Isaiah 10-14 and Ezekiel 26-28). God in His holiness created Lucifer (Satan) with the power of choice, which could involve the creation of an actuality out of a potentiality. This is the only way the writer can understand the expression of Isa. 45:7, “I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the Lord do all these things.”

To understand concepts there must be the potentiality of opposites, e.g., light-darkness; black-white; good-evil; holiness-sinfulness; truth-falsity. Lucifer (Satan) with his free will created the actuality of evil out of the opposite potential to good. God created Lucifer with that power of choice as a freewill agent.
Here is the explanation of the possibility of redemption for fallen man but not for fallen Satan and his angels. Man is seduced by sin; Satan and his followers created the evil that formed the path for such seduction. For such creation there never can be redemption.